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7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011
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EN BANC
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,
in his personal capacity, and inrepresentation of MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS
IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., HADJI MUHMINA J.
USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM,
JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN
TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M.
KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-
E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and
BASSAM ALUH SAUPI,
Petitioners,
- versus -
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, thru
SPEAKER FELICIANO
BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,
PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of
the President Executive Secretary,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary
of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN,
Treasurer of the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 196271 Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 18, 2011
G.R. No. 196305
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- versus -
SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his
capacity as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections,
FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his
capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and
Management, PACQUITO OCHOA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
in his capacity as Senate President,
and FELICIANO BELMONTE, inhis capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives,
Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary,
and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU
CASAN CONDING CANA, and
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO
PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN
(PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,
G.R. No. 197221
G.R. No. 197280
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- versus -
THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR.,
in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and
Management, and HON. ROBERTO
B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurerof the Philippines,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
ATTY. ROMULO B.
MACALINTAL,
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
LUIS “BAROK” BIRAOGO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
G.R. No. 197282
G.R. No. 197392
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THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
JACINTO V. PARAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM,
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.
G.R. No. 197454
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act ( RA) No. 10153, entitled “ An Act Providing
for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of
August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) yearsthereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The
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law as well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs)
for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and theMembers of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 alreadyspawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.
2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multipliedafter RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao andthe Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordillerasconsisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographicalareas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact anorganic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the grantedautonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous regionwith the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission
composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees
from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of
government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislativeassembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
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On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled “ An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.” A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section
18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Regionof Muslim Mindanao ( ARMM ). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days
nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled “ An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, as Amended ”) was the next legislative act passed. This law
provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in theoriginal organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regionalofficials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140[1] - on June22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA
No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilanand Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMMregional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3
years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was notratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regionaloffices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resettingthe ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill
( HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled
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on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB
No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate
Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators votedfavorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred
with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.10153 into law.
As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition
filed with this Court – G.R. No. 196271[3]
- assailing the constitutionality of both
HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 aswell for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,
petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305filed another petition[4] also
assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.
With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the
following petitions against its constitutionality:
a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a
member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in hiscapacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.
No. 197221;
b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal
as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;
c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction[7] filed by Louis “Barok” Biraogo against the COMELEC and
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;and
d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa,
Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.
Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as
registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakasng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections
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scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus[9] against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail theconstitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.
Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights ForumPhilippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for
Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Interventiondated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same
Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to theconstitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.
Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda
within twenty (20) days.
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent
elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these
cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3,Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged
violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure toadhere to the “elective and representative” character of the executive and
legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant
to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of theelective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular
elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of
appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, incomplete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
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From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were recognized and
argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2),Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajorityvote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular electionsconstitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1
and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the
ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.
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We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto .
I. Synchr onization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites
Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution,which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitutionshall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President,
which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It
shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in theMetropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining thehighest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three
years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
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Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought toattain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all electiveofficials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether national or local – to once every three years.[12] This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the ConstitutionalCommission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of theconstitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of thenational and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission
on Elections,[14] we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that
the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the
local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to
end on the same hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections
that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenureon the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize
future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representativesand the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronizedwith the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is
likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be includedamong the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should beunderstood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary
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meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] “[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, its language
should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.”
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word “local” refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or
minor political subdivision.[17]Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall
within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve
within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered
one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of theConstitution entitled “Local Government.” Autonomous regions are establishedand discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted
to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local
government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Thereshall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and theCordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization mandated by the
Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM – unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed inthis case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.
II. The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No.10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or theSenate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days.
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The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of
the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can becomea law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been
printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of
three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensedwith is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill
defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with theSenate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third
readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after
the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediateenactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.
[20]
Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separatereadings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate
enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that hadto be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a
national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to thePresident under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basicrights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.[Emphasis
supplied.]
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The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of their
legislative discretion – gave full recognition to the President’s certification and
promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of graveabuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our
intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justificationfor this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are
not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]
In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold purpose thatunderlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must
always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending
bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect toMembers of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote
on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment
process.[23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both
advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunitiesto present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the
cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Actmay be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall becomeeffective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called
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for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than
ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333
and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws – RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 – cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they
did not change or revise any provision in the latter law ; they merely filled in agap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the
date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds support in
ARMM’s recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled theARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the
date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the firstARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No.8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29]
were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the
ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provisionof RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there
was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the
plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new
date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054 . Thereafter,Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM
regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
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From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat
the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate anddistinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent
when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment
prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No.
