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used to attain the negotiators goals. Strategies differ from tactics on a matter of scale. Tactics are

short term, adaptive moves designed to enact or pursue broader (or higher level) strategies. . . (p. 92;

Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1997), whereas strategies include the use of multiple tactics and

represent stylistic approaches to the negotiation process.

We examine five negotiation strategies that describe approaches to managing conflict: Collaborating,

competing, avoiding, accommodating, and compromising (Dallinger & Hample, 1995; De Dreu, Evers,

Beersma, Kluwer, & Nauta, 2001; Rahim, 1983). These five strategies have been frequently described

in the literature and are based on the dual-concern model (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Rahim & Bonoma,

1979). Collaborating, accommodating, and compromising strategies all derive from a high concern for

others or a pro-social orientation (Blake & Mouton, 1964; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt &

Rubin, 1986; Rahim & Bonoma, 1979). This orientation lends itself to a cooperative, integrative

approach that enables a negotiator to focus on helping others achieve their goals and find mutually

beneficial solutions. Competing conflict management strategies stem from self-concern, or an egoistic

orientation (Blake & Mouton, 1964; De Dreu et al., 2000; Rahim & Bonoma, 1979). Self-concerns

focus on doing what is perceived as best for oneself, such as winning or reaching the best self-outcome.

Each of the five negotiation strategies are described in more detail below.

Collaborating

This strategy has also been referred to as integrating or problem solving. Relative to the dual concerns

model, this strategy represents a high concern for attaining ones own outcomes as well as a high

concern for whether the other party attains their desired outcomes. A collaborative strategy is

represented by a desire to exchange meaningful and accurate information in order to reach an

agreement that is best for all parties involved. There is an emphasis on discovery of the basic interests of

those involved in the negotiation, in order to craft a solution that meets both parties interests. This

strategy is especially appropriate when there is value to synthesizing ideas to develop better solutions,

Proposed I-P-O Model of Salary Negotiations

Choice of Strategy

Compete

Collaborate

Accommodate

Compromise

Outcomes

Salary Increase

Reactions

Decision to Negotiate

(Avoid Strategy)H1a/H2a

H1b-d/H2b

H3/H4

H5

Individual Differences

Risk Aversion

Integrative Attitudes

Figure 1. Proposed I-P-O model of salary negotiations

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 32, 371394 (2011)

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appears to contradict prospect theory, showing that decisions about when to take risks are strongly

rooted in personality (Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-OCreevy, & Willman, 2005). Bottom and Studt

(1993) Argue that the manner in which individuals frame a negotiation are rooted in ones perception of

risk. The more risk one sees in the process of negotiation, the less assertive methods one would be

willing to use in negotiations. Risk averse people may not be willing to chance the destabilization of

relationships with aggressive negotiation strategies, because the impact on future relationships isunknown.

We expect that individuals who are more risk averse will frame a salary negotiation as more of a risk

and thus be less willing to enter into negotiation. When risk averse individuals opt to negotiate, they

will likely take a more passive approach. Risk averse people will be less likely to engage in more active

and aggressive negotiation behavior. Competitive and collaborative approaches to negotiation require a

striving for a different outcome. This different outcome may have the potential of a higher payoff, but

also requires engagement in a negotiation process that may be perceived as potentially causing damage

to the relationship, creating a less stable social dynamic.

H1a: Personality-based risk aversion will predict whether or not individuals choose to negotiate,

above and beyond the effects of contextual power. Individuals who are high in risk aversion will be

less likely to negotiate than individuals lower in risk aversion.

H1b: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, personality-based risk aversion will explain how

individuals choose to negotiate, above and beyond the effects of contextual power. Individuals who

are high in risk aversion will be more likely to use an accommodating strategy than individuals

lower in risk aversion.

H1c: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, personality-based risk aversion will explain how

individuals choose to negotiate, above and beyond the effects of contextual power. Individuals who

are high in risk aversion will be less likely to use a collaborating strategy than individuals lower in

risk aversion.

H1d: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, personality-based risk aversion will explain howindividuals choose to negotiate, above and beyond the effects of contextual power. Individuals who

are high in risk aversion will be less likely to use a competing strategy than individuals lower in risk

aversion.

