1InspectorRightsandSovereignty

The Institute for Domestic and International Affairs

International Atomic Energy Agency

Inspector Rights and Sovereignty

Rutgers Model United Nations

16-19 November 2006

Director: Twisha Mehta

© 2006 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA)

This document is solely for use in preparation for Rutgers Model

United Nations 2006. Use for other purposes is not permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more

information, please write us at [email protected]

Introduction ______________________________________________________________ 1

Background ______________________________________________________________ 2 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty _____________________________________________ 3 International Atomic Energy Agency ______________________________________________ 4 Recent History_________________________________________________________________ 7 Violators of the NPT____________________________________________________________ 7 Other Non-Nuclear Policies _____________________________________________________ 10

Current Status ___________________________________________________________ 14

Key Positions ____________________________________________________________ 17 Western Hemisphere __________________________________________________________ 17 Latin America and Caribbean___________________________________________________ 17 Africa _______________________________________________________________________ 18 Oceana ______________________________________________________________________ 18 Middle East __________________________________________________________________ 18 NGO Positions________________________________________________________________ 19 Media Positions_______________________________________________________________ 21

Summary________________________________________________________________ 22

Discussion Questions ______________________________________________________ 25

Glossary ________________________________________________________________ 26

Appendix A: Strengthened Safeguards System: States with Additional Protocols ______ 32

Appendix B: States that Have Ratified or Acceded to the NPT as of 1 March, 2005 ____ 34

Appendix C: IAEA Organizational Chart______________________________________ 36

Rutgers Model United Nations 2006 1

Introduction The concern of preventing nuclear proliferation spurred the creation of

international, regional and national safeguards to monitor nuclear activities. Verifying the

proper use of nuclear technology is entrusted on an international level to the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an organization created to enforce the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Signatories of the treaty agree to the terms and conditions of

the treaty. The provisions within the NPT include individual agreements with the IAEA

to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, additional protocols to monitor nuclear

activity, and to deter the use of technology for non-peaceful applications. To ensure

compliance, various types of inspections are necessary on regular or irregular basis in

declared and undeclared nuclear facilities. The relationship between the IAEA and

member states of the NPT is based solely only on continued membership. Withdrawing

states are no longer subjected to IAEA safeguards or inspections.

Inspection teams from the IAEA perform two main forms of inspections: routine

and special inspections. Routine inspections simply verify nuclear activities, while

special inspections request the particular state access to declared and undeclared sites

within a short notice period. Any request can be denied, but the IAEA Board of

Governors has the ability to override this decision. In cases such as these, the issue of

whether an international agency should have more rights in a territory that a state holds

sovereignty in arises. For states that are declared Nuclear Weapon States (NWS),

unrestricted access available to IAEA inspectors also infringes upon national security and

secret military programs. This concern of states that wish to be a member of the NPT, but

do not wish to give unrestricted access, allow states that wish to be seen as non-hostile to

hide behind the pretenses of the treaty. This excuse is used to restrict access on the basis

of sensitive military information. Despite potentially invasive inspections, the benefits of

permitting IAEA inspections include increased transparency of nuclear activity and

intent.


The issue of IAEA inspections infringing upon state sovereignty has been assessed

from the creation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. State sovereignty is defined as

the ability of a state to have power within its territory to rule. IAEA inspection teams

require access to sites within the territory of a signatory state. With increasing requests of

access for inspection teams to sites of nuclear activity and storage, states have questioned

whether the amount sovereignty it has relinquished to verify compliance with the NPT

has been exceeded through subsequent inspections on its territory.

Background The Second World War commenced a new age of warfare with the development

of the atomic bomb. From conceptualization to testing the first atomic explosion, the

United States maintained absolute secrecy about the Manhattan Project, to prevent the

Germans from obtaining technology to enrich Uranium to produce a nuclear weapon.

During World War II, the Allies crossed the finish line of the nuclear race when the

United States successfully developed and dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and

Nagasaki in 1945. Although the Allies won the war, the United States attempted to keep

the atomic secret cloaked. However, the Soviet Union obtained the technological process

and materials, and detonated its first atomic explosion in 1949. 1 Following the Soviet atomic explosion, the United States competed with the

Soviet Union by accumulating a record number of nuclear warheads and weapons, with

arsenals reaching 33,000 and 45,000 warheads respectively. Following the stockpiling of

in nuclear weapons by the Cold War’s two competitors, both Britain and France

independently developed and tested nuclear weapons by 1960. Four years later, China

followed and became one of the original nuclear club members in 1964.2 After seeing the

horrific realities of atomic warfare following the Second World War, these original

members of the nuclear club grew concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons

if other state and non-state actors obtained the technology. This concern developed the 1 Mary H. Cooper, "Non-Proliferation Treaty at 25." The CQ Researcher 5, no. 4 (January 27, 1995), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1995012700, (accessed February 1, 2006). 2 Ibid.


Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which became an international regime to prevent

the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968. The NPT is an

international agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, decrease

stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and promote the use of nuclear technology for peaceful

purposes. This treaty has a large conglomeration of member states that have entered a

multilateral agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an international

force. The main framework of the NPT aims to prevent the growth of current nuclear

programs. The treaty distinguished member states as Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and

Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) at the inception of the treaty. The five original

NWS include China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States. There are

eight known NWS to this date. These three additions to the NWS, including India,

Pakistan and Israel, are not member states of the NPT, and therefore are not bound to the

terms of the treaty.3

Of key importance is Article I of the NPT. Note that Article I of the treaty clearly

expounds that no party to the treaty should transfer or accept: nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control oveir such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive device.4

This article is especially important for both NNWS and NWS member states of the NPT

because reinforces the international resolve to prevent the growth in NWS. Article II

extends to states that have not already developed or acquired nuclear weapons by

encouraging any party to the treaty not to accept or seek the transfer of any nuclear

material or technology. Despite the restrictive natures of Articles I and II, membership to

the NPT has advantages that are stated in Article IV. Article IV discusses one of the most 3 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 22 April, 1970, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf, (accessed 1 February 2006). 4 Ibid.


beneficial aspects of being a part of the international non-proliferation regime: use of

nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Both NNWS and NWS are permitted to

research and use nuclear technology for peaceful applications. Equipment, materials and

information relating to these applications may be shared with other member states,

including NNWS, to promote scientific advancement. Article IV provides an incentive

for NNWS to comply with the NPT because it offers clear advantages to states that are in

developing areas of the world.

While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s original intent was to prevent the

growth of nuclear arsenals, member states realized that compliance with the treaty could

not be verified without an independent agency whose sole purpose was verifying and

monitoring the use of nuclear technology and materials. The International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) became responsible for safeguarding nuclear knowledge, and insuring

compliance of all signatories.

International Atomic Energy Agency In 1957, signatory parties of the NPT created the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) as the nuclear ‘watch-dog’ to reduce qualms of nuclear proliferation.

