+31703200733 P.03/37 Foreword This annual reports gives an outline of the subjects which demanded the attention of the National Security Service (BVD) in 1996. It describes the phenomena and groups that constituted a risk to security in the Netherlands in 1996 as well as the BVD's policy and activities. Where possible attention is also paid to more recent developments. The secret, operational information held by the BVD has not been included in this report. This information is provided exclusively to the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services. The international dimension in the work of the BVD again proved to be of increasing importance in 1996. Security issues in the Netherlands are often connected with tensions in other countries. For that reason international cooperation has become essential to keep the risks under control. In addition, it has become evident that crime involves more and more aspects that fall within the BVD's sphere of activity. This has led to more interfaces between the work of the BVD and the field of police and judicial authorities. The rapid developments in the field of telecommunication, concerning both technological developments and market conditions, have great impact on the work of the BVD. Fnally, laws and regulations relating to the BVD are now subject to major alteration. This annual report provides an insight into these developments and enables you to consider the activities of the BVD on their merits, H.F. Dijkstal, Minister of the Interior 19-03-1998 14:40 BIZR II I I I ^
Transcript
+31703200733 P.03/37
Foreword
This annual reports gives an outline of the subjects which demanded the attention of theNational Security Service (BVD) in 1996. It describes the phenomena and groups thatconstituted a risk to security in the Netherlands in 1996 as well as the BVD's policy andactivities. Where possible attention is also paid to more recent developments. The secret,operational information held by the BVD has not been included in this report. Thisinformation is provided exclusively to the parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence andSecurity Services.
The international dimension in the work of the BVD again proved to be of increasingimportance in 1996. Security issues in the Netherlands are often connected with tensions inother countries. For that reason international cooperation has become essential to keep therisks under control.
In addition, it has become evident that crime involves more and more aspects that fallwithin the BVD's sphere of activity. This has led to more interfaces between the work of theBVD and the field of police and judicial authorities.
The rapid developments in the field of telecommunication, concerning both technologicaldevelopments and market conditions, have great impact on the work of the BVD. Fnally,laws and regulations relating to the BVD are now subject to major alteration.
This annual report provides an insight into these developments and enables you toconsider the activities of the BVD on their merits,
H.F. Dijkstal,Minister of the Interior
19-03-1998 14:40 BIZR II
II
I ^
+31703200733 P.04/37
Contents
page
Foreword 1
1 The National Security Service 51.1 General 51.2 Terms of reference 51.3 Control 61.4 Parliamentary scrutiny 71.5 Intelligence resources 8
2 Subjects relevant to national security 92.1 Violation of constitutional rights 92.2 (International) organised crime 22.3 Terrorism and other political violence 132.4 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and trade in conventional weapons 152.5 Espionage 172.6 Integrity of the public sector 182.7 Protective security 192.8 Other areas for attention 22
3 Cooperation 233.1 National cooperation 233.2 Cooperation with the overseas territories 243.3 International cooperation 253.4 European Union 27
4 The provision of information and complaints procedures 284.1 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act 294.2 Complaints
5 Staffing and organisation 305.1 Personnel 315.2 Organisational developments 315.3 Computerised information 315.4 Facilities 315.5 Finance 31
Annexes 33
'y
19-03-1998 14:41 BIZR II
* J-TV_}- | JCK -L- DI L11- I Io(>. I . /V Y
1 The National Security Service
1.1 General 1
In 1996 the National Security Service (BVD) focused its attention on violation ofconstitutional rights, (international) organised crime, violent political groups, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, trade in conventional weapons, espionage and protectivesecurity.
As concerns violation of constitutional rights, it turned out that political, ethnical andreligious conflicts in other countries again led to (latent) tensions in the Netherlands andtherefore demanded the attention of the BVD. The BVD also devoted attention to(international) organised crime, in particular the possible consequences of criminalactivities for the functioning of public administration, the legal order and society in general.The violent political groups to which the BVD gave attention mostly pursued aims in othercountries, except for the radical wing of the environmentalist movement, which inspiredsabotage and other acts of violence in the Netherlands.
The 8VO continued to pay attention to the involvement of Dutch companies in proliferationof weapons of mass destruction. The investigations into illegal trade in conventionalweapons were stepped up. In addition, it proved to be necessary to give attention to theactivities of Russian intelligence services, even though the BVD has now started to workwith these services in a number of fields.
In the field of protective security the BVD issued security advice and recommendations toseveral institutions and companies, while the Service also screened applicants for positionsinvolving confidentiality. Due to the rapid technological developments new questions wereraised with respect to the protection of information which demanded the BVD's attention.
The intensification of the BVD's international cooperation with foreign counterpart serviceswas continued in 1996 and led to the stationing of another BVD liaison officer abroad,namely in Singapore. The bilateral relations with countries in central and eastern Europeand the Middle-East were stepped up. In the run up to the Dutch presidency of theEuropean Union the European cooperation in the field of counter terrorism received a newimpetus.
The rapid developments in the field of telecommunication also have implications for thetechnical resources of the BVD, the Military Intelligence Service and law enforcementagencies. In order to safeguard the interception of data communications now and in thefuture, considerable investments were made in staff and equipment.
The Intelligence and Security Services Act, which provides a statutory basis for the activitiesof the BVD, will be revised. The Council of Ministers decided to submit a proposal for anew Intelligence and Security Services Act to the Council of State for advice in November1996.In the legislative proposal the name of the BVD is changed into General Intelligence andSecurity Service, in Dutch Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD). The billprovides for regulations on the deployment of special intelligence resources and theprocedures involved. These regulations include the interception of (tele)communications
2 and letters, (house) searches and surveillance. Other regulations govern the access of thirdparties to personal and other data held by the BVD. According to one of the principles onwhich these regulations are based, no access is granted to personal data of less than fiveyears old. In addition, it is proposed to set up a new independent supervisory committeefor the intelligence and security services. This committee will be charged with thesupervision of the lawful implementation of the new Intelligence and Security Services Actand the Security Investigations Act,
In connection with the liberalisation of the European telecommunications market in 1997, theTelecommunications Act is being revised, In order to safeguard interception by the BVD inthe future, it will be laid down in the new Act that telecommunication services and networksmust be interceptable as soon as they enter the market. This revision follows naturally fromthe Draft Plan on Lawful Interception of Telecommunication (Second Chamber, 1995-1996,24679, no. 1). Under the new Act service providers will also be obliged to provide data tothe BVD and judicial authorities which they need for interception operations.
The discussions in Parliament on the bill providing for rules pertaining to security screeningwere completed in 1996. The Security Investigations Act came into effect on1 February 1997. The Act provides for regulations for the public and the private sector onsecurity screening and the designation of positions involving confidentiality. Vettingprocedures should now be completed within eight weeks. On the basis of the outcome theMinister of the Interior decides whether or not to grant a security clearance. Decisionsbased on the Security Investigations Act are governed by the General Administrative LawAct. This implies that an applicant who is rejected for a position involving confidentialitymay lodge an objection on the basis of this Act.
1.3 Control
1.3.1 The Minister of the InteriorThe Minister of the Interior, who is accountable for the BVD, meets the Director General ofthe BVD for consultations on a regular basis. Two-monthly reports provide the Minister withdetailed information about all current activities. In 1996 the Minister reconsidered the tasksof the BVD and initiated an adjustment of its terms of reference. The number ofestablishment places has remained unchanged.
1.3.2 Ministerial Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (MICIV)The MICIV comprises the Prime Minister and the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs,Defence, Justice, Economic Affairs and Finance. The regular participants in MICIVmeetings are the chairman of the MICIV and the members of the CVIN-plus group (seeparagraph 1.3.3). The MICIV gives political guidance to BVD and Military IntelligenceService and discusses the co-ordination of the activities of these services. In 1996 the
r/70
4. I v__ i». .- * +JZ lY^2YU0YJJ P. 06/'37
1Y-U5-1Ya 414:41+31703200733 P.07/37BIZA II
MICIV met on five occasions and discussed subjects such as the amended Intelligenceand Security Services Act and interception problems, in addition to a number of operationalissues. The number of meetings was remarkably higher than in previous years (twomeetings a year on average), because of the need to discuss the implications of the newIntelligence and Security Services Act.
1.3.3 Netherlands Joint Intelligence Committee (CVIN)The CVIN coordinates the activities of BVD and Military Intelligence Service. TheCommittee consists of the Co-ordinator for the Intelligence and Security Services and hisadvisor (Ministry of General Affairs), the heads of the BVD and the Military IntelligenceService and representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice. Dependent on 3the subject under discussion, representatives of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and theMinistry of Transport and Public Works also participate in the meetings. In 1996 the CVINmet on ten occasions. The key subjects for discussion were the Intelligence and SecurityServices Act, the protection of information and the cooperation with Military IntelligenceService, police and special investigative services in the field of interception. Other areas forattention included the developments in the CIS, in Iran and in right-wing extremist circles.The so-called CVIN-Plus group met several times in 1996. This group consists of all CVINmembers plus the secretaries general of the ministries participating in the MICIV. Themeetings were held in preparation of MICIV meetings.