Attitudes

One attitudinal individual difference that is likely to play a role in predicting choice of negotiation

strategy is to what extent one holds an integrative view of the negotiation process. In general, people

with integrative perspectives on negotiation believe that information should flow freely duringnegotiations and effort to understand issues on both sides. Individuals who hold integrative attitudes

believe there should be an emphasis placed on commonalities and a search for solutions that meet the

needs of both sides. Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White (2008) found that the ability to take others

perspectives in a negotiation context increased their ability to find unobvious solutions that were

mutually beneficial to both negotiating parties.

In addition to considering others perspectives, integrative attitudes underlie a belief that both parties

are likely to benefit from working together and a belief that a trusting, cooperative approach can lead to


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the best solutions for all parties. Beersma and De Dreu (1999) found that people with pro-social

motives, meaning those who seek good outcomes for themselves and others, were able to reach more

integrative negotiation agreements. Social motives may, in part, stem from integrative attitudes that

convey the value of finding winwin solutions to a negotiation. People with integrative attitudes believe

that for ongoing relationships, a jointly obtained solution is more likely to set up a base for cooperative

future interaction than winlose solutions. In contrast, individuals with a less integrative perspectiveview negotiation as a fixed-sum process, and are more likely to maximize personal gain and

minimize losses with winlose orientations. Individuals that value outcomes and relationships and

view negotiation as an integrative vehicle to reach agreements are more likely to negotiate salaries

and to use collaborative strategies to reach agreement.

H2a: Integrative attitudes will predict whether or not individuals choose to negotiate, above and

beyond the effects of contextual power. Individuals who hold more integrative attitudes about

negotiation will be more likely to negotiate than individuals with less integrative attitudes about

negotiation.

H2b: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, integrative attitudes will explain how individuals

choose to negotiate, above and beyond the effects of contextual power. Negotiation Strategies andOutcomes.

Laboratory research has demonstrated that the type of negotiation strategy used has a dramatic

impact on the process and outcome of the negotiation (Pruit, 1983; Thompson & Hrebec, 1996).

Negotiation research typically differentiates between competitive (forcing) and cooperative (problem-

solving) approaches. Theory and empirical studies have found that cooperative, problem-solving

approaches rather than forcing approaches lead to more integrative (winwin) solutions (Lewicki

et al., 1997; Pruit & Carnevale, 1993). Problem solving behaviors indicative of cooperative approach

involve the exchange of information, preferences and priorities; whereas competitive approaches use

tactics like persuasion, claiming, and the use of threats. It is unclear to what extent experimental

research generalizes to real world salary negotiation contexts, where more variables are necessarily

operating simultaneously.

Competing and collaborating are both active strategies that work to maximize the outcomes of the

negotiator. Whereas collaborating involves a dual focus on maximizing joint outcomes, competing

focuses more directly on achieving an individuals goals. We expected that these two negotiation

strategies will be linked with actual increases in negotiated salary because both strategies include

behaviors and tactics that lead to an overt expression of ones interests and presentation of information

towards the goal of increasing ones salary.

H3a: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, those who use a collaborating strategy will

increase their salary offer.

H3b: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, those who use a competing strategy will increase

their salary offer.

Pay dissatisfaction has been linked with undesirable employee outcomes and behaviors, such as

performance decrements, lateness, and job seeking (Heneman & Judge, 2000; Williams, McDaniel, &

Nguyen, 2006). First, social exchange theory posits that people react more favorably when the

outcomes they receive are positive (Homans, 1961). Further, we expect that strategies that involve a

dual focus on achieving ones interests andcreating or sustaining long term relationships with the other

parties involved in the negotiation will create a more balanced negotiation process, and that negotiators

will reflect back on their negotiations as having been fair and having been satisfied with the negotiation


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process and outcome. The justice literature lends support to this argument. Namely, Adams (1965)

equity theory maintains that attitudes (e.g., fairness, satisfaction) will be adversely affected by

perceived inequities in outcomes. Furthermore, according to the work of Thibaut and Walker (1975)

organizational procedures are more likely to be perceived as fair when individuals are given the

opportunity to influence the decision process; what is known as voice (Gilliland, 1994). Negotiation

strategies that involve a dual focus give the negotiator voice in the negotiation process, in that theyhave the opportunity to influence their outcomes. Strategies such as accommodating, in which

negotiators give up their voice, will likely result in overall lowered perceptions of fairness and lower

levels of satisfaction.

