t' ;/' J • -, Turning the Colombian Brain Drain into a Brain Gain: A study of attitudes among Colombians living in the United States Applied Workshop Project MPA Program School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University April 24, 2002 Manager: Jessie Walker Deputy Manager: Carolina Soto Ricardo Araiza Divya Chaturvedi Akiko Moriyama Ardis Sanmoogan Jennifer Simon Carine Terpanjian Cagri Koseyener Diego von Stauffenberg Eileen Peguero Naohiro Takahashi Faculty Advisor: Milena Gomez
Transcript
t' ;/' J • -,
Turning the Colombian Brain Drain into a Brain Gain:
A study of attitudes among Colombians living in the United States
Applied Workshop Project MPA Program
School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University
April 24, 2002
Manager: Jessie Walker
Deputy Manager: Carolina Soto
Ricardo Araiza Divya Chaturvedi Akiko Moriyama Ardis Sanmoogan Jennifer Simon
Carine Terpanjian Cagri Koseyener Diego von Stauffenberg Eileen Peguero Naohiro Takahashi
Faculty Advisor: Milena Gomez
Acknowledgments:
A special thank you to the enthusiastic support from the Colombian Consul Mauricio Suarez Copete and
Vice-Consul Roberto Castro. We are grateful for the support of our professional association partners
including Profesionales y Estudiantes Colombianos en El Exterior (PECX), the Colombian American
Association (CAA), and the Asociacion de Profesionales Colombianos (APC), as well as the Colombian
Civic Center in New York (CCC).
In addition, we would like to thank Angela Maria Jimenez, from the DNP, for her constant support in
gathering information and consulting with this team. We are also thankful to all those who supported our
research, in particular Diego Aguilera and Orlando Aristizabal from PECX. Ana Maria Gonzalez from
CAA, Jose Miguel Torres from CCC, Arturo Sanchez, Sonia Ospina, our interviewees Ana Maria
Bejarano, German Cavelier, Claudia Gurisatti, Carlos Manzano, Elizabeth Moramass, Deborah Upegui
and a very special thank to all our survey respondents.
2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report addresses one of the most important issues facing Colombia today, the exodus of its educated
citizens to other countries, otherwise known as the "brain drain." Colombia is currently experiencing a
surge in emigration, with 525,000 Colombians leaving the country in the year 2000-a 65% increase
from 1996-making Colombia the largest outflow of immigrants in South America. This surge is a direct
result of increased conflict in Colombia and the economic slowdown that has plagued the country. One of
the priorities of this study was to evaluate and research these attitudes and opinions of the Colombian
migrants to help inform policy recommendations for turning this brain drain into a gain.
From an analysis of past practices in Colombia to stem the brain drain and the research into other
countries best practices, two ways of implementing brain gain policies come forward. Brain gain policies
can be either implemented through incentives to encourage the return of the expatriates to the country of
origin- the return option, or through their remote motivation and association of its development-the
diaspora option. Policies implemented the Colombian Government in the past primarily fell under the
return option.
To arrive at a viable policy recommendation that would address the problem of the brain drain, the
research team decided to survey the attitudes and opinions of the very brains immigrated to the US. A
diversity of Colombians participated in the targeted sample survey with 92 percent falling into our "brain
drain" category of a Bachelor's degree or higher, with almost half actually holding a postgraduate
diploma, Masters degree, or Ph.D. Our survey analysis indicates that professional and educated
Colombians' willingness to return decreases with time spent in the US. Overall, when asked what would
need to change for their eventual return to Colombia, our respondents are more concerned with issues
such as improved security and macroeconomic stability than economic incentives such as tax breaks or
investment opportunities.
Given the reluctance of Colombians to return and reality of conflict in Colombia, our policy
recommendation depends heavily on the diaspora option and builds on the successful existing Colombian
intellectual/scientific diaspora network called Red Caldas. We make a note of caution regarding
recommendations to turn the brain drain into brain gain: the daily violence, economic woes, corruption,
and the lure of the north make any long-term solution problematic. For any lasting impact on reversing
the brain drain, peace and security in Colombia are paramount but we hope that, until then, the Colombian
diaspora can help influence a brain gain for Colombia.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part 1: Background and Analysis
Introduction - 5
Background - 6
The Problem Today - 8
Analysis of Colombia's Past Policies - 11
Best Practices in Other Countries - 14
Part II: Analysis of Data
Methodology - 17
Description of the Data - 19
Analysis of Respondent's Attitudes - 21
Part Ill: Policy Suggestions
Policy Options - 23
Primary Recommendations - 25
Key Steps - 26
Challenges - 27
Future research - 27
Conclusion - 28
Bibliography - 29
Appendices - 31
Project Scope
This research on the Colombian "brain drain" problem is a product of graduate public policy students at
Columbia University acting as outside consultants for the Colombian Departamento Nacional de
Planeaci6n (DNP). The study covers the reasons why Colombians left their country and focuses on
whether any changes or improvements in Colombian policies may turn the current "brain drain" into a
"brain gain".
