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Global Information Security Threats Trend 2011 Dr. Yoichi SHINODA Indonesia Information Security Forum (IISF) 2011 14 – 15 Dec. 2011 Advisor on Information Security National Information Security Center (NISC) Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan Professor Dependable Network Innovation Center Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
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Global Information Security Threats Trend 2011 �

Dr. Yoichi SHINODA

Indonesia Information Security Forum (IISF) 2011 14 – 15 Dec. 2011

Advisor on Information Security National Information Security Center (NISC) Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan

Professor Dependable Network Innovation Center Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology �

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The Outline�

1.  Followups & Updates

2.  Changes In The Long Term Threat Trend

3.  Change of Game

4. Concluding Remarks

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 1

π

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1. Updates �

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 2

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“Update 2010” summaries and followups (1)�

l  Drive-by Download & Gumblar

l  Introduced a new class of attack model: Web-PC integrated infection cycle.

l  Requires integrated approach on both PCs and servers for measures.

l  Stuxnet and Its Impact l  It targets at FA systems, has potential to damage critical

infrastructure.

l  It penetrates and spreads into so called “closed, physically isolated, dedicated systems” ( --> False belief about secureness).

l  New malware utilizing Stuxnet modules are now emerging.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 3

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“Update 2010” summaries and followups (2)�

l  Route Hi-Jacking

l  Large incidents are not reported for 2011; small incidents are daily.

l  Good Old DoS

l  Still a very popular and handy tool for expressing an one’s or group’s intention.

l  Mitigation technology is available in a limited manner.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 4

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2011 Updates (1)�

l  Hactivists became conspicuous.

l  Frequent activities by hactivists (loose community of hacker activists), e.g., “Anonymous” and “Lulzsec” were observed.

l  The activities were triggered by impulsive events, often put large organizations such as national governments and global enterprises into jeopardy.

l  Cyber Space now widely (and officially for some counties) recognized as a field of confrontation, in many aspects.

l  Existence of APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) became clear.

l  Malwares targeting smart phones is showing rapid growth.

l  Trend Micro Oct. 2011 report (+200% growth Sep. to Oct.)

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 5

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2011 Updates (2)�

l  More and more “previously believed-to-be-secure” things now became (potential) threat vectors:

l  Security tokens:

l  A security token vendor has disclosed that some of the internal information was stolen.

l  Certificate Authorities and certificates:

l  A certificate authority was compromised, and was forced to issue forged certificates, resulting in possible vulnerabilities in multiple major global portal sites.

l  E-mails from business partners (or look a likes)

l  E-mails forged to look like they are legitimate, in terms of sender address, subject, attachment names and body text, now may contain fatal attack vectors.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 6

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2. Changes in The Long Term Trend �

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 7

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Threats from the attack vector perspective A)  Network Layer Attack B)  Web Application Layer Attack C)  Malware Infection D)  Abuse of Client Side Application E)  Social Engineering

A Taxonomy of Information Security Threat�

Network Layer Attack

Malware Infection�Social Engineering�

Web App. Layer Attack

Abuse of Client Side App.

Hackers

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 8

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Changes In The Attack Model�

n Around 2000, Network layer attack was very common and many incident of network layer attack were reported.

Ø Most major companies in Japan have firewalls on the front of their system now.

1st Change of Attack model

n Around 2005, Many web application layer attacks were reported. (Massive SQL Injection)

Ø Many web site owner checked the security holes of their web application and fixed them.

Ø However, There are still security holes in their web application today.

n In 2009, Web-based Malware became widespread. Ø Even If the defense of network layer and web application layer are in

place, the risk of this attack still remains. Ø The defense should be in place not only on the server-side, but also

on the client-side. And this fact makes it difficult to fix this problem.

2nd Change of Attack model

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 9

n 2010~ : C

ombined to form

sophisticated attacks.

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Changes In The Target Area�

In 2009, The attack target area is getting larger in spite of the fact that other area is not covered adequately. We need to choose the cost-effective security measures.

Internet System Intranet System

VPN

Attack target area in 2000

Attack target area in 2005

Attack target area in 2009

FTP

Remote Access

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 10

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Did Network Attacks Become A History?�

l  Question: With raise of Web-based attacks, common installation of firewalls, and users shifting to newer operating systems, did network attack become a history?�

l  Answer: No. l  New vulnerabilities in wide range of software and systems are still

reported everyday. l  Network attack is still very active according to network monitors (such as

nicter by NICT). l  Presence of the comprehensive bot networks amplifies effect of newly

found vulnerabilities (e.g.: Welch, Conficker, …) l  Vulnerabilities are utilized for intranet network attacks.�

l  Likewise, Web-Application Layer attacks (e.g. SQL injections and XSS attacks) are still very common.