Within our I-P-O framework, we also hypothesize that negotiating strategies are the mechanism

through which personality based risk aversion and negotiation attitudes influence salary negotiation

outcomes.

H4a: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, those who use a collaborating strategy will have

more positive reactions toward their negotiated outcomes.

H4b: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, those who use a compromising strategy will have

more positive reactions toward their negotiated outcomes.

H4c: Among individuals who chose to negotiate, those who use an accommodating strategy will

have more negative reactions toward their negotiated outcomes.

H5: Negotiation strategies will mediate relationships between risk aversion and attitudes and

negotiation outcomes.

Method

Participants

A sample of 149 newly hired employees in various industry settings participated in the present study.

More specifically, data were gathered from two primary sources; tenure-lined faculty new hires for a

large Mid-Atlantic University (n 71) and from new hires in local industry in the same region (n 78).

Names and email address of all faculty hired within the previous three years were obtained from the

University Human Resources office. Similarly, part-time MBA students enrolled in classes from the

same University were recruited for participation this study. Faculty new hires and MBA students, who

had recently participated in a job search process, received an email with information concerning

the study goals and procedures. Those who were interested in participating were directed to a website

containing survey materials. Only individuals who had been hired within the last three yearswere recruited for participation. This ensured that our participants were not too far removed from the

negotiation process. The sample was comprised of 52 (34 per cent) women and 91 (59 per cent) men;

six individuals did not report gender information. The sample was primarily Caucasian (77 per cent).

To further protect anonymity of respondents, participants did not report their actual age, rather reported

the age band that best reflected their age at the time of survey completion. Thirty-one (20 per cent)

participants fell in the 2029 age range, 55 (36 per cent) participants were in the 3039 age range, 30

(20 per cent) were 4049 years of age, 25 (16 per cent) were 5059 years of age, and only 1 (0.6 per


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Negotiation strategy

Avoidance or the decision to negotiate was assessed with a single dichotomous item, After receiving a

job offer, did you negotiate the terms of the offer? We used this item as a proxy for the avoid

negotiation strategy. Individuals who chose not to negotiate for whatever reason were considered as

avoiding negotiation, whereas individuals who negotiated utilized strategies other than avoid. The

remainder of the negotiation strategies was assessed using both an adapted version of Rahims (1983)Negotiation Scale and items created by the researchers for purposes of this study. A seven-item

competitive strategy scale developed by the researchers was included to assess the degree to which

participants adopted a competitive strategy during job negotiations. An example from this scale is:

During negotiation, I tried to persuade the organization to better my offer by threatening to withdraw

from the process (a0.62). The remaining three scales were adapted from Rahim (1983) and

included items assessing the extent to which participants strategies could be classified as:

Collaborative (I exchanged accurate information with the organization to come to a joint agreement,

seven items, a 0.79), accommodating (I felt myself trying to accommodate to the wishes of the

organization, four items, a0.72), and compromising (I used give and take so that compromise

could be made, three items, a 0.63). Items were measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1

(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Outcomes

Two primary outcomes were assessed in the present study. First we asked respondents who negotiated

to tell us how much they were able to raise their starting salary in dollars. Second, we created a three-

item measure labeled Reactions to Negotiations to assess applicants affective reactions to the

negotiation process. Participants were asked to recall how satisfied they were with their final offer at the

time of hiring (At the time I signed the offer, I felt my final negotiated job offer package, salary and

other job-related benefits, was fair and reasonable), how satisfied they are now with their agreed upon

job offer (Looking back on it, I am still satisfied with the offer I received), and their perception of the

fairness of the negotiation process (I felt the negotiation process was fair and reasonable). The

coefficient a reliability of this scale was a 0.84 and items were measured on a five-point scale ranging

from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Power

Power was used as a covariate in this study representing the negotiating context, and was

operationalized as informational power, additional job offers, and experience. A three-item market-

information scale was created by the researchers to assess how much information participants gathered

about the organization with which they were negotiating. An example item from this scale is: How

much information did you gather about previous offers made by the organization? Items were

measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (nothing/none) to 5 (very much). Alpha for this

scale was 0.70. Participants were asked to indicate the number of alternate job offers they had receivedat the time. Finally, a three-item experience scale was created by the researchers to assess negotiators

previous negotiation and job experience. An example item included: Prior to this job offer, how many

times had you negotiated job offers? Alpha for this scale was 0.79.

