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2011 CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR

POLICY CONFERENCE

EXTENDED DETERRENCE

AND THE 21ST CENTURY

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2011

11:00 AM – 12:30 PM

WASHINGTON, D.C.

CHAIR:

Paul Schulte

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

SPEAKERS:

Ken Jimbo

Keio University

Lukasz Kulesa

National Security Bureau, Poland

Sinan Ülgen

Carnegie Endowment For International Peace

Transcript by Federal News Service

Washington, D.C.

Transcript Not Checked Against Delivery

SCHULTE: Well, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This session‟s ambitious subject is the future of extended deterrence, a strategic arrangement which has

been fundamental to world order since at least the end of World War II. Its provider, the United States, and its consumers, various U.S. allies, describe it as a global public good. Regional rivals, peace movements and antinuclear activists tend to disagree.

And we should note that our title is “extended deterrence,” and not “extended nuclear deterrence.” The

arrangement has had a preponderant nuclear component, but now there are additional factors, like missile defense. Extended deterrence is – tends to be intermittently controversial, although years may pass without any great public mention in the provider or consumer electorates.

[00:00:52] But extended defense may be changing. I suggest that we could think of two current models: The East

Asian model in Japan and South Korea, where you have significant American conventional ground-air and naval forces and the promise of forward-deployable, but not forward-deployed, U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons and low-profile, informal, relatively unpublicized consultation arrangements about the umbrella which the superpower promises to hold open to protect its exposed and much less militarily powerful allies.

In contrast, there is the NATO model in Europe and Turkey, where you have elaborate, formal, well-

publicized Alliance consultation mechanisms. You have some American conventional forces, though those numbers may now be falling, forward-deployed U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Allied territories with carefully worked out shared-ownership and operation arrangements in crisis and war and overall, what has been called a militia approach to collective security. Every ally pledges to defend every other and fight as necessary to do that. Philosophically, there‟s a splendid German word called “schicksalgemeinschaft,” a shared community of fate, which is the initial NATO aspiration.

[00:02:18] Now, I hope that this panel will be able to discuss, aided by your questioning, how valid these models are;

how well they may be – how well they‟re working; what or who is being deterred by what; how regionally satisfactory does this state of deterrence feel; how crucial is the nuclear component; and what factors could or should produce change.

And here we could think of the evolution of domestic political attitudes of the potential of missile defense

or the symbolic and lasting impacts of Fukushima. Will the Asian and the NATO model converge? Are we beginning to see this happening through diplomatic processes like NATO‟s current Deterrence and Defense Posture Review?

Examining these questions, we have three particularly experienced and well-positioned commentators: Dr.

Ken Jimbo from Keio University, a prolific writer who I am assured is most likely to say what other Japanese strategists think in private; Sinan Ülgen from Turkey, a former diplomat, now head of his own think tank and a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe; and Lukasz Kulesa, whose distinguished career has moved in the other direction, from the Polish Institute of International Affairs to the Polish government‟s national security bureau.

[00:03:45]


So we‟ll keep to the traditional format – 10 or 15 minutes for each speaker, and then questions. So Dr. Jimbo.

JIMBO: Thank you, Paul, and good morning. Let me begin by thanking the Carnegie Endowment for

inviting me to speak on this very important topic. And let me also take this occasion to acknowledge your deep sympathy and substantial support for our

devastating damage from the earthquake and tsunami, especially in the Northeastern part of Japan. It has been a difficult two weeks for Japanese citizens to face this so-called triple crisis. Number one is, of course, the disaster relief and the rehabilitation in the Northeastern area; the second is the nuclear accident in Fukushima; and finally the shortage of electricity in Tokyo metropolitan area.

[00:04:38] Now, you may not believe it, if you go to the nighttime in Shinjuku, there is no one outside right now. Of

course, it‟s the inside all the facilities, the lights are on. Because of the saving of the energy now, that nighttime in Tokyo, it‟s pretty much dark. And none of these seem to reach immediate solution right now. And our damage on the human and property losses, on the economy, especially with the recent disrupted supply chains of manufacturers and the huge fiscal pressure for the reconstruction, which may cost up to – all the media say that $300 billion U.S. may become the measure of burden, and that may haunt us for coming months and years.

And we are still not sure the ultimate implication of disaster for the future of Japan and whether this disaster

will be recognized as the decisive blow to the long-term decline of Japan or Japan once again inspire, as we historically did so. It‟s clearly up to all the Japanese. And I wish and I hope many of you believe in the latter, but there is obviously the difficult way to go forward.

[00:06:01] Let me go into the topic – today‟s topic on extended deterrence. And as you recall, during the process of

drafting the Nuclear Posture Review, the extended deterrence was one of the most important imperatives of prescribing U.S. nuclear doctrines, force size and postures and its readiness. And in spite of its importance, there have been wide-ranging debates: What constitutes effective extended deterrence and how much does the nuclear weapon play the role within its concept?

And as I must first speak, I would just like to confirm that extended deterrence, in the most simplified term,

is extending the logic of deterrence to third parties. But the extended deterrence is harder to achieve than the normal, or what we call the central deterrence, because, number one, you need to make a threat credible to an adversary on behalf, or in collaboration with, a third party.

And second, you also need to convince the credibility of the deterrence among the elites of both guarantor

and guarantees on the bipartisan basis. So they have to be acknowledged beyond the kind of party politics. And finally, that you need to assure the domestic public audiences such a form of extended deterrence is necessary for the national security. So it is the multidimensional perception of the credibility of the U.S. security commitment to its allies.

[00:07:47]


And I must underscore that there is no one-size-fits-all type of formula for the success of the extended deterrence. And we need to apply a regional variation to this concept, and I believe this is why the participants from different regions are assembled today. In Asian dimension, the extended deterrence is particularly important for two aspects.

Number one is, it composes the major function to deter and dissuade the large-scale aggression of North

Korea. And we have experienced the record of failure of the denuclearization process and currently faced with their increasing nuclear and missile capabilities. And North Koreans also seem to have upgraded the level of aggression, possibly because of confidence in their escalation-control capacity, as clearly seen by the sinking of Cheonan and firing to the Yeonpyeongdo Island in 2010.

And these event draw a huge lesson for U.S.-ROK security relations, that North Korea may extend its

aggression to the level that may not invite the measure of retaliation by ROK and also by the United States. And the problem here is that North Korea might have calculated the level to the extent that they can provoke ROK or possibly Japan has gone up because of the confidence of their level of, you know, control of the escalation.

And thus, the U.S. and ROK are having the careful review how to respond with – from small-to medium-

scale aggression by reconfiguring the deterrence structure vis-à-vis North Korea. [00:09:36] So we are also facing with the fragile generation transition in North Korea that also increase the uncertainty

of the regime‟s stability. And if an internal instability or – (inaudible) – scenario should happen, and certainly the United States‟ full presence will play the stabilization operation in North Korea, and during such scenario. the extended deterrence to protect Japan and South Korea play a key role to ensure the crisis stability and the damage limitation to the possible counterattacks from North Korea.

