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COON RAPIDS. Mnm. Senator WALTEII MONDALJ:, ' Wa,Mngton, D.c.: • ,,~. " •

Strongly urge no Involvement in cam­bodia. An immediate withdrawal trom Vlet­nam WUl not .upport Prea1dent.

Mr. and Mrs. JAMES JAGELBKI.

MINNJ:APOLIS, Mx;iN.-Senator WALTER F. MONDALE, . Washington, D.C.: 1

We deplore the presidential action Involv- ~ Ing Americana In Cambodia. We strongly urge you to protest on our behal!.

Dr. and Mrs. MARVIN L. STEIN • • c ~

WrNONA, MrNN.;. , Senator WALTr.B F. MONDALE, j Wcuhtngton, D.C.: I

P lease voice vehement protest In turther , Involvement In Southeast Asia.

Mr. and Mrs, HERMAN WEISMAN.

Sr. PAtTL, MJ,r{N.) Senator WALTER F . MONDAI-£, Wcuhtngton, D .C.: !

Urge you exert every effort and Influence to end Asian and Middle East Involvement.

Mr, JOHN W. PETI!:R;9.

Sr. PAtTL, MINN. Senator WALTEIl F . MONDALE. WG3hlng t on, D .C.: • •

We cons ldCT Cambodia furt her Involvement In t he Asia n war and we protest.

Mr. and Mrs. MAX ScHNITZER.

ST. PAtTL, MINN., Sena tor WALTER F . MON DALE, Wash ington, D .C.:

I a m a go.lnst sending American men .or m nterlnl lnto Ca mbodia .

Mrs . BELLE SINCHEIl.

ST. PAUL. MINN. Sen a tor WALTER F . M ON DALE. WCLShington. D .C. :

Urge In str on ges t t erms you fi ght InsanS new mi lltnry co=llment In Cambodia . .

EUCENE OGAN.

ST. PAUL. MINN. • Senator WALTER F . MOND .• LE,

WCLShington, D .C.: A1; m other of IB-year· old bOy r11 send mine

to S weden rat her than slaughter. Mr. and MIS. DICK Y ACER.

ST. PAtTL, MINN. Senator WALTER F. MONDAl.E, WCLShington, D .C.: .

Stop the generals In Cambodia. , i RICHAIU> C. GII.EENlI

-- .-, . ST. PA~, MINN.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE, ••. I Washi ngton. D .C.:

We oppose our comm1tment-ip. cambodia. Mr. and Mrs. H . C. Po~~

ST. PAtTL. MINN Senator WALTER F . MONDALE, . Wcuhlngton, IF.C.:

We are completely opposed to President' • • extending war Into Cambodia. Please _do something Immediately.

Mr. and Mrs. R,oDE!lT BILEMEIl.. •

DtTLtrrH, ~, Senator WALTEA. MONDALE, • WCLSh lngton, D .C.:

Believe Cambodia Involvement counter to national Interest strongly urge f?enate cur~, the executive and m1lltary. . .

Mr. and Mrs. JOHN POO~

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. Senator WALTD. MoNDo\LEi. Washington, D.C. : - •

Was Bhocked by thO President'. dec1s1gn.

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~_~.~~bod1a. g~ot .uP~I1 fI~ctBron t ~rwar. .. ,.. , _

- ~ . l4r. and Mrs.. JAlU8 S. LEJ:.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN: Senator WALTEII MONDALJ:. • Wcuhlngton, D .O.:

We urge your opposItion to the President deciSion to enter America Into war In Cam bodla.

Mr. and Mrs. RICHAllD WEAnfl:uuN,

MINNEAPOLIS. MINN. Senator WALTER MONDALE, Washington, D .O.:

We support all action necessary to prevent' Intervention In Cambodia and expansion oli Indochina war.

Mr. and Mrs. RoBERT A. WINDSOR.

MrNNEAPOLIS, MINN. Senator WALn:JI. MONDALE, Washington, D .O.:

Urge you do all In your power to prevent Nlxon's widening war In Southeast Asia.

Mr. and Mrs. DoN YELLOTT.

Senator WALTEIl MaNDW, Washington, D .C.: ,

We strongly object, to the Cambodian ac­tion resulting In deeper Involvement In Southeast Asia.

Mr. and Mrs. LEW HOKKANEN. ONElDA.

Mt!<NEAPOLlS, 1IIN N . Senator \V ALTER F . MONDALE, Wtl3h i ngton, D ,C.:

I urge you to \,Igorously work to cut of! all finnncial support for t he new American mllItnry Involvement In Cambodia regardless of the rhetoric Rbout aIding the Vletnamtza­tkJn program. This new escalation can only result In more deaths. The Pres ident has contempt uously rejected the advise oC the Congress by th is action, and you have no alternatl \'e but to u se you r const itu tional power over funds to b alance the excessive power or the executive and military.

r greatly appreciate your efforts to date In t his rega rds sincerely . '

EMu. CRAlC.,

N ew D emoCTatlc Coali tion .

TRAV>:RSE CITY, MICH. Senator WALTER MONDALE, Washington, D .C.:

Stop slaughter of AmerIcans, nnd South­east Aslnns . Get UnI t ed States out of Cam­bodla·Vlet nnm now.

ROBERT G . LONG.

MIN NEAPOLIS, MINN. Senator WALTER MONtlALE, Washington, D.C.: _

I have sent. the following telegram to President Nixon quote please keep all U.S. mllltary personnel weapons and vehicles out of Cambodia and Laos. Your people will not believe reasons tor becoming Involved there. Please gl ve the needs ot America first priority unquote.

MAX O. SCH'O'LTZJ:..

. MINNJ:APOLlS, MINN. Senator WALTER MONDALI:, . "' . W/l3hlngton, D.C.:

Deman'd U .S. troops be withdrawn from Cambodia. Senate action requested to restraIn preSidential power .... ' I _. '" . '

Sister MAlty KAy BulsJexN. ? •

- ST. PAtTL, MiNN. Senator WALTER MON1lALr, Wa.shington, D.C.: - . >I ~ J

We CQllSlderPrup.l)od1a further Involvement In the Aklarl"wat' and'we proteat, -

Mr. and Mrs. M.a.x ScHNITZEL

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, DvI.VJ'R, MDnf.

Senator WALp:1l F. MONDALa, . .. WcuMftgto7i D a:' ,- . -I ~ . ( , ~

8trongl~~P~ . our invOIV~'~t ~_ bocUa. Urge you to do whatever you caQ 1D. your power to ce_UlI!l U.S. aid and 1nl'oly ment...- . -.. -, rI;::'" . ..

BEV1:RLT and Eawm OOLD~ ~ I

~ • MnmEAPoLIS, Mmlf. -Senator WALTJ:lI MONDALE, Wa"hlngton, D.O.: •

We are absolutely opposed to Nixon'. send­Ing troops and aid to Cambodia. Trust Sen­ate can block such.

Dr. and Mrs. ReBUT lIARLow. -

FARIBAULT, ~. Senator WALTER MONDALE,' :I • Wa"hlngton, D .O.: • .1 I

Strongly urge you to use all possible 1n tluence to resist any commitment what3oeYer~ In Cambodia. We must concentrate all etrorlj to disengage Vietnam and avoid any !urtherl disasters In Asia. . . ' ~

R. C,BLJSS.·

MOORHEAD.1.fiNN. ' Senator WALTER MONDALE. Wa3hmgton, D.O. :

ExtremelY' upset over President·. declslonj to extend war. Please help; feel this :!"R Sa wrong.

Mrs. ARVID BENSON.

WASHINGTON. D.C. Senator WALT1:R MONDALE. ·· Wa3hington, D .O. : I

Please do whn:t you can to reverse Nixon's. Cambodia decision.

MARY HAltLow.

DULUTH. MINN. Senator WALTER F. MONDALE. Wa.hington, D.O.:

You. as representative of the people of thei United States, must assert yourself In our behalf In this Southeast Asian crisis.

DOROTHY B. Focus.

MrNNEAPOLIS. l.!l.NN. Senntor WALTER MONDALE. Wa3hi71gton. D .O.:

Do all you can to prevent Nixon'. expan­sion ot the war work to make Ulegal what he hn.s done.

JAMES MAcDoNALD.

BrvERLY Hn.LS, CALJ7'. Senator WALTER F . MONDALE', Wa"hl71gton, D .O.:

125.000 mothers say no to Cambodia.. We support any action to re·eS't&bllsh CODSt1-tutlonal right of Congress to declare war.

DoNNA RxED OWEN. DoROTHY B. JONES, BARBARA AVEDON,

Co-Ohalrmen, Another Mother /CX' Peace.

ST. PAuL ... MINN. Senator WALT1:R MONDALE. .... Washington, D .O.: ,-

Request you take hnmed1ate Senatorial ac­tion blocklng unconstJtutlonal, unlicensed Imprudent action announced today. •

JOHN and MARY JEAN DEROSDIII.

MINNEAPOLIS. MINN. Senator WALn:R MONDALl!!. Washington, D .O.:

We will not tolerate neither ' money nor IU'lD4,nor ndvlsers nor troops In Cambodia.

1 r Mr. and Mrs. DANIEL E . WI!:I.NBEIlo.

• MINNEAPOLIS; Mum. Senator WALTER MONDALl!!, Wa"hmgton, D .O.: . .

Urge you -to oppose In all possible"' wa ~ any comm1tment In Cambod1a. .'

Mr. and Mrs. Wn.LIAM D. M~o.

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MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. Senator -W~ .lo{ONEALJ:, . • Washingt01l, D.O.: ~,-

As a Republican . I ·.trongly protest the Involvement of Americana 1n Oambod1a- j

THzooou: P. RTAN.

-! MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. Hon. WALTER MoNDALJ:, Wa"hington, D.O.:

Stop the Pre61dent's move to send U.S. foroee to Cambodia. - .:

Mr. and Mrs. RAy CHISHOLM.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. Senator WALTER F . MONDALl!!, Wa3h!ngton, D.O.:

Applaud your challenge ot the President on ABM urge your challenge of him on Cam­bodian Intervention. .

Senator WALTER MONDALE, Washington, D .O.:

ELDON MASON. ;

AUSTIN, MINN.-

We must sWp Involvement In Cambodia. ELIZABETH HOLMES.

Hon. WALTER F. MONDALE, Washington, D .O.:

ST. PAUL, MINN.

We protest our additional Involvement 1n Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. RICHARD J . NOVAK.

DULUTH, MINN. Sena.tor WALTER F. MONDALE, Washington, D.O.:

We strongly oppose U.S . Involvement In Ca mbodia please help bring our boys home.

Mr. and Mrs. RONALD J. WURSEN.

MINNEAPOLIS. MINN . . Senator WALTER MONDAL.:, -Washington, D .O.:

Pressure President, mllltary abandon mad Asia.tlc nightmare before country completely bankrupt morally, financially. -

Mrs. ROBERT A. GRAY.

Senator WALTER MONDAL!:. Washington, D.C.:

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Oongress must act immediately to halt Cambodian Inten'entlon atop no more Vlet-nama.

Senator WALTER MONDALE, Wa3hlngton, D .O.:

MARTHA ROSEN.

ST. PAUL. MINN.

We deeply protest any further Involvement In Asian war.

. Mr. and Mrs. NOR!olAN Ros£.

Senator WALTER MONDALE, Washington, D.O.:

ST. PAUL, MmN.

Urge you exert every etl.'ort and Intluence to end Asian and Middle East Involvement.

Mrs. JOHN W. PETERSON.

DULUTH, MINN. 1:;enator WALTER MONDALE. Washington, D .O.:

No expansion ot war In Southeast AsIa or mill tary aid to Cambodia. ,

Mr. and Mrs . THOMAS VECCM.I.

'DULUTH, MINN. 1 Senator WALTER MONDALE, --Washington, D .O.: ' - 10 .. •

America wants formal ' commitment. Pro' or con. Please have vote.

• L . and S. OHRISTIANsON.

