2009 - n. 1 - Explicative Models of Complexity

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The Lab's Quarterly

Il Trimestrale del Laboratorio

2009 / n. 1 / gennaio-marzo

Laboratorio di Ricerca SocialeDipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali,

Universit di Pisa


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Direttore:Massimo Ampola

Comitato scientifico:Roberto FaenzaPaolo Bagnoli

Mauro Grassi

Antonio Thiery

Franco Martorana

Comitato di Redazione:Stefania Milella

Luca Lischi

Alfredo Givigliano

Marco Chiuppesi

Segretario di Redazione:

Luca Corchia

ISSN 2035-5548

Laboratorio di Ricerca Sociale

Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali,

Universit di Pisa


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The Lab's Quarterly

Il Trimestrale del Laboratorio

2009 / n. 1 / gennaio-marzo

COMPLEXITY, VAGUENESS, FRACTALS AND FUZZY LOGIC:NEW PATHS FOR THE SOCIAL SEARCH

Massimo Ampola Complexity,vagueness, fractals and fuzzy logic 5

Marco Chiuppesi Indexes, Scales and Ideal Types a Fuzzy Approach 17

Paolo PasquinelliSome Aspect of the Quality in a Living Complex System.

A Preliminary Approach:The Lichen Symbiosis 33

Talita Pistelli Mc

Clelland

Vague tendences:a review of fuzzy set theory comparative studies 45

Luca CorchiaExplicative models of complexity.The reconstructions of social evolution for Jrgen Habermas 53

Chiara FerrettiPaths Towards Addiction:a Fuzzy Model of Causal Relations 83

RECENSIONI

Elisabetta BuonasorteEssere e non essere. Soggettivit virtuali tra unione e divisione

(Annalisa Buccieri, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2009) 93

Laboratorio di Ricerca SocialeDipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali,

Universit di Pisa


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Si tenuta a Napoli dal 1 al 5 Settembre 2008 la VII InternationalConference on Social Scienze Methodology nellambitodiRC33-

Logic and Methodology in Sociology.

Pubblichiamo le relazioni tenute da studiosi impegnati nel Labo-

ratorio di Ricerca Sociale del Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali,

ora, confluito nel Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e Sociali.

Section

Complexity, vagueness, fractals and fuzzy logic:

new paths for the social search


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EXPLICATIVE MODELS OF COMPLEXITY.THE RECONSTRUCTIONS OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION FORJRGENHABERMAS

Luca Corchia

Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche e SocialiUniversit di [email protected]+39 050 2212420

Abstract

Habermasintroducestheconceptofreconstructivesciencewithadouble purpose:toplacethegeneraltheoryofsocietybetweenphilosophyandsocialscienceandre-establishtheriftbetweenthegreattheorizationandtheempiricalresearch.Themodelofrationalreconstructionsrepresentsthemainthreadofthesurveys

aboutthestructuresofthelife-world(culture,societyandpersonality)andtheirrespectivefunctions(culturalreproductions,socialintegrations and socialization). Forthispropose,thedialecticsbetweensymbolicrepresentationofthestructuressubor-dinatedtoallworldsoflife(internal relationships)andthematerialreproductionofthesocialsystemsintheircomplex(external relationshipsbetweensocialsystemsand environment) has to be considered. This model finds an application, above all, inthetheoryofthesocialevolution,startingfromthereconstructionofthenecessary

conditions for a phylogeny of the socio-cultural-lifeforms(thehominization)untilan

analysisofthedevelopmentofsocialformations,whichHabermassubdividesinto

primitive, traditional, modern and contemporary formations.Thispaperisanattempt,primarily,toformalizethemodelofreconstructionofthe

logicofdevelopmentofsocialformationssummedupbyHabermasthroughthe dif-ferentiationbetweenvitalworldandsocialsystems(and,withinthem,throughthera-tionalization of the life-worldandthegrowthincomplexityofthesocialsystems).Secondly, it tries to offer some methodological clarificationsabouttheexplanation ofthedynamicsofhistoricalprocessesand,inparticular,aboutthetheoreticalmean-ingoftheevolutionaltheoryspropositions. Even if the German sociologist considersthattheex-postrational reconstructionsandthemodelssystem/environmentcannothaveacompletehistoriographicalapplication,thesecertainlyactasageneralpremisein the argumentativestructureofthehistoricalexplanation.

Keywords: new model, complexity, social evolution

Index

Introduction

The Lesson of the Classics: the General Theory of Society 54

1. The Theory of Social Evolution 56

2. Social Science and Historiography 70

Basic Bibliography 79


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TheLabsQuarterly 54

Introduction

THE LESSON OF THE CLASSICS: THE GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

Jrgen Habermas has devoted more than thirty years of his studies to social

science, in order to define, through the reconstruction of its traditions of thought,

atheoricalframeworkwhichservesasorientationforprogramsofhistorical-

socialprograms.

As well as the classics ofthesociologicalthought,hehasfacedtheproblems

of societyasawhole,explainingthepropositions,methodsandaimsas

indispensable pre-requisites for a research which widens the disciplinary borders

of the philosophical reflection on one side, and of the historical research on the

other side. Within the long itinerary of his formation, this program represents asortofmainthreadintheanalysisofculturalsystems,socialsystems,per-

sonalitysystemsand,aboveall,inthetheoryof the social evolution,fromthe

reconstruction of the necessary conditions for the anthropological genesis of the

socio-cultural living forms thehominizationuntil the examination of the

logicanddynamicsofthedevelopmentofthesocialformations,thatHabermas

subdivides in primitive, traditional, modern and contemporary formations. Con-

sidering these as the cognitive basis, it is unavoidable to question whether

Habermasreallyachieves,inhisitinerariesthroughthehistoryofideas,the

logicalcoherenceandthedepthofresearchwhicharenecessarytosystematize

the researches in social science into a unitary theorical framework.

WithinthegeneralreconstructionofHabermaswork,thepresentpaperfo-

cuses on the propositions of the explicative model of the theory of social evolu-

tion and on the particular relationships between sociology and historiography.

But primarily, we also have to point out more precisely the object of interest of

his writings, considering that, according to Habermas, the debates within the so-

cialsciencedealwiththecognitivestatute,butfirstofallwiththeobjectual

sphereandatleasttheyconcernthechoiceofmethodologiesandtechniquesof

research in order to approach data, describe them, advance hypotheses, develop

analyses and control their results in relation to the scientific community. In his

opinion, the objectualsphereisthenatthehighestlevelofabstraction:namely

atheoryofsocietywhichreconstructstheconstitutivecomponentsofthe social

formationsandtheprocesses-mechanismsoftheirreproduction,namely

staticsanddynamicsofthesocialphenomena.


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The reference to the constitutive aspects of society is confirmed in the Inter-

view with Hans Peter Krger(1989). Habermas replies to the request of outlining

a geographical map of his theory and affirms: Every theory of society must have

ambition to explain how a society works, and through what it is reproduced1

. Inthis way, he goes back to the research about the classics in the sociological

thought that - starting from A. Comte, H. Spencer and K. Marx until P. Sorokin

and T. Parsons, through F. Tnnies, E. Durkheim, M. Weber has maintained

the idea of building models in order to describe the structural elements of social

formations and the logics of development of human evolution, re-organizing the

material of historical researches from a synchronic (or structural) and a dia-

chronic (or genetic) point of view. The reference to the classics brings about the

attention to the logics of research and to the interdisciplinary horizon opened by

their perspective on social phenomena, in opposition to the reductionistic at-

tempts to bring back social science to specialist spheres, such as economic sci-

ences for production, exchange and use of wealth, political science for constitu-

tion and maintaining processes, crises of power and public opinion, sociology for

social integration and anomic crisis in groups and institutions, psychology for the

individuationandsocializationofgenerations, cultural science for the gene-

sis and the transmission of the canonical forms of knowledge and for heresies.

Habermasfacesthedefinitionofconceptualframeworkofthetheoryof

society,startingfromthereflectiononanunclearrelationshipbetweenthe

theoryofactionandthesystemicaction.Inotherwords,startingfromthe

preliminary question on how conceptual strategies are orientated, social science

canintegrateinaunitarymodel,redefiningthetheoryofactionintermsof

theoryofcommunicativeactionandassuming,evenifareduceddimension,

the neo-functionalistpositionsofthesystemictheory2. This approach, rede-

finedonthemodelofrationalreconstructionsrepresentsthethreadofthere-

flections about thestructuresofthelife-world, cultural reproduction, social in-

tegrationandsocialization,alsoconsideringtheconnectionsbetweenthestruc-turessubjectedtoallworldsoflifeandtheirsymbolicreproductionandma-

terialreproduction3.

1J. Habermas, it. transl.Intervista con Hans Peter Krger, in Id.,NR, cit., p. 90.

