2011 Moral Principles as Moral Dispositions

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Forthcoming inPhilosophical Studies

Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions

Luke Robinson

Department of Philosophy

Southern Methodist University

Abstract

What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if

they exist)groundmoral obligations orat the very leastparticular moral truths? I argue

that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional

properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby

explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions(or moral

powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particulartruths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do other

things that moral principles are supposed to do: explain the phenomena falling within

their scope, support counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, necessary connections

between obligating reasons and obligations. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for

moral laws, or lawlike moral generalizations.

1.

Introduction

What are moral principles? The question is ambiguous. By moral principles one

might mean (e.g.) principles of the sort that figure in moral theories and the like.Principles in thispropositional sensethe sense in which principle means a

fundamental truth, proposition, or assumptionare clearly propositions of one

kind or another. But its far from clear that moral principles of the sort that I have

in mind areor even could bepropositions.

The sort of moral principles that I have in mind are the sort that (if they exist)

are the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations orat the very leastof

particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. That is,

they are principles in thegenetic sense, the sense in which principle means the

origin, source, or ultimate basis of something. It is moral principles in this genetic

sense that moral theorists have in mind when they claim (e.g.) that morality iscomposed of an irreducible plurality of principles (Hooker 2000, p. 2); or that the

aim of moral theory is to identify one first principle, or common ground of

obligation that would be the source of obligation (Mill 1871, chap. I, paras. 3,

I would like to thank Eric Barnes and Steve Sverdlik for helpful comments on an earlier draft

of this paper.


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4); or that [p]rinciples are not like theories, for theories explain what is true in

particular cases without determining it, while principles determine what is true in

particular cases and explain it (Dancy 1983, p. 533); or that particular moral

truths are asymmetrically metaphysically dependent upon the more general truths

stated in first principles (Brink 1994, p. 197). For moral principles that compose

morality, or that constitute the ground or source of obligation, or that differ from

theories in that they not only explain but also determine what is true in particular

cases, or that are metaphysically prior to particular moral truths, would be moral

principles in the genetic sense. That is, they would be the origins, sources, or

ultimate bases of moral obligations orat the very leastof particular truths

about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc.

Moral principles in the genetic sense (if they exist) are apt to be the

truthmakers for moral principles in the propositional sense. But while it might be

argued that moral principles in the genetic sense are themselves best understood

as propositions, one might also argue that they are something else entirely. Andwe must guard against the fallacy of supposing that such principles must be

propositions simply because we can use propositions like Promises ought to be

kept and Killing is wrong to talk about them. This is no less a fallacy than is

supposing that the laws of nature must be propositionsrather than, say, relations

between universals (Dretske 1977; Tooley 1977; Armstrong 1983)simply

because we can use propositions to talk about such laws. And its no less a fallacy

than is supposing that criminal laws must be propositionsrather than, say,

commands of a sovereign (Austin 1832) or social rules (Hart 1994)simply

because we use propositions like Stealing is illegal to talk about criminal laws.

One might think that moral principles in the genetic sensehenceforth,

moral principles simpliciterare a special class of lawlike generalizationsthat

is, laws in the sense in which that term is generally used in the literature on the

laws of nature. For example, a theory of moral principles modeled on the Mill-

Ramsey-Lewis, or best-systems, theory of the laws of nature would hold that

genuine moral principles (the principles of morality, if you will) are those moral

generalizations that figure as axioms in the best deductive systems, those systems

of true moral generalizations that strike the best balance between strength

(information content) and simplicity. But even if the laws of nature are best

understood as generalizations of one kind or another, I have argued that this is notthe right way to understand moral principles (Robinson 2008). The problem with

this law conceptionof moral principles is that moral principles do at least three

things that laws (in this sense) cannot do, at least not in their own rightnamely,

explain certain phenomena, support counterfactuals in particular ways, and

ground moral necessities(see section 2). (It should go without saying that moral

principles cannot be laws if laws cannot do what moral principles do.)


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If we reject the law conception of moral principles two other possibilities

immediately present themselves. One is that moral principles are duty-imposing

rules.1 On this view, moral principles are the moral analogue of (e.g.) legal rules or

rules of etiquette. (Or, as in Aquinas, they arelegal rules.) A second possibility is

suggested by the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory of the laws of nature: that

moral principles are relations between universals. Like the law conception, this

view holds that moral principles are the moral analogue of laws of nature. But it

incorporates an alternative conception of what such laws areone on which laws

of nature are conceived as relations between universals, rather than as

generalizations or propositions of any kind.

In this paper I argue that there is a third possibility, one that is well motivated

and deserving of serious consideration: that moral principles are moral dispositions,

or moral powers.2 In particular, I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of moral

principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individuals that are

responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents andactions, moral properties such as my obligation to remain faithful to my wife and

the wrongness of John Lennons murder. Moreover, I argue that we can fruitfully

conceive of moral principles as dispositions of individualpersons, such as the power

of agents to obligate themselves by promising and the power of persons to obligate

agents not to kill them. And lest I be misread, I mean to allow not only that

patients (infants, dogs, etc.) can be persons, but also that they can have those

moral dispositions of persons that need not be exercised (or manifested)

voluntarily, such as the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them.

This dispositional conceptionof moral principles arguably underlies W.D. Rosss

moral theory. The principles of Rosss moral theory (which are principles in the

propositional sense) seem to attribute moral dispositions to acts, moral dispositions

such as the tendency to be obligatory (1930, pp. 19-20, 28-29; 1939, pp. 86, 89).

But the view that the dispositional properties of acts ground (e.g.) the

obligatoriness thereof is in conflict with Rosss view that it is persons, rather than

acts, that bear moral properties. Obligatoriness, he argues, is not a

characteristic that attaches to acts; obligation is something that attaches to

persons (Ross 1939, p. 56). On this view, acts are not obligatory; rather, persons

have obligations to act.

An attractive way to save Ross from inconsistency here is to interpret him asholding that the truthmakers for the principles of his moral theory (and for claims

1The term duty-imposing rules is Harts (1994). I use it to refer to rules of the sort that

ground (and are therefore metaphysically prior to) duties or obligationsas opposed not only to

guidelines, rules of thumb, etc., but also to so-called descriptive rules that merely codify

independently existing norms or standards.2I use the term disposition as a generic term for dispositional properties: powers, capacities,

tendencies, liabilities, etc. Some use power instead (e.g., Molnar 2003, p. 57).


