SAN SEBASTIAN COLLEGE RECOLETOS DE MANILACollege of Law

Land Titles and DeedsCompilation of 2009 Case Digests

Bernardino, VictoriaCalceta, CentenerCortes, Carl JaysonDe Guzman, Ma. Xenia AmorDullas, Emman Lou Hadji Omar, MUBARAKSantos, Shannon Alyssa

G.R. No. 175788 June 30, 2009Petitioners: ENRIQUITA ANGAT and the LEGAL HEIRS OF FEDERICO ANGATRespondent: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESPonente: Justice CHICO-NAZARIO

Doctrine:It does not mandated under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26 that notice be specifically sent to adjoining property owners; it only necessitated publication and posting of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution in accordance with Section 9 of the Republic Act No. 26. Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26,requiring notice to adjoining property owners, are actually irrelevant to the Petition for Reconstitution filed by Federico and Enriquita considering that these provisions apply particularly to petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26.However, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is already final and executory, and absolutely binds this Court, despite any errors therein. And even if it were otherwise, the error committed by the appellate court as regards the notice requirement would not necessarily result in a judgment favorable to petitioners. The failure of Federico and Enriquita to immediately seek the reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, and their procrastination for four decades before actually filing their Petition, had allowed laches to attach. Facts: In February 1999, Federico and Enriquita (sister of Federico) filed before the RTC a verified Petition5for the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 covering a 3,033,846-square meter parcel of land located in Sapang, Ternate, Cavite (subject property), presenting the owners duplicate copy of said TCT in their possession. Federico and Enriquita claimed that the subject property has been registered with the Registry of Deeds of Cavite in their names, as the true and absolute owners thereof, under TCT No. T-4399, covered by a certain plan PSU-91002. In 1959, the old Provincial Capitol Building housing the former office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite was burned to ashes, totally destroying all the titles and documents kept inside the office, including the original copy of TCT No. T-4399.According to Federico and Enriquita, the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-4399 was intact and has been in their possession since the time of its issuance and up to the present. The owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-4399 has not been delivered to any other person or entity to secure payment or performance of any obligation nor was any transaction or agreement relative to said TCT presented or pending before the Registry of Deeds of Cavite when its former office was burned. No other lien or encumbrance affecting TCT No. T-4399 exists, except the right of Federico and Enriquita therein.Federico and Enriquita attached to their Petition for Reconstitution a photocopy of their owners duplicate certificate of TCT No. T-4399.They also appended to the Petition, however, a Certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite stating that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4399, registered in the names of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, 3,033,846, more or less, are not existing and does not form part of their records. Based on the fact that all records and titles were burned during the fire which razed to the ground the Old Capitol Building of Cavite City housing the Office of the Register of Deeds we could not now find OCT No. 391 and TCT No. T-4399 or any trace thereof and their supporting papers for its issuance including the Entry Book on which the pertinent documents were inscribed.Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order dated 16 February 1999, setting the initial hearing in LRC Case No. 1331 on 10 June 1999 at 8:30 in the morning. Publication, posting, and mailing requirements are complied with. However, all the notices to the adjoining owners were returned unserved for the following reasons: Ambrocio Arca: unlocated, no such name; heirs of Mariano Angat: deceased; Santiago de Guia: unlocated, no such name; and the Office of the Provincial Governor, representing Palikpikan Creek: refused to receive.The petitioners submitted to the LRA the survey plan of the subject property, PSU-91002, the tracing cloth plan with two blueprint copies thereof; the technical description of the subject property; and the Certification dated 25 March 1998 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. On motion of the counsel of Federico and Enriquita, there being no oppositor nor written opposition, the RTC declared a general default against the public and proceeded with the ex parte hearing. However, Ternate Development Corporation (TDC) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Complaint-in-Intervention, questioning the authenticity and genuineness of TCT No. T-4399. It claimed that a portion of the subject property covered by TCT No. T-4399, with an area of 1,783,084 square meters, is owned by and already registered in the name of TDC under TCT No. (T-97541) RT-19915 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite. Federico and Enriquita opposed the Motion for Leave to Intervene of TDC.The RTC denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene of TDC reasoning that TDC could not challenge the validity of TCT No. T-4399 in the reconstitution proceedings since it would constitute a collateral attack on the title of Federico and Enriquita. The RTC declared that the reconstitution proceedings in LRC Case No. 1331 was not the proper forum to resolve the issue of authenticity/genuineness of title sought to be reconstituted, nor a remedy to confirm or adjudicate ownership. It concluded that a separate civil action must be instituted to assail the validity of or seek the annulment of the certificate of title since the same cannot be done in the reconstitution proceedings where the issuance of the reconstituted title is ministerial on the part of the court after a factual finding that the original was indeed existing but was lost or destroyed.After trial and consideration of the oral and