Copyright (c) 2010 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 11

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Web Applications are inherently vulnerable?�

Web applications are inherently vulnerable to attacks:

l  Distributed Nature l  Unlike the traditional applications, web applications inherently deals with

distributed components and services; even secure components and services become unsecure when they depend on unsecure remote components and services.

l  Web programming facilities are often introduced with functionality (aka “richer user experience”) as the first priority; security considerations are often very weak.

l  The WASC (Web Application Security Consortium) has identified 34 different classes of web application attacks and 15 different classes of weaknesses of web applications that can be attacked.

l  Market Pressure l  Most web applications have severe TTM (Time to The Market) schedule. l  Most web applications are believed to be “lighter” than traditional hard

coded applications, thus can be made “cheaper”. l  Most web applications are required to “be fancy”, not “be secure”.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 12

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Rise of the APTs�

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) usually refers to a group with both the capability and intent to persistently and effectively target a specific entity.

l  Advanced l  Operators of APTs have a full spectrum of intelligence-gathering capabilities,

including computer intrusion technologies and conventional technologies such as wire-tapping.

l  Often combine multiple targeting methods to produce more sophisticated methods to gain and maintain access to the target.

l  Persistent l  Operators give priority to a specific task, rather than the opportunistically seeking

gains. l  Targets are constantly monitored, often by “low-and-slow” approach. l  Operator’s goal is to maintain long-term access to the target.

l  Threat l  APTs are a threat because they have both capability and intent. l  The operators have a specific objective and are skilled, organized, and often well

funded.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 13

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3. Change of Game �

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 14

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Awareness Rising�

Awareness rising plays one of the central role in possible measures.

l  Awareness rising in different sectors l  Government l  Private industries and enterprises, and supply chains l  General Public

l  Awareness rising has direct and indirect effects l  Prevent direct damages; large portion of sophisticated attacks are

triggered by icareless or ignorant operations. l  Incubate a common sense among people and industries, in

investments into security aspects of ICT systems.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 15

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From R&D perspective�

NITRD CSIA IWG "Cybersecurity Game-Change / Research and Development Recommendations” (May 2010)

l  Recognition of the current state of the game l  The cost of attack is asymmetric, and favors the attacker.

l  The cost of simultaneously satisfying all the cyber security requirement of an ideal system is prohibitive.

l  The lack of meaningful metrics and economically sound decision making in security results in a misallocation of resources.

l  Proposed way of changing the game l  Make cyber assets a moving target.

l  Create a trustworthy cyberspace (subspace) model.

l  Create a framework of economic incentives to reward secure practices and discourage bad actors.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 16

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Synergy makes 1 + 1 > 2�

l  Most measures comes in singular manner. If resources to implement the measures are used in a synergetic manner, it may change the course of the game.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved.

Cyber Clean Center

MIC METI

ISPs ISPs ISPs ISPs

ISPs ISPs ISPs Customers ISPs ISPs ISPs Customers

corporation

IPSJ (Information Processing Society of Japan)

ISPs ISPs ISPs Researchers Students

end user outreach

MWS (Anti-Malware Engineering Workshop)

organization

participation

NICT

malware info. (benchmark data)

MEXT

IPA

IT-Keys (Human resource development program)

ISPs ISPs ISPs Students

Corporation (use of malware workbench) Outcomes: - Practical measures - Awareness rising

17

Outcomes: - Human resources - New technologies

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Concluding Remarks �

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 18

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Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 9

Infec&on  rate  in  ASEAN  region  was  rela&vely  low  in  1Q-­‐2Q2011.

Malware Infection Rates by Countries/Regions�

Copyright (c) 2010 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 19

1Q-2Q2010

Rates by Microsoft CCM, per 1,000 PCs.

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Source: Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 11

Infec&on  rate  in  ASEAN  region  is  increasing  (despite  the  color  scale/scheme  change).

Malware Infection Rates by Countries/Regions�

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 20 Rates by Microsoft CCM, per 1,000 PCs.

1Q2011

2Q2011

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We can change, we must change�

l  Goals l  Prevent economic and other damages to people, companies, countries and the

region. l  Provide safe and secure investment environment to promote further growth of

individual countries and the region.

l  Current situation l  Attack model is evolving quickly.

l  End users are becoming more connected to the rest of the world every day.

l  Rise of the APTs and parties behind them.

l  Required actions l  Recognize the current state, identify problems.

l  Establish measures in the government. Guide private sectors to do the same.

l  Awareness raising in government and public sectors.

l  Proper investments into proper programs.

l  Don’t panic, but start your action, go on to the next step.

Copyright (c) 2011 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 21

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Copyright (c) 2010 National Information Security Center (NISC). All Rights Reserved. 22


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