Under the treaty, the IAEA is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty, with its responsibilities beginning March 5, 1970 despite the

signatory date of the NPT in 1968. To fulfill its goals, the IAEA developed safeguards to

prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology and materials that would facilitate the

development of nuclear weapons. These safeguards entrust the IAEA as a ‘nuclear

inspectorate’. The Third Article in the NPT states that member states agree to allow the

International Atomic Energy Agency to enforce the terms “for the exclusive purpose of

verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to

preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices.5 The article also recognizes the IAEA’s ability to create and

verify safeguard agreements with each individual state. Article III makes the IAEA 5 Ibid.


responsible for monitoring all aspects of any nuclear process, even if used for peaceful

purposes, “within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its

control anywhere.”6 Each party of the NPT has realizes that these safeguards are the

means to achieving the goal of the treaty.

The IAEA’s predominant role in nuclear non-proliferation is its development of

international safeguards. Safeguards encompass monitoring, verifying and protecting

nuclear activity. One hundred forty-five countries have signed individual agreements

with the IAEA to submit reports of nuclear activities. They also permit IAEA inspectors

to verify the nuclear activities, facilities and materials.7 While signatory nations agree to

allow the IAEA as ‘nuclear inspectorate’ by accepting the terms set by the treaty, the

IAEA performs on-site inspections that are part of its safeguards. Of these, routine

inspections are the most common verification method. These assessments of nuclear

materials and work are done either on schedule, or on a surprise basis. They are limited to

declared sites or laboratories that work with nuclear material or facilities where nuclear

material is processed. The IAEA also has the ability to carry out special inspections under

certain circumstances in which it feels that routine inspections have not allowed it to

maintain nuclear safeguards. The Agency also allows these types of inspections if it feels

if information by the state is not adequate in monitoring and verifying compliance with

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. Lastly the IAEA performs safeguards inspections to

monitor the development of declared facilities, and insure that these facilities have not

deviated from their original plans.8 Despite this, an IAEA inspector’s rights are limited

by the notion that findings from inspections do not allow the IAEA to penalize violators

and enforce the NPT with international law.

For any reason, signatory states of the NPT “have the right to withdraw from the

Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, 6 Ibid. 7 International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 02-02901 / FS Series 1/02/E, pg. 1, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/S1_Safeguards.pdf, (accessed, February 1, 2006). 8 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Factsheets & FAQs,” 2003-2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html, (accessed February 2, 2006).


have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”9 Under the terms of the treaty,

states have most importantly agreed to the compliance with Articles I and II, and have

allowed the IAEA to ensure that these terms are being met. These clauses of the treaty

realize that states are giving up a part of their sovereignty by agreeing to the conditions

set by the NPT. For this reason, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty allows any state

which believes that the treaty has infringed upon its ‘supreme interests’ to withdraw from

the agreement with three month notice identifying the circumstances in which its national

interests are jeopardized.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has as much power as the parties of the

treaty allocate to implement its safeguards systems. While many countries sign the

Treaty, the IAEA still requires cooperation on behalf of governments to permit inspectors

to perform outlined duties. The relationship between IAEA inspectors and the state

governments is clearly defined by individually negotiated comprehensive safeguard

agreements for routine on-site inspections. As with any non-state party interfering or

inspecting a government’s activities, the NPT calls for states to ‘relinquish some

sovereignty’.10 In addition to agreements between the IAEA and governments, the IAEA

is restricted while performing routine inspections. The Agency does not have authority

nor reign to go beyond the terms of inspections by allowing inspectors to search sites that

are not on the itinerary. While the IAEA also has the ability to request access to other

sites when it feels that it does not have ‘adequate’ information to ‘fulfill its

responsibilities’, states maintain sovereignty over the land they rule, and can deny the

inspectors clearance. 11 This ideal relationship as agreed upon in the Structure and

Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not only outlines responsibilities in

insuring compliance with all nuclear activities but also highlights the limited resources 9 Ibid. 10 United States, Technology Assessment Board of the 103d Congress, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), June 1995, 49. 11 International Atomic Energy Agency, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” June 1972, INFCIRC/153 pt 73b, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf153.shtml, (accessed February 2, 2006),


the IAEA has in verification. With a constrained budget, the IAEA is limited in its own

effectiveness. IAEA spending in 1995, totaling seventy million dollars for international

inspections and verifications, clearly shows that it has to rely on state cooperation by

using States’ Systems of Accounting and Control (SSAC) because installing and creating

its own systems would go far beyond the money it already uses. 12

Recent History One hundred eighty-eight states have agreed to the terms of the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty. From its inception, not all signatories have complied with the

stipulations and agreements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The most

notorious examples of such states include Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya. These

states have misused membership status to the NPT under the pretense of Article IV.

Evoking the right of states to share and use nuclear technology for peaceful applications,

states such as Iraq and Iran deviated from IAEA safeguards and additional protocols, and

developed clandestine nuclear programs.

Violators of the NPT Of these violators, Iraq’s non-compliance with the NPT obligations, including

acquisition of nuclear materials for building weapons, was discovered in 1991 after the

Gulf War. Iraq deceitfully developed undeclared nuclear facilities and engaged in

activities that did not fall under IAEA scrutiny during routine inspections. Inspectors did

not suspect any ‘illegal’ nuclear activity outside of the declared sites. Iraq had further

disregarded its individual safeguard agreements with the IAEA by producing plutonium

and uranium fuel, both which indiscretions were discovered by inspectors after the Gulf

War.13 The relationship between Iraq and its IAEA inspectors followed a traditional

agreement, but Iraq’s deceptions did not allow inspectors to discover flagrant violations

during on-site inspections. Iraq always found ways to delay or divert inspections by both

the IAEA and UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). Later on, these inspectors found a

12 “Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency,” 50. 13 Ibid 38-39.


plethora of misleading records on Iraq’s nuclear program and nuclear weapons delivery

systems. Despite the IAEA’s ability to request access to facilities not on the inspection

itinerary at short notice, the agency was hampered from performing its duties due to Iraqi

deception. Further, Iraq was accused of “misleading and incomplete declarations, efforts

at confrontation and intimidation of inspectors, infiltration measures to ferret out

inspections plans in advance… and destruction, removal, or dispersal of evidence to

conceal the purpose of key facilities.”14 The situation in Iraq spurred the IAEA Board of

Governors to resolve holes in the agency’s ability to carry out inspections for safeguard

agreements. From 1992-1993, the IAEA Board of Governors proposed systems to detect

and gain clearance to sites agreed upon for inspection by both states and the Agency, as

well as undeclared sites. While it approved the need to restructure safeguard systems, the

IAEA Board of Governors also recognized the need to build a foundation for further

cooperation between the Agency and the state governments, and increased undeclared

routine inspections to rule out violations.15

North Korea is under scrutiny for non-compliance with IAEA safeguards. North

Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, but never came to terms with

the determined IAEA safeguards that were supposed to be fulfilled within eighteen

months of ratification. Stretching far beyond the cushion time of eighteen months to

comply, North Korea refused to fulfill these safeguards for six years following

ratification. In addition to these blatant violations, North Korea refused to allow IAEA

inspectors to perform routine inspections at declared nuclear facilities, and denied

requests to inspect two nuclear waste sites. At this point in the early 1990’s, North Korea

was suspected of developing a nuclear weapon. Evoking the article of the NPT which

allows a state to withdraw from the treaty under ‘exceptional’ circumstances with

detailed explanation to the IAEA with three month prior notice, North Korea decided to

pull out from the treaty. Later on, North Korea suspended the withdrawal process. The

14 George L. Rueckert, On-Site Inspection In Theory and Practice (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 232. 15 Ibid 207-208.