NORTHFIELD, !.fiNN. Senator 'WALTEI\ 'lo{ONDALE, - '. :.> . ~ " Wa"hlngton, D .O.:

Deeply disturbed by Presidents deciSion on

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-dambod1a. Implore you to oppose U .S. milt­~~91yement there.

• CAJIL and DoaoTHT HOLMGREN • . ' ... •• -. '- MINNIIlAPOLIS, MINN. -

SenatOr WALTa MONDALE, ..-' Washington, D .O.: . .

Cam&xllan todventure shocking betrayal. American democratlo process demand with­drawal on moral legal humanitarian groundL

Mr. and MI1I. FRED PrASHNK.

DULUTH, MINN. Senator WALTER MONDALE, J.. Wcuhtngton, D .O.: • , .If

Our famUy atrol!gly opposes enlarging-the I war In Asia. Please do something. .' _ !

NORMAN SUNDQUIST FAMILY. 'I

DULutH, MlNN: • Senator WALTER MONDALE. r' Wcuhtngton, D .O.: .

I strongly oppose any lilvolvement In Cam­bodla.

Mrs. YALE ~AVlS.

MINN£A" OLlS. Ml'NN. Senator WALTElI MONDALE, Wcuhtngton, D .C.:

Having heard the address by the President I want you to bow as one of your con­stltuence that I support In easence the Prea­Idente declalon. I hope you wUl support him.

Sincerely.

Senator WALTER MONDALE. Wcuhtngton, D .O.:

JOHN I. OWEN.

DULUTH. MINN.

Strongly opposed extension of military In­volvement In Indo-China. Urgently request immedlate and total withdrawal ot aU U8

. troops. United Nations. not the U.S. should police the world. PrlorlUes - at home make this Imperative. Since we are so deeply com­mitted to ABM and MIRV programs It 18 criminal to dlSapa.te American Uves In for­eign wars . We demand Congressional action prerequISite to continuance or extension ot Involvement In Southeast Asia. Press for UN action In Southeast Asia.

DULUTH DFL WOM.EN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE, Wa.shtngton, D .C.:

HAGER CnY, WUJ.

Get Vietnam war stopped. No military help for Cambodia.

MAllY GWEN OWEN SWANSON.

Senator WALTEIl MONDAI.!:. Wcuhfngton. D .C. :

ST. PAUL, MINN.

The Asian WIU' must be stopped. Not esca­lated. The Senate must say no to Cambodia.

Mas. JANET KAMPS.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. Senator WALTER F . MONDALE, • Wa..thington .. D.C.: --- i \.

While we cannot apeak tor tg e silent' ma­jority, we have no Interest In 'malntaln1ng .. pow.erful image, aavlng tace, or any ot the other irrationa11zatlons that have been 'UIIed as justUlcatlon for the oontinuatlon fond ex­tension of thla war. The President's action In sending troops Into Cambodia 18 reprehen­sible. We applaud your antiwar stand and trust that you will do everything ~Ible to stop the President from pursuing this oourse of "ctlon.

• SUI: DEVRIES. . PEGGY NEwrON. M

JANIe. THna . . ~ . _ J~ ~NET.

•. ' ST. PAUL, MINN. 1 Senator WALTEJI MONDALE, ' . ' • . Washfngton, D .C.: ' ' •• - , }..J:;';

Please support the President on Cambodia. Dr. and Mrs. RA.LPH R. GMlU. .

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MOVND, MINN. Senator WALTE1I P. MONDALZ, Washfngtan, ' D .C.: .... ' ; , ~

Nlxon'. action 18 a blatantl1 mega! execu­tive usurpation of war making power.' our duly elected otBe1a1a In Co~ must pr.­ven~ th1a destruction ot our constltutlpnr.1 system.

PAT and F'1u:D FaEvuT. -.

EDINA, MINN. Senator WALTEIl MONDAI.!:, Washfngton, D.C.: .

President Nixon does not hear voice of silent majority who wlah hope and pray. to end Vietnam and Its Involvemente we now have extenalon ot this war so "we will not be hum1llated we will not be defeated" wise . men have swallowed pride and admitted de~ teat before and probably w1l1 agaln ISn't there <

anything you as our elected representative • can do or should the silent majority find out whether only voice heard Is that of the striker anarchist rioter.

. RICHARD B. ~ARNES. -

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. Sena.tor WALTD!. MONDAI.!:, Washington, D.C.:

We want our boys not our prestige no to Nixon.

The RICHARD SWANSON FAMILY. CANDY McDoNALD.

ST. PAUL. MINN. ~ Senator WALTD!. MONDAI.!:, I Wcuhington, D .C.:

Stop the President and the Generals. HOWARD AND MARY ANN HUELSTE1I .

Sena.tor · W ALTD!. MONDAI.!:, Washington, D .C.:

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Violently oppOsed to entering Cambod\" please stop President and end this war.

Dr. and MrII. ERNEST M. HAMMES. Jr. -

ST. PAUL, MINN. Senator WALTEII MONDALE. Wa.shfngton, D .C.:

Our absolute support In oppooslng NlxOD! foreign policy position In the expansion of war In Indochina.

JOHN E . HARRIS. BESSIE HARRIS. KAllEN. JOHN.

PALO ALTO. CALIf' . Honorable WALTE1I MONDALE, Washtngton, D.C.:

Preserve Senates integrity and naUonal honor keep us out of Cambodla Mlnnesote voter at Stanford.

RoBE1IT I . FINK.

ST. PAUL, MINN .~ Senator WALTER MON DALE , Wcuhington, D .C. .

For God's aake stop Nlxon's Indochina war now. We support all your etrom to restore aanlty to U.S. foreign and domest!c policy. The AdminIStration's lack of reason. morality and responsibility warrante censure or .11 necessary Impeachment. . ....

. :Mr. and MrII. PAUL S . HIGGINS.

MINNEAPOLIS: MINN. Senator WALTEa MONDALII:, Wcuhfngton, .D.O •

Get out of Cambodla as well 411 Vietnam. Col. and MrII. NAT WI.BSEIL: .• . " ... ~."\ \ "

I _ I~ ": .!..-~ ... ~.:. . ~LIS, Ji,.N~ Senator .WAJI'l"D, MONDALIl ' . ' ... '. ~~ n : Wa.shfngton, D .O.

Wer votenl~ngly urge you to cont1nu your tight against Cambodlan Involvemen$.

Dr. and MrII. P. B.l"LTNN MIcu.u:L.

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Senator WALTER MOaDALB" Washington, D.O.

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Can't we ever learn trom our ~akes? Censure him.

Mr. and Mrs. ROSSELL HOBBm, Precinct Chairman. Falcon Hetghb Four;

MlliNEAPOLIB. MINN. Senator WALTER MONDIIL!:. Washlntgon. D.O.

We are appalled at the action of President Nixon ot Involving U.S. torces In Cambodia.. This action Is not only In direct contradic­tion to Senate. congressional and publlc view, but also to Nixon's own stAted poUcy of disengagement ·trom S.E. A31a.

We encourage your support ot Senate moves tor Immediate disengagement _or U.8. forces trom Cambodia. .. ' y

Bruce Hanson, Leroy Curwlck, Kay Cur-. wick, Tim Callaghan. Donald KuIs~ Ron Bennett. Kathryn Bennett, Jon. Zbasnlk. Paul Tamm, Tie Hutchinson, Lie Toth. Lanny Schmidt, Leroy Clauenna. Douglas Stone, Robert Carr, Howard Hickman, Richard :\OUnday, Edward Conway, Departmenta ot Metallurgical, Mineral, and Chemical Engineering, University of Minnesota at Minneapolis.

EDINA, MINN., Mall 1. 1970.

Senator WALTER F . MONDALE. Washington. D.O.: ' __

We disagree completely with NL"oIi's'speeeh ot this date. •

Dr. and Mrs. EDWARD O. HOSTAD.

MANKATO, MINN. !>fay 1. 1970.

Senator WALTER MONDALE. Washington. D.C.:

Please do aU In your power to stop expan­sion ot war In Cambodia and to end Ameri­can Involvement In Viet Nam. The Presl­dent·s speech and announced military plans are a profound threat to democracy In the Uni ted States and to world peace. .

JANE and JOHN PoSTEll.

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MINNEAPOLIS. MINN .• ..' , . May 1, 1970.

Senator WALTER MONDAL!:. Wa3hington. D .O.

We adamantly oppose any U.s. Involve.­ment In Cambodia. Support any action yOU . take to prevent same.

Respecttully, ~ Mr. and Mrs. STEVE W.IETING ..

ST. PAUL. MINN .• ' May 1,1970.

Senator WALTER MONDALE. Washington. D .O.:

I 6ppose the President's decision to enta' Cambodia. Congress must end the war now.

_ Mrs. DoNAj.-D HAARSTICK. 1

ST. PAUL, MINN., MAT 1.1970.

Senator W ALTER-MoNDtU.!:: Washington. 1>'.0.: -' We deplore· the capitulation of President' NL1:on to the m1lltary Industrial complex In their latest' venture Into Cambodia. We hope the Senate will demonstrate more wisdom.

Judge snd M.rs. HYAM SEGELL.

ST.PAor.,MINN~ May 1,1970

Senator WALTER MONDALE, Washington, D .O.:

There Is a fourth option withdrawal from a.u Indochlna. and to hell with "our hum1Ua;o tlon. "

C. STJ:VENSOK~ ,

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,

Senator WALTEll MONDALE, Washington, D .O.:

May1,1970.

'Congratula.tlons. Tonight we lU'e very proud ot our President. An Amerlc.'\n tI.nst and a polltlclan second. A man with the I courage to tell his countrymen, and the world, tha.t the time has arrived when Amer- , lcans will stand and be counted.

Mr. lind Mrs. L. A. ELSTAD. ,. ;orr ~

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;€O'RgF£ssto·nQI~~~:"~ ~\ra PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 9 lSI CONGRESS, SEC~ND SESSI<?N

Vol. 116 WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MAY 19, 1970 No. 80

r ~ONoALE. Mr. President. nothing call describe' the despair and disappoint­ment I felt at the Presldent's' declslon to I move U.s. troojl6 into CambodJa and by the incredJble-if only temporary-re­newed bombing of North Vietnam. I

Never have I had such a reaction from my own constltuenl$--an overwhelming vote of fellr and re&cUon against this escalation of the war.

All the wounds which have been in­flicted upon our society-not to men Lion our young men-by .. decade of wllr in Vietnam have been tom even wider by the start of the ~dochlna war. Already young men and young women have died In disturbances retleeLing the shock and dismay which young and old alike have felt since our move Into Cambodia.

011 the evening following the Presl­dent·s announcement, I set torth my own views on Cambodia and on the war In Vietnam in an address to the national convenLion of the ADA. I ask unanimous consent that this speech be reprinted at this point In the COl<ORESSIOl<AL RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, es follows:

Aooa..ua BT 8a:NAl'Oa WALTr1l P . MONDALIl

I hAd been try tn, to decide what my toplc-our keynote-e.hould be. The Presi ­dent's speech last. night. MUted the queatlOD for all of UI. /I .. •

There 1a only one. The war which 1Da.t tn Vietnam and whloh 1Da.t-tt slowly-being wound dOwn, La DOW In Indochina and 'e now I belng maaa1velreeealated. 0, •

I ~~~.~C!!,:::t.:IVes: ' Almost 216,000 American wounded; Unknown mUlion. ot Vletnamese cuual-

t tle:;,me ;00 blllion dolla.rs ~rth oC our re-aourcea: and. '

'A decade ot agony and Itrlte at b orne , . , baa now become an even deeper and wIder war. J ,

''Vletnamlzatlon'' baa now been tuHy re­'fenled Cor. tragic hOAI:. , Many oC us teared that Vletnamlutlon wu

largoly a devie. to buy time and pre-eumpt dlaaent wblle propping up the COrTUpt regime or Tbteu and Ky, But mfmy ot us allO telt that the Presldent. 11 tor no other reason than polltiCi. wu committed to ·'wSnd.1Da down" the war In VIetnam. .. ,

It 15 now clear that the Pr«!sldent baa not abandoned. the d~..,troua obJectlve ot the lut tragic decade. It 18 mflftCJTll "'ctary that ba teeka--the perp4ltuatlon ot whaunr anU ­oommUllla1; goyernmen\ can be tound,-bow­.Yer corrupt, unpopult.r, or undemOCnltlc. ~d however Uttle they wW ngb\ to de tend themaeln •• by wlat,eVlf mlllt&ry me&na are

~ DOC-.y. It ..= .. , poUclT. wblch .... u \0 pre­&erve an American brldgehea4 on the Maln­land or Southeaat Alta ,

TIlII Is \he old poUeJ. I~ Ia .. Pli\lOJ which bu been shown. to be unatta.1nable. Irra­tional. unpopular at hoine and abrotod . and. contrary to AmerJcan Jotereet..