9054 the character of an irrepealable law
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,
Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32]has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitutiondemands.
Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.” In other words, as long asmajority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and holdsession. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws
or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no
less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly,this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend,
revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS [33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a
legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body,
considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as theydo the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future
amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of
omniscience.
xxx
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A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether
pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce
new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by thefederal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its
successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every
legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original actwas passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of
subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34]
(Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is alimitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators’
room for action and flexibility. III. C. Section 3, Article XVI I of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite
requir ement found in Section 18, Arti cle X of the Constitu tion
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarrantedsupermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its
Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement,
we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18,Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a
violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required
only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the
settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35]questions on the extent of
the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seeminglygeneral terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a
plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that “The creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” Withthese wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to thecreation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
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Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act – require
ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are thosethat relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region’s
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionallyconceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.[36]
The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters thatthe Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.
Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite
requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as asubstantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with
these requirements.
IV. The synchronization issue
As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a
constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronizationmust include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already
exists – RA No. 7166 – as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national
and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter
for local governments (with the exceptionof barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are notconstitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already
reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections byexpress constitutional recognition.[37]
To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the
schedule of the ARMM’s regular elections (which should have been held inAugust 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and
local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the
elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in theARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
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synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in thesynchronized elections assume office.
As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosingto grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and
passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.
V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153
A. Basic Underlying Premises
To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material
premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of
Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for thesynchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy asrecognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general andcomprehensive.[39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of
civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged itelsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,
legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.[42]
The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of
Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and
referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found
“in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical
events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organiclaw.”[43]
The constitutional provisions on autonomy – specifically, Sections 15 to 21of Article X of the Constitution – constitute express limitations on legislative
power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting
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what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance
of the autonomous region.
Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations
posed by the prescribed basic structure of government – i.e., that the governmentmust have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must
be elective and representative of the constituent political units; nationalgovernment, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under
Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, ArticleX, “all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.”
The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a
standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the
affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt onwhat the Constitution intends – the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and
administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the
permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In
other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45]
in the relationship between the nationaland the regional governments.
In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates,
with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all,the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the
whole country, while regional autonomy – as the term suggests – directly carries a
narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.
These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of
Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal
situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regionalelections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save
for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how
to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening per iod between theexpiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office
– twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the synchronizedelections on May 13, 2013.
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The problem, in other words, was for in ter im measures for this period,consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established supporting
jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim
measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legallandscape. The Constitution’s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively
provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the new[46] and for theintroduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of
elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpiredunder the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far
enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing
regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with ustoday.
The creation of local government units also represents instances wheninterim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur [48] and DinagatIslands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim
governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan althoughthese positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to
serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected andqualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local
government from a sub-province to a province.[51]
In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-
the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust tothe goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choiceof measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the
guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress toaddress the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume
prime materiality as i t is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153
should be measur ed, i.e ., given the consti tutional objective of synchr onization
that cannot legall y be faul ted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate
the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant
problems that the adjustment of elections necessari ly brought wi th i t?
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B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term – as
an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangayofficials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannotextend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmeña v.
COMELEC :[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified
where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term
and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even
though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
“It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by
an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which
is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the
incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution .”
[Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the
supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a
determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated
should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repealthrough the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of
the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandateexcept only as the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may only
pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command
or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other
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hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called
for .[54]
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly
and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respectto the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from
this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover byCongress.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to
appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the
elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectlywhat it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the
term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can bedone indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a
new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term.This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.[56] Hence,holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that
Congress could not have undertaken.
Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where thequestion of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by,
this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases withcontrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC ,[57] Adap v.
Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v. Comelec ,[59] where the Court ruled that theelective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.
All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for
in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local electiveofficials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year term
limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the
term for which they were originally elected.
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Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had
been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 bycompletely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
C. The COMELEC has no authori ty to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this
Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant toSection 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, asevident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of theSenators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the
second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President
and Vice-President, states: xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.[Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
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Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which
shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on
any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congressand local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon
orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power .[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a poli cy decision in the exercise
of its legislative wisdom that it shal l not cal l special elections as an adjustmentmeasure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act
to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without therebysupplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of
discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narr ow ground and i s merely to annul
a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor
to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its
legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges,
we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of theCOMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date
of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election.[65]Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to
call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutorygrant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with
the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to,and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided
for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause suchas violence, terrorism,loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
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records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the
holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition byany interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested
parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the electionnot held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later thanthirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after thevoting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof,such election results in a failure to elect , and in
any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address
instances whereelections have already been scheduled to take place but have tobe postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogouscauses of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principleof ejusdem generis, the term “analogous causes” will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduledelections. These “analogous causes” are further defined by the phrase “of such
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
impossible.”
Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where
elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force
majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous
causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
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voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where
the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.
In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law – i.e., by congressional policy – and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imaginationcan these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated
by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that
obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of astatute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881
can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compelthe COMELEC to hold special elections.
D. The Cour t has no power to shor ten the terms of elective off icials
Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the
COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that thenewly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of electiveofficials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective
officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] isspecifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as
shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in
order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. Thesettled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has
the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less , or more, than the consti tutionall y mandated three years
[71] as this tinkering would
directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
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commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a callfor special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, theresult is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to beelected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the “term”
means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right andfixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,
while the “tenure” represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds
the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor theCourt has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.
They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if
they do so.
E. The President’s Power to Appoi nt OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM
during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should
be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictlyconstrued; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to berecognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.[emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President canappoint. These are:
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First , the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other publicministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the
rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested
in the President in this Constitution;
Second , all other officers of the government whose appointments are nototherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by lawvest in the President alone.[74]
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be“elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the
appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153
were to be mistakenl y read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to“appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall performthe functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the
May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term endingon the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
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As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and
plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA
No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections
and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhi le prevail . And this is
how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on itsunambiguous facial terms.[75] Aside fr om its order for synchronization, it i s purely
and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requir es.
Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an
unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the
synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based onthe above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionali ty of providing for a
holdover and the unavail abil ity of constitutional possibi li ties for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM off icials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a f ixed and specif ic per iod as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Ar ticle VI I of the Constitu tion – an
unconsti tutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment
period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not “democraticand republican.” For then, the people’s right to choose the leaders to govern them
may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic
regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the “elective andrepresentative” governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution.
But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances
contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly,
the terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution andRA No. 9054 – will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what
has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously,
with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim andtemporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disruptthe election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s
choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as aninterim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used
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in the creation of local government units[76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces
to the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis-à-vis the
regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no
different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State,where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken
in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the “representative” character of the chosen leaders need notnecessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a
function of the appointment process; only the “elective” aspect shall be supplanted
by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks toaddress concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4
and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner
and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed in its
proper context – is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its
autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.
VI. Other Constitutional Concerns
Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral argumentsthat upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous
precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in thecountry, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.
This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellationof elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power
that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively
undertake with respect to elections.
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a
very specific and limited purpose – the synchronization of elections. It was atemporary means to a lasting end – the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and
specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for thecancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by
Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
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Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act ina holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot
compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal
with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgottenthat a period of 21 months – or close to 2 years – intervenes from the time that the
incumbent ARMM elective officials’ terms expired and the time the new ARMMelective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history
– past and current – teach us, many developments, some of them critical and
adverse, can transpire in the country’s Muslim areas in this span of time in the waythey transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the
presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully
functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with eventemporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the presentcircumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs toundertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al .:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the RevisedAdministrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary
appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may
occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is
the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problemruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under
the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation andgovernance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of
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governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will
be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people
of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80]
(Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor,
and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic
services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. Whenviewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally
mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that theConstitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates – synchronization and regional autonomy – such that it is necessary to choose one
over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle inconstitutional construction – ut magis valeat quam pereat : that the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate should not be given importanceover the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear .[82] We refer
to the Court’s declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al. ,[83] thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from
the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, andapparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a
manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional
autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, inthe way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit
to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that
must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its
governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated bythe attendant circumstances.
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Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not besynchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the
autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough
and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far fromconvinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are
granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equatedautonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the
constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the
central government, but rather an efficient working relationship between theautonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective
partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of ascomplete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the
larger political framework of the nation.[84]
[Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted
Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be “within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove
Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration
of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of theConstitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provisionin order to “mak e it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of
the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised
by the national government[.]”[85] Of note is the Court’s pronouncement
in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirr e[86] which we quote:
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Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegatedto political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance
more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,
political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country
to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-
setting for the entire country still lies in the President and
Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to
defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not
just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from havingto act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than theConstitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate – the synchronization of national and local elections – when it enacted RA No.
10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the lawand, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should
address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the
exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to
compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,
are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which isabhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government – the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with
grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
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amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power isexercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its
constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within dueconstitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accusedof any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find
no reason to accord merit to the petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only
reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus,
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the partychallenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v.
Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. Thetheory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95]
[Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm itsvalidity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporaryrestraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice