1942 US Army WWII German Tactical Doctrine 95p.

8/14/2019 1942 US Army WWII German Tactical Doctrine 95p.

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SERIES, NO. 8 DECEMBER 20, 1942

,GERMANTACTICAL DOCTRINE

PREPARED BYMILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SPECIAL SERIES 0t|1 WARa DEPARTMENt 4C5st- ( k(At No. 8dAWsHLGTao.N, December 20, 1942 M ID 461

NOTICE1. The publications of Special Series are for the purpose of providing officerswith reasonably confirmed information from official and other reliablesources.2. Nondivisional units are being supplied with copies on a basis similar tothe approved distribution for divisional commands, as follows:INF Div CAv Div ARMn DivDivHq ---- 8 Div Hq -.- 8 Div Hq 11Ren Tr -2 Ord Co. 2 Rcn Bn 7Sig Co . .. Sig Tr----- 2 Engr Bn 7Engr Bn 7. Rcn Sq .- - 7 Med Bn 7Med Bn 7Engr Sq- . ..7 Maint Bn 7QM Co 7 Med Sq -- 7 Sup Bn - -. 7Hql nf Regt, 6 each 18 QM Sq .- 7 Div Tn Hql 8Inf Bn, 7 each - 63 Hq Cav Brig, 3 each_ 6 Arind Regt, 25 each_ 50Hq Div Arty_ 8 Cav Regt, 20 each. 8- FA Bn, 7 each .-1FA Bn, 7 each_-- 28 Hq Div Arty- 3 hIf Regt --- - 25-- PA Bn, 7 each 21

150 - 150150Distribution to air units is being made by the A-2 of Army Air Forces.3. Each command should circulate available copies among its officers.Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided (1) the sourceis stated, (2) the classification is not changed, and (3) the information issafeguarded. Attention is invited to paragraph 10a, AR 380-5, which isquoted in part as follows: "A document * * * will be classified and* * * marked restricted when information contained therein is for officialuse only, or when its disclosure should be * * * denied the generalpublic."4. Suggestions for future bulletins are invited._ Any correspondence relatingto Special Series may be addressed directly to the l)issemination

Group.Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C.

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FOREWORD

FREDERICK THE GREAT, as the result of his experiences inthe Seven Years' War, is credited with establishing thefirst General Staff in the history of military forces. ThisStaff was created to handle administrative details, thusreleasing more time to the commanders for tactical con-siderations. It was not, however, until 1810 that I red-erick's successors established a school to train officers forGeneral Staff duty. Because successful military resultswere achieved, France, Great Britain, the United States,Japan, and other countries based the formation of theirGeneral Staffs upon the model set by Germany.

Beginning with Scharnhorst, such distinguished leadersand strategists as Moltke (the elder) and von Schlieffenwere closely associated with the development of theGeneral Staff School, which operated continuously from1810 until the outbreak of World War I. Subsequent tothat war the Versailles Treaty forbade the continuance ofthe school, and it was not until 1933 that the Kriegsakade-mie, as the Germans call it, was officially reopened in theBerlin location that it was occupying at the outbreak ofWorld War II.During the years from 1935 to 1939, the United Stateswas allowed to send four individual officers to take thecourse. from their illuminating reports it is possible tolearn the trend of German methods and teachings up toHitler's attack on Poland. Our observers unanimouslyagreed that the main .b'dy of doctrine taught at the

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IV FOREWORDKriegsakademie-the body of dQoctrine that underlies theGerman warfare of today-is set forth in Truppenfithrung,the German tactical bible so very similar in matter andprecept to our own E M 100-5, Field Service Regulations,Operations.The following partial r6sume of doctrine I taught at theKriegsakademie is actually a practical adaptation of rele-vant parts of Truppenfiihrung. It will be noted that thisresum6 (ignoring the factor of translation) is writtenalmost exactly as a German would instruct Germans.This faithfulness to the tone of the original lectures hasbeen made possible because of the extremely adequatereports which were made by the U. S. officer-students.Throughout, striking similarities will be observedbetween German tactical doctrine and that set down inpertinent manuals of the U. S. Army. U. S. officers,however, should not be misled by the similarities to over-look the differences that also exist. With regard to oneof the basic similarities in doctrine, it has been pointedout by one of our Kriegsakademie graduates that "Owingto the phlegmatic nature of the German individual,initiative and aggressive action have to be forced on thelower leaders and staff, rank and file, whereas we possessthese characteristics as a natural heritage."

I The Military Intelligence Service has published the following bullet.inswhich describe various aspects of German military methods: "The GermanArmored Division," Information Bulletin, No. 18, June 15, 1942; "GermanMethods of Warfare in the Libyan Desert," Information Bulletin, No. 20,July 5, 1942; "The German Armored Army," Special Series, No. 4, October17 , 1942; "The Development of German Defensive Tactics in Cyrenaica-1941," Special Series, No. 5, October 19, 1942; "Artillery in the Desert,"Special Series, No. 6, November 25, 1942. Information about specificorganizations and weapons may be found in TM 30-450, Handbook onGerman Military Forces.


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TABLE OF CONTENTSPageSedion I. POST OF THE COMMANDER --------------------- 1

II. DUTIES OF THE STAFF-......................... 2III. ESTIMATE OF THE TERRAIN-.-------------- _ _-__.. 3

1. ROADS AN D ROUTES- .-.................. 32. RAILROADS -----__.-------------------- 43. TERRAIN FOR THE ATTACK - ---- ------- 44. TERRAIN FOR THE DEFENSIVE ACTION .-.... 5a. General .......... 5b. Questions To Be Considered .-... 55. TERRAIN FO R THE DELAYING ACTION .-----.. - 66. TERRAIN FO R THE BIVOUAC .........--.. 6

IV. CONCEALMENT --------------- - 77. PROTECTION AGAINST GROUND RECONNAISSANCE_ 7

a. Hostile Observation .-............. 7b. Offensive Concealment-............. 7c. Defensive Concealment . ........ 8d. False Appearances.-...... 8

S. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR RECONNAISSANCE ---- 89. CONCEAI.MEI' IN REST AREAS.- - 9

10. CONCEALMENT OF TROOP MOVEMENTS-------- 9a. Loading and Unloading........... 9b. Road lMovements .-............ 911. CONCEALMENT IN BATTLE ..--.-------- 10

V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE ------------------ 1112. TIE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS . 1113. WHAT TO REPORT ..............--------- 1214. CONTACT AN D COORDINATION BETWEEN FRIENDLYUNITS----.--------.----.--------- ----- 1215. TDANSMISSION OF ORDERS AN D REPORTS . .-----. 1216. ADVANCE MESSAGE CENTERS- ............. 1317. INFORMATION THROUGH SPECIAL MEAN S----- - 1418. IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF RECONNAISSANCE --. 1419. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE-. 1520. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE --------------- 1521. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS- .------------- 16


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VI TABLE OF CONTENTSSction V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE-Continued.

22. MltTORIZIED ItECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS-- I 6(23. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION OF TH E INFANTRYDivisioX-. 18

24. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE- .--. ........ 18VI. PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATION -. 20

25. OPERATION OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATION TROOPS. 2026. ORDER OF TIE DIVISION COMMUNICATION OF-

FICER ---------------------- ------ 2127. COMMUNICATION IN TUE DEFENSE- . 2228. VARIOUS 1MEANS OF COMMUNICATION.- . ....2

VII. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION ..-.. .... 2629. GUIDING PEINOIPLES ----...-- 2630. CIIANGING TIE MISSION .............. 2831. SEIZING TH E INITIATIVE . . ............28

VIII. THE DECISION -.......................... 20IX. FIELD ORDERS -.......... 30

32. GENEEAL RULES --..-- 3033. r1ARNING ORDERS (VOIBEFEIILE) - . .... 3134. COMPLETE OPERATrkONS ORDERS (GESAMTBE-

FEHLE) - -- ----------- -- 3235. SEPARATE ORDERS (FINZELBEFEHLE) -. . ..3

3(6. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (BES(NDERE ANORNIIUN-O,::) --. -33

X. MARCHES -.. .......................437. MIARCHINGN II;I.LTIPLE COLUMNS- .. 3438. MIARClHING IN SINGLE COLUMN -........ 3539. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR ATTACKS -.S. . 3540. NIGHT MACIIHES- ....----..--- 3741. DAY MARCHES -.----- - - - ---. 3842. ORGANIZATION FOR MARCHING - --- ----- 3943. CONNECTION AN D COMMUNICATION - .- 4144. RATES OF MARCH .4145. lMARCH RESTS .. . 4246. MNARCH OUTrPOSrS .-.. _ 43


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TABLE OF CONTEXTS VIIPageSection XI. VARIOUS TYPES OF BATTLE.-......... P44