SeJilate

The InvL,lon or the Carnbodla.n aanctuarles 1a in direct contradlotion ot tbe President'. owo Quam Doct.rIDe. In "hleh ho laid that we mUlt cease acttng as poUceman Ind can- ' non fodder for the AlJan nattolll. It 11 111 di­rect contradiction of tbe-Jtnterpretatlon ot "Vlet.na.m.lzatlon" wblch' tbe 'Prealc1ent haa given \0 tho American people. It la, IJi tact, aMolute proor 'or the total ra.tlure oC the " VletnamJ.utlon·' doclrtne.

We cannot baye It. both way • . We cannot have both dlaengaaemont aJld MOIlation, W. ca.nnot hold to a go&l or peace. dlaeQpge­ment. and a "poHUeal eoluUon" whUe ex­pn.ndlng t.he war &nd aeeldng the total , de-atructlon or the Cne.Iny. ... ....

The ra.t.1onaJe 11 tbe .ame one we hee.rd 10 yean ADd 60.000 Uve. &(0: "A uttJe more effort and the tlde w11l ~, turned." W«! have h eft.l"d It ort.en 11nce--a lew tllouaand more troop" ... UtUo more bomblnt and \he war will be onlr.

Now we are lola thAt a. .Ix ~ eight week forny Into Cambodla wlU wipe out the ma­Jor oommuntet .anctuarlea and atagt.ns areas which , the, have beld tw at .leut the l ... t .Q.ve yeua.

Btu why weren 't w. told e month, ago that " VleLaa.mJ.zat.lon" would requ1re the In­vaston ot theee temtorl. whteb. have been held by the oommunlata tor eo many yean?

Why weren't we told a. weet ago when the President reported. lumcJent aucceea to an­nounce t.be pull out ot 160.000 more troope In the year ahead.? ,

\Vhat do we expoet t.be Vietcong. the Nort.h Vlet.nlUllMe-and the Chlnese and the So\'JetI, for that malter-to do while we de ... etroy their major lupply and .t.agtng areu?

What wUJ we do Sn 2 monLba l"ben. 1t all , goe-s exactly AI planned. we will have puahed. them out of the PAlTot'a Be&k. the ptab Hook . and Lb.. oUJet' &1' .... , Do we ltay there . . , Indeft.oJtely •• , or do we return to Sout.h Vietnam. and expoct them to atay wherever we may have been lucky enough to hnve puahed. them? ,

How abou t the nll:t Une ot communlat annctullrlN-Juat beyond the reach of Amer. lca.n torCel? All or Aala behlnd the enemy lIue I, a .. sanctua.ry .... When and wbere do we .top? ADd wben. do the, decJ.de to attack our own aanctuan__..t Th&Uanc1, tor example?

The Prf'8ldent's reneon for tbla eeealaUon must be reJooted. There II no way to ma.ke 1\ ·'defenah·. manluyer" out of a tull .cale ol'fenalve Into a neutr&.l na.t1on. with the ad­vice a.nd oonaont neIther 01 that nation n or or COngress.

There Is no way to oake tbla MCRlaUon Into a meR.OI ot "hutenJn, our withdrawal" or " turthering a pollUcal aettlement. ..

The oldest myth or them all again rears Ita deltrucUve head : tlle notJon ot a mODO­lithic world-wid. communlat; conaplr&Cy un­ruterably oommlUec1 to tJulloonquelt Of the world-a conspiracy whIch mUit be .topped. At wbatever coat--"eo that tho BOna and brot.hcra ot oUr.,.,ldI .... 1I&htllljl DOW can)lYo In peace &nd' ~urltJr J . .... ; c,.; -"l~

ODe or the ,traCSO 1ron1 .. or· &.h4 1t'U'. or course, u Ulat \he Mm1nJ.atco,lMlCl p,Ul1 c)lDga

at. the aame . UDl".tlO "~"~· "e. CAn achlc.e 0"n.\.D~ wfbIout • IIlUltarJ commlunent ... '- that we can ul tal,. pin from a conference t&ble what .e ta.tled to gain on tbe batUen..ld..

But t.hI& recent ""Uon haa TlrtuaUJ guar­=_ the death o! \he Pu\o peace Ialka­wh1ch have been In .. coma. anyway tor nearly a yeN' due, In part. to our 1&U ure to even appoint .. top-level nogottator'. ..

We are now b&ck whue we WeN two' Je&n ago--boplng that .ameho.. the other ald. wlll cave in a.nd let ua oa tJUI book.

I supported and will continue too aupport tbe Prea1dent'. obJeot.1ve of wtt.bc1rawal. enn though I thought It ahould han betn much taater. and even thougb I never truat.ed. hi. disavowal of a mWt.&rJ soluUon.

But I now see a longer war a.nd a wiaer war. I see many+ more deatba. I think we should know by th1a Ume the paUenee, Nl­BOtve, and manpower of the VIetcong &.Del t.be North Vlet.nameee. And I lee UI now a.1nt.l n g further and further lnto a w1d.er. more dlI­astroWl, more unw1nab1e, and eyen more un· JustlOabte war. .

And what of the Soviets and the Chinese? They, too, have a vital stake In the eventual outcome of the IndochIna war. The,. too, have pride. And tbey, too, have a resolve .that their course 1. right and that there can be no surrender. • I a.ssure you thAt there are ' many- I bope a maJonty-ylnC the Senate who are turlbly distressed by this new development.

Once a.gaJn , the President. baa Ignorrd the Congre". breaking bll promlae to leek our advtce before such & major cbange in pollc,..

He has gone a.gnlnst the clear will of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

He haa aurely violated. the 'Plrit 01 tht. Congre",'onol Amendment ,which paued the Senate laat December by • YOU ot 73-17 prohibiting the U8e ot American troops In IAOII. I am sarry that CambodJa W&I not In that amendment. It would lurely ba'f'e been simple to ha'f'e added CamlX)c11a to that safe­guard.. but the chances ot our Mmlnl6traUon punulng a ground war In cambodia 'WfOre 10 romote. so btr.a.rTe. that no one thought to put Cambodia Into the leg1alatton.

And the Pre3tdent II, I am eompletely con­vinced, gotng agaJnat the clear wtn of the American people, My own telegrama Prlday mornlng-cent om only houra &tter t.he President'. speech-ran M-l ClgofPl.lt the President.

In tact, there aeema to be much lndleaUon that the Prea1dent went agatnst the advice of many o't ht. own top ctvllla.n adYi.Kn's.

I teel 10 strongly and 10 deeply . . , u d o you and 10 many otherl Ulroughout the country .. • that we muat do everything we can to reverse the polley. OW' only hope 11 to reuset"t the COnstitutioDa) Authority ot Oon­gre~werable to the Amencan peopl&­over our loreJgn polley and the waging of WIU'. , )

I am lully connnced thn.t the Congrna of the Uni t ed States hu tho obligation And the Quthority to Irtop th13 dlauter. And I hope and pray we have the tefll snd the cotes. I hope the Senate a.nd the Congress wlU &mend boUl tbla yel\r's m111tary 8I\les bill and the ml11tary authorlztl tlo n blU to prohlbJt the use oC these Cund.s tor the lupport ot Ame,rl­enn ground or air action In Cambodia and to

~~.h~~~~c~~; ~~t~n~~cu~ t!~noJ ~e~!:~ bodla. U we can avert a dlso.ster on the Su­preme Court, we ean and must avert an even greater one In Indochina, ~ ~: ..

We mUlt go beyond thl\t and demand ttle earne for Laol and a much prompter total withdrawal trom Vlotnam .' ,,-_ • ..,., "'."rJ .,

Then, let UI 1001< at 0"; ~6ii't" .. 't'kmal lnteTeSU f ...... _ '"t- 'n~-f"" . ~

Tho AUdille m.ot~r_ ~a atate or In-Wlen.ble- tenstOll. . oneil &lta.ln Na-tive, seeking to end d---wu Itaiid-otr

-2-

or NATO .... uo th. W.,...w Pact: Most im­portant, n01lOtl&ttoDi hATol1nally begun on way. to haa the lnAne e...nDiI ra~ before the Amortcan and ftOvtet generala plungo tho world &pin Jn10 • n." .... to or !J1otabiUty and Duolear terroo'--& race ocfooollt \h.~1IaII< or eoeIal reronn will be tbe'l!ier .. t ,hypOl:rioy.

Here 11 wber. our t'r'1I4 Cnteraa.t£0n41 Crater_ · eltl lC&. Ber. La wber. we can &d.Y&nce t.b,. ~ C&u.tee: or peace &Ad frH<lom wbleb ... elpouse. But. each ot' t.b ... iMUM wW be oertolUl7-perhapa dUaotrolUlJ-Jeopa.rdI&ed by an eeea.luloD. of t.he Vietnam oon41C\ and. Oreat Power antagonLama wb1ch th1a 11 bound to produce.

'lb.. Prealdent hu ' ea.lled the Indochina Wt.< .. challenge to our'DUlDbood. our peWo. TIm. and. &Itf.l" hJ& m_o alluded to t.hI& COIl.Cept.. .. :- • j

" W. will not be humJllated" ho aald. "Wo wID not be detea.t.e<t" Be wunod · U& not to act "Uk. .. pltlCul belpleaa a1ant • • : ' Be warned UI agalnat our llmt defeat in our proud 190 yean. •

But. I would llke to ut the President how he d.eftues m&n.hood. What. La the mature u­pression ot manly pride?

I bellevo our proaent. policy 1a an upre.­s lon of the pride oC the 'lieU. baaed on .,._ rogo.nce and leiC dCCfIt.. I want our country

: d~~~~~~:a~J~~. °it ~~:~~ hl\"\"e not sutrered a defeat in our proud 190 years, but dOOI that ralae doubLa about our country or about th..l& awful war?

Does that oboenatlon prove \hat our N .... tlon lacb tbo capacIty to ponever. when n ecessary or does It underll.ne the lmmoralJt.y and In!~erenalbU1t.1 of .. alaugbter which kJlll our young and numbs our conac1e.noe on beh,.,U ot a C&UM which can't be ez .. plalned?

I am deeply d1sturbed at the thought of .. gene:raUon which may . 10M aU con11de.noe In the abutty ot a democracy to rospond. W1th Justice, reMon, and humanity. But w1l.at eM we upocl ot .. generation which La aaked to kill and be kllle<1 In a war which ca.nnot be explained' Can a fractured, d.1aheartened. and dernorallzed America poeatbl,. be a price worth paying tor a few more yean of an Amerlca.nlr.ed lO"ernment tn· 8aJgon. anc11n Phnom Penh. I\. " '

Perhapa tbo rr-teoi crime Of! thla ....;. Ia that we ba'f'e forced youn, men and wom.en to cbOO8e between these two lnatlncta. The great majority ot the youna Win never feel a bullet or a piece of IIhnpneL But nearly aU wlll be called upon to dlaa..,... eltbor their coJUClenee, or their oountry.

'lb. President AId "we will Dot be hum..WJ , ated." But we...u.dy an. ,

I beUon tho b1gheo\ and nobleot up ...... 8 100. of" c1vlllzed manhOOd La to admIt error wben one 15 wron,. Tho aame must be true or Nattons. .

