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Revue Internationale d'Arts et de SciencesMedjunarodni Casopis za Kulturu, Umetnost i Nauku

International Journal for Arts and SciencesInternationale Zeitschrift für Kunst und Wissenschaft

VOLUME 7 Paris, printemps/spring 1998 No 25

ISSN: 1164-8147

DOSSIER Kosovo & Metohia

Notes on the Kosovo Problem and the International CommunityDiana Johnstone

Kosovo-Metohija: Origins of a Conflict and Possible SolutionaDusan T. Batakovic

The Kosovo and Metohia Problem and Regional Security in theBalkans

Predrag Simic

Der Kosovokonflikt: Bemerkungen und FragenGeorges Pomphrey

Les sanctions, à quoi servent-elles ?Dragas Keseljevic, Marko Krstic et Djordje Radovanovitch

DocumentsLa loi de non-retour de 1945-1946

Slobodan Milosevic: Speech on the Field of Kosovo (1989)

Kosovo-Albanians Memorandum

Inter -Serbian dialogue on Kosovo: A proposal

Opening Statement, Washington Hearing On KosovoRepression and Violence

Senator Alfonse D'Amato

ArtsLes illustrations dans ce numéro: Bojana Maksimovic

Revue trimestrielle d'arts et desciences

Paris, printemps 1998Volume: 7, N°: 25

Prix: 60 FPublié par:Association DIALOGUEc/o Titre47 bis, Avenue de Clichy75017 ParisPresident:Vlastimir StojanovicCoéditeur:Editions du TitreImprimé par:Editions du Titre47 bis, Avenue de Clichy75017 ParisDépôt légal: Mars 1998ISSN: 1164-8147Commission paritaire: N° 74219Copyright © DIALOGUE, 1998

Directeur et rédacteur en chef:Dragan PavlovicRédacteurs associé:Dusan Batakovic * Gérard Caron * EgonCikla i * Louis Dalmas * DianaJohnstone * Raymond Kent * BorisLazic * Djordje Maksimovic * GoranNikolic * Zlatomir Popovic * SpasaRatkovic * Slobodan Soja * MatthiasSteinle * Radivoj Stanivuk * ZeljanSchuster * Roland VasicAdministration:Nikola Sujica, France * Miro Urosevic,AllemagneConseil de Rédaction:Mojsije Abinun, littérature, France *Milovan Danojlic, littérature, FranceDejan Djokic, RU * Zlatko Glamocak,arts, France * Mirko Govedarica,sociologie, France * Dejan Kocovic,France * Jovanka Konj ikovic ,a rch i tec ture , France * Djord jeKonjikovic, France * Vesna Levkovic,droi t , France Djordje Levkovic ,

biologie, France * Bratislav Milanovic,littérature, Yougoslavie * NikolaMilenkovic, l i t térature, France *Vladimir Milicic, EU * Sima Mraovic,biologie, France * Nenad Petrovic,l i t t é ra ture , RU Negovan Raj ic ,littérature, Canada * Nikola Samardzic,histoire, Yougoslavie * Charles Simic,littérature, EU * Vlastimir Stojanovic,dro i t , France* Gordana Suj ica ,a rch i tec ture , France *ThomasTodorovic, sociologie, Japan *Nina Urosevic, AllemagneTraducteurs:Velimir Popovic * Harita Wybrands________________________________

DIALOGUEDirecteur fondateur (1992-1997):

Dr. Bogoljub Kochovich-------------------------------------------

Publiée avec le concours duCentre national du livre.

______________________________

DIALOGUE on Internet: http://www.bglink.com/business/dialogue

Service abonnementServis pretplate

Subscription ServiceArgentina: Egon Ciklai, GuillermoRawson 2729 IVB, 1636 Olivos,Prov. de B. Aires.Canada: Dusan Pavlovic, 4564 Av-enue Coolbrook, Montreal, Qué,H3X 2K6.France: Nikola Suica, 20, rue JeanColly, 75013, Paris.Suisse/Schweiz : KatarinaVeljanovic, Chemin de la redoute32, 1260 Nyon, (Genève).United Kingdom:Miss Deborah Danica Mager, 88Henniker Road, London E15 1JPU. S. A.: Desa Tomasevic -Wakeman, 2471 Cedar Street,Berkeley, CA 95708.Yugoslavia: Djordje Maksimovic,Cvijiceva 24, 11000 Beograd

Les articles ne reflètentpas nécessairement les

opinions de la rédaction.

Avis aux auteurs“Dialogue” est une revue trimestrielle des idées, plus précisément de toutes

les idées. Comme le contenu d’un numéro se veut très varié et englobera tout ce quise réfère, au sens le plus large aux sciences humaines et naturelles, à la culture etaux arts, les auteurs devraient être conscients que peu de lecteurs sont experts danstous ces domaines. Il faudra éviter les expressions techniques inutiles; là oùl’utilisation de ces expressions sera nécéssaire, il faudra en donner une explicationdétaillée lors de la première utilisation. Les manuscrits devront être proprementdactylographiés, avec un double interligne et uniquement en recto. La rédactionpense que la langue est un outil de communication. Si la forme elle-même est l’objetque l’on veut communiquer, ce texte doit être soumis pour publication dans la partielittéraire de notre revue.

Les “analyses” et les “commentaires longs”, ainsi que les articles originauxseront examinés par plusieurs membres (le plus souvent par 2 à 3 personnes) duComité de rédaction ou de Conseil, parmi lesquels certains habitent en dehors del’Europe. Le délai de transmission d’un pli postal peut ainsi aller de 3 à 7 semaines.Pour cette raison, les auteurs devront avoir en vue que le contenu des articles devrarester d’actualité même 6 mois après leur envoi à la Rédaction de la revue. Les textesen langues étrangères: Les textes soumis pour publication en langue étrangère(français, anglais, allemand) seront publiés sans traduction. Ils occuperont 50% ducontenu de la revue. Ces textes seront accompagnés d’un court résumé.

Les différentes catégories de textes: 1. Editorial (1 à 2 pages). En principeun à trois articles par numéro sur les thèmes politiques (politique au sens large duterme). 2. Commentaires courts (1 page). Ce seront des commentaires écrits par lesmembres de la rédaction ou du Conseil de rédaction ou, exceptionnellement, par leslecteurs. Il s’agira de commentaires sur les articles les plus importants parus dansle même numéro de la revue, ou sur des problèmes divers d’actualité. La structurede ces commentaires courts sera libre, journalistique. Si l’on se réfère à lalittérature, on la citera dans le texte. 3. Analyses et commentaires longs. Cesanalyses et commentaires concerneront les avancées les plus récentes dans undomaine donné. Il est souhaitable qu’ils n’excèdent pas 7 pages de la revue. Lesauteurs devront s’arranger pour que le titre de l’article en décrive correctement lecontenu. L’article doit débuter par un court résumé (100 à 130 mots). Le titre et lerésumé seront traduits en français et en anglais. Un ou deux paragraphes (intro-duction) devront aider le lecteur qui ne serait pas expert du sujet traité, à lecomprendre. Le texte devrait se terminer par une conclusion courte. Dans le cas deconclusion à plusieurs éléments, il faudra la limiter aux plus importants. Lesréférences à la littérature seront mentionnées à la fin de l’article par ordre decitation dans le texte. Les notes ne se référant pas à la littérature sont égalementpermises. Il est recommandé aux auteurs de ne pas essayer de prouver (dans le casidéal) plus d’un fait, et cela en utilisant des arguments déjà acceptés comme desdonnées scientifiques démontrées. 4. Articles originaux. Ce seront des exposésargumentés sur des nouvelles vues des problèmes avec, éventuellement, des solu-tions originales. La structure et la longueur de l’article seront similaires aux“analyses et commentaires longs”. 5. Commentaires des lecteurs. Ce sont descommentaires plus longs (maximum 2 pages) ayant la structure d’un article, maisn’approfondissant pas trop le sujet traité. Un “résumé” n’est pas nécessaire, maisles citations de littérature seront clairement énoncées. 6. Lettres des lecteurs à larédaction. 7. Actualités. Compte - rendus sans analyse profonde, à propos desévénements culturels et scientifiques, ou des nouveaux livres parus aussi bien enYougoslavie que dans le reste du monde, mais qui strictement parlant ne sont pasdu domaine de la littérature (1 page maximum par compte - rendu). 8. Littératureet arts. Prose et poésie. Les créations littéraires originales non encore publiées(maximum 10 pages de la revue). Exceptionnellement il sera possible de faireparaître des contributions littéraires plus longues en plusieurs séquences ou desfragments d’un livre. Peinture et arts plastiques. Des reproductions (3 à 5 pages dela revue).

Zadnjastranakorica

Jedna slika

DIALOG

UEN

° 25 1998

DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 1

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Sommaire

Dans ce numéro/About this issue 3Editorial 5/8Kosovo: A Few Facts (Diana Johnstone) 11

ArticlesNotes on the Kosovo Problem andthe International Community 13Diana Johnstone

Kosovo-Metohija: Origins of a Conflict andPossible Solutiona 41Dusan T. Batakovic

The Kosovo and Metohia Problem and Regional Securityin the Balkans 57Predrag Simic

Der Kosovokonflikt: Bemerkungen und Fragen 87Georges Pomphrey

Les sanctions, à quoi servent-elles ? 95Dragas Keseljevic, Marko Krstic et Djordje Radovanovitch

DocumentsLa loi de non-retour de 1945-1946(Commentaire de 1989 et textes de 1945 et 1946) 101

Slobodan Milosevic:Speech on the Field of Kosovo (1989) 109

Kosovo-Albanians Memorandum(To the Foreign Ministers of the Contact GroupMeeting in London) 114

Inter -Serbian dialogue on Kosovo: A proposal 120

Opening Statement, Washington Hearing On KosovoRepression and Violence 131Senator Alfonse D'Amato

N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998

sommaire

DIALOGUE, N° 25, Printemps/Spring 19982

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Readers should note that articles appear in Dialoguewith minimal editorial intervention, whether in style or con-tent. While authors are requested to follow certain basicstylistic guidelines, Dialogue lacks the means to enforcestylistic conformity. Precedence goes to content over form andto the interest of an argument over its formal presentation.

***La rédaction signale que les articles qui paraissent dans

Dialogue n’ont subi qu’un minimum d’intervention éditoriale,qu’il s’agit de forme ou de fond. Dialogue n’a pas les moyensd’imposer l’uniformité de présentation pourtant demandéeaux auteurs. Priorité est donnée à l’intérêt d’un argumentplutôt qu’à la forme de sa présentation.

Sadrzaj

Privatizacija u Srbiji i "medjunarodna zajednica" 149Slobodan Vukovi}

Domorodka opsena 163Nikola Milenkovi}

Mar{ po led! 176Bo‘idar Violi}

Uputstva autorim 178

SVEDOÂNSTVA O PRO[LOSTI(Dimitrije \or|evi}, Portreti iz novije srpske istorije) 182Du{an T. Batakovi}

Pisma DijalogaLettres de Dialogue / Dialogue Letters(DANS L'EDITION "ABONNEMENT")

ArtsLes illustrations dans ce numéro: Bojana Maksimovic 134

La vision poetique de Dante d'apres M. Pejovic 137Thomas Todorovic

Esquisse pour ma vie sans mensonge 145Milivoje Pejovic

sommaire (cont.)


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DANS CE NUMERO...

Ce numéro de DIALOGUE est consacré auproblème du Kosovo. Deux remarques s’imposent.

L’objectif fondamental de DIALOGUE est decontribuer à une meilleure compréhension desproblèmes pour favoriser l’éventuelle nécessaireréconciliation entre tous ceux qui sont destinés à partagerl’espace de ce qui était la Yougoslavie pendant laplupart du vingtième siècle. Ce but exige d’écarter toutparti pris national, religieux ou ethnique. Toute solu-tion raisonnable doit se baser sur l’appréciation desfaits et des points de vue divergents.

Depuis que l’attention du monde s’est tournéevers la région du Kosovo début mars 1998, les médiaset les responsables politiques de ce qu’on appelle “lacommunauté internationale” ont épousé jusqu’à la cari-cature une interprétation des événements favorable auxthèses des sécessionistes albanais les plus extrèmes.Ainsi ont-ils effectivement poursuivi le démantèlementde cet idéal d’une société multi-culturelle qu’ilsprétendent vouloir défendre, tout en bloquant le dia-logue qu’ils réclament par moments.

Retrouver un équilibre perdu exige de pencher nefût-ce qu’un instant dans l’autre sens. Ce numéro deDIALOGUE donne donc priorité aux aspects et auxanalyses du problème du Kosovo qui actuellement setrouvent pratiquement exclus de la discussion publique.

Une deuxième remarque s’impose à nos lecteursfrançais, auxquels nous présentons nos excuses pour lefait que des textes en langue anglaise dominent cenuméro. Ce regrettable déséquilibre linguistiques’explique à la fois par l’urgence de publier et par notremanque de moyens. Il reflète aussi le fait que, de plus


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en plus, c’est dans la langue anglo-américaine qu’estdécidé le sort des peuples des Balkans, qu’on le veuilleou non.___________________________________________________________

ABOUT THIS ISSUE...

This issue is devoted to the problem of Kosovo.DIALOGUE is fundamentally committed to a

serious examination of problems free of all national,religious or ethnic prejudice, in the conviction thatgreater understanding is the necessary basis for peaceand reconciliation among all those who live side byside in what was called Yugoslavia for most of thiscentury. Reasonable solutions must be based on recog-nition of the facts and of different viewpoints.

Since world attention was drawn to Kosovo inearly March 1998, media and political leaders of whatis called “the international community” have uncriticallyadopted a one-sided interpretation of events favorableto the most extreme ethnic Albanian secessionist claims.In this way they have in effect further discredited theviability of their proclaimed ideal of “multi-culturalsociety” and blocked the very dialogue they claim attimes to demand.

The attempt to restore a lost balance requiresleaning at least momentarily in the other direction. Thisissue of DIALOGUE therefore gives priority to aspectsand analyses of the Kosovo problem which are almostwholly excluded from current public discussion.

No genuine dialogue, no lasting peace is possiblewithout first recognizing the very complex nature ofthe problem. Facts must be established as the basis forvalue judgments. Our only ambition is to contribute tothis effort.


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D I A L O G U EVolume 7, N° 25 Paris Printemps 1998

EDITORIAL

Negotiations of all sorts often founder on differences be-tween the parties in their perception of what is fair. In thisrespect, mediation by a third disinterested party can be quitehelpful. However, at present, instead of a mediator, whowould try to help the parties reach agreement but has little orno power, the Kosovo problem seems to involve an interestedarbitrator with considerable power to impose a solution.

International mediation and even military interventionis being demanded and this demand is highly controversial.First, in principle, interested parties should not mediate (i.e.act as mediators), according to the UN Charter. Many politi-cal analysts qualify the USA as interested in the matter of theBalkans. The military presence of NATO forces, installationsand networks in the region of Southeastern Europe is clearproof of the intense interestedness of the USA and shoulddisqualify it as unsuitable to act as mediator in conflicts in thatregion. Second, the situation in Kosovo is fundamentallydifferent from that in Bosnia. Bosnia was the scene of armedconflict from the moment it declared its independence as aState, and this could have partially justified the presence ofarmed observers. Kosovo is formally recognized by the inter-national community as a part of Serbia, and the problem isessentially political rather than military. There is no legalbasis for NATO involvement. A request for mediation bytruly disinterested — and preferably distant — UN MemberStates,, if agreed by both sides, would be most appropriate.


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Recently, however, disorders have been occurring in-volving attacks on the police by armed groups of ethnicAlbanians belonging to a “liberation army” which has quiteprobably been set up by some foreign power or powers inorder to be used to justify further foreign intervention in theYugoslav lands. The risk that minor armed conflicts couldinflame the whole region may be cited to justify NATOdeployment and to disqualify non-military observers or UNforces. The European Union does not appear able to opposeUS arbitration (in spite of the fact that the USA is an interestedparty whose interests may even diverge from those of EUMember States in the region), which makes final success ofUS involvement in the region via NATO virtually inevitable.

The fact that the events in Kosovo and Metohia resultfrom application of a policy of extremely generous minorityrights in communist Yugoslavia has serious implications forconsideration of human rights issues. These events will prob-ably force the question to be raised as to whether minoritygroups should benefit from any special rights at all (minorityrights). The question would probably have to be seriously re-examined and weighed against other less rapid but much safermeasures such as furthering justice, ensuring nondiscrimina-tion and protecting individual rights.

Moreover, it will become clear that, if it is maintainedthat in principle a State should be based essentially onethnicity, this will lead to permanent conflicts. With thefacilitation of transport and communications, the mixingbetween neighbouring populations is going to increase andcrises concerning frontiers and interstate clashes may be-come more frequent, instability more general and peace muchmore rare. The concept of ethnic States will continue to beused to justify political claims of dubious moral value, suchas: nonacceptance of majority rule even if that rule is equita-ble and just, the right to break up an association withoutadequately satisfying partners who suffer loss from the break-up, the demand for the benefits of an association whilerefusing to accept the burdens, and so on. Of course, ethnicproblems which are present in many European countries


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seriously affect the issue and make the matter more compli-cated.

Will force be used in Europe this time? Or will eco-nomic blockades and sanctions be used instead? In eithercase (as the example of Iraq illustrates), political regimeswhich are the ostensible target may be perpetuated, whilewhole populations are in fact held responsible and forced topay. Jet, instead of blindly insisting on ethnic discrimination,promoting democratic values, multi-cultural tolerance, andsocial justice would be not only more wise but also, simply,more human.

Surprisingly, it has become common to accept withoutmuch concern a quite foolish assumption that there existplaces (even in Europe itself!) where human rights are vio-lated so much that the armed overthrow of such regimes isincreasingly demanded as a form of “humanitarian interven-tion”. Military intervention with important “collateral dam-age” would be, it is maintained, justified without asking thosewho are deprived of those “human rights” whether theywould prefer to die themselves during that intervention, aspart of the inevitable "collateral damage", so as to permitfuture generations to enjoy, presumably, greater “humanrights”. Human rights?

Dragan Pavlovic


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EDITORIAL

Toutes sortes de négociations achoppent sur les diver-gences entre les parties à propos de ce que ces dernièrescroient juste. A cet égard, la médiation d’un tiers désintéressépeut être d’un grand secours. Aujourd’hui cependant, plusque d’un médiateur qui tenterait d’aider les parties à s’accordermais qui ne disposerait que de peu ou pas de pouvoir, leproblème du Kosovo semble relever d’un arbitre intéressé,doté du pouvoir considérable d’imposer une solution.

La médiation internationale est réclamée et cette reven-dication est une source de difficultés. 1 - Selon la Charte desNations Unies, des parties intéressées ne peuvent interveniren médiateurs. De nombreux analystes politiques considèrentles USA comme intéresse en matière de Balkans. La présencemilitaire des forces, des installations et des réseaux de l’OTANdans l’Europe du sud-est est une preuve évidente de l’intérêtde l’Amérique pour cette région, et devrait la disqualifier entant que médiatrice des conflits qui s’y déroulent. 2 - Lasituation dans le Kosovo est fondamentalement différente decelle en Bosnie. La Bosnie a été la scène d’un conflit armé dèsl’instant où elle a déclaré son indépendance et tant qu’Etat, etceci pouvait justifier en partie la présence d’observateursarmés. Le Kosovo est officiellement reconnu par lacommunauté internationale comme faisant partie de la Serbie,et le problème est par essence plus politique que militaire. Iln’existe aucune base légale à un engagement de l’OTAN. Lademande d’une médiation par des Etats membres de l’ONUdésintéressé - et de préférence éloignés - serait tout à faitappropriée.

Récemment, cependant, des désordres se sont produitscomprenant des attaques de la police par des Albanais armésappartenant à une “armée de libération” très probablementmise sur pied par une ou plusieurs puissances étrangères, defaçon à justifier une nouvelle intervention extérieure sur les


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territoires yougoslaves. Le risque que des conflits localiséspuissent enflammer toute la région peut être invoqué pourjustifier un déploiement de l’OTAN et disqualifier lesobservateurs civils ou les forces de l’ONU. L’Unioneuropéenne ne semble pas capable de s’opposer à l’arbitrageaméricain (en dépit du fait que les USA sont une partieintéressée dont les intérêts peuvent même être différents deceux des Etats membres de l’UE dans la région), ce qui rendle succès final de l’engagement américain via l’OTANpratiquement inévitable.

Le fait que les événements en Kosovo-Metohie résultentde l’application, dans la Yougoslavie communiste, d’unepolitique de droits minoritaires extrêmement généreuse,entraîne de sérieuses conséquences en ce qui concerne laquestion des droits de l’homme. Ces événements nousobligeront probablement à nous demander si les groupesminoritaires doivent se voir attribuer des droits spéciauxquelconques (droits minoritaires). La question devra sansdoute être sérieusement réexaminée à la lumière d’autresmesures moins rapides mais plus sûres, telle que lerenforcement de la justice, l’assurance de la non-discrimina-tion et la protection des droits de l’individu.

De plus, il va devenir de plus en plus évident, si leprincipe de fonder les Etats sur une base ethnique est maintenu,que ce dernier sera la source de conflits permanents. Avecl’accès plus facile aux transports et aux communications, lemélange de populations voisines va se développer, multipliantles crises de frontières et les affrontements d’Etats, accroissantl’instabilité et raréfiant les possibilités de paix. Le conceptd’Etats ethniques continuera à servir de justification à desrevendications politiques de douteuse valeur morale, tellesque le refus de l’autorité majoritaire, même si cette autoritéest équitable et juste, le droit de rompre une association sanscontrepartie satisfaisante pour les associés lésés par rupture,l’exigence des avantages d’une association sans acceptationdes charges, et ainsi de suite. Sans compter les problèmesethniques de bien d’autres pays européens, qui influent sur lasituation et la rendent encore plus complexe.


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Va-t-on cette fois-ci avoir recours a la force en Europe?Ou va-t-on se rabattre sur les blocus économiques et lessanctions ? Dans tous les cas (comme le montre l’exemple del’Irak) les régimes politiques qui sont les prétendues ciblessont pérennisés, alors que des populations entières sont enfait rendues responsables et forcées à en payer le prix. Defaçon surprenante, il est devenu monnaie courante d’accepterà la légère l’idée folle qu’il existe des endroits (même enEurope !) où les droits de l’homme sont violés au point qu’onréclame de plus en plus souvent le renversement des régimescomme une forme “d’intervention humanitaire”.L’intervention militaire, accompagnée d’importants“dommages accessoires” serait, dit-on, justifiée sans qu’onprenne la peine de demander à ceux qui son privés de ces“droits de l’homme” s’ils ont envie de mourir pendantl’intervention, victimes de l’inévitable “dommage accessoire”,pour permettre aux générations futures de jouir de “droits del’homme” supposés plus étendus... Droits de l’hommes ?

Dragan Pavlovic


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Belgrade

F. R. Yugoslavia

Kosovo &Metohia

KOSOVO:

A Few Facts

KOSOVO AND METOHIA. Thearea of the present-day Autono-mous Province of Kosovo con-sists of two separate geographicentities. The first is Kosovo, avalley between Pristina andDrenica, 84 km long and about14 km wide, densely populated,with significant agricultural andmineral resources and a networkof important regional transportconnections. The other is the ter-ritory known as Metohia (in me-dieval times metoh was the termfor the holdings of the monaster-ies), which the Albanians includein a broader area calledDukagyin. It is about 80 km inlength and over 40 km in width,and, compared with Kosovo, isprimarily agricultural. The areaof the Autonomous Province is10,887 sq. km., which is 12.3percent of the area of Serbia and10.6 percent of the total area of

FR Yugoslavia. Its population is1,954,747 or 20.5 percent of thetotal population of Serbia, that is19 percent of that of FR Yugo-slavia. According to the last reli-able census in 1981, ethnic Alba-nians (an important frontier mi-nority - a frequent phenomenonin Europe) made up 77.4 percentof the population, whileMontenegrins and Serbs ac-counted for 14.9 percent.

Kosovo and Metohia wereat the heart of the medieval Ser-bian Kingdom which, after the1389 battle at Kosovo Polje (the“Field of Blackbirds “), was con-quered in the mid fifteenth cen-tury by the Ottoman Empire. Fivehundred years of Ottoman rule,based on sharp social, economicand legal distinctions betweenMuslims and non-Muslims, cre-ated deep cleavages between theethnic and religious communities


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inhabiting the same territories.Upon final liberation from Otto-man rule in the First Balkan Warof 1912, the Kosovo region be-came part of Serbia, whereasMetohia became part ofMontenegro. As such, both areasbecame part of the Kingdom ofthe Serbs, Croats and Slovenes(the first Yugoslavia) at the endof the first World War. Duringthe Axis occupation during WorldWar II, when Yugoslavia wasdismembered, most of Kosovoand Metohia was attached to Al-bania, then an Italian fascist pro-tectorate. In 1944 Kosovo andMetohia were returned to Serbiaand constituted for the first timeas a separate administrative dis-trict. Subsequent constitutional(1968, 1971, 1974) and demo-graphic changes under commu-nist rule (due to the extremelyhigh natality rate but also due toimportant immigration fromneighbouring “ultra communist”Albania) tended to strengthen eth-nic Albanian irredentist tenden-cies. The extremely high degreeof autonomy granted Kosovowithin the Republic of Serbia bythe 1974 Constitution encouragedethnic Albanian nationalist lead-ers to consider the territory asessentially an ethnic entity, onewhich could be detached fromYugoslavia. These aspirationsculminated in the secessionist

demonstrations of 1981, whichled to violent clashes with thepolice. In the late sixties andthroughout the decades that fol-lowed, the ethnic Serb inhabit-ants of Kosovo increasingly com-plained to Belgrade that they werebeing pushed out of the province.

Long concealed by Titoistrule, the situation of the Serbianminority in Kosovo became a keypolitical issue only when the post-communist power struggle startedin the late 1980s, when SlobodanMilosevic ostensibly came to theirdefence. This emotional issuefacilitated the parliamentaryrevocation in 1989 of the ex-tremely high degree of provincialautonomy accorded by the 1974Constitution - a measure alsoconsidered necessary for post-communist liberalization re-forms. Ethnic Albanian leadersrejected this change and began aboycott of official Serbian insti-tutions, along with the establish-ment of their own parallel insti-tutions. Followed by a majorityof the ethnic Albanian popula-tion, this boycott widened thegap between the ethnic commu-nities in Kosovo.