And the second aspect on the extended deterrence is of course in China. China poses the question of the

extended deterrence more dynamic than on North Korea. If we take a look at the figures of U.S., Japan and China trilateral relations, Chinese rapid military build-ups has been challenging the deterrence calculus in a very dynamic ways. Chinese growing what we call the “anti-access and area-denial capability” would impede a deployment of the U.S. forces into the combat theater and to limit the location from which those forces could effectively operate. So these aspects have certainly increased the costs and the complexity of the U.S. military response to the crisis in East Asia.

[00:11:03] When it comes to the Sino-Japanese bilateral dimension of the balance of power, China has – already has

twice as big as the size of the defense budget of Japan, and it is going to be four to six times bigger in 2012 and seven to 10 times bigger in 2030. So that these are the figures, based on the optimistic Chinese economic projection, for the next two decades.

But clearly, what we are seeing now is the dynamics where China increasingly have the denial power against

the United States, whereas Japan‟s relative power decline becomes more vivid vis-à-vis China. So crafting the extended deterrence under these new dynamics is one of the most I think difficult and important challenges of the Alliance management.


In the Nuclear Posture Review, the key word given for China is, as you recall, it‟s “ensuring strategic stability.” And it is still unclear to grasp the meaning of the – what the “strategic stability” means. When I ask the people in Washington, D.C., I have been receiving dozens of different answers of what strategic stability really means. And for Japan, it would be surprising to see that Russia and China are categorized in parallel and in the same manner for the objective of maintaining such a stability. And Chinese nuclear arsenal obviously remain(s) much smaller, and it is way behind the size of Russia.

[00:12:48] We are obviously talking about asymmetric stability in terms of military balance, but this stability concept

will also include the broader agenda of the political relationship between Washington and Beijing. So however, since the scope of crafting the stability with China remain very vague, and I believe that the strategic stability in 2020 – 10 years from now on – and the stability in 2030 may be different. And we need to have a constant updating on this concept. And I would like to, you know, throw out to the floor and see what your response will be on this concept.

And the remaining question for U.S.-Japan extended deterrence is: What will be the future nuclear

relationship between the U.S. and China? And China has been working hard to ensure the deterrence against the United States, and that – which we believe the basic doctrine of the minimum deterrence. And however, although the Chinese development of the ICBM has been moderate, as the number of CSS-4 remain(s) in two dozen for the last 10 years.

And they are seemingly developing highly-modernized strategic forces, such as land-based DF-31A, tactical

DF-21 and also submarine-based JL-2. So it may be the matter of time until China becomes more confident of gaining the credible second-strike capability against the United States. So then the question arises how we define such a relationship between United States and China. And I think that still is the remaining agenda of the ensuring extended deterrence in Asia.

[00:14:34] And let me finally point out about the role of nuclear weapons in the extended deterrence, especially in the

Asian dimensions. Again, coming back to the series of reviews in 2010, QDR, NPR and BMDR, they have pointed out the importance of crafting the very unique terms called “tailored regional deterrence architecture.”

And this unique DOD approach to the deterrence concept suggests that the deterrence has to be adjusted to

the uniqueness of the region, whereas the component(s) of deterrence include various forms – not only the nuclear, but also includes non-nuclear striking forces, missile defense and also the counter-WMD capabilities. But as the baseline of these reviews are based on the de-emphasizing of the role of nuclear weapons, so accordingly, the non-nuclear elements should play the vital role for enhancing the extended deterrence and also in the Asian dimension.

So as a result, specifically that the NPR declared the retirement of the TLAM-N, the nuclear Tomahawk that

has been in storage since the Navy completed the withdrawal in early 1990s, indeed, there was a certain amount of concern in Japanese policy community that the retirement might symbolize the reducing visibility and signaling of the U.S. nuclear commitments in Asia.

But as written in the NPR, TLAM-N was one of the numbers of the means to forward-deploy nuclear

weapons in the crisis so that the role of TLAM-N can be substituted by heavy bombers, dual-capable fighters and also by the ICBM‟s and SLBMs. So I think that ensuring the visibility of U.S. nuclear commitment in Asia is still


important, but it could be flexibly forward-deployed, especially by the air component, and that will become highly important in the post-NPR extended deterrence in Asia.

[00:16:51] And my final point is on the no-first-use and sole-purpose questions. I believe that Japan highly appreciates

that the NPR did not adopt the universal policy that the sole purpose of the United States nuclear weapon is to deter nuclear attack on the U.S. and its allies. And given that North Korea‟s – especially on North Korea‟s potential capability to attack Japan by chemical and biological weapons, it is still crucial for Japan to recognize that the U.S. reserve(s) the right that nuclear weapons play a role in deterring its CBW attacks, and even though there is much debate that conventional forces can replace the role of nuclear weapons both in peacetime and during the crisis.

And I think that the nuclear extended deterrence plays a crucial role for simplifying Pyongyang‟s

psychological calculation over their strategic value of possessing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. I will stop here.

[00:17:53] SCHULTE: Thank you very much. Sinan, the view from Turkey. ÜLGEN: A view from Turkey. Thank you, Paul. Taking my cue from yesterday‟s opening panel, I will

start with the specifics, and my specifics relate to Iran. And after a few words about Iran, I‟ll go back to this main and ambitious topic of the future of extended deterrence in the 21st century.

The reason why I want to start with Iran is that we have heard today and yesterday that there continues to

be a number of very different views about how to tackle the conundrum posed by the Iranian behavior on the nuclear issue. And here obviously the role of Turkey, which has been already referenced too, comes to the fore. And I just want to say a few words, if I can, just to set the record straight about what happened and why it happened.

[00:18:54] Now, interestingly enough, yesterday the Brazilian foreign minister – the former foreign minister, Amorim,

started his speech by saying that it was not Brazil that took to lead but it was essentially the U.S. that asked Brazil to play a role in this. A similar case actually can be made for Turkey, because it was actually after the call that ElBaradei gave to the Turkish policymakers to try to guarantee the fuel-swap deal that was being negotiated between the P5-plus-1 and Iran in October of 2009, which foresaw the role of Turkey as an escrow for the nuclear fuel, that Turkey started to become involved in this in a much more active manner.

Now, it‟s certainly also played to Turkey‟s favor and in particular to this new Turkish policy, which is one

that‟s being much more ambitious, wants to portray Turkey as a regional power and therefore a country that needs to have a role in trying to settle all these regional disputes.