II ~'e did, It would indeed be "our 4.n':'i ~~~~:"-It would be the President·, ,11Dfl

W. could deal W1th our real problema: 10. Lbe Mlddl& l!!an; tn Vienna, in the Ohet~. on Indian ReseI"ftUom, In mJgrant camP'. In our schools and h oepltala and churches:. We could save our oceana, lakes and stre&b::lS and our alr. We could reclalm our street. ani! aaaault cr1me without Ia.crtOclng justlc.. W. might reclaIm our young, InCJ't"Ulng num-"" bera or whom hkve t"'glCAlIy rejected the 10.-8tltutlona aD~e prooeuoe of Creedom. TbSi NatIon ~gh"""" -aim Iw .out. 'I!l~CI.:_Wr. Preeldont. be PtQud bie". P~and. proud Amertcana again. - -

August 27, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 14423

crops in some inaccessible areas of South Vietnam and in areas where few South Vietnamese civilians are located. Fur-

lermore, in some areas enemy soldiers ave taken over crops and land belonging

to South Vietnamese civilians. To counter this means of providing

food supplies to the enemy, our forces have engaged in selected crop destruc­tion. By destroying the fields planted or controlled by the enemy, we have made it more difficult for them to provide food for their soldiers. In tum, these forces have been reduced in number and are therefore less effective in killing Ameri­cans and our allies in this war-ravaged country.

Mr. President, this program of de­stroying selected crops in certain areas of South Vietnam has been carefully con­trolled and even at the height of the war did not result in the destruction of more than 1 percent of the annual food production of Vietnam. .

Thus, when one compares that statistic with the success of our crop destruction program in handicapping enemy forces, it is easy to see how unwise it would be to discontinue this effort. The inter­rogation of enemy prisoners reveals that food shortages are among the most critical problems facing the North Viet­namese. These same prisoners attest to the effectiveness of the crop destruction program as it applies to the overall food shortage among enemy soldiers.

Mr. President, the same two reasons I gave yesterday to the initial herbicide amendment offered by my colleagues ap­DIy to this amendment. While I recog-lize their good intentions in offering

is latest amendment, it must be stated again that its passage would indirectly cost American lives in this war. Further, the use of antiplant herbicides on enemy crops is not causing any harmful effects to the ecology of South Vietnam accord­ing to studies we have made.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I urge the Members of the Senate to re­ject this amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from South Carolina.

I yield myself the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, I certainly hope that the Members of the Senate understand that this is essentially the same ques­tion we voted on yesterday, which was rejected by a vote of almost 3 to I-that is, yesterday's vote included the item at issue now.

Second, there is no vast, extensive use of this matter; but where it has been used most effectively, it has driven them to use more of their people for the grow­ing of food and crops, thus taking them away from other support of the military and taking them away from the actual fighting.

As I have said, we have decided this matter primarily on the ground that we are over there trying to defend this vast area of that country from the Commu­nists, and our boys need every reason­able thing, every possible thing we can supply them to protect themselves. This :s jungle warfare at its worst. I think we have enough restrictions now on them as policy. Let us not tie their hands mili-

tarily with respect to every conceivable item, small as this is.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RIBI­COFF). The time of the Senator has ex­pired.

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen­ator has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, with 1 minute remaining, let me simply empha­size that this amendment is quite differ­ent from the amendment of yesterday, with all due deference to the Senator from Mississippi. The amendment yester­day was a broad-based amendment that would deny the use of defoliants for any purpose, and many arguments were raised, I believe sincerely, that there was some kind of military significance to de­foliating areas where the enemy might be ambushing. That is not involved in this amendment. This amendment is against the use of chemicals for the de­nial of food. It is the use of chemicals to deny the enemy food-the spraying of crops.

I would say to the Senator from New Hampshire that we have later evidence than 1967, a 1970 report of the Defense Department, which says tha~ it is anath­ema to the people of South Vietnam.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres­ldent, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, has all time for debate expired?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time for debate has expired.

The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call

the roll. Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the war

in Vietnam has been a series of mistakes and an unquestioned tragedY. In pass­ing this amendment, we have an oppor­tunity to halt one of our most mistaken policies and prevent prolonged destruc­tion among the Vietnamese people far beyond the end of the war.

The American people by nature recoil from the horrors of war. The Vietnam war especially has forced us to question ends and means. Though we have not yet been able to withdraw from bloodshed, we are increasingly questioning such techniques as massive bombing, napalm, and search and destroy missions. One can hope that public consideration of such destruction will help us exert world leadership away from the use of force and violence.

But for some time the United States has had a revulsion and a very clear policy against employment of other weapons of certain types. Since World War I and the days of poison gas in the trenches, we have had a policy against the tactical use of weapons which affect total populations, pOison slowly, con­taminate land; and destroy organic life chains.

Public concern for these issues has been refiected in controversies involving biological warfare research, nausea and tear gas deployment. nerve gas, and tactical nuclear weapons.

But it is clear now that we have un­thinkingly employed destructive mate­rials in Vietnam which deliver all of these catastrophic effects: Anticrop

chemicals. Senator NELSON has explained the poison content of these herbicides, especially cacodylic acid. The possibili­ties of poison buildup in animals and man have been shown in the case of DDT in the United States.

The long-term obliteration of vegeta­tion and botanical cycles is an obvious contamination of the land. The destruc­tion of interdependent plant and animal chain..; is truly appalling, and will plague -the people of Vietnam for years after the war. The research finding that the de­foliant chemical 2,4,5-T causes fetal de­formities in animals should arouse hu­manitarian protest against all herbi­cides, just as we have always opposed biological warfare and tactical nuclear weapons.

The destruction of food crops is a seri­ously mistaken policy. The Senator from Wisconsin has shown that, in guerrilla warfare, this tactic affects the civil popu­lace primarily and has little impact on the guerrilla enemy. By 1967, the war had already caused the loss of over 600,000 acres of riceland, and created thousands of helpless refugees. The loss of another half million acres due to chemical attack is a civil disaste_' which cannot but hinder pacification and reduce support for the United States.

It is clear that the administration's de­lay in submitting the Geneva protocol against chemical and biological warfare to the Senate until August 19, after prOmising prompt action in November 1969, has become an international em­barrassment to the United States; 9 months after the U.N. General Assembly voted 80 to 3 against us, to prohibit use of chemicals under the Geneva Treaty, we still exist under the cloud of herbicide use in Southeast Asia.

Congress has the obligation to act to stop this mistaken policy.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi­dent, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RIBI­COFF) . Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, we re­quest the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is

the question before the Senate? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques­

tion is on agreeing to the amendment of­fered by the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL) and the Senator from Wiscon­sin (Mr. NELSON). The yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. As I understand, Sena­tors who favor the amendment will vote "yea," and those who are opposed will vote "nay."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen­ator is correct. The clerk will call the roll. . The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FuL­BRIGHT), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Okla­homa (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE) , the Senator from

814424 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. McCARTHY), the Sen­ator from New Mexico ~Mr. MONTOYA). and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) and the Senator from Okla­homa (Mr. HARRIS) would each vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG) , the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY). the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE), and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) are rrecessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACK­WOOD) is absent on official business.

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLD­WATER) and the Senate:-- from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) are detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) and the Sen­ator from California (Mr. MURPHY) would each vote "nay."

The result was announced-yeas 33, nays 48, as follows:

Bayh Burdick Byrd, W. Va. Case Church Cooper Cranston Eagleton Goodell Hart Hatfield

Aiken Allen Allott Anderson Baker Bellmon Bennett Bible Boggs Brooke Byrd, Va. Cook Cotton Curtis Dole Dominick

Cannon Dodd Fong Fulbright Goldwater Gore Gravel

[No. 274 Leg.]

YEAS-33 Hughes Javits Kennedy Magnuson Mansfield McGovern Metcalf Mondale Moss Muskie Nelson

NAYS-48

Pastore Percy Proxmire Randolph Ribicotr Smith, Ill. Symington Tydings WUl1ams, N.J. Yarborough Young,Ohio

Eastland McIntyre Ellender Miller Ervin Pearson Fannin Pell Griffin Prouty Gurney Schweiker Hansen Scott Holland Smith, Maine Hollings Sparkman Hruska Spong Jackson Stennis Jordan, N.C. Talmadge Jordan, Idaho Thurmond Long Tower McClellan Wll1iams, Del. McGee Young, N. Dak.

NOT VOTING-19 Harris Hartke Inouye Mathias McCarthy Montoya Mundt

Murphy Packwood Russel! Saxbe Stevens

So the Goodell-Nelson amendment (No. 863) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amend­ment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE-ENROLLED Bn.L SIGNED

A message from the House of Repre­sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his Signature to the enrolled bill (H.R. 15351) to authorize additional funds for the operation of the

Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial Commission, and it was signed by the Acting President pro tempure.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now pro­ceed to the consideration of amendment No. 860 which the clerk will state.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) proposes an amendment as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 860 On page 26, immediately after line 4, insert

the following: "(d) On and after the date of enactment

of this Act, no chemical or biological warfare agent shall be disposed of within or outside the United States unless such agent has been detoxified or made harmless to man and his environment."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a time limitation of 1 hour on the amendment, 30 minutes to the side.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. PTesident, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who

yields time on the amendment? Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I yield

myself 10 minutes. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we

have quiet? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The

Senate will be in order. The Senator from Illinois is recog­

nized. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on Sun­

day, August 16, 1970, two private tUg­boats under Navy contract towed the hulk of a World War II Liberty ship, the Lebaron Russell Briggs, out to sea from a North Carolina port. Destination for the tUgS and the old Liberty ship was a point in the Atlantic Ocean, 282 miles east of Cape Kennedy.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen­ate is not in order. This is not a parlia­mentary body as it is now. Will the Chair protect Senators who wish to hear?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen­ate will be in order. Senators will be seated.

Mr. PERCY. I thank the distinguished Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen­ator from lllinois is recognized.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, at that point the Liberty ship was to be scuttled in order to dispose of 12,540 concrete­encased nerve gas rockets she was carry­ing. Some of the rockets contained the powerful and long-lasting VX nerve gas, others the more soluble GB nerve gas. The rockets had been secured in con­crete in 1967 and 1968, but now the con­crete cases were deteriorating and the Army decided they better be dumped _~t sea.

The decision had caused a national protest. The Army was unable to con­vince the public that there were no dan­gers in transporting the concrete "cof­fins" by rail across the South or that the gas would not be released into the sea, endangering marine life.

The mayor of Macon, Ga., had vowed that the train would not go through his city. The Environmental Defense Fund and the Governor of Florida had gone to

the courts for a permanent injunctio against the dumping at sea. The govern­ment of the Bahamas, only 165 miles tr the southwest of the dumping site, ha protested strongly.

In th~ end, the mayor of Macon re­lented, the legal action failed, and the government of the Bahamas fell silent again. The concrete "coffins" were loaded aboard trains and moved slowly through the South to an Army military ocean terminal on the appropriately named Cape Fear River at Sunny Point, N.C. There the old Liberty ship was loaded with its deadly cargo.

There has been much consternation because the dumping was allowed to take place despite widely expressed public objection. However, it seemed as though the Army had no alternative. The nerve gas rockets could not be removed from their concrete cases and detoxified. Dumping at sea was a safer solution than burying on land. Because of deteriora­tion, no time could be lost in developing a new method to deal with them. To Secretary Laird the issue was clear. He said that it would never happen again.

The fact of the matter was this: the "!jve" nerve gas rockets should never have been put in concrete without being detoxified first. This is now agreed by all concerned, and the Army has aban­doned that procedure. Chemical weapons are now detoxified, and biological weap­ons sterilizea, in entirely different ways. Live chemical and biological weapons will no longer be transported for disposal.

