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Why US National Intelligence EstimatesPredict that the

European Missile Defense System Will FailTechnological Issues Relevant to Policy

Theodore A. PostolProfessor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy

Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Voice: 617 253-8077; FAX: 617 258-5750; e-mail: [email protected]

Plenary LectureGerman Physical Society

Berlin, GermanyFebruary 29, 2008

MITScience, Technology, and

National Security Working Group

Major Issue

Major IssueThe US Intelligence Community Believes that AnyCountry with the Technology and Industrial Capacity toField ICBMs Will Also Have the Technology to FieldCertain Countermeasures.

These Countermeasures Include:

1. Separating RVs2. Spin-Stabilized RVs3. RV Reorientation4. Radar Absorbing Material (RAM)5. Booster Fragmentation6. Low-Power Jammers7. Chaff8. Simple (Balloon) Decoys

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Major Consequence

If these countermeasures can be fielded,they will totally defeat any and all

current and future exoatmosphericUS missile defenses

Findings of MIT/Cornell Studies ofExoatmospheric Missile Defenses(1 of 2)

Major Findings (1 of 2)x The European Midcourse Radar (EMR) cannot do the job (of discrimination).

Simply speaking, it will not have sufficient detection ranges againstwarheads to function as a useful element of the defense.

x The GLOBUS II radar in Vardo, Norway, will instead be needed to perform thediscrimination functions for the European Missile Defense.

x The Forward-Based X-band radar (FBX) will, at best, only be able to performlimited initial tracking and discrimination against warheads launched fromIran.

x All tracking/cuing over Europe will have to be performed by the low-frequency early warning radar at Fylingsdale, England.

x That radar will not even have the resolution to tell the difference between areal warhead and a 0.3 m length of wire.

x One pound of 0.3 m aluminum covered glass wires could produce hundredsof thousands of false radar targets that would be indistinguishable from

actual warheads.

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Findings of MIT/Cornell Studies ofExoatmospheric Missile Defenses(2 of 2)

Major Findings (2 of 2)

x The only available discrimination service for support of the Fylingsdale radar

will have to come from the GLOBUS II radar in Vardo, Norway.It appears that be Norwegian government has not yet informed the Norwegianpopulation about this critical role for the Vardo radar.

x If the Bush administrations unsupported assertions about the nature of theIranian ballistic missile threat were to be correct, the interceptor farms thatthe US wants to deploy in Poland will have to be expanded.

x Even if all the current deficiencies in the US proposed missile defense forEurope are corrected, and the necessary upgrades are made, the USintelligence community predicts that the first Iranian IRBMs and ICBMs willbe will be able to defeat the upgraded European Missile Defense.

False Claim That EMR Can Perform Discrimination Services for the Defense

IMPORTANT FACT IGNOREDBY THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

x The Radar Cross Section (RCS) of warheads atX-Band is roughly 10 times larger than that of a

Locust!xWith RV orientation and/or RAM, the RCS of a

warhead at X-Band can easily be madecomparable to or smaller than the RCS of aLocust.

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False Claim That EMR Can Perform Discrimination Services for the Defense

IMPORTANT FACT NOT DISCUSSEDBY THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

x The Only Radar Capable of Providing aDiscrimination Service for the US ProposedEuropean Missile Defense is the GLOBUS IIX-Band Intelligence Radar at Vardo, Norway.

xGLOBUS II Caused a Scandal in 1999 in NorwayWhen It Was Discovered that the MOD Made

False Claims About Its Actual Purpose to theNorwegian Parliament.