XI]. THE ATTACK -.......................... 4547. FoaMs OF ATTACN_ ....... 4548. CONSIDERATIONS FOE AN AXTTACIKS_ . .-... 4649. MECHANICS OF ATTACYK- ...--------- 47r50. ATTACKING A POSITION- .. .............. 4951 . ARTILLERY EMPI.OYMkNT -..--_....____. 5052. INFANTRY POSITION OF READINESS (BREInTSTI,-

LUNG) ------- ------ 51------------1,53. INFANTRY ACTION UP TO TILE FIRST ASSAUIWT - 525,4. ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY ADVANCE 53S5. INTERMITTENT ADVANCE OF THE RESERVES -. - 5356. BREAKT'I'ROUGH _..-................ 654

a. Penetration of the lostile Position .- 54b. Time of Attack- . ............... 54c. Enernmy Withdrawal- ............ 54

.7. ACTION RECOMMENDF.D FOR CERTAIN SPECIALCASES - ........--- 5558. ?MEETING ENGAGEMENT .-.......... 56

a. Speed and Surprise ............... 56b. Time and Space . .------- 57c. Coordination .- --.. .---.. 57d. Methods .................... 58

59. PURSUIT.......... 58XIII. THE DEFENSE - . .. .....__... 61

60. FAVORABIE TERRAIN FOR DEFENSE - ....... 6161. OTHER CONSIDERATIOXNS .S------..------ 62a. Defense or Delaying Action? .......... 62b. Preparationof Defense Area --....... 62c. Mlaneuvers .-..-.. . ... 6262. GENERAL PRINCIPIES OF DEFENSE - --.-.-.- 63

63 . ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE. AREAS --.-------- 63a. Defense in Depth .-................ 63b. Cover and Obstacles .-.. ...... 64

64. RESERVES, RELIEFS, AN D REAR POSITIONS _---- 6465. ACTUAL OPERATION OF TIIE DEFENSE .....---- 65

a. MFain Line of Resistance ..... 65b. Advance Position..............- 66c. Outpost Position -............. 66


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Vill TABLE OF CONTENTSSection XIII. THE DEFENSE--Continued. Page

66 . ARTIIhLERY IN THE DEFENSE .........--. 67.a. Control by Artillery Commnander- .. ...7h. Tactics- 67c. Barrage ....---. 67

67. IINFANTRY IN THE DEFENSE -------- ----- 6868. ILOSTILE PENETRTATIONS ------.-. ... 6869. THE COUNTERATTACK ...------------- 6870. WITHDRAWAL TO A REARWlARD IPOSITION ..-- f

XIV. THE DELAYING ACTION----- _...---. 70XV. RETREAT-RETIREMENT .- ......... 72XVI. THE EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY - . ......3

71. ORGANIZATION -- 7372. LOCATION IN TIIE ATTACK .-... .. 7573. LOCATION IN THE DEFENSE ...... 7574. COOPERATION WITIr INFANTRY . 75

APPENDIX. SAMPLE GERMAN ORDERS. 77ILLUSTRATION

Figure 1. Artillery ill a division attack .-. ....... ___.. 74


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Section I. POST OF THE COMMANDER

The personal influence of the commander upon histroops is of the greatest significance. He must be locatedwhere he can most effectively lead. On the march heshould be as far forward as security permits, and hislocation should be definitely known by the members ofhis staff so that all reports may reach him promptly. Inthe attack his command post should be located as farforward as possible, yet protected from hostile fire so as toinsure undisturbed operation; for tactical reasons, the postis placed near the main effort, facilitating control at themost important point of the battlefield. The movementof the command post is influenced by the location of existingwire lines, and the divisional signal officer is kept constantlyinformed so that communication requirements may bebetter anticipated. In a delaying action, the commanderremains in the forward position until he is convinced thathis order for withdrawal is being successfully carried out;then, with his artillery commander, he goes back to thenew position. In very difficult or dangerous situations,often present while withdrawals are being executed, thecommander will remain with his troops.

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Section II.DUTIES OF THE STAFF

The commander should not be troubled with details.To insure frictionless performances, there are definiteassignments to staff positions and duties. Each staffmaintains its prescribed strength. The tactical staffremains with the command echelon, whereas the supplyand administration staff remains well to the rear, in thevicinity of the trains.

2


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4 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINEWhat are the widths? 2 defiles and excavated passages?bridges? 3 fords? 4 ferries? 6steep grades? 62. RAILROADS

Differentiate between standard gage (1.435 meters, or4 feet 83/ inches) and narrow gage (1.20 meters, or 3 feet11y inches, to 0.6 meter, or 1 foot 11H inches). Differ-entiate also between field line, cable line, electric, andsteam. How many rails are there, and does room foraddition exist alongside the rails? After a small amountof work on the bridges, tracks can usually be adaptedfor use as marching routes for foot and mounted troops,as well as for motor vehicles.3. TERRAIN FOR THE ATTACK

(a) Where will the enemy. resist the attack? Whereare his advance outposts, main position, switch positions?(b) How has he disposed his forces-infantry, artillery,reserve? (c) Where is a position of readiness (Bereit-stellung), and how can the terrain be best utilized for ad-vance to it? Is there concealment from air observation?Until what point will the attacking force be concealedfrom hostile ground observation? (d) Where are coveredapproaches for infantry toward the hostile position? Areattack objectives so conspicuous and so located that con-centrated artillery fire may be directed upon them?

2 For motor vehicles at least 2.5 meters, or 8 feet 4YZ inches, and for passingat least 5 meters, or 16 feet 9 inches.2 Construction material, capacity, destruction and repair possibilities.4Current speeds, beds, depths (for infantry up to 1 meter, or 3 feet 3.4inches, for machine guns and heavy infantry weapons up to 0.6 meter, or 1foot 11.6 inches, and for armored cars up to 0.9 meter or 2 feet 11.4 inches).5Capacity and time required for crossing.6 Usually negotiable by motor vehicles if the ratio is not higher than 1 to 7.


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ESTIMATE OF THE TERRAIN 5Where are the best positions for artillery and observationposts? Where is the terrain most favorable for tanks?Where does the terrain favor the enemy's counterattack?(e) And, lastly, what kind of attack is most favored bythe terrain-penetration, envelopment, or frontal attack?4. TERRAIN FOR THE DEFENSIVE ACTIONa. General

A defensive position is frequently selected throughexamination of maps. Immediately thereafter, officersare sent on terrain reconnaissance. General Staff, artill-ery, and engineer officers reconnoiter for their respectivepurposes or weapons; later, a coordinated defense plan isbuilt up from their information.b. Questions To Be ConsideredSuch questions as the following arise:

(a) What should be the locations of the main line ofresistance, the flank support, the outpost line, and theadvance positions? (b) Where can artillery and heavyinfantry weapons, as well as their required observationposts, be located to bring the enemy under fire at longranges? (c) How can the enemy be subjected to frontaland flanking fire immediately in front of the main line ofresistance, and where can a counterblow be effectivelydelivered? (d) What obstacles must be constructed tocanalize the attack of the enemy, including his tanks, andto cause him to advance where heavily concentrated firecan be delivered? (e) Where will the reserves be lo-cated to obtain cover and also to facilitate counterattacks?0() Should it be necessary to limit the enemy's penetra-


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6 GERaMAN, TACTICAL DOCTRINEtion, and how can the defensive be established in a posi-tion to the rear?5. TERRAIN FOR THE DELAYING ACTION

Where is an effective first line of defense? Where arelines of defense to the rear? Where is favorable groundfor an outpost line? Where are covered avenues ofwithdrawal? Where is observation for supporting weap-ons? Where are natural obstacles and terrain featureswhich can be converted into effective obstacles? Whereis terrain which permits long-range observation and firing?6. TERRAIN FOR THE BIVOUAC

Before the troops arrive, reconnoiter bivouac areas androutes leading thereto. Avoid large assemblages of per-sonnel. The smaller the groups, the easier to conceal invillages, wooded areas, or other suitable locations. Main-tain the tactical integrity of units in bivouac. If it isnecessary to bivouac by day in open terrain, increase thedistance and intervals to minimize the effect of hostilebombing. T'or tactical purposes, bivouac requirementsinclude: Adequate room; security and screening forceswhich occupy commanding terrain and are sufficientlystrong to permit time and space for the main force tomaneuver according to the situation; and routes connect-ing the various groups and leading to potential defensiveareas. Bivouac requirements for troops demand dryground and land (preferably uncultivated) which islightly wooded, protected against wind, and convenientto a supply of water, straw, and wood. The proximityof villages is desirable.