The committee bill recognizes the problem by including disposal, for th first time, in the HEW safeguards pro­gram on chemical and biological weap­ons. Only transportation and testing had l:1een covered in Public Law 91-121, which was approved on November 19, 1969.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent that section 409(b) be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the section was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECTION 409(b) None of the funds au­thorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used for the transporta­tion of any lethal chemical or any biological warfare agent to or from any mil1tary In­stallation in the United States, or the open air testing of any such agent within the United States untll the following procedures have been Implemented:

(1) the Secretary of Defense (hereafter referred to in this section as the "Secretary") has determined that the transportation or testing proposed to be made is necessary in the interests of national security;

(2) the Secretary has brought particulars of the proposed transportation or testing to the attention of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who in turn may direct the Surgeon General of the Publ1c Health Service and other qual1fied persons to review such particulars with respect to any hazards to public health and safety which such transportation or testing may pose and to recommned what precautionary measures are necessary to protect the publ1c health and safety;

(3) the Secretary has implemented any precautionary measures recommended in ac­cordance with paragraph (2) above (Includ­ing, where practicable, the detoxification ot

&.~ 3

United States oj America

-Q;ongrcsslonallRttotd-PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 9 1st

CONGRESS, SECC?ND SESSION

Vol. 116 WASHINGTON, MONDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1970 No. 200

ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT SITUA­TION IN VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President. IMt December 15 President Nixon made a brle! report to the Nation on the sltul\­tlon In Vietnam. He referred In tllat speech to what he termed a "firsthand. candid and completely Independent" re­port on tile situation In South Vlelnam by Sll' Robert Thompson. the celebrated British expert on guerrllla warfnre and archit~t of the victory over Commwll., t Insurgents In Malaya.

Sir Robert. the President announced had been "caUtiously optimistic" after 1\

5-week trlp to South Vlc.lnnm. nnd had reported "a winning Pooltlon has been a.chleved ... " The President told us tha.t this favorable assessment wns "In line" with other reports and his own thinking. However. he did not reveal Sir Robert·s report beyond tills brlef charac­terization.

These Presidential remarks are par­ticularly notable now. a yoor later. be­cause Sir Robert Thompson has gone again to South Vletnnm on an omclal mission tor several weeks and again re­Ported to the President. But his findings today have not been reported by tile administration in any way to the Ameri­can people. let alone in a Presidential address.

For. according to the New York Times. Sir Robert reported this time a disturb­Ing fallure to eliminate the Vietcong ap­paratus In Soutll Vietnam. Such a failure undermines all otller aspects of pactnca­tlon and eertalnly belles continuing ad­ministration optimism about pollttcal realties In South Vietnam.

In a subsequent radio interview with NBC In London. Sir Robert faulted this press account as over-emphasizing :'one detail" of his report. but he nonetheless publicly acknowledged that the threat of Vietcong subversion was not yet "suf­ficiently reduced."

We must nsk. I think. what is "suf­ficient" after all these yenrs. the bil­lions of dollars. the tens of thousands of American lives.

I should add thnt these reporl8 bear out an earlier nccount In tile New York Times of October 19 that tile Saigon ,.eglme "'as massivelY lntlltered by Com­munist agents.

TIU\t, or course. Is ' what thLs war has alwayS' been about. Not arms caches In Cambodia. or bombing targets In the North. or strlc!ent speeches In Washing­ton. But who Is to rule South Vietnam. Who has tile political stamina to survive tile m1litazy stalemate.

That Ia tile Question our men hn ,'e died for-and stU! die tor. ,

. The whole elaborate. much-celebrated I structure of "VletnamlzaUon" rests on tile political balance. In plainest terms. so long as the Vietcong apparatus re­mains Intact. and so long 113 tile two sides refuse a negoUated settlement. tile prom­Ise of an honorable peace In VletnlUl1 Is a cruel hoax.

TIle American people are entitled to know In full what Sir Robert Thomp­son has reported to the Preslden t from both his t rips.

We nre entitled to know the tlndlngs of the Preslden t's Vietnam Special Stud­Ies Group. which the President. in hi. report to Congress Inst February. characterized as the main forum for de­termining "the factual situation" in Viet­nam.

Senate

A White House spokesman has refused to comment on the Thompson report. cn1lln~ It a "classified matter." TIle most I>owerfu! rebuttal to that position was Riven by President Nixon himself In his foreign polley message of February 18. lie wrote about Informing the pub­lic on Vietnam:

We <'An not try to toot the en~my. who know ""h"t II' Actually happening.

Nor mllst. we tool oUl"8elves. TIle AmeriCAn peoplf' mll"" hA.ve the full truth . We cannot. "tford 1\ 10.1\8 or connd.ence 1n our Judgmen t and III leAdership.

This I. Indeed an Issue of basic confi­dence. TIle ndmlnlstrnt\on must show It hM not been ml.leadlng the American people In the continued spending of lives Rnd mone)'. It must show It Is not the cnptive of the faelle illusions that blinded Its predecessor.

Most of nil . Americans must know the truth about Vietnam to prepare us for whatever trials may lie ahead . For If Communist victories are to be the out­come. we face either U,e challenge of ac­cepting reality or the madness of some at t.empt t.o reverse tt. In any event. Ule sacrifice we ha"e made obllgatcs our Government to tell u. Ule trutll. the whole truth. and to tell us now.

All thl. relate., Mr. President. to yet another striking report. a column b)' Stewart Alsop In Newsweek of Decem­ber 7. ·Mr . Alsop exposes the ominous de­terioration of the morale and discipline of our army In Vietnam. TIlere may be disagreement' over the reBSOns for tills unprecedented alienation of our men from their commanders. But It Is clear that we cannot go on asking our soldiers to fight and die on false pretenses about what has truly been gained In Vietnam.

Mindful of these enormous stnkes. I have written President Nixon to request that he make public the Thompson re­ports nnd oU,er omclal assessm,mts of the situation In South Vletnnrn.

I ask unanimous consent Ulnt the let­ter to the President and the relevant ar­Ucles from the New York Times and Newsweek be printed In the nECORD .

There being no obJection. the Items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD. ns (ollows:

TIle P5:F.JUDr;NT ,

Tile WIllte UOll8e.

U'oJlllfn gto". D.C.

Dr::n::weQ 11 , 1910.

Dr::.u Ma. PaulDCHT : I a.m very concerned over the &erie. or report.a about Sir Rober\ Thnmp"tC'ln's recent t.rl onJour behalf to Soulh \ ' ,M";la.m. CertAIn preu .torles lndl ... (ated thAt he re~urned with t.he Judgment. that dro:1JJ ' bave IU.ll fAUed to eliminate tbe , t threat poeed. by the Vietcong appnratua throughout the country.

In Q. lubaequent Int.en1e ... with NBC In , Lon~on, 81r.. Roben did ot'n.lclze t.heee preu acoounts as having "picked on one detAll" of h'-' report. And he ca11ed t.he 'tenOl' of bla lateat nndlng. "encouraging and even opU­mJstlc ." Yet In thAt same lnunlOw he pub­licI)' "cknowledged that the VIetcong ap­pAntw ,.,.&.1 not yet ".umc:lentiy reduced ," and that. Vlet.cong subversive strength w1t.Mn South Vlet.nam ......... "'l\reat which oould. at.1ll "ol'f'rturu" t.he SAigon regtme.

All thll comes In the ""ue of an equAlly disturbing presa report In October that the CIA nnds the Saigon government n\M.S1vely InnJtrat~d wlt.h COmmunl.st agent.a,

'J1lese reports rl\lse Mrlou. quutlons about the ~'hole structure of paclneaWon a..nd Vlet.­naml:r..at lon policies. If t.he future withdraw­a ls o f U.s, fo rce. Are to depend upon the real struntnA o r the South V:et..nameae regime, t he cOI\Llnlled At rangth of t.he Vietcong In· fnt.Structure- ",,'hl\tcu'er the ma.rl tDAI dRmage It h '\.. stl fff'r('d - cert"lnl)' eM"'" d ou bt. on I\ny

promise to bring aU our men- home lD.- th.--­near future, except t.hrous:b a genutne com4 proml.ae 8ettlement. • Mor~\'er, &0 long NI thLi potential for

Communist. vIctories In SOuth Vlet.nam re .. main. ob8Cure to the American people. and 80 long ft., t.he Admln1etration remains pub­)tcly com1}lltted to quite an OPJXWIILe out­come, the .tn.ge could be &et., .. In the put.. ror Aome dramatic U.s. mJllt.a.ry action to try to retrlnOi the Iltl11\tlon. 1 tear that would not. o nl)' be rutile , but al80 dlMatroU3 for ttie peace o f our own lIOClety. ~ ...

1 therefore uquest ,ou, Mr. President, to mAke public In rul) boLh the reporta ot Sir Roben. Thomp50U And other omclal &SIeM ... ments or t.he .ltuaUon In South Vietnam, 'n­elUding t.hoee or Lbo Vietnam Special Stud.Jes Oroup, which you elted tor searching and factu al I\nalYlls In your Message to the Con­BrNa on Yorelgn Relatlona l ... t F'ebruary.

As yo" "Rid In thRt MeSlage with regard to tnrormJng th, public on Vietnam : •

"We ('nnnot try to tool the enemy, .whO kn011o"5 ... ·hl\t Is Acr.uaJly happening. ,.

" Nor muet we fool oursel.es, The American people m\lst h.,'e the tull truth. W, can­not "n'ord 1\ loss or conndenee In our Judg­ment. and In our lel\del"8hJp."

Tel1lng t.he plAin tru t h about what Ilea fthf"l\d In VietnAm I" surely the beat 1naur­anee, Mr. President, nll\ln.t the d.h1alveneu And recriminAtion we all "!lnt to ayold In trying to end this ""tn r.

Sl llcerely. WALTU P . M'ONDALK,

I Pro m the Ne,,· York Times, Dec. 3. lQ701 EXrntT Now OLOOMY' IN REPoRT TO NaoN

ON V,ETCONG Po WE.

(By Tad Szutc) WAJiIIiNCTO ..... Dec. 2 ,-Slr Robert Tbomp­

&on, the Brl1.1811 expert. on guerrLUa warfare. hM told President Nixon t.bat the United StAtl"8 And "lIIed Intelligence and pollee et­ftJrts hl\ve tAlled to destroy the COmmUOllt .ub\'enll'e I\pparAtus In South VJetnlUl\.

lila report, submlt.ted In ~'rttlng to t.he President. At an unpubllclzed White ROUM meeting 011 OCt. . 13 , appet.n to be In marked contra.,t. ..... Ith the relatively optimistic vie .... on the secu rity sitUAtion In Soutb VietnAm that Sir Robert offered Mr, N1xon Jut De­cember.

Sir Robert. '" nndtng!\-outllned to n'e New York Times todAY by Admln1atratlon om­clAla rAmlliAr with the report-were ba.aed on a new nve·wcek 8eCret mtulon be undenook In SoUUl Vlet.nam at President Nixon". re­quest during September and. October before eomlng to Washington to delher ht. NpOrt.

The prt,' lotls mlMlon for M,c:. NlxOIL _wh1ch tJso JM~d tlve ..... eeks. WAS compleLed Jut Dec. 3, when be met with the Pre:sldent.

In hie polley apeecb on Vietnam 00 Dec. 16. )Jr. Nixon told of the ThomplOn milSlon. de­Urlbed. hia andlnga u "cautiously optlml ..... He," and quoU4 him .. reporting that. "1 ""M Yery ImprtS&ed by the Improvement In the mJlIta.ry and poJltlcal altuatlon In Viet­nam .. compared .1th aU proylou. vl,lta and ~.pocl"Jly In the aecur1ty attuaUon, both In Shl80U and the rural areu:· ~

Sir Robert. ', reoent missIon. bowever, as well ... the existence of hie October report hM been kept ' MOret, reportedly becauN hie new conclusloWl aeem to qutlUon t.he valid .. it.1 ot \.he pacification and Vlet.niunlzaUon Pl'Olnma. Including Operation Phoenix ",' hleb h&A been deacrlbed u a code name for • Ie(l.ret Central Intelllgence Agenoy opera­tion that led to Ule alleged muaa.ere at Mrlal Much IG. 1068.