North Korean state insists that it has a special status under the NPT since its withdrawal

is suspended, and therefore any safeguard systems do not apply. In response, the IAEA

and its other signatory parties have refused to recognize this special status. With the

support of the parties of the NPT, the IAEA was able to uncover North Korean violations.

Through sampling its original safeguard agreements, the inspectors found North Korea

producing more plutonium than it had originally declared. Support of member NPT states

also allowed the IAEA to perform special inspections of two undeclared sites.16

Iran began its nuclear activities in the 1970s, by constructing nuclear power plants

for energy, but soon suspended plans in 1979. In 1995, Iran created an agreement with

the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), to help Iran complete the unfinished

plants it had begun in the mid-1970s. These completed nuclear plants provide nuclear

energy that supplies approximately four percent of the state’s total energy.17 Although

Iran’s non-peaceful nuclear activities are featured in recent news, its history traces back

to the establishment of nuclear energy plants. While the agreement between Minatom and

Iran was contracted in 1995, work began on the plants in 2003. During the same year,

Iran was accused of, and admitted to, using undeclared research facilities for enriching

uranium by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition group. Iran

maintained it would use natural atomic resources to produce nuclear power, which

spurred international concern over Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.18 Early in

2003, Iran admitted to IAEA inspectors that it had imported enough nuclear materials

from China to assemble a nuclear weapon. Later on in the same year, Iran admitted

failure to comply with terms of the NPT in the 1990’s by conducting uranium conversion

experiments and developing heavy water. As a result of these findings, the IAEA set a

deadline of October 31, 2003 for Iran to comply with safeguards to stop nuclear activity.

Iran additionally signed an additional protocol that allows the IAEA to perform surprise 16 “Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency,” 39. 17 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Islamic Republic of Iran,” http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofiles/Iran/Iran2003.htm, (accessed February 3, 2006). 18 NTI, “Iran Profile: Nuclear Overview,” December 2005, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html, (accessed February 3, 2006).


inspections. This additional protocol to the NPT permits inspectors greater access to any

nuclear facility, as well as the ability to investigate all nuclear activities occurring in Iran.

In December 2003, Iran signed the additional protocol on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty, and placed a halt on its enrichment facilities. 19

Until the US invasion of Iraq, Libya kept its nuclear activities veiled in secrecy

from the international community. Despite membership to the NPT, Libya had developed

technology to enrich uranium, but had not implemented any enrichment programs.

Additional violations of the safeguards placed by the IAEA included the import of

uranium, enrichment technology, and blue prints for nuclear weapons. Soon after to

admitting to having undeclared nuclear materials and facilities in December 2003, Libya

signed an additional protocol to the NPT. The protocol verified that Libya exterminated

all materials, equipment and programs leading to the development of nuclear weapons.

This additional protocol also allowed unrestricted access for inspection teams to Libyan

nuclear related facilities, and the ability to rigorously inspect any site with scheduled or

unscheduled inspections. With international pressure, Libya agreed to cooperate with the

IAEA to provide transparency in its nuclear activities through rigorous inspection and

verification measures. 20

Other Non-Nuclear Policies As an original member of the nuclear club, the United States sees interest in being

a staunch supporter of the IAEA and the non-proliferation regime. Given that inspections

by the IAEA are essential in verifying compliance with the NPT, the US works in close

cooperation with the IAEA secretariat to assure that safeguards are met. The bilateral

relationship between the US and the IAEA results in continuous improvements in the

IAEA inspectorate through training and development of innovative inspection technology

19 Ibid. 20 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Annual Report 2003,” 2003 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2003/safeguards.pdf, (accessed 25 February 2006) 53-55.


and techniques.21 The US projects a strong counter-proliferation stance to both members

and non-members of the NPT. It urges reforms to strengthen IAEA safeguard procedures

to insure compliance. In 2004, President Bush proposed measures to strengthen IAEA

authority to enforce the NPT. To supplement the US stance, Bush stated that the IAEA

should “focus intensively on safeguards and…ensure that nations comply with their

international obligations.”22 The United States propounds adherence to the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty by all member states through rigorous inspections that prohibits

nations from shirking away from obligations, and finding loopholes to evade IAEA

scrutiny. The US is adamant about projecting transparency in all nuclear activities to the

international community. Granting IAEA inspection teams full access to declared and

undeclared sites through individual safeguard agreements and additional protocols is

essential for member states of the NPT. With out compliance in such inspections, parties

of the treaty are in violation of Articles I and II of the NPT.

In addition to the NPT, European States also created the Atomic Energy

Community (EURATOM), a regional agency that strengthened regional stance on

nuclear non-proliferation. EURATOM was originally based on the Rome Treaty and

applies to ten states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.23 EURATOM created its own

safeguards systems that would prevent further development of nuclear technology for

military purposes, and signed agreements with the IAEA to verify these controls.

While EURATOM created a regional bond between the IAEA and states of

Europe, Europe continued further in its goal of non-proliferation by creating the

EURATOM Treaty, which creates a binding contract between the communities. While

initial clauses did not clarify relations between European states, the EURATOM treaty

was later clarified by the Court of Luxemburg in 1978. The ruling concerned the 21 John Simpson and Anthony G McGrew, eds, The International Nuclear Non-Proliferation System: Challenges and Choices (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 116-117. 22 John R. Bolton, “The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance,” 27 April, 2004 http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/31848.htm, (accessed 25 February 2006). 23 David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), 70.


International Convention on Physical Protection of nuclear materials. The Court of

Luxemburg decried that individual or collective action taken by member states can not

“impose conditions on the exercise of prerogatives which thenceforth belong to the

Community and which therefore no longer fall within the field of national sovereignty.” 24

Since EURATOM accepts the use of nuclear material for peaceful purposes, it allows the

transfer of nuclear materials intra-community, but imposes an inspection mechanism that

creates EURATOM safeguards. These safeguards have ‘the advantage of permanency’

since all signatories are bound by the treaty. While the states in EURATOM are

signatories of the NPT and have individual safeguards with the IAEA, the EURATOM

Treaty binds the states to the terms of the treaty through multilateral covenants.