4
PART 1: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
Like many developing countries such as India, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, Venezuela, and El
Salvador, Colombia is experiencing what is commonly termed a "brain drain" or an exodus of its
educated citizens to other countries. Today the brain drain is a result of several serious problems facing
Colombia. Left wing guerrillas, right wing paramilitaries and drug traffickers have forced many
Colombian migrants to flea their home country due to its prolonged civil war and resulting violence
imposed. Economically, the Colombian economy suffered its worst recession in 70 years in 1999 and
early 2000. GDP fell by 4.5 percent in 1999, unemployment rate reached 19.5 percent in early 2000, and
the fiscal deficit grew to about 5.5 percent of GDP (Gamarra and Collier 2001).
The causes of the recession were many: a gradual worsening of its fiscal accounts, internal strife,
violence, and external shocks such as the fall in the world prices of oil and coffee. Further, since the late
1950s Colombian politics has been characterized by high electoral abstention, perceptions of corruption,
and generalized political apathy towards, and mistrust of, partisan politics. According to the latest
statistics from the Colombian government's Department of Administrative Security (DAS), 525,000
people left the country in the year 2000-a 65 percent increase from 1996-making Colombia the largest
outflow of immigrants in South America 1• The recent exodus is different from the earlier outflows in that
current migrants represent an increased number of intellectuals, highly educated middle class
professionals and members of the upper class.
All these factors have compounded the problem of brain drain. The term "brain drain" refers to the long
term international migration of skilled people who have been the subject of considerable educational and
professional investment by their own society. Twice, in 1972 and 1982, the government tried to stem the
brain drain flow with policies that included tax and other incentives, with limited success.
However, no coherent strategy currently exists to address this problem along with closely related issues
around capital flight and economic dis-investment. To this end, Colombia' s Departamento Nacional de
Planeaci6n (DNP), the government agency responsible for preparation, execution and assessment of
policies and programs in the public sector, has approached the group to study the economic, political and
1 The team received these up-to-date statistics directly from the Colombian Department of National Planning (DNP) via email communication.
5
social consequence of migration and formulate policy initiatives that attempt to address the problem of
brain drain.
The team carrying out this study is made up of a group of graduate students of the Master in Public
Administration program at Columbia University in New York City. It was developed in a two months
time frame, as part of the Applied Workshop of the Public Administration Program. This short timeframe
was one of the most significant limitations of this project. In addition, the study is restricted to
Colombians living in the US, particularly focusing on the New York and New Jersey areas. lt is worth
noting that the sample surveyed is not representative of the entire population of Colombian migrants to
the US; rather it is a targeted survey whose findings give empirical support to the policy
recommendations. The distance between this research team and the Colombian Departamento Nacional
de Planeaci6n (DNP) made it impossible to have face-to-face interaction, limiting our ability to properly
survey the leadership and staff at the DNP. These factors make the study and its results an initial
approach to the brain drain problem in Colombia. Further research is suggested in order to achieve a
more comprehensive perspective.
This report outlines the research and findings conducted in order to better understand previous and
potential future policies to address the Colombian brain drain. To begin, we present the history and
causes of Colombian emigration to better explain the problem, as it exists today. Next we examine the
past policies implemented by the Colombian government and investigate other countries' solutions to the
problem.
A detailed discussion and rationalization of the project methodology is presented, followed by a
description of our analysis of the survey data. Next, given the context of the current conflict and
economic situation in Colombia, we present a series of policy recommendations. Finally, a discussion of
the challenges we encountered and future research suggestions will complete this report.
Background
Over the last fifty years Colombia has seen its citizens take flight to other countries around the world due
to both the push of internal security issues and the pull of economic and quality of life opportunities
abroad. While the majority of these emigrants have fled to the United States, many have settled in
Canada, Spain and nearby countries in Latin America such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Costa Rica. There
are estimates that nearly three million Colombians or seven percent of the Colombian population is living
6
abroad.2 The DAS claims there are currently around 2 million Colombians living in the US.3 However,
such data on the total numbers of Colombians living abroad are at best an approximation because of
divergent data collection systems in addition to migrants eluding official registration or falsely reporting
their status.
To date, there have been three waves of Colombian migration to the US. "La Violencia," the political
war between the Colombian Conservative and Liberal parties in the 1950s is associated with the first
wave, with emigrants representing people from all socio-economic classes seeking to escape the political
violence. However, the majority of Colombian emigrants were young adult males, who were
accompanied or later joined by their families, from the lower and lower-middle classes that were also
looking for better economic opportunities.
In addition, most migrants came from Colombia's largest interior cities as Bogota, Cali and Medellin
(Gamarra and Collier 2001). Although the civil war ended in the late 1950s, Colombian emigration
continued until the 1970s, but at a slower pace. Individuals representing mostly young adult males from
the lower and lower-middle class continued to seek out economic opportunities abroad (Chaney 1976).
The October 1965 amendments to the United States 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
constituted an attractive 'pull' factor since it repealed the national origins quota system- representing the
most far-reaching revision of immigration policy in the United States. In place of nationality and ethnic
considerations, the INA amendments (P.L. 89 236; 79 Stat. 911) substituted a system based primarily on
reunification of families attracting needed skills, and refugees. The 1965 amendments adopted an annual
ceiling of 20,000 for most countries, provisioned to change by 1968 to a ceiling of 120,000 for the entire
Western Hemisphere eliminating per-country limits and preference systems. As a result, since 1965, the
major source of immigration to the United States shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia,
reversing the trend since the founding of the nation.