documentary evidence submitted by Federico and Enriquita, RTC proceeded to rule on the merits of the Petition for Reconstitution and granted the Petition and ordered that Register of Deeds of Cavite Province to reconstitute the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4399 as shown on plan Psu-91002 in the name of Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, subject to existing liens and encumbrances with annotation at the back thereof and that said title was reconstituted and issued in lieu of the lost one which is hereby declared null and void for all legal intents and purposes. The Republic appealed the RTC Order to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings on the following grounds: (a) no showing that the owners of the adjacent properties were duly notified according to Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26; and (b) failure of Federico and Enriquita to prove their valid interest in the subject property covered by TCT No. T-4399. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 72740. The Court of Appeals issued a Decision granting the appeal of the Republic and reversing the RTC because RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution because the notices of the hearing sent to the owners of the adjoining properties via registered mail were returned without having been served on them. The names of the owners of the adjoining properties were taken from the survey plan made in 1930, and it was not surprising that by the time the notices were sent in 1999, 69 years later, these persons could no longer be located. The Court of Appeals also found that Federico and Enriquita failed to prove that at the time the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 was lost; they were the only lawful owners of the subject property. The Court of Appeals declared the Decision final and executory for the reason that no motion for reconsideration thereof had been filed. Federico and Enriquita file a Motion for Reconsideration, however, CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration decision become final and executory. Petitioners insist that the Petition for Reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 filed by Federico and Enriquita complied with all the legal requirements therefor. They claim that the Court of Appeals committed serious error in requiring notice to adjoining property owners. Petitioners citePuzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.,in which the Court ruled that notice to adjoining property owners is not necessary where the basis for reconstitution is the owners duplicate, following Section 10, in relation to Section 9, of Republic Act No. 26. Assumingarguendothat such notice is mandatory, petitioners contend that they were able to substantially comply with the same, only that the notices they sent to the adjoining property owners were returned unserved.According to the OSG, the RTC gravely erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution despite failure by Federico and Enriquita to comply with the notice requirements under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26. It should be recalled that notices to the adjoining property owners were returned unserved for various reasons. The OSG is adamant in its stance that nothing but strict compliance with the requirements of the law will do, and failure to do the same prevents the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution and voids the whole reconstitution proceedings. Likewise, the OSG maintains that Federico and Enriquita were not able to show that they were the only owners of the subject property at the time of the loss of TCT No. T-4399. Finally, the OSG asserts that the Petition at bar deserves outright dismissal considering that the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals had already become final and executory.Issue:Whether or not the respondent court of appeals also erred in requiring the petitioners to notify the adjoining owners, although the petitioners also substantially complied with the additional requirements imposed by the trial courtRuling: We find that there is no merit in the present Petition.The Court of Appeals ordered the dismissal of the Petition for Reconstitution of Federico and Enriquita was because of the lack of notice to the adjoining property owners, which supposedly deprived the RTC of jurisdiction over the said Petition.The nature of the action for reconstitution of a certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed," denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition.The purpose of such an action is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred. The same Republic Act No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. As we held in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco,failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, Republic Act No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings.Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 26 identify the sources for reconstitution of title. Section 2 and 3 enumerates the sources for reconstitution of OCTs and TCTs, respectively:Section 2. Original Certificates of Title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:(a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;(b) The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title;(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.It is worth stressing that Federico and Enriquita sought the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. T-4399 based on the owners duplicate of said TCT, a source named under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26. The publication, posting and notice requirements for such a petition are governed by Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26. Section 10 provides:Sec.10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition, before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: and, provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this ActIn relation to the foregoing, the provision of Section 9 on the publication of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution reads:Section 9. x x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. x x x.It is evident from a perusal of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26, as quoted above, that it does not mandate that notice be specifically sent to adjoining property owners; it only necessitated publication and posting of the notice of the Petition for Reconstitution in accordance with Section 9 of the same Act. Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26,requiring notice to adjoining property owners, are actually irrelevant to the Petition for Reconstitution filed by Federico and Enriquita considering that these provisions apply particularly to petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26.InPuzon, we explained that when the reconstitution is based on an extant owners duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and genuineness of the certificate, which could best be determined or contested by the government agencies or offices concerned. The adjoining owners or actual occupants of the property covered by the TCT are hardly in a position to determine the genuineness of the certificate; hence, their participation in the reconstitution proceedings is not indispensable and notice to them is not jurisdictional.The Decision of the Court of Appeals is already final and executory, and absolutely binds this Court, despite any errors therein. And even if it were otherwise, the error committed by the appellate court as regards the notice requirement would not necessarily result in a judgment favorable to petitioners. The failure of Federico and Enriquita to immediately seek the reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, and their procrastination for four decades before actually filing their Petition, had allowed laches to attach. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 5 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72740 dismissing the Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. T-4399, filed by Federico A. Angat and Enriquita A. Angat, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 143573 January 30, 2009ADORACION ROSALES RUFLOE, ALFREDO RUFLOE and RODRIGO RUFLOE,Petitioners,vs.LEONARDA BURGOS, ANITA BURGOS, ANGELITO BURGOS, AMY BURGOS, ELVIRA DELOS REYES and JULIAN C. TUBIG,Respondents.FACTS:Petitioner Adoracion Rufloe is the wife of Angel Rufloe, now deceased, while co-petitioners Alfredo and Rodrigo are their children. During the marriage of Adoracion and Angel, they acquired a 371-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Bagbagan, Muntinlupa, which is the subject of the present controversy. Sometime in 1978, respondent Elvira Delos Reyes forged the signatures of Adoracion and Angel in a Deed of Sale dated to make it appear that the disputed property was sold to her by the spouses Rufloe. On the basis of the said deed of sale, Delos Reyes succeeded in obtaining a title in her name. IThe Rufloes filed a complaint for damages against Delos Reyes alleging that Angel Rufloe died in 1974, which was four (4) years before the alleged sale in favor of Delos Reyes.During the pendency of the case, Delos Reyes sold the subject property to respondent siblings Anita, Angelina, Angelito and Amy (Burgos siblings). A new title was then issued in their names. The Burgos siblings, in turn, sold the same property to their aunt, Leonarda Burgos. However, the sale in favor of Leonarda was not registered. Thus, no title was issued in her name. The subject property remained in the name of the Burgos siblings who also continued paying the real estate taxes thereon.The trial court rendered its decision declaring that the Deed of Sale in favor of Delos Reyes was falsified as the signatures of the spouses Rufloe had been forged. The trial court ruled that Delos Reyes did not acquire ownership over the subject property. Said decision had become final and executory. Respondents interposed an appeal to the CA. In their appeal, respondents maintained that they bought the property in good faith after they were shown a genuine copy of the title of the disputed property by Delos Reyes. They also insisted that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court, declaring in the process that respondents were purchasers in good faith and for value.ISSUE:(1) Whether the sale of the subject property by Delos Reyes to the Burgos siblings and the subsequent sale by the siblings to Leonarda were valid and binding; and (2) Whether respondents were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value despite the forged deed of sale of their transferor Delos Reyes. RULING:It is undisputed that the forged deed of sale was null and void and conveyed no title. It is a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally. Due to the forged deed of sale, Delos Reyes acquired no right over the subject property which she could convey to the Burgos siblings. All the transactions subsequent to the falsified sale between the spouses Rufloe and Delos Reyes are likewise void, including the sale made by the Burgos siblings to their aunt, Leonarda.As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land, as in this case, may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, this rule admits of an unchallenged exception: The circumstances surrounding this case point to the absolute lack of good faith on the part of respondents. The evidence shows that the Rufloes caused a notice of adverse claim to be annotated on the title of Delos Reyes and a action for damages and criminal case for estafa, filed by the Rufloes against Delos Reyes, were both pending before the court. This circumstance should have alerted the Burgos siblings as to the validity of Delos Reyes title and her authority and legal right to sell the property. Equally significant is the fact that Delos Reyes was not in possession of the subject property when she sold the same to the Burgos siblings. There was no showing that Amado or any of the Burgos siblings exerted any effort to personally verify with the Register of Deeds if Delos Reyes certificate of title was clean and authentic. Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing with registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly established rule that where circumstances exist which would put a purchaser on guard and prompt him to investigate further. without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as a buyer in good faith. Moreover, the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes it with notice of a flaw in the title of his transferor. To be effective, the inscription in the registry must have been made in good faith. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.