Europe has taken great strides in promoting compliance with any nuclear non-

proliferation agreements entered. Starting in 1995, European states have suggested

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) that would commit states in ensuring counter

proliferation of nuclear weapons as an alternative to the North American Treaty

Organization (NATO), and a supplement to NPT membership. The draft for a NWFZ in

Europe was proposed by Belarus in 1990 to create a strong regional stance on nuclear

non-proliferation. The NWFZ has been especially proposed for Central and Eastern

Europe, and is hoped to be approved by member states as the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

for Central and Eastern Europe (NWFZC&EE). All states entering into this regional

agreement are subject to inspections by other signatory parties to verifying nuclear

activities. These inspection rights include short notice inspections in a state’s respective

territory as well. The Draft on a NWFZ in Europe also proposed, in Article II, the

procedures for insuring such a regional zone. The text suggested under clauses 7-9 that

each signatory state is required to relinquish some sovereignty to allow inspectors ‘full

and free access’ to any nuclear activity related site. In addition, it also allocates IAEA

inspectors responsibility for verifying and reporting all peaceful nuclear activities and

deviations from the proposed treaty. Lastly, if the IAEA inspection teams have found that 24 Julien R. Goens, “The Opportunities and Limits of European Co-Operation in the Area of Non-Proliferation” in A European Non-Proliferation Policy, ed. Harald Muller, 40 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).


a ‘breach of obligations’ have been committed by a state, then the accused state is

obligated to verify its activities as well as comply with the terms agreed upon. 25

In 1967 the Treaty of Tlateloco declared a NWFZ in Latin America and the

Caribbean by binding signatories from “testing, using, manufacturing, producing or

acquiring nuclear weapons.”26 The main highlight of the treaty states that all nuclear

activities as well as facilities are to be only used for peaceful purposes, and goes further

to involve states that have sovereign rights over territory in that region. As the NPT

established the IAEA to enforce the terms set by the treaty, the Treaty of Tlateloco

established the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

(OPANAL) to ensure compliance by all nuclear weapon states in the region. OPANAL

works in cooperation with the IAEA to fulfill its objectives. Other regions have

successfully established NWFZs.27

The African region established a NWFZ with the 1996 Penlindaba Treaty. Like

the Tlateloco Treaty, the Penlindaba Treaty bans the same nuclear activities in addition to

placing banning research on development of nuclear weapons and testing. This regional

system of reinforcing the agreements of the NPT goes further than the Tlateloco Treaty

by having a regional system of checks on nuclear activities. If any signatory party in this

treaty of the African Union (AU) suspects non-compliance, the state in question is given

thirty days to clarify its activities. If clarification is not provided within the given

timeframe, the state in question can be referred to the established African Commission on

Nuclear Energy, which determines whether IAEA involvement is necessary.28

Of the NWFZ treaties established in the major world regions, the Treaty of

Rarotonga has an exceptional stance on non-compliance by signatory parties consisting

of South Pacific states. While other regional supplements to the NPT have safeguard

25 Vienna Peace Bureau, “Draft on the Treaty of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Europe,” Who is next? - The Proliferation of NATO Targets, no. 17 (August 1999), < http://www.inesap.org/bulletin17/bul17art27.htm> (accessed 24 January, 2006). 26 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Coming to Terms with Security: A Handbook on Verification and Compliance, Geneva, Switzerland: UN Publication, June 2003. 69. 27 “The Opportunities and Limits of European Co-Operation in the Area of Non-Proliferation.” 28 Ibid.


systems, compliance protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga are extremely stringent.

Verification of compliance with terms set by the Treaty does not include its own

‘implementing agency’, but involves cooperation of the IAEA. Any signatory suspected

of breaching the terms of the treaty goes through a procedural system with an established

Consultative Committee created in association. Any accusations are dealt with by the

involved party by providing an explanation of nuclear activities to the Consultative

Committee within a certain timeframe. If explanations are not sufficient, the Committee,

upon its discretion, has the ability to order on-site inspections in any suspected territory

under jurisdiction of the violating state. The state in question has the right to include

inspectors to join the team of inspectors from the IAEA, but these representatives are not

in any way allowed to sway or direct the inspectors. In addition, signatory states of the

Treaty of Rarotonga, are subjected to an on-site inspection, and are required to give

IAEA inspectors “full and free access to all information and places within its territory.”29

Current Status Iran remains under close scrutiny by the international non-proliferation regime

following the 2003 agreement to accept an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty. Although inspections following the signing of this protocol revealed

previously unavailable information to inspectors, there is a lack of transparency in Iranian

compliance and cooperation. The IAEA scheduled inspections reported Iran as non-

compliant by postponing and denying clearance to inspectors at enrichment sites.

Additionally, the IAEA reprimanded Iran for failing to declare technological know-how

in enrichment of nuclear materials, a violation of the additional protocol that Iran had

signed. The Iranian government’s failure to completely cooperate with the IAEA

combined with restrictions placed upon the IAEA inspectors to be able to inspect sites

that Iran had previously agreed to grant access, prevented inspectors from dutifully

verifying safeguards.

29 Ibid 71.


Following these incidents, the IAEA forced Iran to place a halt on all nuclear

activities in 2004. While Iran agreed, it did so only on the terms that these activities

would be suspended until the IAEA was able to inspect all facilities it suspected of

continued nuclear activity. After inspecting the two nuclear power plants sites that had

been suspected of enriching uranium, the IAEA requested, but did not receive Iranian

permission for a second inspection in March of 2005.30 While the first round of

inspections did not yield evidence of non-compliance and deviation of original Iranian

nuclear power plans, the IAEA was unable to confirm the misuse of these facilities after

inspection. In 2006 Iran broke IAEA seals and resumed enriching uranium at its nuclear

plants. An interview with the Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei,

revealed that Iran is not transparent in its nuclear activities. The IAEA set a deadline of

March 6, 2006 for clarifying nuclear activities and any connection to military

involvement in these activities. 31 In addition to pressure from the IAEA to comply,

European Nations and the United States for breaking IAEA security seals on its nuclear

facilities have reprimanded Iran. These admonishments were reaffirmed on February 1,

2006 when Great Britain, France, and Germany introduced a draft resolution that called

for the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran to the Security Council for non-

compliance with the NPT and breaking the accords of the additional protocol agreed

upon in 2004. This action, if passed through the Security Council imposes international

punishment upon Iran by the United Nations. Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,

asserted that, “The Iranian people will continue until they master nuclear energy, which is

their right."32 Iranian officials also declared that European accusations and referral to the

United Nations Security Council lacked legal justifications, and was infringing on its

30 “Iran Profile: Nuclear Overview,” Recent Developments and Current Status. 31 Mohamed ElBaradei. Interview with Christopher Dickey. Newsweek. Vienna. 23 January, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10858243/site/newsweek/, (accessed, 24 January, 2006). 32 Elaine Sciolino, “In Another Threat, Iran Warns It May Block Inspections,” The New York Times, 3 February, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/international/middleeast/03iran.html?n=Top%2fNews%2fInternational%2fCountries%20and%20Territories%2fIran, (accessed, 2 February, 2003).


rights to use nuclear technology for energy purposes. Early in 2006, Iran threatened to

end diplomacy if it were referred to the UN Security Council.