The second wave of Colombian emigration surged again in the late 1970s and continued until the mid
1990s. In 1990 about 188,252 Colombians migrated to the US. Although Colombia was experiencing a
favorable economic climate during the 1980s and early 1990s, many Colombians were driven from their
home states due to security threats and drug-related violence-which occurred within the context of an
escalating US-led war on drugs (Gamarra and Collier 2001). To a lesser extent, the promise of jobs,
2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.
7
peace and stability were the other factors that contributed to emigration within this period, similar to the
forces that were responsible for the first wave. These migrants mostly came from the same interior cities
as the first group, with others coming from the coffee-growing region in the west-central part of the
country and the northern coastal city of Barranquilla (Gamarra and Collier 2001 ). The demographic
make-up of this group of Colombians was similar to the first group, but now the numbers of middle,
upper-middle and upper class migrants had increased.
Colombia is currently experiencing another surge in emigration, which began in the 1990s and continues
into the present. According to the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, in 1999, 446,328
Colombians migrated to the US. In fact, the Colombian consul Mauricio Suarez Copete in Manhattan
estimates that the Colombian population in New York City, New Jersey, and White Plains to be around
600,000 while only 15,398 Colombians have registered to vote in the region (Amado 2002). US census
shows that the New York State still has the second largest Colombians in the United States (next to
Florida) in 2000.
Although all socio-economic classes are still involved, this latest wave represent a dramatic increase in
the number of middle, upper-middle and upper-class professionals who are migrating primarily to escape
the increasing violence and personal security threats (extortion, kidnapping, murder, etc.) to themselves
and their families from the Colombian guerrillas, paramilitaries, common criminals, and government
security forces (Gamarra and Collier 2001). In addition, while Colombia's economy entered a deep
recession in the late 1990s the US economy was booming, a lure to many Colombians looking for better
economic opportunities abroad.
Further, by 1990 there was a dense immigration network of Colombians living in the US that facilitated
migration, creating a satellite community. In addition people started migrating for family reasons as close
relatives began arriving. The third wave of migrants is no longer just young adult males and their
families from the larger interior cities, but older Colombians from throughout the country, with an
increasing number from smaller cities in predominantly rural areas. The third wave of Colombian
migration has added yet more diversity to an already divergent Colombian community abroad. This
diversity is a result of the far-reaching effects of political and personal violence, which has pushed
Colombians of all classes and regions out of their country.
8
The Problem Today
Unlike the civil wars of Central America that eventually came to an end through peace treaties, the war in
Colombia continues unabated. In February 2002, during the research period for this paper, Colombian
President Andres Pastrana broke off the three-and-a-half year peace negotiations with the armed
opposition group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (F ARC) after the kidnapping of
Colombian Senator Jorge Gechem Turbay. Since peace talks with the government fell apart, the FARC's
bad faith at the negotiation table has evolved into redoubled attacks on pipelines, power stations, and now
civilians----even in Bogota. As a result, there is a renewed threat to civilian lives, which may lead to more
migration from the country, increasing the brain drain.
The brain drain involves transfer of skills and knowledge from the country of origin and education of the
migrants, to the country where they now work. It is normally thought of as a phenomenon primarily
affecting developing countries whose stock of human capabilities may be seriously eroded by migration
of highly educated and trained personnel to post-industrialized countries-wasting the government's
already scarce resources invested in higher education.
Table 1 shows the emigration of Colombians to the United States in 1990s. One third of the 525,000
people who left Colombia in 2000, according to the DAS estimates, have ended up in the US adding to
the estimated 2 million Colombians (around 5 percent of the national population) already living there.
Throughout the period, the emigration has increased remarkably, mostly because of the rise in non
immigrants-defined as aliens who seek temporary entry to the US for a specific purpose (See Appendix
1 for Figure 1 ). However, we suspect that the number of refugees and asylees in Figure 1 might be far less
than the real number since they are often counted incorrectly.
Table 1: Colombia Population and Emigration to the United States
1990 1995 1999
Population 34,970,000 38,542,000 41,566,000
Total emigrants to the US 188,252 249,131 446,328
Percentage(Total Emigrants/Po~ 0.54% 0.65% 1.07%
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, World Development Indicators
According to the US census, the number of Colombians in New York City decreased from 1990 to 1999
but a look at the broader New York and Jew Jersey areas shows an overall increase in the area (Tables 3
and 4).
9
Table 3: Colombians living close to New York 1990 2000
Nassau County (NY) 6,115 7,230 Rockland County (NY) 445 562 Westchester County (NY) 6,948 7,032
Bergen County (NJ) 7,990 11,161 Hudson County (NJ) 12,488 12,843 Union County (NJ) 9,476 11,423
Total 43,462 50,251
Source: US Census
Table 4: Colombians in New York and New Jersey ~
1990 2000
New York State 107,377 104,179 New Jersey State 52,210 65,075
U.S Total 378,726 470,684
Source: US Census
According to the US census, the number of
Colombians in New York City decreased from
1990 to 1999 but a look at the broader New
York and Jew Jersey areas shows an overall
increase in the area (Tables 3 and 4).