1.4 Parliamentary scrutiny
The BVD's annual report for 1995 and the report of the parliamentary Committee on theIntelligence and Security Services on its activities in 1995 were discussed during a plenarysession of the Second Chamber (Dutch Lower House) on 27 August 1996. Another item onthe agenda of this meeting was the letter from the chairman of the Committee on theIntelligence and Security Services of 15 November 1994 on the composition of theCommittee. The Second Chamber intends to continue the debate on the composition ofthe Committee as soon as it knows what scrutiny instruments have been provided for in thelegislative proposal for a new Intelligence and Security Services Act. As a contribution tothe debate the Minister of the Interior provided a survey of the parliamentary scrutinysystems for intelligence and security services in a number of other countries. This surveywas submitted to the Second Chamber at the end of December 1996.
Both the First and the Second Chamber (Dutch Upper and Lower House) discussed theactivities of the BVD during the reading of the Internal Affairs Budget. A written report on thedestruction of BVD files was submitted to the Second Chamber on 6 May 1996. The reportwas discussed at a meeting with the Standing Committees for the Interior and forEducation, Culture and Science on 6 November 1996, a meeting in which also the StateSecretary for Education, Culture and Science participated. It was decided that the BVD'sselection list will first be tested during one year, which means that files will be selected fordestruction, but not yet destroyed. During this year the Council for Culture will be asked foradvice. Only after the results of this test have been discussed in parliament, the actualdestruction of files will be started.
1.4.1 Committee on the Intelligence and Security ServicesThe Parliamentary Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services comprises thechairmen of the parliamentary groups of the four largest political parties. In 1996 theCommittee discussed BVD matters in two confidential meetings, on 7 May and19 December 1996.
Y71 7i
+31703200733 P.08/37
The subjects for discussion on 7 May included the security measures surrounding theInternational Tribunal for War Criminals from the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, a numberof topical operational matters and the functioning of the Committee. The Ministerunderlined that he provides the Committee with relevant information at its request, but alsounasked-for.
On 19 December the criteria for cooperation between the BVD and foreign counterpartservices were discussed. This subject was tabled as a result of the fact that during theplenary debate on the BVD's annual report on 27 August the chairman of the Committeerecommended the Minister to reconsider these criteria, because questions had been raised
4 in Parliament about the BVD's relations with services in countries where human rights areviolated. The Committee was also informed about the general security situation in Arubaand about a number of current operational matters. The Committee will submit a separatewritten report on these meetings to the Second Chamber. The Committee received writtenreports on a number of operational BVD matters.
1.5 Intelligence resources
In the pursuance of its statutory duties the National Security Service has been authorised todeploy special resources. In this connection it is important that under the aforementionednew Telecommunications Act the lawful interception of telecommunications by the BVD issafeguarded, even when the telecommunications market will be liberalised. Theinterception of telephone communications generates important information. As from 1January 1996 network operators have been legally obliged to make the mobile GSMsystem interceptable.
y^- 8
BIZA IIlY-Ud-lYy 14;:4
* -- i. I L - I - - . .3) (
2 Subjects relevant to national security
This chapter gives an outline of the subjects to which the BVD devoted attention in 1996 5and the principal findings. Where possible it also looks ahead to possible futuredevelopments.
The first paragraph of this chapter deals with the violation of constitutional rights. Itconcerns phenomena which directly affect the democratic legal order.The next paragraph describes the involvement of the BVD in the combat of (international)organised crime. This is followed by a paragraph about violent political groups, some ofwhich are regarded as terrorist groups. Subsequently the developments in the field ofproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms trade are described,followed by a paragraph about the BVD's efforts in the area of counter espionage.
Finally an account is given of the BVD's activities in the field of protective security, followedby a description of a few other areas for attention.
2.1 Violation of constitutional rights
The BVD's attention for the protection of fundamental rights covers racism in general anddevelopments in the extreme right-wing movement in the Netherlands. It also includes theinterference of foreign powers with groups of immigrants in the Netherlands. Finally theBVD is paying attention to (radical movements within) Islamic organisations.
2.1.1 Racism and anti-migrant violenceThe BVD asked two scientific institutes to study the backgrounds of racism and anti-.migrant violence in the Netherlands. In 1994 the Scientific Research and DocumentationCentre of the Ministry of Justice studied the nature and scope of such violence in 1994, aswell as the motives of perpetrators, on the basis of files analysis.The Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law of the University of Utrecht studied racisttendencies among young persons through participant observation. The findings of bothstudies were revealed in May 1997.Parallel to these studies the BVD registers violent incidents targeted at ethnic minorities.Although the available statistical data are incomplete, the conclusion seems justified thatthe number of incidents hardly increased in comparison with 1995, This might beconnected with the decline in right-wing extremism, as shown by the recent election resultsand reduced membership of ultra right parties. A similar tendency developed in Germany,where a dramatic fall in the number of incidents was reported.
2.1.2 The far rightIn 1996 the far right was less in the limelight than in 1995; there were less right-wingextremist demonstrations. However, a number of ultra right individuals did attract attentionby open threats and attempts to intimidate certain politicians, especially representatives of
73 i7
Groen Links (Green Left). In connection with these incidents the BVD provided thecompetent authorities with detailed information and security advice on the protection of thethreatened politicians.
Unlike the general idea about threats as described above and racist violence in general,these incidents cannot always be blamed on extreme right-wing organisations as such.Such incidents, ranging from vandalism to actual violence (arson, assault and battery, etc.)should often be blamed on individuals who do have racist ideas and ultra right sympathies,but not always ties with an extreme right-wing party. In addition, racist violence often alsohas its roots in certain youth cultures. The two scientific studies mentioned under 2.1.1, in
6 combination with the BVD's own investigations, contribute to a better insight into thebackgrounds of this violence.
Due to internal differences the extreme right-wing movement went through a reorganisation in1996. The NVP/CP'86 (National People's Party/Centre Party'86) was split up. Two neo-Nazimembers (both of them councillors) were expelled from the party. Following their expulsion,these two extremists organised a general meeting in the name of the NVP/CP'86, duringwhich a new executive committee was elected. Subsequently, by the end of February somemembers of the old executive committee set up the Volks Nationalisten Nederland (People'sNationalists Netherlands). The neo-Nazis outside the NVP/CP'86 can be found in threegroups: the Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU, Netherlands People's Union), the FAP(Fundamentalist Workers Party) and the ANS (Action Front National Socialists), These groupshave joined forces, but so far this has not led to any solid structure.
2.1.3 Interference of foreign powersThe BVD investigates possible unacceptable interference by certain countries, especiallycountries in the Middle-East, with the communities from those countries in the Netherlands.It has been established that several countries are using their intelligence services to collectinformation on developments within the communities from these countries in theNetherlands and that this sometimes involves improper activities.
The BVD reports such interferences to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enable appropriatemeasures if diplomats are involved in unacceptable practices.The BVD specifically paid attention to attempts from Libya to collect information on Libyanrefugees. Investigations into the activities of the Iranian intelligence service in theNetherlands showed that these services continued their efforts to track down and registeropponents of the regime in the Netherlands. Members of the Iranian community in theNetherlands were intimidated in order to be forced into cooperation.
The BVD also investigated intelligence activities carried out by Iraqi services in the Netherlands.
The BVD devotes attention to developments which have their roots in the South-Slavonicstates which used to be part of the former Yugoslavia. The events in Croatia, the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina arestill closely interwoven.
In the Netherlands the most important development in this field was the opening of a numberof new embassies, In addition to the diplomatic representation of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, also Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina now have an embassy in the Netherlands.Also Macedonia announced its intention to open an embassy in the Netherlands,All these embassies are involved in the intelligence and security policy of their countries.
'/7'
-)i reweav'e P H. 10/37
I Irdj I ti K .) t4 r ) - r, . 11 ..-. 5l
The establishment of embassies has contributed to the disintegration of the formerYugoslav community in the Netherlands into communities of Serbs, Croats, BosnianMuslims. Macedonians and Kosovans,
The intertwinement of politics and crime in the South-Slavonic republics remains a sourceof concern. It cannot be ruled out that criminal groups or individuals in the Netherlands areused for political purposes. The BVD's efforts in this field are co-ordinated with police andjudicial authorities.
The arrival in the Netherlands of the Croatian general Tihomir Blaskic, who is under indictmentby the UN Tribunal for war crimes, required quite an effort from the BVD. However, any 7concrete threats emanating from his presence in the Netherlands were not established.
Serbia and the Serbian community in the NetherlandsThe activities of the opposition parties which have joined forces in 'Zajedno' have added anew dimension to political life in Serbia. Besides, the authorities in Serbia and those in theso-called Republika Srpska (the Serb entity in Bosnia) drifted apart. The BVD establishedan increased political diversity within the Serbian community in the Netherlands, From asecurity perspective the following three movements within this community are important:* supporters of the Serbian government in Belgrade;* people who are mainly oriented on the Republika Srpska;* people who support Vojislav Seselj's ideas.
Seelj is the leader of the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party. A number ofindividuals resident in the Netherlands stimulated Seselj's plan to testify at the UN Tribunal.The Dutch government decided to refuse him a visa.
The BVD established that the Serbian Ministry of Information systematically tried to makethe role of the Serbians in the fall of Srebrenica appear in a favourable light. At least one ofthese Serbian disinformation attempts failed.
In addition, especially the supporters of the so-called Republika Srpska tried to use theDutch media to question the jurisdiction and justice of the UN Tribunal. These supporterssuspect the Tribunal of an anti-Serbian attitude.