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Section IV. CONCEALMENT

Troops must use every opportunity and means to denyinformation to the enemy. Otherwise the essential ele-ment in the attack, surprise, is lost. Concealment ismost effective when the enemy requires a long time todiscover that he has been deceived.7. PROTECTION AGAINST GROUND RECONNAIS-SANCEa. Hostile Observation

Hostile observers and staffs can see great distancesfrom high points (observation posts) with field glassesand telescopes; therefore, (a) when troop movements arecontemplated, study the map carefully to insure coveragainst possible hostile observation; (b) conceal move-ments, positions, and installations by a screen of securityforces to the front and flanks.b. Offensive ConcealmentSecurity in all directions must be considered. Conceal-ment may be either offensive or defensive. If offensive,cavalry and other highly mobile combat units are launchedagainst the hostile reconnaissance forces to drive themback. This method is effective, but occasionally hostilepatrols are able to infiltrate or go around the attackingforce. 7


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8 GIZRMALN TACTICAL DOCTRIiNEc. Defensive Concealment

Defensive concealment is particularly effective whenthe terrain contributes natural obstacles such as a river,a chain of lakes, a swamp, or some similar area. Thestronger the natural obstacles, the weaker the force em-ployed to protect the avenues of approach, and also thestronger the force that can be held as mobile reserve.Reconnaissance units are sent far forward, operatingenergetically and according to opportunity against thehostile reconnaissance force.d. False AppearancesIn situations where it is desired to deceive the enemyand impart the impression of great strength, circulatefalse rumors, execute false marches, and send troopsagainst hostile reconnaissance forces with instructions tofire a great deal of ammunition rapidly, to tie up thehostile communications net, to disturb radio transmis-sion, and to organize deceptive transmission on radio orwire.8. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Strong activity on the part of the hostile air forcerequires careful consideration for the concealment oftroops and installations, particularly when antiaircraftmeans are lacking or very limited. The fact that photo-graphs reveal every detail must not be overlooked. Arti-ficial means of concealment, such as camouflage, smoke,or nets, are effective; but it is more important to surveycarefully the surrounding area. Avoid constructions andartificial works, sharp color contrasts, and lights. Real-ize, on the other hand, that measures for concealment


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10 GERMAX. TACTICAL DOCRINEactual construction that there is little or no tell-taleindication of the preparations.11. CONCEALMENT IN BATTLE

Carry out development and deployment, or either,under the concealment of darkness. If the situationrequires execution by daylight, seek covered areas.Utilize camouflage to conceal the positions of guns, ofheadquarters, and of observation posts.


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Section V. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

The cormmander must continually, day and night, con-duct reconnaissance and utilize intelligence means toseek information clarifying the enemy situation. As soonas possible, he will forward information and importantreports to the next higher cormmander. Once contact withthe enemy is gained, steps should be taken not to losecontact. In higher commands, and sometimes with thelower units, a special officer (intelligence officer) will bedetailed to handle all intelligence matters. Such anofficer works in coordination with all the commanders ofattached intelligence units and information services, andkeeps them constantly informed of the situation.12. THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Keep in mind the following rules governing the prepara-tion of reports: (a) Determine beforehand what reportsmust be sent in code and also what means of signalcommunications are to be used. (b) Differentiate be-between what one has personally seen and what anotherhas remarked or reported. (c) Avoid euphemistic phrasesand exaggerations. (d) State strength, time, and placeexactly. (e) Include information on the condition of theterrain. (f) Send in pertinent information yourself,never assuming that another unit has already sent it in.(g) In very urgent cases, send a report not only to thenext higher commander but also direct to the commander-

11


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COMBAT INTELLIGENCE |13means are uncertain or cannot be maintained, thencourier service 7 is established. Very important ordersor reports are generally sent by officer messengers inmotorcycles or cars. If delivery is uncertain, severalmeans of transmission are used, as well as different routes,to insure the prompt arrival of the information at itsdestination.Every commander is required to know the routes ofcommunication and the messenger route. All units assistin the uninterrupted transmission of reports and messages.Higher commanders and commanders of reconnaissanceand security units are authorized to examine the messageswhich they contact en route, noting on the message thatthey have done so, the hour, and the date.16. ADVANCE MESSAGE CENTERSTo expedite the receipt of information, advance messagecenters are established, particularly in the area or sectorwhere communications will be numerous. Such messagecenters should be easily located, protected from hostilefire, and definitely connected with the rearward messagecenter. Under certain circumstances (for example, on thefront of a cavalry corps), advance message centers andmessage assembly points may be established at consider-able distances from the main headquarters, in order tosimplify and expedite the transmission of informationbetween the reconnaissance units and the main head-quarters.

7 Runners, mounted men, bicyclists, or motorcyclists.


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14 GORMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE17. INFORMATION THROUGH SPECIAL MEANS

The air intelligence service observes hostile air activityand provides information relative to the air situation, andfrom this one can obtain a fairly accurate conception ofthe enemy's intentions. The signal communication in-telligence service observes all hostile communications(radio, telephone, telegraph, etc.) through goniometricintercept, listening posts, wire tapping, observers, andother means. The routine interrogation of prisoners ofwar yields miscellaneous information. Captured docu-ments may include orders, maps, messages, notebooks,newspapers, photographs, and films. Scrutiny of thehostile press and publications is maintained.18. IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF RECONNAISSANCE

Do not dissipate reconnaissance strength. Superiorityof means is very important for successful reconnaissance:but superiority in mobility and clever employment tendto offset numerical inferiority. It will frequently benecessary to fight for information. Advanced hostilesecurity and reconnaissance forces must be penetratedor thrown back to make contact possible with the hostilemain force. In this connection, it is often advisable tooccupy important points quickly with motorized forces.When there is great inferiority to the enemy, fightingshould be avoided, and an endeavor should be made topenetrate the enemy screen or go around it.The commander who specifies what information is tobe obtained should coordinate all his subordinate recon-naissance means. Efficient reconnaissance is not ob-tained through employment of large numbers of recon-


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COMBAT INTELLIGENCE 15noitering units, but by the careful direction and instruc-tion of these nmits as to what the commander wishes toknow. Definite missions and their relative urgency mustbe indicated, and the means of sending information tothe rear, including definitely regulated radio traffic,must be insured.19. STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE

Strategic, or operative, reconnaissance endeavors tobuild up a general picture of the overall situation, thusaiding the commander in chief in making the decisionswhich have important influence on the entire campaign.Missions may include observation of hostile mobiliza-tions, assemblies, initial march directions, railroad move-ments, boat movements, supply echelons, construction offortifications, air activities, locations, strengths, move-ments of motorized and mechanized forces, and, par-ticularly, open flanks. Such missions are performed byair reconnaissance units, motorized reconnaissance bat-talions, and army cavalry units. The three must supple-ment each other and be carefully coordinated to that end.20. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCETactical reconnaissance is concerned with the move-ments of the enemy in closer proximity: his movements,bivouac areas, organization, breadth and depth of disposi-tion, supply service, construction of defensive works, airactivity, and location of airfields and antiaircraft. Es-pecially important is timely report of the location ofmotorized or mechanized forces.For air reconnaissance, the commander utilizes the air-plane squadron which is placed at his disposal for such


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16 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINEpurpose by the air force. For ground reconnaissance, heutilizes independent motorized reconnaissance battalions,motorized reconnaissance battalions of the cavalry,mounted reconnaissance battalions of the cavalry, andreconnaissance battalions of the infantry divisions.21. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS

Definite sectors are generally assigned to reconnaissancebattalions. Within the corps, boundaries between divi-sions are designated, and on open flanks the boundary isdesignated between the flank reconnaissance area of thedivision and that of the corps. Reconnaissance unitsavoid fighting unless it is absolutely required by thesituation in the accomplishment of their missions. If areconnaissance unit be given a security mission, the unitshould be reinforced by others units: for example, bymachine gun, light artillery, antitank, and engineer troops.If a reconnaissance battalion is directly in front of thedivision and in contact with the enemy, it should beordered either: (a) to move off to a side and continuereconnaissance in that area, or (b) to await relief fromtroops coming up from the rear, or (c) to fall back uponthe troops in the rear. In the absence of any orders,under the aforesaid circumstances the reconnaissancebattalion should fall back upon the troops in the rear.On an open flank, reconnaissance battalions are echelonedforward.22. MOTORIZED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS

The important advantage is speed. Motorized recon-naissance battalions can reconnoiter by day and marchon by night, and are restricted only by limitations of the


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COMBAT' LNTLLIGENCE 17motor vehicles, terrain, weather, roads, fuel supply, andsignal communication. They maintain connection withmounted reconnaissance units by radio. Advancing for-ward by bounds-the nearer the enemy, the shorter thebounds-they remain as long as possible on roads. Inhostile territory, different routes for the return areselected, and important points along the road, or im-portant places, are secured. Rest during the night isobtained by avoiding main roads and villages, and byhalting under available cover in isolated areas. Contactwith the enemy, however, must be maintained.The width of a sector should not be over 50 kilometers(31 miles). The depth is limited by fuel supply. Motorvehicles in modern reconnaissance units have a radiusof action of between 200 to 250 kilometers (125 to 155miles) without replenishment.Scouting groups will generally be organized and dis-patched by the commander of a battalion. Such groupsinclude armored scout cars, motorcycles, and radioequipment. Along the more important roads and thoseleading to the decisive areas or points, patrols should bestronger, but too large a patrol increases the difficulty ofconcealment from the enemy. Armored car patrolswithin scouting groups will be given written orders per-taining to route, destination, and information desired;they advance by bounds, with distance and speed some-times prescribed; generally, however, they precede thedivision at about 1 hour (approximately 40 kilometers, or25 miles). Motorcycles are used to fill in gaps and inter-vals, thereby thickening the reconnaissance net. The re-mainder of the motorized reconnaissance battalion serves asa reserve and as a receiving and assembly point for reports.