SOTERO ROY LEONERO, RODOLFO LIM, ISIDORO A. PADILLA, JR., AMY ROSE FISMA, and NORMA CABUYO, vs.SPOUSES MARCELINO B. BARBA and FORTUNA MARCOS-BARBA, represented by IMELDA N. FORONDO, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY

Facts: Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for Quieting of Title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 216.praying that Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 59721, 59725, 59726 and 59727, be declared null and void. Petitioners alleged that this had been declared void in a Partial Decision. Respondents maintaining that all in their names in the tile were all genuine. They further argued that the Partial Decision could not possibly have any effect on them, as they were not parties to said case. RTC dismissed the petition for quieting of title. Petitioner appealed to the CA and the decision of the RTC was affirmed. Issue: was dismissal of the complaint for quieting of title despite the lack of trial on the merits, hence, allegedly depriving petitioners of the opportunity to prove their allegations that respondents' aforementioned TCTs were null and voidHeld: petitioners admit that they are mere possessors of the parcels of land in question and have been ordered to vacate the same. The gist of their claim in the action for quieting of title is that the Decision in the ejectment case against them should not be implemented, because respondents' TCTs are spurious, having emanated from OCT No. 614, which has been declared null and void in a Partial Decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-35672. Petitioners' main prayer is for the nullification of respondents' TCTs.Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can only be altered, modified or cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. In Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, the Court held that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be assailed in an action for quieting of title; an action for annulment of title is the more appropriate remedy to seek the cancellation of a certificate of title Clearly, petitioners' complaint is unfounded and the RTC acted properly in dismissing the same for petitioners' failure to establish the factual basis for it.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit.

RABAJA RANCH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner vs. AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM,Respondent.[G.R. No. 177181 July 7, 2009]