On Oc:t . 14 , the da)' after he ooof8lT'ed with. f'l"O&Ident Nixon, SIr Robert c11ecUN<!d. the Vletn.a.m &It ul\tlon at. a meeting of high level mJIlt.a.ry omcers and Defense Depe.rtment and Intelligence omclalfl, pa.raphrMlng tn repllea to queet.lon.e the key polnt.a contaJned In hla report. to t.he Pre.ldent.

The maJn theme of Sir Robert ... tlndlng. ...... tha( deepl t.e lOtne 8\1Ceeesee in pncU1ca­uon. pe.rtlcUlarly In t.he pertonnance by newly elected omel.t. In SOut.h Vletnameae TllJage., there hu ~en a general failure 1.0 pollee I\Dd h\tcolligenee effort.. aJ.med a t eUm .. iJlAting Vlet.cong appnrat.UA In ~he country,

Tbe Thompoon rejiOi't7Wt.rllUirto- nave emphM1zed tbat IUCCeu in other upecta ot pRCltlcatlOn cAnnot solve the bastc paUtleR} problem tn VietnAm alter UlfJ "'llhdrnwnl of the bulk of American rorc~ 80 long I\S lhe Vietcong apparatus re.rua.l n.s vlrl.ually InUw:l .

Desplt.e ronUnuing AdmJn~tralioll op­ttmism over pac1fico.tlon, as expressccJ In public .tatements. t.he re are otncla)" here with extensive experience In Vietnam ""ho prlvately not only ahare Sir noberL's new conclusions but al60 argue tha I. the South Vietnamese poUtlta! and 5ecurH,y sltua.tion La 80 fragUe o.s to pose a critical lhr~ftL to the Sa.Jgon Oovernment e\'en In Lhe prt!ence of "residual" AroertClm combat force!': .

FOLLOWS EARLIE"- ASSESSMENT

Sir Robert's report followed an earlier as­seMmeut given to President Nixon by the Central IntelUgence Agency that more t.han 30,000 COmmunLat agents had been Inftlt.rnted Into the Saigon Government. including the omce ot President Nguyen Van n,leu.

When The New York Times publlahed on Oct. 19 an article band on the C.I.A. report. White House ornclals said thnt It exaggerated the extent ot the InnltraLiou and Wf\8 "o,·er· 1y pesa1m.1stlc." These comments were mAde. hO ... ·8Yer . tlve days atter the subml56lon o t the Thompson report de-clarl ng the. f\lHed anti&ubverslve program to be " lnMlequlHe."

The responslbUlt.y tor eradicating t.he un· derground Vietcong app"rAtus Is \'es ted In an agency known as Civil Operat.lon. and Rural Operations Support, or COIlDS, an aTm ot the Unlt.ed Sta.t.e. military command In SaLgon. CORDS works In Cool)erntton with the SOuth Vietnamese mlllt.'\ r)' Inte-lIIge-nce a nd national pollee.

Thd American agency's main antl."i ubver· .&Ive Instrument Is the highly controveTIIIlnl Operation Phoenix, composed o( South Viet· namese pollce and Dll1ltary nnd Intelligence ngenta. United States c~vlyAn ftnd mllltl!lry personnel And operRUns ot the Cenlml In· t.eUlgence Agency ....... ho pl"r _ key r ote tn the " 'hole operation.

Sir Robert wna said to ha\'e rtported. ho ..... • ever, t.hAt the three·year-old Operation Phoe· nix and. relo.ted a.cUvlUes were not doing "Ulelr Job" I\nd hAd taned t.o breAk up the enemy'. main etrort tn South Vletnllm.

Other lntelUgence sources laid that. Opere.· tlon Phoentx luelt ",'as InnltrAted b~' Vlt"t· cong _t:tn \.8,

omela14 tamlltl\J' wlt.h Sir Robert's con· cluslona laid. that. be WAS much Jess optlmlS­tio over t.he world wide aspects of the Viet· Dam .ltuat.Jon than be ..... lut rear. Alked at tho Pentagon meeting when the United Stntes could leave Vlet-ttnsl ntd Communllt shelUng Installations appeAred. to bttu' " not. right away." \

CIA SATS ENU;T SPU:.S H OLD VruT. POSTS

1N s.uCON

(By Nen Sheehan) WASJ'lINCTON. OCt. lB.-TIle Central Intel·

lIgence Agenoy has told President. Nixon that the Vlet.namese CommunISts hau tnnlt.rRled more t.han 80,000 agentllnto the Sout.h Viet· namese Government. In an applut\t.ua t.hat. hu b een v1rt.ually Impoulble to destroy.

Bec"uH of thiS, the C .I .A. r,.ported , U

United S""tee troop wlthdra1A'als proceed , a resurgence ot Communl!t st rength In South Vietnam can be expected .

The report t.o :Mr. Nixon Mid thlll the se­cret Communillt agents hRd Included an aide to Prealdent NguyC'n VAn Thleu ot SOuth Vietnam a tormer pro"lnce chief I\nd high oft\clals ~t the pollee and of militAry Intet· lIgence.

CONnllMATlOJ'( BY O FrlC'IAI-S

While tbe study t. not addressed sprclncal· \y to the question ot the Pr~sldent's .·ar pol· Icy, oalclal. ot the United States Oontnment who have read 1t lIy that It does rAise ques· tions about a key U»ff:t ot this policy-Viet. namlzatton, or gradUAlly giVIng the South Vietnamese the main burden of defendIng them..aelvea aga.lnlt the Vietcong and North Vietnamese a.n4 thUI aUo?"log Amarlc .. n troop wtthc1rawala, '

High Wblte House oalclais connrmed the existence of the report. They contended, hOW­ever, that It eX&lgerated the extent ot In­filtration and they rejected the anal,f811 ... Inaccurate and "ovirly pe.salm.l.st1c."

Tbey a&1d that the President had read • lummary ot tta content.a and that he 1s un­derstood to belleve that tbe an&1,.1I1.I unwar­ranted beeause ot the ltenfl'&lty ' optlmllttc reporta he baa been recelvlni ·1'rol1\ other 8Ource, about the progreas' or pacUlcation. the improved mUltary pertormance ot lh. South Vietnamese and the erTeet.& ot the Cambod1&n Incursion.

NO lMPL1CATlON o r FALl. The CentreJ. Intelligence Agency" an"ly.le

does Dot a.ssert or lrnply that t.he South Viet· namese Go\'ernment Is likely to tAil In the next tew mont.hs, the omclats .. ' ho have rtad It. &&14. Nor does the Itudy discou nt the lIkeUhood tbat the South VletnRmtlle Army will perform well In bMtle lor some time to come, u occurred In Cambodia..

(,03

wnat the .Iudy i\6ej'"lmply~tlie omalat. Mid, 'a that the 80uUl VletnaDlMf! Oovern­ment hIlA lIt.tle chAnCe ot enduring O\'f'r the long r\tn b~l\u"e ot t.he Ir~at utl"'lll o f Com· O1\tul "'lt JW!netration .

In terms of troop ",llhdrR'A·"I..- ~he Prul. dt"nt hRl§ 110 t nr committed hlm.;el f only to red ucIng AmerlCRn nlf'n In Sou t h VIetnAm to 284 .000 by neX"t ~I(\y. He hBS IlIdlCI\t.t-d, howe\'er, that he hopes t.o mAke turther wtth­drRl\·"ls 8., his Vletnnmlzatlon pr~rRI1l eon. tlnuu. The President hAS ,,1M) repeA tedly MAtt-d . as did high Whl t.e House oOlcl l\!1 In ('OO1nH'nt Inlt on the C.I .A. AnRlysls. thAt the VletllnmI7"t!on progrAm Is go ing well.

Detnlls ot the top·secret iIItud}' ""rTe mAde 8\'AIIAble to The New York Tlmt'", by the Oo\·t'rnment onlclRls \I.'ho reAd It . The Illidy WM mAde In.st May, the omd:\IA 5Rld, And hM bten circulated In the White 1I01l"'lC , the P .. ,ntAgon And the St.n.te IX-partrnen t In· lorm"tlon received since MRy--ef' p("cIRlIy after the two·month attack on Communt~t ~Anet.lIn rl('S In Ctlmbodla that endt"d June 30--h"-' continued to confirm the C I A: " findings. the ofttclal" at\Jd.

'nl(, "tUdy WM "ppaJ'1"ntly bn ...... ct .... 11 Jlew I'nformatlon about the nature And A17..e ot the CommunlAt spy organ1.7..Atlon In South \'I("lnnm M well ns on a tresh AlInly,,11 o f cftpturrd documenta and interrogAtion" of prlR01u!rtI and defectors duri ng lh~ In,o;t. t .. ·o to thr~e yefU'"l.

In lUi anl\lysl", tho Centrnl IlI l~lllgen('f' Agency says thn t early IMt year Rfter n oum· ber o ( setbacks on the baUleOeld. the Com· munl"18 de-clded to shift their long·rangt strateRY trom Intense mJUtuy acth'lty t o political erosIon, agalnlt the day ""hen Amt'r· tcrm troop &trenlth would no longtr be A

se rious threRt bKauH or wltbdrawalA. The enemy Is conftdent that this Atr"\('g\'

.. -III IUCCM"d, t.he annlyals polntC'd nut. It olTered no cont.radlctlon,

To ca.rry out U,e new et.rat..eg),. the report ft.M("rtl, the Communut8 It~pped lip \-helr tnnltratlon ot secret l8enta Into "Arlm" brAnches ot the South Vjetnam~!'le Ol)\·f'r n· ment.

WOST ""nvu or 60\,)1

11,e at udy estimates tha.t the- ('Hemy hn,i lu nItrated moro than 30,000 agt"nt&-Olost or th("m natives of the souLhern part o ( dh Id('d Vletnam-Int.o the armed lor«s , Lhe pottce force and the South Vlet.namese Intelligence organlmtlona charged ,.,'Ith eradiCAting the Vietcong guerrll1u and their North Vletn,,· mue allies . (JIlgh Whlt.e MOUM oroclall Iftld t.hat. the atudy gAve. total of about. 20 ,000 Agenta, but tbe otDolala who had read It laId they "'f're cert.aJn the ORUre WM 30,000,)

TIle number of .uch ngenta I. 6I\ld t.o be growing, with a goal of 50,000. It this g<l'll III reached. the IPY organization ... ·ould be 6 ver cent. o( the SOuth VleLuame.se mlllt.nr)· and police Corcea. The O.I .A. st.udy doub\.3, ho ..... • e,' eT, thAt the COmmunl.La a.chle,·ed their Bo&l by the end ot 1060, the tArget dale .

While the enemy opemU,'es rnnge I rom very etrecUve t.o very poor. the study snyl'i. the network derives ILl power from the Inct that the United States and "the South Viet· nnme1ie Government have nolhlng remo~ly ('omparnble.

The study describes the " 'o rk lngll uf three Communut pollUca]·nctlon flnd In telligence organlz.aUons, one o( whic h hns pro\'en 10 Impervious to Government. count("fme"A\lre~ that no ne ot Ita Importn.nt "8enta I\lwe bC'Cu arrested. The O.I.A. refers t.o the relntlvel)' (ev,: Arre.t.a to tell how Communist nj:tcntA hA\'e reached Into army belLdquATtna. Into PreAI· dent nllcu's omce t\nd e\'en Into the 1u1l0 · tlRllnR t..ean!.. "J. the Pllrl. peace:. t. .. lk • .

APATtlY A 1'0881111.1: 1U:.AM)~l

In ntld ltlon . the Centul I ntelllJ:clH to

Agency repom the (AJlure ot hundredl .)t tho uu.nda ot SOuth VletnMlNle poUt'tDIC'1l And eoldlen to report. conlAclA b}' Vlet~onR Agente. n'e report adela thAt the ('ntmy net­work could no\. exlit without. the \.n~ lt com .. pltelty-"9t' het.her trom lear. I)'mpathy or Apnthy-of the mPoJ or"lty o( SOuth Vietname6(' loldlers And polleemen.