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about the moral dispositions of acts in general) are dispositional properties of

persons.3 On this view, the truthmaker for the proposition an act, in so far as it is

the fulfilling of a promise, tendsto be right (p. 89) might be the power of agents to

obligate themselves by promising, rather than the tendency of promise-fulfilling

acts to be right; and the truthmaker for the proposition an act, in so far as it is

the act which seems likely to produce most good, tends to be right (p. 89) might

be something like the power of persons to obligate agents to benefit them (or, to

put a quasi-Kantian spin on it, the power of rational beings to obligate themselves

to promote their own perfection and the happiness of others). On this

interpretation, Ross holds that moral principles in the genetic sense are

dispositional properties of individual persons, which properties ground both the

moral obligations of agents and the truth of (true) moral principles in the

propositional sense.

In this paper, I aim to show that this viewthat moral principles in the

genetic sense are dispositional properties of individual personsis not onlycoherent, but also well motivated and deserving of serious consideration. (I neither

attempt nor pretend to show that it is true.) To this end, it may help to note the

following at the outset.

First, it should be evident from the above that when I claim that we can

fruitfully conceive of moral principles like

(POK) promises ought to be kept

and

(KW) killing is wrong

as dispositions, I am not making any claim about propositions like Promises

ought to be kept and Killing is wrong, much less the absurd claim that such

propositions are dispositions. Rather, I am using the expressions promises ought

to be kept and killing is wrong to talk about two moral principles in the genetic

sensenamely, those principles that ground our obligations to keep promises and

to refrain from killing. I am using these expressions to make a claim about what

these and other moral principles in the genetic sense could be.

Second, in rejecting the law conception of moral principles, I am notdenying

that there are moral laws. Indeed, I grant that even if moral principles are not

laws, they at least guarantee that certain ceteris paribuslaws are true. For example, I

grant that POK and KW guarantee the truth of Promises ought to be kept, ceteris

paribus and Killing is wrong, ceteris paribus, respectively. Moreover, in section 6,

3Rosss argument is (roughly) that obligatory acts dont exist at the time that agents are

obligated to perform them and that only existents can bear properties. By attributing not only

moral properties but also the dispositional properties that ground them to persons rather than acts,

one avoids attributing properties to non-existents.


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I offer both an account of why this is so and an account of how we should

understand such ceteris paribusclauses. I also grant both that there might be strict

moral laws and that there is no linguistic impropriety in calling laws principles,

since they are principles in the propositional sense.

Third and finally, non-moral analogues of the view I am defending here are

defended by a number of metaphysicians and philosophers of science, including

Nancy Cartwright (1999; 1989) and Brian Ellis (2002; 2001). The view I am

defending holds that the metaphysical grounds of both obligation and laws of

obligation are real, irreducibly dispositional properties. And dispositionalistslike

Cartwright and Ellis argue that such properties are the metaphysical grounds of

both causation and laws of causation, or causal laws. For example, Cartwright

argues that the laws of physics (quascience) describe not regularities, but rather the

natural powers or capacities of physical systemsi.e., the ones they have in virtue

of their natures (1999, chap. 4).4 And Ellis argues that the fundamental laws of

nature describe the ways in which things belonging to natural kinds must bedisposed to act or interact, given their essential properties and that causal laws, in

particular, describe how things with various causal powers are intrinsically

disposed to act in virtue of having these powers (2001, pp. 106, 206). On such

views, dispositions are not only the truthmakers for laws (pp. 128, 217); they are

also causal principles in the genetic sense, as they are the origin or source of causal

events and interactions.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I argue that

moral principles do the following: explain certain phenomena, support

counterfactuals in particular ways, and ground moral necessities. This argument

lays the foundation for what follows, because any satisfactory, non-skeptical

conception of moral principles must account for the ability of such principles to do

what it is that they do. In section 3, I summarize the case against the law

conception and offer some reasons for developing a dispositional conception of

such principles, rather than an alternative nomological conceptionthereof. In section

4, I argue that we can conceive of moral principles as moral dispositionsand, in

particular, as moral dispositions of persons (agents and patients). In section 5, I

argue that this conception of moral principles can do what the law conception

cannot do: account for the ability of moral principles to explain the relevant

phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moralnecessities. And in section 6, I offer accounts of why moral principlesconceived

as moral dispositionsguarantee the truth of certain ceteris paribuslaws and of how

we should understand the ceteris paribusclauses in these laws. Throughout, my

principal aim is to show not only what a tenable dispositional conception of moral

4On this view, Newtons law of gravity (F=Gm1m2/r2), for example, describes the powers or

capacities of massive bodies qua massive, rather than any regularity (Cartwright 1999, pp. 65, 82).


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principles might look like, but also that the particular dispositional conception of

moral principles developed herein is well motivated and merits serious

consideration.

2.

What Moral Principles DoA (non-skeptical) conception of moral principles must account for the ability of

such principles to do what it is that they do.5 And one thing that moral principles

do is explain the phenomena falling within their scope,6 which scope at least

includes the instances of the laws they guarantee. More specifically, moral

principles explain whythese phenomena obtain or occur. 7 Take POK, for

instance. One phenomenon it would explain is my obligation to remain faithful to

my wife, as that is something I promised to do. Why am I obligated to remain

faithful to my wife?Becausepromises ought to be kept (and because I promised to

do so). Similarly, KW would explain both Mark David Chapmans obligation not

to kill John Lennon and the wrongness of his doing soi.e., the wrongness of

Lennons murder. Why was Chapman obligated not to kill Lennon? And why was

Lennons murder wrong?Becausekilling is wrong.

A second thing that moral principles do is support counterfactuals, or

counterfactual conditionals.8 Our next-door neighbors are away on vacation, and

our neighbors across the street are feeding their cats in their absence. Given these

facts, there is nothing wrong with our not feeding their cats: we have no obligation

to do so. But suppose that we had promised to feed their cats in their absence. In

that (counterfactual) case, we would have been obligated to feed their cats, and

our not doing so would have been wrong.POK supports this counterfactual in at least the following way: one can infer

it from POK. That is, one can infer from POK that we would have been

obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. Moreover, POK

would also seem to be what makes it the case that we would have been so

obligated had we so promised: we would have been obligated to feed their cats

had we promised to do so becausepromises ought to be kept.