Demographics

Questions assessing age, race, and gender were asked in this section.


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Descriptives and CFA

Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations among all study variables. A

confirmatory factor analysis was run to provide evidence for the construct validity of the individual

differences (integrative attitudes and risk aversion) and strategy variables (competing, collaborating,

compromising, and accommodating) examined in the present study. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest

multiple fit indices be used for judging model fit. SRMSR values of


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Table 2. Confirmatory factor analysis of key study variables

Model X2 df Dx2 SRMR CFI RMSEA

1 423.58 335 0.09 0.87 0.042 529.05 344 105.47 0.10 0.73 0.08

3 479.85 340 56.27

0.11 0.80 0.064 583.92 347 160.34 0.11 0.66 0.09

Model 1 specified six distinct factors in which items loaded onto their respective factors (integrative attitudes, risk aversion (thetwo IVs); and competing, collaborating, compromising, accommodating (the four strategies)).Model 2 specified four factors; namely two distinct IVs (integrative attitudes and risk aversion) and two strategies (self-focus vs.others-focus).Model 3 specified five factors; namely one IV (all independent variable items loaded onto one variable representing IV) and fourdistinct strategies.Model 4 specified three factors; namely one IV (all independent variable items loaded onto one variable representing IV) and twostrategies (self-focus vs. others-focus).

Table 3. Logistic regression regressing decision to negotiate onto risk aversion

b SE Wald Odds ratio

Step 1Gender 0.02 0.43 0.00 1.02Sample 1.78 0.46 14.74 5.94

Step 2Market info. 0.11 0.23 0.42 1.12Offers 0.71 0.31 5.13 2.04Experience 0.13 0.20 0.42 1.14

Step 3Risk aversion 0.92 0.38 5.85 0.40

p< 0.05; p< 0.01.

Table 4. Hierarchical regressions regressing strategy onto risk aversion

Competitive Collaborative Compromising Accommodating


R2 0.046 0.036 0.011 0.004Step 2

Market info. 0.27 0.38 0.28 0.12Offers 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.03Experience 0.29 0.16 0.02 0.25

DR2 0.157 0.174 0.081 0.08

Step 3Risk Aversion 0.19 0.31 0.17 0.18

DR2 0.03 0.084 0.028 0.026

p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.10.


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additional variance in use of a collaborating strategy. Consistent with each of Hypothesis 1c and 1d, risk

averse individuals were less likely to compete (b0.19, t 1.97, p< 0.05) or collaborate

(b0.31, t 3.42, p< 0.05). Full results are presented in Table 4.

Hypotheses 2ab examined the incremental variance in negotiation strategy explained by individual

differences in integrative attitudes beyond the effects of contextual power (also controlling for gender

and sample). Hypothesis 2a proposed negotiators who hold more integrative perspectives onnegotiation will be more likely to negotiate than those with less integrative attitudes. Similar to the

analytic strategy outlined in Hypothesis 1a, we control for sample and gender in step 1 and power in

step 2 of the logistic regression. Results, presented in Table 5, reveal that consistent with our reasoning,

those with more integrative attitudes toward negotiation were in fact 1.82 times more likely to negotiate

(b 0.60, Wald4.47, p< 0.05).