Croatia and the Croatian community in the NetherlandsUntil recently there were many local Croatian societies in the Netherlands. Part of them arenow combined in the Dutch branch of the Croatian World Congress. The Croatian WorldCongress offers the Croatian government better opportunities for propaganda orfundraising activities in the Netherlands, The BVD saw contacts between individuals fromthe Dutch branch of the Croatian World Congress and individuals with a background in theCroatian intelligence services.
Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslim community in the NetherlandsIn Bosnia-Herzegovina elections were held in 1996. Also the Bosnian nationals resident inthe Netherlands were given the opportunity to vote. This did not lead to any problems. Thefact that only about twenty per cent of the Bosnians in the Netherlands actually voted,seems to indicate that the majority is not interested in returning to the mother country.Bosnia-Herzegovina opened an embassy in The Hague in 1996. The embassy's principaltask is to support the UN Tribunal by tracking down war criminals and providing evidenceabout them. The Bosnian security service AID plays a major role in these activities and
//
+31703200733 P.12/37
stationed a number of officers at the embassy. In view of the nature of their activities, someof these AID officers feel constantly threatened. This is not surprising, since the head oftheir department, Nedzad Ugljen, was liquidated under dubious circumstances in Sarajevoin September 1996. The pressure under which these officers have to work may lead tobehaviour which is unacceptable to the Dutch authorities.
Macedonia and KosovoMacedonia and Kosovo are still potential hotspots. However, in the past year thedevelopments in these countries have not ensued any problems in the communities ofMacedonians and Kosovans in the Netherlands, In autumn 1996 both Macedonia and
8 Albania announced the intention to open embassies in the Netherlands in the near future.Although Albania was no part of the former Yugoslavia, it is closely involved in the events inthe Serbian province of Kosovo, where the majority of the population is of Albanian origin.
2.1.4 Islamic organisationsThere has been evidence to suggest that within the various Muslim organisations in theNetherlands anti-western and anti-integration movements are winning ground. Discontentwith the poor social-economic conditions of large groups of immigrants is a major causefor a growing aversion from Dutch society. In addition, many Muslim migrants feeldisoriented in their search for a religious identity in a secularised - and sometimes ill-disposed - environment. Orthodox and radical forces at home and abroad are takingadvantage of these feelings. Consequently, people who support integration andparticipation are encountering more and more opposition in their own Islamic circles.
Such a tendency is for example evolving within the orthodox Milli G6rus movement, whichis closely associated with the Rafah party of the Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan. When itbecame evident that the 'modernist' movement would not succeed in realising its ambitiousplans - such as building a multi functional Islamic centre in Amsterdam, which wasthwarted by the city council, they lost authority and were faced with interal administrativeand ideological opposition.In other Muslim groups similar developments took place. For example, the Islamic SchoolBoards Organisation is now dominated by a very orthodox, Saudi-sponsored movement.This was demonstrated by several incidents involving Islamic primary schools, concerningfor instance dress regulations for teachers and mixed swimming lessons.
The pro-Iranian Muslims in the Netherlands are traditionally strictly anti-western. Every yearthey attract public attention by a demonstration on the occasion of 'Jerusalem Day',proclaimed by the late ayatollah Khomeiny. The demonstrators in front of the Israeliembassy in The Hague are obviously supported by Tehran. Every year the demonstrationsparks political commotion and compromises the image of the entire, predominantlymoderate, Islamic community in the Netherlands.
In the long term such tendencies might lead to an increasing isolation of Muslimorganisations in this country. These developments might ensue a risk of increasedintolerance and ideological polarisation between Muslims and Dutch society.
2.2 (International) organised crime
The combat of organised crime demands more and more attention. For the sake ofintegrity, society should be protected from phenomena such as corruption, investment ofthe profits of crime, money laundering, etc., which make it difficult to distinguish underworld
/2
19-03-1998 14:43 BIZA II
practices from legitimate business. This threat does not only concern Dutch society.Criminal organisations often have international contacts and are involved in cross-borderactivities. This implies that developments in organised crime abroad also affect thesituation in the Netherlands, while on the other hand criminal activities in the Netherlandshave an impact on other countries too.An effective fight against organised crime requires, in addition to criminal investigation, abroad-based deployment of the entire government machinery, both in a preventive and arepressive sense, Such an approach cannot be successful if it is restricted to the nationallevel. Co-ordination and cooperation with foreign partners, both in a multilateral context andat a bilateral level, are essential to realise an integrated approach of organised crime,including both criminal prosecution and administrative aspects, 9
In order to contribute to that integrated approach, the BVD devoted increasing attention toorganised crime in 1996. The BVD's efforts do not concern criminal investigation andprosecution as such, since this is the responsibility of the Public Prosecutions Department,the police and special law enforcement agencies. The BVD investigates to what extent theactivities of criminal organisations affect the functioning of public administration, the legalorder and society in general. To this end the BVD also uses its operational resources andasks the help of foreign counterpart services, who have repeatedly proved to be usefulsources of information.
2.2.1 Specific aspects of crimeThe BVD participates in the project of the Ministries of Justice and the Interior which studiesthe relation between crime and ethnic minorities. The question is whether there is adisproportional involvement of immigrants in crime and how this might affect the integrationpolicy and, in a wider sense, the democratic legal order.
The BVD particularly concentrates on the connections between organised crime and ethno-political organisations, as well as the possible involvement of foreign powers. The Servicealso examines the vulnerability of Islamic organisations on the basis of repeated reportsabout infiltrations of mosque administrations by drug criminals. The final results of theproject group are expected to be completed by the middle of 1997.
The Dutch government submitted a report on its current drug policy to the SecondChamber, in which it expressed its growing concern about the production of and traffic inecstacy and other synthetic drugs. Besides, the export of these drugs compromises thereputation of the Netherlands in the international community. The report announced thesetting up of a special unit for the national co-ordination and tracing of ecstacy and othersynthetic drugs. The BVD contributes to the work of this unit by providing relevantinformation, in particular through its contacts with foreign counterpart services.
The BVD's investigations into illicit arms trade, which will be described in detail inparagraph 2.4.2, also cover activities of criminal organisations,
Finally the BVD investigates cases in which criminal groups try to obstruct justice, asmentioned in the report of the Parliamentary Committee on Investigation methods. Itconcerns attempts by criminal organisations to frustrate investigative and prosecutionprocedures and to undermine criminal investigation through countersurveillance,corruption, intimidation and other forms of threatening police and judicial authorities. TheBVD investigates whether and to what extent criminal organisations impair the regularcourse of justice as an essential part of the democratic legal order.
*7r f /3
Tr1 (UO_)LtU (-a t-.1 /1-1I - 1 1
+31703200733 P.14/37
2.3 Terrorism and other political violence
The BVD contributes to the fight against terrorism and other political violence by collectinginformation on organisations and individuals who pursue political aims by violent means.The BVD's efforts are intended to prevent that the democratic legal order, national securityor other important national interests are jeopardized,
2.3.1 Radical Islamic OrganisationsIn comparison with some other European countries relatively few Muslims in theNetherlands maintain ties with radical Islamic organisations in the Maghreb countries
10 (Algeria and Tunisia) and Egypt. The majority of these Muslims fled to the Netherlands toescape prosecution in their country of origin, where they devoted themselves to an Islamicrevolution. Also in the Netherlands they try to stimulate the Islamic struggle through aninternational network of religious brothers which was set up in Afghanistan and Pakistan inthe past.
The mutual solidarity and like-mindedness between the followers of the various radicalgroups is also demonstrated by their willingness to provide logistical support to each other.The BVD has established that the Netherlands is occasionally used as a temporary refugefor radical Muslims from other European countries. A GIA sympathiser from Belgium whoillegally resided in the Netherlands was arrested on the basis of BVD information inAmsterdam in October 1996. The Algerian was handed over to the Belgian authorities, whorequested his extradition in connection with a violent incident. He was also suspected of tieswith GIA members who were involved in the bombings in France in the summer of 1995,
There is evidence to suggest that the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah is working on the(re)construction of its cellular structures in western Europe, On the basis of reports aboutalleged preparations for Hezbollah attacks in European countries, including theNetherlands, the BVD spent much time and effort on thorough investigations into thissubject. Anyway, the attacks did not take place. Nevertheless, the BVD remains alert tosuch signs.
2.3.2 Revolutionary People's Liberation Party - Front (DHKP-C, Devrimci Halk KurtulusPartisi - Cephesi)
The tendency towards a reduction of activities of the DHKP-C seems to have continued in1996. There was, however, some evidence to suggest a DHKP-C involvement in Molotov-cocktail attacks on Turkish banks. In July 1996 DHKP-C followers went in hunger strikeagain in Turkish prisons, but the protests against circumstances in Turkish prisons wererelatively peaceful in the Netherlands. However, DHKP-C supporters did prove to beinvolved in a shooting at Bergen op Zoom.
The DHKP-C was involved in the organisation of (peaceful) demonstrations against the visitof the Turkish vice Prime Minister Tansu Qiller to the Netherlands in November. Left-wingTurkish organisations accuse Mrs Qiller and her party of maintaining close relations with theTurkish mafia.