A third thing that moral principles do is ground moral necessities, necessary

connections between obligating reasonsright- and wrong-making circumstances

(events, states of affairs, etc.) or propertiesand obligations (or rightness and

5This section reprises material from Robinson 2008, pp. 2-4.6I borrow this phrase from Dretske (1977, p. 262).7See, e.g., Brink 1994, pp. 188-90, 197; Crisp 2000, pp. 34-5; Dancy 1983, p. 533; Lance and

Little 2008, 2007; Pietroski 1993, pp. 499-500, 514-5; Vyrynen 2009, 2006, pp. 716-7, 726-7. But

see Jackson, Pettit, and Smith 2000, pp. 81-4; McKeever and Ridge 2006, pp. 6, 7-8, 12-4.8See, e.g., Lance and Little 2007, pp. 155-6, 2006a, pp. 315-6, 317-8; Pietroski 1993, pp. 492,

499-500, 514-5; Vyrynen 2009, sec. 5.


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wrongness tokens). Barring unusual circumstances (e.g., coercion), promises to !

necessitate obligations to !. And barring unusual circumstances (e.g., self-defense),

As being a person necessitates an obligation onBs part not to killA. I call the

kind of necessity involved here moral necessity. (In other contexts, its often

called natural necessity.)

Whatever one calls it, moral necessity is neither logical nor conceptual

necessity. It is necessity de re(necessity grounded in things), not necessity de dicto

(necessity grounded in the meaning of words or logical form). And moral

necessities are necessary connections between circumstances or propertiesnot

logical or conceptual relations between statements, propositions, or ideas. My

promise to remain faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. (Hence,

this is singular, or token, necessitation.) Similarly, Lennons being a person

necessitated Chapmans obligation not to kill him, and my neighbors being

persons necessitates my obligation not to kill them.

These moral necessities require grounds, and they require suitablymetaphysical grounds, rather than logical or conceptual ones, even if these

grounds are no more than, say, social rules. Moreover, moral principles seem to

be these grounds.9 For instance, POK seems to be the ground of the necessary

connection between my promise to remain faithful to my wife and my obligation

to do so. My promise necessitates my obligation to keep it becausepromises ought

to be kept. And KW seems to be the ground not only of the necessary connection

between Lennons being a person and Chapmans obligation not to kill him, but

also of the necessary connection between my neighbors being persons and my

obligation not to kill them. Lennons being a person necessitated Chapmans

obligation not to kill him and my neighbors being persons necessitates my

obligation not to kill them becausekilling is wrong.

3. Rival Conceptions

The law conception of moral principles supposes that moral principles are

generalizations. But mere generalizationscan neither explain the phenomena falling

within their scope, which are their instances; nor support counterfactuals in either

of the two ways in which moral principles do;10 nor ground moral necessities or,

more generally, necessary connections between distinct existences. For example,

the mere generalization All of the coins in my pocket are pennies cannot

explain why any of the coins in my pocket is a penny; nor can it support the

9Might something other than moral principles ground moral necessities? What could do this

that would not count as a moral principle (in the genetic sense)?10This is not to deny that some accidental generalizations provide inferential support for

some counterfactuals, since not all such generalizations are mere generalizations (Armstrong 1983,

p. 47; cf. Lange 2000, pp. 16-7).


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counterfactual that the quarter on my desk would have been a penny had it been

in my pocket; nor can it ground a (de re) necessary connection between being in

my pocket and being a penny. Likewise, if less obviously, the mere generalization

All promises ought to be kept (even if it were true) could not explain why any

promise ought to be kept; nor could it support the counterfactual that my wife and

I would have been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so;

nor could it ground a (de re) necessary connection between my promising to

remain faithful to my wife and my obligation to do so.

Thus, if moral principles are generalizations at all, they must be a special class

of lawlike generalizations. But what distinguishes lawlike generalizations from

mere generalizations such that they can do these things? It obviously wont do to

say that lawlike generalizations are generalizations that explain the relevant

phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral

necessities. What is needed is an answer to the question

What distinguishes lawlike generalizations from mere generalizations

such that they explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals

in the right ways, and ground moral necessities?

In the absence of an adequate answer to this question, we should conclude that

the law conception is mistaken: moral principles are not moral laws.11 Moreover,

even if we did have such an answer, we would still need to consider alternatives to

the law conception.

Two things bear noting in connection with the law conceptions failure to

account for the ability of moral principles to explain the relevant phenomena,

support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities. First, thelaw conception of moral principles mirrors a familiar, Humean account of the

laws of nature: the regularity theory.12Second, the regularity theory in its various

incarnations (including the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, or best-systems, theory of laws) is

a reductive theory of laws that is intended to be consistent with the view that

11I argue elsewhere (Robinson 2008) that none of the following supply an adequate answer to

this question: a best-systems theory of moral principles modeled on the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, or

best-systems, theory of the laws of nature; Sean McKeever and Michael Ridges theory of moral

principles as action-guiding standards (2006); Pekka Vyrynens theory of moral principles as

hedged generalizations (2006; 2008; 2009); Mark Lance and Margaret Littles pragmatisttheory of moral principles as defeasible generalizations (2008; 2007; 2006a; 2006b). Moreover,

one might argue that at least some of these are best understood as accounts of moral principles in

the propositional sense or of moral laws, rather than as accounts of moral principles in the genetic

sense.12According to the regularity theory, the laws of nature are a special class of lawlike

generalizations, such as explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations. This necessarily

glosses over some niceties. For instance, some versions of the regularity theory identify laws with a

special class of nomic regularities, rather than with lawlike generalizations. And different

versions of the theory offer different accounts of what makes a generalization or regularity a law.


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nothingnot the laws of nature and not anything elseexplains events, supports

counterfactuals, or grounds natural necessities (necessary connections between

natural circumstances or properties). Indeed, for Humeans, the point of reducing

laws to generalizations is to avoid any commitment to non-logical necessity (Psillos

2006, pp. 461-2).

