2006 1 O. SALVI – INERIS (F) OLIVIER SALVI, FRANÇOIS FONTAINE, BRUNO DEBRAY contact :...

•• 2006 1O. SALVI – INERIS (F)

OLIVIER SALVI, FRANÇOIS FONTAINE, BRUNO DEBRAYcontact : [email protected]

ADAPTATION OF THE ARAMIS METHODOLOGY TO INTEGRATE THE SECURITY OF HAZARDOUS

INSTALLATIONS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

SRA-Europe, 15th Annual Conference, Ljubljana (SI)


Emergence of new risks: Malevolent on chemical sites

After the selling off of the CELLATEX plant, 153 laid off employees stop the production and demonstrate in the plant on 5 July 2000...

During the night, 4 fires started in the buildings. In the plant, 4 tons of carbon sulphide, 90 tons of soda, and 50000 L of sulphuric acid.On 10 July, the employees threatened to destroy the plant if their claims are not satisfied...500 neighbours are evacuated...

E.g: Cellatex - Givet – France, July 2000


Malevolent on chemical sites

…« Les 147 salariés d’une cartonnerie, en liquidation depuis le 6 mars, sans proposition concrète de repreneur, tentent de se faire entendre par le biais de manifestations ponctuelles. Hier, ils sont passés à la vitesse supérieure et ont menacé de faire sauter leur usine...

...En ligne de mire, 2 barils de 200 litres de méthyléthylcétone. Il s’agit d’un liquide particulièrement dangereux. Explosif, incendiaire et asphyxiant...Un feu est allumé à proximité des deux barils... » (l’Union du 12 avril 2001)

E.g: Socatrem - Reims – France, March 2001


Malevolent on chemical sites

Difficult social climate (Company liquidation)

2 January, 2003 - threat on chemical storage

23 January, 2003 - fire on site caused by malevolent

Daewoo - Mont Saint Martin - France, January 2003

Report – All establishments were covered by the Seveso Directive or by specific environmental regulations


Emergence of new risks: Attacks on chemical sites or on transportation of dangerous goods

USS Cole – Yemen - 2000

Limburg – Yemen - 2002

Baqiq Oil Refinery - Saudi Arabia - February 24, 2006

Necessity to develop adapted methodologies and tools


And now ?

New French regulation (Decree n° 2006-212 of February 23, 2006 related to the security of Critical Infrastructures (« secteurs d’activités d’importance vitale »)

Necessity to carry out a risk analysis by activities sector (e.g. chemical sites, marshalling yards etc.)

Operators must establish an “Operator Security Plan”

Public Authorities have to establish an “External Security Plan”

How to integrate security aspects ? Information on risk assessment already exists for most of these critical infrastructure.


Hazard Identification

Risk Analysis

Consequences Assessment

Risk Assessment

Mitigation Measures

Prevention Measures

PreventionEmergency

Planning

Preparedness (exercises)

Intervention

Response

Recovery

Lessons learned from

past accidentsExperiencefeedback

Investigations

1st layer of risk knowledge: the Major Hazards Control Approach (accidental risks)


2nd layer of risk knowledge (security) to develop a global approach including risks and threats

Risk Assessment

Better Hazard

Identification

Consequences Assessment

Threat AssessmentThreat Analysis

(modus operandi)

Prevention Measures

Mitigation Measures Prevention

Countermeasures Prevention

Recovery

Lessons learned from past events

Experiencefeedback

Investigations

KnowledgeManagement

Emergency Planning

Preparedness (exercises)

Intervention

ResponseCBRN

Response


New Dedicated methodologies for Security: American Chemistry Council, ACC (2001). Site security guidelines for the US

chemical industry CCPS, (2002) Guidelines for Analysing and Managing the security vulnerabilities of

fixed chemical sites American Petroleum Institute, API (2003). Security guidelines for the petroleum

industry European Initiatives (Germany, Austria, The Netherlands)

… or

Adaptation of the ARAMIS methodology


Principles of the ARAMIS methodology

Risk = Frequency Intensity Vulnerability

ConsequenceRisk severity

Frequency

F(initiating event)