So Turkey was, in a way, glad to espouse this role and perhaps carried it a bit too far. Carried it a bit too far

in the sense of, instead of acting as a facilitator, which it was asked to do, actually portrayed its role and really saw its


role as being one of a mediator. And this is perhaps an area where – when its relationship with the West, and in particular with the P5-plus-1, turned more sour.

[00:20:46] But nonetheless, when you talk to the Turkish authorities, what they tell you is that whatever Turkey did

going from the October deal to the May 2010 deal, was in full concert with the P5-plus-1. They would tell you that even as they were negotiating the deal with Iran, they were almost in real time informing their counterparts in Washington from the room adjacent where they were actually negotiating the deal.

Secondly, we also heard from Ambassador – from the U.S. ambassador yesterday that the U.S. had sent –

Obama has sent a letter to the Turkish policymakers and the Brazilian policymakers basically arguing that the deal that was on the table was deficient. It‟s the first time that I hear such a version of events, because interestingly enough, both Turkish policymakers and the Brazilian policymakers demonstrate that letter as a justification of their behavior. That letter was taken, both in Ankara and in Brasilia, as a green light.

[00:22:11] So, you know, these two countries have quite some seasoned diplomats. They know how to read the letter.

And I would tend to think that, you know, either the authors of the letters used wrong terminology, but nonetheless, the effect has been to encourage those two countries to go ahead with the deal.

So I‟m telling you all of this just to give a sense of the frustration that was built in Ankara after the deal went

sour, because in all truthness (ph), they fully believed that they were doing something which was to the interests regional peace and stability but also that had received the green lights, by and large, from the P5-plus-1, and in particular from the policymakers here in Washington, D.C.

Now, having said that, what were the mistakes? The mistakes, as I‟ve tried to outline, was that Turkey tried

to carve a role for itself in this deal that possibly went beyond what the international community was ready to recognize, and that was from transforming itself from the a facilitator to the mediator.

Nonetheless, the Turkish diplomacy was quick enough to recognize this perhaps overambition, and as of

June, 2010, which was, you know, the first time that we saw the signs that some of the lessons had been learned, that Turkey pulled back, along with Brazil, to the role of facilitator. And that‟s in that capacity that actually Turkey was host to the latest meeting, that Ambassador Einhorn referred to yesterday, between the P5-plus-1 and Iran, which took place in Istanbul in February this year.

[00:24:05] But fundamentally, when you look at what motivates Turkish policymakers with regard to Iran, after this

imbroglio of, you know, we‟ve read, many of us, analysts saying that Turkey was not on the same wavelengths as the rest of the international community in understanding the seriousness of the challenges posed by Iran‟s nuclear program. I tend to disagree with this. Turkey is one of the very top countries that is rightly concerned about Iran‟s nuclear program.

Now, when you look at the map, it should be quite clear that Turkey should actually be one of the countries

that have the most concern about Iran‟s nuclear program. It is concerned because the threat of – you know, the


threat that Iran can represent, not only vis-à-vis Turkey, because Turkey is pretty confident about the NATO security umbrella, and so on, and that‟s the second part of what I have to say.

But nonetheless, it is concerned because of its regional impact, because of the domino effect it can have in a

region that‟s already very volatile, because of, again, the regional instability that it may usher in, especially with particular to – with reference to Israel and Iran.

[00:25:36] So, all in all, there is absolutely no difference in terms of the strategic evaluation of what this situation means

between Ankara and its partners in the West. Turkey does not want Iran to go down the route of nuclear weapons. The difference has, however, been a tactical difference. Again, yesterday we heard Amorim, and that‟s basically the same behavior approach adopted by Turkish policymakers who tend to think that dialogue with Iran, engaging with Iran, giving more room for diplomacy would allow the international community to reach a better outcome.

And again, when you talk to the Turkish policymakers, they don‟t make a secret of the fact that when they

go and talk to the Iranian policymakers, they are quite frank. They criticize Iran and they basically try to impel Iran to comply with the requirements set out by the international community, in terms of adopting the rules of transparency and in terms of complying with the rules of the IAEA.

Now, turning back to the more general question of how this extended deterrence is viewed from a Turkish

perspective, again, taking into account the case of Iran. Turkey is a NATO member, and it is one of the most active NATO members, so it has a say in how NATO is going to evolve its own deterrence doctrine. And in particular, now that, after the Lisbon summit, the deterrence posture review has been adopted by NATO, there are three fundamental points that Turkey would, I would tend to think, make going forward in terms of this deterrence review:

[00:27:40] One, Turkey views NATO as a nuclear alliance. And obviously, according to some reports, Turkey is host

to some of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Out of the 150, 200 – the range between 150-to-200 tactical nuclear weapons that European NATO countries have, Turkey is host to about 90 of them. Having said that, 50 of those have been earmarked for delivery by the U.S. Air Force and 40 of them by the Turkish air force. That‟s a bit, you know, interesting because the Turkish air force does not have the capacity to deliver gravity nuclear bombs.

So I‟m saying this just to show you that actually, the fact of hosting these nonstrategic nuclear weapons on

its territory is not so much for the deterrence factors that it tends to give, but rather, Turkey sees this as the political – as the political impact, as a way for the U.S. to show its commitment to the trans-Atlantic world, and in particular to Turkey, as a political commitment for Turkey‟s defense.

So it really embodies the trans-Atlantic partnership. It‟s the political value much more than the strategic

value. It‟s a proof of burden-sharing within the NATO Alliance, and it‟s also proof that NATO continues to be a nuclear alliance.

[00:29:29] So Turkey is not particularly interested in this debate of the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons. Again,

a reason why that is so is that, unlike many of the countries in the West, and we‟ve seen some of those countries drafting a letter to the NATO secretary general –Turkey does not have a political movement that actually champions


this idea. So the question of denuclearization has not been politicized in Turkey, unlike in some Western countries, in particular obviously Germany and the Netherlands.

And the third issue is that even though, leading to the Lisbon summit, we have seen some of Turkey‟s

reticences with regard to portraying some of Turkey‟s neighbors as threats in the NATO documents related to missile defense, nonetheless, Turkey sees – as long as the question with Iran is not settled, and obviously not knowing how Russia‟s relationship will evolve, Turkey still sees the value of NATO remaining a nuclear alliance. And therefore, it will continue to push for this point of view in the deterrence review that has been decided.

[00:31:06] And finally, a few words on missile defense, which has the potential to fundamentally alter the equation

between nuclear deterrence and non-nuclear conventional deterrence. There, the Turkish viewpoint was highly publicized before the Lisbon summit, but essentially that is because Turkey did not want to be the core, the center of confrontation between NATO and its own neighbor, that it decided to press its partners for – in order to delete references to some of its southern neighbors from the NATO documents.