497735-42-4


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18 GEIRMAN, TACTICAL DOCTRIqNE23. RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION OF THE IN-FANTRY DIVISION

The reconnaissance battalion of the infantry division isemployed as a unit, even if the division is advancing overa broad front in several columns. The advance is madeby bounds somewhat shorter than those of the motorizedreconnaissance battalion. Scout groups are sent outunder the direction of the battalion commander. Thebattalion can reconnoiter an area approximately 10 kilo-meters (6 miles) in width, and seldom is sent more than 30or 40 kilometers (25 to 30 miles) forward. The strengthof the scout groups (sometimes up to that of a platoonwith light machine guns) is, however, determined by thesituation and the mission. Patrols sent out from thescout groups remain on the roads as long as possible,advancing by bounds from observation point to observa-tion point.Reconnmaissance battalions of interior divisions areUsually withdrawn to the rear after the battle actuallybegins. If, however, the division is operating over abroad front or in difficult terrain, the battalion may bereinforced, and utilized to fill in a gap or to seize an impor-tant terrain feature. Communications must be carefullyprovided. Extra signal equipment and personnel may beattached in exceptional cases.24. BATTLE RECONNAISSANCE

The purpose of battle reconnaissance is to reconnoiterthe enemy's front, flanks, and rear to establish definitelythe location of his flanks, artillery, heavy infantryweapons, and reserves. Such reconnaissance locates our


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CONCEALMENT 19own front line and often provides close-in security andterrain reconnaissance.s Security is necessary at all times,but reconnaissance must not be neglected to accomplishsecurity. Battle reconnaissance is established usually atthe opening phases of the development or deployment.The advance of the infantry in the attack reveals veryquickly the location of hostile infantry and artillery; also,fire from our artillery upon hostile infantry will generallyresult in the hostile artillery delivering counterfire andthus revealing its location.There are both air and ground means available forperforming battle reconnaissance. Some of the specificmeans of battle reconnaissance are: (a) Infantry patrols,sometimes reinforced with light machine guns, heavymachine guns, light mortars, or antitank guns. (b) Engi-neer patrols, particularly valuable in approaching a forti-fied area, a defile, or a river. (c) Artillery patrols, con-isting usually of an officer :and a few mounted menassigned to reconnoiter routes of approach, observationposts, and fire positions. (d) Observation battalion (artil-lery), skilled in locating targets by sound and flash, andin evaluating aerial photographs.9 (e) Captive balloons,supplementing the preceding means and permitting ageneral view over the hostile front.

8 Our observation posts and other friendly personnel, who are reconnoitcringfor our own artillery, heavy infantry weapon, and antitank positions, can gainmuch helpful information from units of the reconnaissance battalion. Some-times they actually accompany the battalion to get early information aboutthe terrain, potential targets, and gun positions.9 It assists our own artillery in firing on concealed targets by transmittingweather data. By accurate surveying principles, it establishes the locationnet for the batteries. The net is not restricted to the division sector, butsometimes extends 6 to 10 kilometers (as much as 6 miles).


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Section VI. PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNI-CATION

The higher unit is responsible for the establishment andmaintenance of communication with the next lower unit.Wire connection with neighboring units is always estab-lished to the unit on the right. This rule does not releasethe commanders of responsibility, however, to maintaincontact with units to their left.Of special importance is the connection between artilleryand infantry. If an artillery unit is attached to an in-fantry unit, then the infantry is responsible for the con-nection; if the artillery is supporting an infantry unit, butnot attached to it, then the artillery is responsible for theconnection. If, however, the artillery, through somespecial circumstances, is unable to establish the connec-tion, then the infantry must undertake the responsibility.Connection with heavy infantry weapons is the respon-sibility of the infantry commander concerned.25. OPERATION OF SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONTROOPS

The commander issues orders for the employment of hiscommunication units ordinarily after receiving the recom-mendations of the communication officer. It is mostessential that the commander punctually give the com-munication officer a complete picture of the situation,including the commander's intentions. The communica-tion means of a command post are assembled in a message

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PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNICATION 21center. The proper functioning of communication isdependent upon its useful employment on the part of thecommander and upon the technical training of personnel.26. ORDER OF THE DIVISION COMMUNICATIONOFFICER

The order of the division communication officer shouldcontain: (a) The enemy situation, our own troops, theplan of the commander; (b) the mission of the signalbattalion; (c) specific orders for the signal communicationcompanies and supply train; (d) when applicable, instruc-tions relative to secrecy, replacement, utilization of com-mercial nets, and system maintenance.In the advance march, the division communicationbattalion builds and maintains an axis of signal com-munication (wire lines) along the route upon which thedivision commander and his headquarters are advancing.In friendly territory, the existing commercial net is util-ized to a maximum; in enemy territory, heavy field cableis generally installed overhead. When contact with theenemy has been established by the division, wire com-munication must be maintained at all costs with the corpsand must also be supplemented by radio and other means.Establishment of lateral connections within the divisionand between divisions is also very important in co-ordinating the tactical effort.Within the division, all command posts and observationposts should be connected according to their relativeimportance. The division signal battalion will establishlines to the infantry regiments, artillery commander, andthe artillery units operating under the artillery com-mander, as well as lateral connection to adjoining di-


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22 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINSFvisions. When there is a deficiency of means, the estab-lishment of the aforementioned artillery connection haspriority. The division signal officer will coordinate theestablishment of the communication net and supervise itsconstruction by his own signal troops and the communi-cation troops of the various units. In a rapidly advancingattack, in pursuit, or in wtihdrawals or retreat, he willrestrict the amount of installation.27. COMMUNICATION IN THE DEFENSEIn the defense a very extensive communication net isestablished. Its construction is governed by the situation,and by the time, materiel, and personnel available.Several means of communication between all importantdefensive installations are provided. Wire communica-tion is carried by buried cables. Special communicationnets (such as infantry, artillery, antiaircraft) are estab-lished. Alarms for gas and air attacks are installed.Technical means to intercept hostile messages areintensified.28. VARIOUS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

When new troops are attached to a command, additionalcommunication requirements are introduced; so reservecommunication personnel should always be held out.The operation of communication troops must not beinterfered with in any manner by other units. Thevarious means of communication can be characterizedas follows:(a) Telephone.-Installation of the telephone requirestime and mat6riel. Wire lines are sensitive to such dis-turbances as fire, wind, snow, frost, and storms. The


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PRLNCIPLES O'F COMMUNIICATION 23enemy can easily listen in on conversations, particularlyover single-wire connections; in the danger zone, therefore.double lines and heavy insulated wires are used.(b) Telegraph.--The telegraph is simple in operationand installation, and very often cannot be easily inter-cepted. The Morse code is utilized.(c) Automobile, mounted messenger, bicylist, motorcyclist,runner. In a war of movement, these means are oftenthe most reliable. They are used without hesitancy whentechnical means are not available. Speeds of transmissionvary.'0(d) Radio.-When wire connections fail or are notfunctioning steadily, the radio is indispensable. Electricstorms, static, other radio transmission on similar wavelengths, mountains, and other interferences minimizeeffective range of hearing. In practice, radio is valuableonly if messages are short; transmissions should thereforebe in telegram form, omitting all unessential words.(e) Blinker.-This is an important signal means inbattle when wire lines are destroyed. It cannot be usedfor great distances, and is greatly restricted by fog, mist,bright sunshine, or proximity of enemy observation.Blinker messages must be very short, since 20 wordsrequire about 10 minutes for transmission.(f) Rockets, Very lights, fiares.-These serve as signalswhose meaning has been prearranged and is thoroughlyunderstood by the troops concerned. Very pistols andpyrotechnic equipment are carried habitually on light

10Messenger on horse, 1kilometer (%ths mile) in 5 to 7 minutes; automobileor motorcycle, 30 to 40 kilometers (25 to 31 miles) per hour-on good roadsconsiderably faster; bicyclist, 15 to 20 kilometers (12 to 15 miles) per hour.


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24 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRLNEtelephone carts and also in all combat trains. Ability tosee these signal lights is greatly influenced by the terrain.Also, there is always the chance of confusion with enemysignal lights.(g) Signal flags and panels.- -Prearranged signals withthese means enable ground troops to send short messages,particularly in communicating with airplanes and balloons.(h) Alarms.--Horns, sirens, bells, and gongs are usedfor gas or hostile airplane warning.