Efficiency of the safety barriers

Efficiency of the SMS

Severity Vulnerability

Safety culture Number of vulnerable targets

Characteristics of the Critical event= Substances involved,amount, rate


Principles of the methodology – 6 major steps

Identification of major accident hazards

Identification of the safety barriers and assessment of their performances

Evaluation of safety management efficiency to barrier reliability

Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios

Assessment and mapping of the risk severity of reference scenarios

Evaluation and mapping of the vulnerability of the plant’s surroundings


Identify all hazardous equipments

Select pertinent hazardous equipments

Associate CE to each equipment

Build fault trees Build event trees

Build bow ties

Identify safety barriers

Define the level of confidence of safety barriers

Set a risk reduction goal

Propose new barriers

Estimate the risk reduction

Classify the barriers

Select the barriers for audit

Audit delivery systems Audit safety culture

Calculate operational LC

Estimate risk reduction

Establish the complete set of scenarios

Collect data about frequencies

Estimate frequencies of CE from generic data

Calculate frequencies of CE from the fault trees

Calculate frequencies of Dangerous phenomena

Calculate the consequences of the RAS

Use risk matrix to define the RAS

Estimate the class of consequences of the DP

Calculate severity for each CE and each DP for each mesh

Aggregate all the severities into a global severity index for each mesh

Draw the severity map

Define the study area

Divide the study area into meshes

Identify the targets

Quantify the targets

Calculate the vulnerability for each mesh

Draw the vulnerability map

MIMAH

Management Safety Culture

MIRAS

Severity Vulnerability

Initial ARAMIS methodology


ARAMIS : a bow-tie approach

CE

DC

DDC

DDC

DDC

DDC

UE

CuE

UE

UE

UE

UE

UE

UEand

or

or

or

and

or

NSC

DC

SCE

SCE

DP

DP

ME

ME

ME

DP ME

DPME

ME

TCE

TCE

TCE

Fault Tree Event Tree

CriticalEvent


ARAMIS : a bow-tie approach

CE

DC

DDC

DDC

DDC

DDC

UE

UE

UE

UE

UE

UE

UE

UEand

or

or

or

and

or

NSC

DC

SCE

SCE

DP

DP

ME

ME

ME

DP ME

DPME

ME

TCE

TCE

TCE

Safety barriers


Identify all hazardous equipments

Select pertinent hazardous equipments

Associate CE to each equipment

Build fault trees Build event trees

Build bow ties

Identify safety barriers


Set a riskreduction goal

Propose newbarriers



MIMAH

Selection of malovelentscenarios

Threat analysisUse analysis of past

events



Set a risk reduction goal

Propose new barriers



Select the barriers for audit

Audit delivery systems Audit safety culture

Calculate operational LC

Estimate risk reduction

Establish the complete set of scenarios

Management & Safety Culture

Verify if safety measures can

benefit security

Specific security measures


Collect data about frequencies

Estimate frequencies of CE from generic data

Calculate frequencies of CE from the fault trees

Calculate frequencies of Dangerous phenomena

Use risk matrix to define the RAS

Estimate the class of consequences of the DP

MIRAS

Not used : security is

deterministic


Calculate the consequences of the RAS

Calculate severity for each CE and eachDP for each mesh

Aggregate all the severities into a globalseverity index for each mesh

Draw the severity map

Severity

Use the severity calculation

methodology to rank the security

scenarios


Define the study area

Divide the study area into meshes

Identify the targets

Quantify the targets

Calculate the vulnerability foreach mesh

Draw the vulnerability map

Vulnerability

Vulnerability of the environment of the critical infrastructure is the same


Conclusion

Safety and security : Using the same approach improves consistency and efficiency of the analysis, and it saves resources

Benefits from ARAMISthreat assessment : use MIMAH results to determine the hazard

potential and the most sensitive installations prevention and countermeasures : verify if countermeasures for

safety can benefit for securityresponse : use the severity calculation

Complete ARAMIS withscenarios of malevolent actionsspecific security countermeasuresanalysis of past events


Bibliography

User Guide to be downloaded : http://aramis.jrc.it

Special Issue of Journal of Hazardous Material

Outcomes of the ARAMIS project (Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for IndustrieS in the framework of SEVESO II directive), New stakes and opportunities in the control of major accident hazards. Vol. 130.

Salvi O., Debray B., 2006, A global view on ARAMIS, a risk assessment methodology for industries in the framework of the SEVESO II directive. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 2006, vol. 130, n° 3, pp. 187-199.


Acknowledgement

The work presented in this paper has been elaborated in the frame of the EU project ARAMIS “Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for IndustrieS”, co-ordinated by INERIS (F) and including EC-JRC-IPSC-MAHB (I), Faculté Polytechnique de Mons (B), Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (E), ARMINES (F), Risø National Laboratory (D), Universita di Roma (I), Central Mining Institute (PL), Delft University of Technology (NL), European Process Safety Centre (UK), École des Mines de Paris (F), École des Mines de Saint Etienne (F), École des Mines d’Alès (F), Technical University of Ostrava (CZ) and Jozef Stefan Institute (Si).

The project is co-funded under the Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development Programme in the 5th Framework Programme for Science Research and Technological Development of the European Commission.


Thank You for your attention

http://aramis.jrc.it

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2006 1 O. SALVI – INERIS (F) OLIVIER SALVI, FRANÇOIS FONTAINE, BRUNO DEBRAY contact :...

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