Now one might well think that laws of nature that did not explain events,

support counterfactuals, or ground natural necessities would not be lawsof nature

properly so called. But this thought reflects agoverning conceptionof the laws of

nature (Beebee 2000). And it is a point of contention in the philosophy of science

whether the so-calledlaws of nature govern events or merely describe them

whether, as Helen Beebee puts it, they make the facts or are purely

descriptive of them (p. 578).

Moreover, Humeans are not the only ones who hold purely descriptive, non-

governing conceptions of the laws of nature. Dispositionalists typically deny that

laws govern, and while some (e.g., Stephen Mumford [2004]) are eliminativistsabout laws, others hold that laws are merely descriptive generalizations. Ellis is

representative of this latter group:

The laws of nature are still widely thought of as governing natureas

imposing order and structure upon itas if by the command of God. I

shall argue that this is quite the wrong way to think about laws of nature.

(2001, p. 203)

The basic laws of nature aredescriptions ofthe ways in which things

belonging to natural kinds must be disposed to act or interact, given their

essential properties. (p. 106)

However, unlike Humeans, dispositionalists dont reduce laws to generalizations

in order to avoid a commitment to non-logical necessity. Indeed, they reject the

Humean skepticism about non-logical necessity that motivates the regularity

theory.

What options are available to the moral theorist who is looking for a suitable

governing conception of moral principles, one that can account for the ability of

moral principles to explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals in

the right ways, and ground moral necessities? One such option is to (first) identify

moral principles with moral laws and (then) develop and defend a suitable

governing conception of moral laws. For instance, one might argue that moral

laws are rules (e.g., divine commands, precepts of reason, or social rules) or

relations between universals, rather than generalizations. Call conceptions of

moral principles that identify them with moral laws nomological conceptionsof moral

principles.


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A second option is to develop and defend a suitable governing conception of

moral principles that does not identify such principles with moral laws. For

instance, one might argue that moral principles are dispositions and that moral

laws are merely descriptions of the ways in which agents must be obligated to act

(in suitable circumstances) given these dispositions. Its this second option that I

pursue below.

But why pursue this second option? In particular, why not stick with the

familiar idea that morality just is a system of rules and that moral principles just

are the rules that compose morality?

One reason to pursue the second option is theoretical unification. Someone

who is independently attracted to dispositionalism of the sort defended by

Cartwright, Ellis, et al. should want to explore the possibility of a moral

dispositionalism. For doing this opens up the possibility of a unified account of

causation and causal laws, on the one hand, and of moral obligation and moral

laws, on the othera unified account on which all of these are grounded indispositions. This is not to say that a dispositionalist like Cartwright or Ellis

couldnt conceive of moral principles as rules, rather than as dispositions. Its only

to say that such a dispositionalist should find the possibility of such a unified

account worth exploring.

A second reason is interpretive. Insofar as Ross is arguably best interpreted as

holding a dispositional conception of moral principles (see sec. 1; cf. Robinson

2006), we might better understand his influential moral theory and the theoretical

resources available to him if we have a better understanding of moral

dispositionalism and its theoretical resources. For instance, if we interpret Ross as

a moral dispositionalist, thenas section 6 illustrateshe is not committed to

denying that the valence of an obligating reason may vary as other factors vary

such that (e.g.) what is a right-making reason in one case may not be one in

another (Robinson 2006). Moreover, a better understanding of moral

dispositionalism and its theoretical resources might also help us better understand

other moral theories and the theoretical resources available to them. For instance,

it is possible to recast the core claim of Kantian ethics as the claim that

imperfectly rational beings simultaneously possess and exercise the power to

obligate themselves to respect both their own rational agency and that of others.

(Compare the view that massive bodies simultaneously possess and exercisecertain gravitational powers.) And it is possible to recast Sidgwicks claim that as

a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally,not merely at a particular

part of it (1907, p. 70), as the claim that rational beings simultaneously have and

exercise the power to obligate themselves to aim at good generally. Thus, it also

seems possible to recast the debate between Kantians, consequentialists, and


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pluralists as a debate over what moral dispositions are possessed by agents and

patients.

A third and closely related reason is that these nomological conceptions of

moral principles are not consistent with moral theories that recognizepro tanto(or

contributory) obligating reasons (or duties).Pro tantoreasons areto use a

familiar metaphorthe sort of reasons that have weight; that outweigh and are

outweighed by one another; and that retain their weight when they are

outweighed by other, weightier (pro tanto) reasons.13But there is no need for

someone who thinks that morality is a system of rules to think that obligating

reasons arepro tantoreasons. One could hold, for example, that I ought morally to

save a drowning child rather than keep a promise to meet a friend for coffee, not

because one reason outweighs another, but simply because the relevant moral

rule states that we must keep our promises exceptwhen preventing a great harm

requires breaking a minor promise. And this suggests a stronger claim, one that I

defend elsewhere: that moral rules cannotground pro tantoobligating reasons. 14Moreover, I also argue elsewhere that neither relations between universals nor

lawlike generalizations can groundpro tantoobligating reasons, but that

obligating dispositions can do this.15And if I am right about all of this, then

anyone who accepts the (broadly Rossian) view that obligating reasons arepro tanto

reasons has yet another reason to pursue the second option, to develop a

conception of moral principles as moral dispositions.

4. Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions

The dispositionalists conception of the world stands in stark contrast to that of theHumean. And this contrast is as relevant to understanding a moral

dispositionalism as it is to understanding a dispositionalism of the sort defended by

Cartwright, Ellis, et al.

In the world as Humeans conceive it, nothing is responsibleeither for what

happens or for what is the case. Nothing makesanything happen or be: not the

laws of nature, and not anything else. Causes do not make their effects happen:

they do not produce or otherwise necessitate them. And nothing is as it is because

something made itor caused it to bethat way. Moreover, there is nothing in

13The term pro tanto reason was introduced by Kagan (1989, p. 17) as a substitute for Rosss

term prima facieduty. However, Ross used his term to refer to token actsspecifically, token acts

that tend to be duties sans phrase (1930, pp. 28-9). And he l ikened these moral tendencies to those

of bodies subject to gravitational and other physical forces. Both the concept of apro tanto reason

and that of aprima facie duty are often glossed in terms of factors that always have weight, but that

characterization is controversial.14See Luke Robinson, Right-Makingand Wrong-MakingReasons, MS.15Ibid.