Radar-Range Fans for Vardo and US Proposed EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars

Cape Cod

GrandForks

Clear

Locations of ICBM

EMR Line-of Sight

Fylingsdale Line-of Sight

Thule Line-of Sight

Cape Cod Line-of Sight

Locations of Postulated ICBMsLaunched from Iran

to the Continental United Statesat One Minute Intervals

Fylingsdale Tracking

ThuleTracking


Thule Tracking

EMR Tracking

Cape Cod Tracking

Vardo Line-of Sight

Vardo TrackingVardoTracking

EMR Tracking

Range-Fan for S/N=1000.10 seconds Integration

and RCS=0.01 m2

Range-Fan for S/N=100with One Pulse

and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2

EMR

Thule

EMR

FBX

Vardo

Fylingsdale

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Requirements for Expanded

Numbers of Interceptors

MIT

Science, Technology, andNational Security Working Group

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Locations of Launch Sites Associated with European and US Missile Defenses

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

GrandForks

Clear

Thule

CapeCod

FBX

InterceptorFarm

InterceptorFarm

European InterceptorLaunch Site

US InterceptorLaunch Site

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Area Covered by 100 Missile Expanded Polish Launch Site

United States

Capitol

Area Covered by 100 Missile Expanded Polish Launch Site

United StatesCapitol

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Orbital Sciences Ground-Based Interceptor andRaytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles

Throw Weights of Potential ICBMs to 10,000 Kilometers Range

Minuteman IIIWarhead

Minuteman IIILaunch Weight 75,000 lbsThrow Weight 2,500 lbs

European GBILaunch Weight 49,500 lbsThrow Weight 1,500 lbs

Midgetman ICBMLaunch Weight 30,000 lbs

Throw Weight 1000 lbs



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Coverage of the Missile Defense Radars



Locations of Radars Associated with European and US Missile Defenses

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

GrandForks

Clear

Thule

CapeCod

FBX

InterceptorFarm

InterceptorFarm

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GrandForks

Clear


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2

EMR

Thule

EMR

FBX

Vardo

Fylingsdale


Cape Cod

GrandForks

Clear

Locations of ICBM

EMR Line-of Sight

Fylingsdale Line-of Sight

Thule Line-of Sight

Cape Cod Line-of Sight




ThuleTracking


Thule Tracking

EMR Tracking

Cape Cod Tracking

Vardo Line-of Sight

Vardo TrackingVardoTracking

EMR Tracking


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2

EMR

Thule

EMR

FBX

Vardo

Fylingsdale

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Relative Size of the Different Radars



Comparison of the Relative Sizes and Average Power of the Fylingsdale UEWR, theGLOBUS II Radar at Vardo, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band (FBX) Radar

UEWR

FBX

Globus II

PAVE PAWS31 meter Diameter

~ 755 m2 Antenna Area150 KW

Average Power

GLOBUS II27 meter Diameter

~ 570 m2 Antenna Area150 KW

Average Power

FBX9.2 m2 Antenna Area

30 70 KWAverage Power

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Comparison of the Relative Sizes of the European Midcourse Radar, theGLOBUS II Radar at Vardo, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band (FBX) Radar

GLOBUS II~ 570 m2 Antenna Area

27 meter Diameter150 KW

Average Power

EMR105 m2 Antenna Area

~ 20 - 30 KWAverage Power

FBX9.2 m2 Antenna Area

50 60 KWAverage Power

The Forward-Based X-Band Radar (FMX) Has Limited Acquisition AbilitiesAgainst 0.01 m2 Cone-Shaped Warheads at Ranges Greater Than 1000 km

Initial Discrimination Range Capabilities:Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 100, 390 km Range Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 1.2 Watts Average Power per T/R ModuleUgraded Discrimination Range Capabilities:Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 100, 490 km Range Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 3 Watts Average Power per T/R ModuleTracking Range With Upgrades:Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 020, 730 km Range Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 3 Watts Average Power per T/R Module

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US Intelligence Findings onForeign Ballistic Missile Developments



Intelligence Findings onForeign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures

US Intelligence findings predict thateven an upgraded US MissileDefense will be defeated by

postulated Iranian/ North KoreanICBMs when they are first deployed!

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Foreign Missile Developments and

the Ballistic Missile ThreatStatement for the Record to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

on Foreign Missile Developments and theBallistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015

by Robert D. WalpoleNational Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs

September 16, 1999

Penetration Aids and CountermeasuresWe assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also develop various responses to US theater and national defenses. Russiaand China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the requisite technologies.

x Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably would rely initially on readily available technology including separatingRVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power

jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoysto develop penetration aids and countermeasures.

xThese countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight test their

missiles.