2 J. Habermas, it. transl. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit.,p. 697.

3

J. Habermas, it. transl. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit.,p. 739.


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1. The Theory of Social Evolution

The processes of social reproduction had been reconstructed in a specialist

waybyE.HusserlsphenomenologyandGadamersphilosophicalhermeneutics,referringtotheactualizationofculturaltraditions,Meadssymbolicinteraction-

ismandWeberscomprehensivesociologywithrespecttothecoordinationof

socialactions,andatleastS.FreudspsychoanalysisandJ.Piagets,L.Kol-

bergs,andR.Selmanscognitivepsychology, the social psychology in relation

to the processes of socialization. Without omitting the original contributions

givenbyA.Schtz,T.LckmannsandP.Bergerssocialphenomenology,A.

Cicourelsethno-methodologyandI.Goffmansdramaturgy4.Thetheoryof

communicativeactingaimsatmakingasyn

thesis of all these different tradi-tions.Thestructuresofthelife-worldregenerateintheprocessesofcultural

reproduction, social integration and socialization, but social systems also have to

produce material resources, rule the internal functioning and control the envi-

ronmentanditsboundaries;Marxdefinedthisprocessasmetabolismbetween

societyandnature5.Throughtheconceptofsocietyontwolevels,Habermas

goesbacktoT.Parsons6andN.Luhmanns

7works.

In the propositions of the social evolution, he specifies the integration of both

explicativemodelsintheanalysisofthesystemiccrisesofsocialformations

provokedbyenvironmentalchallengesand/orinternalcontradictionswhich

fall upon the reproduction of the structures of the life-world and whose resolution

requiresinnovativeanswers8. As we shall mention, Habermas connects the

4J. Habermas, it. transl. Scienze sociale ricostruttive e scienze sociali comprendenti, in Id.,MB, cit., pp.

29-30.5 J. Habermas, it. transl. Azioni, atti linguistici, interazioni mediate linguisticamente e mondo vitale, in

Id.,Il pensiero post-metafisico (NMD), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1991, p. 102.6

J. Habermas, Talcott Parsons Konstruktionsprobleme der Theoriekonstruktion, in J. Matthes, Le-

benswelt und soziale Probleme. Frankfurt a.M.

New York, Campus, pp. 28-48; Id., it. transl. TalcottParsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della societ, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 811-950.7

J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale?, in Id., Teoria della societ o tecno-logia sociale (TGS), Etas Kompass Libri, Milano 1973, pp. 95-195; Id., it. transl. Un concetto sociologicodi crisi, in Id., La crisi di razionalit nel capitalismo maturo (LPS), Bari, Laterza, 1975, pp. 5-9; Id., it.transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LSW2, cit., pp. 359-360; Id., J. Habermas, it. transl. Storiaed Evoluzione, in Id., Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico (ZRHM), Milano, Etas Libri, 1979, pp.154-157, 175-179; Id., it. transl.Excursus sulla appropriazione delleredit della filosofia del soggetto da

parte della teoria dei sistemi di Luhmann, in Id., Il discorso filosofico della modernit. Dodici lezioni(PDM), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1987, pp. 366-383; Id., it. transl. Sulla logica dei problemi di legittimazione,in Id.,LPS, cit., pp. 105-123, 141-157; Id.,Diritto e morale. Lezione seconda. Lidea dello Stato di dirit-to, in Id.,Morale, diritto, politica (MDP), Torino, Einaudi, 1986, pp. 45-78, Id., it. transl. Sociologie deldiritto e filosofie della giustizia, in Id., Fatti e norme. Contributi a una teoria discorsiva del diritto e della

democrazia (FG), Milano, Guerini e Associati, 1996, pp. 61-67.8 J. Habermas, it. transl. Un concetto sociologico di crisi, in Id.,LPS, cit., p. 7.


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functionalist analysis of changes in structure and function, clarifying genetic

questions9. The theory of social systems worked out byneo-functionalismis

notabletoexplain,withintheprocessoffunctionaldifferentiationwhichchar-

acterizessocialevolution,thegenesisoforganizationprincipleswhichsolveout the systemic challenges, because it precludes the reconstructionoflearning

processarisingfromthelife-world. This problem had already been raised by the

oldmasteroffunctionalism,S.N.Eisenstadt10

.

TheconnectionbetweenthetheoryofactionHabermasapproachtoindi-

catethereconstructionsofformalpragmaticsinthesphereofsocialtheory

andthetheoryofsystemsrepresentsthemostimportantproblemforatheo-

retical construction of social components in the theories of cultural reproduction,

of social interaction and socialization11.Aconceptualandnotbanalconnection

between both paradigms is, above all, at the bottom of the study on social chang-

ing12

. Indeed, even if the problem that dominates the researches is the reconstruc-

tion of structures and changing of the life-world, he considersthatthisstudyre-

ceives its right place online within a history of the system, only accessible for a

functionalistic analysis13.

In the perspective of the comparison with the systemic theory, he interprets

Marx.

During the Seventies, Habermas tried to make coincide the research program

aboutsocialevolutionwithareconstructionofhistoricalmaterialism14, ad-

dressing more attentiontotheresultsofthesciencesconsignedtotheoblivion

of middle-classknowledge15

. During the Fifties, he had already taken into ac-

counttheheritageofhistoryofphilosophyofoccidentalMarxismoftheSec-

ond International and the Soviet canon, the Diamat, according to the news studies

openedwiththediscoveroftheyoungMarx16

. On the other hand, in the essays

contained in For reconstruction of Historical Materialism (1976), Habermas

9 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 182.10

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 186.11

J. Habermas, it. transl. Talcott Parsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della societ, in TKH,cit, p. 813.

12 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, inZRHM, cit., p. 183.13

J. Habermas, it. transl.Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in TKH, cit, p. 696.14 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,Dialettica della Ra-

zionalizzazione (DR2), Milano, Unicopli, 19942, p. 151.15

J. Habermas, it. transl.Dialettica della razionalizzazione, inDR2, cit., p. 224.16

J. Habermas, Marx in Perspektiven, in Merkur, IX, 1955, pp. 1180-1183; Id., it. transl. Sulla di-scussione filosofica intorno a Marx e al marxismo, in, DR2, cit., pp. 23-107; it. transl. Tra filosofia escienza: il marxismo come critica, in Id., Prassi politica e teoria critica della societ (TP), Bologna, Il

Mulino, 1973, pp. 301-366;Metacritica di Marx a Hegel: la sintesi mediante il lavoro sociale, in Id., Co-noscenza e interesse (EI2), Roma-Bari, Laterza, 19832, pp. 27-45.


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takesseriouslyMarxandEngelstheoreticattempt,definingthefirstthe-

sisofhisresearchprogram:ThesisI:Historicalmaterialismshouldnotbecon-

sidered as a heuristics, neither as history, neither as an objective of history, nei-

ther as an objectivistic theory of history, neither as a retrospective glance at ananalysis of capitalism done more than a hundred years ago, but as an alternative

solution to take into account in relation to the statement nowadays dominating

about a theory of social evolution17.ThisreconstructionleadsHabermas to re-

definethepropositionsofhistoricalmaterialismrelatingtotheconcept of social

work,thetheoremstructure/superstructure,thedialecticsbetween productive

forcesandreproductionrelationshipsandthedefinitionofsocialformation.

In his Theory of communicative acting (1981), Habermas repeats argumenta-

tions that he had already exposed in his collection of writings For the reconstruc-

tion of historical materialism (1976),withoutqualifyingthetheoryofdevelop-

mentwiththeexpressionformulatedmaterialistically.Nowhetakes about a

partialoverlappingamongparalleltheoricalstrategies18

. In each case, the at-

tempt consideringthemeaningofthewordreconstructioninHabermaspro-

ceedings, was then criticized in English-speaking and Latin countries, even if his

studies founded their collocation in a continuitywiththecriticaltheory,inpar-

ticularwiththeproblemofmodernityinM.Webersinterpretation of Hegel-

Marxism.

ItismeaningfulthatWebersconsiderationtowardsHabermasTheory, then

at the end of ten-year researches carried out atMax Planck Institutin Starnberg,

does not find a confirmation in previous writings. Only at the end of the Seven-

ties,Habermaspresents,inclassicalsociology,Erfurtsociologistsworksasthe

mostimportantattempttoformulateamodelofstagesofdevelopmentofthe

socio-cultural evolution intendedasalogicallyreconstructedprocess.This

displacement can be explain through the fact that exactly in those years the stud-

ies of S. Kalberg, W. Schluchter, F. H. Tenbruck, R. N. Bellah e R. Dbert, K.

Eder and others were published. Here the dominating perspective of the philoso-phicaldebatesintheTwentiesaboutWebersSociology of Religion goes back to

investigatethetheoryofrationalization,afterbeingshelvedforlongtimebya

deeper investigation inEconomy and society19.