2.3.3 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK-Partye Karkeren Kurdistan)With the setting up of a Kurdish parliament in exile the PKK seems to have dived intodiplomatic politics in western Europe. The PKK uses the satellite tv station MED TV, whichhas offices in the UK and Belgium, for propaganda purposes. The station got embroiled ina number of political questions, in which also the Netherlands became involved. The
'/71
19-03-1998 14:44 BIZA II
Turkish authorities launched an extensive campaign to convince the authorities in westernEurope of the involvement of the PKK as a terrorist organisation in the broadcasting station.According to the Turkish authorities the PKK uses the profits of drug and arms trafficking tofinance the station, However, judicial inquiries in Belgium have furnished insufficientevidence to confirm these allegations, The BVD provided the Dutch government with detailson these developments.
The fact that the PKK supported protest demonstrations on the occasion of the hungerstrike in Turkish prisons can be regarded as an overture between the PKK and left-wingTurkish organisations. Such a cooperation might imply a combination of forces of thelargest violent opposition movements in Turkey. 11
2.3.4 Northern Irish terrorist organisationsAn IRA bomb attack in London in February 1996 marked the end of the then 17 months oldtruce with the British authorities. More attacks followed, also in Northern Ireland, in spite ofseveral arrests by the British police and security services.An IRA mortar attack on a British barracks in Germany in June demonstrated that theEuropean continent, too, may again become a scene of battle in this conflict. The Dutchauthorities have stepped up their security measures.
2.3.5 Violent activismThe BVD feared that the radical group RaRa would resume its actions in the course of1996. For that reason a threat assessment was submitted to several bodies, in order toenable them to take preventive security measures.
Within the - otherwise peaceful - environmentalist movement a small violent section isemerging. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) repeatedly inspired sabotage actions againstactivities such as road constructions and cutting down trees, as well as actions targeted atmultinationals and government institutions. The ELF claimed responsibility for a number ofattacks, such as the attack on BASF in Arnhem. The BVD has stepped up its attention forviolent environmentalist movements.
The political situation in Indonesia led to a number of demonstrations in the Netherlands. Inaddition to Indonesian opponents resident in the Netherlands, also a few Moluccansparticipated in these actions, All demonstrations had a peaceful character. In the sameperiod the Indonesian embassy, the Indonesian airline Garuda and - because of its flightsto Indonesia - the KLM received a number of threatening letters. The senders could not betraced. The threats were not followed by actions, In view of these incidents and the radicalideas of a number of young Moluccans about the realisation of the RMS ideal - the freeRepublic of the South Moluccas - the BVD continues to watch the activities of certainMoluccan individuals, insofar as these might endanger Dutch national security or the DutchMoluccan community as a whole.
2.4 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and trade in conventionalweapons
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms trade pose a threat tointernational peace and security and are therefore high-priority items on the politicalagenda. By conducting investigations and by providing relevant information the BVDcontributes to the countering of proliferation of weapons. These activities are carried out inclose co-operation with the Military Intelligence Service.
/J
iAl Hcil r3H. lt>/37, . 11 s I I
19-03-1998 14:45
2.4.1 Proliferation of weapons of mass destructionThe prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems isone of the key issues of Dutch foreign and export policy. The Netherlands has joined allrelevant multilateral treaties and cooperation groups aimed at the prevention of theproliferation of these weapons.The BVD's task in the field of non-proliferation involves the early identification andprevention of Dutch involvement in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this waythe BVD contributes to the consolidation of the Netherlands' credibility and integrity as atreaty partner, and to the protection of the reputation of Dutch trade and industry andscientific institutions. These interests might be prejudiced when Dutch companies would
12 prove to be involved in the supply of products intended for programmes of weapons ofmass destruction.The BVD works in close cooperation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and EconomicAffairs. The BVD regularly gave the Ministry of Economic Affairs advice on the issuing ofexport licences. The BVD's findings in the field of suspicious transactions were alsoprovided to the judicial authorities.
In view of the worldwide extent of procurement networks, international cooperation in thefield of counter proliferation is indispensable. For that reason the BVD is regularly in contactwith foreign intelligence and security services with the aim to exchange and verify dataabout programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction in high-risk countries and theprocurement activities involved.
Procurement for programmes for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systemsis mostly carried out in secret. To this end a wide range of concealing techniques, well-known from traditional intelligence operations, is used. The major high-risk countries in thefield proliferation with which the Netherlands is currently confronted are Iran, Iraq, Libya andPakistan.
Iran has programmes for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and for missiles. TheBVD has established that Iran is also procuring goods and know-how for theseprogrammes in the Netherlands. In this procurement the military aspect plays an importantrole.
A major part of the infrastructure for the production of weapons of mass destruction in Iraqhas been dismantled by the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), butthere is evidence to suggest that there are still caches where weapons are stored or can beproduced.
Libya still constitutes a threat in the field of non-proliferation. Its programmes for chemicalweapons and missiles are a source of serious concern, The BVD is investigating Libyanprocurement activities for these programmes in the Netherlands.
Pakistan has a nuclear weapons programme, but Pakistan's proliferation activities in theNetherlands are mainly aimed at the procurement of goods for the ballistic missilesprogramme,
2.4.2 Illegal trade in conventional weaponsThe BVD's interest in arms trafficking has a double purpose: the identification of contactsbetween Dutch arms traffickers and radical political groups, and gaining an insight into(Dutch involvement in) international flows of weapons.
BIZR II +31703200733 P.16/37
+31703200733 P.17/37
As police and judicial authorities are responsible for the prosecution of suspected Dutcharms traffickers, the BVD operates in close conjunction with these bodies.
Unlike trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms trade is not alwaysillegal. However, at an international level an increasing need is fell to gain insight into flowsof weapons and to know what regions are over armed. To this end the United NationsArms Register' and the Wassenaar Arrangement2 were set up. It is evident that nowadaysthe Great Lakes region in Africa replaced the former Yugoslavia as the principal destinationof illicit flows of weapons. In the Netherlands the Ministries of Economic and Foreign Affairsare the bodies responsible, but the BVD adds to the effectiveness of their policy byproviding relevant information, 13
2.5 Espionage
2.5.1 Russian intelligence servicesIn view of the still unstable political and economic situation in Russia, the Russian leadersneed effective intelligence and security services. These services largely fall under theauthority of the President and their duties partly overlap, The present intelligence servicesmake no secret of the fact that they are the heirs of the former Soviet Union services.
The Federal Security Service (FSB) is the largest service in charge of the protection ofnational security. The FSB has wide executive powers. Its main tasks are counterintelligence, the combat of organised crime and counter terrorism. The service displays agreat deal of confidence and has. adopted an offensive attitude towards representations ofwestern intelligence services and western government and non-government organisationsin Russia, which are frequently accused of harming Russian national interests.
The principal services involved in international operations are the Russian foreignintelligence service SVR and the military intelligence service GRU. The SVR plays animportant role in the development of Russia's foreign policy. The service has been taskedto collect information in the field of politics, economy and science and technology. TheGRU's primary task is gathering military information.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian intelligence services kept a low profile inthe West for a couple of years, as a result of reorganisations, reconsideration of theintelligence task and political pressure. Now that the services have strengthened theirposition at home, they have regained confidence. After a relatively quiet period, there arenow signs of increasing activity of the Russian intelligence services in the Netherlands too.
1 A register, set up by the UN in 1992, in which countries can enter transactions In conventional weapons. Theregistrations are made on a voluntary basis and the correctness and completeness is not verified, The registercovers only seven categories of weapons (tanks, aircraft, helicopters, warships. armoured vehicles. missiles andheavy artillery). So far ninety countries have regularly provided Information to the register.2 The Wassenaar Arrangement is a cooperation group which was set up by representatives of 33 countries inVienna on 12 July 1996. The participants made agreements on weapons as well as goods and technologies witha military application to be placed under export control and on how to keep each other informed of issued orrefused export licences. The first meeting about this specific cooperation look place at Wassenaar.
v~~~~~~~z- 7~~~~~~~~~~~
19-03-1998 14:45 BIZA I I
+31703200733 P.12/37
The BVD and the Military Intelligence Service try to counter activities which endangernational interests or interests of allied powers. However, the BVD also shares someinterests with the Russian services, such as the combat of illegal arms trade and organisedcrime, Therefore, with respect to some subjects, the first steps on the path of cooperationwere made (see chapter 3).
2.5.2 Economic espionageRecent legal texts, statements of government leaders and reports of parliamentarycommittees have shown that the intelligence and security services of all large countrieshave put more and more emphasis on economic espionage the last few years. The
14 question whether the Netherlands should step up its countermeasures in this respect hasbeen subject for discussion between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the BVD for quitesome time.
At the request of the Ministry of Economic Affairs the BVD conducted an exploratoryinvestigation into the protection of know-how in the field of material technology in 1996. Tothis end the BVD interviewed several relevant companies and institutions. The studyconfirmed the findings of similar investigations relating to biotechnology and informationtechnology: in general the organisations concerned were very much aware of the fact thatprotection of know-how is necessary. Major breaches were not established.
In spite of these conclusions the BVD continues to pay attention to activities of foreignintelligence services aimed against Dutch economic interests. Foreign intelligence servicesmight be interested, in addition to technological information, in secret strategical companyinformation and various financial data, or in intended Dutch standpoints in internationaltrade negotiations.The question whether the BVD should give attention to activities initiated by otherorganisations than foreign intelligence services (such as espionage by large foreigncompanies aimed at essential Dutch industrial information) continues to be subject fordiscussion between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the BVD.