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/walpole.htm


Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on missile advances around the world, particularly from Russia and North Korea.Moreover, some countries that have traditionally been recipients of foreign missile technology are now sharing more amongst themselvesand are pursuing cooperative missile ventures.

We assess that countries developing missiles also will respond to US theater and national missile defenses bydeploying larger forces, penetration aids, and countermeasures. Russia and Chinaeach have developed numerouscountermeasures and probably will sell some related technologies.

Many of these countries probably have considered ballistic missile defense countermeasures. Historically, the development and deploymentof missile defense systems have been accompanied by the development of countermeasures and penetration aids by potential adversaries,either in reaction to the threat or in anticipation of it. The Russians and Chinese have had countermeasure programs fordecades and are probably willing to transfer some related technology to others. We expect that during the next 15 years,countries other than Russia and China will develop countermeasures to Theater and National Missile Defenses.

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/walpole.htm

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Speeches&Testimony

IranianBallisticMissile,WMDThreat totheUS

The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to

the United States Through 2015Statement for the Record to the

International Security, Proliferation and Federal ServicesSubcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officerfor Strategic and Nuclear Programs

(as prepared for delivery)September 21, 2000

2006-2010.

Most believe Iran will likely test an IRBMprobably based on Russian assistance during this period.

All assess that Iran could flight test an ICBM that could deliver nuclear weapon-sized payloads to many parts of the United States in thelatter half of the next decade, using Russian technology obtained over the years.

Ballistic Missile Defense Countermeasures.

Many countries, such as Iran, probably will rely initially on readily available technologies to develop penetration aids andcountermeasures, including: separating RVs, radar absorbent material, booster fragmentation, jammers, chaff, anddecoys. These countries could develop some countermeasures by the time they flight-test their missiles. More advancedtechnologies could be available over the longer term. Some of the factors that will influence a nations countermeasures include: theeffectiveness weighed against their cost, complexity, reduction in range-payload capability; foreign assistance; and the ability to conductrealistic tests.

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/walpole_missile_092200

How the Countermeasures Work



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Effects of Countermeasures on Emerging Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats

First Generation Countermeasures Predicted by the US Intelligence Community

Separating RVsRadical reductions in the radar detectivity of warheads against X-Band radars (Cross Sections of 0.01 m2 or less)

Spin-Stabilized RVsRemoval of potentially exploitable fluctuations in the size of an otherwise tumbling warheads X-Band Radar Cross Section.

These can be used to increase detection ranges relative to tumbling warheadsRV Reorientation

Guarantee that warheads are oriented so as to minimize the X-Band radars detection range against the warhead

Radar Absorbing Material (RAM)Guarantee that warheads will be invisible to the X-Band radar. Also confounds discrimination by X-Band Radars

Booster FragmentationHides the low-Radar Cross Section warhead among numerous low and high Radar Cross Section fragments

Low-Power JammersEliminates the ability of the X-Band radar to detect, track, or discriminate against either warheads or decoys. A dumb jammer ofroughly 0.1 Watts would be adequate for defeating the proposed European Midcourse Radar to be located in the Czech Republic.

Chaff100 grams of Chaff could easily hide a warhead or a decoy from the X-Band radar. The countermeasure would deply many

clouds of Chaff, some of which contain warheads, decoys, or nothing, to overwhelm the X-band radarsSimple (Balloon) Decoys

Could be used to degrade the ability of kill vehicle to hit the warhead (note US anti-satellite attack on an alleged tank ofHydrazine). More importantly, can make it impossible for Kill Vehicle to know which of many balloons might contain a warhead.Can also be filled with radar absorbing foams, to make the balloons and warheads invisible to the X-Band radars

Separating RVs, Spin Stabilized RVs

and Re-Oriented RVCountermeasures to the Defense



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Radar Cross Section of Large Round-Nose Warhead