This could be explained by increased
incorporation among Colombians into US
society, causing families to move further away
from close-nit communities, such as Jackson
Heights in Queens, into the surrounding
suburbs.
One of the priorities of this study is to evaluate whether recent migrants include a proportionally larger
percentage of professionals from all sectors of Colombians society. Tables 5 and 6 show US Immigration
and Naturalization Service data on the immigrants and non-immigrants classified by occupations. This
data must be examined carefully since 80 percent of immigrants admitted to enter the United States report
no occupation. In addition, more than 90 percent of non-immigrants are coming to the United States as
temporary visitors for business or pleasure.4
Table S. Selected Class of Admission) I Table 6. Selected Class of Admission ) I (Immigrants from Colombia to the US in 19~ (Non-immigrants from Colombia to the US in 19 Occupation 2008 20.1% Protess1ona1, :spec1a11ty &
Technical 455 4.6% r.xecut1ve, AC1mtn. &
Managerial 118 1.2%
Sales 240 2.4%
Officials 1,750 4.0% 1 emporary workers tor Business 71 ,166 15.8% 1 emporary Workers tor Pleasure 338,790 75.3%
Source: Immigration and Natu1·a/ization Servic Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service
4 Immigrant: a person who comes to a country to take up permanent residence. Non-immigrant: the absence of former.
10
An exacerbation of the Colombian brain drain problem could have a lasting negative impact on the
country. Investment in education may not lead to the desired economic growth if a large number of its
highly educated people leave the country. In other words, the brain drain makes it more difficult for
Colombia to retain the very people critical for its economic and social development. Although Colombia
falls into the third ranking (out of four) of Latin American countries expenditures spent on students- in
1990 Colombia spent around $1,000 per year per student-this is a significant investment for a
developing country.5
A discussion of brain drain and policies addressing this problem cannot be complete without considering
the phenomenon of transnationalization. In an increasingly globalized world there are integrative forces
of capital flows, information flows, and movements of people. As large-scale migration is an
instrumental aspect of the globalization, it is represented in current elite discourse, as a process of global
multiculturalization, and the real processes of movement across borders, integration/disintegration, and,
transnationalization (Smith 2002a).
The concept of transnationalization addresses how countries with increasing migrant populations can
strategically incorporate their diasporic populations into their newly defined political community, or
"global nations" (Smith 2002b ). In other words, transnational ism basically refers to the maintenance of
economic, cultural, social and political connections between sending and receiving counties. In the past,
immigrants broke off from their native countries and assimilated to their new societies. Today, we are
seeing (as argued by the authors) that the governments of Mexico, the Dominican Republic or Colombia
have successfully forged these transnational connections for the benefit of their countries. They have
recognized that, in varying degrees, (trans)migration has emerged as a structural element in their
respective economies, for example, the growing importance of remittances. The government of Colombia
has also recognized the importance of their diaspora by allowing for dual citizenship, the de-territorialized
political representation and legislation that facilitates economic linkages.
5 Comparing expenditures on students, it is seen that in 1990, Brazil spent about nine thousand dollars per year per student in federal institutions, compared with about 1,500 for Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, around one thousand for Argentina, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay, and around 500 or less for Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru. (Latin America: National Responses to World Challenges in Higher Education by Simon Schwartzman. Prepared for the Symposium on the new world challenges for higher education, organized by the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, Washington, December, 1998. http://www.airbrasil.org.br/simon/challenges.htm)
11
Analysis of Colombia's Past Policies
Historical policy responses to the problem of brain drain have typically addressed countermeasures, either
to prevent/regulate flows or to cancel their negative effects through taxation. However, the concept of
transnationalism has entered the consciousness of policy makers. Recently, according to Jean-Baptiste
Meyer et al, conceptions about migration have evolved, putting stronger emphasis on brain gain, which is
based on idea that the expatriate skilled population may be considered as a potential asset instead of a
definite loss ( 1997).
Di·as·po·ra (n.)
• A dispersion of a people from their original homeland.
• A dispersion of an originally homogeneous entity, such as a language or culture:
There are two ways to implement the brain
gain: either through the return of the
expatriates to the country of origin-the
return option, or through their remote
motivation and association of its
development- the diaspora option. (Meyer
et al. 1997)
Policies implemented in the past by the Colombian Government primarily fell under the return option.
Decree No. 1397 of August 16, 1972 offered a tax incentive plan to professionals and technicians living
abroad, seeking to import items from abroad to firmly resume permanent residency in Colombia. The
decree outlined the responsibility of the Colombian government, lnstituto Colombiano de
Especialiazacion Tecnica en el exterior (ICETEX), a government organization that provides scholarships
for educational advancement, Fondo Colombiano de lnvestigaciones Cientificas y Proyectos Especiales
(COLCIENCIAS - the government's research organization) and the Colombian professional or
technician.
The policy obligated ICETEX and COLCIENCIAS to hire only professionals of Colombian descent
based on the need and demand for the specialization of this individual. Once all requirements had been
met professionals and technicians would be tax exempt from items imported and specified in contract.