D. J.


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Notes on the Kosovo Problem andthe International Community

Diana Johnstone

________________________________________________RESUMÉ. L’enjeu essentiel du conflit au Kosovo c’est le statutpolitique du territoire et son maintien dans un État (la Serbie) pluri-culturel. Les nationalistes albanais mène la lutte pour détacher ceterritoire au nom de leur majorité démographique, rejetant ainsi lacoexistence pluri-culturelle. La réaction quasi-unanime de ce qu’onappelle “la communauté internationale” au drame du Kosovo estrévélateur de l’évolution du monde de l’après-guerre froide. Lesexigences contradictoires de cette “communauté” groupée autour dela puissance des États-Unis (soutien formel au principe de l’intégritéterritoriale de la Serbie, tout en incitant par leur parti pris affiché lesnationalistes albanais à poursuivre leur lutte) attisent les conflitsethniques, dont l’inextricabilité servira finalement à justifier, au nomde la défense des droits de l’homme, l’intervention politique,économique et éventuellement militaire (de l’OTAN).

Les mensonges circulés pendant des années selon lesquels lesintellectuels de l’Academie serbe auraient prôné la “purificationethnique” dans le “Memorandum” de 1986 (dont les passages souventincriminés sans être lus sont ici cités dans le texte) ainsi quel’ignorance volontaire des projets de compromis (ici mentionnés) ontpréparé l’opinion pour l’interprêtation d’une action de police - certesbrutale mais largement provoquée - comme le début de la “purifica-tion ethnique”, voire du “génocide”. Ainsi suit l’appel aux sanctionsqui en appauvrissant encore davantage la Serbie rendra la marge decompromis et de réconciliation encore plus étroite.

Enfin, l’intervention au nom des droits de l’homme risque den’être qu’un prétexte pour gérer un chaos que la communautéinternationale aurait largement contribué à créer. Dans le conflitautour du statut politique du territoire du Kosovo, le côté albanaisjouit de l’avantage décisif d’une stratégie qui depuis des années faitappel à cette intervention, tandis que le côté serbe s’y oppose. Ce droitde l’intervention, mis en pratique dans les Balkans, pourra par la suiteêtre appliqué à d’autres régions d’intérêt stratégique ou économique,


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dès qu’une minorité ethnique préfère l’appartenance à “la communautéinternationale” à celle de l’État où elle se trouve.______________________________________________________

I - Outside Intervention

At news of violence in Kosovo, the main question immedi-ately raised in the European Union (EU) and the United Statesby editorialists, commentators and politicians has been, "whatcan, what should we do about it?" Outside intervention in theBalkans is a very old story. However, its recent revival interms of a universal moral imperative owes much to tworecent developments:

- Television coverage focusing especially on violentmanifestations of problems, creating the impression, or illu-sion, that "everybody knows what is happening".

- The existence of a single world superpower, theUnited States, with its extensions in NATO, "the West", the"international community", and the organizations it domi-nates (usually including the United Nations, not to mentionthe OSCE, the World Bank, the IMF, etc.). Such concentra-tion of power creates the impression that "the internationalcommunity" is potentially able, through use of primarilyAmerican military power, to achieve by force whatever itdecides to do. The corollary of this assumption is that people,or at least governments, which fail to interfere are "guilty" ofcomplicity in the "crimes" being committed.

This mixture of image and power has radicallydevalorized the role of discreet diplomatic mediation, whichis by nature neither visible nor forceful, and is easily por-trayed as craven and lacking in moral resolve. The issue forthe international community is presented in terms of wielding"carrots" and especially "sticks", rather than in terms ofunderstanding and reconciling the fears, interests and possi-bilities of the populations directly involved.

A third development, which follows naturally, is thedeliberate political exploitation of the first two — the media


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coverage and the potential of the U.S. and its subsidiary alliesto intervene militarily. It is now possible, notably, for asecessionist or irredentist movement to hope to achieve itsaims primarily, if not solely, by mobilizing these two forces.This is a lesson of the Yugoslav situation.

Regarding Kosovo, the basic political issue is the statusof the province of Kosovo-Metohija as a part of Serbia (in turna part of rump Yugoslavia) or as an independent State free tobecome part of a Greater Albania.

The two sides in this political conflict have opposingstrategies which are totally and intimately linked to the issueof international intervention.

* The entire strategy of the ethnic Albanian side in thepast decade has been based on mobilizing international sup-port, first political and eventually military, on behalf ofKosovo’s secession from Serbia. This is an elaborated, long-term strategy with clear aims and clear methods of achievingthem. It is vigorously supported by the Albanian diaspora,notably in Germany, the United States and Turkey. The ethnicAlbanian demand for secession is not at all, as commonlyportrayed, a reaction to repression by Slobodan Milosevic. Itwas there first. It draws on a century-old nationalist move-ment which from its inception has turned to outside powersfor decisive support in the realization of its objectives. Thisaspiration, like all the other centrifugal forces let loose informer Yugoslavia, received major encouragement from theinternational community’s recognition in the winter of 1991-92 of the right of Slovenia and Croatia to unnegotiatedsecession as independent, essentially ethnically defined, States(1).

In 1988 and 1989, Yugoslavia and Serbia made consti-tutional changes revoking the extremely extensive autonomyaccorded the Autonomous Province of Kosovo by the 1974Constitution. The international community has uncriticallycondemned these changes, accepting their characterizationas an instrument of Serbian oppression. Three factors havebeen commonly ignored: however unwelcome to the ethnicAlbanian leaders, these changes were widely supported in


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Serbia as necessary to enable the realization of the economicliberalization reforms; they were enacted legally; and they leftintact the political rights of ethnic Albanians as well as aconsiderable degree of regional autonomy. One can onlyspeculate to what extent, without the prospect of decisiveoutside intervention on their behalf, the ethnic Albanians ofKosovo might have tried to make use of the existing legalframework. They could, for instance, have voted to fill 42 ofthe 250 seats in the Serbian parliament with their representa-tives.

Instead, boycotting participation in the institutions andpolitical life of the Serbian State has led the ethnic Albanianpopulation into a sort of internal secession, denounced toforeign sympathizers by those who have instituted it as"apartheid".

Meanwhile, the successful boycott of the Serbian schoolshas produced a generation of ethnic Albanians whose edu-cated members speak English better than Serbian and are thusmuch better prepared to win international support than tocommunicate with Serbian neighbors.

* The Serbian government, in contrast, has had novisible strategy other than to keep the international commu-nity at bay by insisting that the Kosovo problem is an "internalaffair". This is too static a policy to deserve to be called astrategy, in fact. Milosevic has used the ethnic Albanianboycott of Serbian elections to bolster his party’s parliamen-tary majority with the Kosovo seats, but this is no more thana short-range political advantage. The fact that in all the otherconflicts in ex-Yugoslavia, the international community hastaken the anti-Serb side, and that even after Dayton the "outerwall of sanctions" was maintained only against Serbia, osten-sibly as pressure to "solve the Kosovo problem", is enough toconvince Serbs that however little they have to hope for fromMilosevic, they have nothing to hope for from the "interna-tional community" either.

* The nature of these conflicting strategies leads to astructural bias in favor of the ethnic Albanians on the part ofthe international community, that is, of its influential compo-


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nents: the United States government first of all, which isvirtually invited by ethnic Albanian leaders to come in andtake over; NATO, whose new mission can be practiced andenhanced; and all the numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations which find in the troubles offormer Yugoslavia a perfect laboratory and justification forthe extension of their own operations.

What is actually being done by the international com-munity in regard to Kosovo resembles very much what wasdone in the first stages of the wars of Slovenian and Croatiansecession. At first, the United States took the position that itopposed the breakup of the existing nation of Yugoslavia, butrapidly added the proviso that it would oppose any use offorce by that nation’s armed forces to prevent the breakup.These contradictory signals both gave the green light toBelgrade to reject secession and encouraged the secessioniststo go ahead with their plans, while the resulting confusion,and hesitancy, within the Yugoslav Armed Forces, hasteneddesertion by both officers and soldiers and the formation ofirregular armed militia along ethnic lines.

The same pattern is being repeated in regard to Kosovo.The U.S.-led international community is officially opposed toindependence for Kosovo, but is also opposed to use of forceby Belgrade to disarm the increasingly violent secessionists.While ostensibly accepting Belgrade’s sovereignty, this am-biguous position has encouraged secessionists to provokearmed encounters which are promptly and vehemently blamedon the Serbs.

Serbia has for years been subjected to extremely severesanctions — economic and even cultural — continued to thisday by an "outer wall" (unilaterally imposed by the U.S. withEuropean consent) that keeps it out of international organiza-tions. Serbia is an international pariah, its people largelyinvisible except for the glimpses selected by unsympatheticinternational news media. Since compromises are most easilymade from positions of strength, the continued pressure andthreats weakening Serbia are scarcely conducive to largesse.

The occasion statements by U.S. officials reproving


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"violence" on the part of Albanian Kosovo separatists aretoothless and in no way balance the demands on Belgrade tosolve the Kosovo problem "or else". It takes two parties toreach a compromise. When pressure is put only on one sideto compromise, there is absolutely no incitement to the otherparty to do so. At present, the Albanians can be reasonablysure that if the situation is allowed to deteriorate, the inevita-ble Serbian repression will only strengthen their position vis-à-vis the international community.

At present, the ethnic Albanian nationalist leaders aredemanding international intervention sight unseen, convincedas they are — and with good reason — that they have won theinternational community to their side. Serbs reject it foressentially the same reason.

Certainly nothing could be more welcome than a trulyfair and unbiased international mediation. An even bettersolution would be the emergence in Serbia of leaders fromboth the Serbian and ethnic Albanian communities with theability to reach out to each other in the manner of a NelsonMandela. Unfortunately, there is as yet no sign of the triumphof such wisdom (2). If anything, the bullying pressure beingapplied on one side only, combined with a deliberate impov-erishment of the country which leaves no margin for generos-ity, works against such a dynamic.

II - Who Belongs in Kosovo?

The presumed fact that 90% of the population of Kosovo isethnic Albanian (3) is increasingly cited as an implicit justi-fication of their separatist demands by people in Europe andAmerica who would never draw such a conclusion regardingthe presence of large ethnic concentrations in other countries,starting with their own.

The fact that Kosovo was the cradle of the medievalSerbian kingdom is noted without sympathy as a quaintarchaism by Western commentators who seem more im-


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pressed by the claim of ethnic Albanians to be the successorsof the ancient Illyrians, the first inhabitants of the Western,and who recently have even been adopting ethnic Albanianplace names and terminology (4). Albanian nationalists cher-ish identification with the unknown Illyrians because theyfeel it gives them a stronger right to be there than the Slavswho settled there as farmers in the 6th century. Serbianhistorians regard the Albanian claim of descent from theIllyrians as plausible but irrelevant, inasmuch as both Serbsand Albanians have inhabited the area for many centuries (5).Historians readily acknowledge that Albanian feudal lords,who at the time were Christians enjoying equal rights withinthe Serbian medieval state, fought alongside Serbian knightsat the battle of Kosovo in 1389.

The conflict between Serbs and Albanians developedthree centuries later, following the mass exodus from South-ern Serbia in 1690 of Christians (including Albanians), whowere resettled by the Habsburg monarchy in its border lands,the Krajina, as a result of wars between the Ottoman andHabsburg empires. The mountaineers who resettled the plainsof Kosovo in the 18th century were actively converted toIslam by the Turks, who regarded their Christian subjects, notwithout reason, as potential subversives in alliance with theCatholic Habsburgs (6). From that time on, various outsidepowers have found it in their interest to accentuate differ-ences and conflicts between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albani-ans.

The ethnic Albanians who had converted to Islam by the19th century gained privileges (to bear arms, serve in theadministration and collect taxes) denied the Christian popu-lation. Such privileges stood in the way of development of anAlbanian nationalism parallel to the 19th century Serbian,Greek and Bulgarian national liberation movements. WhenAlbanian feudal lords did revolt, it was rather to try to retainthese privileges than to achieve an independent State of equalcitizens. This historic difference has had ideological conse-quences. Because they were deprived of equal rights underOttoman rule, the Serb leaders adopted an egalitarian politi-


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cal philosophy borrowed from France as appropriate to theirnational liberation struggle in the 19th century. This meantadvocacy of a state of equal citizens enjoying equal rights.The practice certainly did not always live up to the principles.But there is a significant and practical difference between anation that proclaims principles of equal citizenship and onethat does not. The tradition is there to be encouraged — whichis not accomplished by dogmatically denying its existence.

The coexistence of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovoraises the question of the terms of a multi-ethnic state. TheRepublic of Serbia defines itself, in Article 1 of its Constitu-tion, as "a democratic State of all the citizens who live in it",without reference to ethnic identity, in contrast to Croatia orMacedonia. Serbia is in fact the most multi-ethnic State in theBalkans; one third of its citizens are non-Serbs, with rightsequal to all others. Serbs from other countries cannot auto-matically claim Serbian citizenship, in contrast to Croatsliving in Bosnia, for example, who vote in Croatian elections.Formally at least, the ethnic Albanian residents of Kosovohave more citizenship rights in Serbia than the many ethnicSerb refugees who have flooded into Serbia from Croatia andBosnia since the collapse of Yugoslavia. But they refuse toexercise them. Rights that are spurned wither away.

The fact that Serbia is suffering from internationalsanctions is an incentive to leave it. Montenegro, a countryhistorically "more Serb than Serbia", has elected (admittedlywith votes of ethnic Albanians) a new President who is takinghis distance from Belgrade, to the applause of the "interna-tional community" which dangles the prospect of lucrativeinvestments before a government which might deprive Serbiaof its last access to the Mediterranean. The desire to escapefrom the hardships visited on Serbia is even strengtheningseparatist impulses among the Serbian ethnic majority inVoivodina. In short, the policy of punishing Belgrade isleading to the further disintegration of the last truly multi-ethnic country in the Balkans — all in the name of "multi-ethnicism".

This centrifugal movement can only produce endless


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conflict and flight from the troubled region.

III - What is the Danger of "Ethnic Cleansing"?

Given recent precedents, international armed intervention ismost likely to be drawn into Kosovo by public perception thatSerbs are engaging in "ethnic cleansing" and must be stoppedand punished.

Such a perception has been being anticipated and pre-pared for years. The preface to a 1993 book (7) predicted that:"One can expect that ... the Belgrade regime, frustrated butnot thoroughly defeated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will betempted to open up another theatre of war, most obviously inKosovo, which would become one more victim of militaryaggression and ‘ethnic cleansing’." Five years later, MadeleineAlbright was saying substantially the same thing. At the 9March London meeting of the "Contact Group", Ms Albrightcompared Serbian police actions in Kosovo to "ethnic cleans-ing" in Bosnia and declared: "We are not going to stand by andwatch the Serb authorities do in Kosovo what they can nolonger get away with doing in Bosnia".

The logic of such predictions is neither political norstrategic, but psychological, of a Manichean type: the wicked"greater Serb" will take out "frustration" suffered in Bosnia byinflicting "ethnic cleansing" on Kosovo. This is the type ofreasoning that flows naturally from ethnic stereotypes, inwhich one ethnic group is demonized, that is, is portrayed asenjoying evil action for its own sake.

Given the widespread adoption of that stereotype con-cerning the Serbs, there was always a great probability thatthe inevitable clashes in Kosovo would be interpreted byinternational media as yet another instance of Serbian "ethniccleansing" of non-Serbs. Still, it was surprising to see howquickly a police action — brutal but limited — targetingarmed rebels was characterized as "ethnic cleansing" andeven "genocide" by editorialists and politicians.


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Ethnic cleansing and the "Memorandum" of theSerbian Academy

The various ethnic separatisms that have won their pieces offormer Yugoslavia have found it useful to blame the wars ofsecession in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on asupposed deliberate project to create a "Greater Serbia".Under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, this "aggres-sion" is said to have followed a program for ethnic cleansingset out in a 1986 Memorandum written by the Serbian Acad-emy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade. The notion that the"Memorandum" was a sort of "Mein Kampf" of "GreaterSerbia" has received such acceptance that it even shows up ina French text-book for advanced high school students:

"Ethnic cleansing: theory elaborated [mise au point] bymembers of the Belgrade Academy of Sciences and advocat-ing ethnic homogenization of the territories of former Yugo-slavia inhabited by Serbs, by using terror to drive out the otherpopulations to allow definitive annexation of these territoriesby Serbia." — Pierre Milza & Serge Berstein, Histoireterminale, Hatier, 1993, p.330.

It is therefore relevant to look at the passages in thatinfamous but largely unread "Memorandum" which deal withKosovo and which include its only references to "ethniccleansing". They also are the passages which go farthest inwhat could be considered "Serbian national pathos", theearlier part of the document consisting of a more prosaicanalysis of Yugoslavia’s economic problems.

In its most controversial section, the draft document(the Memorandum was published in draft form by its politicalenemies in 1986, the better to denounce it) took up recentcomplaints by the dwindling Serbian minority in Kosovo thatthey were being driven out of the province by acts of hostilityfrom the ethnic Albanian majority, which at the time enjoyedpolitical control. The "Memorandum" denounced what it


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called "the physical, political, legal and cultural genocide ofthe Serbian population of Kosovo and Metohija". It describedthe Albanian nationalist demonstrations which began in 1981,a year after Tito’s death, as the declaration of "a very specialbut total war" against the Serbian people.

"The Albanian nationalists, the political leaders ofKosovo, with well-defined tactics and a clear objective, havebegun to destroy inter-ethnic relations founded on equalrights, for which Serbs had fought hardest in Kosovo andMetohija. The autonomous region, at the favorable moment,obtained the rank of autonomous province, then the status of‘constituent part of the Federation’ and benefits from greaterprerogatives that the rest of the Republic to which it formallybelongs. The next step of the ‘escalation’, the Albanization ofKosovo and Metohija, has been prepared in perfect legality.In the same way, the unification of the literary language, of thename of the nation, of the flag and of the schoolbooks withthose of Albania following Tirana’s instructions, was done ina way quite as open as the border between the two countries.Plots which ordinarily are carried out in secret were fomentedin Kosovo not only openly but ostentatiously."

The "Memorandum" predicted that unless a fundamen-tal change was made meanwhile, in ten years there would beno more Serbs in Kosovo, but rather "an ethnically pureKosovo". If, it warned, "genuine security and equality underthe law for all peoples living in Kosovo and Metohija are notestablished, if objective and lasting conditions are not createdfavoring the return of the people driven out, that part of theRepublic of Serbia will become a European problem withvery grave consequences. Kosovo represents a key point inthe Balkans. Ethnic diversity in many territories of the Bal-kans corresponds to the ethnic composition of the Balkanpeninsula and the demand for an ethnically pure AlbanianKosovo is not only a heavy and direct threat to all the peopleswho are in a minority there but, if achieved, it will set off awave of expansion threatening all the peoples of Yugosla-via..."

However excessive this description of the situation may


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have been, it clearly was not the elaboration of a "theory"advocating ethnic cleansing of other peoples by Serbs, butrather the expression of a fear that Serbs would be "ethnicallycleansed" from Kosovo by the Albanian majority there. Thepolitical conclusions that could be and in fact were drawnfrom the arguments put forth in the "Memorandum" werequite simply the constitutional changes enacted two yearslater to revoke the extreme autonomy granted in 1974 (8).

Whether they are described as "terrorists", "freedomfighters" or, more neutrally, guerrillas, it is undeniable thatarmed bands exist in Kosovo, have carried out armed attacksand have declared their intention to carry out more. There isno government in the world that could stand back and allowsuch groups to operate unhindered.

Sympathizers with the ethnic Albanian movement com-monly present it as an exemplary non-violent resistance tooppression, in the tradition of Gandhi, and explain the recentturn to violence by impatience resulting from the failure of theinternational community to reward the peaceful leadership ofIbrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosova (LDK).This is of course an idealized over-simplification of a morecomplex and ambiguous situation. It is indeed true that Mr.Rugova has opted for non-violence, as a part of his strategy ofwinning international support. However, it is not true that theturn to violence is only a recent development. First of all, ina region prone to violence, the Albanians have traditionallybeen even more associated with recourse to arms than any oftheir neighbors, excepting perhaps the Montenegrins. Non-violence is thus perhaps too recent an innovation to be totallycredible, especially since the contemporary movement itself,before producing Rugova’s LDK, had already begun in amore militant mould. The guerrillas of the "Kosova Libera-tion Army", the UCK (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves), are acontinuation of a decades-long underground movement.

"The roots of the underground groups reach far back tothe sixties and seventies", according to an article in theFrankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung by Stephan Lipsius (9). "Theoldest of the organizations currently active both in Kosovo


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and abroad is the ‘Kosova People’s Movement’ (LPK). It wasfounded in German on 17 February 1982 as the ‘People’sMovement for a Kosova Republic’ (LPRK). This was not anew founding, but rather a merger of the following fourpreviously independent underground organizations: the ‘Na-tional Liberation Movement of Kosova and of the OtherAlbanian Regions of Yugoslavia’ (LNCKVSHJ), the ‘Marx-ist-Leninist Organization of Kosova’ (OMLK), the ‘Commu-nist Marxist-Leninist Party of the Albanians in Yugoslavia’(PKMLSHJ) as well as the ‘Red Popular Front’ (FKB)."

"The political goals of the LPK include unification of allAlbanians in former Yugoslavia, that is in Kosovo, Macedo-nian, Montenegro and South Serbia, in a common State.Contrary to the non-conspiratorially active Kosovar partiesheaded by the LDK, the LPK does not basically reject vio-lence as a means of political conflict. The LPK calls forpolitical and financial support to the UCK, but so far does nottake part in armed ambushes or bomb attacks." UCK commu-niques and announcements are published in the LPK paperZeri i Kosoves, leading to speculation that the LPK is thepolitical arm of the UCK, according to Lipsius.

Next to the LPK and the UCK is a third undergroundorganization in Kosovo. Least is known about this one. It isthe ‘National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova’(LKCK). It was founded on 25 May 1993 in Pristina. Somefounding members of the LKCK had left the LPK out ofpolitical differences or personal animosities with the LPKparty leadership. Officially the reason for the split was thegrowing programmatic rapprochement between the LPK andthe LDK. Contrary to the strictly non-violent policy of theLDK, the LKCK demanded militant action against the Ser-bian rulers. In addition the LCKC is for a State unifying allAlbanian-inhabited regions of former Yugoslavia with Alba-nia, that is for construction of a Greater Albania. The LKCKdoes not support the existence of the self-designated ‘KosovaRepublic’.

The LKCK has a political and a military arm, the so-called ‘LKCK Guerrilla’. Contrary to the UCK, the LCKC


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Guerrilla has not yet undertaken military actions or attacks.The reason is that for the LKCK, the time for application ofthe entire Kosovar military potential has not yet come. Thesecond general assembly of the LCKC proposed a Four-PhaseModel for the ‘Liberation of the occupied areas’. The firstphase is marked by political education work in the populationand structural preparation. In the second phase begin armedindividual actions, while the third phase will see the unifica-tion of the LCKC, the LPK and the UCK as the ‘National Frontfor the Liberation of Kosova’. The joint military actionsundertaken in the third phase should lead in the fourth phaseto popular uprising and total mobilization of all forces.According to information from LCKC circles, we are now inthe second phase.

And meanwhile, thanks in part to the collapse of orderin Albania last year, the Kosovar rebels are better armed thanever. There are unconfirmed rumors that the guerrillas of the"Kosovo Liberation Army" (UCK) in the Drenica region arethreatening aircraft with stinger missiles, and that this is whythe police undertook to try to recapture control of the regionin the first days of March. If the UCK do not yet have "stinger"missiles, put into general circulation by the US via AfghanMuslim guerrillas in the 1980s, they soon will have. It is well-known that the Albanian irredentist movement is financed notonly by taxing its own people but also by drug-smugglingthrough the Balkans, notoriously in the hands of ethnicAlbanian clans (10). Buying light arms is no problem.

While Rugova traveled freely between his Pristina head-quarters and Western capitals winning support for his non-violent struggle, the violent phase of the struggle got underway.In 1996, there were 31 political assassinations in Kosovo.The targets were Serb officials but also ethnic Albanianscondemned as "collaborators" — the better to destroy the lastbridges between the two communities. The pace quickened in1997, with 55 assassinations. While Rugova was claimingthat the UCK was a figment of Serb propaganda, guerrillasraided eleven police stations in coordinated attacks in Sep-tember 1997 before making a first public appearance, armed,


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uniformed and masked, before a crowd of 20,000 at a funeralon 28 November 1997. In January 1998, a UCK statementissued in Pristina announced that the battle for unification ofKosovo with Albania had begun. The number of killingsescalated, with 66 killed before the massive Serbian policeoperation against guerrilla bases in the Drenica region inearly March 1998.

No government on earth could be expected to remainpassive in the face of armed bands that have claimed 152 livesin a little over two years — least of all the government inWashington. It would be hard to find a precedent for theUnited States’ threat to impose heavy sanctions and freeze theforeign assets of the legitimate government of a country facedwith such an armed insurgency unless it withdraws its policeforces and leaves the rebels unmolested.

What is "ethnic cleansing"? While everybody is againstit, few seem interested in understanding its real meaning andcauses as the basis for combatting it. The prevalent attitude,in the depoliticized public consciousness of the 1990s, is tosee it as a sort of pure evil, an expression of racist or ethnichatred which surges from "the darkness of the human soul"(rhetoric of a speech by U.S. Vice President Albert Gore) forno reason. The only remedy envisaged is punishment.

In the Balkans, "ethnic cleansing" is rarely a proclaimedpolicy. A notable exception is the Croatian Ustasha move-ment’s deliberate policy of eliminating Serbs and other mi-norities from the lands of Croatian "historic rights" which itcontrolled during World War II. Croatian extremists in theUstasha tradition have taken up both the theory and thepractice in Tudjman’s Croatia. The Tudjman regime has notopenly adopted the theory but has tolerated the practice, withthe result that Croatia has in fact been "ethnically cleansed"of the vast majority of its Serbian population in the mostthorough and successful operation of the kind in the formerYugoslavia. The international community has not punishedCroatia. On the contrary, the Zagreb government has beensubstantially rewarded by membership in international or-ganizations and foreign investment, both denied Serbia.