17 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,DR2, cit., pp. 152.18 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, p. 769.19

J. Habermas, it. transl.La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 229-230,289-291.


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IfMarxinterpretationisinfluencedbyHabermascriticstoneo-functionalism

andthecomparisonwiththeproductionparadigmofphilosophyofpraxis20

,

the new interpretationofWebersanalysisofoccidentalrationalizationmustbe

re-conducted to the model of reconstructive science employed by psychology toexplaintheontogeneticdevelopment.Hepresentedtheideaofanhomology,

relatively tight between filogenesis and ontogenesis21

, which could find a con-

firmationinMeadsinter-actionism, in the Ego-psychoanalysis and psychology

and above all in genetic structuralism by Piaget, Kohlberg, Selman, Flavell and

others agroupofstudieswhichrepresentsthelastoffourtraditionsof

thought,fromwhichHabermasdrawsenduringconceptualthemes,nextto

ParsonsandLuhmannssystemicneo-functionalisttheory,thehistoricalmate-

rialismoflayversionswhichavoidfideismsofscientismandphilosophyof

historyandWeberiansociologyinthemorecarefullyuniversalisticinterpreta-

tion suggested in the Seventies. The concepts and hypotheses of the psychology

of developmentrepresent,indeed,amodelfortheredefinitionofsocialscience

fromareconstructiveperspective.

In his anthropological reflections, Habermas maintains that social science

must prepare a theoretical frame which permits not only to reconstruct the

socio-culturalevolutionalmechanisms,butalsotodefineproperlywhatis

meantwiththeexpressionprincipleinthehistoryofgenre22a proposition

that our author finds confirmedinParsonsSystems of societies (1966)23.

We must anticipate that, following Lvy-Straussandmanyotheranthropolo-

gistsstudies,Habermasfindsthatthegapbetweenmanandotheranimalspe-

ciesmustbefoundinthefamiliarizationofmantheevolutiveinnovation

whichmakesthegenesisofthesocialprimitiveformationpossible,aroundthe

parentalstructures.Ifonasub-humanlevel,thebiologicalreproduction

representsaconditionalcenterofthegenesisofthenexusofsolidarity

among the members of a species, as E. Durkheim24

and S. Freud25supposed,the

unityofrelationshipisthefactorforthediffusionofsocialsolidarity.Family

skipsthehierarchicalone-dimensionalorder,accordingtowhicheveryanimal

is assigned transitively only one status,allowingthemaleadultmemberofthe

20J. Habermas, it. transl.Excursus sullobsolescenza del paradigma della produzione, in Id., PDM, cit.,

pp. 77-85.21 J. Habermas, it. transl.Introduzione: il materialismo storico e lo sviluppo di , in Id.,ZRHM, p. 12.22

J. Habermas, it. transl.Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalit, in Id., TKH, cit.,p. 224.

23 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sviluppo della morale e identit dellio, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 142-143.24 J. Habermas, it. transl.Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in Id., TKH, p. 604.25

J. Habermas, it. transl.Psicoanalisi e teoria della societ. Nietzsche e la in Id.,EI2, cit., pp. 271-272.


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grouptoconnect,assumingthepaternalrole(thestructuralfamilyunit),the

status withinthesystemofwomenandchildrenofthereproductionofsocial

ties to the status inthemalesystemofeconomybasedonhuntingandwar26.

HabermaspresentsthisanthropologicalhypothesisastheSecondThesisfor

the reconstructionofhistoricalmaterialism:Thespecificallyhumanlivingway

can be sufficiently characterized if hunting economy in the organization condi-

tions of the family is taken into account. Production and socialization as equally

important for human genre. The family structure of society which reigns as the

appropriation of external natural as the integration of internal nature is funda-

mental27.Habermasdoesnotspecifyanypossibleexternalorsociological

conditionswhich,inthesocio-cognitive process of co-generationofthesocial

worldandsubjectiveworld,determinedthepassagefromthebiological en-

tityoffamilytoparentalstructures.Heisinterestedinthenecessaryassump-

tions thelogicofdevelopmentsothattheabstractedcognitivecompe-

tences,therulesofsocialactingandsubjectiveidentity(necessarycondi-

tions for the reproductionofeverysocialformation)arisefromtheinteractions

basedonaninstinctualgroundandsymbolicallymediatedofgroupsof

hominids.HabermasfollowsMeadsandDurkheims28

perspective about the

transformation of the linguistic medium in its relationships with the cognition

and interaction structures. Indeed, the new cognitive and relational competences

allow,throughcommunicativeacts,theproductionofaknowledgeculturally

accumulated(culturaltransmission),thesatisfactionofgeneralizedexpecta-

tions of behaviour,convenientlytothecontext(socialintegration)andthecon-

stitutionofsteadypersonalitystructures(socialization).Thecriticalliterature

neglects the fact that the theory of communicative acting is not a moral doctrine,

but a reconstruction of the ontogenesis and filogenesis of competences29

.

Once reconstructed the necessary conditions to the constitution of human so-

cieties,Habermasworksoutarationalmodelwhichcomprehendsbothevolu-

tional challengesandthelogicsofdevelopmentofthepossibleinnovativeso-lution.Aswehavealreadyexplainedbefore,integratingthesystemictheory

andtheactiontheory,hepresumesthatthesocialevolutionfollowsadou-

bledifferentiationwhichproduces,ontheoneside,thedifferentiationbe-

tween life-world and the social sub-systems,and,ontheotherside,theforma-

26J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 153-

154.27 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, inDR2, cit., p. 154.28 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 548-

669.29 J. Habermas, it. transl. Coscienza morale e agire comunicativo, in Id.,MB, cit., pp. 123-204.


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tionoftwodifferentlogicsofdevelopmentthegrowthofcomplexityofso-

cialsystemsandtherationalizationofthelife-world:Iunderstandsocial

evolution as a second grade differentiation process: system and life-worlddiffer

fromoneanother,asthefirstscomplexity andthesecondsrationality growmore and more, not only respectively as system and as life-world at the same

time they get differentfrom one another30.

Withinthetheoryofsocialevolution,Habermasassumessomehypotheses

oftheoryofsystems following Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Parsons and at

least Luhmann. The beginning of the functionalistic analysis deals with the

adaptiveproblemsthatasocialsystemmustsolvewithinthesphereofmate-

rial reproduction,wheresomeevolutivechallengesarisewhichgenerateim-

pulsestodifferentiation.Theevolutivelogiccanbedescribed,aboveall, as

agrowthofsocialcomplexity31

. Habermas remembers that since Durkheims

Division of Labour(1893), functionalism has focused on the concept of differen-

tiation, whose explicative importance is not to be re-conducted to mere socio-

economical criteria. This differentiation is, above all, a segmented and/or func-

tional differentiationofsocialstructurestowhichformsofsocialintegrationin

relationshiptothetypeofsocialsolidarity(mechanical/organic)anddifferent

formsofpersonalidentities(collective/individual)arecorrelated.Whatishere

interestingisthecentralitydedicatedtolabouras development engine in the

material reproduction of genre which characterizes the evolutive theory since

MarxpraxisphilosophyuntilSpencersorganicism32

and contemporary func-

tionalism33.Inthistraditionthepossibilityinfavouroftheanalysisoftheca-

pacitiesofdirectionandcontrolofsystemsconsistsofre-elaboratingtheinter-

nal complexitytowardsenvironmental challenges with the differentiation and

re-unification of partial systems functionally specified34

.

In this reconstruction it results that from a first evolutive level primitiveso-

cietieswhereonlytherepetitionofsimilarandhomogeneoussegmentsis

present familiar structures followingthesocialdevelopment,asystemofdifferentorgans,eachofthemhavinggotaspecifictask,hasgenerated,and

theseorgansarebuiltupthemselvesbydifferentparts,whicharereciprocally

coordinated and subordinatedaroundthesamecentralorganthe State which

dependsonthemandexertsamoderatingactionontherestoftheorgan-

30J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 749.

31 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, p. 769.32 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 698-699.33

J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 147.34 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LSW2, cit., pp. 347-350.


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ism35.If,passingfromprimitivesocietiestotraditionalsocieties,adifferent

relationship among the structures of material reproduction segmentedvs.

functionalemerges,modernsocietiesmustfaceadifferentiationbetween

nomorecentralizedbutdecentralizedsocialstructures,whichfindtheirbal-ancepointinthecomplementaryrelationshipbetweentheStateadministra-

tion,regulatedandlegitimatedbyarational-legal power and the capitalistic

trade economy36

.

Inthisintroductionitisnotpossibletosumuptheschemeaboutthemecha-

nisms of systemic differentiation and the medium of regulation, nor to explain in

detail the long reflections about the single social formations:

SOCIAL FORMATIONS

DIFFERENTIATION AND

INTEGRATION OF SYSTEMIC MECHANISMS

Primitive

societies

Equalitarian Similar unities. Not economic exchange

Stratified Structural differentiation Not political power

Traditional societies Not similar unities. Political power

Modern societies Functional differentiationEconomic exchange and

political power

Tab. 1. Mechanisms of systemic differentiation

Habermas joins the theorical convention, common in the sociology of chang-

ing, of distinguishing between primitive equalitary and stratified societies, tradi-

tional and modern societies based on mechanisms which raise the levels of pos-

sible increases of complexity37

. On the other side,thecriteriaofsystemicdiffer-

entiationappliedalsobyHabermasinthereconstructionofthetheoryofsocial

evolution does not suits, as from a functionalistic point a view, it must be made a

distinctionbetweengradesofcomplexity,butnotbetweenevolutivelevels38

.