Furthermore, Hypothesis 2b maintains that among those who choose to negotiate, those with an

integrative perspective will be most likely to adopt a collaborative strategy. To test this hypothesis, we

regressed, individually, the remaining four strategies (compete, collaborate, compromise, and

accommodate) onto integrative attitudes (controlling for sample and gender in step 1, and power in step

2). Results of this analysis indicate that integrative attitudes only explained significant incremental

variance in collaborative strategy (7.3 per cent, see Table 6). Thus, negotiators with integrative attitudes

Table 5. Logistic regression regressing decision to negotiate onto integrative attitudes

b SE Wald Odds ratio


Step 2Market info. 0.11 0.23 0.23 1.12Offers 0.71 0.31 5.13 2.04Experience 0.13 0.20 0.42 1.34

Step 3

Attitudes 0.60 0.28 4.47 1.82

p< 0.05; p< 0.01.

Table 6. Hierarchical regressions regressing strategy onto integrative attitudes

Competitive Collaborative Compromising Accommodating


R2 0.046 0.036 0.021 0.004Step 2

Market info. 0.27 0.38 0.28 0.12Offers 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.03Experience 0.29 0.16 0.02 0.25DR2 0.157 0.174 0.077 0.08

Step 3Attitudes 0.15 0.29 0.13 0.09DR

2 0.021 0.073 0.015 0.007

p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.10.


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preferred collaborating strategies (b 0.29, t 3.15, p< 0.05). This provides full support for

Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

Hypotheses 3ab examined the relationships among negotiation strategies and resultant salary

increase (controlling for gender and sample effects). Hypothesis 3a predicted the use of a more

collaborating strategy would result in increased salary offer. Results provide partial support for this

prediction (b 0.19, t 1.77, p 0.08). Negotiators who used more collaborative strategies were ableto raise their salary offers; however this effect was only approaching significance (see Table 7).

Hypothesis 3b proposed use of a more competing strategy would result in increased salary offer.

Results support this proposition (b 0.34, t 3.28, p< 0.05, see Table 7).

Hypotheses 4ac examined the impact of negotiation strategies on reactions to negotiations

(controlling for gender and sample effects). Specifically, Hypothesis 4a proposed use of a collaborating

strategy would lead to more favorable reactions. Results support this proposition (b 0.50, t 5.92,

p< 0.05). Hypothesis 4b, that negotiators using a compromising strategy would have more favorable

reactions, was similarly supported (b 0.29, t 3.10, p


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present investigation. Avoid was also not examined as individuals who chose not negotiate did not have

the opportunity to raise their salary offer through job negotiations and thus, did not provide us this

information. The outputs examined included the two primary dependent variables discussed

throughout this paper: Salary increase and reactions to negotiations.

More specifically, in Hypothesis 2b integrative attitudes were found to influence collaborating

strategies. We thus examine how collaborating strategies mediate the relationship between integrative

attitudes and reactions to negotiations. In Hypotheses 1bd risk aversion was found to influence

competing, collaborating, and accommodating strategies. We in turn examine how competing and

collaborating strategies mediate the relationship between risk aversion and salary increase (recall,

competing and collaborating explained variance in salary increase, see Hypotheses 3ab); and also

examine how collaborating and accommodating strategies mediate the relationship between risk aversion

and reactions to negotiations (recall, collaborating, accommodating and strategies each explained variance

in reactions to negotiations, see Hypotheses 4ab). We examined each path individually. That is, weentered each mediator individually, rather than entering all mediators simultaneously.

Step 1 of mediation is fulfilled as expected given previous hypothesis testing. Controlling for sample

and gender, the independent variables each predict their respective mediators. Namely, risk aversion is

a significant predictor of each of the aforementioned four strategies (see Table 9 steps 1a1c), and

integrative attitudes are significant predictor of collaborating strategies (see Table 8 step 1a). Next we

must determine that the strategies predict salary raised and reactions to negotiation, respectively

controlling for risk aversion and integrative attitudes. Tables 8 and 9 provide full results of step 2, as

Table 8. Mediation analysis: testing effect of negotiation strategies on attitudes-outcome relationships

Step 1a Step 2a Sobel testCollaborative Reactions

Controls

Sample

0.18

0.09Gender 0.05 0.25

Independent variableIntegrative Attitudes 0.37 0.31

MediatorCollaborative 0.45 Z 3.10

p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p< 0.10.