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In general, ethnic cleansing, that is, the expulsion ofmembers of a different ethnic group from a disputed area,arises from fear that their presence will serve to justify rivalclaims for political control of that territory. Nothing is betterdesigned to stimulate such fears than the prospect that fromnow on, an ethnic group claiming a local majority representsa threat of secession from the country in which it finds itself.

Once the international community gave its assent to theunnegotiated disintegration of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia intoethnically-defined States, the struggle was on for control ofterritory along ethnic lines. In this struggle, Serbs, Croats,Muslims, and Albanians have all accused their territorialrivals of "genocide". These accusations reflect both genuinefears and political calculation, and outsiders should be pru-dent in echoing such inflammatory terms. In the West, em-phasis on "genocide" by analogy with totally different historicsituations has obscured the primary political cause of "ethniccleansing": fear that the presence of members of a politicallyorganized ethnic group will be used to support territorialclaims.

The presence on the small territory of Kosovo of twoarmed camps indeed threatens to lead to a bloody and terribleconflict. In the propaganda skirmishes leading up to such aconflict, the Serbs have once again lost the labelling battle.Their label for their armed adversaries, "terrorist", has beenreluctantly endorsed by US proconsul Robert Gelbard, beforebeing dropped as soon as Serbian authorities acted accord-ingly. On the other hand, the ethnic Albanian label for Serbianactions, "ethnic cleansing", has been taken up at the highestlevel of the international community, as well as by a chorus ofcommentators and petition signers.

The notion that early denunciation of ethnic cleansingwill help to prevent massacres is probably dead wrong. On thecontrary, such highly-charged overstatement contributes toemotional polarization, to mutual fear and suspicion, tosuppositions about NATO intervention, and above all to thesort of desperation on both sides that can lead people tocommit desperate and terrible acts.


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Leaders of both the Serbian state and the ethnic Alba-nian nationalists have proclaimed their willingness to acceptcohabitation between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Thewiser course is to accept this declaration of principle on itsface value and to consider any acts contrary to this principleas deviations from mutually accepted principles.

IV - Are the Serbs Willing to Compromise?

Dobrica Cosic, Serbia’s leading novelist, often characterizedas the spiritual father of the national revival, proposed parti-tion of Kosovo-Metohija as a way of solving the conflictbetween Serbs and Albanians (11). As President of Yugosla-via in 1992 and 1993, Cosic raised the possibility on variousoccasions, such as when speaking to the foreign affairscommittee of the European Parliament in Brussels on March30, 1993, without arousing any interest.

Cosic described (12) Kosovo as "a European questionof the first rank. Nevertheless, up to now, neither the Euro-pean Community nor the CSCE have found the right way ofhelping to resolve the Albanian-Yugoslav and the Albanian-Serb problem." He attributed this to "the fact that the problemof Serbo-Albanian relations has been misrepresented andreduced to a problem of human rights."

This meant that "the central factor" was being "studi-ously overlooked: the aspiration of Yugoslav Albanians tounite with Albania and create a ‘Greater Albania’." Thesecessionist ambition of the Albanian nationalist movementis the very essence of their human rights demands. From thatambition flows a behavior of obstruction in every sphere ofsocial live: politics, culture, public education, the economy,media. For the problem is not that the Albanians are deprivedof cultural, political or other rights; the problem is that theyhave these rights but refuse to exercise them. They boycott enbloc the society in which they live; they do not recognize it.The issue is not about opening the schools: they are open. The


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issue is that they insist that the curriculum in those schools beborrowed from the Albanian State and that they issue diplo-mas in the name of the ‘Republic of Kosovo’.

"I consider as a great misfortune the fact that theAlbanians have excluded themselves from political life andthat they do not take advantage of their autonomy. They haveall the civil and political rights needed for constituting them-selves as an autonomous community. That is officially guar-anteed.

"The whole world, all the human rights champions aresaying that the Albanians have been banned from the schools.That is a pure lie! They are the ones who refuse to attend theschools governed by the program of the Serbian state, whichnevertheless guarantees them courses in Albanian history andculture and the use of their language. They insist on schoolspaid and maintained by the Republic of Serbia but where thecurriculum and schoolbooks come from Albania and thediplomas would bear the heading, ‘Republic of Kosovo’!"

"The human rights argument is no longer anything butan ideological weapon used by the secessionists and theirforeign protectors in view of realizing their national ambi-tion: the union of all Albanians in a single State. And so longas they will not have achieved that end, the question of humanrights in Kosovo-Metohija will continue to be heated up andSerbia will remain indicted by the international community.It will not do us a bit of good to point out that the Albaniansbenefit from national and human rights such as no othernational minority enjoys. [...]Kosovo will be Serbia’s malig-nant tumor which will exhaust her economically, block herdevelopment and threaten her territorially by demographicexpansion."

The military dangers were clear five years ago. Cosicwas aware of "precise information on the existence of 60 to70,000 Albanians organized in paramilitary units in Kosovo.This is an army ready to go to war the day when Mr. Rugova,Mr. Berisha or some other Albanian is through with thesoothing rhetoric that they serve up to the CSCE." Yugoslaviawas even then being isolated and crushed by sanctions, and


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even threatened with military intervention if they "commitaggression" in Kosovo — that is, on their own territory. If theSerbian army should move to oppose secession, Cosic won-dered: "will they send missiles to raze our cities and airports?"

In such a dilemma, Cosic concluded it was necessary tosatisfy the national aspirations of both the Serbian and Alba-nian peoples by a "peaceful and fair territorial division".

This offer having found no takers on the Albanian side,there is no present sign of its being actively pursued by theSerbs either. In itself, it may well be a fair proposal. However,it encounters two types of objections.

* The Western "international community", starting withthe United States, has vetoed it for reasons of analogy andprecedent. Partitioning Kosovo would go contrary to thepolicy adopted to justify recognition of Slovenia and Croatia,considering ex-Yugoslavia’s internal boundaries as inviola-ble. This policy is the very basis for branding Serbia as the"aggressor" in Croatia and in Bosnia and therefore cannot beeasily abandoned. Moreover, if Kosovo were partitioned,why not Macedonia, where Albanians are concentrated in theWestern areas and would also demand to join "Greater Alba-nia"?

* The danger of setting such a precedent also worriesSerbs. Suppose ethnic Albanians, thanks to their much higherbirthrate, attained a majority in some other part of Serbia.Would they demand secession there too? The "Greater Alba-nia" project includes more than Kosovo. Where if ever wouldit all end?

Privately, a number of Serbs would welcome some sortof negotiation which would "save the monasteries" and cutlosses. But how?

Various compromise proposals have been put forth byindependent Serbian intellectuals. One such proposal is pub-lished in this issue of DIALOGUE. In another, ProfessorPredrag Simic of the Institute of International Politics andEconomics in Belgrade has suggested that the AutonomyStatute of Trentino-South Tyrol in Northern Italy, long ascene of irredentist unrest among the German-speaking, for-


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merly Austrian inhabitants, could serve as a European modelfor resolving the Kosovo crisis.

This and other independent proposals could be consid-ered "trial balloons" which could be taken up at the officiallevel should they ever meet with the slightest sign of intereston the Albanian side. So far, however, this has not been thecase. Encouraged by their image as victims of Serbian oppres-sion, enjoying strong support from Western governments andhuman rights organizations, Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian na-tionalists have no incentive to settle for anything less thantheir ultimate goal: Greater Albania.

V - Human Rights

The attitude of the international community toward the Yugo-slav disaster has been characterized throughout by confusionbetween national rights and human rights. It is unclear towhat extent this confusion is accidental or deliberate inWestern countries, where the concept of "national rights" isvariously appreciated according to political tradition (withsignificant differences between the United States and Ger-many, for instance). The readiness in the United States, inparticular, to consider denial of separatist ethnic rights asviolation of human rights represents a mutation that may notbe unrelated to the confusion in the American left, in particu-lar, resulting from the critique of universal values and the riseof "identity politics".

Regarding the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, what sort ofcivil society is being built in the context of the long militantnationalist struggle? Some positive effects may be assumed.Literacy has certainly been vigorously encouraged by a move-ment which, since its inception in the late 19th century, hasbeen led by literature professors looking for a country to gowith a language only recently transposed from the oral tradi-tion. The rise in general literacy must also be beneficial to thestatus of women. On the other hand, this is a society closed in


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on itself, obsessed with its own identity. Its human rightsorganizations are concerned with the human rights of ethnicAlbanians. All questions of democratization and politicaldirection are put off in expectation of the "independence" thatis supposed to solve them all.

The political modernization and democratization of theAlbanian people in the Balkans remains a legitimate andunfulfilled aspiration. Had they used their political rightsunder the Serbian Constitution, they could have elected animportant number of representatives to the Serbian Parlia-ment, and altered the political balance of power in Belgrade.Instead, they have missed out on contributing to the begin-nings of multi-party democracy in Serbia and seriously crip-pled its development. Massive ethnic Albanian abstentionhas ensured Milosevic’s party of a majority it might otherwisehave lost. It is highly doubtful that holding parallel electionsfor ethnic Albanians only, resulting in unanimous election ofan unchallenged leader, Ibrahim Rugova, and of election of a"parliament" which has never functioned, provides a betterinitiation into democratic political practice than could havebeen gained by using the official elections to further theinterests of the Albanian people of Kosovo within the SerbianRepublic (13).

The situation of ongoing ethnic hostility is bad for allsides. Each is likely to care less and less about what happensto the "others".

In early March, the Serbian raid on the rebel base atPrekaz had not ended before the Clinton administrationannounced measures to "punish" Belgrade for its "violence"and began to pressure other governments to join in imposingnew economic and diplomatic penalties on Yugoslavia. Giventhe absence of similar reaction to, for instance, Turkey’s useof "disproportionate force" in its raids against Kurdish rebels,such reprimands can carry little moral weight with Serbs.How many innocents perished in Panama in the United Statesextraterritorial raid to arrest a foreign head of state in his owncountry? How many women and children died in Waco,Texas, in a police raid on a group which was armed, but which


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had not — in contrast to the ethnic Albanian guerrillas inPrekaz — claimed dozens of assassinations?

The double standard employed is so blatant, that theuniquely severe reaction of the international communitycannot appear to most Serbs as an expression of genuine deepconcern for human rights, but rather as part of a longstandingpolitical campaign to isolate and fragment their country.

Nevertheless, regardless of any and all hypocrisy andulterior motives on the part of outside accusers, it is more thanlikely that acts of police brutality occurred in the course ofthat and related raids on guerrilla bases, if only because actsof brutality are all too usual in such circumstances.

Unfortunately the chorus of indignation and calls forpunishment led by Madeleine Albright can only make itharder for Yugoslavs who are concerned about high stand-ards of respect for human rights to demand an accountingfrom their government. Nevertheless, some have done so.

Following its own investigations in the Drenica regionin early March, the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center(HLC) reported that its findings "contradict Serbian policereports on the number of dead and the locations and circum-stances in which they were killed" and urged the SerbianMinistry of Internal Affairs to give reporters and representa-tives of humanitarian and human rights organizations accessto the area and thereby enable the public to be provided withfull, accurate and timely information. "The indications thatthe persons killed, wounded or arrested were connected withthe attacks on police must be presented to the public", theHLC stated in a communiqué, pointing out that it is "inSerbia’s best interest to immediately institute an inquiry" intothe circumstances of the death of Kosovo Albanians in policeactions, including exhumation of the remains for forensicexamination.

It would be in keeping with traditional practices forhuman rights advocacy groups in other countries to supportsuch demands from local Serbian organizations, as a meansof strengthening democratic civil society and the rule of law.

This is in fact the sort of work done by Amnesty


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International, whose own reports from Kosovo in early March1998 were reasonably precise, factual and balanced, relatingcharges made by both sides and noting which had not beensubstantiated or confirmed.

The reactions to events in Yugoslavia display a majordifference of approach to human rights questions, of consid-erable political significance.

What can be considered the traditional Amnesty Inter-national approach consists broadly in trying to encouragegovernments to enact and abide by humanitarian legal stand-ards. It does so by calling attention to particular cases ofinjustice, excessive severity or violation of legal norms. Itthereby participates, through outside moral support, in vari-ous internal struggles for the advancement of humanitarianlegal standards, in alliance with whatever local forces areengaged in such combat.

The approach of Human Rights Watch and above all ofits affiliate, the Vienna-based International Helsinki Federa-tion for Human Rights, is quite different. Aaron Rhodes,executive director of the International Helsinki Federation forHuman Rights, displays none of the scrupulous concern forfacts which is the hallmark of Amnesty International. Hedeals in sweeping generalities. In a column for the Interna-tional Herald Tribune (14), he wrote that Albanians in Kosovo"have lived for years under conditions similar to those suf-fered by Jews in Nazi-controlled parts of Europe just beforeWorld War II. They have been ghettoized. They are not free,but politically disenfranchised and deprived of basic civilliberties". The comparison could hardly be more incendiary,but the specific facts to back it up are absent.

At least in the case of Yugoslavia, the Helsinki andHuman Rights Watch approach differs fundamentally fromthat of Amnesty International in that it clearly aims not atcalling attention to specific abuses that might be corrected,not at reforming but at discrediting the targeted State. By theexcessive nature of its accusations, it does not ally withreformist forces in the targeted country so much as it under-mines them. Its lack of balance, its rejection of any effort at


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remaining neutral between conflicting parties, contributes toa disintegrative polarization rather than to reconciliation andmutual understanding. It therefore contributes, deliberatelyor inadvertently, to a deepening cycle of repression and chaosthat eventually may justify, or require, outside intervention.

This is an approach which, like its partner, economicglobalization, breaks down the defenses and authority ofweaker States. Rather than helping to enforce democraticinstitutions at the national level, it carries the notion ofdemocracy to the largely abstract level of the "internationalcommunity", whose sporadic and partial interest in the regionis dictated by Great Power interests, lobbies, media attentionand the institutional ambitions of "non-governmental organi-zations" — often linked to powerful governments — whosecompetition with each other for donations provides motiva-tion for exaggeration of the abuses they specialize in de-nouncing.

The readiness of distant observers to accept the mostextreme allegations serves to discredit and ultimatelydisempower all State authority in former Yugoslavia. This"international community" may indeed be serious when itwarns Ibrahim Rugova and his followers that it does not wantan independent Kosovo, much less a "Greater Albania". Thelogic of its actions is to reduce the entire region to anungovernable chaos, from which can emerge no independentStates, but rather a new type of joint colonial rule by theinternational community.

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(1) "Ethnically defined" because, despite the argument accepted by theinternational community that it was the Republics that could invoke the right tosecede, all the political argument surrounding recognition of independent Sloveniaand Croatia dwelt on the right of Slovenes and Croats as such to self-determination. Claiming that it was impossible to stay in Yugoslavia because theSerbs were so oppressive was the popular pretext for the nationalist leaders inpower in the Republics to set up their own statelets. Recognition of theadministrative borders was a de facto support for the non-Serbian nationalisms —in the name of anti-nationalism. No other single act has been more decisive indetermining the subsequent fate of the region. Countless books, articles and


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declarations blaming the wars in Yugoslavia solely or primarily on onenationalism, Serbian nationalism, and on one man, Slobodan Milosevic, havedeflected attention from the responsibilities of all the other internal and externalactors, not to mention crucial economic and constitutional factors. An outstandingexception to this chorus is the careful account of these factors by Susan Woodwardin Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Brookings,Washington, 1995.(2) The separatist positions of Adem Demaqi are proof that it takes more thanyears in prison to make a "Mandela".(3) The fact is "presumed" because ethnic Albanians boycotted the most recentcensus in 1991.(4) The generally well-documented 1998 Spring Report of the influentialInternational Crisis Group (ICG) comments on its decision to refer throughout toethnic Albanians in Kosovo as "Kosovars" as follows: "Serbs living in Kosovo arealso sometimes called Kosovars. In this report, however, ‘Kosovar’ always meansethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Serbs use for ethnic Albanians, either ‘Albanci’ orthe derogatory term ‘Siptar’..." First, by giving the ethnic Albanians, and not theSerbs, a name attached to the region, the implication is established that the ethnicAlbanians really belong in Kosovo, whereas the Serbs are outsiders. The same wasdone earlier by adopting the terms "Bosniak" and even "Bosnian" exclusively forMuslim inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Kosovo the appropriation of theplace name is even more questionable, in view of the circumstance that a large butundetermined number of Albanian "Kosovars" have immigrated into Kosovo quiterecently, whether during the wartime fascist occupation or afterwards, when theethnic Albanian Party leaders tolerated illegal immigration from Albania itself.There is no mention in the long ICG Report of this clandestine immigration fromAlbania into Kosovo.

The statement that "Serbs use... the derogatory term Siptar" is equallybiased. The Albanian word for Albanian is precisely Shqiptar, written in Serbianas Siptar. That is how the Albanians have alway called themselves; it means "eaglemen" and is scarcely derogatory. No mention is made of derogatory terms used bythe Albanians to designate the Serbs...

At the very start of the ICG report, mention is made of the importance ofKosovo for Serbs and for "Kosovars". Speaking of the importance for Serbs, theparagraph begins:

"According to Serb mythology, Kosovo is the cradle of their nation..."Speaking of the importance for Kosovars (i.e., Albanians), it begins:"As descendants of the ancient Illyrians..."Thus the thoroughly documented history of the Serbian kingdom is

described as "mythology" while the Albanian supposition is accepted as fact.With a board of directors including George Soros and prestigious political

figures including Shimon Peres and the crown prince of Jordan, financed by bothgovernments and private sources, the ICG is the perfect "think tank" for the"International community" at its highest levels.(5) Radovan Samardzic et al, Le Kosovo-Metohija dans l’Histoire Serbe, publishedby L’Age d’Homme in Lausanne in 1990; and Dimitrije Bogdanovic, Knjiga o


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Kosovu, Serbian Academy of Sciences and the Arts, Belgrade, 1985. Serbianhistorians point out that the two ethnic populations co-habited the region in theMiddle Ages, but were differentiated in their economic activities. Place names,legal texts and tax documents indicate that in the thirteen century, the Serbs weretillers of the soil, centered in the plains, whereas Albanians (and Vlachs) wereherdsmen who moved through the mountains according to grazing seasons. Anotherinteresting instance of ethnic specialization is the immigration of Germans fromSaxony to work the important gold and silver mines at Novo Brdo near Pristinaduring the height of the Serbian Kingdom. Such occupational distinctions have ofcourse been lost in modern times. See Samardzic, 1990, p.30. See also GeorgesCastellan, Histoire des Balkans, Fayard, 1991, p.66.(6) Castellan, pp 211-214.(7) Branka Magas, in the introduction to The Destruction of Yugoslavia, London,Verso, 1993.(8) Susan Woodward points out that the same Serbian liberal leaders whoattempted to denounce the intellectuals’ nationalism by leaking the incomplete"Memorandum" wanted to reduce Kosovo’s autonomy for purely economic reasonsbut saw no way to do it. The ex-banker Slobodan Milosevic found the politicalexcuse to do so by defending the Kosovo Serbs: the political trick that built hispower base. Ibid, p. 78.(9) "Bewaffneter Widerstand formiert sich", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4March 1998. It may be noted that the FAZ is the last newspaper in the world thatcould be accused of being pro-Serb.(10) "Minorités albanaises et géopolitique de l’héroïne", La DépêcheInternationale des Drogues, Paris, No 57, Juillet 1996.(11) "While he was president of Yugoslavia in 1992 and 1993, Dobrica Cosic madediscreet contact with Kosovo Albanian leaders. He wanted to discuss the territorialdivision of the province, with the Albanian part, except for a number of Serbianenclaves, leaving Serbia. This was rejected by Albanian leaders." Tim Judah, TheSerbs, Yale University Press, 1997, p.307.(12) Cosic’s analysis of the Kosovo situation, as expressed before and during histerm as President of Yugoslavia (cut short in mid-1993 by Milosevic, who perhapsconcluded that his domestic prestige was not exportable and thus of no use), is tobe found in a 1994 collection of his writings published by L’Age d’Homme underthe title L’Effondrement de la Yougoslavie.(13) Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosova (LDK) are described asfollows by Tim Judah in The Serbs, Yale University Press, 1997: "The party is ledby Ibrahim Rugova whose father was executed by the communists when theyrestored the region to Yugoslav control. His trademark is a scarf worn at all times.The LDK brooks little dissent and those that challenge it are howled down in LDKpublications and can even be ostracised in the tight-knit Albanian community.Kosovo is odd because, despite constant police repression, Albanian politicianshave held semi-underground polls, have declared Kosovo ‘independent’, have setup a parallel education system, and have hailed Rugova as president of theRepublic of Kosova. Woe betide any Albanian family or shop or businessman whowill not pay his dues to Kosova’s tax collectors. In his capacity as president,Rugova sweeps out of his headquarters, a ramshackle wooden building, hops into a


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limousine surrounded by aides and bodyguards and drives about Pristina just like areal Balkan president. A government-in-exile complete with ministers commutesbetween Tirana, Germany and Skopje. Rugova travels abroad to lobby forinternational recognition for his phantom state, but despite the odd hassle over hispassport he has not been arrested since challenging Serbian power in such a blatantfashion."(14) International Herald Tribune, 18 March 1998. Two months earlier, Mr.Rhodes hastened to address a letter to the same newspaper vehemently attackingJonathan Clarke, who had had the temerity to write a balanced columned entitled"Don’t Encourage Separatist Aims of Kosovo Albanians". Mr. Rhodes accused Mr.Clarke of echoing Belgrade propaganda and of seeming to "favor appeasement inthe face of murder, torture and the total denial of the human rights of KosovoAlbanians".


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Kosovo and Metohia: Origins of aConflict and Possible Solutions

Dusan T. BatakovicHistorian, Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade

The inter-ethnic tensions and political crisis in the southernprovince of Serbia - the autonomous province of Kosovo &Metohija - have a long and turbulent historical background.From the twelfth to the fifteenth century it was part of theSerbian medieval kingdom, the Serbian empire and the Ser-bian Despotate. From mid-fifteenth to early twentieth cen-tury, these regions were parts of the Ottoman Empire. From1912, until today - with the exception of the Second WorldWar occupation - Kosovo and Metohija were integral parts ofthe Kingdom of Serbia, later on the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatsand Slovenes, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the SocialistFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, and still today in the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia as in all the above mentioned states,was and is an integral part of Serbia. Neither Kosovo norMetohija was a distinctive territorial unit until 1945. InOttoman times as well as in the twentieth century, theseregions were part of larger administrative units. The presentinternal border and political status of the province of Kosovoand Metohia were arbitrarily established by the communistdictator Josip Broz Tito in 1945.(1)

The Communist Solution

Within the communist Yugoslavia, the centuries-old Serbo-Albanian conflict was only one aspect of the complex conceptfor resolving the national question which was carried out in


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phases and in the name of “brotherhood and unity” by J. B.Tito. The communist dictator of Yugoslavia was a Croat,brought up in the Habsburg environment of constant fear of“the Greater Serbian threat” as well as the ideological patternof Lenin’s teaching that the nationalism of big nations is moredangerous than the nationalism of smaller ones. For thesereasons, Tito was consistent in stifling any hint of “Serbianhegemony” which, according to the communists, was per-sonified in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The first two decadesof bureaucratic centralism (1945-1966) were a necessaryphase for the communist authorities to consolidate power.During that period Tito relied on Serbian cadres with whomhe emerged victorious from the civil war. The decentraliza-tion (from 1966 to 1974), based on the plans of his two closestassociates - Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene, and Vladimir Bakaric,a Croat - which aimed at strengthening the competencies ofthe federal units, notably by the Constitution of 1974, finallyled to the renewal of inter-ethnic tensions.

With the introduction of national-communism, a modelshaped by Edvard Kardelj, the power of federal jurisdictioncame to reside in the ruling oligarchies of the republics. Thusthe Party nomenklatura became sovereign each in its ownrepublic, where each came to represent the majority nation-ality. As the only republic with provinces, Serbia was theexception, since, under the Constitution, the provinces coulduse their veto power against inner Serbia. National-commu-nism, through the 1974 Constitution, introduced majorityrule for the leading nation in each of six republic and twoprovinces of the federation, with the result that there contin-ued to be - to a greater or lesser extent - discrimination againstnations or national minorities residing in each republic orprovince.

Josip Broz - Tito skillfully manipulated the growingnationalism in order to prevent an ideological thaw of thehard-line dictatorship and to preserve his undisputed author-ity. In the last phase of his rule, marked by the Constitutionof 1974, he became, like Brezhnev in the USSR, the obstacleto any semi-liberal evolution of the system. As Tito’s only


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legacy there remained the common ideologically orientedarmy, and the bulky party-bureaucratic apparatus, now di-vided along republican and provincial borders - borderswhich, although officially administrative, increasingly re-sembled the borders of self-sufficient, covertly rival nationalsates, linked together on the inside by the authority of thecharismatic leader, and from the outside by the danger of apotential Soviet invasion.

In such a context, Kosovo and Metohia had an impor-tant role: at first it was an autonomous region (1946), then anautonomous province within Serbia (1963) and finally anautonomous province (1974) only formally linked with Ser-bia, with competencies that were hardly different from thoseof the republics (the only thing it lacked was the Leninistprinciple concerning the right to self-determination). Kosovoand Metohia owes the change of its status within the federa-tion not to the freely expressed will of the people of Serbia (ofwhich it had been an integral part since 1912), but exclusivelyto the concepts designed by a narrow circle of communistleaders around Tito to resolve the national question within thewhole federation.

During the period of centralism when Albania was partof the Soviet bloc, openly hostile towards Yugoslavia (1945-1961), Tito relied on the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia whorepresented the guarantee of the preservation of Yugoslavia’sintegrity in that region. After the reconciliation with Moscow(1955) and the gradual normalization of relations with Alba-nia (1971), Tito favored the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in away which, after the 1968 and 1971 Constitutional amend-ments, they understood not only as a possibility for nationalemancipation but also as a long-awaited opportunity to takehistoric revenge against the Serbs who had deprived Albanianfeudal leaders of privileges enjoyed under the Ottoman Em-pire. In contrast to the modern democratic state of equalcitizens, the ideological and national model for Kosovo andMetohia’s ethnic Albanians was the Stalinist-type ethno-nationalism of Enver Hoxha, imbued with century-old intol-erance towards the Serbs. The erasing of the name of Metohija,


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as an exclusively Serbian-Orthodox term, from the name ofthe autonomous province in 1968 symbolically indicated thedirection to be taken by the ethnic Albanian communistnomenklatura in Kosovo in their national policy.