The policy was to take effect immediately after approval of the decree and applied to individuals aspiring
to return as of August 1970. However, the policy was scheduled to expire July 13, 1973. The success of
the policy was hindered for several reasons, the expiration date of the policy, the corruption of some
officials, and the lack of opportunities for some expatriates to utilize the skills obtained abroad.
The return option has been successfully realized in various new industrialized countries such as Singapore
and the Republic of Korea or large developing countries such as India and China, but has met limited
success in Colombia. The diaspora option, on the other hand, proceeds from a different strategy based on
12
the recognition that many of the expatriates are not likely to return. The objective, then, is to create the
links through which they could effectively and productively be connected to its development (Meyer &
Brown 1999).
Since 1991 there has been increased attempts on behalf of the Colombian government to initiate policies
directed at the diaspora. A major example of this was the social reforms to the 1991 Colombian
Constitution that resulted in a multitude of political, social and economic rights for expatriates. This
reform was initiated by began with a grass-roots movement of Colombians based in Miami, Florida, that
lobbied the National Constituent Assembly to include dual citizenship reform in the new Constitution.
Article 96 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution allowed native Colombians and those born to Colombians
the right to be acknowledged as citizens of both Colombia and their host country. This in turn afforded
the dual-citizens the same rights as native-born Colombians.
The Constituent Assembly, also approved and included in the 1991 constitution, improved the political
representation of Colombians abroad in the national Congress by creating a global extraterritorial
electoral district that includes all countries outside the national territory. Unfortunately this representation
is limited to one individual who has to work on behalf of the interests of all Colombians abroad, which
clearly are not uniform. In addition to these reforms, in 1997 the Colombian Congress passed a law
granting expatriates the right to vote for congressional candidates representing electoral districts in
Colombia, providing migrants the power to elect from abroad the legislative representatives of their own
regions of origin.
To further enhance the rights of Colombians abroad the Ministry of Foreign Relations created the
Programa para la Promocion de las Comunidades Colombianas en el Exterior (Program for the
Promotion of Colombian Communities Abroad or PPCCE) as part of the Colombia Para Todos
(Colombia for Everyone) program. This program included outreach to Colombian nationals living abroad,
legal assistance for those incarcerated in foreign jails, professionalization of consular officials, and efforts
at surveying the needs and characteristics of the Colombian diaspora (Guarnizo 1999). Just recently in
March 2002, the Colombian Social Security in the Exterior program was created by the Social Security
Institute (ISS) to offer all Colombians living abroad a pension plan and/or an opportunity to pay for the
pension plans and/or health coverage of family or friends living in Colombia. This in tum serves as an
avenue for Colombians living abroad to lend a hand to family and friends living in Colombia.
13
In addition to policies that help Colombians abroad, COLCIENCAS initiated a network of expatriate
Colombian researchers, academics and engineers called the Colombian Network of Researchers and
Engineers Abroad or "Red Caldas." Established in 1991, Red Caldas encourages Colombian experts
around the world to contribute to scientific and technological progress by publicizing the results of their
research. Its aim is to contribute, from abroad, to the scientific, technical, socioeconomic and cultural
development of Colombia (Meyer et al. 1997).
Today Red Caldas brings together nearly 1,000 out of the roughly 2,000 people of the Colombian
scientific diaspora, living in 30 countries. A quarter of them live in other Latin American countries, 24
percent are in the USA, 12 percent in Great Britain, 9 percent in France, 9 percent in Germany and the
rest in other areas of the world. The social and human sciences are the most significant fields (31 percent),
followed by technology and engineering (23 percent). Then come the natural sciences (16 percent), the
hard sciences (14 percent), medicine and health (12 percent) and finally earth and environment (4 percent)
(Meyer et al. 1997).
The professionals focus on three major aspects in the network. The first is a system of permanent
communication through an electronic database. The second is the organization of local associations, or
"nodes". These are groups of scientists, engineers, and professionals officially working for the
development of Colombia under NGO status in the resident country. Worldwide, there are 21 nodes, the
largest located in the United States, France, Spain and Canada.
Relevant to this study, listed members of Red Caldas located in New York went on to form PECX, the
Association of Colombian Students and Professionals Abroad-also a partner organization assisting the
research conducted for this study (Meyer et al. 1997). Finally, the third category of activity for Red
Caldas is the collaboration on joint projects between diaspora and home community members. These
projects began in 1994 and include the Bio-2000 project, which focused on biomedical applications of
physics and another project, centered on robotics and automation with the aim of designing a
multipurpose industrial robot (Meyer & Brown 1999).
Best Practices in other Countries
Many other developing countries such as the Republic of Korea, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Mexico are
grappling with the brain drain phenomenon and have designed and implemented both return and diaspora
option type policies to reverse the flow. Perhaps other countries' "best practices" would not work in
14
Colombia because of the country's unique situation. However, the evaluation of these other attempts to
reverse the brain drain can help better inform potential new policies for Colombia.