Functionalism is able to describe the process of functional differentiation which

determines the formation of new social structures, but cannot explain the genesismechanism has no value ofexplanatio39. Besides, the differentiation processes

canbecluesofanevolutiveprocess,butalsocausesofamovementinevo-

lutivedirectionswithoutescape40

. The complexity can be explained only exam-

35 J. Habermas, it. transl.Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalit, in Id., TKH, cit.,p. 192.

36J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, pp. 766-767.

37 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., pp. 749-750.38 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 146-147.39

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 179-180.40 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LSW2, cit., p. 350.


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ining the mechanisms of learning which develop within the principle of social

organization and those which, face the environmental challenges or internal in-

soluble contradiction allow innovative answers41

.

Habermasfacesgeneticquestionsbringingupthelimitationsbetweenold

andnewsociologicalfunctionalism,introducingacomparison between bio-

logical and social evolution, and indicating the conditions which make possible

to investigate. Here it suffices to underline that the restoration of the evolution-

ism in social science is due to contemporary biology, whose model of organic

changing does not explain exhaustively the logic of development of human be-

ings: A sociologistwho makes coincide the social development with the growth

of complexity, acts as a biologistwho describes the natural evolution of species

in the concepts of morphological differentiation. An explanation of evolution

must goes back to the inventories of behaviour of species and mutation mecha-

nisms. Similarly, we should distinguish, on a level of social evolution, between

the solution to control problems and the mechanisms of learning42. Besides, bi-

ologistsexplainthelearningofspeciesthroughtheprocessofgeneticmuta-

tiona sort of mistake in the transmission of genetic information which creates

thedeviantphenotypes, which are selected under the selective spur of the envi-

ronment, making the stabilizing of a population in the new environmental condi-

tions possible43

. As it is impossible to transpose such model to social changing, a

mechanismofequivalentvariationmustbepointedout:theprocessesofcul-

tural learning.

Three aspects space out the genetic mutation in the human sub-species from

learning on a cultural level: a) the evolutive learning process completes not only

through the changing of genetic patrimony, but also through the changing of a

potential of knowledge; b) on this level the distinction between phenotype and

genotype loses any meaning. The inter-subjectively shared and transmitted

knowledge is a constitutive part of the social system and is not owned by isolated

people; c) who, indeed, constitute themselves as people just by means of sociali-zation. Natural evolution brings among the member of the species a more or less

homogeneous repertoire of behaviours, while social learning provokes an accel-

erated diversification of behaviour 44.

Only reconstructing learning mechanisms and processes, we can explain why

some societies even few of them have been able to find solutions to problems

41 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 147.42 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LSW2, cit., p. 350.43

J. Habermas, it. transl.Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, p. 143.44 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, p. 144.


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of direction and control and why they have developed exactly those solutions,

which have made possible a functional differentiation and a new balance in or-

ganizationalstructures.Thenadistinctionmustbemadebetweenawholeof

(equivalent)solutionsofasystemiclocatableproblem,ontheonehand,

which must be investigated in functionalistic terms,andthelearningprocesses

on the other hand, which can explain why some systems widen their capability of

problem solving and others fail face the same problems45

.

When learning problems are investigated, it must be clear which forms of

knowledge are relevant for the evolution and what is the learning subject.

On the cultural level, the life-worldrepresentsahandeddownandlinguis-

ticallyorganizedreserveofinterpretative,evaluativeandexpressive

models, through which experiences are pragmaticallyorganizedinlearning

schemesandsemanticallyformulatedininter-subjectivelycommonnotions

andindailycommunicationsandspecialistdiscourses46

. The concept of cul-

ture offered by Habermas, that we cannot examine in this work, has the merit of

illuminatingimplicitknowledge,behindprocessesofcomprehensionand

agreement,showinghowthebackgroundoflinguisticknowledgeandcommon

sensetakesshape,andhowaculturaltraditionofexpertsliesover,retroacting

and elaboratingvisionsoftheworld(mythology,theologyandmetaphysics)

andformsofspecialistknowledge(scienceandtechniques,moralandlaw,aes-

thetics and arts).

Facingsystemicchallenges,whichgetintocrisistheadaptiveandintegra-

tive functionsofsociety,theavailableformsofknowledgearethepotentialsof

solutionwhichallowtoimagineandcarryoutnewprinciplesofsocialor-

ganization. On one side, integrative functions of comprehension, legitimation,

socializationinsymbolicreproduction Habermas expresses this sphere with

the concept of life-world; on the other side, adaptive functions of innovation, di-

rectionandcontrolofcomplexityinthematerialreproductionHabermas

summarizes this sphere by the use of the concept socialsystem.Everyinnova-tionrisesfromanewleveloflearning.

Atthispoint,HabermasredefinesMarxdialecticsbetweenproductiveforces

andproductionrelationships,questioningthattheprocessofsocialevolution

mustbeintendedinatechnicalsense,asiftechnical-scientific knowledge was

aboundbetweenbothproductiveforcesandformsofsocialintegration:

The fundamental assumption of historical materialism, that the growth of pro-

45

J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LWS2, cit., p. 352.46 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e Mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 712.


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ductive forces (and relative increase of productivity of social work) represents

the learning mechanism, which helps us to explain the passing to new social for-

mations, is not maintainable empirically47

. The growth of cognitive potential

and its conversion into technologies which develop the material reproduction canexplain the birth of certain systemic problems, but it cannot be explained how

this arisen problems can be solved. The introduction of new forms of social inte-

gration, i.e. the substitution of the relational system with the state of passing from

the primitive society to traditional societies, does not require a technologically

valuable knowledge, which can be actuated according to the rules of instrumental

knowledge (a widening of control on the external nature), but the widening of the

practical-moral knowledge, that can embody new interaction structures48

. Only in

this sense, according to Habermas, it can be defended the principle that a social

systemdoesntendandnewproductionrelationships does not take over before

the material conditions for their existence take shape within the old society.

The dialectics between systemic challenge and forms of knowledge is refor-

mulated as the 4th Thesis for reconstruction of historical materialism: When

systemic problems arise and they cannot be solved through the method of the

dominating production anymore, the existing form for social integration is in

danger. An endogenous mechanism of learning foresees the accumulation of a

cognitive-technical potential, that can be used to solve problems which generate

such crisis. But this knowledge can be given form in order to allow the deploy-

ment of productive forces only if the evolutional step towards an institutional

framework and a new form of social integration has been made. This step can

only be explained on the basis of different learning processes, the pratical-moral

ones49

.

ItisinterestingthatHabermasneglectsheretheaesthetical- expressive

knowledge,thatknowledgewhichraisestheproblemofauthenticinterpreta-

tionofneedsonthesideofindividualsinexistentialdiscoursesandaestheti-

calcritic.Ontheotherside,intheTheory of Communicative Action, he supportsthattheselectivityofmodernsocietiestowardsthecomplexofaesthetical-

practicalrationalityisduetothescarceeffectofartintheformationofsocial

structures50

.

47J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LWS2, cit., p. 357.


157.49 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157-

158.50 J. Habermas, it. transl.La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 341.


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As far as the imputed subject, Habermas affirms that learning neither can be

ascribedonlytoindividualsnortosociety.Ifitistruethatindividualslearn

thelearningmechanismsfall within the exclusive prerogatives of the human or-

ganismthey acquire the competences within the symbolic relationships of so-cial groups and cultural traditions. Furthermore, he affirms that the learning

processes which find their access to the interpretation system of cultural tradition

reproducethemselvesthroughthemediationofsocialmovementsorinexem-

plaryprocesses51.Knowledgeacquiredinafirsttimebyindividualsormar-

ginalgroupsisthensharedatacollectivelevelandchangesinto a reserve of

knowledge, a cognitive potential of adaptation or integration, which is socially

usable52

.

Introducingthenexusbetweenideasandinterests,heshowsthelimitsof

comprehendingsociologyandoftheculturalisticconceptofthelife-world

and he restores materialisticallythe study of the functions of culture within

the social theory. Habermas is convinced that all societies based on classes with a

politicaloreconomicgroundarefeaturedbytheproblemoflegitimationor

criticsexercisedbyculture,and,inparticular,oftherelationshipbetweenthe

reproductionofculturalknowledgeandcontrolstrategiesexercisedbypower

andmoney.Culturaltraditionsarenotonlytheexpressionofideas,valuesand

needs of social groups they are created by, elaborated and transmitted in the se-

quence of generations. They also meet the need of cultural legitimation of the

materialinterestsofagrouprank or class in relation to the interests of other

groups, assuring the non-problematicalreproductionofsocialformations

which institutionalize the differentiated participation to political power, the un-

equal distribution of economical wealth, the selective acknowledgement of social

prestige and dignity of cultural identities. In such a context of analysis, Haber-

masreflectionsaboutthestrategyofmanipulationofconsensusandaboutthe

formationofideologicalconceptionsoftheworldhavetofindtheircolloca-

tion.Inthedefinitionoftheconceptofsocialformation,hereconfirmsthatthe

deploymentofproductiveforcesisimportant,butitisnotthemaindimension

of a theory of social evolution which intends to periodize the development. If we

wanttofindadefinition,theMarxisttraditionssolutionofidentifying the social

formationstartingfromthewayofproductionwouldntbeadequate53

.