(i) Signal gun.-This small mortar, which projects amessage container, is useful in position warfare.(j) Courier pigeons:-Although requiring at least 3days to orient, courier pigeons are useful under heavyfire, for they are sensitive to gas, and terrain does notinfluence them. They fly about 1 kilometer (5/8thsmile) in a minute. They do not fly in darkness, rain, orstorm, and with snow it is difficult for them to orientthemselves.(k) Message dogs.--Expert and affectionate care bythe men in charge of message dogs results in most satis-factory returns. Such dogs can be used under heavyfire, and can remember and find locations on a battlefieldin a radius of about 2 kilometers (1} miles). They willefficiently follow an artificially made track (scent) up to6 kilometers (about 4 miles).(I) Listening-in apparatus.-This apparatus is estab-lished to determine the location of hostile activity inplanting mines, and to listen in on hostile communications.

(m) Airplanes.--An airplane may be used to connecta division headquarters Fwith its foremost elements orneighbor units. In such cases, no other reconnaissancemission should be given the plane. It is important to


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PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITCATION 25establish the location of the foremost line of infantry andof the hostile line; the infantry troops on prearrangedsignal will display panels to assist the plane on the mission.Planes may be used for artillery fire direction, and formaintaining connection between division, cavalry division,and corps or army headquarters. They are particularlyadapted to distributing quickly important orders ordelivering reports to units a considerable distance away.

(n) Captive balloons.-Balloons observe artillery fire,give prearranged signals indicating the time of the day,the signal to open fire, etc. Their communication meansinclude flags, panels, blinkers, and telephones. Weatherconditions, heavy-wooded terrain, and mountainous coun-try restrict their usefulness.

497735--42-5


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Section VII. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUA-TION

You must thoroughly work yourself into the stituation.Place upon the situation map the location of your owntroops and put down the information that you haveabout the enemy. This information is built up byreports from various sources, as suggested above underthe heading "Combat Intelligence." Information mustbe evaluated objectively; one must be extremely carefulnot to interpret what is received as one would like it tobe, or as one hoped it would be. A large part of the in-formation received in war is contradictory, a still greaterpart is false, and by far the greatest part is very uncertain.29. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Carefully read the orders received from the next highercommander, and consider all information received. Inconsidering the situation, the following principles govern:-The first and most important principle is to utilize tothe maximum the available means. Any moderation inthis regard is a deterring factor in attaining the ultimategoal. Second, concentrate as much of your force aspossible where you plan or believe the principal blow (themain effort) will fall, and expose yourself disadvantage-ously at other points, in order to be more certain ofsuccess at the point of the main effort. The success ofthe main effort more than compensates for any minorlosses sustained. Third, lose no time. Unless special

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ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 27advantages accrue by delay, it is very important that youexecute your plans as quickly as possible; through speedyaction many measures of the enemy are nullified in theirinitial stages. Finally, you must weigh each situationindependently, restricting yourself only to a considerationof the essentials. The following questions may hereoccur:

Mission.-What is my mission? Does it require de-cisive action or delaying action? Must I fight an inde-pendent action or will I be influenced by the movementsor action of other troops?Terrain.-What is the condition of terrain between mytroops and the enemy? Which routes lead toward theenemy? Where does the terrain permit approachescovered from air or land observation for an attack on theenemy position? When my mission requires defense,where does the terrain offer favorable defensive positions?What possibilities are therefore available for the ful-fillment of my mission?

Enemy.-What can the enemy do'to counter my plans?Where is the enemy now located? 11" Are there any basesfor his strength and organization? What can he do,making correct tactical suppositions?" Are there anyindications that the enemy has acted incorrectly? Do Iknow anything about the ability or personality of thecommander or the condition of his troops? How will theterrain influence the enemy's action? How can I bestfulfill my mission with the most damage to the enemy?

'I Always favor the enemy in computing the distances possibly covered bythe enemy since his position was last reported.12Ahvavs assume that he will carry out his plan most disadvantageously toyou,


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28 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRrIEOwn troops.-Where are my own troops? Which areimmediately available? Which troops can be later drawn

in? And when? Are special transportation means suchas a railroad or motor trucks at my disposal? What canI expect from my troops considering their past perform-ance? How is the supply situation, especially with re-gard to ammunition? Is support from other organiza-tions possible? Which of the present possible solutionswill give the greatest success?30. CHANGING THE MISSION

As a result of all these considerations, is the accomplish-ment of my mission no longer possible? (When, owingto unavoidable circumstances or unpredictable events, itis impossible to carry out a mission, then and then onlymay I change my mission, and I must then assume fullresponsibility for the change. I must select a substitutemission to assist effectively the general scheme of ma-neuver. I must notify at once the next higher commanderin case I decide that it is impossible to carry out myassigned mission.)31. SEIZING THE INITIATIVEIn general, when confronted by a vague situation anddifficult circumstances, as is often the case in war-beactive. Seize and maintain the initiative. Do not expector await hints or suggestions from the enemy relative toyour next move.


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Section VIII. THE DECISION

The decision must indicate a clear objective to beattained by the coordinated and aggressive use of avail-able means. The strong will of the leader must dominateat all times; often the stronger will compels victory.Never let anxiety over personal security interfere orinfluence in any manner the real task, which is the annihila-tion of the enemy. Calmly weigh the situation, thinkingquickly but overlooking nothing essential. Insure thatall assistants clearly understand your plans. Nervous-ness on your part is quickly reflected by subordinates.Never hold a council of war. Complication and con-fusion are frequently introduced, and generally only anincomplete decision results. One can think through asituation much better and reach a definite decision byindependently estimating the situation."Once a decision is made, do not deviate, except forexcellent reasons. In this connection, however, one canbring about disaster by obstinately clinging to the initialdecision when justifiable grounds are present for a change.The true art of leadership is the ability to recognize whena new decision is required by the developments or changesin the situation. The commander should be resolute butnot obstinate.

13The division commander will generally hear the suggestios and pro-posals of his chief of staff.

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Section IX. FIELD ORDERS

Publishing orders is an art that can be learned only bycontinual practice. Prompt distribution of faultlessorders furthers the confidence of the troops in the leaderand often has decisive influence in achieving success incombat. Conversely, power in the attack or strength toresist in the defense can be greatly reduced by faultyorders.Commanders of divisions or larger units generally usewritten orders. Simple instructions and brief missionsmay be communicated orally or through the communica-tions net, but the text should be simultaneously recorded.Commanders of units smaller than a division generally useoral orders, but again, the text must be recorded in writ-ing. While higher commanders usually make referenceto points or areas on maps, commanders of small unitspoint out or make such designations actually on the ter-rain. Although oral discussions with subordinates maycontribute to clarity, the leader should not become de-pendent upon such discussions. Decisions and ordersremain the direct responsibility of the leader himself.32. GENERAL RULES

The following rules embrace accepted fundamentalsand help to gain uniformity: (a) Do not issue orders untilyour plan of action is definitely established. (b) Dis-tribute the order early enough to allow the lower echelonstime for further dissemination and full compliance.30


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FIELD ORDERS 31(c) Create conditions that are conducive to clearness andconciseness, leaving nothing to mutual agreements. (d)Place yourself mentally in the shoes of the subordinatesreceiving the order. (e) State only what subordinatesmust know for the proper performance of their tasks.(f) Always state definitely whether the combat is to beattack, delaying action, or defense, and whether thetroops must remain "prepared for action" or whetherthey "may rest." *(g) Issue affirmative statements,avoiding ambiguous or vague expressions and statementsof exaggeration.14 (h) Include a brief commendation ofa unit for the execution of a difficult or unusual task,particularly when troops are ordered to withdraw, toretire, or to pursue under circumstances difficult for thetroops to comprehend. (i) Use prescribed abbrevia-tions. (j) Embody pertinent information for each sub-ject, unit, or weapon in a separate paragraph, underliningkey words or phrases. (k) Number all orders succes-sively, also the paragraphs within the order.33. WARNING ORDERS (VORBEFEHLE)

Warning orders, usually transmitted orally, by tele-phone, or by radio, are issued to troops to give advanceinformation about the will of the commander. Theinformation contained therein is influenced by existingcircumstances-the time available, the situation withrespect to the enemy and our own troops, etc.-but ingeneral will include such items as the plan of the com-mander, arrangements for reconnaissance and security,time and place of departures, march destination, bivouacs,halts, and changes of direction. Warning orders must

4 A statement of conjecture or expectation must be definitely stated assuch.


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32 GE:RMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINEbe followed as soon as practicable by a complete order oran individual order.34. COMPLETE OPERATIONS ORDERS(GESAM TBEFEHLE)Complete operations orders present a full survey of thesituation with respect to the enemy and our troops, theplan of the commander, the role each unit will play, andpertinent information for the troops. The usual arrange-ient follows:Enemy.-Pertinent information of the enemy, includ-ing strength, dispositions, condition, losses sustained,defeats suffered, and the commander's expectation ofwhat the enemy may do.Own troops.-A brief orientation involving the nexthigher units, neighboring units, and special supportingunits.Generalplan.--A clear and concise expression of theplan of the commander (not repetition of the plan of thenext higher commander), to ensure that subordinatesfully understand his intentions.Detailed plan.-An announcement of the specific detailsrelating to such matters as reconnaissance, missions,supply and evacuation, communication, and the com-mand post.'5

"5As to reconnaissance, the detailed plan mentions the enemy informationdesired, the areas to be reconnoitered and by whom and when, the time andplace where resulting reports are to be sent, and the sequence of rceonnais-sances according to their urgency. As to missions, what each unit with indi-cated attachments or detachments must fulfill is clearly stated. In respect tosupply and evacuation, the definite functioning of agencies in relation to thecombat elements is specified. As regards communication, the axis of com-munication for the unit publishing the order is indicated, and special instruc-tions, such as those pertaining to the use of the radio or existing commercialnets, are included. As for the command post, the location of the commander'sheadquarters and the tile when it opens or closes, etc., are given.