One interesting example is the Republic of South Korea, which implemented both return and diaspora
type policies that successfully encouraged expatriates home. The government established research
institutions, such as the Korea Institute for Science and Technology (KIST) in 1966, as a way to attract
returnees (Human Development Report 200 I). Returnees who join KIST were given a great deal of
research and managerial autonomy, and are offered salaries competitive with overseas incomes, better
working conditions and help with housing and children's schooling. The state-led repatriation was quite
successful, though there were other reasons, such as Korea 's improved economic prospects. Today,
rather than focusing on the physical return of their pools of technological talent living abroad, Korea is
working to construct cross-national networks among them. Jt is organizing networks of professionals
overseas and linking them back with Korea. One example is Korea's visiting professor programs that tap
into the expertise of those uncertain about returning home for good (Human Development Report 2001).
In El Salvador the migration trend is somewhat different. The majority of the emigrants have only a
secondary education when they leave El Salvador, completing their post secondary studies in the United
States-causing the average educational level of emigrants to be higher than the local level (Andrade
1999). This trend is common to Central American countries in large part, due to a scarcity of institutions
of higher learning. El Salvadoran remittances make up 10 percent of the country's GDP, motivating the
government to institute a number of policies and programs to protect the well being of Salvadorans I iving
in the US, which make up roughly 20 percent of their population (Le6n 2000). One example of this
commitment is the consulate's office of community affairs that offers free legal advice, facilitates
immigration status, and promotes human rights for immigrants in general.
However there is criticism that the current emphasis on remittances misses the potential value of the
knowledge, contacts, and talents acquired by Salvadorans abroad. In response, the government has also
attempted to foster relationships between the diaspora and their counterparts in El Salvador. One example
is the Competitiveness Project that brings together a specific set of economic actors in El Salvador to
conduct outreach to their emigrant counterparts for the purpose of economic development. Specifically,
the Emigrants Cluster, as it is known, attempts to connect small and medium-sized enterprise in El
Salvador with emigrant businesspeople interested in investing in El Salvador (Leon 2000). Another
example is the Unidad Salvadorena network (UNISAL), which was set up via the web to conduct
campaigns to support development efforts in El Salvador (Andrade 1999).
15
Another best practice using the diaspora option is program T AL VENff ALAND set up by the Permanent
Delegation of Venezuela at UNESCO at the end of 1994, with the support of this Organization. It is a
project whose principal objective is to recreate bonds with the diaspora intellectual and scientific
Venezuelan in the world, and "to recover the intelligence expatriate" by helping it to promote
communication networks with the country (Meyer et al. 1997). The principle is to finance short duration
work meetings with the members of the scientific and intellectual community in Venezuela. Significant
seminars and meetings were organized, as well in the fields of biology, medicine, and physics, as in that
of the artificial intelligence or philosophy, or the economy. Today the Data Bank created by the
Delegation of Venezuela counts more than 1.000 indexed experts and 175 visits of work carried out with
the country (Meyer et al. 1997).
In the past ten years Mexico has increased its ties with Mexicans living abroad for more than three
decades. The government created the Program for Mexican Communities Living Abroad (PCME), whose
main responsibility is to promote cooperation with Mexican expatriates. This program was created
because the Mexican government perceived remittances sent by Mexicans to their country not only as a
source of economic resources, but also as a brick in its wall of solidarity. In addition, the program
involves an important social component directed primarily to those less favored in the US. It is important
to highlight that part of the creation of the PCME was influenced by the large immigrant flow of
Mexicans, as it increased the government's need to protect its nationals in the exterior and confront
bilateral problems (Mohar 2000). In addition, by strengthening these ties the government encourages the
sustaining dispatch of economic resources to Mexico. As stated by Mohar (2000) the challenge is to
identify those areas of common interests for Mexicans on both sides of the border and to learn to respect
the understandable differences between both groups.
An additional resource is the UNDP sponsored diaspora program called the Transfer of Knowledge
Through Expatriate Networks (TOKTEN), which began in 1977 and in the twenty years since has
facilitated over 5,000 volunteers engaging in assignments in 49 developing countries in a wide spectrum
of fields. Nearly all areas are covered, from public administration to management of enterprises, from
agricultural research to computer technology. Since 1994, the program has come under the umbrella of
the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) program. The TOKTEN concept is a "global UNDP mechanism
for tapping on expatriate nationals, who had migrated to other countries and achieved professional
success abroad, and mobilizing them to undertake short-term consultancies in their countries of origin,
under UN aegis" (UNDP).
16
The TOK TEN approach is regarded as an added dimension of technical cooperation, which contributes to
reducing the adverse effects of the "brain-drain", with several advantages as such as the shared language
and traditions, relatively low cost and speed of implementation. The TOKTEN program is based on a
spirit of volunteerism, which means that TOK TEN volunteers are not paid direct salaries but are entitled
to roundtrip air ticket and a daily subsistence allowance (DSA). TOKTEN has programs in China,
Turkey, Nepal, Pakistan, Vietnam, Philippines and Lebanon, among others.
All these countries have divergent forces that cause the migration of educated and professional people,
which also differ considerably from Colombia. In Colombia, the lack of opportunities is compounded by
the daily violence, which creates a strong "push" factor, but nonetheless there is the potential for creative
policies that can help the situation. The goal of this research is precisely to formulate a set of proposals to
recommend policies to turn the Colombian brain drain into a gain. The next section of this paper lays out
the research methodology and results informing the final section on policy recommendation and
suggestion for future research.