A series of successive administrative, judicial, policeand physical pressures against the Kosovo and MetohijaSerbs resulted in their quiet but steady and forced migrationto inner Serbia, a process which many knew about, but whichvery few dared publicly mention. Over the years, due to thissilent ethnic cleansing tolerated or even encouraged by thefederal communist leadership, the Serbian population inKosovo and Metohia was reduced by almost a half, from 23.6percent in 1948 to 13.2 percent in 1981, the relatively highbirth rate during Tito’s rule notwithstanding. The Montenegrinpopulation in Kosovo and Metohia fell from 3.9 percent in1948 to 1.7 percent in 1981.(2)

As the process of moving out proceeded, the land of theexpelled Serbs was given to emigrants from Albania. Fromthe end of the Second World War until Tito’s death in 1980,the number of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohiatripled, resulting in a 164 percent population increase in theperiod of 1948 to 1981. Among them there were also a largenumber of immigrants, a number that has still not beendefinitely determined. The gradual settlement of Albanianrefugees from Albania in Kosovo and Metohia, during thefirst years after the Second World War, aimed to ease theexpected annexation of Albania to the Yugoslav federation.The second wave of settlement of refugees was organizedfrom the late 1960s to late 1980s by the local nomenklatura ofethnic Albanians in order to improve Albanian ethnic domi-nation of regions with a strong Serbian population. Theuncontrolled growth of the ethnic Albanian population gaveadditional social stimuli to numerous young people, increas-ingly and openly educated on the basis of national mythologyand brought up to hate Yugoslavia. The economic frustrationof the young and predominantly agrarian population of ethnicAlbanians was thereby largely diverted into the huge propa-ganda campaign of national dissatisfaction. Thus, the official


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theory of Enver Hoxha that the Albanians were the directdescendants of the ancient Illyrians was used as a “proof” ofthe ethnic Albanians’ historical right to Kosovo and Metohija.The Serbs, who arrived there many centuries after the Illyrians(only in the 6th century), were stigmatized in popular opinionas the unlawful intruders into genuine “Albanian lands”.(3)

The Kosovo Riot and the Serbia Reaction

The unanimous demands by the Albanian minority to createa republic of Kosovo (with the right to self-determination,including secession), set out in 1981, only a year after Tito’sdeath, disrupted the sensitive balance of forces in the federalleadership of communist Yugoslavia. The attempt to hush upthe Albanian question in Kosovo and Metohia by means of aparty purge and with outside efforts (actions by the federalmilitary and police forces) and to minimize the problem of thediscrimination against the Serbs and their forced displace-ment, resulted in growing frustration among Serbs all overYugoslavia in the years that followed. (4) Serbs gradually,but in an increasingly large numbers, started realizing that theTitoist communist order, contrary to the interwar period, wasbased on the national inequality of Serbs in Yugoslavia.

The attempts by Serbian communists to resolve thequestion of Serbia’s competencies over the provinces inagreement with the other republican leaderships, for thepurpose of protecting the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia moreefficiently, were rejected by all the other republics withunhidden antagonism. All attempts from 1977 to 1987 to putan end to the discrimination against the non-Albanian popu-lation in Kosovo and Metohia failed. The intransigence of thenational-communist nomenklatura in the federal leadershipcreated dangerous tensions that were hard to control: theKosovo Serbs started broadly self-organizing. (5)

The Serbs’ growing national frustration was skillfullyexploited, after a party coup in 1987, by Slobodan Milosevic,


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the new leader of the Serbian communists: instead of forumshe used populist methods, taking over from the SerbianOrthodox Church and the non-communist intelligentsia therole of the protector of national interests. Thus, the protectionof the endangered rights of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohiabecame a mean of political manipulation. Milosevic’s inten-tion to renew the weary communist party on the basis of newlydiscovered national ideals came at a moment when an irre-versible process of communism’s demise by means of nation-alism was launched in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Unionitself. Milosevic’s communist approach to the national ques-tion began to compromise overall Serbian interests in Yugo-slavia. At that moment, for most of the Serbs, preoccupied bythe question of Kosovo, the interests of the nation were moreimportant than the democratic changes taking place in theEast, especially since Milosevic had created the semblance ofa freedom of the media where former political and ideologicaltaboos were now freely discussed. Democracy in Serbia wasbelated only because of the unresolved national question.

The ethnic Albanians were already organized as a ho-mogenous political movement. They held to their radicalstands demanding neither political freedom nor human rights,but exclusively collective rights: “the Republic of Kosovo”within the Yugoslav federation. Ethnic Albanians respondedto reassertion of Serbian authority with a relentless series ofstrikes and demonstrations: they were aware that the aboli-tion of the autonomy based on the 1974 Constitution ofcommunist Yugoslavia, meant, in fact, the abolition of cer-tain elements of statehood, and put restrictions on uncon-trolled Albanian political domination. But by organizingmass demonstrations, they only strengthened Milosevic’spositions. The polarization within the republican leadershipsin regard to the Kosovo and Metohia issue became public.The support of the communist leaderships of Slovenia andCroatia to the ethnic Albanian demands definitely cementedMilosevic’s charisma. The final results of open rivalry be-tween Serbia and other republics were the following: amajority vote by the National Assembly of Serbia to limit


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Kosovo and Metohia’s autonomy, huge unrest among theethnic Albanians, and severe police repression in Kosovo andMetohia. On March 26, 1989, the semi-republican status ofthe two Serbian provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, wasreduced to the more usual competencies of autonomousregions. The 1989 amendments to the 1974 Constitutionannulled the provinces’ right to two separate legislatures,abolished the veto power held by the provincial legislatureover the legislature of Serbia, placed the power over interna-tional relations in the hands of the republic, and limited theright to debate a measure to a period of six months, afterwhich the matter was to be settled by a referendum. Thereferendum, boycotted by the ethnic Albanians was held onJuly 1, 1990. Kosovo remained as an autonomous province,but with territorial autonomy and a Statute which would beenacted with the Serbian parliament. The legislative authoritywas transferred to the parliament of Serbia and the executiveauthority to the Government of Serbia. The highest judicialauthority resided in the Supreme Court of Serbia. The nameMetohija (left out by the Albanian communist nomenklaturain 1968) reappeared in the official name of the autonomousprovince.

The ethnic Albanians (through the members of thedismissed provincial communist Assembly) responded onJuly 2, 1990 by proclaiming Kosovo as republic withinYugoslavia and adopted their own Constitution on Septem-ber 7, 1990 at an assembly held secretly in Kacanik. Theseacts, followed by the widespread Albanian boycott of allofficial institutions, were regarded by Serbian authorities asan attempt at secession. The result was firing of those who lefttheir jobs, thereby challenging the state unity of Serbia. Thesecond measure was harsh police retaliation against armed oranarmed street protesters. Since then, the ethnic Albanians,determined to obtain independence from Serbia, have con-sistently refused to have any contact with official Belgrade orwith the local government in Kosovo. They have constantlyboycotted Serbian parliamentary elections and accused theregime of “colonial” and “apartheid” policies.


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The secessionist movement of the ethnic Albanians inKosovo and Metohia, derived from the logic of the Titoistorder and based on ethnic discrimination and intolerance, ledto the homogenization of the Serbs in Yugoslavia, directlyproducing Milosevic. This, following the domino effect,resulted in the homogenization of the other Yugoslav nations.In a state with such mixed populations, due to the inability ofthe communist and post-communist leaderships to placedemocratic principles of organizing a multi-ethnic commu-nity above narrow national interests, this homogenizationdirectly led to the tragic civil war.

The Balance of Intolerance

After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Serbo-Albanian conflict lost its important Titoist dimension andonce again became Serbia’s internal issue, despite the de-mands to establish the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovothrough internationalization of the Kosovo issue as part of thesearch for a global solution of the civil war and the ethnicconflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. If the ethnicAlbanians were to give up their refusal to live in Serbia andcast their votes against Milosevic’s candidates, the demo-cratic opposition in Serbia could easily take over power,which would open the way to a long-term solution. On theother hand, as long as Milosevic is in power in Serbia,Ibrahim Rugova, the “president” of self-proclaimed Republicof Kosovo, can still hope for the internationalization of theKosovo issue.

The two essentially authoritarian regimes, the Serbianone and the shadow regime of Kosovo Albanians, are onlynourishing the extremism on both sides.

The geopolitical realities point to the fact that everyattempt at achieving the Kosovo Albanians’ goals wouldcause a war of broader Balkan proportions with unforesee-able consequences, because this would mean changing the


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stable inter-state borders established way back in 1912 and1913. The right to self-determination, which the ethnic Alba-nians refer to when rejecting even the very thought of remain-ing within Serbia, is not envisaged anywhere in Europe fornational minorities, no matter how large their percentage maybe compared to the country’s overall population.Today, the ethnic Albanians account for approximately 18percent of the overall population of Serbia. That is approxi-mately the same as the percentage of the Serbs and other non-Albanians in Kosovo.

The Possible Solution: The Regionalization ofSerbia

Mistakes have been made on both sides. The ethnic Albaniansattempted to resolve the Kosovo question without the partici-pation of the Kosovo and Metohia Serbs and against interestsof Serbia, and the Serbian regime tried to resolve the problemwithout consulting the ethnic Albanians. The only viablesolution appears to be the opening of dialogue and mutualconcessions. The first concession of the ethnic Albaniansshould be the recognition of Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovoand Metohia. It is absolutely a conditio sine qua non forfurther negotiations. The next step would be negotiated con-cessions concerning the form of Kosovo and Metohia’s au-tonomy.

A return to the old type of political organization set forthby the 1974 Constitution would mean a return to the com-pletely outdated concept of administrative decision-makingby simple majority vote - as was the practice under Titoist rule- and would inevitably result in a renewed flare-up of ethnictensions, but this time on a larger scale. What is urgentlyneeded is the abolition of collective rights - the communistlegacy - and their replacement with human and civil rights forall citizen regardless of nationality and religion. Unlike theSerbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who are ethnically,


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linguistically, and culturally close to the Croats and BosnianMuslims, and therefore threatened by silent assimilation, theethnic Albanians are in no danger of losing their ethnicidentity through assimilation since their culture, languageand religion differ substantially from those of the Serbs.

Serbia should therefore offer the broadest possiblestatus of autonomy to Kosovo-Metohia and the European-type of minority rights to ethnic Albanians. Minority rights,such as the right to use one’s own language in the localgovernment, the courts, schools and universities, as well asthe freedom of religion and full cultural autonomy, wouldhave to conform to international law in every respect. Thegradual introduction of a genuine democratic government,through which the majority ethnic Albanians in Kosovo andMetohia, and the ethnic Albanian minority within the wholeof Serbia, would became part of the Serbian state system, withfull participation in parliamentary elections as well as publicinstitutions such as schools and universities, would helpreduce existing ethnic tensions since all economic and politi-cal matters would be resolved in the parliament of Serbia bythe freely elected representatives of all citizens of Serbia.

There are others forms of territorial arrangements thatwould work better as they are envisaged by the Serbiandemocratic parties in opposition to Milosevic’s regime. Theseparties consider that instead of ethnic and ideological criteria,it is more important to use economic and geographic criteria,with a heavy emphasis on a new communication system. Inthe 1970s and 1980s Kosovo and Metohia was unable to meetmore than 10 percent of its domestic needs with its ownproduction; whatever else was needed came from the federalor Serbian government. The financial investments in Kosovoby federal agencies in this period exceeded the total amountof funds used for the development of inner Serbia. On theother hand, inner Serbia was obliged by the federal govern-ment to invest in Kosovo and Metohia, regardless of its owneconomic stagnation. This had disastrous consequences forinner Serbia, which was deprived of a stable economicdevelopment, and for Kosovo and Metohia itself where the


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investments were placed in a completely wrong way. Insteadof encouraging small business or agriculture, funding wasinvested in big hotels, stadiums, bureaucratic buildings orlarge industrial complexes. For all these reasons, reforms areurgently needed to restructure Kosovo and Metohia’s basiceconomic production and whatever infrastructure alreadyexists in the province so as to raise its productive capacitiesto the level existing in Serbia.

A regionalization of Serbia - as envisaged by theexperts from the opposition parties, that is based on eco-nomic priorities would reduce the risk of a centralized,authoritarian regime fueling particularistic and secessionistaims. Any linking of minority question with the territorialclaims is only a basis for further confrontations. A region suchas Kosovo and Metohia with from 1.6 to 1.9 million inhabit-ants would be able to thrive by means of its own productivecapacities without threatening the integrity of the state. Thiswould be desirable in all respects.

Denationalization of state property, and the return ofproperty confiscated during and after the Second World Warto its rightful owners, is a basic prerequisite not only for allpolitical solutions, but also for a favorable economic devel-opment in the future. Furthermore, regionalization wouldrelieve the provincial administration of some of the enormouscosts through the creation of smaller territorial units thatwould function as effective economic units.

Already culturally and linguistically united, the ethnicAlbanians would have better chances for economic prosper-ity within the smaller regional units. A Regional Assembly forKosovo and Metohia, as a territory with an ethnically mixedpopulation suffering from rising inter-ethnic tensions, wouldconsist of two chambers. Members of the lower chamberwould be elected by direct vote, while each ethnic groupwould be equally represented in the upper chamber.(6) TheAssembly would vote its own Statute by a two third majorityof both chambers. The acts adopted by the local parliamentwould not have the force of law but of decrees, necessarilyin accordance with the existing laws of Serbia. An ombuds-


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man (an ethnic Albanian or a Serb) would be necessary tomonitor implementation of these decrees.

Within this system - which would be set out only forKosovo and Metohia not for the rest of Serbia - would beprevent the use of any ethnically-based majority vote, atechnique so destructively applied under the communists,while it guaranteeing the protection of all ethnic groups, notonly the Serbs and ethnic Albanians, but the Turks, Muslimsand Gypsies also. According to this project, the province ofKosovo and Metohia would enjoy rights similar to thoseenvisaged for autonomous communities under the presentconstitution of Spain, or for regions according to the presentconstitution of Italy. All those competencies are far broaderthen those envisaged by the present Constitution of Serbia.The possible changes in legislative competencies of theprovince can be made only when the present Constitution ischanged or amended by the National Assembly of Serbia.This is the most European, entirely democratic and multi-cultural solution, even though it is for the time being com-pletely rejected by the political leadership of ethnic Albani-ans. But in time it could be accepted by the Kosovo andMetohia Serbs as well as by the opposition parties in Serbia,who are strongly in favor of regionalization. The present lowlevel of political culture in Serbia, including Kosovo andMetohia, makes this global project viable only after theestablishment of full parliamentary democracy within Serbiaand Montenegro.

Practical proposals

The practical proposals within this framework are the follow-ing: to improve the present condition of school system, theethnic Albanians should be given the right to attend theschools (which they more or less voluntarily left in 1990) inthe existing school buildings which are now used only by theSerbs and Muslims and other minorities, like Turks and


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Gypsies. If they do not accept the curricula in use for thewhole of Serbia, they can organize their own curricula, whichwill not be financed by the Serbia. If it is possible to find acommon ground for curricula which will be accepted bySerbia, then it can be partially financed by the state. For themoment, the most important issue is to have all the studentsattending regular schools. Once a common program of school-ing is agreed upon, ethnic Albanian teachers and professorswill be paid by the state, like all the others in Serbia. Thequestion of curricula is very sensitive, because Serbia cannotagree to pay for schooling which is, in many aspects, hostileto the state itself. There will be no ideological limitations inthe search for a mutually acceptable school curricula.

Second, the health care problem should be solved bythe return of Albanian cadres to the existing system ofhospitals and acceptance of rules which are generally ob-served elsewhere in Serbia. Ethnic Albanian patients, al-though officially rejecting all political connection with Ser-bia, are unofficially accepting the sovereignty of Serbia byfrequently coming for medical care to Belgrade and othercities in inner Serbia, instead of going to Pristina, Pec orMitrovica. Since they are not paying any taxes to the statefunds, this humantarian acceptance of ethnic Albanian pa-tients produces severe costs for Serbia. There is no realpossibility of creating separate health-care system that willgive to ethnic Albanians some kind of satisfaction concern-ing the governing of the hospitals or other medical institu-tions. The services offered by the Serbian hospitals are notpresently covered by the social security of ethnic Albanianpatients but by the state of Serbia itself.

Some immediate improvements can be made on thelevel of public infrastructure. While formally rejecting anyofficial ties with the state, ethnic Albanians all used thefavorable economic situation and spiralling inflation in Ser-bia during the last several years to pay off their apartmentsand became owners of state-owned property at very lowprices (as happened elsewhere in Serbia). On other levels aswell, useful and commonly accepted state laws could provide


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the basis for improving inter-ethnic relations. The decreesfiring ethnic Albanians could easily be annulled for thepractical reasons of needed jobs and specialists for manyfactories, mines and companies. With their gradual return totheir jobs, the question of the management of those compa-nies or factories can be solved by mutual concessions, or, asa better solution, prescribed by the state laws of privatizationwhich will give to employees the right to buy company sharesand thus participate in owning and running the companies.

The most problematic issue, but only for the moment,concerns the judiciary and executive bodies. If there is amassive return of ethnic Albanians in all structures of theKosovo and Metohia economy, the next step will be theirparticipation in the executive bodies of the political system.If the model of two-chamber system for the future Assemblyof regionalized Kosovo and Metohia is accepted by bothsides, the ethnic Albanians will be proportionally representedin all levels of the political system, including the judiciary andexecutive body.

The Present Situation and the InternationalMediation

Serbia is not as militarily and politically powerful as it was inearly 1990’s, but it is still strong enough to defend Serbianterritory itself if necessary. The Albanian side is overestimat-ing international support, and underestimating the readinessof the Serbs to defend Kosovo and Metohia after the wars lostin Croatia and, partly, in Bosnia, even in moments of impor-tant internal turmoil such as the power struggle in late 1996and early 1997. Due to a constant internal power struggle, inorder to remain in power, Milosevic’s regime, which inSeptember 1996 signed an educational agreement with IbrahimRugova, is not in a position to make more concessions toKosovo and Metohia ethnic Albanians than could any other,democratically elected government of Serbia. Even a fully


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democratic government would need stability in Kosovo andMetohia to consolidate the international position of Serbia.

The role of international mediators, from the USA to theEU, needs to be extremely balanced, avoiding any one-sidedapproach, which has not been the case during the last severalyears. The ethnic Albanians understood the internationalmediation only as an opportunity to impose upon the Serbsand Serbia their own projects, ranging from the status of arepublic within Yugoslavia, with no political ties with Serbia,to independence under international guarantees. But thiswould mean an imposed, not a negotiated settlement, whichwould not be viable in the long term. The role of the interna-tional mediators should be to pressure ethnic Albanians tofind a common ground with Serbian authorities for a negoti-ated solution acceptable by both sides. Any solution whichwould not be found within the present Serbia is completelyunacceptable for the Serbian side, not only for the currentMilosevic regime but also for the democratic parties in theopposition. Any change in political status of any part of theSerbia can be effected only with the approval of the NationalAssembly of Serbia. Therefore, all negotiations must acceptthe fact that FR Yugoslavia is an internationally recognizedstate, and that Serbia, as a part of that federation, will notunder any circumstances abandon its sovereignty on any partof its own territory. This is also the general standpoint of theinternational community concerning the states that emergedfrom the former SFR Yugoslavia. Therefore, democracy asthe general framework seems as the only way out of thepresent crisis in the province of Kosovo and Metohia. A stepby step approach is, in this respect, more viable then anyimposed solution.

_________________________________________________(1) R. Samardzic (ed.), Kosovo-Metochien in der serbischen Geschichte, Lausanne:L’Age d’Homme 1990.(2) R.Petrovic, M. Blagojevic, The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins fromKosovo and Metohija. Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985-1986, Belgrade:Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 1992.


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(3) Cf. D.T. Batakovic, The Kosovo Chronicles, Belgrade: Plato 1992, pp. 23-38.The Albanian view on Illyrian theory in : Albanians and Their Territories, Tirana:Academy of Science 1985.(4) “Declaration of the Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church against theGenocide by the Albanians on the indigenous Serbian Population, together with theSacrilege of their Cultural Monuments in their own Country”, South Slav Journal,vol 11, No 2-3 (40-41), London 1988, pp. 61-64; 87-89.(5) Kjell Magnusson, “The Serbian reaction: Kosovo and the Ethnic MobilizationAmong the Serbs”, Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, vol 4:3(1987), pp. 3-30.(6) Cf. M. Jovicic, Regionalna drzava, Beograd: Vajat 1996.


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The Kosovo and MetohiaProblem and Regional Security in

the Balkans

Predrag Simic (1)

Institute of International Politics and EconomicsBelgrade, Yugoslavia.

1. Introduction

Serbian-Albanian relations and, in particular, the problem ofthe Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohia (2)where the national aspirations of the two nations are inconflict, are among the most complex contemporary ethnic,territorial and security problems in the Balkans and in Eu-rope. For the Serbs, Kosovo and Metohia is part of theirnational territory, a region of great strategic and economicimportance besides being the cradle of the medieval state ofSerbia - a place with a concentration of Serbian historical,religious and cultural monuments and where the legendarybattle against the Ottoman conquerors had been fought in1389. In other words, it is an area that sublimes the collectiveidentity of the Serbian people just as Jerusalem does, forinstance, for the Jewish nation. For the Albanians, Kosovoand Metohia is a territory where they comprise an ethnicmajority, where Albanian national movement was born in1878 and where is still the focus of Albanian irredentism. Inbrief, Kosovo and Metohia has an important place in thenational consciousness of both Serbs and Albanians - for theSerbs, it stands for Ancient Serbia, whereas, for the Albani-ans, it is their Piedmont - and this made ethnic conflict overKosovo and Metohia intractable from the very beginning. Theproblem of Kosovo and Metohia is consequently a dispute


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over the historical rights of the Serbs and the ethnic rights ofthe Albanians, two conflicting principles of international law,that made any attempt of international mediation in thisdispute extremely complicated.

The Kosovo and Metohia problem is, however, muchmore than an ethnic and territorial dispute between the Serbsand Albanians. This is, above all, a region with the highestpopulation growth in Europe: in the period 1948-1981, itspopulation had doubled, completely upsetting the ethnicbalance that had existed among the Albanians and Serbs. (3)In a matter of twenty years (1961-1981), the local Albanianpopulation increased by 90 per cent bringing its percentage inthe overall population up from 66.2 to 77.4 and the Serbiandown from 23.6 to 7.3, with Montenegrins accounting for 1.7compared with 3.9 per cent previously (see Tab. I). Further-more, half the ethnic Albanian population is under the age of20, so it is expected that there will be another doubling of itsnumbers in the next decade. Second, despite large invest-ments on the part of the federal government, Kosovo andMetohia has remained the most underdeveloped region of FRYugoslavia precisely because of its high demographic growth,its traditional social structure, misguided investments and forvarious other reasons. Third, this is the religious and culturalproblem, as the ethnic Albanians are largely Moslems whereasthe Serbs are Christians. In addition, it is a political andgeostrategic problem since this is an area crucial to Serbia’sand FR Yugoslavia’s stability and security and the boycottethnic Albanians are conducting by abstaining from thepolitical life of the country (they make up 16.5 percent of thepopulation of FR Yugoslavia), has created a major gap on itspolitical scene. Fifth, it is also an economic problem as someof the main natural resources and industrial facilities ofSerbia are located in this province. Last, but not least, it is alsoa regional and European problem, because any kind of emer-gency situation in the area would destabilize all neighboringstates (above all the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-nia), causing broader conflicts in the southern Balkans.


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Tab. I: Population Trends in Kosovo and Metohia 1931-1991 (4)________________________________________________________Year Total Serbs/Montenegrins % Albanians %1880 240,300 - - - -1890 301,200 - - - -1900 378,300 - - - -1910 475,200 - - - -1921 439,010 - - - -1931 552,064 150,745 27.3 331,549 60.11948 727,820 199,961 27.5 463,742 63.71953 808,141 221,212 27.4 524,559 64.91961 963,988 264,604 27.4 646,605 67.11971 1,243,693 259,819 20.9 916,168 73.71981 1,584,441 236,525 14.9 1,226,736 77.41991 1,956,196 214,555 11.0 1,596,072 81.6

From a contemporary point of view, one could say thatthe crises and civil war that broke out in the former SFRY hadbeen detonated by the Serb-Albanian dispute over Kosovoand Metohia. Violent demonstrations of ethnic Albanian thatoccurred in April 1981, hardly a year after the death ofMarshal Tito, gave an initial blow to the ethnic balance of the“Second Yugoslavia”, inciting nationalism in all the Yugo-slav republics which, ten years later, brought about theultimate dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. The Alba-nian national movement of that time in Kosovo had come outdemanding that this Serbian province be given the status of aseventh Yugoslav republic which, under the constitutionalorder of the SFRY meant a step towards secession from theRepublic of Serbia and the SFR Yugoslavia as well, andcreation of a “Greater Albania”. (5) The irredentist movementof the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo an Metohia roused strongnational mobilization in Serbia - the largest of the Yugoslavrepublics which was already antagonized by the constitu-tional changes of 1971 and 1974 which had established anasymmetrical relationship between this republic and its twoautonomous provinces (Voyvodina and Kosovo and Metohia).Serbia’s demands for reform of the Yugoslav Federation wereat once countered by Slovenia and then by Croatia, which, ina covert way at first and then quite openly, took the side of the


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ethnic Albanians of Kosovo and Metohia seeing them asallies in their power struggle with Serbia; this ended in theiractual secession and the dissolution of the SFRY, followingwhich both of them lost interest in Kosovo and Metohija.

On a broader scale, the problem of Kosovo an Metohiahad, over the past fifteen years or so, transformed itself underthe influence of the changes that were occurring in Europe. Inthe bipolar Europe SFRY was a respected member and one ofthe leading countries of the non-alignment movement whosestability was supported both by Washington and Moscow.Albania under Enver Hoxha, on the other hand, was a rigidcommunist dictatorship and all its attempts at international-izing the issue of Kosovo did not meet with significantsupport from the international community. Most of the illegalpolitical groups of Albanians from Kosovo shared, under theinfluence of the regime in Tirana, a radically leftist, Stalinistor Maoist (“Marxist-Leninist”) orientation that isolated themeven more. The crisis that exploded in the Soviet bloc and thepolicy of the West during the eighties upset this balance andthe Eastern European nationalist movements in time becameallies in the struggle against the communist regimes indirectlyalso affecting the international position of SFRY which hadlost its privileged status of a “strategic buffer” between Eastand West. Consequently, the nationalist movement of theethnic Albanians of Kosovo gradually attracted the attentionof influential Western circles, especially after the collapse ofEnver Hoxha’s dictatorship in Albania. The well-organizedAlbanian emigration in the USA and Western Europe (espe-cially in Germany, the Benelux and Scandinavia), had muchto do with this.

An analysis of the CIA, published in the New York Timesin November 1990, predicted that civil war would break outin SFRY within next eighteen months and that it wouldactually flare up in Kosovo. Although war did actually startsix months later, the prediction prove to be wrong, since thewar did not started in the ethnically mixed and povertystricken province of Kosovo and Metohia, but in Sloveniathat was the richest and only ethnically homogenous republic


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of the former Yugoslavia. While the war went on in thewestern republics, Kosovo and Metohia maintained its rela-tive peace, primarily because of a balance of fear in which theleaders of both ethnic communities estimated that a conflictbetween them would surpass even the violence that had cometo expression in Bosnia and Herzegovina and be fatal to theinterests of both nations. Despite their mutual distrust andtheir profoundly disrupted relations, the Serbs and Albaniansof Kosovo took care not to exceed a point that would inevi-tably provoke a breakout of conflict. Thus, quite unexpect-edly, the gravest ethnic problem in Yugoslavia escaped frombeing drawn into the Yugoslav civil war, but relations be-tween the two ethnic communities remained frozen, in a wayunprecedented in Europe. With its constitutional amend-ments of 1989 and 1990, Serbia did away with the disputedprovisions of the 1974 Constitution. This, however, was metwith resistance from the Albanian political parties of Kosovothat resorted then to creating their own para-state with theresult that two parallel systems of government - one legal andthe other illegal - came into being. Although the participationof Albanian political parties in the Republic and Federalelections would probably have made them runner ups to theleading group in the country opening opportunities for theinstitutional solution of these open problems, they haveremained adamant in their boycott, regardless even of the factthat such a policy has become counterproductive to the bestinterests of the Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohia.

After the initial support given by some internationalcircles to the Albanian national movement of Kosovo andMetohia, the international community has changed its atti-tude taking the standpoint that any attempt at the forcedsecession of this province from Serbia and FR Yugoslaviawould undoubtedly first draw neighboring FRY Macedoniainto the conflict (as a strengthening of Albanian parties in theborderline area had come about in the early nineties), andthen all the other neighboring countries as well. When thecivil war in the former Yugoslavia began to be unraveled asa result of the Dayton peace agreement, the international


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community’s stand that the problem of Serb-Albanian rela-tions in Kosovo be settled within the framework of Serbia andFR Yugoslavia, certain changes began taking place within theAlbanian and Serbian political parties creating possibilitiesfor a new approach to Serbian-Albanian relations in theBalkans. The two ethnic communities will, however, need toface the difficult heritage of their past and find new constitu-tional models of autonomy for ethnic Albanians living inSerbia, different from those the Yugoslav communist feder-alist model had developed. The new model of autonomymust, therefore, be sought within the standards established bythe OSCE (CSCE), and the Council of Europe, but above allin existing European models of autonomy for ethnic commu-nities. The motive for doing this should not merely be onaccount of the pressure of the international community: Thedevelopment of democratic institutions in Serbia will hardlybe possible if the Kosovo and Metohia issue is not solved, andvice versa, the problem of Kosovo and Metohia cannot beresolved without strengthening democratic institutions inSerbia, that is, without the political participation of theAlbanian segment of the population in the political life ofSerbia and FR of Yugoslavia.

2. Kosovo and Metohia: the Burden of the Past

In mediaeval Serbia, the present region of Kosovo and Metohiawas not a separate administrative entity; reference to it as theVilayet of Kosovo appears only towards the end of the 19thand at the beginning of the 20th Century in the territorialorganization of the Ottoman Empire where it covered broaderarea with administrative center in Skoplje. After the end of theFirst Balkan War in 1912, the Kosovo region became part ofSerbia, whereas Metohia became part of Montenegro. Thiswas internationally recognized by the London Peace Confer-ence of 29 July 1913, when the present State of Albania wasalso recognized. Kosovo and Metohia appears as a distinctive


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territory only in documents of the Yugoslav Communist Partyin this century at the end of the twenties. Although duringWorld War II it had come under “Greater Albania” which hadbeen created as an Italian protectorate, Kosovo and Metohiawas not given any special territorial status. It is only in 1946that Kosovo and Metohia became a separate administrative“district” within Serbia, under the first constitution of “Sec-ond Yugoslavia. (6)

Contrary to contemporary stereotypes, Serbian-Alba-nian relations had not been antagonistic during the middleages, nor had the two nations been at odds before the periodof Ottoman conquests in the Balkans. In the medieval State ofSerbia, the Albanians were an active factor: Albanian feudallords were recognized as was their property and titles, andthey were treated without discrimination under the laws of theSerbian Nemanjic Dynasty. (7) The Serbs and Albaniansresisted the Turkish invaders together and it is recorded thatAlbanians were part of the Serbian formations in the Battle ofKosovo. The core of the political, economic and cultural lifeof the medieval State of Serbia, between the 12th and the 15thCentury, was in Kosovo, as numerous monasteries and theremnants of medieval cities and other cultural monumentstestify. (8) Kosovo an Metohia retained this status throughoutthe first centuries of Ottoman occupation (15th and 16thCentury), and it is only at the end of the 17th Century (1690)that the first great exodus of Serbs from this area took place.

It was then that Albanians began to be converted toIslam and there are many who were given influential posi-tions in the hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire (9) and becamethe stronghold of its rule in the Balkans. The Ottoman au-thorities fostered this process through tax and other conces-sions which induced most of central Albania to switch toIslam in the 16th Century (Albanian Catholic and Orthodoxcommunities had persevered only in the north, in the areaaround Skadar). This conversion to Islam first embraced thefeudal lords, then the townspeople and finally the villagers.The privileges of the Moslems and discrimination towardsthe Christians ignited the first controversies between the


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Albanians and Serbs in the area of present-day Kosovo andMetohia, where Albanians began settling in increasing num-bers during the 18th and 19th Century, assimilating andpushing the Serbian population northwards. (10) Ottomanrepression against the Christians grew in the 17th Centurybecause the Empire’s expansion into Europe had been haltedand the Habsburg armies during the 17th and 18th Centurymade deep thrusts into the Balkans. Two waves of exodus ofSerbs took place under this pressure - in 1690 and 1737 - andthe Habsburg princes settled these Serbian refugees alongwhat they called their Military Boundaries (Militärgrenze) inVoyvodina, southern Hungary and the so-called Krayinas(11). Thus gradually weakened the resistance from the localChristian population in the area of present-day Kosovo andMetohia against the pressure of the Albanian colonizers whohad settled in these parts for economic reasons (in search ofcultivable land), and social reasons, too (to escape bloodfeuds), as well as by planned resettlement which the Ottomanregime had organized.

Intensive settlement in the area took place in the last twocenturies of the Ottoman Empire’s existence, the idea prob-ably being to prevent any homogenization of the Slav popu-lation which was revolting against the Ottoman authoritiesand also to prevent the formation of new national states in theBalkans. The First Serbian Uprising of 1804-1813, whichmarked the beginning of national revolutions in the Balkans,opened a new phase in Serbian-Albanian relations. In its firstnational program - the Nacertanije (the Plan) of Ilija Garasaninof 1844 - Serbia set itself the task of freeing the SouthernSlavs from Ottoman occupation in cooperation with the otherBalkan nations. Thus, ties were established with the CatholicAlbanian tribe Miriditi which agreed to their common strug-gle against the Turks in 1849. The endeavor to incorporateAlbanians in the liberation movement of the Balkan nationswas significant, because as much as 70 percent of the Alba-nians were converted to Islam by the middle of the 19thCentury and were interested in safeguarding the OttomanEmpire and its institutions. The resistance against the Otto-


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man Empire’s reforms of 1839 (tanzimat) provoked unrestamong the Islamicised Albanian feudal lords which had itsrepercussions on the Christian population which they consid-ered responsible for the suspension of the privileges they usedto enjoy. Further Albanian colonization of the Kosovo andMetohia region was intensified at that time, developing intomass terror and ethnic cleansing of the local Serbian popula-tion.

The 1876-1878 wars against the Ottoman Empirebrought the Serbs and Montenegrins into their first seriousconflict with the Albanians. As the Serbian army’s advance-ment went through territory that was colonized by the Alba-nians, the Porte mobilized these Albanians to fight the Serbs.The operations of the Serbian army in southern Serbia, whenKosovo was briefly taken over in 1878, provoked a wave ofrefugees in the opposite direction as well high 30,000 Alba-nians deserted those parts of the country which the Serbianarmy had occupied. However, that same year, the BerlinCongress brought a stop to the liberation movements of theBalkan nations and began partitioning the Ottoman Empire.Thus, a “League for Defense of the Albanian Nation” wasfounded at Prizren in June 1878 (“The First Prizren League”),and the first Albanian national program was adopted then. Itsobjective was the creation of an Albanian state which wouldcover four regions: a) southern Albania and Epirus withJoannina as its capital; b) northern and central Albania(Skadar, Tirana and Elbasan); c) Macedonia (Skoplje, Debar,Gostivar, Prilep, Veles, Bitola, Ohrid); d) Kosovo with partsof southern Serbia and Macedonia (Pec, Djakovica, Prizren,Novi Pazar, Mitrovica, Sjenica, Pristina, Gnjilane, Presevoand Kumanovo). In short, the First Prizren League laid downthe terms for the creation of a “Greater Albania” which haseven to this day remained the objective of AlbanianIrredentism. Although the League enjoyed the support of theTurkish authorities at the start, after the Berlin Congress, theAlbanian movement took a turn against the Porte whichliquidated it in 1882 and the whole area was thrown into astate of anarchy and violence. Repression against the Serbian


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population inhabiting the area of present-day Kosovo andMetohia, led to the exodus of around 400,000 people intoSerbia between the years 1878 and 1912. (12)

The First Balkan War of 1912 had ended Ottoman rulein the Balkans but had also sparked off open conflicts amongthe national programs of the Balkan states. Serbia had enteredthe war intending to liberate the Serbian people living underOttoman administration and to secure an outlet to the AdriaticSea which inevitably brought it into conflict with the Albani-ans. Underestimating the power of the Albanian nationalmovement, Serbian politicians of the time counted on theassimilation of the Albanians into Serbia, possibly extendingthem autonomy in those parts where they comprised a major-ity. This opinion has been strengthened by the relatively weakresistance of the Albanians against the advance of the Serbianarmy through Kosovo and Metohia and northern Albania. Thesituation then soon took a different turn when the Albaniannational movement won the strong support of Austria-Hun-gary and Italy which were interested in creating an Albanianstate that would be under their influence and in preventingother Balkan states from establishing any strongholds alongthe Adriatic coastline. A compromise was reached among thebig powers at an ambassadorial conference in London in1912-13 when a territorial demarcation was made betweenthe new Albanian state and its neighbors. Despite the fact thatneither the Balkan states nor the big powers (Italy in particu-lar (13)) truly respected the decisions of the ambassadorialconference, these boundaries have by and large remained asdelineated then to this day.

Serbia, like the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Sloveniansfounded in 1918, had no set policy with respect to theAlbanians who found themselves within her borders in 1912.Under the Peace Treaty concluded in Berlin in 1878, Serbiahad committed herself to protect the religious minoritieswithin its territories (14); this was amended only in 1919under the terms of the Peace Treaty signed at Saint Germainsconstituting part of the Versailles Peace Treaties. The newlycreated Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes committed


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itself to protect the lives and freedom of its people, regardlessof origin, nationality, language, race or creed; the equality ofall citizens before the law; everyone’s right to speak his ownlanguage, and so on. In practice, however, the situation wasquite different: Except for the Albanian feudal lords and thetownspeople who found their place in the new state regime(especially through the Moslem Jemiet party (15)), ethnicAlbanians were deprived of these rights. Albanian terroristactivities, known as kachak, which evoked retaliation fromthe authorities, encumbered the situation. (16) In the area ofpresent-day Kosovo and Metohia, the new state had two mainobjectives: to conduct an agrarian reform (to liquidate theOttoman feudal system), and colonization (to achieve anethnic balance in its population). The chaotic way in whichthe policy was carried out and the abuses inflicted by the localauthorities, only broadened the gap between the Serbs andAlbanians. In the period between 1922 and 1941, 12,000families (about 60,000 people) were settled in Kosovo andMetohia, which made up about 9.2 percent of the prewarpopulation. Negotiations were conducted between Turkeyand Yugoslavia in the thirties on the resettlement of a largernumber of Albanians into Turkey “in the way in whichRomania, Bulgaria and Greece had solved the problem oftheir Moslem population”, but nothing had come of it. Theposition of Serbian and Yugoslav left, in the first place of theSerbian Social Democratic Party (17), and the CommunistParty of Yugoslavia (CPY) in the period between the twoworld wars, strongly opposed the policy of the Serbian rulingcircles towards the Albanians.

The Albanian population of Kosovo, thus, welcomedthe break-up of Yugoslavia and Fascist occupation as itsliberation, which the occupying forces instigated by annexingthe territory of present-day Kosovo and Metohia to “GreaterAlbania” which has been established as an Italian protector-ate. Between 1941 and 1945, the non-Albanian population ofKosovo and Metohia was exposed to terror and ethnic cleans-ing, particularly the Serbs and Montenegrins who were colo-nized and together with a large number of their indigenous


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compatriots were banished to Serbia. In his lecture on “GreaterAlbania” at the Royal Italian Academy on 30 May 1941, thepresident of the Albanian puppet government, Mustafa Kruya,had pointed out that “with the victory of the axis powers andestablishment of the new world order, Mussolini and Hitlerwill ensure the Albanian people a national state that willcover its broadest ethnic borders and be indissolubly linkedwith fascist Italy”. The leaders of the pre-war Moslem Jemietparty of Kosovo had at that time founded a new Albanianpolitical organization with a pronounced irredentist program- the Lidhja kombetare shquiptare. Upon Italy’s capitulation,the policy of this party continued to be supported by the ThirdReich which contributed to the formation of the “SecondPrizren League” at the end of 1943. At that time, the Yugoslavcommunists also appeared on the scene and through theirrepresentatives in Albania and in Kosovo and Metohia organ-ized the Albanian communist and anti-fascist movement,opening a new phase in the history of Yugoslav-Albanianrelations.

In brief, centuries of Ottoman occupation andIslamization of the Balkans profoundly disrupted relationsbetween the Albanians and other neighboring nations thatoften saw in them the instrument of Ottoman repression. Thegap between the Slavs and the Albanians grew in the 19th and20th Century when their national programs clashed, creatinga vent for the interference of non-Balkan powers which haddeftly taken advantage of these animosities for their ownpurposes. The legacy of such a history has been profoundmistrust that at times transpired into national hatred betweenthe two nations which is evident from the pejorative meaningof the word Shquiptar (Albanian) in Serbian, and Shkie (Slav)in the Albanian language. The religious factor should, how-ever, not be underestimated (Islam is definitely accountablefor the high demographic growth in Kosovo an Metohia), noroverestimated, for, even from the time of the First PrizrenLeague, the credo of the Albanian national movement hasbeen: “the religion of the Albanians is Albanianism” (feja eshqyptarit ashi shqyptaria). (18)


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The Albanian Minority in the “Second Yugoslavia”

At the end of the 19th and in the first half of the 20th Century,the Serbian and Yugoslav left had treated Serbian-Albanianrelations within the scope of its aim at having the nationalquestion resolved through the creation of a Balkan confedera-tion. The dilemma of the communists was cut short by theComintern which had decided at its Fifth Congress in 1924 tobreak up the state of Yugoslavia considering it to be a“product of world imperialism”. From then onwards thenational policy of the CPY was founded on the Leninisttheory about “the reactionary nationalism of hegemonic na-tions and the progressive nationalism of oppressed people”,from which they drew the conclusion as to the need to counter“Greater Serbian nationalism” and for the cooperation ofcommunists with all anti-Serbian nationalist movements. Atits Fourth Congress in 1928, the CPY adopted the position ofthe Comintern that Yugoslavia should be dismembered as itwas a country “created in the Balkans by world imperialismto counterrevolutionary purposes aimed against the SovietUnion”. This position was modified only in 1936 when theComintern took a turn towards a “national front” policy andadopted a new policy for Yugoslavia’s preservation anddefense. In doing so, however, the initial position that Yugo-slav communists must support the Albanian national move-ment was not changed until the beginning of World War II.The CPY played a major role during the war in the formationof the Communist Party of Albania (CPA) and in organizingan anti-fascist movement as well as creating organs of gov-ernment for the new Albanian state. (19)

A conference that took place in the village of Buyan inAlbania from 31 December 1943 to 2 January 1944 was laterthe cause of considerable controversy. A this conferencedelegates of the Albanian and Yugoslav communists invitedthe ethnic Albanians of Kosovo to join in the struggle againstfascism with the hope that the victory of the communistswould open the way to unification with Albania. Although the


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stands taken at the Buyan conference were criticized withinthe caucus of the CPY even before the end of 1944, theyrevealed two basic features of the CPY’s policy in respect ofKosovo and Metohia at that time: Its desire to have the ethnicAlbanians of Kosovo and Metohia join the anti-fascist move-ment and its orientation towards incorporating Albania into aYugoslav or possibly a Balkan communist federation oncethe war came to an end. In a letter to the CPA at the end of1943 concerning the future of Kosovo and Metohia, theCentral Committee of the CPY had responded in the follow-ing manner: “Armed struggle against the occupying forcescan only be clearly indicative of what who wants and forgereal democracy and brotherhood of the people, so there is noneed to emphasize the fact that such a question cannotconstitute a problem where we and democratic anti-imperial-istic Albania are concerned ... New Yugoslavia will be acountry of free people and there will, therefore, be no placein it for national subjugation of the Albanian minority.” (20)

It is the predominant opinion among Serbian historiansthat there were at least three motives for the creation of theAutonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohia on 7 August1945: a) to resolve the status of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo;b) to make way for the incorporation of Albania into aYugoslav communist federation (21), and c) to create abalance between the Serbs and the other nations of thecountry based on the Leninist doctrine for resolving nation-ality questions in multi-national states (so called “WeakSerbia - Strong Yugoslavia” policy). In support of the latter,the argument most often presented is that such autonomousregions were created only within the territory of Serbia andnot within Macedonia or Montenegro, both of which alsohave areas in which Albanian minorities exist, nor for thatmatter within any of the other Yugoslav republics (Croatiaand Bosnia-Herzegovina) which have ethnically mixedpopulations. (22) The Yugoslav constitution and a special billpassed January 1946, define Kosovo and Metohia as anautonomous region of Serbia and this was reaffirmed in theSerbian constitution of January 1947. The Yugoslav constitu-


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tion of 1963, however, provided the possibility for the crea-tion of autonomous provinces within the federal republics,leaving it to the republics to decide on this themselves.

The victory of Slovenian and Croatian faction in theLeague of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1964 made the statusof the provinces a major stake in the struggle for power withinthe Yugoslav federation, which reflected on their status in theconstitutional amendments of 1968. Under these amend-ments, legislative and judicial authority was passed on to theprovinces and they were given direct representation in thefederal parliament, their rights were determined under sepa-rate provincial constitutional laws and Metohia was abol-ished from the name of Serbia’s southern province, so for thefirst time it was to be known as the Socialist AutonomousProvince of Kosovo. It is interesting to note, however, that thefirst Albanian nationalist demonstrations in “Second Yugo-slavia”, took place in 1968, but were quickly suppressed bypolice and the federal army. The constitutional amendmentsof 1971 further extended the rights of the autonomous prov-inces of Serbia to the extent that they were given constitu-tional power and their representation in the Federal Parlia-ment was also broadened; they were given seats in the StatePresidency, the Federal Government, the Constitutional Courtof Justice and they were to be given a “relative number ofposts in the commanding staff of the army, in diplomacy” andso forth. In effect, these amendments in the Yugoslav consti-tutional system made the provinces almost equal with therepublics, making it assume a confederational form. Al-though the territory they covered continued to be part of theterritory of the Republic of Serbia, the provincial leadershipdominated by the Albanians began referring to the provinceas a “constituent element of the Federation”.

This development reached a climax with the federalconstitution of 1974 which practically evened Serbia with itstwo provinces (the provinces were given the right of veto toany changes in the republic or federal constitution), creatinga collision of competencies in the functions of the Republic(whilst they had no sovereign territory they did have sover-


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eign rights!). Under its own constitutional law, the compe-tencies of the Province of Kosovo were extended even fur-ther, so far as to include the right to ratify internationalagreements. (23) Subsequent analyses of these constitutionalreforms from 1974, indicated that they were the basis of“asymmetrical federalism” and even of the “protectorate ofthe Province over the Republic”, which is clearly a violationof the fundamental principles laid down at the Second Ses-sion of the Anti-fascist Council of the People’s Liberation ofYugoslavia (AVNOJ - Antifasisticko vece narodnogoslobo|enja Jugoslavije) in 1943, i.e. of the constitutive actsof the “Second Yugoslavia”. Thus, during the eighties, Kosovobecame a key problem in the political life of Serbia and ofYugoslavia, provoking major changes not only in Serbia(Slobodan Milosevic’s advent to the position of President ofthe Republic), but in relations within the Federation werepositions became sharply polarized. Whilst Serbia and theother eastern republics viewed Kosovo primarily as a politi-cal and ethnic problem incited by the actions of the Albanianirredenta, in the opinion of the western republics, Kosovowas an economic and social problem which had assumed thecharacter of an ethnic controversy only after Serbia’s policytowards it had changed. One and the other, however, saw theproblem of Kosovo in the eighties as a clear example of thefailure of the Yugoslav communist policy.

On the one hand, development of generous autonomy inthe sixties and seventies did not satisfied the Albanian popu-lation of the province, nor did it ensure its loyalty towards theYugoslav Federation. On the other hand, the exorbitant in-vestments into capital intensive plants in an area aboundingin labor and natural resources but lacking capital, over thesixties and seventies, produced frustrating results: whilstSlovenia’s and Croatia’s complained that much of theirincome was being poured into Kosovo as the province contin-ued to lag behind in its economy on the Yugoslav scale,Kosovo was complaining about the unfavorable terms-of-trade that were being imposed in its dealings with thesedeveloped republics to which it was selling its raw materials


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and energy cheaply whilst having to pay high prices for theirmanufactured goods. The main reason for this lagging wasconcealed behind the exceptionally high population growth,higher than in any of the neighboring countries even amongthe Albanians in Albania. Delayed demographic transition,the unsuccessful Yugoslav development policy for Kosovo,limited employment opportunities and the relative opennessof “Second Yugoslavia”, which opened a window to theworld for the young Albanians of Kosovo, gave vent to theemergence of a militant nationalism which exploded in theprovince in 1981.

A revision of the controversial constitutional provi-sions of 1974 ensued 14 years later, in 1988, with amend-ments to the Federal Constitution. Changes in the constitutionof Serbia, which were endorsed by the parliaments of its twoprovinces (26), were effected the following year. Althoughthe controversial competencies were thereby transferred tothe Republic Parliament, a three step procedure was ensuredto afford the provinces the possibility to abort the passing ofany controversial bill (the possibility of giving an opinion,deferment for a period of six months, or conducting a refer-endum). A year later, the new Serbian constitution waspassed determining the status of the provinces as “a form ofterritorial autonomy”, whereby the provinces were given theright to bring their own statutes with the prior agreement ofthe National Assembly, and the southern province was againrenamed Kosovo and Metohia. Serbia’s constitutional orderwas basically reverted to the principles of the 1963 FederalConstitution, which stipulated that the rights of the provinceswere to be prescribed in the constitution of the Republic.Furthermore, the controversial constitutional provisions of1968, 1971 and 1974 were made null and void. When it wasconfronted with the boycott of the Albanians, the Republicauthorities tried to establish general administration over theentire territory of the republic “through centralization ofgovernment, political and propagandistic pressure, as well aspolice repression” (27), but this only widened the gap be-tween the Serbian and Albanian ethnic communities in


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Kosovo.

Serbs and Albanians: Civilizing the Conflict

These changes and the manner in which they were executedin Kosovo caused a new round of homogenization of theAlbanian national movement in Kosovo at the end of theeighties when a major political turnabout occurred. The oldMarxist-Leninist parties and movements disappeared fromthe political scene and were replaced by new Albanian partiesand leaders: “Carried by the flood of events in the area offormer Yugoslavia, the political leaders of the Albaniannational minority chose complete self-isolation from thepolitical and public life of the new FR Yugoslavia and astrategy of passive resistance, and for the creation of aparallel system of government and further internationaliza-tion of the ‘Kosovo problem’, playing on the card of being‘the victim of Serbian repression’”. (28) The DemocraticLeague of Kosovo (LDK) and its leader, the writer IbrahimRugova, were given the main role in the national movementof the ethnic Albanians. The LDK was founded 23 December1989 at Pristina, when it declared itself in its program docu-ment in favor of a democratic, federal and socialist Yugosla-via, for the government of law and political pluralism, free-dom of speech, the press and political organization. TheDemocratic Forum of Kosovo was founded in Pristina on 1July 1990 to muster all the newly formed ethnic Albanianparties for the purpose of establishing “the sovereignty ofKosovo as a constitutive entity of the Yugoslav community ofequal standing with its other entities”, in other words, thestatus of a seventh Yugoslav republic. A demand was madefor annulment of the Serbian constitutional amendments ofMarch 1989, as well as of all the bills brought on the basis ofthem.

The Albanian political parties of Kosovo and Metohiareacted to the constitutional reforms by radicalizing theirdemands. In September 1990, two thirds of the Albanian


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Tabl

e II:

Proj

ectio

n of

Pop

ulat

ion

Grow

th of

Kos

ovo a

nd M

etohi

a (24

)__

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

_Y

ear

Total

Serb

s, M

onten

egrin

s%

Alba

nian

s%

Oth

ers

%19

6196

3,98

8264

,604

27.4

646,

605

67.1

52,7

795.

519

811,

584,

441

236,

525

14.9

1,22

6,73

677

.412

1,17

97.

619

911,

956,

196

214,

555

11.0

1,59

6,07

281

.614

5,56

97.

420

012,

400,

000

194,

000

8.1

2,04

1,00

085

.016

5,00

06.

920

112,

900,

000

170,

000

5.9

2,34

0,00

086

.619

0,00

06.

920

213,

360,

000

155,

000

4.6

2,99

5,00

089

.121

0,00

06.

320

313,

800,

000

145,

000

3.8

3,42

5,00

090

.123

0,00

06.

120

414,

180,

000

135,

000

3.2

3,79

5,00

090

.825

0,00

06.

020

514,

500,

000

130,

000

2.9

4,10

5,00

091

.226

5,00

05.

9


International

Tabl

e III

: Pro

jectio

n of P

opul

atio

n Gro

wth i

n Ser

bia (

25)

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

____

___

Yea

rTo

talSe

rbs,

Mon

teneg

rins

%Al

bani

ans

%O

ther

s%

1931

5,79

5,72

44,

195,

670

72.4

355,

517

6.1

1,24

4,53

721

.519

617,

642,

227

5,80

9,43

975

.066

9,77

28.

81,

163,

016

15.2

1981

9,31

3,67

76,

669,

621

71.6

1,30

3,03

214

.01,

341,

024

13.6

1991

9,79

1,47

56,

785,

894

69.3

1,67

4,35

317

.11,

331,

228

13.6

2001

10,2

20,0

008,

080,

000

79.1

2,14

0,00

020

.9-

-20

1110

,498

,000

7,83

8,00

074

.72,

660,

000

25.3

--

2021

10,8

17,0

007,

687,

000

71.7

3,13

0,00

028

.9-

-20

3110

,718

,000

7,14

8,00

066

.73,

570,

000

33.3

--

2041

10,6

98,0

006,

748,

000

63.1

3,95

0,00

036

.9-

-20

5110

,535

,000

6,26

5,00

059

.54,

270,

000

40.5

--


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members of the provincial parliament organized a secretmeeting at Kacanik and adopted a “Constitution of the Re-public of Kosovo” which laid down the demand for thefoundation of an “independent Republic of Kosovo”. (29)Quite in conformity with their policy of “severance” fromSerbia, the Albanians boycotted the first multi-party electionsin Serbia of 1990. The aggravation of the country’s politicalcrisis at the beginning of 1991, emanating from Slovenia’sand Croatia’s secession, suited the radical Albanians ofKosovo: in January 1991, Albanian nationalists attacked thepolice stations at Pec and Kosovska Mitrovica and the follow-ing month more than 7,000 Albanians and Croats held jointdemonstrations in Frankfurt calling for “the right to self-determination of the peoples of Yugoslavia”. On the basis ofthe “Kacanik Constitution”, ethnic Albanians of Kosovo heldan illegal referendum in September 1991, and in May 1992elected their own parliament with Ibrahim Rugova as presi-dent of the “Republic of Kosovo”. Analyzers consider that“the leaders of the ethnic Albanian political parties hadthereby made it known to the Serbian authorities that theywere not interested in any kind of autonomy, not even in theconstitution of a new provincial parliament, but in constitut-ing their own government authorities leading the way to theirwithdrawal from Yugoslavia.” (30)

“The Coordinating Committee of Albanian PoliticalParties in Yugoslavia” with Ibrahim Rugova as chairman,passed a political declaration in October 1991 putting forththree options for the solution of “the Albanian question inYugoslavia”:* If the external and internal borders of the SFRY remainunaltered, the status of a sovereign and independent statewith the right of association in a new community of sovereignYugoslav states, is demanded. Ethnic Albanians within Ser-bia, Macedonia and Montenegro should enjoy the status of anation and not be a national minority within it;* Should only the internal borders of the SFRY be changedand not the external ones, the founding of an AlbanianRepublic is called for, incorporating, apart from Kosovo,


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those territories in central Serbia, Montenegro and Macedo-nia which are inhabited by Albanians;* In the event that the external borders are changed, theAlbanians would by referendum and the proclamation of ageneral declaration, declare territorial unification with Alba-nia and the creation of “an undivided Albanian state in theBalkans within Albanian ethnic boundaries” (31), namely,within the boundaries that had been proclaimed by the FirstPrizren League in 1878 (Fig. 2).

Although there had been certain Serbian-Albanian con-tacts (32) in previous years, their results were meager and theethnic Albanian political party rank and file considered thesecontacts with Serbian and Yugoslav officials to be acts ofnational betrayal. (33) While counting on a weakening ofSerbia and the FR Yugoslavia as a result of the civil war in theformer Yugoslavia and the possibility of its opening the wayfor their secession, many Albanians joined the ranks of theCroatian and Moslem army. (34) Their exclusiveness andunwillingness to abstain from their radical objectives broughtinto being a dual system of government, finances, education,health care and the like. Thus an unexpected modus vivendiwas temporarily found by the two ethnic groups, as theSerbian authorities have by and large been tolerating the“parallel authorities” of the Albanians (except the formationof para-military forces). (35) On the other hand, the Albani-ans under the leadership of the LDK have been withholdingfrom violence having pursuing the of internationalization oftheir demands and isolating themselves within the “virtualreality” of their para-state. Disregarding the interests of thenon-Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohia, the ethnicAlbanians seek a dialogue with Belgrade from a powerposition, accusing the Serbian side for “occupation” and“apartheid”. They are refusing direct negotiations with theSerbian or Yugoslav authorities, insisting to be recognized asthe representatives of the “sovereign Republic of Kosovo”,while the legal Serbian authorities reject this in particular,pointing out that Kosovo and Metohia is the internal affair ofSerbia and FR Yugoslavia. The situation has affected rela-


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tions between Belgrade and Tirana, which Albanian policyconsiders completely dependent on the Kosovo issue.

It is rather paradoxical that the Albanian boycott of themulti-party elections in Serbia in 1990, 1992 and 1993 hadactually strengthened the power of the leading Serbian par-ties. In the 1992 elections, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)won 13 mandates in the electoral district of Pristina with42,396 votes; the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) got 5 mandateswith 18,735 votes, and so forth. The situation was repeated inthe December elections the following year when the leadingSPS in Kosovo and Metohia won a total of 21 mandates (theSRS got 2 and the coalition of the opposition parties DEPOSgot 1 seat). Although some prominent Albanian intellectualsof Kosovo and Metohia (Shkelzen Maliqi), called upon theAlbanians to individually take part in the elections in Serbia,only two Albanian parties outside Kosovo (the Party ofDemocratic Activity and the Democratic Party of Albanians)came out and got 2 mandates in the Serbian Assembly. Hadthe Albanians of Kosovo and Metohia performed their elec-toral rights in the Republic and Federal elections, they couldhave counted on taking power in 24 of the 29 municipalitiesof the province, and have at least 24 seats in the Republic and12 seats in the Federal parliament. As the dominant Serbianparties would then have lost equivalent number of seats, theparticipation of the ethnic Albanians in the ballot would haveconsiderably changed the existing political balance in thecountry.

The ensuing settlement of the Yugoslav drama has beencreating visible nervousness among the Albanian politicalparties in Kosovo and Metohia and polarization as to how thestruggle for secession from Serbia and FR Yugoslavia is to befurther conducted. In simpler terms, the leaders of the radicalwing, Rexhep Qoxia, a writer (president of the Forum ofIndependent Intellectuals), and Adem Demaqi (president ofthe Committee for the Protection of Human Rights), areagainst the policy of the LDK and Ibrahim Rugova and arepleading for maximalist objectives (the “third option” men-tioned earlier). Rugova, himself, is in favor of an “independ-


International

ent and neutral Kosovo”, whereas Buyar Bukoshi, the “primeminister of the Republic of Kosovo in exile”, under theinfluence of circles in the West, is inclined to the idea of areturn to the autonomy of 1974. The ethnic Albanians ofKosovo and Metohia had followed the course of the war inCroatia and in Bosnia Herzegovina with mixed feelings: theysaw in the establishment of a Serbian state in the Krayina(Croatia), a precedent which could be applied in the case ofKosovo and Metohia (the “K+K” program), but Croatia’sassault in the summer of 1995 and the exodus of around200,000 Serbs in an “ethnic cleansing” that had followed,incited fear among the Albanians that Serbia might attempt totake similar action in Kosovo and Metohia. Naturally, noth-ing of the kind happened and the Albanian parties are seekingnew options in solutions which various international media-tors have proposed for Bosnia.

Preoccupied with the drama of the civil war in Croatiaand Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbian political parties have notshown much understanding nor readiness to deal with Ser-bian-Albanian relations in Kosovo and Metohia. Both thegovernment and opposition share the opinion that problem ofSerbian-Albanian relations in Kosovo and Metohia are theinternal affair of Serbia and FR Yugoslavia, and that thingswill return to normal once the ethnic Albanians turn theirbacks on their militant leaders and join in the political life ofthe country as loyal citizens. The leading SPS has been tryingto rally a certain number of ethnic Albanians of Kosovo intoits lines (36), whereas the Associated Yugoslav Left (JUL -Jugoslovenska udruzena levica) is expounding its anti-na-tionalist policy opening itself with more or less successtowards all the national minorities in the country. The centerand right parties have, in the main, still not declared them-selves on the problem nor what model of coexistence betweenthe Albanians and Serbs in the southern Serbian provincethey are in favor of, probably because they find that thesubject would not ensure them any popularity nor the votes ofthe Serbian voters. The years of conflict and distrust havesimply created a deep gap between the political elite of the


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two nations which is presently the greatest obstacle on theway to resolving this problem.

Despite this, there is little likelihood that Serbian-Albanian relations could now escalate into open conflict; thetragedy of the civil war in Croatia and in Bosnia Herzegovinais sufficient warning that any conflict in Kosovo and Metohiawould be fateful to the interests of both nations and would endwithout any real victor. Thus the end of the war in the regionof the former Yugoslavia inevitably places this problem onthe agenda since its solution will directly affect not only theinternal stability of FR Yugoslavia, but also the stability of theentire Balkans. Hence, it needs to be emphasized that FRYugoslavia is the largest multi-national and multi-confes-sional community in the Balkans - with diverse national,cultural, religious and linguistic features: “It is a state withuncompleted administrative organization, a state that is in theprocess of political constitution, and the features of which areremnants of the normative and institutional order of theformer Yugoslavia”. (37) According to the 1991 census,there are 10,394,026 inhabitants living on its territory, themajority of whom are Serbs (62.2% or 6,504,048 persons),whereas Montenegrins make up 5 percent (519,757) of thepopulation of FR Yugoslavia. The “Others” comprise thirtyodd ethnic groups among whom the Albanians form thelargest with 16.5 percent (1,714,768 (38)), Hungarians fol-low with 3.3 percent (344,147), Moslems with 3.2 percent(336,025), Romanies (Gypsies) - 1.4 percent (143,519), Croats- 1.1 percent (111,650), and so on. The majority of Albaniansin the FR Yugoslavia lives in the region of the Kosovo andMetohia province where they are an absolute majority in 25of the 31 municipalities, whilst the Serbs are the absolutemajority in 5 municipalities, that is in 16.1 percent of theterritory of this province.

According to their respective constitutions, FR Yugo-slavia, Serbia and Montenegro are defined as being the statesof their citizens, not as national states. Accordingly, membersof both majority and minority nations all enjoy equal humanrights and freedoms (39), and the provocation of national,


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racist, religious and other inequalities, and equally so theprovocation of national, racial or other hatreds and intoler-ance are regarded as constitutional offenses and are punish-able. (40) Under the Federal Constitution, members of thenational minorities are guaranteed freedom of expression oftheir national identity and culture, the use of their nativelanguage and alphabet, the right to education in their mothertongue, the right to public information in their own language,the right to educational and cultural organizations and asso-ciations financed on a voluntary basis which the governmentmay support, the right to establish and maintain mutualrelations with their compatriots within the FRY and abroadwithout interference (however, not to the detriment of FRYand its republics), and also the right to participate in interna-tional non-governmental organizations on condition that thisis not to the detriment of the interests of FRY and its repub-lics. In short, the constitutional order of FR Yugoslavia andher republics does not represent an obstacle for the ethnicAlbanians to partake in the political life of the country, theproblems arise in practice which is still very different fromthe legal norms.

Under the circumstances, it would not be realistic toexpect any lasting solution to the disturbed Serbian-Albanianrelations in the near future. What might be expected is thecommencement of a dialogue that would create conditionsfor the return of ethnic Albanians to the political institutionsof Serbia and FR Yugoslavia and for the institutional solutionof the open issues. The main obstacle to the commencementof such a dialogue, despite certain encouraging signs, is theoverwhelming radicalism of the ethnic Albanians whosepolitical parties are still not ready to give up the idea of an“independent state of Kosovo” and a “Greater Albania”which would have the same consequences for the security ofthe Balkans and of Europe as would the creation of a “GreaterCroatia”, a “Greater Serbia” or a “Greater Bulgaria”. On theother hand, Belgrade’s hesitation at present to offer a politicaldialogue may be comprehended as delaying in the hope thatextremists on both sides will weaken and create conditions


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for negotiations over the autonomy of ethnic Albanians inKosovo and Metohia which will be able to reach a sustainablecompromise between the legitimate demands of the Serbs andthe Albanians. It is hard not to discern that the only real basisfor the commencement of such a dialogue and for defining theautonomy of the ethnic Albanians in Serbia and FR Yugosla-via, both in the territorial as well as in a normative sense, isthe so-called “minority standards of the OSCE (CSCE)”formulated in Paris in 1989, in Copenhagen (l990) and inMoscow (1991), as well as the European models of autonomyfor ethnic communities which have had their confirmation inpractice (Southern Tyrol and the like). However the frame-work for such a solution could only be presented with theexpansion of European integrations into the Balkans, for it isonly in this case that the solution of the Serbian-Albaniancontroversy in Kosovo and Metohia would not mean a zerosum game, but a way for the two nations to satisfy theirlegitimate interests. Unfortunately, considering the discour-aging results of past mediations in the Yugoslav crisis, it isdifficult to expect that European integrations will be preparedto make sustained efforts in this direction in the near future.

________________________________________________1) Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Yugoslavia.2) The area of the present-day Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohiaconsists of two separate geographic entities. The first is Kosovo, a valley betweenPristina and Drenica, 84 km long and about 14 km wide, densely populated, withsignificant agricultural and mineral resources and a network of important transportconnections in this section of the Balkans. The other constitutes the territory knownas Metohia (in medieval times metoh was the term for the holdings of themonasteries), which the Albanians include in a broader area called Dukagyin. It isabout 80 km in length and over 40 km in width, and, compared with Kosovo, isprimarily agricultural. The area of the Autonomous Province is 10,887 sq. km,which is 12.3 percent of the area of Serbia and 10.6 percent of the total area of FRYugoslavia. Its population is 1.954.747 or 20.5 percent of the total population ofSerbia, that is 19 percent of that of FR Yugoslavia. See: Branislav Krstic, KosovoBetween Historical and Ethnic Rights, Kuca Vid, Belgrade 1994, pp. 11-20.3) On this point, see: Milos Macura, The Development, Social and DemographicProblems of Kosovo, in: Kosovo Today and Tomorrow, Jugoslovenski pogledi, No.2/88, pp. 389-390.4) B. Krstic, op. cit., p. 90.


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5) Apart from Kosovo and Metohia, the eastern parts of Montenegro, parts ofcentral Serbia, half of the FYR Macedonia and southern Epirus in Greece(Chameria in Albanian), would form part of it according to the maximalistAlbanian national program.6) The first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was a constitutional monarchy under the ruleof the Serbian dynasty Karadjordjevic; the second Yugoslavia (1945-1991) was acommunist type federation consisting of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia).7) Dimitrije Bogdanovic, Knjiga o Kosovu (Book About Kosovo), Serbian Academyof Sciences and the Arts, Belgrade 1985, pp. 23-35.8) D. Bogdanovic, Kosovo in the Culture of Mediaeval Serbia, in: Knjiga oKosovu, op. cit., pp. 40-47.9) For instance, the Albanian family of Küprulü gave a whole dynasty of grandviziers at the height of the Ottoman Empire. See: Georges Castellan, Histoire desBalkans, XIV-XX Siècle, Fayard, Paris 1991.10) See: D. Bogdanovic, The Dispersion of Albanians Throughout the YugoslavCountries in the 17th and 18th Century, in: Knjiga o Kosovu, op. cit., pp. 85-125.11) Krayina means frontier in the Serbian language. On this point, see: PredragSimic, Le conflit Serbo-Croate et l’eclatement de la Yougoslavie, Politiqueétrangère, No. 1/94, pp. 129-144.12) J. Jovanovic, Southern Serbia from the End of the 18th Century up toLiberation, Belgrade 1941, pp. 39-41.13) At the Versailles Peace Conference at the end of World War I Italy asked forprotectorate over Albania. The representatives of the newly founded Kingdom ofthe Serbs, Croats and Slovenes particularly defied these Italian aspirations, beingin favor of having an independent Albanian state in its neighborhood.14) Article 35 of this Treaty reads: “Differences of religion and religiousdenomination cannot be held as an obstacle for anyone to be excluded or to beprevented from enjoying his citizen’s or political rights, from not being accepted inpublic service and positions, and not to be accorded honors or not to be able toperform various trades or professions in whatever location this may be in Serbia.Freedom to conduct public church ceremonies in all religious faiths will beguaranteed to all citizens of Serbia and to foreigners and no obstacle shall be madein their relations with their spiritual fathers.” Quoted after: D. Bogdanovic, op. cit.,p. 184. Citizen equality regardless of religion was provided for in all thefundamental laws that Serbia promulgated in the period from 1888 to 1919.15) Nevertheless, members of the Jemiet and other Albanian political organizationsnurtured their irredentist objectives and in 1941 were recruited to work in officesof the puppet state of “Greater Albania” which was created under Italianprotectorate.16) The activity of Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohia had the support ofthe Albanian and Italian authorities. The Italian minister of foreign affairs, CountCianno, had written at that time: “We must lull the Yugoslavs. But later, ourpolitics must energetically deal with Kosovo. This will keep the irredentistproblem alive in the Balkans, engage the attention of the Albanians and be a knifeaimed at the back of Yugoslavia.” Quoted after: D. Bogdanovic, op.cit., p. 191.


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17) The positions of Serbian Social Democrats on relations between the twonations may be found in the book of their leader Dimitrije Tucovic, Serbia andAlbania - A Contribution to Critics of the Aggressive Policy of the SerbianBourgeoisie, published in 1914, in which he criticizes the policy of the Serbiangovernment towards the Albanians during the Balkan wars. Contemporary Serbianhistorians are of the opinion that Tucovic’s views about Serbian-Albanian relationswere under the influence of Austrian social democrats.18) See: Rexhep Ismaili, Albanians and South-Eastern Europe (Aspects ofIdentity), in: D. Janjic and S. Maliqi (eds.), Conflict or Dialogue - Serbian-Albanian Relations and Integration of the Balkans, Open University, Subotica1994.19) See: Milan Komatina, Enver Hodja i jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi (EnverHoxha and Yugoslav-Albanian Relations), Sluzbeni list SRJ, Beograd 1995.20) Vladimir Dedijer, Yugoslav-Albanian Relations, pp. 126-127.21) On this point , see: M. Komatina, ibid.22) D. Bogdanovic, op. cit., p. 239.23) After the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution, a “positive discrimination” ofthe Albanians in Kosovo took place: bilingualism became a condition foremployment in public services; 80 percent of the available posts were reserved forAlbanians on a parity basis; national quotas were strictly applied whennominations were made for public functions; the University of Pristina became thelargest Albanian higher school; the Academy of Science and the Arts of Kosovowas actually an Albanian academy; in the mid-eighties an Albanian (Sinan Hasani)became president of the Presidency of the SFRY, and so on. Total Albanization ofpublic life, that is the establishment of ethnic Albanian domination in the province,resulted in discrimination of the non-Albanian population in everyday life and their“ethnic cleansing” out of Kosovo and Metohia.24) Source: B. Krstic, op. cit., p. 193.25) Source: B. Krstic, op. cit., p. 243.26) Voyvodina’s Assembly in February, and the Assembly of Kosovo in March1989; out of a total of 180 members of parliament in Kosovo, only 10 had votedagainst and 2 abstained.27) Dusan Janjic, Socialism, Federalism and Nationalism, Sociology, Vol. XXXIV,No. 3/1992, p. 319.28) Zoran M. Lutovac, Minorities, the CSCE and the Yugoslav Crisis, IDN &IMPP, Belgrade 1995, p. 113.29) It deserves to be noted that already by 22 October Albania had recognized the“independence of Kosovo” and opened a “diplomatic mission of the Republic ofKosovo” in Tirana in an obvious attempt at internationalizing the “Kosovo issue”.Endeavors of the Albanians of Kosovo to get the support of the EuropeanCommunity and the United Nations for a “Republic of Kosovo” (a request waseven made for the deployment of the “Blue Helmets”), did not bring any results,however. See Dusan Janjic, National Identity, Movement and Nationalism of Serbsand Albanians, in: D. Janjic and S. Maliqi (eds.), Conflict or Dialogue..., op.cit.,p. 161.


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30) Ibid, p. 115.31) Kosovo as a State, special edition of the magazine Republika, No. 3.32) The convention of Serbian and Albanian intellectuals in Budapest and the visitof a delegation of the Democratic Alliance in Belgrade 1993; meeting held at theSwiss Embassy in the summer of 1994; contacts between the SPS and the SocialistParty of Albania in 1995, etc.33) On their return from a visit to the Institute of International Politics andEconomics of Belgrade in October 1993, which had a strictly academic character,three representatives of the Democratic Alliance of Tirana were accused in Albaniaand among the Albanians of Kosovo for national treason and collaboration withBelgrade!34) “Albanians joined the Croatian army voluntarily and with their weapons ... It isa known fact that there were many esteemed Albanian officers of high rank whojoined the Croatian army and not just ordinary soldiers; they contributed toCroatia’s victories so far against the Serbian army.” Behar Zogiani, Granic’s Pro-Serbian Position on Kosovo, Buyku, quoted after: TANJUG BBS, 27 February1996.35) Apart from the Albanian language media controlled by the official authoritiesof Kosovo, there are a number of independent newspapers and magazines inAlbanian language expressing very critical attitudes towards the authorities ofSerbia.36) So far, only one Albanian, Hayrie Rugova from Pristina, has been elected at thelast party congress (March 1996) to the leading bodies of the SPS.37) Zoran M. Lutovac, op. cit., p. 97. On this matter see: Vladimir Goati,Dilemmas Concerning the Institutional Development of Third Yugoslavia, Arhiv zapravne i drustvene nauke, No. 2/1994, pp. 247-270; Vladan Kutlesic: State of theConstitutions of Serbia and Montenegro, Their Constitutionality, Legality andConformity with the Yugoslav Constitution, Arhiv za pravne i drustvene nauke, No.3/1994, pp. 382-392.38) As the Albanians had boycotted the 1991 population census, an estimate wasmade on the basis of the previous 1981 census (the number of Albanians in thewhole of the former Yugoslavia was then 1,340,796) and data relating to thenatural demographic growth. Albanian political parties deny this figure and claimthat there are more than 2,000,000 Albanians living in FR Yugoslavia. The censusboycott in Yugoslavia in 1991 and in FYR Macedonia in 1994, the latter conductedunder international supervision, make the data produced in Albanian sources opento founded suspicion.39) Article 20 of the Constitution of FR Yugoslavia reads: “All citizens are equalwithout distinction as to national origin, race, sex, language, religion, political orother opinion, education, social status, property and other individual features. Allare equal before the law. Everyone is obliged to respect the freedom and rights ofothers and is responsible for same.”40) Article 50 of the Constitution.


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Der Kosovokonflikt: Bemerkungenund Fragen

George PumphreyBonn

Auf dem Balkan folgt eine Krisenmeldung auf dieandere. Dieses Mal brennt die Lunte im Kosovo. Es warvorauszusehen. Wie Bosnien zuvor, wird der Kosovo zumDauerbrenner erklärt. Staatsangehörigkeit soll keine Rollespielen, sondern die Probleme werden wieder aufVolksgruppenzugehörigkeit reduziert. Es gibt wieder nur dieBösen und die Guten, die Täter und die Opfer, die Serben unddiesmal die Albaner. Nicht das Tun sondern das Sein istbestimmend. Darüber sind hierzulande Regierende und Op-position wesentlich einer Meinung. Die quasi-totalitärgleichgeschalteten Medien hierzulande, mit ihrer Flut vonnichtssagenden Bildern und vielsagenden Interpretationen,Nachrichten, die nicht auf Fakten sondern auf Gerüchtenbasieren, zielen auf die Einteilung in Weiß und Schwarz,lassen keine Grautöne mehr zu, schließen Zweifel und Fragenaus.

Das Erschreckende dabei ist doch, daß für denübergroßen Teil der bundesdeutschen Opposition der Balkannur noch in "Ethnien" existiert und grundlegendeWidersprüche, die für jede Gesellschaft gelten, keinerleiBedeutung auf dem Balkan mehr haben sollen: z. B.Widersprüche innerhalb der "Volksgruppen" selbst zwischenFriedensbewegten und Kriegstreibern, zwischen denKompromiß Suchenden und jenen, die jeden Kompromißvon vorneherein ausschließen, zwischen Arm und Reich,Links und Rechts.... Nach dem Motto "Macht besteht darin,Realität zu definieren und sie durch Handeln in die gewünschte


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Richtung zu bewegen" haben die Meister der veröffentlichtenMeinung es verstanden, unser ehemals progressives Vokabularfür ihre Zwecke zu vereinnahmen. Progressive Begriffe vongestern wie "Selbstbestimmungsrecht" - als es umAntikolonialismus ging - werden heute in ihrer Auswirkungins Gegenteil gewandelt, um neue Apartheid-Situationenungeniert zu rechtfertigen.