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the world that couldbe responsible for anythingnothing that could make

anything happen or be. In other words, there are no natural principles in the

genetic sense: nothing is the source or origin of anything else. Rather, the world

is [just] a vast mosaic of local matters of fact, just one thing after another (Lewis

1986, p. ix).

But in the world as dispositionalists conceive it, something is responsible for

what happens and for much of what isnamely, dispositions (or powers). In their

view, the dispositional properties of individuals are responsible for and thereby

explain what they do, what they become, what they are like, etc. Aspirin relieves

headaches, and the power of the aspirin I took to do this is responsible for and

thereby explains its relieving my headache. Fish eggs developinto fish, and a

particular fish eggs real potential to do this is responsible for and thereby explains

its developing into a fish. Ravens are disposed to be black, and a particular ravens

disposition to be black is responsible for and thereby explains its occurrent

blackness. On this view, there are natural principles in the genetic sense: thenatural or innate disposition[s]16 of individuals are the origins, sources, or

ultimate bases of events, processes, states of affairs, etc.

This is, of course, an oversimplification. Single dispositions are rarely if ever

responsible for events, etc. As George Molnar puts it, events are typically

polygenicthat is, what a number of different powers [or dispositions] in

combination manifest (2003, pp. 194-5). When salt dissolves in water, for

instance, this is no less a manifestation of the waters power to dissolve salt than it

is a manifestation of the salts disposition to dissolve in water (Heil 2005, p. 350).

And processes, states of affairs, etc., are likewise typically polygenic. Indeed, the

salts dissolution is a polygenic process, and the waters being saline is a polygenic

state of affairs. But none of this is an objection to the view under consideration, for

all that follows is that responsibility for events, etc. is typically shared among a set

of dispositions (reciprocal disposition partners).

Now consider a moral case, a case of obligation. If I am obligated to remain

faithful to my wife, or if Lennons murder was wrong, then something is

responsible for and thereby explains this: it is not a bare occurrence bearing only

contingent relations to other bare occurrences. On the moral dispositionalism I

defend here, it is moral principles quadispositional properties of individuals that

are responsible for and thereby explain such phenomena. For example, ifasseems plausibleagents have the power to obligate themselves by promising, then

my power to do this (quaproperty of me) is responsible for and thereby explains

my obligation to remain faithful to my wife (quaproperty of me). Likewise, if

persons have the power to obligate agents not to kill them, then Lennons power

16 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v., principle.


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to do this (quaproperty of him) is responsible for and thereby explains Chapmans

obligation not to kill him, as well as the wrongness of Lennons murder.

Here, too, this is an oversimplification. An agent cannot obligate herself by

making a promise to just anything: rocks and trees lack the (reciprocal) capacity to

be promisees. And persons cannot obligate non-agents not to kill them: non-

agents lack the (reciprocal) capacity to be so obligatedi.e., they are not liableto

be obligated not to kill others. So the moral dispositions of promisees and

potential murderers also have (reciprocal) roles to play, and responsibility for

obligations is typicallyand perhaps alwaysshared among a set of dispositions

(reciprocal disposition partners).

This view leaves room for moral laws, just as views like Cartwrights and

Elliss leave room for causal laws. But these laws are not responsible for our

obligations. Moreover, they are comparatively poor candidates for identification

as moral principles. For on this view the obligation to keep a particular promise is

due, not to any law, but rather to a set of dispositions manifesting in combination.Suppose, for example, that my wife and I are obligated to feed our neighbors

cats. This is not something that neighbors are normally obligated to do, so we

might ask questions such as Why are we so obligated? and How did we come

to be so obligated?. The obvious answer is that we are so obligated because we

promised to feed their cats and that we became so obligated by promising to do

just that. If this obvious answer is correct, then what is responsible for and thereby

explains our obligation on the present view is not a law, but rather the power of

moral agents to obligate themselves by promising manifesting in combination with

other relevant dispositions, including those of our neighbors quapromisees.

Hence, the best candidates for identification as moral principles are the relevant

dispositions; and if anything deserves to be identified as themoral principle at work

here, it is the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising.

Much the same is true in the case of my obligation not to kill my neighbors.

Unlike feeding ones neighbors cats, one normally does have an obligation not to

kill ones neighbors, and it is normally wrong to do so. Yet we can still ask Why

am I so obligated? and How did I come to be so obligated?. An obvious

answer is that I am so obligated because my neighbors are moral persons and that

I became so obligated by becoming a moral agent. If this answer is correct, then

what is responsible for and thereby explains my obligation on the present view isnot a law, but rather the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them

manifesting in combination with other relevant dispositions, including those of me

quaagent. Hence, once again, the best candidates for identification as moral

principles are the relevant dispositions; and if anything deserves to be identified as

themoral principle at work here, it is the power of persons to obligate agents not to

kill them.


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Notice that both of these moral powers arelike rest mass and the capacity

of muons to decayunconditionally manifesting powers, powers whose manifestations

are not responses to stimuli (Molnar 2003, pp. 85-7) and hence do not need to be

triggered in order to manifest.17This is noteworthy, first, because there is nothing

unusual about such powers, and second, because the mere possibility of such

powers arguably refutes any reductive conditional analysis of disposition

ascriptions, since their manifestations are not conditional on the occurrence of

stimuli, or triggering events (pp. 85-7, 90, 93). (Granted, a showing that

ascriptions of moral dispositions cannot be reductively analyzed is not sufficient to

show that any such dispositions exist. But it is sufficient to refute one argument

against their existence.)

Now in proposing that moral principles could be moral dispositions, I am not

proposing that such dispositions would be ungrounded (or baseless) dispositions.

Indeed, it seems plausible that they would be grounded in the rational,

sentimental, or perceptual powers and capacities that are constitutive of moralagency and patiencythe moral naturesof agents and patients, if you will. Indeed,

for all that I argue here, they could bethose same powers and capacities. They

could even be those same powers and capacities necessarily, such that a world

with agents and patients is ipso factoa world with morality: a world with obligating

reasons, obligations, and the moral dispositions that ground them. For to say that

moral principles are irreducibly dispositional properties is not to say that they

cannot be reduced to or identified with other dispositional properties. But moral

dispositionalism as such takes no stand on these issues.

Moreover, in neither the moral case nor the non-moral case is the

dispositionalists thesis this: that the properties which are responsible for and

thereby explain the relevant phenomena are dispositional properties of individuals

that exist over and above their non-dispositional, or categorical, properties.

Rather, it is (roughly) that the properties of individuals are dispositional

properties, and that these properties are responsible for and thereby explain the

relevant phenomena in their own right, and hence without the need either for

further properties or for laws that govern. This thesis can take various forms

e.g., that the intrinsic (i.e., non-relational) properties of individuals are all

dispositional properties rather than categorical ones (e.g., Molnar 2003, pp. 158-

62); that every property is dispositional as well as qualitative (e.g., Martin andHeil 1999); and that properties are clusters of powers, and hence dispositional

(e.g., Mumford 2004, pp. 171-4; Shoemaker 1980). But in no case is it that the

17My promising is not a triggering of my power to obligate myself by promising but rather an

exercise of that power. So if it requires a trigger, it requires a causaltrigger. But my power to

obligate agents not to kill me does not seem to require even that (see the discussion of constantly

manifesting powers below).


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dispositional properties of individuals that make them powerful particulars18are

ones that exist over and above their categorical properties.

Finally, I am not proposing that moral principles are causaldispositions.

Perhaps on the correct account of causation (if there is just one) moral dispositions

will turn out to be causal ones.19 But they may not. And moral dispositionalism

proposes no more than that moral dispositions and causal dispositions are species

of the same genera (viz., dispositions, or powers), just as some alternative views

propose no more than that moral laws and causal laws are species of the same

genera (e.g., explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations). Moreover,

there may well be important disanalogies between moral dispositions and causal

ones. But that alone would no more suffice to undermine moral dispositionalism

than the existence of important disanalogies between moral and non-moral facts

or properties would suffice to undermine moral realism.

5.

Doing What Moral Principles Do

Unlike the law conception, our dispositional conception of moral principles can

account for their ability to explain the relevant phenomena, support

counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities.

Recall first that moral principles explain the phenomena falling within their

scope. For example, POK explains my obligation to remain faithful to my wife,

and KW explains both Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon and the

wrongness of his doing sothe wrongness of Lennons murder. As I implied

above, moral principles will explain why these phenomena obtain or occur if they

are responsible for them: if they make them be or happen. And moral principlesconceived as moral dispositions are responsible forand thereby explainthese

phenomena. There are, however, different ways of cashing out this view

depending, for example, on whether one takes the bearers of these dispositions to

be persons (agents and patients) or actions. So what follows is but one way of

cashing out the claim that POK quamoral disposition is responsible forand

thereby explainsmy obligation to remain faithful to my wife and that KW qua

moral disposition is responsible forand thereby explainsboth Chapmans

obligation not to kill Lennon and the wrongness of his doing so. It is not the only

way, and it is intended to be illustrative, not definitive.

Given that moral agents canobligate themselves by promising, lets stick with

the idea that POK just is the power of moral agents to obligate themselves by

promising. And lets say that my obligation to remain faithful to my wife is

18The phrase is Harr and Maddens (1975, p. 5).19Cf. The question of whether moral generalizations are causal [ones] depends largely on

what the right theory of causation is (Pietroski 1993, p. 511).


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generated by my promising to remain faithful to her quaexercise of this power.

On this view, the claim that POK is responsible for my obligation to remain

faithful to my wife should be understood as the claim that this token obligation is

generated by an exercise of a token instance of POKa POK trope. Lets also say

both that KW just is the power of moral persons20to obligate moral agents not to

kill them, and that Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon was generated by an

exercise of this power. On this view, the claim that KW was responsible for that

obligation should be understood as the claim that it (Chapmans obligation) was

generated by an exercise of a KW trope of which Lennon was the bearer.

Now its important to note that, in this context, neither the term power nor

the term exercise connotes volition. Causal agents have causal powers,

which they exercise. And myriad things without wills have causal powers, which

powers they exercise non-voluntarily. Thus, to suggest (e.g.) that Chapmans

obligation not to kill Lennon was generated by an exercise of a KW trope borne

by Lennon is not to suggest that Lennon didanything that could constitute anexercise of a power. Granted, I did something that could constitute an exercise of

one of my moral powers: I promised to remain faithful to my wife. But that is no

reason to suppose that all (or even most) moral powers must (or even can) be

exercised voluntarily. Moreover, the analogy between moral powers and causal

powers is actually stronger in the ChapmanLennon case than it is in the

promising case. For not only are causal powers typically exercised non-voluntarily;

such powers also typically operate on other thingsas Lennons power to obligate

Chapman didrather than on their own bearersas my power to obligate myself

by promising does.

What about the wrongness of Lennons murder? If we took the view that

actions are the bearers of the relevant dispositions, we could say that KW is the

tendency of killings to be wrong and that the wrongness of Lennons murder is

generated by an exercise of a KW trope borne by that action.21But in keeping

with the view that KW is the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them,

we might rather say that the truthmaker for the claim that Lennons murder was

wrong is Chapmans having been obligated not to kill him. If we say this, there is

no need to give an account of what it is for KW to be responsible for the

wrongness of Lennons murder quaaction property. All we need is the account

already given of what it is for KW to be responsible for Chapmans obligationquaproperty of him.

20Again, I mean to allow not only that patients (infants, dogs, etc.) can be persons, but also that

they can have those moral dispositions of persons that need not be exercised (or manifested)

voluntaril y, such as the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them.21One reason not to take this view is that it requires attributing properties to non-existents.

(See n. 3 and accompanying text.)


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Once again, things are not as simple as this sketch suggests. Obligations are

typically polygenic (generated by multiple dispositions manifesting in

combination), and the moral dispositions of my wife and Chapman share some of

the responsibility for these obligations, too. For example, we are liable to be

obligated not to kill others, and Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon is no less

a manifestation of his liability (quaagent) to be obligated not to kill persons than it

is a manifestation of Lennons power (quaperson) to obligate agents not to kill

him. (Likewise, the salts dissolving in water is no less a manifestation of its

disposition to dissolve in water than it is a manifestation of the waters power to

dissolve salt.) But none of this changes the basic picture of how moral principles

quamoral dispositions are responsible for the obligations and other phenomena

that they explain: they generate those phenomena by manifesting.

Now recall that moral principles support counterfactuals in two ways: one can

infer the relevant counterfactuals from them, and they (the principles) seem to be

what make it the case that the relevant counterfactuals are true. Moral principlesconceived as moral dispositions certainly support counterfactuals in the first of

these two ways. For example, from the fact that moral agents have the power to

obligate themselves by promising, one can infer that my wife and I would have

been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. Indeed, the

whole anti-realist project of trying to reduce disposition ascriptions to subjunctive

conditionals presupposes that dispositions support counterfactuals in just this way.

Moral principles conceived as moral dispositions also support counterfactuals

in the second of these two ways. For dispositions are (inter alia) properties of

individuals in virtue of which they would do or be things (Ellis 2001, pp. 117, 129;

Heil 2005, p. 344). For example, if POK just is the power of agents to obligate

themselves by promising, then POK just is the property of my wife and methe

property of which we each bear tropesin virtue of which we would have

obligated ourselves to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. And as

such, POK is what makes it the case that we would have been so obligated had we

so promised. We would have been so obligated had we so promised because

promises ought to be keptthat is, because our promising to feed our neighbors

cats would have been a successful exercise of a POK trope, one that generated an

obligation on our part to do what we promised to do: feed their cats.

Finally, recall that moral principles ground moral necessities, necessaryconnections between obligating reasons and obligations. My promise to remain

faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. Here, POK is the ground

of this moral necessity, this necessary connection. Similarly, Lennons being a

person necessitated Chapmans obligation not to kill him, and my neighbors

being persons necessitates my obligation not to kill them. Here, KW is the ground

of these necessary connections.


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Once again, moral principles conceived as moral dispositions do what moral

principles do. The connection between the exercise of a power and the outcome

generated thereby is necessary, not contingent. In the case of causal powers, that

outcome is the effect produced by the exercise of that power. The exercise of a

causal power produces, and thereby necessitates, its effect.22The effect is the

necessary outcome of the powers exercise. The power therefore grounds the

necessary connection between the cause and the effect. For example, the aspirin I

took relievedmy headache. Aspirin has the power to relieve headaches, and the

aspirin I took exercised its power to do thisthe trope of this power that it bore.

This exercise produced, and thereby necessitated, my relief. My relief is its

necessary outcome. (Note that this is singular, or token, necessitation and, in

particular, singular, or token, causation. Hence, the claim is not that the

probability of this outcome given my taking the aspirin was 1.) And in this sense,

the power of aspirin to relieve headaches grounds the necessary connection

between the cause (my taking the aspirin) and the effect (my relief).In the case of obligating powers, the outcome generated by the exercise of

such a power is normally an obligationalthough in exceptional cases it may fall

short of that (see section 6). Hence, in the typical case, the exercise of an

obligating power generates, and thereby necessitates, an obligation. The

obligation is the necessary outcome of the powers exercise. The power therefore

grounds the necessary connection between the obligating reason and the

obligation. For instance, in our first example, I obligate myself to remain faithful to

my wife by promising to do so. Agents have the power to obligate themselves by

promising, and I exercised my power (quaagent) to do thisthe trope of this

power that I bear. This exercise generated, and thereby necessitated, my

obligation. My obligation is its necessary outcome. (Once again, this is singular, or

token, necessitation.) And in this sense, POK (the power of agents to obligate

themselves by promising) grounds the necessary connection between the

obligating reason (my promise to remain faithful to my wife) and the obligation

(my obligation to remain faithful to my wife).

Our second example adds an important complexity. Chapmans obligation

not to kill Lennon was generated, and thus necessitated, by the exercise of an

obligating power: Lennons power quaperson to obligate agents not to kill him,

which is a KW trope. And in this sense, KW grounds the necessary connectionbetween the obligating reason (Lennons being a person) and the obligation

22The exercise of the power creates the second feature and in that sense necessitates it

(Cartwright et al. 2005, p. 811). It is not laws that [explain and necessitate]; it is causes. The cause

necessitates its effectit makes it happen, or brings it about; and the occurrence of the effect is

explained by the occurrence of the cause (Cartwright 1993, p. 428). [Causal] laws describe

natural kinds of processes that are the displays of causal powers.[E]vents activating these powers

necessitate other events that are their displays (Ellis 2001, p. 287).


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(Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon). That much is the same. The difference

is this. Neither Lennon nor Chapman did anything that constitutes either the

exercise or the triggeringof Lennons power quaperson to obligate agents not to kill

him. But then again, neither needed to. For unlike POK, KW is what we might

call a constantlymanifesting power, a power thatlike rest massis exercised for

as long as it is not prevented from doing so.23

If the idea of a constantly manifesting obligating power sounds odd, consider

the following. Moral persons have moral rights, including the right not to be

killed. These rights are properties of their bearers. (Indeed, on some accounts they

are properties their bearers have in virtue of their moral natures: the powers and

capacities that make them moral persons.) These rights impose obligations on

others, which obligations are necessitated by these rights. And at least some of

these rights, including the right not to be killed, do this more or less constantly. In

other words, at least some moral rights, including the right not to be killed, act like

constantly manifesting obligating powers.Moreover, given that the right not to be killed acts like a constantly

manifesting obligating power, we might plausibly identify KW with the right not

to be killed. We might then identify the KW trope borne by Lennonhis power

quaperson to obligate agents not to kill himwith Lennons right not to be killed.

This yields the plausible view that Lennons right not to be killed was what

obligatedChapman not to kill him. The exercise of Lennons right not to be killed

quatrope of KW generated, and thereby necessitated, Chapmans obligation not

to kill Lennon. And, in that sense, Lennons right not to be killed was responsible

for and thereby explains Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon. Hence, our

dispositional conception of moral principles coheres in explanatorily powerful

ways with plausible views about the moral rights of persons, including the view

that such rights ground at least some moral obligations.

6.

Ceteris Paribus Laws

Now my aim here is not to defend any particular account of moral laws.