In the 2003 Annual IAEA Report, the Agency stated that verification methods of

the NPT needed to be strengthened to counter non-compliance from states such as Iran.

With forty-five NNWS that had not enforced individual safeguard agreements by the end

of 2003, the IAEA finds it difficult to carry out to verify compliance with Article III of

the NPT. With out implementation of safeguards by member states, the IAEA

inspectorate is ineffective. With out state cooperation in bringing these agreements into

force, the Agency cannot implement verification methods of compliance with the

safeguards, and project a state’s nuclear transparency. Of these forty-five cases, the IAEA

was only granted international support in the Iraqi instance where a UN Security Council

resolution mandated inspections to verify nuclear activities.33 The latest IAEA annual

report, released in July 2004, reported only forty states that had not yet implemented

safeguard agreements. The decrease in states that have not enforced safeguard

agreements displays the necessity for nuclear transparency through IAEA inspections. By

enforcing these agreements, states are able to prove compliance with the NPT despite

intrusive IAEA inspections. Not enforcing individual safeguards prevents the Agency

from drawing conclusions about nuclear intentions, thus raising concern by the

international non-proliferation regime.

The IAEA 2004 Annual Report stressed the significance of additional protocols

that states individually sign with the IAEA. These protocols grant the IAEA inspectorate

the privilege of expanded access. In comparison to other safeguard agreements, these

additional privileges include access to information regarding a state’s nuclear cycle, and

locations of nuclear activity. In 2004 alone, the number of additional protocols rose from

twenty-four to sixty-two. Of these, fifteen included members of the European Union.34

Providing IAEA access to more secure information and locations is simply not an 33 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Annual Report 2003,” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2003/safeguards.pdf, (accessed 25 February, 2006). 34 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Annual Report 2004,” July 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/safeguards.pdf, (accessed 25 February, 2006).


altruistic move on behalf of states. By relinquishing sovereignty, states benefit with their

relationship with the IAEA since the Agency disseminates verification with the NPT.

Such conclusions are essential for states to maintain credibility in respective regions as

and in the international forum. Even NWS, including the United States, have signed

additional protocols to assure the international community that it upholds the terms of the

NPT.

Key Positions Western Hemisphere

The United States promotes the use of the IAEA as an international organization

that prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons and use of nuclear technology for non-

peaceful purposes. The United States, one of the largest supporters of the IAEA

safeguard systems, has the support of many European countries such as the United

Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Through individual consensus between NATO nations

and allies, the United States reached many bilateral and multilateral agreements with its

western proponents to prevent the abuse of nuclear materials.35

In addition to the US stance on nuclear non-proliferation, European countries

agree with American sentiments to prevent additional states from obtaining nuclear

weapons. From its inception, Western European states have been adamant about

implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Evidence of their feelings is

shown through the establishment of EURATOM and NWFZs.36

Latin America and Caribbean While the European system of enforcing nuclear non-proliferation through

regional agreements was not adopted and ratified by members of the European

community, other regional sections have successfully adopted the notion of Nuclear

Weapon Free Zones. OPANAL originally was allowed to perform inspections in the

territories of signatory states, but a 1992 amendment to the Treaty transferred that 35 “The Opportunities and Limits of European Co-Operation in the Area of Non-Proliferation.” 36 Ibid.


responsibility to the IAEA. All signatory states are subjected to special inspections by the

IAEA when non-compliance is suspected with out exception.37 Therefore, this region is

in compliance with the IAEA and supports its scope.

Africa

The role of the IAEA in this regional system is to conduct on-site inspections as

per the 1996 Penlindaba Treaty with Commission members as part of the inspection

team. The AU has been proactive in its attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation. This is

evident by allowing the IAEA the proper access to facilities to do its job. The findings of

the IAEA inspection team are then taken up to the AU to determine if the state in

question will be referred to the UN Security Council. 38

Oceana

While other regional supplements to the NPT have safeguard systems, compliance

protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga the most rigorous of all other regional safeguards.

Non-compliance issues are dealt with directly by the regional body. In addition,

signatory states of the Treaty of Rarotonga, are subjected to an on-site inspection, and are

required to give IAEA inspectors “full and free access to all information and places

within its territory.”39 The rigorous regional standards and necessary complete

cooperation with the IAEA demonstrates the efficacy of this regions view towards

nuclear proliferation.

Middle East The Middle East does not have a proposed or implemented notion of a nuclear

weapon free zone in its region largely due to the lack of a unified regional stance. With a

conglomeration of states with vastly different ideologies ranging from Israel to Iran, the

entire Middle East has not been able to develop a regional system of safeguards. Scholars

do point out that as in any other region, “In the Middle East, IAEA NPT-type safeguards

37 Ibid 71. 38 Ibid., 71-72. 39 Ibid.., 71.


would hardly be regarded by the states concerned as adequate unless they were

supplemented by a regional system of safeguards and inspections.”40 While this region

remains divided on the issue of nuclear activities and respective state transparency, there

have been proposals of a Middle Eastern nuclear weapon free zone as well as additional

regional cooperation in counter nuclear proliferation. The Director-General of the IAEA,

Mohamed Elbaradei, mentioned in an interview that in order to develop a strengthened

regional safeguard regime, it is essential for states such as Israel to become a part of the

nuclear non-proliferation regime. Without membership, the IAEA can not perform

inspections other than those requested by Israel itself. Mohamed Elbaradei explained that

“the nuclear non-proliferation regime is a voluntary regime. Israel, India and Pakistan

have not acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As Director General and as an

international civil servant, my authority with regard to these States is basically moral and

political, rather than legal.”41 Despite hesitation, many Middle Eastern states request the

IAEA to develop a means of bringing the nuclear goals of the region on to the negotiation

table to be able to discuss the possibility of a NWFZ. These discussions facilitated by the

Director General of the IAEA included the participation of Israel despite its ideological

differences from its neighbors in regional agreements. With the additional threat of

nuclear weapons and technology being transferred to terrorist organizations in countries

such as Libya and Iraq, the establishment of a NWFZ hopes to bring peace and stability

to the region.

NGO Positions Non-governmental organizations have played an integral role in nuclear non-

proliferation and verifying the containment of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Age Peace

Foundation, a well known NGO in the nuclear realm, has its goals closely aligned with

the IAEA. The United Nations recognizes it as a peace messenger organization because 40 David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the First Forty Years. (Australia: IAEA Publications, 1997), 435 41 ElBaradei, Mohamed. Interview with Mustafa Abdalla. Al-Ahram 27 July 2004 <http://www.iaea.org/PrinterFriendly/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2004/alahram27072004.html> (accessed 6 February, 2006).


advocates strengthening international law and abolishing weapons of mass destruction.