The Supreme Court ruled that in our jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. The intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him must be specifically alleged and proved. The burden of proof rests on petitioner, and the petitioner in this case failed to discharge the burden. Petitioner did not show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles Soguilon is indeed spurious. More importantly, petitioner failed to prove that respondent took part in the alleged fraud which dated back as early as 1966. Only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are. Moreover, a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and such registration is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land.The Supreme Court also reiterated the rule that, where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Thus, every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.FACTS:Petitioner Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation is a domestic corporation and a holder of TCT No. T-88513covering the subject property located at Barangay Conrazon, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro.Respondent Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) is a government corporation, which manages the pension fund of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and a holder of TCT No. T-51382covering the same subject property.On September 1, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaintfor Quieting of Title and/or Removal of Cloud from Title before the RTC. It averred that on September 6, 1955, a Free Patent was issued in the name of Jose Castromero, and on June 1, 1982, the Free Patent was registered, and an OCT covering the subject property was issued in the name of the latter. Sometime in 1982, Jose sold the subject property to Spouses Sigfriedo and Josephine Veloso and TCT No. T-17104was issued in favor of the spouses. On January 17, 1997, Spouses Veloso, in turn, sold the subject property to petitioner for the sum ofP634,116.00 and TCT No. T-88513 was issued in petitioners name. Petitioner alleged that it was the lawful owner and possessor of the subject property.In its Answer, respondent claimed that its title over the subject property was protected by the Torrens system, as it was a buyer in good faith and for value, and that it had been in continuous possession of the subject property since November 1989, way ahead of petitioner's alleged possession in February 1997.Respondent stated that on April 30, 1966, a Homestead Patent was issued in the name of Charles Soguilon, and upon registration, an OCT was issued in Charles's name, covering the same property. On October 18, 1982, Charles sold the subject property to JMC Farm Incorporated, which was then issued TCT No. 18529.On August 30, 1985, JMC obtained a loan from respondent in the amount ofP7,000,000.00, with real estate mortgage over several parcels of land including the subject property.JMC failed to pay, hence, after extra-judicial foreclosure and public sale, respondent, being the highest bidder, acquired the subject property and was issued TCT No. T-51382 in its name. Respondent contended that from the time it was issued a title, it took possession of the subject property until petitioner disturbed respondent's possession thereof sometime in 1997. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner on the ground that petitioner's title emanated from a title older than that of the respondent. Moreover, the RTC held that there were substantial and numerous infirmities in the Homestead Patent of Charles. The RTC found that there was no record in the Bureau of Lands that Charles was a homestead applicant or a grantee of the Homestead Patent. Thus, the RTC held that Charles's Homestead Patent was fraudulent and spurious, and respondent could not invoke the protection of the Torrens system, because the system does not protect one who committed fraud or misrepresentation and holds title in bad faith. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court. It held that Charles's Homestead Patent was earlier registered than Jose's Free Patent. The CA held that Jose slept on his rights, and thus, respondent had a better right over the subject property. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.ISSUES:a. Whether or not respondent's title which originated from a fake and spurious homestead patent, is superior to petitioner's title which originated from a valid and existing free patent.b. Who, between the petitioner and respondent, has a better right over the subject property?

RULINGS:a. The Supreme Court ruled that in our jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed. Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. The intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner, injure him must be specifically alleged and proved. The burden of proof rests on petitioner, and the petitioner in this case failed to discharge the burden. Petitioner did not show that the Homestead Patent issued to Charles Soguilon is indeed spurious. More importantly, petitioner failed to prove that respondent took part in the alleged fraud which dated back as early as 1966. Therefore, the petition was denied.b. The Supreme Court held that respondent is an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value. Thus, as far as respondent is concerned, TCT No. 18529, shown to it by JMC, was free from any flaw or defect that could give rise to any iota of doubt that it was fake and spurious, or that it was derived from a fake or spurious Homestead Patent. Likewise, respondent was not under any obligation to make an inquiry beyond the TCT itself when, significantly, a foreclosure sale was conducted and respondent emerged as the highest bidder. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the Court cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property.Moreover, a Homestead Patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Section 103 of P.D. No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents, and such registration is the operative act to convey the land to the patentee. The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land.

HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 168848HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE DE LUZURIAGA vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 169019June 30, 2009

FACTS:Subject of the instant controversy isLotNo. 1524 of the Bacolod Cadastre.Petitioners filed anApplication for the Registration of Title before the RTC.In it, the subject lot was specifically identified as Lot No. 1524, AP-06-005774, Cad. 39, Bacolod Cadastre, situated in the City ofBacolod,IslandofNegros. The survey plan duly approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Regional Office, Iloilo City; and the technical description of the subject lot were submitted to the RTC.The application was amended to stating that the parcel of land in question be ordered registered and that an original Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the late Jose R. [De] Luzuriaga, Sr. pursuant to Decree No. 22752 covering Lot No. 1524 of Bacolod Cadastre.Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order of general default except as against respondent Republic of thePhilippines, which entered its due appearance through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which, in turn, designated Bacolod Assistant City Prosecutor Abraham Bayona to represent the OSG at the trial.Among the evidence petitioners adduced during the hearings was a copy of Decree No. 22752[8]dated October 7, 1916, issued by the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) pursuant to the decision in the cadastral case confirming and granting unto the late Jose R. De Luzuriaga full ownership of Lot No. 1524.By Decision dated May 24, 1999, the trial court ratified its order of general default and judicially confirmed the incomplete title of the late De Luzuriaga, Sr. over Lot No. 1524 pursuant to Decree No. 22752.The OSG, for the Republic, received a copy of the Decision on June 22, 1999, but opted not to file an appeal. Pursuant to the above decision the Bacolod Registry issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-58 in the name of De Luzuriaga, Sr.Meanwhile, in September 1999, Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Co., Inc. (DAALCO) filed a Complaintagainst petitioners before the RTC forQuieting of Title, Annulment and Cancellation of [OCT] No. RO-58with prayer for injunctive relief and damages. DAALCO claimed that its predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Lizares, was the registered, lawful, and absolute owner of Lot No. 1524 as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) ofBacolodCityon February 8, 1939.On November 24, 1999, or six months after the RTC rendered its Decision, the Republic through the OSG, however, sought the annulment thereofviaan unverifiedPetition for Relief from Judgmentfiled before the RTC. The RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment because it is not sufficient in form and substance and filed out of time.The Republic moved for reconsiderationof the above denial order arguing that its procedural lapses are not fatal to its case. Moreover, the OSG alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583 inasmuch as the corresponding amended application for registration dated May 5, 1998 was not published and a copy of which the Republic was not served. Finally, the Republic raised anew the argument on the unavailability of Decree No. 22752 as basis for the application of land registration in view of the implementation of Sec. 39 of PD 1529.The Republic later filed a Supplement (To Motion for Reconsideration) reiterating the merits of its case.The RTC denied the Republics motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Republic elevated the case before the CA. The appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting certiorari and ordered the remand of the instant case to the trial court for reception of evidence to determine whether the RTCs Decision confirming the title of the late Luzuriaga, Sr. overLot1524 will result in a double titling of the subject lot.Through the equally assailed May 25, 2005 Resolution, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, these petitions. ISSUES:1. Whether or not a cadastral case and Quieting of Title case can proceed independently?2. Whether or not the contention of the OSG that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cadastral Case No. 97-583 due to non-publication of the amended application for registration is tenable.?RULING:1. Yes, they can proceed independently. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners contention that a petition for relief from judgment and the special civil action for quieting of title cannot proceed separately is without solid basis.Cad. Case No. 97-583 and the suit for quieting of title in Civil Case No. 99-10924 each involves different concerns and can proceed independently.The cause of action of the Republics petition for relief from judgment of double titling of the subject lot is different from DAALCOs quest for quieting of title. From another perspective, DAALCO basically seeks to nullify the issuance of OCT No. RO-58 in the name of the De Luzuriaga heirs, while the Republics petition assails the grant of ownership to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of land duly registered under OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares, who thereafter transferred the title to his heirs or assigns. In fine, both actions may proceed independently, albeit a consolidation of both cases would be ideal to obviate multiplicity of suits.2. No. As the Supreme Court held that the Republic, after participating in the proceedings below, has raised the issue of jurisdiction, drawing attention to the non-publication of the amended application for registration during the trial of Cad. Case No. 93-857. The Court cannot see its way clear to the jurisdictional challenge posed by the Republic. As it were, the Republic entered its appearance in Cad. Case No. 97-583 represented by prosecutor Bayona. The petitioners in that case appeared to have complied with the essential jurisdictional requirement of publication. The required survey plan, technical description, and original tracing cloth have been duly presented and submitted as evidence. Prosecutor Bayona obviously found the cadastral proceedings to have been in order, else, he would have duly protested and assailed the same.We hardly can subscribe to the Republics argument that the publication of the amendment in petitioners application is a conditionsine qua nonfor the RTC, acting as cadastral court, to acquire jurisdiction. Sec. 7 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, provide for the publication of the application for registration and the schedule of the initial hearing.This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like ordinary administrative registration, arein rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence. Due publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim and identity of the property that will be surveyed.And any additional territory or change in the area of the claim cannot be included by amendment of the plan or application without new publication, otherwise the cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction over the additional or amended claim.But where the identity and area of the claimed property are not the subjects of amendment but other collateral matters, a new publication is not needed.In the case at bar, there is no dispute that due publication was made forLotNo. 1524, its identity and area.The amendment in petitioners application in the relief portion neither altered the area and identity of the subject lot nor added any territory. Thus, no new publication is required.Besides, the Republic, through Prosecutor Bayona, has been duly notified of such amendment.Consequently, the Republic could not plausibly argue that it was deprived of its day in court.