2.6 Integrity of the public sector
2.6.1 The NetherlandsThe BVD drew up guidelines about integrity which were published in May 1996. Thepublication contains a practical method which enables organisations in the public sector to:* identify vulnerable activities carried out by employees:* assess the existing defence against violations of integrity;* draw up measures and provisions to increase the defence of the organisation against
violations of integrity, if necessary.
The BVD helps organisations with the implementation of these guidelines upon request. In1996 the BVD was asked to survey the integrity of the administrations of the provinces ofUtrecht, Overijssel and Drenthe, the local authorities of the town of Hellevoetsluis and theHaarlem district public prosecutor's office.
The BVD's registration centre for violations of integrity received about twenty five reports.Investigations into twenty three of twentyfive cases were completed by the end of 1996. Thereports mainly concerned (alleged) violations of integrity at semi-government andgovernment institutions and the police, including fraud, corruption, other punishableconduct and objectionable practices.
BIZA IIly-~J-lyu 14:46
+31703200733 P.19/37
Figure 1 Reported violations of integrity
s! ~ ~Sources 1995 1996Public sector 12 8Police 10 3Citizens 8 12Trade and Industry 1
Anonymous 1 _Miscellaneous 1 1Total 33 25
Eleven reports were not investigated by the BVD, because either they had already beendealt with by a law enforcement agency, they fell under the responsibility of themanagement of the organisation concerned, or because they did not concern the publicsector.In eight cases an examination of the facts furnished insufficient evidence to suggest thatactual violations of integrity were concerned.
The four remaining reports did concern such violations. Three of them concerned possibleconflicts of interests, but investigations did not furnish any evidence to suggest thatoffences had been committed. These cases were passed to the management of theorganisations concerned. One case concerned corruption/fraud at a governmentorganisation, but the BVD discontinued its examination of the facts when the suspectpassed away. Figure 1 shows from what sources the reports about violations of integrityoriginated.
The number of violations reported fell slightly, possibly because integrity awareness hasincreased since the registration centre was set up in 1994 and also because manyorganisations appointed their own counsellors to whom violations of integrity can be reported.
2.7 Protective security
2.7.1 VitalsectorsIt is the duty of the BVD to promote measures to protect security at so-called vitalcompanies and institutions, organisations which are vital to the preservation of social life.They can ask the BVD's advice about organisational, material and personal security andthe BVD provides them with threat assessments.In 1993 interministerial discussions were started in order to adjust the definition of vitalcompanies and institutions (and the list of vital interests) to the changed internationalsecurity situation.
The national co-ordination centre of the Ministry of the Interior asked the ministriesconcerned to respond to the draft list which was drawn up in 1995. These responses are
3 ~~) ~ now being processed.In 1996 the BVD devoted special attention to the security of Schiphol Airport. The BVD also
r*^ ~ ~ surveyed the security of companies in the processing industry and organisations (partly)working for the government, The BVD issued recommendations to increase the securitylevel of these companies and institutions.
·fsl /?
15
I D--)J I 0 14 -4 b di/H 11
+31703200733 P.20/37
2.7.2 The public sector and related (defence order) companiesThe BVD issued security recommendations to several government institutions (including theMinistry of Education, Culture and Science and the Netherlands State Institute for WarDocumentation in connection with the Srebrenica inquiry) and High Councils of State in1996. The BVD also gave security advice to police forces.
In the event of security incidents the BVD advises or helps the organisations concerned attheir request. In 1996 the BVD for example conducted an investigation for the Ministry ofthe Interior into the possible premature release of (part of) the contents of the report on theplane crash near Eindhoven.
16A Minister or a High Council of State may ask the BVD to make a security survey. Such asecurity survey provides a view of the security of an organisation, related to a definedinterest and a threat assessment. It is intended to make the organisation aware of the risks,and, if necessary, on the basis of the survey recommendations are made in order to raisethe security to an acceptable level. In 1996 a security survey was made at the Ministry ofSocial Affairs and Employment.
In the sphere of protective security the BVD acts as National Security Authority (NSA) forNATO and WEU. In this context NATO and WEU surveys were made at the Ministry ofAgriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, the Ministry of Education, Culture andScience, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs (including the Dutch diplomatic representations in London, Bonn andBrussels).
If classified information (state secrets or NATO and WEU classified information) has to becommunicated outside the public sector, for example for a defence order, it is of theutmost importance that the information is handled properly. In these cases the BVD givesthe companies and organisations concerned advice on the security measures to be taken.In cases related to defence orders the BVD acts in cooperation with the Military IntelligenceService. The BVD also subjects employees of these companies and organisations tosecurity screening (see paragraph 2.7,3).In 1996 the BVD, partly in conjunction with the Military Intelligence Service, surveyed thesecurity of the following organisations: HSA Huizen, National Aerospace laboratory, TNOPhysics Electronic Laboratory, TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory, TNO Technical HumanBiology, TNO Defence Research. In cooperation with the Military Intelligence Service theBVD organised information sessions for approximately 170 defence order companies ontopical developments in the field of international security and security matters.
To ensure adequate co-ordination of and information exchange on security matters, theBVD participates in meetings of the cooperation group of Security Officers.In its capacity of National Security Authority (NSA) the BVD and the Military IntelligenceService participate in the meetings of the WEU Security Committee, the NATO SecurityCommittee and the Multinational Industrial Security Working Group.At a bilateral level the BVD consulted with the NSAs of Germany, the United Kingdom andFrance in 1996.
2.7.3 Security screeningThe BVD subjects applicants for positions involving confidentiality in the public and theprivate sector to security screening, The following figure gives an overview of the number ofpositions involving confidentiality and security investigations.
20
19-03-1998 14:46 BIZA II
+31'/13200733 P.21/37
Figure 2 Positions Involving confidentiality and security screening in 1995 and 1996
1 Excluding the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces, The number of positionsinvolving confidentiality in the public sector in percentages of the work force was 4 percent, both in 1995 and in 1996.
2 Security screening in 1996 included 11,328 investigations for the Royal MilitaryConstabulary at Schiphol Airport.
3 International organisations and foreign counterpart services.The outcome of security screening was negative in 257 cases in 1996. In 19 cases theoutcome gave the competent authorities insufficient reason for rejection. It concernedone A-category and 18 B-category positions'. This implies that 238 applicants were notappointed to positions involving confidentiality as a result of vetting. It concernedparticularly applicants for positions at Schiphol Airport who were rejected on the basisof criminal antecedents. 31 persons lodged an appeal against their rejection. Two ofthem successfully, they were appointed later.
Figure 3 Security screening, appeals and rejections
Category negative outcome appeals lodged succesaful rejectionssecurity screening by the applicant appeals
1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
A 4 10 - 1 1(1) 9-
13 252 246 36 30 1 1 251 228
C ; 1 - . '1
Total 266 257 36 31 1 2 251 238
1 Contrary to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on constitutional rights andemployment of civil servants, the applicant was not appointed. The applicant did notlodge an appeal against this decision,
1 Positions involving confidentiality are divided into three categories; A. B and C. These categories refer topositions which 9gve access to three levels of secret information and which therefore offer the opportunity toseriously harm (A). injure (B) or afect (C) national security.
/gc \
17
v o .r L 2 -StU -4 -'q f D X LH 1 1
Figure 4 Grounds for rejection per category in 1995 and 1996
Ground for A-category positons B-category positions C-category positionsrejection
' : .1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
Ct. i____ ____ ._ : ... . -_ . . ,!. .,.. . -
cnau -d 7 2 3 -cxirnl:s 5.. 22
Tota - 9 251 228 - 1.
On 1 February 1997 the Security Investigations Act came into force (Bulletin of Acts, Ordersand Decrees 1996, 525), as well as a number of mandates which enable the head of theBVD to act on behalf of the Minister in the following cases:* the designation of positions involving confidentiality;* decision-making on the basis of security screening;* the provision of information on individuals to foreign powers or international institutions on
the basis of security screening.The bodies involved in the implementation of the Act were informed of its contents andimplications. It concerns ministries, High Councils of State, employers of persons filling orapplying for a position involving confidentiality, international institutions and foreigncounterpart services.
The coming into force of the new Act implied that vetting procedures had to be changed inorder to ensure that investigations can be completed within eight weeks. In addition, theBVD introduced new questionnaires to be provided to applicants for positions involvingconfidentiality, along with information on contents and implications of the vetting. It wasdecided to increase the number of BVD officers working on security screening through aninternal re-allocation of jobs. This re-allocation was necessary because of the large extentof repeat security screenings (an estimated 400 investigations for A-category positions onan annual basis) and the increased number of A-category positions at the police.
2.7.4 Protection of informationThe BVD gives advice on the protection of information in two interministerial committees:the Information Security Council and the Special Information Security Council. TheInformation Security Council focuses its attention on the protection of information ingeneral, The Special Information Security Council concentrates on the protection ofinformation relevant to the democratic legal order, national security or other importantnational interests.An important element in policy making is the use of cryptography. Cryptography should onthe one hand enable safe data communication, but on the other hand it should not be usedto conceal illegal activities from law enforcement agencies and intelligence and securityservices.
The BVD participates in international OECD and European Union consultations on the useof cryptography. These consultations are intended to reach European agreement on a so-called Trusted Third Parties system. Trusted Third Parties are independent bodies whichhave the confidence of two or more parties that want to exchange ciphered messages.
Y87
18!