Table 9. Mediation analysis: testing effect of negotiation strategies on risk-outcome relationships

Step 1aCompetitive

Step 1bCollaborative

Step 1cAccommodate

Step 2aSalary raised

Sobeltest

Step 2bReactions

Sobeltest

ControlsGender 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.23 0.09Sample 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.19y 0.25

Independent variableRisk Aversion 0.31 0.41 0.25 0.04 0.11

MediatorsCompetitive 0.36 Z 2.36

Collaborative 0.21 Z 1.65 0.55 Z 3.66

Accommodating 0.43 Z 2.27

Note: Standardized regression coefficients (betas) are shown.p< 0.05; p< 0.01; p 0.10.


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well as supporting Sobel tests, and a summary is provided here. Support was found for our mediation

analyses.

As presented in Table 8, use of a collaborating strategy mediated the relationship between integrative

attitudes and reactions to negotiations. Follow up Sobel tests support this mediating role (Z 3.10,

p< 0.01). Thus, it appears that negotiators with more integrative attitudes had more favorable reactions

to negotiations and this occurred through their use of more collaborative strategies.As presented in Table 9, the relationship between risk aversion and salary raised was mediated by use

of competing strategies (Z 2.36, p< 0.05) and partially mediated by the use of collaborating

strategies. Namely, risk averse individuals were less likely to raise their salaries and this was in part due

to their decreased likelihood of adopting competing strategies and to a less extent collaborating

strategies (Z 1.65, p 0.10). Similarly, the relationship between risk aversion and reactions to

negotiation was mediated by collaborating (Z 3.66, p< 0.01) and accommodating strategies

(Z 2.27, p


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post-offer recruitment activities, of which job negotiations would be one. She notes recruitment does

not end when an offer is extendedin fact, it may become especially important at this stage (p. 149).

Thus, more fully understanding the job negotiation process can also provide some needed insight into

an important late-state recruitment phenomena that has lasting impact for both the organization and

new employee. We only examined the role of the job candidate in salary negotiations, but as a relational

process, the organizations negotiating strategies would undoubtedly influence the process andoutcomes. Rau and Feinaur (2006) have noted the lack of research on the role of the organizational

agents who negotiate salary packages, but have advocated that factors such as organizational agent

effort level and perceived ability to influence are important factors in the salary negotiation process.

In addition, our samples focused on the salary negotiation process only for those applicants who

accepted job offers. More research on the job negotiation process for the full range of job applicants

entering into salary negotiations would be valuable to understand factors that lead to the failure to hire.

There are likely situation factors (e.g., better alternative job offers) and organizational factors (poor

negotiation process on the behalf of the organization) that may impact failure to hire decisions.

Similarly, the literature on job negotiations would be greatly enhanced by investigating both sides of

negotiations. Namely, gathering data from both the perspective job seeker and organizational

representative would advance understanding of the reciprocal nature of job negotiations.

Limitations

Few field studies of salary negotiations have been undertaken, and while we believe that field studies

are the critical next step in testing our experimentally-based negotiations findings, there are limitations

associated with this type of retrospective design. We relied on respondents reflection of their job

negotiations, which in some cases happened anywhere from a few months to a few years back. The

primary weakness of this approach is the potential impact of memory over time. It is important to note,

however, that retrospective designs are common designs used in organizational research to study

phenomena such as reactions to performance appraisals, managerial decisions, and recruitment decisions,

to name just a few (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Bies, Shapiro, & Cummings,

1988; Greenberg, 1986; Holtz & Harold, 2008). In Bies and colleagues work examining reactions to

managerial decisions (Aquino et al., 2006; Bies & Shapiro, 1987) effects were established in a controlled

laboratory setting and then replicated in a retrospective field setting, thus providing support for the use of

retrospective designs with actual employees. Similarly, retrospective designs are also quite common in the

applicant reactions literature (see Bauer et al., 2006 for an example).