51 J. Habermas, it. transl.La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., p. 259.52

J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LSW2, cit., p. 350.53 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 122-126.


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Habermas prefers, indeed, to connote the social formation on the basis of

veryabstractregulamentationsthathedefinesprinciplesoforganization,

whoseinstitutionalnucleusbuildsuptheengineofmaterialandsymbolical

reproduction

54

.Hesummarizestheconceptofprincipleoforganization:With this term I intend those innovations which are produced by steps of learn-

ing which can be reconstructed according to an evolutional logics and establish a

leveloflearningalwaysnewofsociety.[]theyarestructuralmodelsordered

according to an evolutional logic, which denote new structural conditions of pos-

sible learning processes. The principle of organization of a society circumscribes

spheres of variation, and in particular it establishes within what structures possi-

ble changes of the system of institutions and interpretations are possible; to what

extent the capabilities existing in the productive forces can be socially used, and

to what extent such productive forces can be stimulated; and then how much the

activity of control, and so the systemic complexity of a society can be pow-

ered55

.

This revisionist perspective expressed in other works in an identical way56

is the first part of the 5th Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism:

A social formation is not to be defined through a determined way of production

(or even through the particular economic structure of a society), but through a

principle of organization. Every principle of organization establishes a level of

learning, i.e. the structural conditions of the possibility of learning technical-

cognitive and practical-moral processes57

.

Theprocessofrationalizationdoesnotonlyconcerntheprogressofpro-

ductiveforcesinthesolutionoftechnicaltasksandinthechoiceofstrate-

gies,butalsothemoralconceptionsofculturaltraditionsandmoralcon-

sciencesoftheindividualswhichareinstitutionalizedin structural nucleus of

social integration.

HabermasdeclarestofollowMaxWebersstudies,wheretheprocessofra-

tionalizationcanbeintendedasahistorical-universalprocesswhichproceeds

ontwolevels:theculturallevelofthedifferentiation of new forms of knowl-edge(andoflevelsoflearning)andthesociallevelofthetranslationof

culturalknowledgeintoaprocessofmodernizationwhichinstitutionalizes

conductsofpersonallifeandformsofassociatedformsoflife(thevital dis-

positions and social subsystems): This theory is based on the assumption that

54J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 183-184.


159.56 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LWS2, cit., p. 353.57

J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157-158.


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the processes of onthogenetical learning anticipate the push of social evolution in

some way, so that social systems can, as soon as their structurally limited control

capability gets over-stimulated by non-avoidable problems, they can, in some

cases, resort to superabundant capabilities of individual learning, available alsocollectively through images of the world, and then use them for the institutionali-

zation of new levels of learning58

.

Oncethesociologicalmodelfocusesontheabstractconceptastheprinciples

oforganization,thetheoremstructure-superstructureisnomoreintendedina

reductionisticsense.Habermasaffirmsindeedthatateachevolutionalstage,

the relationships of production crystallizearoundadifferentinstitutionalnu-

cleus,definingspecificformsofsocialintegration.Thefunctionofregulating

the access to production means and then the distribution of social wealth is as-

sumed by parental systems in primitive societies and by State institutions in the

great ancient civilizations59

. Only with capitalistic-liberal societies, economy be-

comesacentralelementoftheentiresocietyasthecapitalacquiresthefunc-

tion, through the medium of private law, of defining the class relationships, and

notonlythefunctionofinternalregulationwithinthemarket.Alsointhiscase

the basic assimilation to economic structure is misleading, because not even in

capitalistic societies the basic sphere coincides with the economic system60

.

Habermas marks out a reasonable series of social formations, each of them is

featured by a different principle of organization made possible by the institution-

alization of higher levels of technical and practical learning, which present a own

logicofirreversibleandnecessarydevelopmenthigher and higher structural

stages of development whiletheirdevelopmentdynamics the historical

way of achieving such stages remaincontingentandconditionedaccording

to the different events of the social systems.

SOCIAL FORMATIONS PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION

1. Primitive societies EqualitarianParental structure

StratifiedAncient reigns

State organization2. Traditional societies Great empires

Feudalism

MercantilismComplementary relationship

State/Market3. Modern societies Liberal capitalism

Organized capitalism

Table 2. Development of the organization principles of social formations

58 J. Habermas, it. transl.Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LWS2, cit., p. 352.59

J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,DR2, cit., p. 155.60 J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in Id., TKH, cit, p. 769.


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Habermas summarizes the reflections aboutwavesofevolutionofsocial

developmentasthe3rd Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism:

Thedifferentwaysofproductionjoinedinacomplexbuilduptheeconomical

structure of a society. This society crystallizes each time around an institutionalnucleus (family relationships, state, market, etc.) and fixes the form of social in-

tegration. The theorem structure-superstructure must explain the waves of social

evolution. This affirms that a) the systemic problems which, in determined cir-

cumstances require evolutional innovations, appear in the basic sphere of society

and can be analyzed as disturbs of social reproduction; and that b) an evolutional

innovation to which it is given raise always consists of a modification of the eco-

nomical structure and of the relative form of social integration61.Inthiscritical

phaseoftrespassingtoanewlevelthetheorem of the superstructureisvalid,

according to which productive forces and production relationships acquire a di-

rection role and constitute the basis which determine the whole society62

.

The problem deals with the nexus between the increase of systemic complex-

ity of societies in relation to the problems of material reproduction and the ade-

quacy of rationalization processes in the socialization of the new generations, in

the coordination of social institutions and the formation of cultural traditions.

Whensystemicproblemsariseinasociety,andtheseproblemstranscendthe

capabilities of integration of the organization principle in force (familiar, political

or economical), the social system must develop new production relationships in

order to solve out the difficulties of reproduction in an evolutionally effective

way, and these relationships imply the recourse to a practical-moral knowledge,

endowed with a own logic of development, and previously accumulated (al-

though socially still unused). Its institutionalization makes possible and furthers

the development of a new technical-organizative knowledge, and also a widening

of productive forces and the complex system-environment. Only with learning

processes we can explain why some social systems develop in an evolutional

sense, finding solutions to the problems of regulation and control, while othersfail face these challenges

63. These reflections can be found in the second part of

the Vth Thesis for the reconstruction of historical materialism:Intheexplana-

tion of the trespassing from a social formation to another (for example, the origin

of the State or capitalism) we must: a) go back to systemic problems which tran-

scend the capability of control of the ancient social formation, and b) resort to an

61 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,DR2, cit., p. 156.62

J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 118.63 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,LSW2, cit., p. 350.


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evolutional learning process which generates the new principle of organization.

A society can learn, evolving, as it allows to solve out systemic problems face

which the available capability of control fails, maximizing and using institution-

ally the capabilities of individual learning in excess. The first step here consistsof establishing a new form of integration, which then permits to potentiate the

productive forces and to widen the complexity of the system64.

2. Social Science and Historiography

The debated theme of the relationship between social science and histo-

riographicalstudieshasbeenobjectofHabermasreflection since the middle of

the Sixties, as different passages taken from On the Logic of the Social Sciences

(1967)65

and Knowledge and Human Interests (1969)66prove. But only since the

middle of the Seventies he has been completing the framework of relationships

betweenhistoriographyandsocialscience,astheprogrammaticalessayHis-

tory and evolution (1976)67

attests and the Second intermediate consideration:

System and life-world(1981)68 and thenActions, linguistic acts, interactions me-

diated linguistically and life-world(1988)69 precise.

Tracingthenodalpointsofthedebatebetweennomologicalsciencesand

ideographicalsciences,Habermasrealizedthatthenecessityofconceptsand

comparative perspectives essentialaspectsoftodaysrenewedhistoriography

was stronger than the rigid methodological dualism canonized by Neokantism70

.

The junction of both field of knowledge has been experimented with success, so

thatsomescientistshavetalkedaboutsociologizationofhistory71.Themutual

functionalityinhumanknowledgewasalsoduetotheimpulsegiventocom-

paredresearchsincetheFiftiesbyAmericanacademicals institutions seeRe-

ports 54 and 64 of the Social Science Research Council, by European institutions

64 J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp. 157-158.

65J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit.,

pp. 31-86; Id., it. transl.La problematica della comprensione del senso , in Id.,LWS, cit., pp. 149-153,220-253.

66J. Habermas, it. transl. La teoria del comprendere dellespressione di Dilthey, in Id., EI2, cit., pp.

142-162; Id., it. transl.Lautoriflessione delle scienze dello spirito, in Id.,EI2, cit., pp. 163-186.67 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit, pp. 154-183, 192-197.68

J. Habermas, it. transl. Sistema e mondo vitale, in TKH, cit., pp. 704-744.69

J. Habermas, it. transl. Azioni, atti linguistici, interazioni mediate linguisticamente , inNMD, cit,pp. 82-97.

70 J. Habermas, it. transl.Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit., p.

31.71 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit, pp. 154-155.