But nonetheless, Turkey agreed for missile defense to come under the NATO umbrella. One of the

fundamental pillars of that system, the early-warning radar, will be in the Turkish territory in all likelihood. So that already shows that Turkey is willing to play a fundamental role in the future of missile defense.

There are, however, two caveats to that, and one is that Turkish policymakers – in view of what I said and in

view of the fact that they continue to attach to NATO retaining the nuclear dimension – don‟t want that nuclear dimension to be undermined just by virtue of the fact that NATO now has a missile defense, or will have missile defense in a few years‟ time.

[00:32:45] And secondly, perhaps more provocatively, there are a few Turkish policymakers which think that missile

defense – the installation of the system – could lead to regional instability in the Middle East. The reason being that missile defense would actually give the ability not only to NATO members but also to NATO friendly members, and in particular to Israel, to engage in deterrence by denial.

And therefore, up until the time when this system is fully operational, that can mean perverse incentives for

a country like Iran to go ahead in its nuclear ambitions. So let me end with this provocative thought. Thank you. SCHULTE: Thank you. Lukasz. KULESA: Thank you very much. First of all – first of all, it‟s great to be back at the Carnegie conference. Many thanks for the organizers for

the kind invitations. And also, to make things perfectly clear, here I‟m wearing my old think-tank hat. So what I‟m about to say is not the official position of Poland or, god forbid, the voice of Central Europe, even though I think there is a certain flavor of our approach to the questions of extended deterrence.

[00:334:30]


But I wouldn‟t be too – it wouldn‟t be too surprising to start with the same issues that Ken mentioned, which is the crucial importance of the credibility of extended deterrence. And I think, in the European context, it‟s very closely connected with the general state of health of the trans-Atlantic relationship, of the North-Atlantic alliance. And here, if you look at the challenges, the challenges have little or nothing to do with the nuclear dimension.

If I could give a list, first of all would be the growing gap in the conventional capabilities between both sides

of the Atlantic. As we are reminded almost daily by Secretary Gates and also NATO Secretary Rasmussen, it used to be that the United States accounted for 50 percent of the overall defense spending of the Alliance; now it‟s close to 75 percent. Which of course has a negative impact on the operational capabilities – the capabilities to act jointly, but also have – and will have in the future, if we have the ambitious task of looking into the 21st century as a whole – it will have the impact on the political side as well.

[00:36:00] So the conventional capabilities gap, also the leadership problem. It turned out that it‟s quite difficult to

guide the Alliance with 28 members. And the recent problems to come to agreement on the Libyan situation is a good example to that.

So these challenges should give us a perspective, certain perspective – the context of looking at the nuclear

dimension, which is one of the elements, if not the crucial element of extended deterrence. So consequently, I‟ll start with discussing the deterrence requirements as a whole, and then in the second part of this presentation, I‟ll move directly into the nuclear dimension, and specifically the depressing question whether the United States still needs to forward-deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Well, it‟s almost a cliché now to say that most of the threats which are facing the trans-Atlantic environment

cannot be deterred, are not deterrable with nuclear weapons. But I would argue that still, the emerging threats do not make this traditional part of deterrence directed against the states redundant.

And here, from the Central European perspective, I would argue that basically, assurance beats deterrence,

that the internal aspect of assuring the allies – making credible this supposition that the United States would come to the assistance of the allies – it‟s right now much more important than the external effect of communicating certain things, or having credible capabilities to face the potential enemies.

[00:38:08] Why is that? Because, again, from the Central European perspective, there are two nightmares – two

nightmarish scenario which we face, and they don‟t have anything to do with a threat of a military attack or aggression. One such scenario is a NATO which is being transformed into a discussion club – NATO which cannot reach decisions, with diverging threats perceptions, and turns into some kind of OSCE with a little bit of a better capabilities – so transformation of NATO in the direction which we would not want it to take. And second, the U.S. withdrawal – military withdrawal from Europe.

These two scenarios, they would not result automatically in increased threats of an attack against NATO

territories, but it would certainly weaken the European security architecture and leave us, in a sense, sailing in uncharted water. Hence, the emphasis which we put on deterrence as a core feature of NATO; and deterrence, which has a number of very practical elements starting with, of course, the political dimension of making sure that NATO is cohesive enough in the face of the challenges.


[00:39:46] Secondly, that NATO has the appropriate early-warning, intelligence-gathering, intelligence-sharing and

information-sharing capabilities, because frankly speaking, we‟ve had too many surprises lately. Let me mention the Georgian situation in 2008, but also the developments in the Middle East and North Africa I think came a surprise to many.

The third part would be the conventional, so-called reassurance package, something which was agreed at the

latest NATO summit in Lisbon and codified in the new Strategic Concept – so issues like the continuous development of robust conventional forces, the contingency planning for different scenarios, having exercises which actually involve Article 5 scenarios, things like having the right infrastructure and reinforcement capabilities in place.

As number four, I would put missile defense, which might be a useful tool for defense, first of all, but also it

has a potential to become a symbol of trans-Atlantic unity and of burden-sharing – the “potential” because it also has a potential to be a very destructive, divisive issue, especially if we don‟t agree on a mode of cooperation with Russia. We can see some of the things connected with the George W. Bush idea of missile defense being repeated.

[00:41:37] And as number five, I would say that – as number five, come the nuclear extended deterrence. Just to give

you an example – just to give you the context, and the fact that if we concentrate too much on the nuclear dimension, we might be losing the overall picture. Of course, on a related, parallel track, in the case of Poland, also the physical presence of U.S. troops and U.S. installations has this symbolic effect of assurance.

But having this kind of assurance-deterrence posture in place, the question naturally goes, would it be

provocative? And the Russians specifically are quite bitterly complaining about the contingency planning. For example, there were some juicy details in the WikiLeaks about who is supposed to protect whom.

[00:42:38] I think, for our perspective, two issues are worth mentioning: First of all, that what we are talking about is

the very nature of the Atlantic alliance and the U.S. presence in Europe. And for us, this nature involves NATO being a common-defense organization which actually has some capabilities and some ways of implementing the general pledge of Article 5. But secondly, having these deterrence elements in place would make the region much more comfortable about the reset in the U.S.-Russian relations and also about moving further with the NATO-Russia cooperation.

Now, moving directly to the nuclear dimension, specifically the tactical nuclear weapons, here unfortunately

for many of us, there is no automatic switch, that the moment that you beef up the conventional elements of deterrence, there would be less need or no need at all for the nuclear elements. But the relationship evolves and there is an impact of this renewed, more focused thinking on the conventional deterrence, on missile defense, on the way that we think about the usefulness of the nuclear weapons.

[00:44:08] In the debate so far, the countries of the region have been rather cautious, especially about the idea of a

quick withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, which was less about their perceived utility in some


purely theoretical scenarios involving Russia and much more about the political consequences of such a move which would not be agreed before between the allies, the consequences on our faith in Article 5, the consequence on our feeling about where we are vis-à-vis the importance of the relation with Russia but, I would submit to you, not really about any scenarios of protecting the Baltic states with tactical nuclear weapons.

But also, the countries of the region took this renewed interest in the tactical nuclear weapons and the whole

discussion about the withdrawal, and they took it and they tried to redirect it. They tried to redirect it and made it – make it into an opportunity to engage Russians about their arsenal of the tactical nuclear weapons.

Here I can say that Poland is proud to be a bit active on this issue. Our Foreign Minister Sikorski took a

personal interest in the topic, so there was an op-ed first with the Swedish foreign minister. Then last year, there was a Polish-Norwegian initiative, a non-paper which was forwarded to our NATO allies which basically outlined a plan to engage the tactical nuclear weapons into a wider arms control, confidence-building mechanism. And as far as I noticed, this proposal and this non-paper is still on the table.

[00:46:29] So where are we now? With the new Strategic Concept of NATO, that was a compromise. It satisfies

everyone, which means that it‟s open to interpretations. From our point of view, no unilateral withdrawal. There was a link established between the NATO decisions and the Russian tactical nuclear weapons potential, and also, as was mentioned before, the comprehensive defense and security review was initiated, which likely doesn‟t just deal with tactical nuclear weapons but would look at the issues in a more comprehensive way.

So now we have time to actually get ready for the negotiations, which will probably be the U.S.-Russian

negotiations, with NATO just being – keeping informed, and possibly bringing up some ideas on the table about the hard job being done by the United States and Russia. So it‟s time for the cost-benefit analysis for the United States and for NATO. What kind of carrots are we willing to offer to the Russian side to make it interested in the debate on the tactical nuclear weapons?

[00:47:46] But also for Russia, it seems that it‟s a good time to have a thorough reflection about, what are the certain

categories of tactical nuclear weapons good for? What do you needs to – why do you need, for example, the nuclear warheads for air-defense systems, and what‟s the capacity to go down? And also for Russia to decide, and for us also to reflect, what would be the scope of such talk? Should we somehow connect it with the talks on the conventional bias in Europe with missile defense, or should these stay at a separate track?

One thing is certain. There are no magic solution, no silver bullets to get results quickly. If you are serious

about this topic, about the reduction and diminishing the role of tactical nuclear weapons, then it really seems that we are starting a very long journey.

And during this journey, of course there will be pressure, from time to time increased, to go the unilateral

way – for NATO or for the United States to make the first step. But also – and I would say, especially from the certain European quarters – there would be voices basically saying that we expect to see some results from the U.S.-Russian negotiations first before a major change in the NATO nuclear posture. And I will stop here. I‟m looking forward to the discussion.


SCHULTE: Thank you very much. Yes, questions of timing, and focus and emphasis become critical. So now we have about 30 minutes for questions. And I‟d like to ask people to line up for the microphone, and please introduce yourself. Please describe – give your name and affiliation. So first –

[00:49:48] Q: I am Zahir Kazmi. I am from the National Defence University of Pakistan. Before I ask the question –

(inaudible) – the French developed nuclear – (inaudible) – because they thought America wouldn‟t sacrifice New York for Paris. Would U.S. sacrifice for Tokyo? And I ask this question because Tokyo‟s governor, who is about to retire this year, lately have given remarks that –

MR. : He‟s running again. Q: Yeah – that Japan should develop nuclear weapons, and even sell these. And to Mr. Ülgen, my question is that – will Turkey develop nuclear weapons if Iran is successful in doing

that? How will it affect its relationship with NATO? History proves that if a state has decided to become a nuclear-weapons state, no one can stop it. And that‟s my question, thank you, bye.

[00:50:44] JIMBO: Briefly, you mentioned about the classic question of the decoupling. That has been the case when

the French went to nuclear. Because of the credibility of the U.S. commitment in Europe, it could be highly doubtful in the case of the crisis management. Would it be the case that we are going to see in the Asian context – it‟s yes and no – while that United States have the overwhelming conventional and the nuclear capability towards any of the potential – (inaudible) – in this region, when – especially to China, have the most, more capable second-strike capability to the United States.

And if the North Korea will succeed in a longer-range missile that can target U.S. mainland, that could be

the case which would increase the cost of the U.S. engaged, especially for the retaliation to our forces, that will I think undermine especially the mind-set of the leaders and the public and how the credibility of deterrence could be maintained. So that these are the, I think, the situation what‟s being going – happened in Asia – (inaudible).

SCHULTE: If I understand you correctly, with certain developments of the Chinese nuclear capability, the

question of whether reliance on American commitments was enough might become rather important in Japanese thinking?

[00:52:24] JIMBO: Well, it really depends on the level of the situation. When it comes to the peacetime deterrence, I

do not think that the decoupling question would matter so much. But where it comes to the crisis and how to manage the issue – especially whether the United States can go into Taiwan, whether the United States will defend the remote island, like Senkaku, that is the balance of the – not only the conventional, so the nuclear – (inaudible) – escalation scenario really I think affect the mind-set of the leaders. And these are the, you know, the situation that rapidly changing on the ground.

SCHULTE: Right, OK, thank you. And Turkish nuclear weapons?


ÜLGEN: Yes, to my dear Pakistani friend, that is unimaginable. I don‟t see that at all. Turkey‟s policy response to a nuclear Iran would be containment and to play the role that Turkey would actually critically play in a future containment strategy against Iran. Turkey is a NATO member and will continue to be so.

So the only – I mean, the only scenario where Turkey would actually develop its own nuclear-weapon

capacity would be if it decided to basically break links with its traditional partners in the West, because obviously you cannot have a concealed weapons program while continuing to be a NATO member. So I don‟t see that happening.

[00:53:53] SCHULTE: Thank you. Q: Miles Pomper from the Monterey institute. Two questions, first one, a general question for Polish and

Turkish panelists. Both of you mentioned factors for your country‟s support for the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

that have very little to do with the Russian tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the NATO Strategic Concept seems to indicate that the West would be willing to reciprocate for a Russian reduction in tactical nuclear weapons by considering reducing or eliminating U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. So how do you square those two? I mean, it seems that a Russian withdrawal wouldn‟t actually help in addressing your issues.

The second question is on – particularly when you look at it, if there were eventually a withdrawal of U.S.

tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, you would have to verify the presence or the absence of nuclear weapons in European states. We already have some states in Europe which have said, as part of the extension of NATO to Eastern Europe – Central and Eastern Europe, that they would not house nuclear weapons. As a confidence-building measure, do you think Poland and other countries would be willing to have inspections to prove that they do not have nuclear weapons from NATO?