Furthermore, surveying negotiators while they were actively involved with the process may raise

serious ethical concerns. Namely, asking our respondents questions pertaining to their strategy or with

regard to their satisfaction and fairness with the process may effectively interfere with the process,

causing them to change their behavior. For instance, a negotiator responding to questions about whether

they feel their offer or the process to date is fair, may begin to rethink the terms of the offer given or

decide s/he is no longer being treated fairly and reject what was before a satisfactory offer. Similarly, a

negotiator presented with items questioning competitive versus accommodating strategies may rethinkthe tactics s/he is employing and change his/her behavior toward the organization. Thus, the risk that a

Hawthorne-type effect might occur by presenting such information in tandem with the actual

negotiating process must be weighed along with the limitations of a retrospective design.

Related, the length of time since negotiating the terms of their offer could have an impact on

important study mediators and outcomes. We, however, did not collect data that would enable us to

control for the time elapsed between negotiation experience and survey completion. This will be an

important consideration for future research. Another potential limitation was our sample. We


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conducted two survey administrationsone among university faculty members and another using part

time MBA students who were employed full time by local organizations. The MBA sample contained

employees that worked across industries. It is possible that there are different approaches or norms to

salary negotiation across industries. We noted that the magnitude of the effects differed very little

across samples. Still, because sample differences were found among a few study variables, we controlled

for sample for all of our statistical analyses. Furthermore, the similar magnitude of effects across the twosamples gives some preliminary evidence for cross-industry generalizability of these findings.

The study methodology used a single-administration, cross-sectional study which may artificially

inflate relationships among variables due to common method bias. However, this is a criticism levied

against any cross-sectional design. Given the correlations in Table 1 were not overly inflated, and

results of Harmans one-factor test indicates that neither a single factor nor a dominant factor accounts

for the majority of variance in survey responses, we can be more confident that common method bias is

not an underlying cause for study results. Additionally, three of our scales had reliabilities lower than

the generally accepted 0.70 level. The compromise and competing strategy scales were among these

scales whose coefficient alphas were in the 0.63 and 0.62, respectively. However, a confirmatory factor

analysis indicated our strategy scale had fair fit. Furthermore, our scale was an adaptation from the

well-validated Rahim (1983) scale. Finally, given the high level of support for the hypotheses involving

competition, for instance, would suggest that perhaps our results actually provide a conservativeestimate of true effects. Regardless, future research examining job negotiations strategies will be

needed to replicate and improve upon these scales.

Yet there were advantages to our sample as well. Respondents were the actual negotiators who had

participated in real salary negotiations. Most previous research has relied on student simulations of

negotiations. These types of simulated negotiations make it difficult to assess affective-laden outcomes

accurately, because of the lack of realistic emotional investment. In sum, we have presented an initial

set of evidence that there seems to be meaningful connections between both contextual and individual

difference variables as predictors of negotiation strategies and outcomes.

Implications

There are important implications of these findings for both organizations and job seekers. First and

most obviously, job seekers must be aware of which strategies and actions will be most effective in

terms of salary gains. As we pointed out, just $5000 difference in starting salary may have implications

for over $600 000 worth of earnings over ones career.

Our results suggest only active strategies will result in salary gains. Formal programs educating

graduating students and individuals who plan to change jobs, on how to engage in such strategies may

be especially beneficial. This would serve a dual benefitforming attitudes about the value creation

possibilities available through effective negotiation, and developing a set of skills to enhance actual

negotiations.

The results of the present investigation call to light the importance of affective responses to the salary

negotiation process. Organizations should be especially cognizant that salary negotiations represent

one final opportunity to convince their top candidates to accept their job offer. To the extent thenegotiation process is perceived as unfair or the offer as unreasonable, the organizations chances of

securing an affirmative response are reduced; decreasing the utility of the entire recruitment process.

Moreover, even for those candidates who ultimately accepted the offer despite perceived unfair

negotiations, the relationship between employer and employee could be damaged. Future longitudinal

research examining the long-term impact of negotiations on commitment, performance, and other

related important outcomes will help further elucidate whether the job negotiations has a long lasting

impact on the relationship between the employee and organization.


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Conclusions

In conclusion, we provided an analysis of how several types of individual differencespersonality

based risk aversion, attitudes, as well as contextual information influence the use different negotiation

strategies in a salary negotiation. We then examined how negotiation strategies influenced salarynegotiation outcomes directly, and as mediators of individual differences. This allowed us to extend

previous research on the role of individual differences and negotiating strategies in predicting outcomes

of a salary negotiation. Our study offers evidence that risk-aversion and integrative attitudes are

important predictors of the use of a collaborative approach to negotiation. Collaborative styles, along

with competitive strategies, lead to significant gains in salary offers, while collaborative approaches

also led to feelings of satisfaction with the negotiated deal and fairness with the negotiated process.