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FIELD ORDERS 3335. SEPARATE ORDERS (EINZELBEFEHLE)

Separate orders (Einzelbefehle) are issued when circum-stances render it impractical or unnecessary to issue acomplete operations order (Gesamtbefehl). Such circum-stances include situations wherein individual units mustbe given specific or special instructions, or where the timeavailable does not permit the issuance of a completeoperations order. The separate order (Einzelbefehl) con-tains the necessary information to insure coordination ofeffort; and later the publication of the complete field orderwill include such information, briefly stated, as was sentout previously in individual orders.36. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS(BESONDERE ANORDNUNGEN)

Special instructions supplement operations orders withinformation principally concerning ammunition, com-munication, equipment, food supply, transportation, med-ical and veterinary service, construction, and civilpopulation. In general, special instructions are writtenand are issued direct to the units or agencies that theyconcern.

497735- 42--3-


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Section X. MARCHES

All arrangements pertaining to a march should bebased upon the premise that the mass of the force mustarrive at the new destination with the minimum effortand the ma.rimum secrecy. When contact with the enemyis imminent, the march formation should favor easy andrapid development for combat. When contact is un-likely, the comfort of the command is the importantconsideration. In view of modern air developments,movements under cover of darkness will be the rulerather than the exception. There will be circumstancesrequiring day marches, however; or they may be safelyundertaken when the weather precludes hostile airactivity.37. MARCHING INMULTIPLE COLUMNS

The command should be marched in multiple columns,using all available routes, thereby saving the strength ofthe troops, affording better protection against air attacks,and maintaining the command in such formation as tofacilitate development for combat. The following con-siderations, however, prevail: (a) Organization in depthpermits freedom of maneuver. (b) Echelonmnent of somecolumns on the open flank affords protection or facilitateslater envelopment of the hostile flank when the enemy isfixed in the front. (c) The strength of columns and thelocation of stronger columns will be determined by thewhereabouts of the enemy and by the tactical plan, as

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MARCHES 35influenced by the terrain. (d) If the situation is initiallytoo vague to determine such dispositions, then severalweak columns should be marched into aggressive actionagainst the enemy to clarify the situation; the mass ofthe force may then follow in one or more columns. (6)The width of the advance should not be so broad as topreclude the building up of a main effort when contactwith the enemy is made. (f) Zones of advance withboundaries should be indicated. (g) And, lastly, trans-mission of orders and reports must be carefully organized.38. MARCHING IN SINGLE COLUMN

The division sometimes cannot avoid marching in asingle column. The great disadvantage is the extraor-dinary length, which precludes assembling for a coor-dinated effort in 1 day. An advantage of the singlecolumn over multiple columns is greater security andflexibility for changing direction.39. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR ATTACKS

The movements of large forces are protected by anti-aircraft precautions, particularly at initial points, rivercrossings, and defiles. Antiaircraft batteries advancingby bounds are set out in advance to front and flanks toprovide protection at these critical points. The com-mander -must insure that antiaircraft units have priorityon roads. The danger from air attacks during daylightis greatly reduced by the following appropriate methods:

Increasing the depth of march columns-At the com-mand Fliegermarschtiefe! (air defense depth), the troopunits, horse-drawn elements, and other vehicles doublethe distances normally maintained on the march. Simul-


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36 GERMAN 1TACTICAL DOCTRI.Etaneously it is indicated whether security forces, such asflank or advance guards, maintain, increase, or decreasedistances. Arrangements are made for air defense depth,if circumstances require such precaution, at the beginningof the march; or rest periods may be used to increase ordecrease distances. With short march columns, extensionor retraction are also accomplished during the march.Increasing the breadth of march columns.--At the com-mand Fliegermarschbreite! (air defense breadth), thetroops spread out, using both sides of a highway oreven expanding into the adjacent fields. The formationinvariably imposes march difficulties upon the troopsand is avoided whenever possible. When troops arealready marching in air defense depth, it is seldomnecessary to require the additional precaution of marchingin air defense breadth.Dividing a column.-Very long columns marching alonga single route are broken up into several short groupswith between 1- and 3-kilometer (3/- to 2-mile) intervals.Disposing of the motorized units.-The motorized unitsof the infantry division, except the reconnaissancebattalion or units employed on security missions, arecdivided into groups and follow the various columns,advancing by bounds. If the situation permits, theyare organized into a motorized column and marched ona special road. Motor vehicles are also marched in theintervals between the advance guard and the main body,and between units of the main body.Averting hostile planes.-Upon the approach of hostileplanes, air guards promptly sound the warning, using pre-arranged signals. Marching troops throw themselvesdown on, or off to the sides of, the road. Motor vehicles


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MARCHES 37halt, and their drivers set the brakes. Mounted troopsclear the road and continue the march under availablecover. Antiaircraft weapons immediately fire upon' thehostile planes, but riflemen do not fire unless a plane comeswithin range. Frequently the troops are put in readinessto withstand a simultaneous air and gas attack. At night,if flares are employed by the hostile fliers, foot soldiersthrow themselves to the ground off the roadside. Every-one else and all vehicles remain absolutely motionlesswhile antiaircraft artillery provides defense.40. NIGHT MARCHES

Although night marches initially tax the strength oftroops, this disadvantage is minimized after troops be-come adjusted to resting in day.bivouacs and eating regu-larly on a changed schedule. Night marches havedecided advantages: they deny altogether or restrictmaterially hostile ground and air reconnaissance, and bykeeping the enemy ignorant, they contribute to surprise;also, night marches bring troops into position for battlewith fewer losses and consequently higher morale.In spite of the fact that main highways are often illumi-nated with flares by hostile aviators, it is frequentlynecessary to utilize highways for marches. If many alter-native parallel routes are available, the principal high-ways are avoided, or utilized by motor elements only.The hour of assembly at the beginning of the marchshould come after dark in order to preclude observationby hostile planes. Troops are formed as for a day marchwithout extension of distance or expansion of width forair defense; but the security forces are drawn in somewhat


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3S GER'LAIA TACTICAL DOCTRINEcloser, and distances between units are slightly increasedto insure sufficient buffer room. Double connectingfiles; sent by the principal unit to the subordinate unit,or from the rear unit to the forward unit, are liberallyused to maintain contact. The order of march is similarto the arrangement for a day march. If the tacticalsituation permits, foot troops precede the mounted troops.On good roads and by starlight or moonlight, the rate ofmarch is practically the same as that of a day march.On poor roads or in heavy darkness, the rate decreases to3 kilometers (just under 2 miles) per hour and even less.Bicycle troops and motorized units also march appreciablyslower by night than by day. It is advisable to arrangeshort rests-about 10 minutes in every hour; long restperiods tend to make the troops sleepy.

The alert commander does not march his troops directlyinto bivouac if daylight is about to arrive. He haltsthem in an available covered area and arranges to havethem divided into small groups before the troops march onto bivouac or other destination.41. DAY MARCHES

When contact with the enemy is at all possible, thecommander must march his command during the daywith "preparedness for combat" as the foremost con-sideration. When contact with the enemy is not immi-nent, the commander can divide his command and marchthe various units on several routes. When time is notpressing, the movement also can be carried out in smallgroups over long periods of time. In any case, the firstconsideration in a day march is tactical; but the possi-bilities of cover should not be overlooked. The stronger


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MARCHES 39columns should be marched over the routes offering themost cover, while the weaker can be sent over the moreopen routes. The time of departure on a day march isinfluenced by the situation, the weather, the season, thelength of the intended march, the condition of the troops,and other factors. It is desirable to march from an oldbivouac area under cover of darkness and reach a newone by daylight.42. ORGANIZATION FOR MARCHINGInfantry marches in columns of three men abreast,cavalry marches in columns of two abreast (exceptionallyfour), and motor vehicles travel in single columns. Ingeneral the right side of the road is used; but when organ-izations are mixed, the infantry should be permitted tomarch on the more comfortable side for walking. Withinthe infantry division, the commander must organize histroops for the march so that he can bring all of them tobear against the enemy in a concerted attack in a singleday. In order to accomplish this, it may be necessary tomarch in two, three, or four columns, with each columnproviding its own security. Examples are illustrated bythe following diagrams:Example 1 (Where the division ismarching in columns a, b, and c,and there are no adjacent units)

b

a | cL


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Example 2 (Where the division ismarching with its left flank open)b