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation strongly believes in preventing the proliferation of

nuclear weapons endorsing implementation of safeguard systems set by the agency. To

facilitate methods of counter proliferation, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation holds an

annual international law symposium. The theme of the 2006 symposium revolves around

international law and response to failed compliance with the NPT. It hopes to brainstorm

innovative ideas to address non-compliance with the NPT, and develop international

response to situations like that of Iraq post Gulf War, and the current Iranian situation.

Another NGO which advocates strengthening counter-proliferation stances is

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). In a 2002 letter, the

IPPNW urged the United Nations Security Council to allow inspectors to return to Iraq to

complete inspections before militarily enforcing Iraqi disarmament. This organization

urges inspectors to be granted more rights to effectively complete their assigned tasks in

disarming and reporting nuclear activities and materials. The letter also encourages the

Security Council to allow UN inspection teams to have full access to all sites that are

suspected of nuclear activities or stockpiling. These sites do not exclude presidential

palaces or any other undeclared sites of nuclear stockpiling or activity.42 The IPPNW

encourages this because it sees inspections as an alternative to immediate Security

Council referral, and international military or economic action.

The NPPNW also supports the creation of regional nuclear weapons free zones.

These NWFZ have additional regional safeguards that member states sign in addition to

agreements with the IAEA. This double form of inspection and verification strengthens

the role of the IAEA in enforcing the NPT. Other signatory parties bind states that enter

regional agreements. Defecting on safeguards holds repercussions for the violating state

by other members of the regional NWFZ. Since the IAEA does not have any authority to

punish or correct any violations, these regional agreements fortify international resolve to

prevent nuclear proliferation. The NPPNW encourages such agreements because it 42 Robert K. Musil, “PSR (IPPNW-US) Letter to UN Security Council,” 23 October, 2002 < http://www.ippnw.org/IraqPSRUN.html> (accessed, 7 February, 2006).


provides reinforcement to the cornerstone agreements of the NPT with valid

consequences for non-compliance. Additionally, member states of regional NWFZ

treaties explicitly agree to terms of inspections by regional inspectorates or IAEA

inspection teams. These arrangements can not in anyway accuse inspection teams of

violating state sovereignty because states are fully aware of the terms of the treaty prior

to ratification.

Media Positions

Media positions vary with the country of origin of media companies. Geographic

location often is a determinant factor in media positions since the press projects images

that reflect the ideologies of the respective public. In the case of the recent Iranian

incident, the media has had two opposing views on the situation. It is clear that Western

media, such as CNN, clearly have western positions on Iranian non-compliance with its

agreements to suspend nuclear activities. Recent CNN reports include western suspicion

of what is feared as a development of an Iranian nuclear weapon program. Other reports

have alleged Iranian anger in response to being reported to the United Nations Security

Council. Words such as ‘anger’ and Iranian threats to end diplomatic talks have been

viewed by western media as hostile actions. Other media sources, such as the New York

Times, have written similar articles on the Iranian response to possible referral to the

Security Council for non-compliance to the additional protocols.

Middle Eastern media views this incident differently. An Egyptian weekly

newspaper, the Al-Ahram, views the Iranian situation as the West versus Iran. Iran’s non-

compliance of the NPT is just a way of fighting against years of European pressure to

make its nuclear activity more transparent to assure the international community of the

peaceful use of its power plants. It sees European pressure as a western way of preventing

Iran from developing. A more well-known Middle Eastern media source, Al Jazeera,

gives an excellent alternative opinion. Its articles quote Iranian statements as a means of

explaining the lack of cooperation with the IAEA rather than as reasons for suspecting

deviation from original intent.


Summary

Signatories of the NPT are under an obligation to verify safeguards assumed under

this treaty. Despite such a utopian concept, signatory states have sovereignty over their

territory. Therefore, the International Atomic Energy Agency cannot use international

force or clout to insure compliance. The IAEA’s responsibility to perform its duty is

defined solely by the amount of sovereignty that each member state relinquishes. With

growing fears of nuclear proliferation, the IAEA hopes to reinforce the goals and statutes

it was created to uphold. Deceptive activity under pretenses of status as an NPT

signatory, such as Iraq and the self-proclaimed special status of North Korea with the

IAEA, creates implications for the lack of assertion in the inspection process and

inspector rights to gain clearance to declared and undeclared sites. Examples of such

holes in the nuclear counter proliferation regime will have profound effects on the

international community.

Hans Blix, the former chairman of the United Nations Monitoring and Verification

Inspection Commission, defined the relationship between states and the IAEA in the

following statement: “the inspections are not performing espionage, nor are they an

international arms control police. It must be remembered that the government of the

inspected state retains territorial control and can at any time deny inspectors access and

withhold cooperation- but it can do so only at the price of sending warning signals to the

world.”43 The relationship between states and the IAEA can be seen as a mutual bond in

which there are both positive and negative aspects. While states may be concerned about

relinquishing some sovereignty by allowing inspectors access to sites, they ultimately

have control over the territory they rule. Additionally, states undergoing inspection have

the right to ensure that its own representatives accompany IAEA inspectors at all times.

43 Hans Blix, “The role of Inspection as a part of the effort to prevent the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 28 May, 2001, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/ExecChair/Blix%20in%20Ottawa.htm, (accessed 5 February, 2006).


Complying and granting clearance for inspectors is an excellent tool to provide

transparency for nuclear ambitions and activities.

For non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), the concern of inspections infringement

on national security arises with the issue of confidence of the inspectors. Many NNWS

states, such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan originally worried that

inspections would reveal patented and new nuclear technology that would otherwise be

advantageous in peaceful applications, but would place them at a disadvantage if

inspections made sensitive information public. Addressing these concerns, the IAEA

maintains secrecy in reporting all findings of inspections, thus maintaining confidentiality

with respect for a states’ public and private nuclear activities.

Additionally, regional systems of safeguards as well as bilateral agreements

between states with respective agencies in collaboration with the IAEA may serve to

promote and reinforce the authority of the agency. Inspections occurring from additional

regional and bilateral agreements between states reinforce a state’s position and

fulfillment to the obligations it signs under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Such

agreements also are formed to place a binding agreement between states to commit to

what they have asserted under international law. Any state that is suspected of non-

compliance is subject to reprimands, and expected to rectify the transgression to follow

with the terms of the treaty.