The O.I.A. clt.ed Buch teellngl M evIdence that the Sa.lgon Oovernment could not com­mand tbe deep loyalty ot Ule men on whom It depend. to detend it.seU.

Altbough the SOutb VIetnamese Oo\'ern­ment ls., 1nfi1trated trom bot.tom to top. the Itudy aRys, the United Stat.ee and Saigon , h:we bad lIt.tle aueeesl not. only In penetrat­Ing the COmmUnist orglWlz.nUon but al&o to r keeping .genu aUve In arelU the Commu· nll1.8 control.

The .tudy olfers the following 1\51'e&''1 l1l1'nt. of the advantagel o( the eO("Ill)" " "Irt\ln! monopol), on .ub\'enlob:

There Is Po permnnent. ImbalAnce' In wetteRl mlllt.ary Inte11lgence. The ('nem)' IA usunlly fOf'Cwnrned o( allied mons and WI' United 51 les nnd South VI("loAm are ullunJl}' Igno· rnnt or Communl l\. onee.

8ef't\n~~ moet Oovemnu"nt·held tLrtAA: nri' nonunnl1r, rather thlUl fir mly. oont.rolled. th~ tnt'lln 111 "bl,. t.n n'("rult. 1W!'1~t1"tl' Rlld to

clroclde (r~ly who should be M8-.'lMltl.'\ltd r(.o r :'\I\:<lmum po liticAl effect..

-2-

- TIleen.ml1u.i":eiOilliiifiiCiintt ~ can­thwftrt Oovemment erIoN to lndltrat4t lta orgtml7..ntlon fUld t.en1t.ory. Government nRentA Me expo&Od In advtulOO and progrn.ma "Iollco h M Phoenix-an elTort begun In I DG7 to unco"er Rnd d~stroy the Vie tcong appt\· I':\tll.ll In the oountrya.td~re undermlntXt , Ontcl!\ls no~ thn.t'tho .tudy provided the lI\05t pl!\u.61ble explanation )'et. tor the con· lInulnt: (1\l1\1re 'ot PboenIx, a. program oon· s ld("r("d ,'I tn.l to Vlctnamlzatlon.

l'eneLrntlon o C non·Communl.t poltUcal p l'\rttt'S RJ,d rell glona groUp8 t.1Jow. t he Com· Ilnl1l1sta to tAke ndvn.utage or, nnd worsen, tho chronic l>olItlcal wcnkoeu 01 the Sout.h \"letnruneso oovcmmcnl..

The Communists can .Un·lve d e6plt.e grea.t. allied mlHU\.ry pressure. Tb"", U Amcr1ca.n troop wlthdrnwnb procero, tl resurgence ot Communist st.ren(;t.h can be expected. In cutUng townrd It.a goo.l o( 284 ,000 men. the United StM-c!'4s expcct.a to hAVO ::S44,OOO soldiers In Vleln.,m by t.ho end o( I070-a reductJoo o f 206.000 In t.,,·o yenra.

Dlsctl1~lng the mnke·up o( the enemy ftp~ pnrattu, the C,I .A, report 5."l)·s that the Ulre-e Communist orgonl7.aUons thftt control tbe esUmMed totnl of 30.000 ngent.e receive their orders lrom )"'"01, UlTOuGh the Centrnl or­nee (or South Vlelntun. the Commun1at com· InRnd lor the Sou\.h.. The d est.rucUon ot Ita hendquArt.crs was a. ROOI o ( Ule AmerlellIl dri\'e InU,} Cn.mbodla. but it l.t ltill operating In the Jungh~s.

According t.o lhe CJ,A., tho tull-tlme op. ("uth'es Are to be distinguished trom t.be mn.ny mOTe Una 01 thousn.nlb ot part-time (\g('nta Md Vlttcong Iympftthlzen In South.

, Vlet.nam. TIle lltrgest segment ot about 20,000 tull·

time opcrntl\'l"8 Is run by the M.1Iltal'J PI'06e­IrUng .':.!Ctlon. whose primary Aim Is to un· dermlne the mornle and etTectivenesa ot the South Vletnnmese ftnned torces and pollee, ncco«Hng to the .tudy.

nA~:.f t~c~~e.,~:~:n~S:loS;~t:m~e~~ 'T'htr try to' rec rUit other soldier. to the Communist Cnl15e, tomtnt d.tc.sent w1tbln unit.. perroI'm co,'en IL'J&ASllnatlona, eneour· nge d e-6erUons nod dete-cUOI1J1i and arrange Auommoc.lntlOl1s In whlch Government mJlI· tary unlta. t.o (",old CMuruUes, tnc.ltly a;-rM not. t.o Rttnck communllt forCH. Sucb ac· commodAtiona n.re II. .... -tdespread pracUce that Amrrtcan mHlt.nry R.(:hllen hRve not been I\ble to end.

Nr.TWoaJt or cooarDB

This group of 20,000 agents 15 ,upported by a large net.work. -of couriers And k.eeperl o t u(e.houses, "'htre agenta can take ret· lIge. MOlt kt"ept:rI ot these retugea are the wins or relA.tlves or SOuth Vietnamese 801-dltrs And pollcemen, the study continues.

A second grou~bout 7.000 agentJ;-l.I run by the Vietcong M.llItary • .Intelllgence Section, the Itudy &aYS. These agents are said to be spotted throughout all levda ot tbe police. amled torces and clvlllan admlnls· trallon, principally tor esplonnge. The .tudy not.es t.hAt the mission or lOme ot tbe h tgh· Jutl acenh Is to try to manipulate Oovern· ment policy. TIle MUttRry Intelligence see· tlon also In tercepts SOuth Vletname' e Army nnd poUce rndlo communications.

South VleLnameso eountcrlut.elllcence has hAd Its greM"st. SUCCC5S against these 00111· tar1 Intelligence AGents. but the Itudy cau· tlons thM the auccC1S5 ha.s been a limited Ol\~. A widely publicized roundup last. r enr prob"l»y appr~hendcd less than hnlC o( t.he high· leve l aG~nt.a worklnC solely In the So.J. gon "reo., the study MyS.

TIle third And pOMlbly most da.ngerous network. o( agent.a repor\,('d by the Central Intelligence Agency I I an estlmat.ed total ot 3.000 members ot tbo Vietcong aecurl1.y sen­I("e who permeate t.he SOuth Viet.namese po· lice Intelligence &ervlce, tbe army mulll· G~u(,~ and m.llltnry security ~rvlce, and the

Central Intell Igence Ornce. tbe 8out,h Viet.· naine-fie couuterpn.rt · ot the C .I.A. Othe r agents from the &eCret eervloe are repon.ed to be active throughout the non·CommunlBt. polUlcal pnrtlea Bnd rellgloua groupe,

The Vie tcong &eCurlt.y c.ervloe ,L1 rcport.t'dly a type o( poltllcnl and secret police with the mAin mission 01 combating JnlUtraUon or

~~!%R~~C~: "nt~l~he~~~~l~~rimi~~ nlst·dominat.ed regions 1n the' 80uth.

The service all50 report.ed1y jo~P.tes Ja.rge networks oC clvlUan 1ntorm&ll~ Govern­ment. areas, draw. up blackl~a~C event A Communlst-lll1luence<l 80 t tak.a powu In Sou1.b Vietnam, aD4J lIiIleota and kUla those people on ib.e bl.ack11&t.a .. 'bose deaths might have an lmmedlate ps),cbo­logical "nd political lmpa.ct.

TIle chleC mlulon o( Ua 3.000 .agent.. In the 5ou1.h Vletmull("le .t.ruclure U to keep th' Communlste Inromle<i ot bow much the Government. kno,,'. Rbout tbem and to block Rny p("HelraUon by Oovernment.

"l1'e Vietcong aecurlty .enlee II so e.mclen~ that n Orlet o ( Ita Important agenu Iu. ve been

ftP~~~)~~~~~.~i" ::k:!~~~ ~r~~ Ihat Althougb lIumc l ~llt d.nta Are AVAllnble \0 es tImate the

Ilze ot t.1;l. :ctand8lUDe apparatua a.nd lOW It worb,'both the United State. nnd the SOuth Vietnamese Oo\'ornment. have not been able to obtAln t.be kind ot precl&e In. formAtion needed. to IdenUly and nrrc.st thousands at individual o.genta and dest.roy t.he network.

The South Vietnamese Government htu. been maJting greater eaorts In recent. m onths to apprehend agents. the omclnls who rend the report laid, but ha.s not achieved meRn· tngtul progress because the penetration by the enemy 18 already 60 great..

To illustrate t.he omnlsclence ot the sub· "enlve apparatus, the stUdy rhea flome ex· ample. from among the relaUyely small num· ber ot Agente who have been apprehended.

One wu Huynh Van Trong. Presldeot Thleu's speCial asslatant ror poUltenl atTnln. M such he was privy to the l~nerm06t work· ings ot the South Vietnamese Oovernmcilt M well as to .ecre~ communications bct. .. '~n Mr. 'Ibleu and President Nixon. He hAd 1\11110 participated tn the Pnrls peace talks And had been sent on A senslt.lve poUt.JcnJ mts-tII lon to the United States.

Another agent WB.S t\ National As!embly deputy and two more wcre urny mAjors who had aerved In the section ot the poltce torce whocse mlsalon ta to prevent Communis t In· rutratlon. A tourth "gent was the tormer assIstant chlet or the counterlnte11lgence branch or the anny secu rity senlce. One agent W8.3 tho chid medical omcer ot the national police, another WM a t ormer pro v· Inee . drier ftlld another WI\8 the tormer deputy pollce chlet or Hue, the old ImperiAl capital. The cWet or the principal army communlcatlona ~nter In Dalat wn.s I\\so reportedly discovered to be acting tor the Vietcong.

SOme agents Ai the bottom hn.\'e turned up In deceptively userul postl6. One V.·M the chauffeur tor the commanding gencml ot the a.rmy corps that cncompR.SSet thc northern· most provinces ot the country. A 5econd agent was the main sen·ant. In anot.her gtn. erat·s house.

In tracing t.he enemy 's decision to sh irt to a strntegy emphasizing political erOll lon, t.he Itudy said that It had b«n mnde by Ule North Vletnnmese Politburo. In addition to ordering a rcducUon In fighUng, the Pollt· buro call~ tor a cut In Infiltration trom North Vietnam, t.hc Centrnl Intelligence Agency said, lnnltraUon decl1ned trom about 250 ,000 men In 1968 to Ilpproxlmntely 120,000 In 1969. with the rt\le \.hIs year report.edly runnlng tOWArd hl\1t the 1969 tolnl.

AMNESTY PROCltAlrI osm The Com munists nlso shi ned thousI'ncis

ot tratned personnel from thelr milltft.ry torces Into the t.hree polltlcl\l burceucracles _":- - -that penet.rat..e Ule SouUl VlcLnameee OOY" erlUnent aod sent large numbera ot polltlCAl let\dera Into government territory. the study says.

These new agente enter the SOuth Viet· nam.etWJ atructuJ"8 by 6Cveral rout.ee, one ot the moct, common of wbJch 18 the Govern· ment'. amnesty program for Conununlst de· fectors :",,80me Communll\ documents refer to the Infiltration proc:ea ea "the trans­formation ot party CAdle. lnto Innocent peopl . ...

There 15 e\' ldence that at le:\8t severnl thousand fnlse detectora enterr<.1. thro\lgh more than halt the pro\'lncC8 ot South Viet· nam In lOG!) , the study sa)'s. Ornclals sl\ld they could not estimate what percentage ot the 47 ,203 Vietcong detectors ~ported by the SAigon Government IMt yrf\l" were Actually Vietcong agenla.

The study a.s.s.erts that large numbers ot what the communists call "1eg1\lIzro C!'drc8" are now quietly Hvlng And working In 8\IP­posedly paclned d\!rtrtcta.. A 1t"gf\lIud cadre Is an agent who b.... I'cq\llred legitimate status In South VletnRme!l~ society.