[00:55:22] SCHULTE: Lukasz, and then Sinan. KULESA: OK, first of all, the linkage with the Russian tactical nuclear weapons. It was introduced even

though in the previous reduction at the NATO sites, the Russian factor was never cited. In the 1990s, there was no connection.

Again, speaking in my personal capacity, I would say that a lot of people realized that actually it‟s a good

opportunity, a chance provides itself to put the issue of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons on the agenda and signal the fact that there is something wrong with the numbers and the fact that we‟re not really sure what‟s their utility for Russians.

Because on the one hand, you have the doctrine, which seems to assign very little, if not at all, a place for

tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, you have some comments and some exercise scenario which point out that at least some parts of the Russian experts and the military people would see a place for tactical nuclear weapons in warfighting or as a de-escalation signal.

[00:56:56]


So I think it was taken as a good – as a good opportunity to bring this topic to the fore and try to engage the Russians. But the language of the Strategic Concept is open enough that even if we don‟t have reciprocity on the Russian side, I think some will argue that it still should not block decisions by NATO if such decisions come from this deterrence posture review which I was talking about before.

SCHULTE: Sinan. ÜLGEN: From the Turkish perspective, if there‟s a deal between U.S. and Russia to eliminate or to greatly

reduce the tactical nuclear weapons in the European geography, then Turkey would not want to be the only country remaining hosting theatre nuclear weapons on its territory.

So I think that‟s the answer: Turkey would not – that‟s not politically sustainable. Turkey would not want

to be in that position. So despite the fact that Turkey sees those essentially as a political commitment of the U.S. to Turkey‟s protection, then, you know, the other situation is certainly more undesirable.

SCHULTE: You wanted to come in on the verification question. [00:58:28] KULESA: Yeah, the second question of Miles. Well, right now, again, I wouldn‟t speak for other countries

and also not for the official position, but it seems that if we come with a process which involves NATO and Russia, then of course on-site visits and also visiting some of the places that used to – that used to host nuclear weapons seems to be a legitimate part of the package.

But still, it seems that it should not be step one. The step one should be some of the most obvious things,

like reaffirming the presidential nuclear initiatives. But certainly, it‟s an option, of course, on the basis of reciprocity. You know, Every couple of years there is this Kaliningrad scare, that‟s someone mentions that something was deployed, or not deployed, or might be deployed in the Kalinin oblast, which is next to Poland in Lithuania. So if you are talking transparency, confidence-building measures, it also should involve the other side. Thank you.

[00:59:51] SCHULTE: Right. Thank you. Next question? Q: My name is John Gardenier. I‟m a retired naval officer and had some training towards attaché duty and

diplomacy. I think perhaps I‟ve experienced more reluctance to use military force among military people than I have

among the civilians or diplomats, in that we‟re going to be shot at first and involved first. And what bothers me at this conference is I see deterrence, which is certainly a very legitimate concept, expressed in military terms. You know, if somebody hits me, I can hit them back real hard. And I wonder if there isn‟t a better role for more diplomacy in deterrence.

I don‟t think that the U.S. set a very good example when Robert Einhorn, yesterday, totally trashed both

Brazil and Turkey over the attempts to implement a common policy in Iran. I think that was a horribly dismissive statement on his part.

[01:01:00]


More generally, I think each of the regional conflicts I‟ve heard, including those in South Asia, which aren‟t

here at this table, involves a bully in the schoolyard that is potentially threatening its neighbors. And I think the neighbors need to coordinate very much among themselves. In the case of Japan, I wonder if there‟s enough coordination with South Korea and Taiwan.

In the case of Turkey, I know that the Gulf emirates and Kuwait don‟t even want Iran to have nuclear

energy because they are bullying in economic, as well as other, ways. They probably cannot, you know, attain their wish of keeping Iran from having nuclear energy, but I wonder if Turkey, which I greatly respect, of course, is coordinating enough with its neighbors, say Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates and Kuwait. I think it sounds like Poland is doing a better job and there may be more coordination in Central Europe than there is in the other regions.

SCHULTE: So the question is whether – Q: The question is, can any of these regional conflicts be further defused by better use of regional

diplomacy? SCHULTE: Starting with Japan. [01:02:35] JIMBO: Well, I appreciate your mention about the role of diplomacy in deterrence. And I think that the

concept of deterrence, and a large part of it, is based on how to, you know, deal with those intentions. And those intentions could be made through, obviously, by the diplomacy.

And the components of the deterrence is, of course, you need a political willingness. And second is to have

the capability and third to have the mutual understanding between allies and also by the adversaries. To make those deterrence happen, the basic thing we need to do is the signaling and messaging and also to have the political bonds, especially between allies and also the protectors.

And also, I really appreciate your mention about the coordination among the regional actors, especially with

South Korea and Taiwan. For the case of Taiwan, we do have the significant development on the – especially on the security collaboration between two countries. That started back in 1990s, but in recent years, we also started our official discussion how we share the intelligence on – (inaudible) – issues. And also, we talk about the AXA (ph), which is the logistic cooperation between two militaries in dealing with the possible contingency in Korean peninsula. So on the practical level, those security collaboration is moving forward with South Korea.

[01:04:15] Taiwan is, of course, a different question. We don‟t have a formal diplomatic relationship so that there is no

chance that we can have the formal military-to-military collaboration on the issue. But on the track 1.5 and track two level, we have been collaborating a lot now, especially on the assessment of the rise of China. And as you look at the map, the islands of Japan and Taiwan and Philippines are all on the first island chain. And we need to have a deeper collaboration with those regional member states, especially in dealing with the increasing anti-access and area-denial capability with China.

SCHULTE: And are Poland and Turkey exploiting diplomatic reassurance and other options adequately?


[01:05:02] ÜLGEN: Very quickly, perhaps, thanks to WikiLeaks, we know how some of the regional leaders look at

Iran‟s program, in particular the Saudis. We always thought that they had a rather pessimistic viewpoint but it was still quite illustrating to read some of that on paper, on printed paper. But the thing is, of course, those countries do not want to be seen acting full-frontal against Iran and giving the perception that they are totally in bed, in a way, with the U.S. and the West. That‟s their challenge.

And so at the bilateral level, yes, you can be sure that this subject has certainly been one of the main themes

when Turkey talks to these countries. But in the Middle East, because of the limitations that I‟ve just tried to highlight, I don‟t see any sort of regional effort gathering speed against the Iranian program.

KULESA: Very briefly, Poland is part of a group of countries which have similar concerns. Sometimes

they are put simply as the new NATO member states, even though I don‟t think that Slovenia and Croatia has exactly the same – the same view on these things. But we are lucky enough to have a group of countries within NATO which think more or less on the same terms, and also United States, which after some hesitation decided to basically develop this policy the way it did.