Spin Stabilized Warheads

Separated Warheads (Tumbling)Warhead Reorientation

0.003 m2

Radar Cross Section of ICBM Upper Rocket Stages

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Aspect angle, Theta [Degrees]

RCS-

dBsm

RCS at 0.1 GHz

RCS at 10 GHz

50

Rocket MotorBehaves Like Radar

Corner Reflector

Rocket MotorRadar Cross Section

at X-Band

Cylinderwith No Endplates

Cylinderwith Endplates

Radar Cross Section of Circular Cylindersat Frequencies of 0.10 and 10.0 GHz

Cylinder DimensionsApproximate Titan II

3m Diameter x 30m Length

Cylinder

with Endplates

No Endplates

Spin Stabilized WarheadsSeparated Warheads (Tumbling)Warhead Reorientation

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Radar-Range Fans for 1 m2 Targets for EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

GrandForks

Clear

Thule



Range-Fan for S/N=100and RCS=1.00 m2


CapeCod

Radar-Range Fans for 0.01 m2 Targets for EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

GrandForks

Clear

Thule





CapeCod

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Radar-Range Fans for US Proposed EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

GrandForks

Clear

Thule







CapeCod

1 m2RCS

0.01 m2RCS

Radar Absorbing Materials (RAM)

Countermeasures to the Defense

MITScience, Technology, andNational Security Working Group

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Properties of Radar Absorbing Materialsat Frequencies at or Near X-Band

Graded dielectric reticulated foam radar absorbingmaterial. This material is about 1.9 centimeters thickand weighs about 3 ounces per square foot.

Resonant radar absorbing covering. This absorber istuned to 8.5 GHz. It is roughly 1.8 centimeters thickand weighs about 1.1 pound per square foot.

Dual-band radar absorber with resonant absorbtion at 9and 18 GHz. This material is about .45 centimeters thickand weighs about 1.5 pounds per square foot.

Data from:

Richard N. Johnson, Radar Absorbing

Material: A Passive Role in An Active

Scenario, The International

Countermeasures Handbook, 11th

Edition, 1986, EW Communications, Inc.,

Frequency ofGBR X-Band

Radar


Radar


RadarRadar Absorbing

Materials

Booster FragmentationCountermeasures to the Defense


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False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development AgencyTest Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975,

Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT),

Booster Fragmentation

False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development AgencyTest Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975,

Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT),

Figure 8.4. The Signature of Fragmented Tanks experiment cut the Stage II of Titan II ICBM B-27 (62-008) into the numerous pieces shown above. The resulting debris cloud was used to test the ability of the SafeguardAnti-Ballistic Missile radar system to discriminate between debris from the upper stage and the reentry vehicle. From David K. Stumpf , Titan II, A History of a Cold War Missile Program, The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville,Copyright 2000, pages 200-201

6 Ft Man andMinuteman Warhead

Booster Fragmentation

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Low-Power JammerCountermeasures to the Defense



X-Band Transmit/Receive ModuleAverage power 2 Watts, Peak Power 10 Watts

2.66 inches

1.05 in

Low-Power Jammers?

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Devices that Can Be Used to Build X-band Jammers

Devices that Can Be Used to Build Low-Power X-band Jammers

Low-Power Jammers

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ChaffCountermeasures to the Defense



Defense Exhaustion Strategy Using Chaff

Chaff

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Weight and Frequency Dependence of Chaff

Frequency dependence of the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of chaff. The RCS per dipole is inversely proportional to radar frequency. This effect can be offset

by reducing the dipole diameter as frequency increases. The data shown above is from R. Layne DuBose, Chaff Systems for Ships Defense, The

International Countermeasures Handbook,11th Edition, 1986, EW Communications, Inc., Palo Alto, California, pp.343-349.

Nose-On RCS of a Round-Back Cone-Shaped Warheadwith a Pointy Nosetip atX-Band is About .0001 m2.