A1I an eXAmple or IUch oonr &CUvlUes, aU ~ ''.f!:mbers ot l\ vll1"ge council In ftn osten!Jlbly p~ct ned. cUawlct recently weTe dlacovere<i to bo Vletcoull agenle. . ., •

Although tho study _ not dd'io directly. ; It rl\l-ee questlona about the optlmlstlC re ..

porta on pactt\catJon 'that Mr, NlxoD hoe been .receiving. Ita lmpUcatlon, lOl1\e omc1ala who

t bav. read Jt Mld. 1. \II ••• ·ozq:re"!l'lq .... bftTe decided to lonle extent at least.:.:-not to oppose allled ptlclft.caUon dorts frontally but to con~ntrate on inftitr&lm« th~ paellleMl.

concitldlng b,dTlCuaatng th"JaelFOt meili= ' In~tul poll uenl commitment 'to the Salr.o '"l GO·:t'tl1rnrn t by the majority or SoutJ\ Viet· tlttmt",e lJoldl t"rl, the study fe-m,nks thAt dur· l1\g fl" 18-nv>oth period only 348 solillen rt"· ported thftl they had been approftchrd by thc Vietcong. During this time. the Central In· tell!~('nC"c Agency ,ay •• tt II known thfLt. the VlttC"ong mnde hundreds ot thOUSAnds ot np· proa C" hr~ to m1ItUry pcrsonnt"1.

COMMENT bT OTP1CtAl..5

Wht"n nrst asked about t he Iludy restcrdl\r, the White House dtellned to 6cknov.'ledge It,., f'x t~tenoe. Today high Whlt.e House omclals did flO but conl,cnd~d thl1t the Ihldy had ~n "~~tnllatly a one·man product." that It did "not rrp~nt the torm"l position ot the C.I.A ." nnd thl't It hn.d not In l'oll'eQ a com· btnnt n""lrUCAI effort by 1\11 American Intel· 1If:t"nce Sf'n' lct"S.

Under qUC3l.1onlng, lhey expll\ln~c1 th"t whnt th~y munt Wfll that the analystl had b~t'll done "on ft n"rro"," basis" In the Cen· tml rnt,(" llIg~ncc Agency. but with rl'w mfLte· r lft.l furnl , hed by &11 the Int.elllgenee agenclt"l. They "Iso SAid that the analYlta hac1 been coordlnf\t<'d wlt.hln the C.t .A .• th~n ... ·Itb the re .. t at the IntellIgencc ngcncles "on I' IImlt~d batlll5"' And IMtly distributed under ft. Central Intelligence AgoncY8tft.Olp aa an Institutional re-por t.

A Apoke~mnn tor the agency hAd no com· ment on t.he st.udy.

VJI:TNAW: OUT PASTU (B1 Stewart Alsop)

WA51IlNOTON,--Obedlen\ to bLs Pt\vlo\'11Ul tmpulsCfl, Sermtor FulbrIght charged last v;~elt tha t the Air raids on Nort.h VietnAm nnd the prLsoner·rescue operaUon algnl\led "nn elli:pal1slon ot the w.,.:' The chances (Lre thnt the pr~clse opposite la true. For th ero l~ a growing teallng among t.he Admlnlstra· ttou's pollcymakers tha.t It might be n good Idea to acct"lerate the rate ot w1t.hdra\\'a l trom Vlel nam \'cry sharply.

,1IUC uo two good rNuons why this would he A good Idea.. Ono ls that ' di scipline I\ud morn le In the Amerlcn.n Army In Viet.· nam Rte delerlorat.lns \"cry at'tlously. The othrr Is thAt t.he Army hAJJ Rcompllsh~d the bl\slc mlu lo n tor which It WI\S sent to Viet. · I1nm. .

As to Ute firlt point, an Item of evidence lS the Addition to Ute "erb "to tmg" to the f'nllstrd man'. vocabulArY In VletnaDl. Thc ",'ord meAns to uae a fragmentation grenAde to coo) the a.rdor 01' Any otncer or NCO too I';\gu to makc contAct with the enemy. No doubt. the Dumber at men who hnve been f!"AJ.q;W. IlJ Irnall, but the word It.~e lt tells t he stor)·.

Much other evidence teUs the IUlllle storr, i'kt the rf'cent Article In Lite About all tn· r.~ntr}· C'OmpfUlY wh05e Well point com· lI\ :lIlt1e r had to plead with his nUll to g6 on pl\lrnl- when n. commnnder hlL6 to plend with h15 men. In8lead ot ordering them. hi , out,. Ilt hI'S gone plumb to hell. l1u\t the whole Army In VietnAm lain dnngt"r of going plumh til hcl1 Is turther att.ested by a small nood (I t lelt~ra trom Vlet.nam Itlmulnted br 1\

(''I111)le of rf."Ce-nt. piKes In this apace. AVOID CONTACT

A M'rgrollt, tor e:CAmple, WTItt"S lhl\t '·lcnd · f'MS ot Imnll combat units like myseU " are under nNce preaaure trom their men to do e\'erytJllng poMlble to "avold contACt. with the ent"m)· ... Other lett.era heM v.·ILn~s to the bIUUIlf'M ot t.he combat soldiers who fecl­vdth reason-that the ayst.em d lscnmlnf\t("l nSI\.hUlt them . "10m a combt\t Infnntrymnn, r\ drnfLCfl, 1\ loscr." one mnll "'-rote. "The tew time. we go to the reM \\'C I're trel\tNI l1ke FC Unl by t he cle-rks And Jerks ... I ..... o uld "'ther shoot. my conunnnding olhct"r thall the entmr:'

'nu!rc arc cf'rtRln obvious U'fbOlUi tor the deteriorAtion ot dlacl pUl1e And mornlt . Are· trt"at I. the mocst dlmcult. ot militAry move· menU!, p.'\rtly beenule no olle WAn\..8 to be t he IMt mall killed In " ,,'ar. " No one WAIlU to be a CMualty tor no reason at all." wrltee an en1l6~ man, "especially whcn t.he decl· eJon to t.ermtnat.e the ftghttng o\'er h ere hAA nlrelLdy been taken.·' ' f

Any army, mOl'eover, retlecta the home front, and tbe home tront haa JOlt stomach for the war, Tho war wu hardly mentioned In t.he recentfl. cAmpa.1gn, And no brass band, ,Tee" the returning veU!rAJl . The Army re·

-3-

• '",:, Ui8b..nnrOn~ lii""RnOthor w'Y-tOO:­J'Uef'nt. wttnouea betOft a HoUle committee t~tln.ed. UUlt bct.v,,'eeh eo ver cent and 80 ptr ~nt ot the enlisted mNl hA\'e tried the powtrtul Vic:l.uam mirlju iiila'-:--'rhe drug cuI· tUJ'"'ft. 1o o\.htr ..... ords. haa Inyaded the ArmY· A pot. amoldng nnn}' CRn hard.Jy be e:cped~ 1() be a t\n; t·cln.&l. nghtlng torce.

DIlEAOrvL 8YfiTr;tJ

There 1.1 nlso 1\ lell obvloua reason tor Lhe delertoratlon-th. Anny'. dreadtul Iyltf1ll

vr r«Tultment. Under the Iystem. the Army f'ntlc" men to enlist by promising them, al· moat In so many worda. that they wttl not have to nght In Vletnnm. A mnn who enlists betore he Ie drorted Ls perm1tted to ch()i()Ml hLs o",' n " MOS" or m lUtuy occupationAl spe· clnlty. Not . surpris ingly. o nly 2.6 per cent. c.hO<>!fe tho hllantrr.

Thla drendtul S}'HtC01 hns now c3ugll t up with Ule Army In Vietnam , The comb"t. toroea In Vietnam thr« or four yenn ago were h1ghly protes~l (\nf\I, and "ery Imprea. ~ lve, Now, 1 6 n result or the ar~tem. the com· bnt torC4!'ft aret mnnned by bitter dratt.eu. AlmOlt nine out 01 t~n (88 per cent) ot the Influl try rtnfmeo are dmft.ces,

The r!«ult la Ino\"ILa.bI~tbe drattees get killed In dlaproporUonat.e numbers. They make up If'U than A third ot the men In Vlctnam. nut according to a at.udy bJ An­drew OIL"'II tor the National J ournAl, con· Urmct1 by ~e Pentagon m :mpower ezpeite aa Hf'C Urnte. they get "11100 At neRrly double the mt~ ot the non-draftee enllated men.

Is It. any wonder that \.he drattefl are I)!l.t.er? II tt.. In tne\., any wonder that they do :IA lIt.t1e nghtJng aa poelIlbJe? And 1a Jt any ""onder t.a.ht thoee ""ho know the BCOn!I are l,eglnnlng to think about pulling thll: non­lI~hUng fUTlly out at Vietnam In a hurry?

Prf'fe-Jlt. plana ('AlJ tor w1thc1raw1na to the le\'N. ot I\bout 280,000 men by May, wi th grnduAI 'to'lthdrAWIlI. thereat\.er to around ~O ,OOO m'"en In tOe tau ot 1972, TIlls "resldun.l to~" will zs.a manned wholly by non· drflt~a. He Job w1.l) be to e.mure eontlnuf'd ft lr and ftrt'power I!uperlorUy to the South \ ' let.nl'melSe. Lhus protecting t.o the extent ~tble the huge American tn\'f'"tment ot blood and t.ren.aure In VletllAm.

TIlls rAte or wlt.hdrawA I could cert..nlnly be I\ccelrrat.ed . According to Uu»e who should know, the draw·down to the reeldual·torec le\'el could be c."ompleted. In an orderly tuh· Ion . br the tall ot next year. perhap8 by late ~\1Inmf' r . The chler argument. agoJnst auch nil "ccelt-ratlon IA Ulat It 'Would undercut our b:lrgftll1tng J)()"'u In PMIs. But surely It OHRht to be ob"lou, by \hI, t.lIne thAt Ule (;omnmnlat .Ide hu not..--end ne\'er hu hnd-the slightest Int.entton ot negotiating I' com promise settlement our "Ide could con· crl,",,!>ly ACcept.

nlere are rislLa, ot coune. In- an aocel· f'rR Led wtt.hdrft. .. "1tJ. but. the greatf'lt r lak ot nil I. Inh~rent In \l)e constant de terlora.Uon of dlsclpllno nnd morale In our Army tn Viet· 111'01. There Is nlso flno',her rettJlon .... hy lllf' ..... lthlirAwol could ond should be hccelPr'Rted .

OB.J£CT ACHIEVE.D TIul object ot ou: long agency lu Vlunam

hu bten to preHnt t.he CommunlJ;ta from ulz.lng powrr br force In South VleUlam. No one can predict wha t. might llappen Ave or ten rean trom now. But tor the Imme-1I1Rtely torr~able tut.ure. according to ululble mf!n who know ~:ha t they are t.a lk· tng about. t.hnt object hl\& been nchle\"ed,

The ComOlunllt.a cnn ,Ull muke a lot of trouble. ot course. But. fJ \'("D After an accele· rated .. 'Ithdrft\\·nl, t.hey .3lmply d o Dot have the torces or the political aupport to make jitood on their promise to rename Brulon Ho Chi Minh City-not. unlna we American., ftre 1\ .. lnine enough t.o throw .... "y our whole huge In\'C6tm~ot tn Vletuam by , ... lthdraw· Ing. In a Ot ot pique. all our ,upport. tor the J:HOople ... ·ho ha\'e tought on our aide.

Buk In 1960, Sen . George Aiken proJ>OIed that ~' e make a "unilateral declArAtion ot mllllAry Victory;' and withdraw our torcn trom VI~tnam . In the sen .. thnt t.he b •• lc American obJectiye In Vl,tnam has noW' been achlfnd, that "ylclory" haa at last been ,,·on. 80 I, I. lime to ukt' those bitter drf\ttee8 In our crumbling Arm }" out ot VleUlftm-and the looner the better .

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