Adjacent Unit

t

Example 3 (Where the division is marching as an interior unit)f ; a b

Adjacent, Unit rt Adjacent Unitl l c l I

Example 4 (Where there is a containing force and the division ismarching as an enveloping force)

Adjacent Unit

t t i i


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MARCHES 4143. CONNECTION AND COMMUNICATIONThe commander of a larger unit is responsible for con-nection with the next lower; the smaller units mustcooperate, however, when difficulties arise. In terrain,or under circumstances, where visibility is restricted,arrangements for continuous connection are intensified.On a march in several columns, communication betweenthe columns is maintained through the most appropriateavailable means.'644. RATES OF MARCH

Since it is important to provide conditions which permitan even rate of march, the mixing of different sorts oftroops should be avoided as much as possible.'? On goodroads and under favorable conditions the followingaverage speeds can be accomplished:"Per hourFoot troops ............--....... 5 km (3mi)Foot troops (small units) .......--.... 6km (33; mi)Mounted troops (trot and walk) - -------- 7 km (4 mi)Mounted troops (trot) .......---- 10 km (6 mi)Bicyclists ...........--- 12 km (7% mi)Motorcyclists ...........-- ..... 40 km (25 mi)Large organizations with all weapons:

(1) Including rest periods - .--... 4 km (2/' mi)(2) Under stress, without rest periods -------- 5 km (3 mi)Motorized units ---------------------- 30 km (18 mi)lb Airplanes (troops expose panels upon signal from the air observer), radio(when secrecy does not preclude its use), ray lamps, liaison officers (throughthe messenger system), wire telephone and telegraph (when contact with theenemy is imminent), blinker (frequently), and signal flags (seldom).17Pack animals are one disturbing factor in maintaining an even rate of

march.'8 For foot troops under ordinary conditions the distance prescribed as a"buffer" between companies, or similar units, is 10 paces; for mounlted troopsand trains, 15 paces. Such distances do not apply, of course, when air de-fense depth has been ordered.


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42 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINEIntense heat, poor roads, snow, ice, absence of bridges,and other local conditions greatly influence the march

rate and the travel distance accomplished. The rate forfoot troops on a cross-country or mountainous marchdecreases from the normal hourly rate by as much as 2or 3 kilometers.When great distances must be covered rapidly, motorand rail transportation can be used to expedite marches;for distances under 150 kilometers (93 miles) the use ofmotor transportation is recommended. When circum-stances require foot or mounted troops to make forcedmarches, every effort is made to assist the accomplishment.Strict march discipline is preserved, and severe measuresare meted out againstmalingerers. The men are told whythe particular march is being made, and arrangements aremade for rests where refreshments such as hot coffee ortea will be served. Their packs are carried, if possible, intrains.45. MARCH RESTS

The commnander should indicate in the march order allthe necessary information concerning the duration andother conditions of the march. An officer should be sentforward to reconnoiter suitable areas for rests. Arrange-ments should be made for a short halt, not longer than15 minutes, to begin after the troops have marched about2 kilometers (1%miles) so that equipment and clothingmay be comfortably readjusted on the men and animals.The troops remain near the road during such short periods,spreading out only a sufficient distance to secure coverfrom hostile air observation. When a long march is made,halts are ordered about every 2 hours. Rest periods are


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Section XI. VARIOUS TYPES OF BATTLE

The most important types of battle are the attack, thedefense, and the withdrawal, or retreat. A combinationof these types occurs simultaneously or successively in thecourse of every major campaign. The commander andthe General Staff Officer must master the fundamentalprinciples involved in these various forms of tacticalmaneuver. Resolute application of these principles maypenetrate, at least will help to neutralize, the ever-present"fog of war."44


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Section XII. THE ATTACK

The attack may be launched (a) from one directionagainst front, flank, or rear; (b) from several directionssimultaneously; (c) after penetration, into a new direction.47. FORMS OF ATTACK

The frontal attack is the most frequent form of attack,but mechanized and motorized weapons will decrease thisfrequency. It requires superiority in strength and pro-duces decisive results only when the hostile front ispenetrated.The enveloping attack (envelopment) is the most effec-tive form of maneuver, and if aggressively employed deepin the hostile flank or rear, it can result in a most decisivevictory, or even annihilation of the enemy. An envelop-ment of both flanks presumes marked superiority in means.Wide envelopments are more effective than close-in.Among the factors that contribute to successful envelop-ments are deceptioni, concentration of strength at thecritical point, available reserves, mobility, and simplicityof maneuver. As to surprise, the enemy must not begiven the time necessary to take countermeasures. Asto mass, strength must be concentrated on the flank of theenvelopment so that hostile extension of the line can beoverrun or circumvented, and hostile defensive movesquickly and effectively frustrated. As to fixing the enemy,

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46 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINEthe hostile forces in the front must be containedsimultaneously with the enveloping attack."

The penetration is an attack where the maneuver isintended to split or separate the hostile line of resistance.The following considerations contribute to success: selec-tion of a favorable point (a weak part of the enemy posi-tion, or favorable terrain); surprise (such as feints at otherpoints, or secrecy in concentration of strength); breadth ofpenetration (preferable a base as wide as the depth ofthe penetration or wider); depth in organization (toexploit breaking through, and to check hostile counter-attacks); rapid and full exploitation of the break-through.The limited objective attack is a form of maneuver in-tended to win important terrain features, to contain theenemy frontally, or to stop the hostile advance. Organi-zation in depth is not required.48. CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ATTACK

Some important general considerations for an attack arethe following: (a) Obtain unity of command and action;avoid piecemeal attacks. (b) Establish a main effort.(c) Assign narrow zones of action. (d) Reinforce fire byadditional artillery and heavy infantry weapons. (e)Coordinate and intensify the fire of all weapons. (f)Make timely employment of tanks and reserves. (g)Exploit successes quickly and fully even though thelocation of the main effort may properly have to be

19 his may be accomplished by point attack (which is both effective, andeconomical in troops), by frontal attack (which involves employment ofconsiderable force and thereby reduces the troops available for the maineffort), and by attack with limited objective (which requires a smaller forceand releases more troops for the main effort).


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THE ATTACK 47changed.20 (h) Recognize the crisis in a battle and reactappropriately.

Be alert to every advantage, to each success no matterhow small, to any mistakes made by the enemy-andexploit these to the fullest degree. If the attack appearsdefinitely stopped by strong hostile resistance at a certainpoint, further success may be better accomplished byinjecting fresh troops, by concentrating fires on a differentarea, or by changing the disposition of troops.49. MECHANICS OF ATTACK

The width of a zone of action is dependent upon terrainand mission. A battalion of infantry with both flanksprotected is assigned a zone of action 400 to 1,000 meters(roughly 440 to 1,100 yards) wide. An infantry divisionin a meeting engagement where terrain is favorable foremployment of supporting weapons, is assigned a zone ofaction 4,000 to 5,000 meters (4,400 to 5,500 yards) wide;but an infantry division having both flanks protected andmaking the main effort against a strong hostile position isassigned a zone of action of 3,000 meters (3,281 yards).A definite objective or direction must be indicated forthe attack. Although zones of action are prescribed, theyneed not be completely filled with troops. For divisionsand larger units, these zones are selected from the map;for the smaller units, they are determined by inspection ofthe terrain itself. The boundaries are extended deepenough into hostile territory to preclude mixing of unitsfor the duration of the day's operation. Strongpoints and

20For example, in passing an obstacle-river or mountain chain-the maineffort may be switched during the progress of the operation because of abreak-through in an unexpected point.