Ähnlich mit dem Begriff "Menschenrecht": frühergeltend als Kampfbegriff gegen Kolonialismus, Apartheid,Sklaverei und Ausbeutung, für die Anerkennung als Mensch(im Gegensatz zum "Untermenschen") als gleichwertigesSubjekt in der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungder Welt, wird er heute selektiv für eine Bevölkerungsgruppereklamiert und einer anderen faktisch abgesprochen, indemsie als sprach- und rechtloses Objekt des Weltgeschehensvom elitären "Klub der Menschheit" ausgegrenzt bzw.ferngehalten wird. Besonders wichtig für Friedensbewegteund Linke ist, nicht an umdefinierten Begriffen festzuhalten,sondern die Prinzipien auf die Tagesordnung zu setzen, diediesen Begriffen in der Vergangenheit zugrunde lagen. Nichtethnisch und national, sondern Völkerverständigung undInternationalismus! Als Anstoß für Überlegungen, die zueiner Rückeroberung unserer Begrifflichkeit führen, imFolgenden einige Bermerkungen und Fragen zumKosovokonflikt.

1. Albanischer NationalismusDaß die serbische Regierung ihren Teil Schuld trägt,

daß der Konflikt eskalierte, ist - denke ich - unumstritten.Aber die Regierung hat nicht in einem luftleeren Raumgehandelt. Was wäre denn die Antwort jeder anderenRegierung gegenüber jeder anderen sezessionistichenBewegung die Gewalt anwendet? Dies entschuldigt in keinerWeise Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die auf beiden Seitenverübt werden. Der albanische Nationalismus betrifft nichtnur Kosovo, sondern als Staatsbürger andere Nationen lebenAlbaner zerstreut über die ganze Region. Es wird berichtet,


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daß ein Großteil der materiellen Unterstützung für dieAufständischen in Kosovo aus Albanien kommt. Soll einGroß-Albanien besser sein als ein Groß-Serbien?

2. Die "Internationalisierung" des KosovokonfliktsDas Anwenden zweierlei Maßstäbe für sich selbst und

für schwächere Nationen wird heute in den stärkeren undstarken Nationen auch von der Opposition weitgehend kritikloshingenommen. Während sich Frankreich, Italien,Großbritannien, Deutschland, die USA und Rußland in Lon-don treffen um serbische Polizeiaktionen gegenTerroranschläge albanischer Sezessionisten zu verurteilen,kommt keiner auf die Idee Großbritannien nach seinenArmeeaktionen gegen die Nordiren oder französischePolizeiaktionen gegen terroristische korsische Seperatisten,oder den "Vermittler" Gonzales nach Spaniens Antwort aufterroristische Anschläge im Baskenland zu fragen, um nurdiese zu erwähnen. Welcher dieser Staaten der Kontaktgruppeduldet denn eine Gewaltanwendung gegen ihren jeweiligenStaatsapparat ohne massiv dagegen vorzugehen - und daß dieBRD diesbezüglich nicht gerade zimperlich ist, braucht nichtausgeführt zu werden. Unter Berufung auf nebulöse"Menschenrechte," die weder für alle noch überall reklamiertwerden, werden vorhandene völkerrechtliche Verträge undinternationale Normen außer Kraft gesetzt und ein Gesetz-des-Dschungels gegen schwächere Länder eingeführt. NurRußland scheint zu erkennen, welche Gefahr eine solcheInitiative in sich bergen kann. Dieinternationale Kontaktgruppe ist zum einen gegen dieSezession des Kosovo und zum anderen gegenGewaltanwendung durch die serbische Polizei bei derEntwaffnung zunehmend gewalttätiger albanischerSezessionisten. Dies konnte zum einen Belgrad’s Auffassungbestätigen, der Kosovo sei ein interner Konflikt zum anderenmußte es die Sezessionisten ermutigen bewaffneteAuseindersetzungen zu provozieren, wohlwissend, daß dieSerben dafür verantwortlich gemacht werden. Diese


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widersprüchlichen Signale können den Konflikt nur anheizenund verlängern. Im Kosovo haben wir eine Situation wie inBosnien: die Sezessionisten sind nicht stark genug um sichmilitärisch durchzusetzen, deshalb brauchen sie"internationale Intervention". "Die politische Führung derKosovo-Albaner begrüßte dagegen in einer erstenStellungnahme die Londoner Beschlüsse vom Vortag als"ersten und wichtigen Schritt" zur Internationalisierung desKonflikts, bedauerte aber zugleich, daß nicht deutlicher Druckauf Belgrad ausgeübt worden sei. Auch die albanischeRegierung in Tirana begrüßte den Plan der Kontaktgruppe"heißt es in der Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 11.3.98."Im Gespräch mit der türkischen Zeitung Milliyet forderteeine Vertreterin der Demokratischen Liga des Kosovo (LDK),der wichtigsten albanischen Partei, die Entsendung von Nato-Truppen, um noch mehr Blutvergießen zu verhüten. "Dieinternationale Gemeinschaft und die Nato sollten handeln,um eine weitere Tragödie wie in Bosnien zu verhindern",sagte Edita Tahiri, die in der LDK für Außenbeziehungenzuständig ist." (AFP 04.03.1998)

3. Die besondere Rolle DeutschlandsWenn Klaus Kinkel laut AFP (02.03.1998) "Terrorismus

und Gewalt, egal von welcher Seite sie ausgingen" verurteilt,ob er da auch die UCK und ihren politischen Flügel LPKmeint?. Die LPK hat sich in Deutschland zusammengefundenund ist heute noch unter dem Namen "DemokratischeVereinigung der Albaner in Deutschland" mit Sitz in Siegburgvertreten. Albanische nationalistische Gruppen, darunter di-verse sich "marxistisch-leninistische" nennende, genießenseit Jahren Bewegungs- und Organisationsfreiheit in derBRD - schon erstaunlich wenn man sie mit der Behandlungder PKK in der BRD vergleicht. Agenturmeldungen berichten,daß es Kinkel war, der die Kontaktgruppe in Londonzusammentrommelte um Kosovo zu diskutieren. Aus deranfänglichen Kritik am deutschen Alleingang in bezug aufdie Abspaltung Kroatiens und Sloweniens lernend, achtet


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Kinkel nun darauf, in "Koordinierung" mit den anderenMächten zu handeln. Vorpreschen will die BRD diesmal alsonicht. Wie heute im Fall Kosovo, lehnten 1991 die USA unddie europäischen Mächte das AuseinanderbrechenJugoslawiens ab. Die Ablehnung damals hielt bekannterweisenicht lange vor, nachdem die BRD Ende 1991 Kroatien undSlowenien anerkannte. Die doppeldeutigen Signale derKontaktgruppe heute, die ständige Betonung Kinkels, derjetzige status quo müsse einer umfassenden Autonomieweichen, und die weitere Zuspitzung des Konflikts - ebenauch durch ein nicht zu erwartendes Ablassen vongroßalbanischen Bestrebungen - lassen die Frage aufkommen,wie lange die Ablehnung diesmal währen wird. In diesemZusammenhang sei daran erinnert, was Rupert Scholz 1991zu Beginn des Bürgerkrieges in Jugoslawien, anläßlich einergemeinsamen Tagung der Bundesvereinigung der DeutschenArbeitgeberverbände mit Bundewehrgeneräle zum Thema"Fragen an das Selbstverständnis der Deutschen" von sichgab. Laut Protokoll äußerte Scholz, "daß dieserJugoslawienkonflikt unbestreitbar fundamentalgesamteuropäische Bedeutung hat"; während die Folgen desZweiten Weltkrieges überwunden seien, ging es nun darum,"noch die Folgen des Ersten Weltkrieges zu bewältigen",Jugoslawien sei "eine sehr künstliche, mit demSelbstbestimmungsrecht nie vereinbar geweseneKonstruktion". Für Scholz hieß das, "daß (...) Kroatien undSlowenien völkerrechtlich unmittelbar anerkannt werdenmüssen. Wenn eine solche Anerkennung erfolgt ist, dannhandelt es sich im Jugoslawienkonflikt nicht mehr um eininnenpolitisches Problem Jugoslawiens", eine internationalIntervention sei dann möglich." (IG-Medien Zeitschrift M)

4. Die ethnische Komponente der Außenpolitik derBRD

Zu bedenken ist, daß ein wesentlicher Aspekt derAußenpolitik der BRD für diese Region Europas ethnischbegründet ist. Diese "völkische" Herangehensweise setzt


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voraus, daß Völker ver schiedener Ethnien nicht in Frieden(weiter) leben können. Das Motto "1 Volk, 1 Führung, 1Boden" scheint sich wieder durchzusetzen. Aber völkischwill man es heute natürlich nicht mehr nennen, man nennt es"ethnisch" damit es besser zur Waffe "Menschenrechtspolitik"paßt. Diese völkische Politik führt nicht nur auf dem Balkanzu einer Katastrophe. Was wäre wenn sie sich in den anderenVielvölkerstaaten durchsetzen würde wie Frankreich,Großbritannien, Spanien und Italien? Dies ist Apartheidpolitikauf Europäisch. Washington DC, die Hauptstadt der USA ist80% schwarz und 20% nichtschwarz. Wenn die 80% nunbeschließen, sie wollen nicht mehr den "weißen" USAangehören, sondern sich mit Afrika verbünden? Oder großeTeile des Südwestens der USA, die mehrheitlich Chicanosind, möchten sich Mexiko zuschlagen, oder Miami Cuba?Oder gar: Was wäre, wenn die Deutschen in den GrenzregionenPolens ihre Sezession und Anschluß an Deutschlandproklamieren? "Ethnisch" alles nachvollziehbar oder zurechtfertigen? Oder anders gefragt: wann und wo sollen wirvölkische Politik gutheißen oder "ethnische" Lösungenunterstützen, wo und wann nicht? Oder muß linke Politiknicht eine ganz andere Ebene beschreiten? Die Ost-West-Konfrontation wurde durch "ethnischen Konflikt" ersetzt undim internationalen Denken als maßgebliche politischeKategorie inzwischen etabliert. Wie oft werden derartigeKonflikte jedoch vorgeschoben und bewußt geschürt umganz andere Machtinteressen zu kaschieren und zu verfolgen?Das völkische Denkmuster führt unweigerlich in dieAufteilung in "gutes" und "böses" Volk, in ein Volk mit"Menschen"rechten und eines ohne, wie die "internationaleGemeinschaft" bereits mit Jugoslawien vorgeführt hat undheute immer noch vorführt. Nur zwei Beispiele: einSezessionsrecht für Kroatien bzw. Bosnien-Herzegowina,aber Weigerung des gleichen für kroatische Serben bzw.bosnische Serben um in Jugoslawien zu bleiben,"Rückkehrrecht" für Flüchtlinge aus Gebieten, die in derheutigen Republika Srpska liegen, aber keins für Flüchtlingeaus der Föderation. Die Designierung eines bösen Volkes und


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die einseitige Parteinahme von außen mußte den Krieganheizen und ging soweit, daß allein die Reklamierung derRechtengleichheit für alle Beteiligte als "pro-serbisch"diffamiert wird. Gerade Linke in Deutschland hätten jedenGrund skeptisch gegenüber völkischen, "ethnischen"Erklärungen, Denkmustern und "Lösungen" zu sein... Nachall den leidvollen Erfahrungen dieses Jahrunderts muß dieLinke offensiv Internationalismus und Völkerverständigungam Ende des Jahrhunderts fordern und auf die Tagesordnungdes kommenden Jahrhunderts setzen.


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Les sanctions, à quoi servent-elles ?

Dragas Keseljevic, Marko Krstic, DjordjeRadovanovitch *

L’évolution récente de la situation au Kosovo a suscitéune campagne réclamant de nouvelles sanctions contre laYougoslavie, alors que toutes les précédentes, appliquéesdepuis 1992, ne sont pas encore levées ! Les médias, surtoutd’outre-Atlantique, demandent un nouvel embargo et desactions punitives à condition qu’il n’y ait pas de victimes dansles rangs des forces militaires américaines faisant partie destroupes de l’ONU ou de l’OTAN !

Récemment, à propos de l’Irak, les plus hautes autoritésfrançaises ont exprimé leur préférence pour la voie diploma-tique et émis des doutes sur l’efficacité de l’embargo quitouche les populations et non les régimes en place.Effectivement, les expériences d’embargo aussi bien enYougoslavie que contre Cuba et l’Irak, confirment le bien-fondé de ce point de vue.

A la différence de ces deux derniers, en Yougoslavie, lepeuple avait réagi avec éclat contre le régime antidémocratique.Au cours de l’hiver 1996/97, le peuple serbe, privé de tout,avec une économie en ruines, un chômage qui atteignait 50%,supportant, sans aide internationale appropriée, la charge depresque 700 000 réfugiés, avait trouvé la force, dans unsursaut inattendu, de manifester sans relâche contre le pouvoirpendant trois mois et par un temps exécrable. Certes, lesleaders de l’opposition démocratique, hissés au premier planpar la révolte populaire, avaient été reçu ensuite dans lescapitales occidentales dont les médias s’étaient montrés,pour une fois, bienveillants, en saluant le réveil de "l’autre


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Serbie". Hélas ! Provisoirement ébranlé, le régimeantidémocratique profitant des dissensions au sein del’opposition, mais surtout de l’appui et de la reconnaissancedes Etats-Unis, des gouvernements de l’Union européenne etde la faveur des diplomates et des multiples négociateurs etmédiateurs internationaux, a réussi, non seulement à semaintenir, mais à renfoncer sa mainmise sur le pays épuisé, àbout de souffle.

Pendant ce temps de la révolte démocratique en Serbieet au Monténégro, l’opposition albanaise au Kosovo n’a pasbougé, elle n’a, malheureusement, pas essayé de prendrecontact avec l’opposition serbe, ni donné suite aux avancesde celle-ci. On oublie généralement, en particulier les Albanaisdu Kosovo, qu’à la veille de la tragédie yougoslave, en mars1991, le régime et ses dirigeants, tous - comme c’est le casencore aujourd’hui, anciens titistes et communistes - avaientsorti l’armée et les chars dans les rues de Belgrade contre lesmanifestants et qu’il y a eu, à cette occasion, des morts et desblessés.

Contrairement à l’assertion d’un sociologue connu surle "total-nationalisme" serbe, à Belgrade et en Yougoslavieles événements au Kosovo n’ont provoqué aucune manifes-tation contre les Albanais, ni incidents avec les nombreuxAlbanais qui travaillent en Serbie, en dehors du Kosovo.D’ailleurs, pendant la tragédie yougoslave, les Serbes deSerbie n’ont pas montré un empressement particulier enversleurs frères de Croatie et de Bosnie. Plus de 100 000 jeunesappelés ont esquivé de servir dans l’armée populaireyougoslave, ce qui est un fait unique dans la longue histoiredu peuple serbe ! Les observateurs étrangers n’ont pu constateraucune attitude hostile du peuple serbe à l’égard des 109 000Croates vivant en Serbie, des 240 000 musulmans, d’unedizaine de milliers de réfugiés Musulmans de Bosnie, desSlovènes et autres. Alors que les nationalistes croates ontforcé l’exode d’environ 500 000 Serbes, dont 250 000 deKrajina sous les yeux du monde entier qui n’a pas réagi !Actuellement, le nettoyage ethnique achevé, il ne reste plusque 2% de Serbes en Croatie ! Un phénomène similaire s’est


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produit en Slovénie à l’encontre des non-Slovènes qui yhabitaient !

Le problème du Kosovo relève de “la quadrature ducercle” comme s’en aperçoivent les nombreux diplomates etservices américains, dont l’arrogance dans les affairesyougoslaves est aussi inefficace que partiale. Pour les Serbes,paradoxalement, le fait d’avoir été, pendant les deux dernièresgrandes guerres, du côté des démocraties occidentales,représente, aujourd’hui, un handicap. Il ne faut pas oublier,qu’au cours de la dernière guerre, 60 000 Serbes ont étéexpulsés du Kosovo par le pouvoir nazi albanais que lesAllemands et les Italiens avaient mis en place, puis interditsde retour, après 1945, par le régime titiste.

L’événement majeur de l’histoire des peuplesbalkaniques a été l’invasion turque, d’un côté et la vassalisationet conquête du Nord des Balkans par l’empire habsbourgeois,de l’autre. Au Kosovo, lors de la bataille décisive contre lesTurcs, en 1389, à la tête de la résistance balkanique se trouvaitle prince serbe Lazare, mais aussi les représentants d’autrespeuples parmi lesquels les Albanais. En combattant pour leurliberté, les Serbes ont pris une part active dans la lutte pour laliberté et l’indépendance de tous les peuples balkaniques. Unbon connaisseur polonais de l’histoire et des problèmesyougoslaves, C. Bobrowski, écrivait que "dans sa lutte, laSerbie n’a joui de l’appui des grandes puissances que parintermittence. Elle ne s’intégrait dans aucun des desseinsdurables formés par l’une quelconque de ces puissances,tandis que son histoire et sa géographie avaient de bonneheure donné à entendre qu’elle ferait un mauvais vassal . . .Il n’est pas étonnant dans ces conditions que le mythe - enbonne partie fondé - de la liberté conquise de haute lutte . . .,liberté qui n’est ni un don de ciel ni des puissances alliées, soitdevenu l’une des composantes essentielles de la psychologieserbe" (1).

Toutes les sanctions économiques contre les Serbestouchent non seulement la Yougoslavie (la Serbie et leMonténégro) qui, par sa position centrale dans les Balkans,contrôle toutes les voies principales, terrestres et fluviales, de


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la région, mais aussi la Hongrie, la Roumanie, la Macédoine,l’Albanie, la Bulgarie, la Grèce et la Turquie.

Sur la complexité tragique de la question du Kosovos’est exprimé, il y a plus de deux décennies, en 1975, avec unerare clairvoyance, André Malraux lors d’un entretien avecl’écrivain serbe Zivorad Stojkovic, récemment disparu : "J’aibeaucoup de sympathie pour votre pays : j’ai admiré la Serbiedurant la Grande Guerre; j’ai été impressionné parl’organisation et la force de votre Résistance pendant ladernière guerre ; j’ai gardé le souvenir de la Yougoslavied’avant-guerre, bien qu’elle fut une monarchie, pour sonopposition au fascisme, pour avoir refusé de s’allier à l’Axe.Au prix d’une guerre ! . . Mais, ajoutait-il comme un reproche:". . . Vous êtes dans une situation néfaste. Vous avez raison,votre Algérie est dans votre Orléanais. Si le Kosovo n’étaitque le pays de votre histoire, ce ne serait pas l’essentiel, maisil est au coeur de votre culture, et la culture, puisque c’est lebien le plus précieux que l’on possède, n’appartient jamais aupassé. Je pressens plus que je ne comprends l’ensemble de laquestion. En plus de la détermination, il faut avoir le couraged’aborder toutes les possibilités de solution raisonnable, cequi ne veut pas dire des solutions molles. C’est absurde, j’ail’air de vous donner des conseils, alors que je ne fais queparler sincèrement, en ami . . ." (2).

Ce conseil est toujours valable. Il faut rechercher "toutesles possibilités de solution raisonnable".

Le récent développement, en particulier le voyage àBelgrade des ministres des affaires étrangères de la France etde l’Allemagne, a enfin ébauché une perspective constructiveet des méthodes appropriées pour se diriger vers une solutionpacifique tenant compte, d’une façon impartiale, des intérêtslégitimes des deux parties en conflit. Il est évident - et les deuxministres l’ont formellement reconnu - qu’outre le facteurdémographique, la prépondérance numérique de la popula-tion albanaise, il y en a d’autres, non moins importants, enpremier lieu l’intégrité territoriale de la Fédération yougoslave,les droits historiques du peuple serbe, la sauvegarde et laprotection de ses sanctuaires, le respect des droits des minorités


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nationales et religieuses, qui doivent être pris en considérationet garantis par l’ONU, et en particulier par les Etats-Unis, laRussie et les pays de l’Union européenne.____________________________________________________________________

* Fondateurs du Groupe de Paris, qui, depuis 1971, rassemble lesintellectuels originaires de l’Europe du Centre et de l’Est, y compris laRussie____________________________________________________________________

(1) C. Bobrowski : La Yougoslavie socialiste, p. 15, 16 et 17, ArmandColin, Paris 1956.

(2) Zivorad Stojkovic : “Une utopie obligatoire ?”, p. 464/5/6, Revue desEtudes slaves, tome 56, Fascicule 3, Paris 1984.


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LA LOI DE NON-RETOURDE 1945-1946

Commentaire de 1989et textes de 1945 et 1946

I - COMMENTAIRE(Politika, vendredi 10 March 1989)

Prof.Dr. Gavrilo Perazic:“A DECISION DE 1945 CONCERNANT L’INTERDICTION DU

RETOUR DES COLONS DANS LEUR FOYERS ESTJURIDIQUEMENT INVALIDE”

Le Comité de coordination de la conférence féderative SSRNJ(Fédération Socialiste de la République des Peuples Yougoslaves)vient d’approuver l’initiative du Forum yougoslave pour les droitsde l’homme concernant l’annulation de la décision du ComitéNational de Libération de la Yougoslavie (NKOJ) du 6 mars 1945.Dans l’argumentation de l’initiative, le Pr.Dr.Gavrilo Perazic aexposé en sept points les arguments avec lesquels il prouve que ladécision mentionnée est juridiquement invalide.

1) Jusqu’à récemment inaccessible au public, la DécisionNKOJ (no 153) du 6 mars 1945, intitulée “Interdiction provisoire deretour aux colons sur les lieux de leurs habitations d’autrefois” aprovoqué l’indignation justifiée de toute l’opinion yougoslave.Particulièrement aujourd’hui quand, sous la pression des séparatistesalbanais, le Kosovo se nettoie éthniquement, la conscience juridiquedoit se demander quelle erreur juridique fatale ont pu commettre lesdirigeants de l’Etat (le gouvernement encore provisoire de la guerre)pour qu’elle frappe encore aujourd’hui par ses conséquences.

En tant que juriste, je considère que cette décision est

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juridiquement défectueuse pour les motifs suivants:a) Déjà dans le terme “interdiction” est comprise, bien sür, la

sanction si l’interdiction est violée. Avec le terme “colons” le NKOJ,c’est-à-dire son Commissaire aux Affaires intérieures, fait une dis-crimination parmi les habitants du Kosovo et de la Métohie, mettantceux que frappe l’interdiction dans la situation de citoyens non-protégés, au sens de leur libre choix de résidence en Yougoslavie etde leur liberté de disposer de leurs biens. Est-ce que cette décision neleur a pas ôté le droit de citoyen dans ces régions, en considérant cesterritoires — ceux sur lesquels il leur est interdit de retourner —comme des lieux d’habitation provisoire, et leur déniant le droit d’yfonder leur vie?

Les droits supprimés illégalementb) En qualifiant cette interdiction de “provisoire” et en

l’accompagnant d’une argumentation consciencieuse pour que cesgens ne s’exposent pas aux dépenses et aux inconvénients, avec lapromesse que tout rentrera dans l’ordre moyennant une décisionparticulière concernant “qui pourra déménager, quand et dans quellepartie du pays”, le Commission aux Affaires intérieures privevisiblement ces citoyens de leur droit de récupérer les biens qui leuront été enlevés par la force et de réintégrer leurs foyers confisquésillégalement par l’occupant.

2) L’infraction la plus drastique qui caractérise cette décisionest le manque de respect des règles standard existant depuis toujoursen matière de droits internationaux, qui condamnent les déportationset les expulsions forcées des territoires occupés, et qui incluent cesactes dans les crimes internationaux pour lesquels beaucoup de chefsallemands entre autres ont été condamnés à Nuremberg et pard’autres tribunaux après la Seconde guerre mondiale.

En fait, on sait que l’Albanie avait le statut de protectoratd’Italie, et que par le decret du roi d’Italie et du Régent albanais du12 juillet 1941, la plus grande partie du Kosovo et de la Métohija aété annexée à la grande Albanie, où ont été modifiés l’ordreconstitutionnel, l’organisation administrative, etc., ce qui est contraireau droit international.

3) A cette époque, des dizaines de milliers de réfugiés de laMacédoine, du Kosovo et de la Metohie ont fui leur foyer et, poursauver leur vie, ont émigré en Serbie et dans le Monténegro. Sous laprotection de l’occupant italien, le pouvoir du Quisling grand-albanais a entrepris la dénationalisation et la persécution des citoyensd’origine non albanaise, au premier chef des Serbes et desMontenegrins.

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de guerre, se sont perpétrés d’autres crimes selon le droit interna-tional, comme la déportation forcée sur une base religieuse etnationale, et d’autres. Dans l’article no 6 du Statut du TribunalInternational Militaire de Nuremberg, sous la clause no 6, il est ditque parmi les crimes contre l’humanité figurent “l’assassinat,l’extermination..., la déportation et d’autres actes inhumains...exécutés contre n’importe quelle population civile, avant ou après ladurée de la guerre, ou la persécution sur une base politique etreligieuse”, ou n’importe quel autre crime ressortant de la compétencedu Tribunal, sans tenir compte du fait que les actes violent ou neviolent pas les lois du pays où les crimes ont eu lieu.

Il est évident qu’ici le principal coupable, d’après le Droitinternational, est l’occupant. Mais également le pouvoir Quislinglocal. C’est-à-dire que le pouvoir fantoche albanais n’est pas déchargéde sa responsabilité concernant ces actes, parce que, selon l’article no8 du Statut du Tribunal, “le fait que l’accusé ait agi sur l’ordre de songouvernement ou de son supérieur ne le déchargera pas de sesresponsabilités”... Mais on peut considérer le cas comme une raisond’adoucir la peine si le Tribunal trouve que la justice l’exige. Enmême temps, les “chefs, les organisateurs, les provocateurs ou lescollaborateurs qui ont pris part à la conception ou l’exécution d’unplan commun pour la réalisation de ces crimes, sont considéréscomme responsables.”

Les doutes concernant la légalité de la Décision4) Il est d’une importance capitale de souligner que ces actes ne

se périment pas (Conventions concernant la non-péremption descrimes de guerre et des crimes contre l’humanité, Journal officiel dela Fédération Socialiste de la République de Yougoslavie, 50/1970).Indépendamment de la date à laquelle ils ont été commis, il n’existepas de péremption pour les crimes suivants: a) d’après la définitiondu Statut international..., les crimes de guerre; b) les crimes contrel’humanité...” Les Etats s’obligent à entreprendre dans leurslégislations les mesures relatives à la poursuite et à la condamnationdes crimes indiqués, et à la suppression des décisions de péremptionde tels crimes si celles-ci existent.