PART U: ANALYSIS OF DATA
Methodology
Due to the unique factors leading to the Colombian brain drain problem, this study sets out to better
understand educated and professional Colombians' motivations for leaving their country and attitudes
towards returning. The research team decided the most effective means to establish effective policy
recommendations was to survey the attitudes and opinions of Colombian ''brains" who have immigrated
to the US. To explore these attitudes and perceptions, the group designed a questionnaire (see Appendix
2) to survey such professionals, drawing on both a New York University and south Florida study
(Hoffinan & Zuleyman 1997 and Kesselman 2001).
No claim is made that the survey sample is representatives of the general population of Colombian
migrants to the US. The findings based on this sample might not be generalized to all Colombian
migrants in the US, or to the relevant associations; rather they serve as empirical evidence to understand
relevant theoretical hypotheses to establishing policy recommendations. For this purpose, a random
sample is not necessary; rather a targeted survey approach is more effective in understanding reasons for
migration and what incentives may be necessary to facilitate return.
17
Through the partnership of the Colombian Consulate and a number of Colombian associations based in
New York City-including the Professionales y Estudiantes Colombianos En El Exterior (PECX), the
Colombian American Association, and the Asociacion de Professionales Colombianos (APC)-the group
was successful in reaching a wide diversity of Colombians. Ninety-two percent fell into our "brain drain"
category of a Bachelor's degree or higher, with almost half holding a post-graduate diploma, Masters
degree, or Ph.D. (see Figure 2). In addition, over half completed their last year of education in Colombia,
In order to initiate the diaspora network, we recommend the DNP propose its creation at the National
Migration Commission, made up of the DNP, Colciencias and the Foreign Ministry, among others. The
network would require the following steps. First, helped by Colciencias, set up a consultative meeting
with the Red Caldas to learn best practices and bring them into the fold of this umbrella network. Second,
establish a mission statement for the network. Third, create a strategic plan. Fourth, approach UNDP's
TOTKEN group, to make Colombia and its diaspora part of its program. Lastly, tap into the knowledge
of the Foreign Ministry to facilitate the network's expansion and make it consistent with current
migration policies. The DNP should also conduct a survey of existing associations, institutions and
government agencies (domestic and abroad) and determine the most effective way to bring them into the
network.
Challenges
The diaspora option faces the challenge of reaching out to an overall distrustful migrant community. The
violence and drug war has left many expatriates wary of their fellow Colombians, with some even fearing
to disclose their whereabouts for fear of retribution. ln this scenario, many Colombians could be reluctant
to participate in associations and to return to Colombia for training or teaching activities. However, the
professionals Colombians involved in professional associations based on fields of expertise, of which
there are significant and tightly connected communities, are more open to the diaspora option, as we have
found out from our survey and interviews.
27
Future Research
The problem of brain drain in Colombia is complex and requires significant future research to turn the
brain drain into a brain gain. Although this study provides one step forward in addressing this critical and
difficult issue, there is other research that could be done to help inform future policies. The areas of
future study can be as simple as compiling a database of Colombian emigrants, or as complicated as
determining the socio-psychological responses to the violence in the country and their effects on
migration. However, one important policy needing future research is the impact of remittances.
According to El Tiempo (2002), Colombia receives US$670 million in remittances per year, 80 percent of
which comes from the US This amount - which is currently equivalent to half the value of Colombian
coffee exports - is expected to increase to US$ l billion within two years. 8
El Tiempo cites as well, that together with Cubans, Colombians are the Latin immigrants who face the
highest transaction costs to send money back home.9 One possible explanation is that Colombians are
perceived as "risky agents" due to the drug-trafficking problem. Interestingly, the results of a survey
done by the Multilateral Investments Fund organism shows that among Latin immigrants, those earning
less than $20,000 are more likely to send money back home than those with income over $40,000.
In order to assess the impact of remittances in relation with the brain drain problem, and make policy
recommendations, further examination is required. In the meantime, the government's efforts should
focus on obtaining more favorable conditions from the US government, for Colombians to send money
back home.
Conclusion
With globalization increasingly diluting countries' borders, the outbreak of war and violence in various
parts of the world and increased economic opportunities in the developed world, have all created a brain
drain pandemic. Colombia is not alone in facing this problem, as we have discussed at great length in our
study. But the way it can deal with it makes it stand apart. The daily violence, economic woes,
corruption, and the lure of the west make any long-term solution an illusion. However, there is a ray of
hope and it is embedded in the scientists, doctors and professionals whose talents and skills can be used to
provide some brain gain to the country. The Colombian diaspora has the power and potential to alleviate
the brain drain through coordination and collaboration.
8 As stated by Donald Terry, chief of the Multilateral Investments Fund (IADB). 9 US$25 per each $200 remitted.
28
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND CITED WORKS
Amado, Maria del Carmen. (2002) Colombianos acudiran a las urnas. Hoy, February 27, p4/Locales.
Andrade-Eekhoff, Katharine. (1999) Transnational knowledge-sharing - opportunities in the field of Salvadoran migration. Appendix to El intercambio transnacional de conocimientos: posibilidades a traves de la migraci6n Salvadorena, April 15.