But that‟s one part of the answer. The second part of the answer is that we don‟t neglect the development

of relations with Russia, and the better these relations are, the more assured we are on the general European security. So that‟s also part of the picture, which should not be neglected. Thank you.

SCHULTE: Okay, next question. [01:07:24] Q: Hi, Rachel Oswald from Global Security Newswire. This question is for Professor Jimbo. You spoke

about China‟s rapid development of its military capabilities and how that equates to potential denial power for the U.S. projection of force. So I was wondering if you could give any insight, if you know about where China‟s thinking is on the issue of the extended deterrence the U.S. provides to South Korea.

Right now, South Korea and the U.S. are discussing that extended deterrence and ways they can enhance it.

One potential way would be to let it be known that, should North Korea launch another attack on South Korea, the U.S. would respond with a precision conventional strike on the North.

Could you see China – and this might not happen next year, but in a couple years, when China‟s military is

more evolved – could you see them denying the U.S.‟s ability to carry out that conventional strike? And if so, how would that affect North Korea‟s decision to carry out more provocative actions against the South?

[01:08:29] JIMBO: It‟s a really tough question and also, it‟s a really complicated matter. First of all, I think Chinese

perception on extended deterrence in Asia widely is negative, in the first sense. That has been a kind of part of the U.S. San Francisco networks that potentially are harmful for the Chinese regional security. But at the same time, they‟re partially positive because that has been assuring those U.S. allies in the region would not go nuclear. So that has been, kind of, the two sides of the coin. That‟s the basic perception of the extended deterrence.


But when it comes to the nuclear dimension, of course – and also combined with the conventional dimensions – there has been increasing, I think, confidence on the Chinese side that can actually – (inaudible) – the situation in favor of the Chinese calculation. What happened in 1996 was, you know, the Chinese missile exercises, when Taiwan had a presidential election. In response to that, the U.S. sent two aircraft carriers off the coast of Taiwan. That has been the message sent to the Chinese mainland.

But I do not think that the United States – the equivalent response will be possible if the United States

recognizes the anti-access and area-denial capabilities. The same thing happened, maybe, on the North Korean situation. When the U.S. and Korea tried to conduct the military exercises in the Yellow Sea, the Chinese – the initial response was, do not come into my backyard, which means that they also have the somewhat quasi-denial capability.

[01:10:28] If the United States wanted to have the operation in the Korean Peninsula, they also, you know,

operationally need to go into the Yellow Sea to conduct the operation, which means the China also has denial power, even for the Korean contingency operations, which means that – all of those flashpoints and regional contingencies, we see very different equations what we saw in the „90s and as of today.

And you mentioned also about the new technology. I think these are the technology in the years to come.

And I think it‟s – the most important component is still based by the conventional warfare. In terms of that, I think that the way that the Chinese proceed is, I think, they have more confidence in how to control the issue in Southeast Asia.

SCHULTE: Thank you. Next question. Q: Thanks. I have two questions for Mr. Jimbo. The first is – SCHULTE: Introduction? Q: What was that? SCHULTE: Affiliation? [01:11:31] Q: Oh, yeah. Sorry. Rachel O‟Dell. I‟m with the Carnegie Endowment Asia program. The first question

is about – is to kind of push a little bit more on this question of, what is the threshold at which Japan would seek to acquire its own nuclear weapons? And I think that when people are talking about U.S. arms reductions or, you know, re-evaluation of U.S. grand strategy, a lot of times, Japan and South Korea obtaining nuclear weapons is kind of – I mean, Senator Kyl didn‟t directly refer to Japan and South Korea but he said, you know, our allies might seek to acquire them if we no longer can provide that extended deterrence.

I think it‟s used a lot in this debate. So just kind of pushing, you know, there‟s all these converging factors,

some of which you referred to – China‟s growing capabilities, North Korea‟s growing capabilities, perhaps U.S. decline of capacity and willpower in Asia. And then you also have Japanese politics that play into it – you know, what is the willingness of the Japanese people to acquire nuclear weapons, you know, revise the constitution and that sort of thing?


And then the second question: Should the United States really, you know, begin to scale back its presence in Asia? Perhaps we‟re thinking more long term here. Is there any arrangement that you can see of that would provide a stable nuclear – stable deterrence environment in East Asia – you know, perhaps like NATO? Perhaps it would look completely different. But if you had to, you know, identify a potential arrangement, what would that be?

[01:12:58] JIMBO: Well, thank you so much. On the first question, it is really hard to imagine, especially when we

have the Fukushima Daiichi power-plant issue and there should be more, I think, anti-nuclear movements will be widely shared among the public. And once we cannot really move these commercial projects forward, I do not think those nuclearization issues would be the case that realistically pursued by the Japanese people.

But suppose that the situation where extended deterrence is widely in doubt among the leaders and also the

public – there is no capability credibility there, you know, and also there is no assurance among the public. And secondly, there may be the different case than the USSR – that North Korea and China may have a different calculation over how deterrence works. So then we have to, you know, supplement those deterrence by the denial capability, mainly by the missile defense. And you may work against North Korea by – I don‟t know.

You know, it‟s really shaky for the future Chinese forces. And there is a technology question, as well. So

that the people may think that the extended deterrence is gone and the missile defense, now, capability is not credible. And then I think the third step we would think about is the Japanese own capability to attack those potential adversaries, firstly by the conventional weapons. And what if the conventional weapon is not enough? And the fourth stage is when the nuclearization come up.

So that is has been a lot of steps before we, you know, truly think about the nuclearization process and we

have to, you know, strengthen our alliance relationship and technological cooperation on missile defense. And maybe some, I think, conventional offensive capability of Japan should be owned. So these are, I think, the wide range of options before we are thinking about going nuclear.

[01:15:01] So that is another reason why I do not think that, you know, our own nuclear capability is not that viable

option. And second, that you also mentioned about a really valid question of the future of the U.S. engagement in this reason, and what if that the U.S. will scale back its presence from Asia? I personally prefer that the U.S. should be stationed in Japan and also in the wider area of Asia to ensure that the U.S. presence will deal with the possible potential conflicts and, you know, stabilizing the regional process.

But I think that one possible thing is that – how to deal with the anti-access and area-denial capability.

China now, and in the coming future, has the precise-strike capability towards U.S. facilities in this region. And then cost-effective analysis may, you know, show that if you have a more offshore response capability to scale back from the first island chain to the second island chain.

And if the technology allows them to pose the same capacity to deter and the response to the crisis, that

might be possible. But I think in terms of the reaction time and how to deal with the possible, you know, contingency in this region, I think that the current location will play a huge role in the years to come.

SCHULTE: Thank you. We now, I think, have to go into pre-lunch mode so I suggest everybody

introduces themselves, asks their question and then the panel will deal with the three. And then we‟ll go and eat.