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andbyworksabouthistoryofsocietybyM.Bloch,L.Febvre,F.Braudelin

the Annales, by R. Bendix, P. Lepsius, C.W. Mills, H.U. Wehler, W. Cahnman

and A. Boskoff, E. Schulin and F.G. Maier, O. Hintze, B. More and many other

researchersthat,followingthetrailofWeberianstudiesandMarxisthistori-ography,workedoutanapproachwhoseresultswereassumedbyHabermas

aspartialtheoriesinmanypassagesofthetheoryofsocialevolution.

The German scientist underlines that this direction of research appears critical

towardstraditionalhistoriography,gainingawiderspace-time perspective and

a sensibility for phenomena that had been, until those days, completely or par-

tially neglected: history as social science moves away from the political history

of State and capital actions, framed in a history of ideas, and leads to a social and

economical history, where the history of cultures is also integrated72

. Habermas

alsopointsoutthecentralityofcollectiveactorsandtheuseofaggregated

quantitative indicatorsinaprogressivedisplacementofweights,withoutthatthe

narrative application of sociological instruments denies the idea of historiogra-

phy.

Whilesociologyofhistoryenrichesanddoesnotdamagehistoriography,

Habermas affirms that other instrumentsofsocialscience,therationalex-post

reconstructionsofthetheoryofactionandthemodelssystem/environmentof

thesystemictheory,cannot,contrarily,havefullhistoriograhicalapplication73

.

The reconstructions of the development logics of social formations and the narra-

tive representations of historical events are, indeed, two forms of knowledge

which represent complementary but different ways of studying society and their

terms of cooperation lead the matter to explanations on historical research.

Retracing critically the epistemological discussions of the Fifties/Sixties on

the Theses expressed by K. Popper, G. Hempel, E. Nagel, H. Oppenheim,

Habermasfocusesfirstofalltheproblemifhistoricalexplanationscanbe

causalexplanations.Thereflectionsmoveroundtheextensibilityoftheso-

called Covering Law Model and to the critics that he only partially shares topositivismmadebytheidealisticphilosophyofhistory(R.Collingwoodand

W.Dray)andbyanalyticalphilosophyoflanguage(A.Danto).Butgenerally

his writings remain indefinite and require many efforts of interpretation74

.

72 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit, p. 165.73

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 154-155.74

J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, inLWS, cit., pp.45-52; Id., it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione, in Id.,LWS, cit., pp. 161-221; Id.,it. transl. La logica della ricerca di Charles S. Peirce, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 91-112; Id., it. transl.

Lautoriflessione delle scienze della natura, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 113-141; Id., it. transl.,Lautofraintendimento scientistico della metapsicologia, in Id., EI2, cit., pp. 255-256; Id., it. transl. lim.


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Habermasintroducesthecasualproblemdistinguishingthedescriptiveand

theexplicativefunctioninhistoriographicalresearch.Ifdescriptionsareasser-

tionswhichreproduceaparticularcontextofobservation,explanationsare

argumentswhichdeducethegenesisofpasteventsandtheprevisionofthefu-ture ones through the nexus between the elements of the context and the law

which directs the production of the specific historical events75

. The Covering

Law Model,initsclassicalform,affirmsthattheexplanans is composed by a

seriesofexistentialstatementsaboutinitialorcontextualconditionsofthe

beginningofphenomenaandtheoricalstatementsabouttheirgenerallaws.

Thedifferenttypesofstatementsarethepremisesofthecasualexplanation:

startingfromthegeneraloruniversallawsandfromtheinitialconditions

itispossibletoinferasinglestatementwhichexpressestheconclusion

abouttheobjectofprevision(explanandum)76.

Inthecourseoftheepistemologicalreflexions,thestudiesaboutthelogicsof

sciencehaveledtheNeopositivismtomorecautiouscognitiveproposals but,

for Habermas, the whole debate about the theme of historical explanation versus

scientific explanation would remain mortgagedby the limited conceptions of the

International Encyclopedia of Unified Science77. For the co-operators of the En-

cyclopedia, as for the first Positivists-, the historical-social phenomena repre-

sentedaresearchsphereinarearpositioninrelationtothenaturalones,and

while they cherished a hope about the development of social science, they had

great doubts about thesamepossibilityinrelationtoatheoreticalknowledge

abuthistory.HabermasremindsthatPoppertemperedtheunityofsciencewith

theideaofdifferentfunctionsofscientificaltheoriesaboutnatural and social

phenomena and in relation to historicalstudies.Whilemorphologicalsciences

are interested in researching hypotheses whose explicative content always

growing isfortifiedbyresultsofconditionedprognoses,thegeneralization

doesntfall,inprimafacie,withinthepossibilities of history. With the expres-

sionexplanation sketch,Hempelpointedoutmorepunctuallythathistoriansinterestedintheexplanationofspecificeventsdonotworkoutcompleteex-

planations,butexplanations in rough draftwhichdonotincludegenerallaws

Discorso e verit, in Id.,LWS2, cit., pp. 319-343; Id., it. transl. Charles S. Peirce sulla comunicazione, inId., TuK, cit., p. 17-21; Id., it. transl.La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, in Id., TKH, cit., pp.285, 291, 295, 319.

75 J. Habermas, it. transl. Poscritto del 1973, in Id.,EI2,cit., p. 317.76 J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit.,

pp. 40-41.77 J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione, in Id.,LWS, cit., p. 242.


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butimplytheminanimplicitandpre-reflexiveway78

. Nagel himself refused

a sharp separation between natural sciences and historical sciences, observing

thatifhistoricalinvestigationdealswithwhatissingular,wemustnotsuppose

a different logical structure of scientific and historical explanation, for these lastsmakeawideuseofgenerallaws,evenifimplicitly

79. Definitely, the sup-

porters of the Covering Law Model arenotinterestedinthefactthatthegeneral

lawareassumedasabackgroundwhichisnotthematizedbythehistoricalex-

planation,[22]noteventhattheinitialconditionsofeventsarehardlyrecon-

structable, in consequence of the time distance and the impossibility to re-

proposethem,inlaboratory.AlsothehistoryoftheLogics of the scientific dis-

covery followstheuniquecognitivemodel:inspiteoftherestrictions of their

model, Popper, Hempel and Nagel firmly believe that the historiansjob,asfar

as it follows the requirements of investigation or not, such as the criteria of a lit-

erary exposition, ends with a casual explanation of events and circumstances,

where the sussumption to general laws is valid as explanation scheme80

.

Fromthispointofview,Poppersspecificationthatthe historical explanation

onlydescribesstateofthingsindeterminedspace-time regions does not mod-

ify the problem, because its control always deals with the use of initial conditions

andgenerallaws.ThestatisticaltranslationofE.Nagelsmodeldoes not even

change the state of the debate. According to Nagel, apart from the logics of ex-

planation,theincompletenessofthenecessaryconditionsandtheimpossibility

ofindicatingthesufficientconditionsofeventsforbidarelationshipoflogic

deductionbetweenconditionsandconclusions.Whatappearsasgenerallaw

ofhistoricalexplanationscannotbeacategorystatute,namelyitcannot belong

totheexplanationsasmajorconditionsindeductionprocedures.Onthe

other side, as Hempel affirmed ifadequatefundamentsfortheexplanation of

the explanandum arenotavailable,theeventcanbeinferredstartingfrom

statements which define the explanans, then replacing, as conditionforthelaw,

astatistical-probabilistic assertion:E.Nagel,inagreewithHempel,focusesthe attention on the fact that historical explanations do not imply the assumption

of laws at all; the condition through which we get to conclusions about the cause,

usually has the form of a statistical generalization as it follows: in determined

78J. Habermas, it. transl.Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit., p.

41.79 J. Habermas, it. transl.Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit., p.

42.80

J. Habermas, it. transl.Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit., p.45.


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TheLabsQuarterly 74

circumstances, we can expect a determined behaviour with more or less probabil-

ity. The historian must then be satisfied with probabilistic explanations81

.

Habermas affirms that re-considering the conditions of historical explanations

notasuniversalbutasprobabilistichidessomeobjectionsraisedbyR.

Collingwood and W. Dray about the possibility that historical explanations can

satisfytheconditionofasussumptiontogenerallaw.

Unfortunately,Habermasreflections are fragmentary and this introduction

only allows us to list the stages of the investigation that leads him to believe that

theempiricalgeneralizationofhistoricalexplanationscannotbeassumedasan

inferencecriteriafortheformationofhistoricallaws.