Cardona Gutierrez, Ramiro. (1980) El Exodo de Colombianos, Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo.
Cha, Dong-Se, Kwang Suk Kim, and Dwight H. Perkins. (1997) The Korean economy 1945-1995: Performance and vision for the 2 I"' century. Human Development Repo!:!, United Nations Development Program, pp.91-93. www.undp.org/hdr2001 /
Chaney, Elsa M. (1976) Colombian Migration to the United States. The Dynamics of Migration, Part 2. ICP Work Agreements. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, Interdisciplinary Communication Program, pp.87-141.
Colombian Government. COLCIENCIAS and Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. Evaluacion del programa de retomo de profesionales y tecnicos. Bogota
De Perez, Amada Raquel. (2001) Fronteras, migracion y desplazamiento: una mirada internaciona/ de/ conjlicto. Exodo. Patrimonio e Identidad. Ministerio de Cultura.
Gamarra, Eduardo, and Michael W. Collier, (2001) The Colombian Diaspora in South Florida. Latin American and Caribbean Center Working Paper Series, No.I , Florida International University. http://lacc.fiu.edu/publications resources/publications fim.htm
Guamizo, Luis Eduardo. The Rise of Transnational Social Formations: Mexican and Dominican State Responses to Transnational Migration, Political Power and Social Theory, V. 12, pp.45-94.
Guamizo, Luis Eduardo and Luz Marina Diaz. (1999) Transnational migration: A view from Colombia. Racial and Ethnic Studies, Vol. 22 No.2, March: 397-421.
Guamizo, Luis Eduardo and Arturo Ignacio Sanchez and Elizabeth M. Roach. ( 1999). Mistrust, fragmented solidarity, and transnational migration: Colombians in New York City and Los Angeles. Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.22, No.2, March, pp.367-396.
Hoffman, Amparo and Zuleyman Escala. (1997) The Colombian community in metropolitan New York: Who are we and where are we going? Unpublished research, New York University: Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, November.
Johnson, Jean M. and Mark C. Regets. ( 1998). International mobility of scientists and engineers to the United States - brain drain or brain circulation? National Science Foundation. http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/issuebrfj'sib98316.htm
Jozsef, Borocz. (1989) Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation. International Migration Review Vol. 23 No. 3, Fall, pp. 606-30
Kerber, Ross and Madeline Gaughran. (1999) 'Celtic Tiger' shows its teeth: New prosperity and progress luring many back to Ireland. The Montreal Gazette. July 4.
Kesselman, Jonathan R. (2001) Policies to Stem the Brain Drain--Without Americanizing Canada. Canadian Public Policy, Vol. 27, No. 1, March: 77-93.
Leon, Rene. (2000) El Salvador's relations with Salvadoran emigrants, in Latinos and US Foreign Policy: Representing the "Homeland"? eds. Rodolfo de la Garza and Harry Pachon, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 121-124.
29
Meyer, Jean-Baptiste and Mercy Brown. (1999) Scientific Diasporas: A New Approach to the Brain Drain. The World Conference on Science, UNESCO - ICSU. 26 June- I July. www.unesco.org/most/meyer.htm
Meyer, Jean-Baptiste, Jorge Charum, and Dora Bernal. ( 1997) Turning Brain Drain into Brain Gain: the Colombian experience of the Diaspora Option. Science. Technology and Society, Vol. 2, No. 2: 1-28.
Mohar, Gustavo. (2000) Relations with the Mexian Diaspora, in Latinos and US Foreign Policy: Representing the "Homeland"? eds. Rodolfo de Ia Garza and Harry Pachon, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 125-129.
Puche, America Esmeralda Montanez. Coming of Age in Colombia: No Podemos Perder La Esperanza
Rueda, Clara lnes. (2002) La Bonanza de las Remesas. El Tiempo, March I 0.
Smith, Robert. (2002a) Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and The Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politic. Forthcoming, International Migration Review, October.
Smith, Robert. (2002b) Diasporic Memberships in Historical Perspective: Comparative Insights from the Mexican and Italian Cases. Forthcoming for inclusion in volume eds Josh De Wind, Peggy Levitt and Steven Vertovec.
Stark, Oded, Christian Helmenstein, and Alexia Prskawetz. (1998) Human capital depletion, human capita/formation, and migration: A bless ing or a "curse"? Economics Letters, Vol. 60, No. 3, September, pp. 363-67.
Ulloa, Fernando Cepeda. (2000) The exceptionality of Colombians, in Latinos and US Foreign Policy: Representing the "Homeland"? eds. Rodolfo de la Garza and Harry Pachon, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Pub, 105-111.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2001) Making New Technologies Work for Human Development. Human Development Report pp.91-93, www.nstda.or.th/htrnl/reverse brain drain.html
UNDP, TOKTEN world wide history. http://www.undp.org.lb/tokten/history.htm
Wold Bank. ( 1998) Knowledge for development. World Bank World Development Repo!!, June 30, http://www.worldbank.org/htmVfud/technetlwdr98/parttwo.htm
30
APPENDIX 1: FIGURES NOT IN THE DOCUMENT
Flgure 1: Emigra tion from Colombia to the U nlted States