22
+31703200733 P.22/37I1__U__ lild q- 4 b11H 11
They make for example the cryptographic keys, control these keys and provide them toregular requestors such as the users themselves, but possibly also law enforcementagencies or intelligence and security services. It is essential that the position of theNetherlands in these international consultations is based on well-founded and co-ordinatedconsiderations.
2.8 Other areas for attention
2.81 Netherlands Antilles, ArubaIn 1996 the BVD continued to devote attention to security-related developments in theNetherlands Antilles and Aruba. The fact that the islands only have a small population 19involves the risk of intertwinement of politics, administration and business, which mightaffect the integrity in of the public sector.
Another important factor is the presence of organised crime in this region. The geographicsituation of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, near drug producing countries and onimportant drug transport routes, their well infrastructure, banks, casinos, hotels, free-tradezones, tax advantages and the large flow of tourists make them attractive to internationalcriminal organisations.
The report 'Met alle respect' (With all due respect), which was published in 1996 reflectsthe findings of the 'De Ruiter Commission', also underlines these risks.
2.8.2 SurinamThe Netherlands has special ties with Surinam, which is internationally seen as a specificaccountability, The BVD follows the developments in Surinam because an undermining ofthe democratisation process in Surinam is expected to have repercussions on therelationship between Surinam and the Netherlands. That relationship can be regarded asan important political interest to the Dutch government.
2.8.3 Religious sectsOn the basis of incidents in other countries in which religious cults were involved, the BVDexamined what threat might emanate from such cults or sects in the Netherlands.
In the Netherlands religious movements have not proved to pose a serious threat tonational security, the democratic legal order or other important national interests so far.
T J. fI _ ( j t | ( _ d r ) . /rJ 1.i 5
+31703200733 P.24/37
3 Cooperation
20 3.1 National cooperation
In the pursuance of its duties, the BVD cooperates closely with other bodies involved innational security matters.
3.1.1 Ministry of Economic AffairsThe BVO cooperates with the Ministry of Economic Affairs in various fields and at variouslevels. The efforts in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction andcombating illegal trade in conventional weapons are closely co-ordinated with the StrategicGoods and Sanction Policy Department of the Foreign Economic Relations branch. At anexecutive level regular consultations take place with the Economic Surveillance Department.
With regard to safety-policy directed at vital busines, institutions and objects, the BVD alsohas a long-standing relationship with the Crisis Control Unit. At a strategic levelconsultations with the ministry take place about economic espionage (see paragraph 2.5),
3.1.2 Ministry of Foreign AffairsThe cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs encompasses security aspects of visaand admission policy, as well as subjects such as violation of constitutional rights,espionage, proliferation and illegal arms trade. BVD information was for example used bythe Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a contribution to regional policy documents. The BVD, onthe other hand, used Foreign Affairs information for its analyses in 1996.
3.1.3 Military Intelligence ServiceThe cooperation with the Military Intelligence Service (MID) in the fields of proliferation andcounterespionage has been intensified. Joint teams were set up and close consultationstook place in connection with the preparation of the new Intelligence and Security ServicesAct.Both the placement of a BVD officer at the MID's Industrial Security Office, who acts as a co-ordinator with respect to the cooperation between BVD and MID in the field of industrial security,and the stationing of an MID officer at the BVD's Netherlands Industrial Visit Control Office(NIVCO), which handles international applications to visit Dutch companies, were continued.
3.1.4 PoliceThe project concerning cooperation between police and BVD (the Hermandad project) nearedits completion in 1996. Many of its plans were realised. The BVD concluded cooperationprotocols with most of the regional triangles (police force manager, chief of police and publicprosecutor), while the cooperation with the Regional Intelligence Services was intensified.
The relationship with the police also improved in a wider sense. Consultations between theBVD and the middle management of the police are now taking place on a structural basis
19-03-1998 14:48 BIZA II
o -LM1 iL +1'YU.J200733 P. 25/37
and the BVD organises practical training programmes for these police officers In addition,a working group was set up to optimise the information exchange between BVD and policeunder the current law,
The Hermandad project, which was completed on 1 April 1997, led to a considerableimprovement in the cooperation between police and BVD. Conflicts of competence madeway for co-ordination, collaboration and adequate communication. The BVD will try tomaintain and where necessary expand the results that were reached,The Director General of the BVD discussed the relationship between BVD and police withthe Council of Chief Constables.The head of the BVD and the head of the Criminal Intelligence Division (CRI) of the National 21Police Services Agency regularly meet to discuss policy matters. At a working levelsubjects such as terrorism and other shared interests are discussed,
3.1.5 The Great Evaluation Triangle and the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC)The 'Great Evaluation Triangle' comprises the director general of the Public Order andSafety Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the head of the National Co-ordinationCentre of the Ministry of the Interior, the deputy head of the BVD, the director general of thedepartment for Legislation, Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice of the Ministryof Justice, the head of the Special Investigations department of the Criminal IntelligenceDivision, the deputy secretary general and the deputy head of the Cabinet and Protocolsection of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the director Legal Alfairs of the Ministry ofDefence.The Great Evaluation Triangle draws up recommendations for the security of property andpersons for whom the government bears a special responsibility, such as diplomats anddiplomatic property in the Netherlands and persons who visit the Netherlands at theinvitation of the Dutch government. These recommendations are also based upon thefindings of the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC).
The Technical Evaluation Committee consists of representatives of the Justice, Interior andDefence Ministries, the BVD and the Criminal Intelligence Division. The committee ischaired by the National Co-ordination Centre of the Ministry of the Interior. Under normalcircumstances the TEC meets twice a month.
3.1.6 Public Prosecutions DepartmentThe BVD and the Public Prosecutions Department exchange information and consult eachother on several subjects. In operational matters the central public prosecutor responsiblefor counter terrorism and other BVD matters acts as an intermediary between the BVD andthe Public Prosecutions Department. The role of the intermediary has become moreimportant, which helps to distinguish criminal investigation from intelligence gathering andadds to an effective exchange of information between the BVD and the Public ProsecutionsDepartment.
3.1.7 Royal Military Constabulary, Customs, Fiscal Intelligence and InvestigationDepartment and Central Criminal Intelligence Agency
The BVD maintains good relations with the Royal Military Constabulary. Policy consultations,held about five times a year, lead to agreements on the cooperation between the twoorganisations. A new cooperation protocol was concluded in March 1997. Cooperationprotocols were also concluded with Customs and the Fiscal Intelligence and InvestigationDepartment (Ministry of Finance) in 1996. With the Central Criminal Intelligence Agencydiscussions about subjects of common interest took place on several occasions.
+31703200733 P.26/371ILH 11
3.2 Cooperation with the overseas territories
When necessary and where possible the BVD cooperates with the Security Service of theNetherlands Antilles (VNA) and the Security Service of Aruba (VDA), The BVD not onlyexchanges information with these services, but also organises training courses for VNA andVDA staff.The relationship with the VNA prospered in 1996 and has led to cooperation on varioussubjects. The VDA prepared an internal reorganisation in 1996, which will be carried out in1997. The BVD liaison officer in Caracas is a vital link between the BVD and the VNA and VDA.
3.3 International cooperation
The BVD cooperated with various friendly foreign intelligence and security services on awide range of subjects in the past year. This cooperation was mainly based on the need tocounter common threats, such as those emanating from radical elements within the Islamicfundamentalist movement - especially in Europe -, but also the fact that organised crime isincreasingly making inroads on legitimate business is an alarming development in manycountries.
The threatening. proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons continued to be amajor international topic too. In addition, the rapid - global - developments in the field oftelecommunication and the preparation for the Dutch presidency of the European Unionadded to the fact that international contacts were stepped up.The BVD liaison officers abroad are important pillars for the BVD's international cooperation.
The BVD liaison officer in Ankara, who covers the Middle-East region, helped to stimulatethe exchange of information with the intelligence and security services in Jordan and Egypt.
Through the efforts of the liaison officer in Singapore the contacts with the services inSingapore and Indonesia could be intensified, while new relations were established withservices in Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia. The Singapore liaison officer plans to visitJapan, South-Korea and the Philippines in the first six months of 1997.
The developments in Aruba demanded the special attention of both the BVD representativein Washington and the liaison officer in Caracas in the past year.
The strategic position of the liaison officer in Washington, his extensive network, but also hiscontacts with the Canadian security service, have frequently yielded useful inforration andoffer the opportunity to introduce various BVD officers to their counterparts in North-America.
3.3.1 Western European intelligence and security servicesThe BVD maintains close contacts with a large number of western European intelligenceand security services. The platform of 17 heads of services, the so-called Club of Bern,plays an important role. However, the current magnitude of this group - which initiallystarted with 7 services - does not help the effectiveness of the six-monthly meetings. Lastyear it was therefore decided to restrict the discussions to one key subject. During theautumn meeting this subject was Islamic fundamentalism.
3.3.2 Eastern European intelligence and security servicesIn 1996 the head of the BVD visited the Russian intelligence and security services SVR andFSB for the first time. The visit was a first step towards cooperation in areas of common
A . 216
v- I-)~± I0 14 - 40 O
aL)nnri iL
interest, such as terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destructionand arms trafficking. Both parties expressed the intention to realise an exchange of liaisonofficers. Nevertheless, the BVD continues to pay heed to intelligence activities of Russianintelligence services targeted at western interests.