Nevertheless, I did claim that even if moral principles are not laws, they at least

guarantee that certainceteris paribus laws are true. This claim raises three questions:

23Constantly manifesting powers should be distinguished from continuously manifesting powers,

powers that are exercised for as long as they exist (Molnar 2003, p. 86). Continuously

manifesting powers are a subset of constantly manifesting powers, which are themselves a subset of

unconditionally manifesting powers (see p. 14). The difference between constantly and

continuously manifesting powers is an extrinsic one: continuously manifesting powers (of which

rest mass is one) are simply constantly manifesting powers for which no masks exist (see n. 25).

They remain liable, at least in principle, to being both finked (see n. 25) and prevented from

exercising successfully (see below).


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(1) why do moral principles guarantee laws; (2) why might those laws be ceteris

paribuslaws rather than strict laws; and (3) what sense is to be given to the ceteris

paribusqualifier in this context, what does it mean?

The moral dispositionalist has ready answers to these three questions. First,

moral principles guarantee laws because they are dispositions, and because

dispositions guarantee the truth of certain generalizations. For example, if an

agent has the power to obligate herself by promising, it follows that she obligates

herself, not whenever she exercises that power, but rather whenever she exercises

that power successfully.24 And if agents as such have the power to obligate

themselves by promising, it follows that agents obligate themselves whenever they

exercise this power successfully. Thus, if POK is the power of agents to obligate

themselves by promising, it follows that promises ought to be kept, ceteris paribus. (It

does notfollow that all promises obligate [see below].)

Second, these laws might hold only ceteris paribus because dispositions can (e.g.)

fail to manifest if necessary enabling conditions are absent, be prevented frommanifesting by masks and finks,25 and manifest unsuccessfully because opposing

dispositions are also manifesting. For example, if I promise to kill Smith, Smiths

power (quaperson) to obligate me not to kill him might mask my power to obligate

myself by promising such thatin this casemy having promised to !is not an

obligating reason, not even apro tantoobligating reason. If not, that power will at

least oppose my power to obligate myself by promising such that I am not

obligated to kill him.

Third, the sense to be given to the ceteris paribusqualifier in this context is

when other things relevant to the disposition are equal (Molnar 1999, p. 7)

that is, when relevant enabling conditions are present; when relevant interfering

or opposing dispositions are absent, inoperative, or ineffectual; etc. Thus, our

dispositional conception of moral principles can explain not only why there are

moral laws and why these laws might hold only ceteris paribus, but also how we

should understand the ceteris paribusclauses in these laws.

Moreover, we can now see that this conception of moral principles can also

explain why the necessary connections between obligating reasons and obligations

do not hold universally. Promises to !do not always necessitate obligations to !,

24It follows from the concept power that the power to X cannot be exercised in the right

circumstances without X obtaining (Cartwright et al. 2005, p. 812).25A mask is anything with the power to prevent the manifestation of a disposition without

making its bearer lose that disposition. Packing materials used in the shipping of fragile objects

mask their fragility (Johnston 1992, p. 233). A fink is anything with the power to make an object

lose or acquire a disposition upon the occurrence of that dispositions trigger or stimulus (Martin

1994, pp. 2-3; Lewis 1997, p. 144). A circuit breaker is a fink: it causes a circuit to lose its capacity

to carry a current above a given magnitude upon the occurrence of the very event that would

otherwise trigger the manifestation of that capacity.


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but rather do so barring unusual circumstances (see p. 7). My promise to remain

faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. But I might have had no

such obligation if my wife had coerced me into marrying her. Likewise,As being

a person does not always necessitate an obligation onBs part not to killA, but

rather does so barring unusual circumstances. If you are trying to kill me, I might

have no obligation not to kill you despite your being a person. The explanation

for why the necessary connections between obligating reasons and obligations do

not hold universally is simply that dispositions can (e.g.) fail to manifest if

necessary enabling conditions are absent, be prevented from manifesting by masks

and finks, and manifest unsuccessfully because opposing dispositions are also

manifesting.

To see (again) how this works, consider the following variant of our third

example.

Our neighbors return home from their vacation to find their cats dead.

Mistakenly thinking that my wife and I had promised to feed them

during their absence, they fly into a homicidal rage and try to kill us.

Unfortunately, deadly force is our only available means of defense.

To keep things simple, lets stipulate that it is permissible for me to kill our

homicidal neighbors.

What the dispositionalist will say here is that one of two things is happening.

Either the KW tropes borne by our neighbors (their rights not to be killed, if you

like) are being masked (see n. 25) or otherwise prevented from manifesting. Or else

they are manifesting unsuccessfully, and thus not succeeding in obligating me not

to kill them. Which the dispositionalist says will depend on whether or not shewants to say that our neighbors being persons is apro tantoobligating reason, or

that I have apro tantoobligation not to kill them. If she wants to say that it is such a

reason, she will say that the KW tropes borne by our neighbors are manifesting

unsuccessfullythat they are manifesting and thereby generatingpro tanto

obligations (moral forces, if you like), but that they are not thereby obligating me

(at the overall level) not to kill our neighbors. But if she wants to say that our

neighbors being persons is not apro tantoobligating reason in this case, she will

say that these KW tropes are being masked or otherwise prevented from

manifesting. Either would be sufficient to explain why our neighbors being

persons fails to necessitate an obligation on my part not to kill them in the unusual

circumstances of this variant case. Hence, we need not consider the difficult

question of which is the correct view.


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7.

Conclusion

What are moral principles? I have argued that we can fruitfully conceive of moral

principles in the genetic sense as moral dispositions and, in particular, as real,

irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that

are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents andactions. Such dispositions are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral

obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible,

impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do what moral principles do: explain the

phenomena falling within their scope, support counterfactuals in the right ways,

and ground moral necessities. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral

laws.

I concede, however, that a complete defense of this (or any) dispositional

conception of moral principles requires further argument. For example, I have

offered no argument either against the view that moral principles are moral rules

or against the view that they are relations between universals. I have only

claimedon the basis of arguments offered elsewherethat neither view is

consistent with moral theories that recognizepro tantoobligating reasons (or duties)

and that such theories therefore require alternative conceptions of moral

principles. Nevertheless, I have shown not only what a tenable dispositional

conception of moral principles might look like, but also that the particular

dispositional conception of moral principles developed here is well motivated and

merits serious consideration.

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