According to some references of his writings, we can summarize the following

lineofreasoning:a)thehistoricalexplanationdoesnotpermitthecompletede-

scriptionofevents,becausethehistoriancanonlyindicationthesufficient

conditionswhichgivesbirthtoacertaineventingeneral;hecanonlygobackto

aseriesofnecessaryconditionstothegenesisofpastevents;b)thehistorian is

withinamarginofuncertainty,notonlyfortheunavoidableprovincialismin

relationtothefuture,butalsoforthearbitrarityofthenarrativesystemofref-

erence where historical events are comprehended and explained. To this respect,

Habermas confirms that every historical explanation does not represent the be-

ginning of a work in progress in an un-endedseries,onprinciple,ofpossible

explanations82; c) the narration fixes some relationships between the events of a

determinedgeneralsituation,selectingthepossibleseriesofnecessarycondi-

tions,startingfromaknowledgebackgroundwithoutpretentions of empiri-

calvalidity,butwhichistheobjectofinvestigationevenifonlyglobally83

;

d)thebasicchoicesofthedirectiontotakeintheresearchofnecessarycondi-

tionsandaboutthemomentwhenitisreasonabletoenditdependonthehisto-

riansjudgment,accordingtohisexpectationsandthelogicsofcontrolvalid

in the historiographical tradition. Habermas reminds that also Popper, trying to

keeptogetherhissolutiontotheKantsproblemandthereflectionsofpost-positivism,introducedtheconceptofmetaphysicalprogramsofinvestiga-

tion84

.

81 J. Habermas, it. transl.Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit., p.42.

82J. Habermas, it. transl.Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit., p.

48.83 J. Habermas, it. transl.Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit., p.

49.84

J. Habermas, it. transl. Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, in Id.,LWS, cit.,pp. 44-45.


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Elsewhere,Habermashadfixedaparallelbetweentheroleofparadigmsin

scientificexplanationsandtheroleofgeneralinterpretationsinhistorical ex-

planations85.Thetypegapfromtheparticulartotheuniversalisnotprob-

lematic if it happens in the context of a system of reference recognized as ade-quate by all participants to the discussion: a community of investigators estab-

lishes and works in empirical conditions and proceeds contemporarily in the re-

search of consensus onmeta-theoreticalproblemslinkedtopre-scientific ex-

perience [24] accumulated in the language of common sense. Since the Sixties,

Habermas has been sharing Th. S. Kuhnsideathatsystemsofreferencewhich

specify the conditions of validity of argumentation of theoretic assertions can be

acceptedderive from primary experience of daily life86

.

Habermaspointsoutthattheansweraboutthemeaningofahistoricalevent

is strictly predefined by the questions that the interpretation frameworks permitstodevelop.Thesense of historyisnotadata it self and the collocation of the

event A1 in the narration, namely the history which tells A1, depends on the

choice of the interpretative hypotheses. A same event will have a different mean-

ing according to the decisions assumed by the historian, first of all, in relation to

its belonging (or not) to the narrative plot and secondly according to the relation-

ships he establishes between that event and groups of following events. As it is

not possible to put any pre-arranged limit to the number of different possible per-

spectives, that means that every historical narration is in certain measure conven-

tional, and its sense depends in any case on the hermeneutical starting situation

of the narrator87

.

Habermaspointsoutthatthecontinuityofhistoryisalsoaproductofnarra-

tion.Certainly,thecontinuityoftherelatedeventsunderlinesontheunifying

force of existentialnexus,whereeventshavealreadyacquiredtheirmeaningfor

the contemporaries, before historiography arrives. On the other side, it may not

be ignored that selecting the interpretation framework, the historian chooses the

beginning and the end ofthestoryandwhatmustbeconsideredasaperiod,

wheretherelevanteventsareconceivedaselementsofauniquenexusgener-atednarratively

88.Thehistorianestablishesalso,aswithWeber,somerelations

tothevaluewhichorienttheattributionof meaning in the cognitive research.

TherearesomenormativeaspectsthatHabermasexpresseswiththeconceptof

contemporarity ofhistoryandtherewithhetriestostimulatetheconscience

85 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 199.86 J. Habermas, it. transl.Lautoriflessione delle scienze della natura, in Id.,EI2, cit., p. 131n.87

J. Habermas, it. transl.Storia ed Evoluzione

, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 161.88 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 159-160.


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that any application imply an unavoidable actualization of the past on the base

of expectations and concerns of the present89

.

ButcontrarilytoH.M.Baumgartnerscriticaboutthehistoriansautono-

mousdonationofform,Habermasbelievesthatthehistorianfindsaownobjec-

tual already-built sphere, and more precisely, already narratively pre-build90

. In

historiographical works, historians set themselves in the background of previous

knowledgeshandeddowninindividualandcollectivememorieswhosecontinu-

ityovercomesthedistancebetweentheinterpreter and his/her objectual

sphere91

.

Habermastheoryofsocialevolutionrepresentsanattemptofdefiningthe

fundamentalproblemsofageneralmodelofrulesforpossiblesolutionstoprob-

lemswhichindicatesontheonesidetheevolutivechallenges,and on the

othersidethelogicsofdevelopmentofinnovativesolutionsthroughwhich

social formations overcome crises or fail. So he investigates the necessary condi-

tionstothegenesisofthesocialprinciplesofobjectualorganizationininstitu-

tionalcomplexes,startingfromculturalresources,namelythelogicsofdevel-

opmentofpragmaticcompetences,withoutwhichwecouldnotevenimagine

the individual conceptions, behaviours and attitudes which, spread in collective

sphere, are the human capital of innovative processes. In such sense, reconstruc-

tivesocialsciencemustindicateandtestuniversalhypotheses92

.

The atypical character of the assertions about social evolutions derives, for

Habermas,firstlyfromthefactthat,whilenomologicalsciencesallowtoinfer

someconditionedprevisionsabouteventswhichhappeninthefuture93

, the

rational ex-postreconstructionscannotexcludethatinthefuturesomestruc-

tures of conscience different from the known ones become accessible94

. As

social theory develops a model ex-post, separating such structures by the chang-

ing processes of empirical substrata95,wemustnotsupposetheunicityof

sense,thecontinuity,thenecessityorirreversibilityofthehistorical

course96

. If the ideathatthedevelopmentlogicsisnotpredefinedandthateve-

rythingcouldhavebeendifferentisvalidforthepastnothing worries himmore than seeing the theory of social evolution confused with a philosophy of

history -,inthediagnosisoftheproblemsofthefuture,Habermaspaysatten-

89 J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione, in Id.,LWS, cit., p. 238.90 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 198.91

J. Habermas, it. transl. Comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione, in Id.,LWS, cit., p. 232.92

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 194.93 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 160.94 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 196.95

J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,DR2, cit., p. 161.96 J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 115.


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tiontothestructuralpossibilitieswhichhavenotbeenyetinstitutionalizedand,

perhaps, will never be97

.

Evenifthecasualexplanationofhistoryhasnotbeenexplained,hewrites

that history has the taskofindividualizingthechangesoftheoutlineconditionswhich are favourable or not to the genesis and consolidation of the forms of so-

cial integration, as well as the conditions which offer an evolutive challenge in

the phases of development of social formations98

. The principles of organizations

onlycircumscribethelogicevolutivespacebutifandwhenitcomesto

newstructuresdependsonthecontingentcircumstancesofthesinglehistorical

events,forwhosestudyonlyhistoricresearch is competent: historic research

must explain, in genetic terms, if, how and when a determined society has

achieved a determined level of development in its base-structures99

. In another

passage he writes: I find more appropriate to start, first of all, from the inter-

dipendence of two casualities which flow in two opposite directions. If we dis-

tinguish the level of the structural possibilities (levels of learning) from the level

of the factual courses, it is possible to comprehend both casualities with an ex-

change of the perspective of the explanation. We can explain the occurring of a

new historical event referring to contingent outline conditions and to the chal-

lenge set by structurally open possibilities; instead, we explain the arising of a

new structure of conscience referring to the logic of development of the previous

structures and to the boostgiven by the events which generate problems100.

Inthisinterdisciplinaryframework,Habermasseparatestheproblemsofevo-

lutivelogicsfromthoseofevolutivedynamicofhistoricalevents,totheex-

tentthatheaffirmsthathistoricalmaterialisrelatedtodeterminationswhichare

specificforsocialevolution101.Thetheoryofsocialevolutionandhistoric

researcharemethodicallydistinguishedandreferred each other102

. This does not

meanthatheneglectstheproblemsofsocialdynamics.Inthestudyaboutthe

changingofsocialsystemsitisnecessarytoevaluate,atthesametime,thelo-

gicsofdevelopment(thestructuresofconscience)andthehistoricalproc-

esses(theevents)103.In the debate started in the ex-Federal Republic of Germany by J. Rsen

104,

Habermasreflectsthenabouttheoffer,evenmodest,ofthetheoryofsocial

97 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, p. 197.98 J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 357.99

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 184.100

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 183.101 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 195.102 J. Habermas, it. transl. Unaltra via di uscita dalla filosofia del soggetto , in Id., PDM, cit., p. 303.103

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 182.104 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 203.


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development to historiography, not excluding that a theory of social evolution

cannot be used as a meta-theory to evaluate the concurrent histories of a same

sphere of phenomena. Perhaps it is possible to get some points of view adequate

to the critics or the justification of problematic directives and narrative perspec-tives. In this mediated manner, a theory of social evolution can still inspire histo-

riography105

. Even if, at the beginning of the same essay, he recognized that the

realofferoftheoryelevatedtohistorybythetheoryofsocialevolution,only

showsitsfirsthints106

.