Several countries in eastern Europe are increasingly confronted with illicit arms trade andother forms of international crime originating in their countries. For that reason the BVDstarted a dialogue with a number of intelligence and security services of these countries
In May 1996 BVD representatives visited the security service of Ukraine, the SBU, while acouple of months later the deputy head of this service visited the BVD. Apart from initiatingcooperation in several fields, the Ukrainians showed a particular interest in the BVD'sdemocratic embedding and in parliamentary control.
BVD representatives paid a first visit to services in Latvia in September. Also this visit was mainlyintended to find out whether cooperation in the field of illegal arms trade would be possible.
3.3.3 Central European intelligence and security servicesIn June 1996 the so-called Middle Europe Conference (MEC) was organised for the thirdtime, this time in Slovenia. It was a successful meeting, which strengthened the tiesbetween the participating heads of services. It was decided to invite the Swiss serviceBUPO to join the MEC group.
The acceptance of a Code of Practice implied that the leading role of the BVD in theorganisation of the MEC meetings had formally come to an end. It was agreed, however,that, when the occasion arises, the MEC may still ask the BVD for help.
The next MEC meeting will be held in Hungary in May 1997.
3.3.4 North Africa/Middle EastThe deputy head of the BVD accompanied the Minister of the Interior on his trip to Moroccoin October, where he visited the Moroccan security service. The BVD already maintainedrelations with Morocco's foreign intelligence service.
At the invitation of the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS) the head ofthe BVD visited Cairo in September. In addition to the GIS he also visited the Department ofState Security, the Egyptian security police, which comes under the Ministry of the Interior,and he met the Egyptian Minister of the Interior. All Egyptian hosts were pleased with thecooperation with the Dutch service.
33.5 NATO and WEUFor the first time in history the NATO Special Committee organised a meeting with themembers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council/Partnership for Peace (NACC/PfP) inNovember 1996. Eighteen of these countries accepted the invitation to discuss the terms ofreference, the role and function of security services in a democratic society with NATOrepresentatives. The delegations from the PfP countries consisted of heads of securityservices, members of parliament and in some cases the ministers responsible.
At the request of the North Atlantic Council a separate meeting was held on the eve of theaforementioned meeting, during which the NATO Special Committee discussed mattersrelating to terrorism and organised crime with Russia.
YJ -,21
+-t- z0iy200 J Pz .27/37
19-03-1998 14:49 BIZA II +31703200733 P.28/37
In its capacity of NSA (National Security Authority) the BVD participates in NATO SecurityCommittee and WEU Security Committee meetings. In 1996 these committees particularlyconcentrated on the adjustment of regulations and procedures for the mutual exchange ofconfidential and secret NATO or WEU information. The NATO Security Committee alsodiscussed the new NATO security treaty and the possible revision of NATO's securitypolicy, an object of study since 1995.
3.4 European Union
Terrorism, racism/xenophobia and the protection of information and telecommunicationcontinued to be key subjects on which the BVD focused its attention in relation to theEuropean Union in 1996. The cooperation between police, judicial authorities and securityservices also received due attention.
During the Italian and Irish presidency the working group on Terrorism, a cooperationgroup of the Justice and Interior Ministers of the European Union, drew up the biannualthreat assessment document on terrorism. This document provides information on terroristincidents. More than 475 terrorist incidents were reported to have taken place in theEuropean Union in 1996. In these incidents 19 people were killed and 380 wounded.Considerable material damage was inflicted.
The past year was characterised by a continuation and revival of national terrorism. Thetermination of the IRA cease-fire on 9 February 1996 was followed by several attacks bythis group in the United Kingdom, Germany and Northern Ireland.Both the ETA and the FLNC in Corsica committed terrorist attacks in the course of the year.
From the terrorist groups which have their roots outside the European Union, movementsfrom the Middle East and Turkish groups such as Dev Sol and the PKK continue to pose aserious threat to the EU. Although since 1 January 1996 no major violent incidents could beblamed on these groups, followers of both Dev Sol and the PKK are indeed heldresponsible for a large number of small-scale incidents in 1996. In addition, Islamicfundamentalist groups resident in a number of Member States continue to pose a seriousthreat, although they, too, were not responsible for any major terrorist incidents in theEuropean Union in the past year.
The activities of terrorist groups outside the European Union continue to pose a threat tothe interests of the European Union and its citizens, as appeared for instance fromactivities of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Algeria and Egypt and attacks againstWestern interests in Saudi Arabia. Also outside the European Union the attention forcounter terrorism has been stepped up. A large number of declarations was drafted andtreaties were concluded which should lead to a tightening of national legislation and anintensification of international cooperation, including the cooperation between intelligenceand security services.
The secure data communication system for the Working Group on Terrorism, whichreplaced the cryptofax for the exchange of confidential information - a BVD initiative - cameinto operation in 1996 and has functioned satisfactory since.
In addition, preparations were made for the Dutch presidency of the European Union in thefirst six months of 1997.
'q3
+31703200733 P.29/37
4. The provision of information and complaintsprocedures
4.1 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act 25
In the year under review the BVD caught up its backlog of pending applications under theFreedom of Information Act, Each natural person who filed an application in the periodfrom 1991 to 1996 received a decision. More than six hundred applications were dealt with.A large part of the applicants were allowed to inspect documents that could be released.Approximately hundred applications, relating to organisations, will be dealt with in the firstthree months of 1997.
A decision on an application to inspect a personal file is based on the principle thatinformation cannot be provided when this might impair the functioning of the BVD, andconsequently national security. This implies that sources and methods, and in particular theBVD's current knowledge, should remain secret. Therefore, the BVD cannot reveal whetherit has collected information on an individual in relation to current threats or not.
For that reason, people who just want to know whether the BVD holds a file on them and ifso whether they may examine this file, receive no answer. Only when the applicationconcerns data which were recorded in a social context that no longer bears any relation tothe BVD's current activities, these data might be released. Applicants are therefore askedto specify in what context they suppose to have drawn the attention of the BVD or at leastto restrict their application to non-topical data.
Therefore the analysis of the topicality of the context indicated by the applicant (andappearing from the file) is an extremely important first step towards a decision on anapplication to inspect a file,The next step is to find out whether the non-topical data on an individual can be releasedwithout disclosing any sources or methods. Subsequently it should be established whetherany other grounds for refusal are applicable under the Freedom of Information Act, afterwhich, in accordance with previous judgements, data about third parties are removed fromthe files. This is a very labour-intensive job, also because in many cases extensive fileshave to be paraphrased or summarised, because otherwise the applicant would get noinformation at all.
Finally, all applicants receive a recent annual report along with the decision on theirapplication. In this way they can form a picture of the BVD's current activities and they cansee for themselves whether their actions might entail any BVD involvement, such asopening a file on them, which implies an infringement of their privacy.
The above-described procedure for handling applications under the Freedom ofInformation Act has so far been approved by the administrative court, In all cases thecomplete file was provided to the court, including the refused documents. These
BIZRI II
I
documents were always submitted to the court, but subject to article 8:29, paragraph 1 ofthe General Administrative Law Act (concerning the exclusive inspection of the court).
The Roermond court passed judgement in the first appeal by a member of the Associationfor the Prevention of Destruction of Files on 17 January 1997. The appeal was dismissed asunfounded. In its judgement the court endorsed the current BVD policy under the Freedomof Intormation Act, which implies that the distinction between topical and non-topical datawas deemed correct. The court also approved of the procedures for the provision ofinformation, the removal of data from files and the binding effect of source protection. Inone case an appeal with the Judicial Division of the Council of State set aside the
26 judgement of the court below, but only as far as it lacked the explicit observation that aBVD investigation into the subject had been completed. Otherwise also that decision couldbear the test of judicial criticism.
4.2 Complaints
In 1996 the National Ombudsman issued one report (96/295) on a complaint about anallegedly wrong BVD inquiry. The complaint was not upheld.
Five complaints were lodged with the National Ombudsman in 1996. Three of them are stillunder investigation. In two cases individuals complained about the fact that the BVD failedto respond to a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act (seeparagraph 4.1). However, after the BVD sent a reply in both cases, the NationalOmbudsman decided not to start an inquiry.
One complaint about the BVD was submitted to the Committee on the Intelligence andSecurity Services. The complainant also lodged a complaint with the National Ombudsmanabout the same question, but he decided not to start an investigation.
One complaint was submitted to the BVD. After examination the complaint was rejected asunfounded.
I/ if
+31703200733 P.30/371q-<;-1998 14:50 BIZA II
+31703200733 P.31/37
5 Staffing and organisation
5.1 Personnel 27
On 31 December 1996 the BVD employed a staff of 552, consisting of 165 women and 387men. The number of establishment places was 519. The BVD had an influx of 38employees in 1996, while 25 employees left the service.
5.1.1 Career policyMobility continues to be a key issue in the BVD's personnel policy. Also in 1996 specialefforts were made to advance mobility of employees. Several internal publications weredevoted to this subject.In addition, a job-rotation and secondment project was started in cooperation with anumber of organisations, whose activities correspond reasonably with the work of the BVD.Negotiations with for example the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Department abouttemporary employment of BVD officers are expected to lead to the first contracts in 1997. Inthese contracts aspects such as the duration of the employment and all other conditionsshould be clearly defined. In addition, the BVD discussed the creation of a job-rotationnetwork with various bodies. This plan will be finalised in 1997.