NOTE:

ChaffOne Kilogram of ChaffReflects More Than 1 millionTimes More Radar Signalthan a Single Warhead

Roughly 100 grams or less of Chaff willConceal a Warhead/Decoy for 10 to 20minutes from an X-Band Radar!

Radar Cross Section of Chaff Dipoles

The peak radar cross section of a tuned dipole is.

.VSO

O #

22

48

The average radar cross section of a randomly oriented tuned dipole is,

VV

O #3

1615 2

.

Chaff

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Radar Cross Sections of Various Shapes of Interestin Ballistic Missile Defense Applications

Chaff

BalloonCountermeasures to the Defense


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Targets are Identified by Their Brightness in Two Infrared Wavelength Bands

Targets As They Might Be Seen at 200 kilometers range~20 seconds to impact, lateral separation ~3.5 km?, total divert ~.5 km/sec?

Target 1Observed Brightness





Target 10

Observed Brightness


Target 8Observed BrightnessTarget 5

Observed Brightness


Balloons

IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV

Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 230 250 km for FOV 1 1.5

~3.5 km

~3 km

2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon(Roughly Ten Times Brighterthan the Mock Warhead)

Mock Warhead

Rocket Stage thatDeployed the MockWarhead and Balloon

Balloons

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Some Photos of Objects that Could Appear Like Warheads

Large Balloon 2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon Balloon With White CoatingWith Reflecting Coating With Black Coating

Light Rigid Replica Decoy Minuteman Inflatable Decoy Minuteman Warhead

Balloons

Statement Indicating that Top Management of the Ballistic Missile Defense OrganizationKnew About the Discrimination Problems Identified in the IFT-1A Experiment

"So the decoy is not going to look exactly like what we

expected. It presents a problem for the system that wedidn't expect,"

Statement ofLieutenant General Ronald Kadish,Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,while being filmed by 60 Minutes II after learning thatthe 2.2 meter balloon misdeployed (did not inflate properly)during the IFT-5 experiment

Balloons

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IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV

Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 230 250 km for FOV 1 1.5

~3.5 km

~3 km

2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon(Roughly Ten Times Brighterthan the Mock Warhead)

Mock Warhead

Rocket Stage thatDeployed the MockWarhead and Balloon

Balloon Canister is Now the

Least Bright Object:

Hence, the Balloon Canister

Looks Like the Warhead

Balloons

Further Observations and Conclusions

MIT

Science, Technology, andNational Security Working Group

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Observations and Conclusions

Observations and Conclusions

xThe Bush administration has been systematically providing inaccurateinformation to its European allies (and apparently to NATO) about the USproposed missile defense for Europe.

xIt is highly implausible that this campaign of providing such basically falsetechnical information was or is an accident.

xThe implications of these US actions, and the passive response to it by theEuropean allies and NATO, raises serious questions about the future of US-European security relations.

xThese problems will almost certainly be solved by any of the US Presidentialcandidates when they take the office, but the European allies should notassume that the US was solely to blame for this deplorable historical incidentin US-European security relations.

Appendix

False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the

European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs,Subcommittee on Security and Defense


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False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union,Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense

The European Midcourse Radar (EMR)Cannot Possible Have the Range toPerform Discrimination Services for

the European Defense System

European InterceptorsAre Fast Enough to

Overtake and InterceptRussian ICBMs

European Interceptorsand Radars Cannot

Possibly DefendNorthern Japan

Orbital Sciences Ground-Based Interceptor andRaytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles

Estimated Dimensions and Weight of theNational Missile Defense Launch Vehicle

Rocket ComponentsLength

(ft)Diameter

(ft)Component Weight

(lbs)