[01:16:45] Q: Thank you. David Mosher from the Congressional Budget Office. This is primarily – to the panel, but

primarily to Dr. Jimbo. One of the things – and I think Paul Schulte mentioned it best at the beginning – that the way NATO had

set up all the organizations and institutions that allowed extended deterrence to exist, that allowed the allies to work through difficult issues – if you look at that list and then you sort of take the same list and apply it against the institutions that were set up, both with Japan and with Korea during the Cold War and even today, you‟ll find that very few of those actually exist in the deterrence mechanism, if you will – extended deterrence mechanisms with our Asian allies.

That probably was appropriate during the Cold War. You know, the threats were very different. We had

conventional forces eye-to-eye in Europe, which we did not have in Asia. But now that the Asian threats from North Korea and the rise of China are becoming more prominent, my question to you is, what sorts of institutions and organizations and changes do you think need to be made in the way that the United States and Japan – and then throughout the region, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan?

Are there things that you think need to be established that would help improve coordination on not only the

standard deterrence the way we think about it but also, as you mentioned, about denial for missile defense, which is a big difference between now and NATO? And then to the NATO panelists of those NATO countries, that you have that missile defense element, as well, which is complicating, or at least adding more dimensions than you had before.

SCHULTE: Thank you. Next. Q: Oh, my question is for Sinan. SCHULTE: Introduction? [01:18:31] Q: I‟m Paul Ingram. I‟m the executive director of the British-American Security Information Council. I

haven‟t walked into the wrong workshop, but I wanted to raise the issue of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East and how that impacts on Turkey‟s calculations around the extended deterrence and NATO, in particular.

Because I know, from a number of statements, that Turkey‟s government is credibly committed to Obama‟s

vision of a nuclear weapon-free world and, in particular, is highly supportive of the establishment of the conference in 2012 and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Does Turkey see itself as involved in that? And how does that, then, sit with deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish soil? Would Turkey be willing to reconsider its position as a host state if that were to facilitate the WMD-free zone in the region?

SCHULTE: Thank you. And final question? Q: I‟m Bernard – (inaudible) – with the Monterey Institute. And my question is too broad for the final pre-

lunch mode – but at least I – (inaudible, laughter). SCHULTE: Perhaps Turkey and then Japan and any general comment people want to make.


[01:19:52] ÜLGEN: Obviously, last year at the NPT Rev. Con., Turkey was one of the countries which had sided with

the Arab countries, in particular Egypt, to push for the adoption of the idea of having a conference in 2012 on a WMD-free Middle East. Now, that is fully in line with the Turkish viewpoint.

The government is fully committed to this idea. And here, obviously, Turkey sees, also, in the case of Iran,

the fact that, you know, having a country in the Middle East – Israel, as a state that possesses nuclear weapons – as a handicap to finding the right type of solution to the Iranian question.

So from that perspective as well, the Turkish viewpoint is that discussing about this issue, even though

Israel is not party to the NPT, obviously, but having this discussion would certainly help to bring in a degree of trust in the Middle East. And I think if it would contribute to achieving the outcome of having a nuclear-free Middle East, I have no doubt that the question of the tactical nuclear weapons hosted in the Turkish territory would also be part of the package. That‟s certainly worth paying the price.

[01:21:29] But having said that, you know, that‟s a bit too early to jump to conclusions because as long as, realistically

speaking, the Middle East peace process has – or the question – the Israeli-Palestinian issue is still on the table, I don‟t realistically see a possibility for that conference to really achieve something very concrete.

So I think, here, the international community should really try a parallel approach and look at what‟s

happening today in the Middle East as an opportunity to push and really to coerce the different parties to come together to address that question that has remained intractable for so long. And it‟s only after that that I think we would have a fair chance of achieving something realistic at the conference in 2012.

SCHULTE: I guess the question is what is classically represented as, does East Asia suffer from NATO

envy – (laughter) – in the case of replicating that system there? [01:22:41] JIMBO: Well, I think that was the excellent question, how we institutionalized the extended deterrence in

the alliance-management mechanism. And one of the big difference between NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance is the very existence of the Nuclear Planning Group and that context that, you know, given that the Nuclear Planning Group is based on how those existing, you know, regular stationing of the tactical nuclear force in Europe is the case, how they can be the member of the decision chain.

In the case of Japan, where there is no, like, regulatory stationing tactical nuclear weapons is no longer

available – also, in South Korea – I think from the views of Washington, I think it might be too costly to engage two parties to be directly in the decision chain to engage in the nuclear operations. But I think it is important to have the closer consultation, especially on how the doctrine is made and the stationing process and the operation through the, I think, even deeper dialogue.

When we look at the process of the drafting of the 2001 and „02 NPR and 2010 NPR, it‟s a difference of the

thickness of the consultation process between allies. There has been very few consultation in 2002 but there has been a rich conversation going on among the allies. And that really is important for, I think, assuring allies and how


those doctrines and operations could be made. And I think if we could, you know, go forward about the institutionalization process, what I would like to see is trilateral cooperation between Japan, Korea and also, the United States.

[01:24:42] And we share a lot in common, given the deterrence structure in East Asia and we also, as a component, can

share a lot of, I think, the sensors and data regarding the WMD collaboration. To make it more like a regional component of the extended deterrence could be, I think, more, I think, efficient when we talk about the East Asian component of extended deterrence. And second is to, you know, I think, stretch a bit to look at the Southeast Asian context. There‟s the Philippines, Vietnam and also Indonesia. Those rising powers also have that common agenda to deal with the rise of China.

By having more, like, capacity buildings of the military-to-military relations and their coast guard and also

police and those judicial capabilities, I think that it would be – have more like an, I think, multilayered cooperation in the region, which those extended deterrence and also U.S. presence in the region could be pursued in, I think, multiple terms.

And finally, what I want to see as the institutionalization is that there has been the track 1.5 dialogue going

on between U.S. and China on the strategic nuclear weapons. There are so many rounds of talks there. But we are very curious. And maybe Japan and Korea wish to be in the circuit, as well. I think in order to gain a better understanding of the Chinese nuclear doctrine and its transparency issues, I think the regional members should be given the chance to join in that context, as well.

SCHULTE: Okay, we‟re almost at the end, but Lukasz, a chance for final observations from Central

Europe. [01:26:45] KULESA: Just one sentence on missile defense. I would like to share and reinforce Sinan‟s point that

missile defense can be a useful tool but also, for us, it‟s not a replacement of the nuclear weapons. And no matter how effective it is, simply, the value of the nuclear weapons, in the eyes of the potential enemies or adversaries, would be different than nuclear defense. So here, I think we‟re on the same page. Thank you.

SCHULTE: Well, it remains a huge subject, but thank you for being such a worthwhile panel and such an

inquisitive audience. And now lunch. (Applause.) (END)

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