5.1.2 Emancipation policyThe available instruments of the BVD's career-planning programme were specificallydevoted to emancipation. The number of women in senior positions increased by about 11per cent. In this connection the appointment of Mrs M.C.W. Verdonk as Director of theState Security Branch on 1 July 1996 is worth mentioning.However, the general influx of new staff, including women, remained low. The eflorts toappoint more women, particularly to senior positions, will be continued in the next fewyears.
5.1.3 Working conditionsThe efforts to improve working conditions were stepped up in 1996. A study of the possiblerisks to safety, health and well-being of the staff led to a risk assessment and riskevaluation. The recommendations following from this assessment will be carried out in1997. Many corrections have already been made, such as facilities to prevent complaintscaused by visual display unit activities.
5.1.4 36-hour working weekBy the end of 1996 preparations were made to introduce the 36-hour working week assmoothly as possible on 1 January 1997. The staff was provided with extensive information,while individual wishes were listed and agreements were laid down, taking intoconsideration such factors as the continuity of work, capacity utilisation and office hours.Through this methodical approach the introduction of the changed working hours did notinvolve any mentionable problems.
19-03-1998 14:50 BIZA II
+31703200733 P.32/37
5.1.5 Absenteeism due to illnessIn the past year the BVD continued its efforts to reduce absenteeism due to illness. Theprofessional support by the Social Medical Team (management, company doctor andpersonnel department) was stepped up. The preventive effect of this approach is evident.The rate of absenteeism due to illness remained relatively low compared to the averagerate in the public sector.
5.1.6 TraiinngThe in-house system of staff training courses based on a modular format, developed in1991/1992, was evaluated. Efforts were made to realise a better adaptation of the trainingcourses to the demands of the organisation. In the field of automation the emphasis wasput on word processing courses.
5.1.7 Decentralisation of personnel powersBy the end of 1996 several personnel-related powers were decentralised, as part of theBVD's policy of integral management. However, the personnel department continues toplay and advisory, executive and controlling role.
5.2 Organisational developments
The demands to the organisation of the National Security Service are in a state of flux. Theimplementation of the Security Investigations Act and the new Intelligence and SecurityServices Act make 'major repairs' inevitable. Preparations for a new reorganisation werestarted in 1996.
5.3 Computerised information
The provision of computerised information is an important aspect of the work of the BVD.Investments have been made in products which improve this provision of computeriseddata. Self-developed software was replaced by market products. An important step forwardwas made towards the development of a new documentary information system. Thegeneral introduction of this system in 1997/1998 will considerably add to the reliability andcontinuity of working procedures.
The BVD's external secure communication lines were extended. Safe communication is nowpossible with all BVD liaison officers abroad. The information exchange with EU countrieswas extended by the TREVI network for the European Working Group on Terrorism.Finally, a secure network was set up with six Regional Intelligence Services and the RoyalMilitary Constabulary at Schiphol Airport. The other Regional Intelligence Services will followin 1997/1998.
5.4 Facilities
The internal security policy of the BVD is aimed at a permanent high level of securityawareness. A number of security measures was adjusted. As part of the BVD's efforts toguarantee the integrity of staff and organisation, a counsellor was appointed to handleintegrity matters.
In order to consolidate the skills and motivation of the company aid services, specialattention was given to procedures in the event of calamities which involve an evacuation ofthe building.
Vq7
19-03-1998 14:51 BIZR II
+31703200733 P.33/37
5.5 Finance
Extra resources were allotted to the BVD to finance cryptography, to improve informationtechnology, to realise safe communication lines and to station a liaison officer toSingapore, For the replacement of a major part of the obsolete office furniture the BVDcould release a one-time amount of money.
Figure 5 Expenditure in 1996
Staff;ecret
urcCe
StaffResourcesSecret
(49,206,000)(17,160,000)(4,379,000)
qqIf 33
29
ul-e>-ly a 14;:t> BIZR II
-y
_ _
+31703200733 P.34/37
Annex 1
Parliamentary reports etc. relating to the NationalSecurity Service, 1996
Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services
24 714 Report by the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services on its activitiesin 1995.
no. 1 Report (approved 19 April 1996).no. 2 Motion on the rehabilitation of Mr Wilman (rejected) of 27 August 1996no. 3 Report of the International Conference in Warsaw (28 August 1996).no. 4 Review of the control systems for intelligence and security services in a number
of other countries (19 December 1996)
22 036 Removal and destruction of files held by the National Security Serviceno. 12 Details on the destruction of BVD files on the basis of the meeting of 28 June
1995.no.13 Report of the general discussions on removal and destruction of BVD files on 6
November 1996.
The National Budget
24 400 National budget for 1996Chapter VII Ministry of the Interior
25 000 National budget for 1997Chapter V11 Ministry of the Interior
no. 5 Questions 23 and 24 on possible adjustments of the Statute as a result of thefindings of the 'De Ruiter Committee'.
Miscellaneous (Questions in Parliament, etc.')
Letter to the Standing Committee for the Interior dated 15 January 1996Information on the formation of an inspectorate for the intelligence and security services;regulations on supervision will be included in the proposal for a new Intelligence andSecurity Services Act.
Appendix to the proceedings 1995-1996, no. 423Questions asked by Mrs Scheltema-de Nie (D66) about the forwarding of registeredtelegrams by PTT Telecom (reply by Minister Dijkstal (the Interior), also on behalf of theMinister of Defence).
1 Political paries mentioned: D66: Democrals 66; Groen Links; Green left-wing Party; AOV: General Associationfor the elderly: PvdA: Labour Party.
Y*S 3 ;~Y3
bL1H 111 D-WO-1:2 1'4 -31
+31703200733 P.35/37
Appendix to the proceedings 1995-1996, no. 932Questions asked by Mrs Oedayraj Singh Varma (Groen Links), Green Left) about anapplication to inspect a Police Intelligence Service file (reply by Minister Dijkstal).
Appendix to the proceedings 1995-1996, no. 1102Questions asked by Mr Verkerk (AOV) about supervision of mosques (reply by MinisterSorgdrager (Justice), also on behalf of the Minister of the Interior).
Appendix to the proceedings 1995-1996, no. 1131Questions asked by Mr Rehwinkel and Mr van Oven (PvdA) about the existence of a BVDfile on the journalist Willem Oltmans (reply by Minister Dijkstal).
Appendix to the proceedings 1995-1996, no. 1565Further questions about the existence of a BVD file on the journalist Willem Oltmans (replyby Minister Dijkstal).
Proceedings of the Second Chamber, 27 August 1996, 101-6710Plenary debate about the annual reports by the Committee on the Intelligence and SecurityServices and the BVD for 1995, and about a letter concerning the composition of thecommittee.
Proceedings of the Second Chamber, 3 September 1996, 104-6841Vote about the motion (24 714 no.2) concerning the rehabilitation of Mr Wilman. The motionwas rejected.
Appendix to the proceedings 1995-1996, no. 1640Questions asked by Mr Sipkes (Green Left) about a list of individuals who allegedlyadopted a 'hostile' attitude towards Morocco (reply by Minister van Mierlo (Foreign Affairs),also on behalf of the Minister of the Interior)-
Appendix to the proceedings 1996-1997, no. 132Questions asked by Mr van Oven and Mr Lillipaly (Labour Party) about a judgement by theEuropean Court of Human Rights (reply by Minister Van Mierlo (Foreign Affairs), also onbehalf on the Minister of the Interior).
Appendix to the proceedings 1996-1997, no. 225Questions asked by Mr Dittrich (D66) on the expulsion policy relating to Chinese asylumseekers who exhausted all legal remedies (reply by State Secretary Schmitz (Justice), alsoon behalf of the Minister of the Interior).
Appendix to the proceedings 1996-1997, no. 369Questions asked by Mrs Oedayraj Singh Varma (Groen Links) on a list of persons allegedlyinvolved in Makro fires (reply by Minister Dijkstal)
1 -U3- liib 14- n1 b1IlR II
+31703200733 P.36/37
Appendix 2 Overview of the workforce
Figure 6 Workforce in numbersrelation women - men
D1
02
03
D4
D5
D6
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Women s Men
70 80 90
Strategy and PlanningDemocratic Legal OrderState SecuritySocial and Economic interestsOperational Information GatheringManagement Support and Central Facilities
01D2D3D4D5D6
36
19-03-1998 14:52 BIZR II
+31703200733 P.37/37
ColofonPublisher: Ministry of the Interior
National Security ServiceCommunications DepartmentPO BOX 200102500 EA The HagueThe Netherlands
TBB 970683
TOTAL P.37
19-03-1998 14:52 BIZA II
EuroIntel '98 PROCEEDINGS 1 st Annual Conference & Exhibit European Intelligence
& European Electronic Security: Open Source Solu - Link PagePrevious 1997 Assessment: Four years of oversight and recommendations Comite Permanent de Controle des Services de
Renseignements, Belgium
Next FBI Innocent Images: Online Child Pornography/Child Sexual Exploitation Investigations
![United States Patent - OSS.Net · United States Patent [19] Farwell 11111 111111111111 111111lllillllllll11 111111111111111 11111111111iI11111iii US005363858A [11] Patent Number:](https://static.documents.pub/doc/80x56/603905c969795821012ab708/united-states-patent-oss-united-states-patent-19-farwell-11111-111111111111.jpg)