Shroud 11.6 4.17 200

Payload (Kill Vehicle) -- -- 155

Payload Adaptor -- -- --

1st Stage (Orion 50XLG) 33.8 4.17 37,800

2nd Stage (Orion 50XL) 11.7 4.17 9,500

Total 51.4 -- 47,655

Estimated Performance Parameters of the National Missile Defense Launch Vehicle

Rocket ComponentsBurn Time

(sec)Vacuum Specific

Impulse (sec)Vacuum Thrust

(lbs)Component Weight

(lbs)Propellant Weight

(lbs)Empty Weight

(lbs)Empty/Full

Mass Fraction

Shroud -- -- -- 200 --

Payload (Kill Vehicle) -- -- -- 155 --

Payload Adaptor -- -- -- -- --

1st Stage (Orion 50XLG) 70 295 149,500 37,800 35,480 2,320 0.0614

2ndStage (Orion 50XL) 70 289 36,000 9,500 8,680 820 0.0859

Total 140 -- -- 47,655 --

Orion 50XLRocket Stage

ExoatmosphericKill Vehicle

Orion 50XLGRocket Stage

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Pegasus Launch Vehicle

Ground-Based InterceptorAchieves 6.3 km/sec Carrying a Payload of 1950 lbs

OrbitalSciences GBI

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Ground-Based InterceptorAchieves 8.5 to 8.7 km/sec Carrying a Payload of 220 to 155 lbs

MidgetmanICBM

OrbitalSciences GBI

The GBI Has a HigherLift Capability than theUS Midgetman ICBM!

The Ground-Based InterceptorCan Carry a Full Minuteman III BUS and Three Warheads to 6,000+ Kilometers

OrbitalSciences GBIMinuteman Shroud,

Warheads, and BUS

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False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union,Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense

The European Midcourse Radar (EMR)Cannot Possible Have the Range toPerform Discrimination Services for

the European Defense System

European InterceptorsAre Fast Enough to

Overtake and InterceptRussian ICBMs

European Interceptorsand Radars Cannot

Possibly DefendNorthern Japan

False Claim That Japan Can Be Defended from Europe

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False Claims Made in Presentations to European (and Japanese?) Alliesby Missile Defense Agency

that US Proposed European Missile Defense Can Defend Northern Japan

FBX in Eastern Turkeytoo Far from Missile Trajectoryto Track the Deployed WarheadRCS ~ 0.01m2

X-Band Radar inCzech RepublicBelow Radar Horizon Sea-Based X-Band

Radar Off AdakBelow Radar Horizon

Launchfrom Iran

NO PLAUSIBLE WAY FOR DEFENSE SYSTEM TO OBTAINPRECISION TRACKING DATA NEEDED TO GUIDE

INTERCEPTORS FROM ALASKA!


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False Claim That Interceptors Cannot Engage Russian ICBMs

Interceptorlaunched 250-300 sec after threat

Russian

ICBM

Interceptors CannotCatchRussian Missiles

400 sec

600 sec800 sec

1,200 sec

Time(sec)afterRussian ICBM Launch

Moscow

Interceptor

U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability

Approved forPublicRelease07-MDA-2623(13JUN07) ms-109673B / 061407

ICBM

Burnout

ICBM

Apogee1,000 sec

27


Interceptorlaunched 250-300 sec after threat

Russian

ICBM

Interceptors CannotCatchRussian Missiles

400 sec

600 sec800 sec

1,200 sec

Time(sec)afterRussian ICBM Launch

Moscow

Interceptor

U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability

Approved forPublicRelease

07-MDA-2623 (13 JUN 07) ms-109673B / 061407

ICBM

Burnout

ICBM

Apogee1,000 sec

27

Russian ICBMTrajectory

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Location of SS-18/19 Russian ICBM at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight

0700 600 500 400 300 200 1008000

100

200

300

400

500

Range (km)

Altitude(k

m)

SS-18/19 Powered Flight Profile

Locations Every 5 Seconds

Second StageIgnition

Burnout(340sec)

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Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec InterceptorAgainst SS-18/19 ICBM Launched from Vypolzovo Russia

ICBM Burnout (SS-18/19)at 300 seconds

alsoLaunch of Interceptor

from Poland

Interceptor CompletesPowered Flight

ICBM Breaks RadarHorizon

3.5

4.55.5

6.57.5

8.5

2.5minutes

300seconds

1minute

234

57896

1

0 minutes

2

3

4

5


Location of SS-25 Russian ICBM at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight

0700 600 500 400 300 200 1008000

100

200

300

400

500

Range (km)

Altitude(k

m)

SS-25 Powered Flight Profile

Locations Every 5 Seconds

Third StageIgnition

Second StageIgnition

Burnout(170 sec)

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Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec InterceptorAgainst SS-25/27 ICBM Launched from Vypolzovo Russia

ICBM Burnout (SS-27)at 180 seconds

alsoLaunch of Interceptor

from Poland

Interceptor CompletesPowered Flight

ICBM Breaks RadarHorizon

3.5

4.5

2.5minutes

180seconds

1minute

2

34

5

789 6

1

0 minutes

2

3


Intercept Points for Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec InterceptorAgainst SS-25/27 and SS-18/19 ICBMs Launched from Vypolzovo Russia

Intercept Point AgainstSS-25/27 ICBM

Intercept Point AgainstSS-18/19 ICBM

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False Claim That Radar in Czech Republic Performs a Critical Role in the Defense

False Claim That Radar in Czech Republic Performs a Critical Role in the Defense


GrandForks

Clear


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2

EMR

Thule

EMR

FBX

Vardo

Fylingsdale

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Appendix

Statements Made by Responsible US Officials



Some Notable Quotes

"As you see, if there are Russian launches from interceptor sites we could establish tracks on those, but although we can

establish those coverages the interceptors cannot catch them."LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY A. TREY OBERING, III

Director, Missile Defense AgencyMarch 1, 2007Q&A SESSION

http://prague.usembassy.gov/obering-mar1.html

As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented after theApril 19 NATO-Russia Council meeting, "The Allies were convinced and are

convinced that there are no implications of the United States system forthe strategic balance... Ten interceptors will not, and cannot affect thestrategic balance and ten interceptors cannot pose a threat to Russia."

http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/roo050307.htm

"U.S. missile defense plans are neither directed at nor a threat to

Russia. Due to the location and capabilities of the European missiledefense assets, the proposed system would have no capability againstRussian ICBMs."

Missile Defense CooperationU.S. Missile Defense Factsheet

http://prague.usembassy.gov/md704-factsheet.html

"Senior Russian officials as well as their experts understand the limitedcapabilities of the interceptors and the X-band radar, including why the

European-based assets would have no capability against Russian ICBMslaunched at the United States, and how it is optimized for engaging

ballistic missile threats launched out of Iran."Brian R. Green Statement for the Record to the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 3/27/07

http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Strat032707/Green_Testimony032707.pdf

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Some Notable Quotes

"First of all, these interceptors, the radars, are not designed againstthe Russian threat. You're not going to counter the hundreds of RussianICBMs and the thousands of warheads that are represented by that fleetwith 10 interceptors in a field in Europe. The radar that we were putting

there -- first of all, it is designed against the Middle Eastern threat,not against the Russian threat.

With the radar that we have there that we have proposed, it isa very narrow beam radar. It has to be queued. And so even if we wanted

to try to track Russian missiles with that radar, we could only tracka very, very small percentage of those missiles. And even if we could,passing that information off and having an interceptor try to intercept

the Russian missile, we can't do it. The interceptors that we wouldplace in Europe are not fast enough to catch the Russian ICBMs. We're in

a tail chase from a location in Poland and if you'd like, in that -- inresponse to any questions, I can show you some slides on that as well. "

AIR FORCE LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERINGTHE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2007, 12:00 P.M. ESThttp://kiev.usembassy.gov/files/070223_missile_defense_eng.html

"MR. HADLEY: Of course the deployment that we're talking about in Europe is not about Russia at all. It's not aimed atRussia. The systems we would deploy do not have capability of any significant character against Russian ICBMs destined

for the -- that are aimed at the United States. Just doesn't have any capability."Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steven Hadley

on the President's Trip to the G8 Summit and EuropeWhite House Conference Center Briefing Room

June 1, 2007http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070601-11.html

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