On the other side, the historical explanations are absolutely indispensable for

the definition of reconstructive sciences for the re-discovery and control of hy-

potheses. On the one hand, through the intellectual engagement and the histo-

riansexperienceoflifethehistoricalresearchcarriesoutaeuristicfunction

fortheformationsoftheoremsoftheevolution,asitsuggeststypologicalcom-

parisons among social structures and schemes of development. On the other

hand, it carriesouttheirreplaceabletechnicalfunctionofobtainingtheneces-

sary historicaldatafortheindirectcheckofthealmost-empiricaltheorems

of reconstructive sciences107.Habermas,indeed,aimsatintegratingthegeneral

framework of referenceofthetheoryofsocialevolutionwithpartialtheories

intothedifferentambitsofresearchinordertoverifyindirectlyhishypotheses

necessarytosocialreproduction108

. Furthermore, the sociological theory can

count, as well as historiography, on the results of historical researches whose

contribution represents a correction in relation to the unavoidable space-time and

thematic provincialism of the same theory109

.

Butwhatdoestheindirectcheckofthepropositionsofthereconstructive

scienceconsistof?SomeHabermasanswerscanbeproposedwhichcanbede-

duced by his fragments of reflection, but none of them brings to clarity. This as-

pect of his methodology has not been solved yet by the critical literature, even if

it is fundamental in theantinomybetweenthegreattheorizationandtheem-

piricalresearches.

The answer to that questions remains then undetermined. Anyway, I hope thatI have achieved the argumentative clarity and the linguistic simplicity I due to the

reader/hearer, and relyonthefriendly-unfriendly cooperation of many scien-

tists.

105J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, pp. 196-197.

106 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, p. 154.107 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 192.108

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 155.109 J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., p. 156.


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Basic Bibliography

HereisabibliographyaboutHabermaspublications,selectivelylimitedtothe

documents where the assumptions of the theory of social evolution are precised. SomeItalian translations are quoted and, in case they do not exist, their editions in German or

inotherforeignlanguagesareindicated.Furthermore,Habermaspublicationsareoften

collection of writings which have been taken and re-ordered chronologically in this bib-

liography. In view of the complex structure of some books, such as The Theory ofCommunicative Action, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and Between Factsand Norms, we have preferred to indicate the titles of each chapter using a sub-numeration.Thisallowsthereadertoindividuateeasilythethemes,thesystemicthe-

ory,theauthors,thehistoryofideastheydealwith.

1967

J. Habermas, it. transl.Logica delle scienze sociali (LWS), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1970:01.Il dualismo tra scienze della natura e scienze della cultura, pp. 3-66.02.La metodologia delle teorie generali dellazione sociale, pp. 67-136.03. La problematica della comprensione del senso nelle scienze dellazione empirico-

analitiche, pp. 137-258.04.La sociologia come teoria del presente, pp. 259-286.

1968

J. Habermas, it. transl. Conoscenza e interesse (EI2), Roma-Bari, Laterza, 19832:

02.La metacritica di Marx a Hegel: la sintesi mediante il lavoro sociale, pp. 27-45.04. Comte e Mach: lintenzione del vecchio positivismo, pp. 72-90.05.La logica della ricerca di Charles S. Peirce: laporia di un realismo degli universali rinno-

vato secondo una logica del linguaggio, inEI2, cit., pp. 91-112.06.Lautoriflessione delle scienze della natura: la critica pragmatica del senso, pp. 113-141.07. Teoria del comprendere dellespressione di Dilthey: identit e comunicazione linguistica,

pp. 142-162.08.Lautoriflessione delle scienze dello spirito: la critica storicistica del senso, pp. 163-186.10.Autoriflessione come scienza: Freud e la critica psicoanalitica del senso, pp. 209-238.11. Lautofraitendimento scientistico della metapsicologia. Per la logica di uninterpretazione

generale, pp. 239-264.12. Psicoanalisi e teoria della societ. Nietzsche e la riduzione degli interessi della conoscenza,

pp. 265-291.J. Habermas, it. transl. Su alcune condizioni necessarie al rivoluzionamento delle societ tardo-capitaliste, in Id., KK, cit., pp. 61-76.

1970

J. Habermas, it. transl.La pretesa di universalit dellermeneutica, in AA.VV.,Ermeneutica ecritica dellideologia (HI), Brescia, Queriniana, 1979, pp. 131-167.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Appunti per una teoria della competenza comunicativa, Giglioli P.P.(ed.),Linguaggio e societ, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1973, pp. 109-125.

J. Habermas,Machtkampf und Humanitt, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12.12.1970.J. Habermas, ber das Subjekt der Geschichte, in Koselleck R. Stempel W. D., Geschichte

Ereignis und Erzhlung, Mnchen, Fink 1973, pp. 470-476.


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1971

J. Habermas, it. transl. Osservazioni propedeutiche per una teoria della competenza comunica-tiva, in J. Habermas N. Luhmann, it. transl. Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale(TGS), Etas Kompass Libri, Milano 1973, pp. 67-94.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria della societ o tecnologia sociale?, in J. Habermas N. Lu-hmann, TGS, cit., pp. 95-195.

1972

J. Habermas, it. transl. parz. Discorso e verit, in Id.,Agire comunicativo e logica delle scienzesociali (LSW2), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1980, pp. 319-343.

1973

J. Habermas, it. transl.La crisi di razionalit nel capitalismo maturo (LPS), Bari, Laterza, 1975:01. Un concetto sociologico di crisi, pp. 3-36;

02. Tendenze di crisi nel capitalismo maturo, pp. 37-104;03. Sulla logica dei problemi di legittimazione, pp. 105-159.

1974

J. Habermas, it. transl. Sviluppo della morale e identit dellio, in Id., Per la ricostruzione delmaterialismo storico (ZRHM), Milano, Etas Libri, 1979, pp. 49-73.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Possono le societ complesse formarsi unidentit razionale?, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 74-104.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Il ruolo della filosofia nel marxismo, in Id.,Dialettica della Razionaliz-zazione (DR2), Milano, Unicopli, 1994, pp. 139-166.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Confronto di teorie in sociologia: lesempio delle teorie dellevoluzione,

in Id.LSW2

, cit., pp. 340-360.J. Habermas, it. transl. Problemi di legittimazione nello Stato moderno, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp.207-235.

1975J. Habermas, it. transl.Introduzione: il materialismo storico e lo sviluppo di strutture normati-

ve, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 11-48.J. Habermas, it. transl. Per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., ZRHM, cit., pp.

105-153.J. Habermas, it. transl. Tesi per la ricostruzione del materialismo storico, in Id., DR2, cit., pp.

151-165.

1976

J. Habermas, berlegungen zum evolutionren Stellenwert des modernen Rechts, in Id.,Zur Re-konstruktion des Historischen Materialismus (ZRHM), Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1976, pp.260-270.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storia ed Evoluzione, in Id.,ZRHM, cit., pp. 154-206.

1980

J. Habermas, it. transl. Scienze sociali ermeneutiche e scienze sociali ricostruttive, in Id.,Eticadel discorso (MB), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1985, pp. 25-47.


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1981

J. Habermas, it. transl.Dialettica della razionalizzazione: J. Habermas a colloquio con A. Hon-neth, E. Kndler-Bunte e A. Widmann, in Id.,DR, cit., pp. 221-264.

J. Habermas, it. transl.La funzione vicaria e interpretativa della filosofia, in Id.,MB, cit., pp. 5-24.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria dellagire comunicativo. Razionalit nellazione e razionalizza-zione sociale (TKH.I), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986:01.Introduzione: approcci alla problematica della razionalizzazione, pp. 53-228.02.La teoria della razionalizzazione di Max Weber, pp. 229-378.03. Prima considerazione intermedia: agire sociale, attivit finalizzata e comunicazione, pp.

379-456.04.Da Lukcs ad Adorno: razionalizzazione come reificazione, pp. 457-529.

J. Habermas, it. transl. Teoria dellagire comunicativo. Critica della ragione funzionalistica(TKH.II), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986:05. Il mutamento di paradigma in Mead e Durkheim: dallattivit finalizzata a uno scopo

allagire comunicativo, pp. 547-696.

06. Seconda considerazione intermedia: sistema e mondo vitale, pp. 697-810.07. Talcott Parsons: problemi di costruzione della teoria della societ, pp. 811-950.08. Considerazione conclusiva: da Parsons attraverso Weber sino a Marx, pp. 951-1088.

1985

J. Habermas, it. transl.Il discorso filosofico della modernit (PDM), Bari-Roma, Laterza, 1985:01.La coscienza temporale della modernit e la sua esigenza di rendersi conto di se stessa,

pp. 1-11.Excursus sulle Tesi di filosofia della storia di Walter Benjamin, pp. 12-23.02.Il concetto hegeliano della modernit, pp. 24-45.Excursus sullobsolescenza del paradigma della produzione, pp. 77-85.

Excursus sulla appropriazione delleredit della filosofia del soggetto da parte della teoriadei sistemi di Luhmann, pp. 366-383.

1986

J. Habermas, it. transl. Storiografia e coscienza s

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