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48 GERMANA TACTICAL DOCTRInEdifficult terrain must be included within a unit's zone ofaction and not located on its boundary line. Frequentlyonly the designation of an objective is required in order tomaintain direction and to preclude mixing of organiza-tions.Do not include too much detail in the attack order andthus restrict initiative. The mission must be clear-whatto do, but not how to do it.The important task of all weapons is to enable theinfantry to close with the enemy and to drive deep into hisposition in order to crush all resistance or to annihilatehim.This end can be accomplished only if the hostile automaticweapons and artillery are neutralized or destroyed. Co-ordination between infantry and artillery must at all timesand in all situations be carefully arranged.When tanks and infantry are operating together, theyboth should be initially assigned the same objective,namely, the hostile artillery. Tanks can often attackfrom a different direction. The coordination of otherweapons of the division attacking with tanks is based onthe activities of the latter. The division commander isresponsible for such coordination. Artillery supports thetank attack by firing upon antitank weapons, blindinghostile observation, and neutralizing villages and edges ofwoods. Artillery fire must be carefully observed and con-trolled to preclude firing upon friendly tanks and advanc-ing troops. Engineer troops remove tank obstacles andassist tank units forward. The air force provides con-nection between the fast-moving tank units, the division,and the artillery. Combat aviation may be employed toneutralize antitank weapons.Antiaircraft troops protect the deployment of troops,


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THE ATTACK 49positions of readiness, artillery positions, and battlereconnaissance planes. The main effort must receive thebulk of antiaircraft protection. Gas may be used againstartillery and reserves, and in connection with road blocksor blockades on an open flank. The communications netwill be based upon the plan of maneuver; separate netsfor artillery and infantry will be established, the artillerynet having priority.50. ATTACKING A POSITIONThe plan of attack will be determined by the situation,the morale of the enemy, and the extent of his defensiveworks. Approach to the hostile position may be possibleonly under cover of darkness. If the position cannot beturned or enveloped, then a penetration must be madethrough some point in the front. The employment ofinadequate force and means leads to severe reverses.Careful plans for the attack must include the necessaryinformation about the enemy and the terrain?' Thoroughreconnaissance must be conducted by the officers of allarms, but reconnaissance parties must be kept restrictedin size. Air reconnaissance is of particular value. Ob-servation and listening posts must be established. Limited-objective attacks, strong combat patrols, and similarmethods may be necessary to gain the information de-sired.The location of the main effort will be determined byfriendly intentions, the situation, the defensive strength

21 The following points should be clarified: Where are the enemy's ad-vanced positions, outpost lines, main line of resistance, switch positions,reserves, and observation posts? Where does the terrain favor the approachand the attack? Where has the enemy employed gas and obstacles?


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50 GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINEof the hostile position, the covered approaches, and theobservation for supporting weapons, particularly theartillery. In selecting a place for a penetration or break-through, consider the following points:(a) Find out how the attack can be further developedafter the initial break-through. (b) Insure sufficient roomfor maneuver. (c) Avoid natural strongpoints or envelopthem. (d) Locate favorable terrain for the employmentof tanks. (e) Capture points or areas that will givegood observation deep into hostile positions. (f) Desig-nate close or far-distant objectives according to the sizeof the attacking unit: if the final objective cannot bereached in one advance, designate intermediate ob-jectives involving in some cases limited-objective attacks.51. ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENTUnder the protection of advance infantry units, theartillery will be brought forward. Prompt reconnaissanceof the terrain must be carefully made by artillery officersin small groups. If possible, positions for the batteriesshould be so placed that the artillery mission may becarried out without change of locations. Ammunitionsupply, observation, hostile position, communications,alternate positions, and range must all be considered,and any necessary preparations carried out in advance.The distribution of the artillery will be determined byits mission. Units will usually be employed intact; itmay, however, be necessary to detach batteries, particu-larly the heavy artillery. In very narrow division sectors,for example, heavy howitzer batteries may be taken awayfrom divisions to operate against distant targets undercorps.


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THE ATTACK 51The initial mission of the artillery may include anyor all of the following: firing upon important targets in

the battlefield, drawing the fire of hostile artillery, engagingin counterbattery work against hostile artillery and anti-aircraft batteries as early as possible, and firing uponlarge hostile group movements at maximum ranges andas promptly as possible.52. INFANTRY POSITION OF READINESS (BEREIT-

STELLUNG)The following considerations for an infantry "position ofreadiness" may be listed as follows:(a) Avoid too close proximity to the enemy position incases where no cover is available to friendly troops. (b)Ifthe enemy has previously offered strong resistance in thefighting, if there is reason to avoid premature entranceinto the effective hostile defensive area, or if the enemysituation in the main battle position is not clarified, havethe troops partially developed before they are conductedforward in their respective zones of action. (c) Avoidhostile air and ground obstruction by prohibiting largeassemblies in restricted areas, by exploiting all ground foldsand available cover, and' by approaching immediatelyprior to the jump-off as close to the hostile position ascover permits. (d) Select the infantry jump-off positionas close as possible to the hostile position in order to permitthe artillery to push well forward and carry out its missionwithout changing location. 22 (e) Establish local security

UaWhen the terrain and available cover do not permit the close approach ofthe infantry, the artillery must be echeloned to the rear and prepared tosupport the infantry advance on the enemy position.


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52 GEIRMAN TACTICAL DOC-TRINEwith infantry detachments. (f) Gain sufficient depth bydrawing out and retaining reserves to the rear. (g) If theforces going into the position of readiness are scheduledto make a close-in envelopment, insure that the positionis a sufficient distance off to the side to preclude theenveloping force advancing into and mixing with otherfriendly troops on the flank, when the attack is launched.53. INFANTRY ACTION UP TO THE FIRST ASSAULT

The infantry action up to the first assault is carried outunder the support of artillery and heavy infantry weapons.If exceptionally strong artillery support is available, theinfantry can more freely advance against the enemyposition; if the artillery support is not strong, however,then the infantry must advance cautiously. In the lattercase, moving forward under cover of darkness or of smoke,the infantry takes advantage of cover to avoid hostileobservation and of defiladed ground to avoid hostile fire.The infantry attack begins with the advance of thelight weapons under cover of the fire of artillery andheavy infantry weapons. Part of the latter should bepushed forward with the initial echelons to insure con-tinual close support. Riflemen work forward throughthe use of fire and movement. Local fire superioritymust be exploited to the fullest degree to capture ground.Those units or parts of units which cannot advancefarther should dig in and hold tenaciously the groundalready won. When weak points in the hostile positionare found, they should be attacked aggressively and withreserves. Thus a push forward can be made. Againstconsolidated and extensive defensive works on the otherhand, the infantry may struggle for days, working slowly


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THE ATTACK 53forward. Trenches and terrain may be won, lost, andrewon during the course of the action.54. ARTILLERY SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY AD-VANCE

The effectiveness of counterbattery missions directedby the artillery commander depends upon observationand available ammunition. Neutralization was often ac-complished in World War I by a simultaneous concen-tration of several batteries using gas shells. Initiallymany batteries may be concealed in a firing positionawaiting the opportunity to surprise the enemy. Whennew hostile batteries are discovered or additional enemyforces 23 are located,. then concentrated fire may be de-livered upon them with these batteries. This method ismuch more economical in ammunition than continual fireof all artillery against apparent but not definitely iden-tified targets.As the situation develops and clarifies, artillery fire canbe switched from the manifestly less important targets tothe more important areas. The infantry will sometimesbe unavoidably delayed in its advance by reason of changesin the infantry-artillery plan of coordination. There willbe situations in which many hostile batteries will not belocated until friendly infantry has pushed forward anddrawn fire.55. INTERMITTENT ADVANCE OF THE RESERVES

At the disposal of the commander, the reserves followbeyond range of hostile fire. When the terrain permits,23 Artillery engages the hostile infantry which is fighting on the flank or

in front of friendly infantry.


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THE ATTACK 55should be taken: (a) Maintain close contact with thehostile infantry. (b)Promptly reconnoiter the new hostilepositions. (c) Move the artillery well forward. (d) Pre-pare for hostile counterattacks. (e) On the following day,push rapidly forward with all force; compel the enemyto stand and fight, to take flight, or to suffer destruction.57. ACTION RECOMMENDED FOR CERTAIN SPECIALCASES

If the enemy has had only a short time in which toprepare his defensive position, if the morale of the enemyis shaken, or if the possibility of surprise is introduced,the preparations for attacking a position may be shortenedto limited reconnaissance, more rapid development andpreparation by the artillery, and employment of tanksand smoke screens.If the enemy resorts to delaying action, the responseshould be to break through his line at one point andexploit the break with strong force, and to press closelyupon the withdrawing hostile troops.If the enemy falls behind the cover of a very strongposition, the direction or location of the main effort shouldbe changed. Knowledge of the terrain will permit advanceplanning in this maneuver. More artillery, tanks, andengineer troops should be moved well forward, and mini-mum requirements should be established in the communi-cation system. If the enemy succeeds in falling backupon an entirely new and very strong defensive position,a regrouping of the attacking forces and new plans maybe required.


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a6 GER.UAN TACTICAL DOCTRINEIf the attack continues until nightfall without produc-ing decisive results, the regrouping of the command

should be carried on under cover of darkness. The day'sbattle experience may indicate a new point for the maineffort, and the order for attack should be issued just asearly as possible. Reconnaissance must be energetic andcontinued, for the enemy will also make changes in hisdisposition during darkness. Night attacks are usefulin determining hostile intentions and movements, inseizing favorable positions for the following day's jump-off, and in obtaining observation. Harassing fire by theartillery and air night-bombing attacks should be sched-uled. Artillery support may not be possible at dawn ofthe following day, unless the exact enemy positions havebeen located. Only then can the artillery deliver un-observed supporting fires. Sufficient light for artilleryobservations should be awaited in preference to sendingthe infantry forward unsupported. Artillery on otherfronts may be fired for deceptive purposes during theinterval of waiting.Passing over to the defense from the attack may be anecessary prelude to holding captured ground, or may beordered by higher authori

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1942 US Army WWII German Tactical Doctrine 95p.

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