The issue of inspections infringing upon state sovereignty is of both regional and

international concern. While all signatories of agreements that require inspections as a

form of monitoring and verification enter into agreements know the scope of the terms,

states become most concerned when inspections go beyond the fine line of individual

sovereignty and the extent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With one hundred

eighty-eight member states that have agreed to the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty, the responsibility of ensuring compliance with such a large conglomeration of

states falls upon the IAEA, which must maintain a great amount of discretion. This


discretion is required in determining the need for pressing states for more inspectors’

rights while respecting a state’s sovereign rule over a territory.


Discussion Questions • If sovereignty includes the right to agree to treaties, should the terms of such

treaties bind states to compliance by force? • What are the implications of a strengthened IAEA? Should states relinquish more

sovereignty to ensure peace? • Should the role of the IAEA be strengthened to be able to penalize violators of the

NPT? • What aspects of inspections infringe upon the rights of states? • How should inspections be reformed to respect state sovereignty while carrying

out its safeguards? • Should countries that have signed and agreed to the terms of the NPT be able to

evict inspectors from their respective countries? • Should inspectors be required to have representatives of a state present while they

inspect sites? • If countries are suspected of deceiving the IAEA (as in the case of Iraq), should

inspectors have the right to override the state’s denial of clearance to sites? • Should states that are known to have undisclosed nuclear activities and facilities

be forced to sign additional protocols to the NPT after admitting to it? Should inspectors be granted more rights to access in nuclear-non compliant states?

• Why are regional systems of verification necessary if most safeguard systems

established are already in cooperation with the IAEA? Why do regional systems have more clout of compliance and have more aggressive inspection rights than the IAEA alone? Should this be remedied?

• Have regional positions on IAEA inspections helped or hindered inspectors? • Should the role of the IAEA be reformed to be an international enforcer of the

NPT? • If a state refuses IAEA inspection teams, should the UN Security Council or

member states be responsible for enforcing compliance with the NPT?


Glossary

Additional protocols (APs): These were designed for States having a safeguards agreement with the Agency, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nonproliferation objectives. Other States may accept and implement those measures of the Model Additional Protocol that they choose with a view to contributing to non-proliferation aims or to the effectiveness and efficiency objectives of the Protocol.44

Ad-Hoc Inspection- an inspection that is not part of series of regular, routine inspections. Ad-Hoc inspections are also called random inspections. 45

Comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs): All non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT, as well as States party to the regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, are required to conclude CSAs with the Agency. In accordance with the terms of such agreements, a State undertakes to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities, within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere for the purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Under these agreements, the Agency has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all such nuclear material.46

Declared Facility- A facility that has been identified by a treaty party as being subject to the terms of a treaty. All non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are required to declare these facilities under IAEA safeguards.47

Declared Site Inspection- an inspection conducted at a relevant site to the NPT. 48

Non-Nuclear States- States that were not originally nuclear state at the signing of the NPT49 Nuclear States- States that were original nuclear states at the signing of the NPT.50

44 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Annual Report 2004,” July 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/safeguards.pdf, (accessed 25 February, 2006). 45 United Nations, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Coming to Terms with Security: A Handbook on Verification and Compliance. (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Publication, June 2003). 46 IAEA Annual Report 2004 47 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.


On-site Inspection (OSI)- This is a short visit by an inspection team to verify compliance with the safeguards determined by the state and the IAEA, as well as the NPT.51 Special Inspection- An inspection in which the IAEA or regional safeguards agency conducts an investigation upon credible evidence of non-compliance.52 Transparency- Openness of information regarding a state’s nuclear activities, both peaceful and military. 53 Voluntary offer agreements (VOAs): The five NPT nuclear-weapon States have concluded safeguards agreements covering some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. Under the VOAs, facilities or nuclear material in facilities notified to the Agency by the State concerned are offered for the application of safeguards. VOAs serve two purposes: to broaden the Agency’s safeguards experience by allowing for inspections at advanced facilities; and to demonstrate that nuclear weapon States are not commercially advantaged by being exempt from safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities.54

51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 IAEA Annual Report 2004


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Appendix A: Strengthened Safeguards System: States with Additional Protocols

The latest status report, as of 17 February 2006, includes: State Board Approval Date signed In Force State Board Approval Date signed In Force

Afghanistan 1-Mar-05 19-Jul-05 19-Jul-05 Latvia 7-Dec-00 12-Jul-01 12-Jul-01

Albania 16-Jun-04 2-Dec-04 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 9-Mar-04 10-Mar-04 */

Algeria 14-Sep-04 Liechtenstein 16-Jun-05

Andorra 7-Dec-00 9-Jan-01 Lithuania 8-Dec-97 11-Mar-98 5-Jul-00

Armenia 23-Sep-97 29-Sep-97 28-Jun-04 Luxembourg 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04

Australia 23-Sep-97 23-Sep-97 12-Dec-97 Madagascar 18-Jun-03 18-Sep-03 18-Sep-03

Austria 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Malaysia 22-Sep-05 22-Nov-05

Azerbaijan 7-Jun-00 5-Jul-00 29-Nov-00 Mali 10-Sep-02 12-Sep-02 12-Sep-02

Bangladesh 25-Sep-00 30-Mar-01 30-Mar-01 Malta 28-Nov-02 24-Apr-03 12-Jul-05

Belarus 3-Oct-05 15-Nov-05 Marshall Islands 1-Mar-05 3-May-05 3-May-05

Belgium 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Mauritania 18-Mar-03 2-Jun-03

Benin 17-Sep-04 7-Jun-05 Mauritius 14-Sep-04 9-Dec-04

Botswana 20-Sep-05 Mexico 12-Mar-04 29-Mar-04

Bulgaria 14-Sep-98 24-Sep-98 10-Oct-00 Monaco 25-Nov-98 30-Sep-99 30-Sep-99

Burkina Faso 18-Mar-03 17-Apr-03 17-Apr-03 Mongolia 11-Sep-01 5-Dec-01 12-May-03

Cameroon 16-Jun-04 16-Dec-04 Morocco 16-Jun-04 22-Sep-04

Canada 11-Jun-98 24-Sep-98 8-Sep-00 Namibia 21-Mar-00 22-Mar-00

Cape Verde 16-Jun-05 28-Jun-05 Netherlands 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04

Chile 10-Sep-02 19-Sep-02 3-Nov-03 New Zealand 14-Sep-98 24-Sep-98 24-Sep-98

China 25-Nov-98 31-Dec-98 28-Mar-02 Nicaragua 12-Jun-02 18-Jul-02 18-Feb-05

Comoros 16-Jun-05 13-Dec-05 Niger 9-Mar-04 11-Jun-04

Costa Rica 29-Nov-01 12-Dec-01 Nigeria 7-Jun-00 20-Sep-01

Colombia 25-Nov-04 11-May-05 Norway 24-Mar-99 29-Sep-99 16-May-00

Croatia 14-Sep-98 22-Sep-98 6-Jul-00 Palau 1-Mar-05 13-May-05 13-May-05

Cuba 9-Sep-03 18-Sep-03 3-Jun-04 Panama 29-Nov-01 11-Dec-01 11-Dec-01

Cyprus 25-Nov-98 29-Jul-99 19-Feb-03 Paraguay 12-Jun-02 24-Mar-03 14-Sep-04

Czech Republic 20-Sep-99 28-Sep-99 1-Jul-02 Peru 10-Dec-99 22-Mar-00 23-Jul-01

DR Congo 28-Nov-02 9-Apr-03 9-Apr-03 Philippines 23-Sep-97 30-Sep-97

Denmark 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Poland 23-Sep-97 30-Sep-97 5-May-00