SPOUSES. VILLAMIL, ETC. VS. VILLAROSAG.R NO. 177187April 7, 2009

Facts:Petitioner-spouses Villamil alleged that they were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 223611. That they visited the said lot and found that a residential house was being constructed by a certain Villarosa. Petitioners verified their title with the office of the register of deeds and found out that the title in their names was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Paterno by virtue of a deed of assignment purportedly executed by them in favor of Paterno. A Deed of Assignment was likewise executed by Paterno in favor of Spouses Tolentiono, and on the basis of the said document, a new title was issued in favor of the latter. Thereafter Spouses Villamil instituted a complaint for annulment for annulment of title, recovery of possession, reconveyance, damages and injunction against the Spouses Tolentino and Villarosa. Spouses Villamil averred that since Paternos transfer to Sps. Tolentino is spurious, the Spouses Tolentino could not also transfer any right to Villarosa on account of the principle that no one can transfer a greater right to another than he himself. The trial court found that the deed of sale executed by sps. Villamil in favor of Paterno is fake; that Paterno is a fictitious person, and that spouses Tolentino and Villarosa are both buyers in bad faith. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial courts decision and declared void the title of the Spouses Tolentino and Paterno but upheld the validity of the title of Villarosa holding that the latter is a purchaser for value and in goodfaith.Issue:Whether or not Villarosa can be declared a purchases for value and goodfaith? Held:Yes, well settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. A forged or fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title if the property has already been transferred from the name of the owner to name of the forger. This doctrine serves to emphasize that a person who deals with registered property in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a torrents title. Having made the necessary inquiries and having found that the title to be authentic, Villarosa need not go beyond the certificate of title. He examined the transferors title, which was then under the name of Spouses Tolentino. He did not have to scrutinize each and every title and previous owners of the property preceding Tolentino. In sum, Villarosa was able to establish good faith when he bought the subject property. Therefore, the title issued in Villarosas name is valid.

Republic v. Lee TsaiG.R. No. 168184. June 22, 2009.

FACTS: Respondent filed an application for the confirmation and registration of the subject property under Presidential Decree No. 1529. She (alleged that she is the owner of the subject property and the improvements thereon. She also declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive andnotorious possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. The trial court granted respondents application for registration. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that respondent need not prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was already superseded by Republic Act No. 1942 (RA 1942), which provides for a simple 30 year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of title.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is required for respondent to prove her open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

HELD: YES. Note that respondent did not specify under what paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. But it appeared that respondent filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529. There are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529:(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June1945 or earlier. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

There were various amendments to PD 1529. In Republic v. Doldol, the Court provided a summary of these amendments:

"The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529."

In this case, respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the subject property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948. In view of the lack ofsufficient showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, respondents application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied.

The same ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Javier (G.R. No. 179905, 19 August 2009).