Negotiators who accommodated ended up feeling most unsatisfied, and were left with the perception

that the process to their negotiated agreements was unfair.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Kate Bezrukova, Matt Cronin, and Kevin Rockmann, and Claus Langfred for

their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Author biographies

Michelle A. Marks is an Associate Professor of management in George Mason Universitys School of

Management. She earned her Ph.D. in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from George Mason

University. Dr Marks teaches courses in organizational behavior, leadership, global business andhuman resource management in executive, MBA, and undergraduate programs. Her research and

consulting interests are in the areas of high performance teams, multi-team systems, leadership

development, and strategic alliances.

Crystal Harold received her doctorate in IndustrialOrganizational Psychology from George Mason

University. She is currently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Resource Management

in the Fox School of Business and Management. Her research aims to enhance organizational

recruitment theory and practice. Specifically, she examines the role of personenvironment fit

perceptions in the applicant job choice process, the role of employer brand image, and strategies

for organizations to improve their recruitment processes. Additionally, she examines issues surround-

ing applicant and employee reactions to injustice.

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Appendix A

Negotiation Strategy

Competition Scale

(1) During negotiation, I tried to persuade the organization to better my offer by threatening to

withdraw from the process.

(2) In the negotiation process, I presented information about my past record and qualifications to

improve the quality of the offer extended to me.


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(3) During negotiations, I made clear the value and benefit I could bring to the organization, in an

attempt to influence the process.

(4) While negotiating, I did not take no for an answer.

(5) During the negotiation process, if I felt that the organizations offer was unreasonable, I made sure

to make my feelings known.

(6) I presented information about the market value of the position for which I was hired.

Collaborate Scale

(1) I tried to negotiate an offer that was acceptable to both me and the organization.

(2) I tried to integrate my interests with those of the organization to come up with an offer supported by

both sides.

(3) I tried to work together with the organization to come up with an acceptable offer.

(4) I exchanged accurate information with the organization to come to a joint agreement.

(5) I tried to bring all of our concerns out in the open so that the issues can be resolved in the best

possible way.

(6) I collaborated with the organization to come up with an offer acceptable to both of us.

(7) I tried to work with the organization to gain a thorough understanding of their position.

Compromise Scale

(1) I tried to find a middle ground to reach an acceptable offer.

(2) I proposed a middle ground to resolve the differences between our two sides.

(3) I used give and take so that compromise could be made.

Accommodate Scale

(1) I initiated job negotiations, but I gave in to the demands of the organization.

(2) To reach an agreement, I allowed more concessions than the organization.

(3) I felt myself trying to accommodate the wishes of the organization.

(4) Though I attempted to negotiate, I found myself going along with much of what the organization

initially offered.

Inputs

Integrative Attitudes

(1) Negotiation is almost always a process of ones gain over the other.

(2) A good title to negotiation is a confrontation between sides with opposite goals.

(3) Negotiation is almost always a process in which both sides can benefit simultaneously.

Risk Aversion in Negotiations(1) I am not willing to take risks when choosing a job or a company to work for.

(2) I prefer a low risk/high security job with a steady salary over a job that offers high risks and high

rewards.

(3) I prefer to remain on a job that has problems that I know about rather than take the risks of working

at a new job that has unknown problems even if the new job offers greater rewards.

(4) I view risk on a job as a situation to be avoided at all costs.


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Market Information

(1) How much did you know about the organization from which you received an offer?

(2) How much did you know about the salary and/or benefits of current employees in the position you

applied for?

(3) How much information did you gather about previous offers made by the organization?

(4) How much information did you gather about the market value of your position?

Experience

(1) Prior to this job offer, how many times had you negotiated job offers?

(2) How many full time jobs have you had before taking this position?

(3) How many years of full time work experience have you had before taking this position.


DOI: 10.1002/job


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