Ecuador 20-Sep-99 1-Oct-99 24-Oct-01 Portugal 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04

El Salvador 23-Sep-02 5-Sep-03 24-May-04 Republic of Korea (ROK) 24-Mar-99 21-Jun-99 19-Feb-04

Estonia 1-Dec-02 Romania 9-Jun-99 11-Jun-99 7-Jul-00

Fiji 16-Jun-05 Russia 21-Mar-00 22-Mar-00

Finland 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Senegal 1-Mar-05


France 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Serbia and Montenegro 14-Sep-04

FYROM 16-Jun-05 12-Jul-05 Seychelles 18-Mar-03 7-Apr-04 13-Oct-04

Gabon 18-Mar-03 8-Jun-05 Singapore 20-Sep-05 22-Sep-05

Georgia 23-Sep-97 29-Sep-97 3-Jun-03 Slovakia 1-Dec-02

Germany 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Slovenia 25-Nov-98 26-Nov-98 22-Aug-00

Ghana 11-Jun-98 12-Jun-98 11-Jun-04 South Africa 12-Jun-02 13-Sep-02 13-Sep-02

Greece 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Spain 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04

Guatemala 29-Nov-01 14-Dec-01 Sweden 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04

Haiti 20-Mar-02 10-Jul-02 Switzerland 7-Jun-00 16-Jun-00 1-Feb-05

Holy See 14-Sep-98 24-Sep-98 24-Sep-98 Tajikistan 12-Jun-02 7-Jul-03 14-Dec-04

Honduras 16-Jun-05 7-Jul-05 Tanzania 16-Jun-04 23-Sep-04 7-Feb-05

Hungary 25-Nov-98 26-Nov-98 4-Apr-00 Thailand 20-Sep-05 22-Sep-05

Iceland 9-Sep-03 12-Sep-03 12-Sep-03 Togo 22-Sep-03 26-Sep-03

Indonesia 20-Sep-99 29-Sep-99 29-Sep-99 Tunisia 1-Mar-05 24-May-05

Iran 21-Nov-03 18-Dec-03 Turkey 7-Jun-00 6-Jul-00 17-Jul-01

Ireland 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Turkmenistan 1-Mar-05 17-May-05 3-Jan-06

Italy 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04 Uganda 25-Nov-04 14-Jun-05 14-Feb-06

Jamaica 12-Jun-02 19-Mar-03 19-Mar-03 Ukraine 7-Jun-00 15-Aug-00 24-Jan-06

Japan 25-Nov-98 4-Dec-98 16-Dec-99 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04

Jordan 18-Mar-98 28-Jul-98 28-Jul-98 United States of America 11-Jun-98 12-Jun-98

Kazakhstan 18-Jun-03 6-Feb-04 Uruguay 23-Sep-97 29-Sep-97 30-Apr-04

Kiribati 10-Sep-02 9-Nov-04 Uzbekistan 14-Sep-98 22-Sep-98 21-Dec-98

Kuwait 12-Jun-02 19-Jun-02 2-Jun-03 Totals 113 107 74

Strengthened Safeguards System: Other Parties with Additional Protocols

Other Parties Board Approval Date signed In Force

Euratom 1/ 11-Jun-98 22-Sep-98 30-Apr-04

1 1 1

*/ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has pledged to apply its Additional Protocols pending entry into force. 1/ The Agency also applies safeguards, including the measures foreseen in the Model Additional Protocol, in Taiwan, China. Pursuant to a decision by the Board, the relations between the Agency and the authorities in Taiwan, China are non-governmental. 2/ Accession to the additional protocol with EU NNWS reproduced in INFCIRC 193/Add.8 [pdf] Source: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html


Appendix B: States that Have Ratified or Acceded to the NPT as of 1 March, 2005 Afghanistan Congo Iceland Myanmar Slovenia Albania Costa Rica Indonesia Namibia Solomon Islands Algeria Côte d'Ivoire Iran (Islamic Republic of) Nauru Somalia Andorra Croatia Iraq Nepal South Africa Angola Cuba Ireland Netherlands Spain Antigua and Barbuda Cyprus Italy New Zealand Sri Lanka Argentina Czech Republic Jamaica Nicaragua Sudan Armenia Democratic People's Republic of Korea* Japan Niger Suriname Australia Democratic Republic of the Congo Jordan Nigeria Swaziland Austria Denmark Kazakhstan Norway Sweden Azerbaijan Djibouti Kenya Oman Switzerland Bahamas Dominica Kiribati Palau Syrian Arab Republic Bahrain Dominican Republic Kuwait Panama Tajikistan Bangladesh Ecuador Kyrgyzstan Papua New Guinea Thailand Barbados Egypt Lao PDR Paraguay FYROM Belarus El Salvador Latvia Peru Timor-Leste Belgium Equatorial Guinea Lebanon Philippines Togo Belize Eritrea Lesotho Poland Tonga Benin Estonia Liberia Portugal Trinidad and Tobago Bhutan Ethiopia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Qatar Tunisia Bolivia Fiji Liechtenstein Republic of Korea Turkey Bosnia and Herzegovina Finland Lithuania Republic of Moldova Turkmenistan Botswana France Luxembourg Romania Tuvalu Brazil Gabon Madagascar Russian Federation Uganda Brunei Darussalam Gambia Malawi Rwanda Ukraine Bulgaria Georgia Malaysia Saint Kitts and Nevis United Arab Emirates Burkina Faso Germany Maldives Saint Lucia United Kingdom of Great Britain and Burundi Ghana Mali Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Northern Ireland Cambodia Greece Malta Samoa United Republic of Tanzania Cameroon Grenada Marshall Islands San Marino United States of America Canada Guatemala Mauritania Sao Tome and Principe Uruguay Cape Verde Guinea Mauritius Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan Central African Republic Guinea-Bissau Mexico Senegal Vanuatu


Chad Guyana Micronesia (Federated States of) Serbia and Montenegro Venezuela Chile Haiti Monaco Seychelles Viet Nam China Holy See Mongolia Sierra Leone Yemen Colombia Honduras Morocco Singapore Zambia Comoros Hungary Mozambique Slovakia Zimbabwe

* Announced its withdrawal on 10 January 2003. Source: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/presskit.pdf


Appendix C: IAEA Organizational Chart

Source : http://www.iaea.org/About/org_chart.html

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