5) Nous désirons souligner un fait qui jette le doute sur lalégalité de cette décision (relative à l’interdiction de retour): leprésident du NKOJ a, le 5 mars 1945, présenté à l’AVNOJ (ComitéAnti-fasciste de Libération Yougoslave) la démission de cet organisme,selon ce qui avait été prévu dans l’accord avec le gouvernement royal,le 2 novembre 1944. Dans cet acte ne figure pas la date de son entréeen vigueur, bien que la loi elle-même concernant la dissolution duNKOJ (Comité National de Libération de la Yougoslavie) ait été


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promulguée le 7 mars de cette année et soit entrée en vigueur le jourde sa proclamation. Cet intervalle du 5 au 7 mars n’aurait pas dû êtreutilisé aux fins de prendre cette décision par un organe qui avait cesséd’exister, puisque c’est seulement par la suite qu’a été créé legouvernement unique de la DFJ (Fédération Démocratique deYougoslavie).

6) Le NKOJ a donc promulgué une décision pendant que laguerre durait encore. De cette manière, cet organisme a objectivementamnistié le crime de persécution des Serbes et des Monténégrins duKosovo au lieu de condamner les procédés qui les ont amenés àabandonner leurs foyers, c’est-à-dire la dénationalisation, ladéportation et la fuite forcée.

Sans entrer dans les motivations politiques, objectivement,juridiquement, même s’il s’agit de nos propres concitoyens auxquelson a promis des compensations, cet organisme n’avait pas ce droit.Etant donné que les actes ci-dessus sont considérés comme des crimesinternationaux, il n’appartient pas à un gouvernement national deprendre une décision arbitraire concernant le traitement de cescrimes, ce dernier doit se plier au Droit international.

7) Il est urgent aujourd’hui, justement parce que ces crimes nese périment pas, que l’instance la plus haute de la SFRJ, l’Assembléede la SFRJ, confirme publiquement l’invalidité juridique de cet acteab initio, car il a indubitablement fourni aux séparatistes le fondementde leurs actions, dès les premiers jours de l’après-guerre, en vue dela réalisation d’un Kosovo et d’une Métohie ethniquement purs. C’estde cette façon qu’on réfutera le dernier argument des séparatistesalbanais (à coté de l’annulation de la résolution de Bujan), et qu’onempêchera leurs inspirateurs de se servir de n’importe quel motifjuridique pour leurs troubles entreprises.

II - TEXTES DES LOIS

Journal Officiel, dimanche 5 août 1945, no 56, pages 510 et 511.527.Dans le but de réparer les dommages causés aux droits des propriétaireset aux intérêts des agriculteurs indigènes sur les territoires de laMacédoine et de la région du Kosovo-Métohie, par la colonisation etla réforme agraire basée sur la loi et les décisions prises avant le 6avril 1941, la Présidence du Comité Antifasciste de LibérationNationale de la Yougoslavie, conformément à l’article no 4 de laDecision du corps populaire suprême législatif et exécutif représentatifde la Yougoslavie, décide ce qui suit:

LA LOI


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Concernant la révision de la distribution des terre aux colons et auxintéressés agraires en Macédoine et en Kosovo-Métohie.

(Les articles 1 et 2 ne concernent que la Macédoine.)Article 3

1 - Sont annulés tous les baux féodaux ou semi-féodaux (tels ceux deserfs) au Kosovo et dans la Métohie et sont proclamés tous lesfermiers-locataires comme propriétaires des terres sur lesquelles ilsont travaillé.2 - Les personnes qui, dans cette région, pratiquaient exclusivementl’agriculture et qui entretenaient la terre comme serfs, métayers, etfermiers-locataires au moins depuis l’année 1935, ne possédant pasd’autres terres ou n’en possédant pas suffisamment, sont déclaréspropriétaires des terres qu’ils cultivent.

Article 4Les colons à qui ont été distribuées des terres dans les régions duKosovo et de la Métohie jusqu’au 6 avril 1941, perdent leurs droitsdans les conditions suivantes:a) si la terre d’un propriétaire privé leur a été distribuée, étant donnéque chaque agriculteur ayant cultivé sa terre est considéré commepropriétaire, nonobstant le fait qu’il ait ou n’ait pas un titre depropriété foncière concernant cette terre ou qu’il ait travaillé sur cetteterre comme serf ou locataire permanent;b) si, après 1918, ils étaient installé sur les terres des Shqiptar - lesémigrants politiques;c) s’ils n’étaient pas des agriculteurs, et qu’ils ont reçu la terre en tantque gendarmes, employés des finances ou semblables, pour servicesrendus aux régimes anti-nationaux;d) s’ils vivaient de la terre distribuées comme des rentiers.

Article 5Pour tous les cas de l’article 4 figurant dans la loi, une décision seraprise au plus tard le 1er septembre 1945, par une commission mixtedes délégués du ministère de l’Agriculture de la Serbie, et de déléguésrégionaux du Comité national de la région de Kosovo-Métohie.

Article 61 - Les colons-agriculteurs sur le territoire du Kosovo et de la Métohiequi, d’après cette loi, perdent les terres préalablement distribuées,obtiendront, sous la condition de ne pas appartenir aux groupes c) etd) de l’article 4, une compensation en terre dans un autre endroit dansla même région, si pour cela ils disposent des moyens nécessaires, etcela en premier lieu sur les terre des colons appartenant aux groupesc) et d) de l’article 4. Si cela n’est pas possible, ils emménageront horsde cette région.

(La clause 2 de l’article 6 ne concerne que la Macédoine.)Article 7


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Tous ces actes et ces opérations, afférents à l’exécution de la présenteloi, sont exemptés de taxes.

Article 8Le ministre de la Colonisation exécutera cette loi et fournira toutesinformations utiles à son application en accord avec les gouvernmentsde Macédoine et de Serbie.

Article 9La présente loi entre en vigueur dès sa publication dans le JournalOfficiel de la Yougoslavie Démocratique et Fédérale.Le 3 août 1945Belgrade

La Présidencedu Comité Antifasciste de la Libération Nationale

Le Secrétaire: Le PrésidentM. Perunicic, (signed) Dr. I.Ribar, (signed)

.****

Journal Official, no 89, daté du 5 novembre 1946, page de couvertureet page 1114634.

DECRETConformément à l’article 73, 6, et de l’article 136 de la Constitution,le Présidium de l’Assemblée Nationale de la FNRJ (RépubliqueFédérative Populaire de Yougoslavie) promulgue une loi confirmant,modifiant et complétant la loi relative à la révision de la distributiondes terres aux colons et aux intéressés agricoles dans les régions dela Macédoine et du Kosovo et Métohie, datée du 3 août 1945, quiconformément à l’article 136 de la Constitution, a été décidée par leComité législatif et par le Conseil fédéral des peuples de l’AssembléeNationale de la FNRJ.

LOIrelative à la confirmation, aux modifications et aux compléments dela loi concernant a révision de la distribution des terres aux colons etaux intéressés agricoles en Macédoine et dans les régions du Kosovoet de la Métohie.La loi relative à la révision de la distribution des terres aux colons etaux intéressés agricoles dans les régions de la Macédoine et duuKosovo et Métohie du 3 août est confirmée avec les changements etles compléments énoncés dans la présente loi, de manière à ce que sontexte modifié déclare:

LOIrelative à la révision de la distribution des terres aux colons et auxintéressés agricoles dans la République Populaire de Macédoine et


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dans la Région autonome du Kosovo et de la Métohie.(Les articles 1 et 2 ne concernent que la Macédoine.)

Article 31 - Sont annulés tous les baux féodaux ou semi-féodaux (tels ceux deserfs) dans les régions autonomes du Kosovo et de la Métohie et sontproclamés tous les fermiers-locataires comme propriétaires des terressur lesquelles ils ont travaillé.2 - Les personnes qui, dans cette région, pratiquaient exclusivementl’agriculture et qui entretenaient la terre comme serfs, métayers, etfermiers-locataires au moins depuis l’année 1935, ne possédant pasd’autres terres ou n’en possédant pas suffisamment, sont déclaréspropriétaires des terres qu’ils cultivent.

Article 4Les colons à qui ont été distribuées des terres dans les régionsautonomes du Kosovo et de la Métohie jusqu’au 6 avril 1941, perdentleurs droits dans les conditions suivantes:a) si la terre d’un possédant privé leur a été distribuée, étant donnéque chaque agriculteur ayant cultivé sa terre est considéré commepossédant, nonobstant le fait qu’il ait ou n’ait pas un titre de propriétéfoncière concernant cette terre ou qu’il ait travaillé sur cette terrecomme serf ou locataire permanent;b) si, après 1918, ils étaient installé sur les terres des Shqiptar - lesémigrants politiques;c) s’ils n’étaient pas des agriculteurs, et qu’ils ont reçu la terre en tantque gendarmes, employés des finances ou semblables, pour servicesrendus aux régimes anti-nationaux;d) s’ils vivaient de la terre distribuées comme des rentiers.

Article 5Pour tous les cas de l’article 4 figurant dans la loi, une décision seraprise au plus tard le 1er décembre 1946, par une commission mixtecomposée de délégués de la Commission de la réforme agraire et dela colonisation auprès du gouvernement de la FNRJ, de délégués duministère de l’Agriculture de la République Populaire de Serbie, etde délégués régionaux du Comité national de la Région autonome deKosovo-Métohie.

Article 61 - Les colons-agriculteurs de la Région autonome du Kosovo-Métohie qui, d’après cette loi, perdent les terres préalablementdistribuées, obtiendront, sous la condition de ne pas appartenir auxgroupes c) et d) de l’article 4, une compensation en terre dans un autreendroit dans la même région, si pour cela ils disposent des moyensnécessaires, et cela en premier lieu sur les terre des colons appartenantaux groupes c) et d) de l’article 4. Si cela n’est pas possible, ilsemménageront hors de cette région.


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(La clause 2 de l’article 6 ne concerne que la Macédoine.)Article 7

Tous ces actes et ces opérations, afférents à l’exécution de la présenteloi, sont exemptés de taxes.

Article 81 - La Commission de la réforme agraire et de la colonisation auprèsdu Gouvernement de la FNRJ exécutera cette loi et fournira toutesinformations utiles à son application en accord avec les gouvernmentsde la République Populaire de Macédoine et de la RépubliquePopulaire de Serbie.2 - Les affaires de l’article 3 de cette loi ressortent de la compétencedu ministère de l’Agriculture de la République Populaire de Serbie.Le ministre de l’Agriculture de la République Populaire de Serbiepeut présenter un règlement pour la liquidation de ces rapports.

Article 9La présente loi entre en vigueur dès sa publication dans le JournalOfficiel de la Yougoslavie Démocratique et Fédérale.

Le 2 novembre 1946Belgrade

La Présidence de l’Assemblée Nationalede la République Fédérale de Yougoslavie

Le Secrétaire:. Le PrésidentM. Perunicic, (signed). Dr. I.Ribar, (signed)

(Les termes de la loi de 1946 qui diffèrent de ceux utilisés dans laloi précédente sont en italiques.)


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SPEECH BY SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AT THECOMMEMORATION OF THE 600TH

ANNIVERSARY OF THE BATTLE OF KOSOVO28 June 1989 at Gazimestan, Kosovo

Friends, comrades,in this place, on this spot in the heart of Serbia, on the field of

Kosovo six centuries ago, fully six hundred years ago, there tookplace one of the most important battles of its time. Like all greatevents, it left behind it many questions and secrets, it has been theobject of unceasing scientific research and the usual popular curios-ity.

As social circumstances would have it, this great six hundredthanniversary of the battle of Kosovo is taking place in the year in whichSerbia, after many years, after many decades, has recovered itsStatehood and its national and spiritual identity.

For us therefore it is not hard to answer that old question, “whatshall we have to present to the king?”

In the play of history and life, it would seem that Serbia hasrecovered its statehood and its dignity in this very year 1989 so as tocelebrate this historic event from the distant past which has greathistoric and symbolic significance for its future.

Today, in speaking of the battle of Kosovo, it is hard to tell whatis historic truth and what is legend. Today that no longer matters. Thepeople have repeatedly remembered and forgetten under the pressureof suffering, and still were filled with hope, just like any other peoplein the world. The people were ashamed of treason and glorifiedheroism. Therefore it is hard to say today whether the battle ofKosovo was a defeat or a victory of the Serbian people, whether onaccount of it we fell into slavery, or whether thanks to it we survivedthat slavery. Answers to those questions will be ceaselessly sought byscience and by the people. One thing that remains certain after all thecenturies we have been through since is that in Kosovo, six hundredyears ago, discord reigned. If we lost the battle, then that was not onlythe result of the social superiority and military advantage of theOttoman Empire, but also of the tragic discord in the highest ranks of


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the Serbian State. Then, in that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire wasnot only stronger than the Serbian. It was also luckier than the SerbianEmpire. Discord and betrayal in Kosovo were to pursue the Serbiannation like an evil fate for the whole of its history. And in the last war,that dissension and that betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbiainto an agony whose historic and moral consequences exceeded thoseof the fascist aggression. And later, when socialist Yugoslavia wasformed, the Serbian leadership in this new country remained divided,inclined to make compromises at the expense of its own people.

No people in the world would have accepted the concessionswhich many Serbian leaders made on their account. All the more inthat throughout their whole history, the Serbs had never conquered orexploited others.

Their national and historic essence through all their history andthrough two World Wars, as today, was liberating. They constantlyliberated themselves and when they had the opportunity, they helpedothers to liberate themselves. And the fact that in these regions theyare a great nation is in no way a sin for Serbs to be ashamed of. It isan advantage that they did not use against others. But I must say hereon this great legendary field of Kosovo that the Serbs never even usedthat advantage of being a great nation for themselves.

Thanks to their leadership and politicians and their vassalmentality, they even felt guilty toward others, and to themselves. Thediscord among Serbian politicians held Serbia back. And theirinferiority humiliated Serbia. So it went on for decades, for years.Here we are today, on the field of Kosovo, to say that it is not like thatany more. There is no more suitable place that the field of Kosovo tosay this. And therefore, in Serbia, there is no more suitable place thanthe field of Kosovo to say that harmony in Serbia will make possibleprosperity for the Serbian people, for Serbia, and for its citizenswithout regard to national or religious affiliation. Serbia today isunited, equal to other republics and ready to do everything to improvethe material and social position of all its citizens. If there is harmony,cooperation and seriousness, she will succeed.

Therefore the optimism which is today present in Serbiaregarding the future is realistic, all the more in that it is based onfreedom which enables all people to express their positive, creativehuman abilities for the advancement of social and personal life. Never


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in history did Serbs alone live in Serbia. Today more than ever before,citizens of other nationalities and ethnic groups are living here. Thatis not a handicap for Serbia. I am sincerely convinced it is anadvantage. National structure is changing in this direction in allcountries in the contemporary world, especially in developed coun-tries. More and more, and more and more successfully, citizens ofdifferent nationalilties, different faiths and races are living together.Socialism especially, as a progressive and just democratic society,would not dare to allow people to be divided by nationality andreligion. The only distinction that can and mut be allowed insocialism is that between those who work hard and those who donothing, between respectable and dishonorable people. Therefore allthose who live honestly in Serbia from their labor deserve respectfrom other people and other nationalities in their republic. Moreover,our whole country must be organized on this basis. Yugoslavia is amultinational community, and it can survive only on condition of fullequality of all the nations that live in it. The crisis that has affectedYugoslaiva has led to national, but also to social, cultural, religiousand many other less important divisions. Among all those divisions,the national divisions appear to be the most dramatic. Eliminatingthem will facilitate eliminating other divisions and alleviate theeffects caused by them.

Ever since multinational communities have existed, their weakpoint has been the relations established between the various nations.Like a sword over their heads, the constant threat is present that oneday will arise the question of one nation being threatened by others,thereby setting off a wave of suspicion, accusations and intolerancewhich as a rule grows and is hard to stop. Internal and outside enemiesof such communities know this and therefore generally organize theiraction against multinational societies by stimulating national con-flicts. At this moment we in Yugoslavia are behaving as though thisexperience were absolutely unknown to us. And as if in both our ownnearest and most distant past we had not experienced all the tragedyof national conflicts which a society can live through and yet survive.

Equal and harmonious relations between the peoples of Yugo-slavia are the indispensible condition for Yugoslavia’s survival, forher emergence from crisis and above all the indispensible conditionfor her economic and social prosperity. In this, Yugoslavia is not


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different from the contemporary societies around her, especially inthe developed world. This world is more and more marked bytolerance, cooperation and equal rights between peoples. Contempo-rary economic and technological, but also political and culturaldevelopments are bringing various peoples together, making themmutually dependent, and more and more equal to each other. Equaland united peoples are the first who can step into the civilizationtoward which humanity is moving. If we cannot lead the way towardsuch a civilization, we surely don’t need to bring up the rear.

At the time when the famous historic battle in Kosovo tookplace, people were looking to the stars for help. Today, six centurieslater, they are again looking to the stars for conquest. It used to be thatthey could allow themselves disunity, hatred, betrayal because theylived in smaller worlds weakly linked to each other. Today, asinhabitants of the planet, if we are disunited we cannot master evenour own planet, much less the other planets, unless we live in mutualharmony and solidarity.

Therefore, perhaps nowhere on earth more than our homelandhave words devoted to harmony, solidarity and cooperation betweenpeople so much meaning as here on Kosovo field, which is the symbolof discord and betrayal.

In the memory of the Serb people, that discord was decisive forthe loss of the battle, and for the evil fate that Serbia endured for fullyfive centuries. But even if it weren’t so from the historical point ofview, it remains certain that the people experienced discord as theirgreatest misfortune. And the obligation of the nation is therefore toprevent it in order in the future to protect itself from defeat, failureand stagnation. The Serbian people have this year become aware ofthe necessity of mutual harmony as the indispensible condition for lifetoday and for further development.

I am certain that this consciousness of the need for harmonyand unity will enable Serbia not only to function as a State, but alsoto function as a successful State. Therefore I think it makes sense tosay so right here in Kosovo, where discord once tragically and forcenturies held back and imperiled Serbia, and where restored har-mony can enable her to advance and restore her dignity. And suchconsciousness about mutual relations represents an elementary ne-cessity for Yugoslavia too, as her fate lies in the associated friendly


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hands of all her peoples.The Kosovo battle contains still another great symbol. That is

the symbol of heroism. To this symbol have been dedicated poems,dances, literature, histories. For six centuries, Kosovo heroisminspired our creativity, nourished our pride, kept us from forgettingthat we once were a great and brave army, and proud, one of the greatwhich even in defeat remained unvanquished.

Six centuries later, today, we are again in battles and facingnew battles. These are not armed battles, although even those cannotyet be ruled out. But regardless of what kind they are, battles cannotbe won without decisiveness, courage and self-sacrifice, withoutthose qualities which were present in the Kosovo field so long ago.Our main battle today relates to achieving economic, political,cultural and in general social prosperity.

For the rapid and successful approach of the civilization inwhich people will live in the 21st century, for that battle, weespecially need heroism. It goes without saying, a different sort, butthat courage without which nothing serious and great in the world canbe achieved remains unchanged, remains eternally necessary.

Six centuries ago, Serbia here on the field of Kosovo wasdefending herself. But she also was defending Europe.

She then found herself on the rampart which protected Euro-pean culture, religion, European society as a whole. Thus today itseems not only unjust, but also unhistorical and altogether absurd todiscuss whether Serbia belongs to Europe. She has been there all thetime, today as before. It goes without saying, in her own way. In a waythat in an historic sense never deprived her of dignity.

In this spirit, we today are striving to build a rich and demo-cratic society. And thereby, we are contribuitng to the prosperity ofour beautiful and yet at this moment unjustly tormented country. Andthereby we contribute to the efforts of all progressive people of ourage who are working for a new and better world.

May the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever!Long live Serbia!Long live Yugoslavia!Long live PEACE AND BROTHERHOOD among nations!


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MEMORANDUMof Kosovo - Albanians to the Foreign

Ministers of the Contact Group Meeting inLondon

Monday, 9 March 1998

The Government of the Republic of Kosova, as the highestlegitimate executive body of the Albanian institutional life in theRepublic of Kosova, in its capacity to perform all the rights derivingtherefrom and under political guidance by the Coordinating Councilof the Political Parties of Kosova in today’s emergency situation, ishonoured and privileged to address itself to the distinguished ForeignMinisters of the Contact Group Countries meeting in London, onMonday 9 March 1998, to discuss in an emergency meeting theexplosive and ever deteriorating situation in Kosova. The Government of the Republic of Kosova wishes to reiterate,distinguished Foreign Ministers, its most profound and grave concernover the recent barbarous, massive combined and indiscriminate Serbpolice, paramilitary and military attack, from land and air, againstthe defenceless and peaceful Albanian civilian population in variousvillages of Skenderaj and Drenica zones. According to independentreports, in their large-scale, police-military operation which is stillgoing on, the combined Serb forces have killed over 60 Albaniancivilians, including women and children, destroyed numerous housesand property, forcing the Albanians to leave their ancestral homesand villages, in another sweeping ethnic cleansing, which takes exactheritage from what the Belgrade regime organised and carried out inBosnia and Hercegovina during 1991-1994. The Serbian Belgrade regime is using all kinds of manipula-tions, fabrications and concoctions to try to justify their long-standing, overall anti-Albanian state terrorism and genocide, as wellas their present, totally unacceptable and fully condemnable militaryand police aggression against the Albanian people of Kosova, withalleged anti-terrorist operations. The whole world understands, as


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could be visibly confirmed by all those few who have been able topenetrate into the sealed off region and some very reliable TVchannels, that this is not the case. All condemn terrorism, in whateverform it appears. There is nothing new to this position. But what ishappening in Kosova is something quite different and far from Serballegations, which can be hardly believed any longer. In the face of an ever increasing terror, violence, militaryaggression, ethnic cleansing, flagrant violation of all internationalnorms, standards, principles and commitments, as well as all human,political and national rights of the two million-strong, unprotectedAlbanian population of Kosova by the Belgrade regime, the Govern-ment of the Republic of Kosova is appealing to the Contact Group totake immediate action to stop this new wave of aggression andmassacres against the Albanians of Kosova. The Government of the Republic of Kosova, in its all-out effortsto work cooperatively and constructively with the major factor ofinternational politics, it its efforts to do whatever it possibly can tostop the Serbian massacres and aggression, and to represent faith-fully the wishes, desires and aspiration of an entire people of twomillion in their bid for the right to decide on their own political future,kindly takes this opportunity to request to the Contact Group to showthe necessary cohesion, cooperation and determination to act, withoutlosing time, to stop Belgrade’s policy and dictator from furtherpursuing its political objectives through terror, oppression, violenceand use of force in Kosova.

Distinguished Foreign Ministers, Rump Yugoslavia is another unsuccessful effort to keep unityby force. We all know that forced unity is no unity and the coerciveunity that Milosevic is advocating is again serving only as a cover forSerbian hegemony, which we all know by now what it means.Milosevic is unwilling to give to the Albanians in Kosova the sameright to self-determination that he demanded, inspired, encouragedand supported politically and militarily, for the Serbs in Bosnia andCroatia, which subsequently led to terrible blood-shed and loss oflives. Old, sentimental alliances with and support for aggressive,warmongering regimes and their policies for unjust causes in the


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modern, ever integrating world of democratic countries that share thesame values radiating over the entire world, seem to be groundlessand little justified, it at all, today, at the close of the Millennium. With four of the former six republics and two autonomousregions of the SFRY gone independent, and rightly supported in theirbid to do so, Kosova, it is clear, cannot survive in any sort ofYugoslavia controlled and dominated by Serbia. The Albanian peopleof Kosova are not secure, in any way, and they cannot endure anymore the kind of genocide, oppression and aggression they areexperiencing, nor can they be forced to live in a building which hasalready collapsed, simply because one wishes to keep that building’sfacade and the few remaining ones inside by force, when all its otherinhabitants have left. After 80 years under Serbian rule, the Albanians have opted,through a broad popular referendum, that they want to be free ofSerbian state terror, humiliation, domination, oppression, violationof all their political future, just as any other people has the right to doand/or have done, including some of those of the former Yugoslavia.They have been pushed by the Serb actions onto a path of no returntowards absolute self-determination and freedom. And they havechosen to do so through a resistance that is non-violent, as they havedemonstrated all along these decades and have been credited for it. Inview of the current tragedy of the Albanian people of Kosova, theGovernment of Kosova wishes to put before you, through thisMemorandum, certain concrete measures and actions, which it pro-poses as part of a strong, forward looking package, which the ContactGroup hopefully would be in a position to agree upon, and bring tobear on Belgrade all kinds of pressure, ruling out no option, ifnecessary, and save the entire region from further, unpredictabledestabilisation. With all the above clearly in mind, in order to stop what ishappening and find just, fair and lasting solutions, projecting long-term stability, the Government of the Republic of Kosova kindlyrequests the distinguished Contact Group Foreign Ministers to seri-ously consider taking concrete steps as follows:* Present dynamics point to further violence by those who have theweapons, the political orientation and goals to do so. The status quocannot - nor should it - endure any more. Avoiding such a violence


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requires an urgent, comprehensive international peace process, inwhich all involved would participate as equals, with clear, indiscrimi-nate and/or superior-versus-inferior positions.* Kosova, as a major international issue of key significance for thefuture of the region’s stability, should be channelled toward peace-fully negotiated political solutions, with strong international media-tion, a step that we have always asked for and which should ultimatelybe imposed on Milosevic.* Certain non-military confidence building measures should imme-diately take place, in the first instance, such as, the unconditional andimmediate return of the OSCE long-duration mission; an immediateend to all kinds of repression and human, political and other rights andfundamental freedoms; immediate opening of school buildings andpermission of Albanian students to continue all studies in their mothertongue in their normal school buildings; establish democratic institu-tions, including the independent judiciary and the parliament; allowcomplete and unimpeded freedom of expression and association, aswell as freedom of the media; All this is part of the entire bulk of international documents,decisions, resolutions and statements of the UNGA, UNSC, CoEParliamentary Assembly, EU, NATO, OSCE and its ParliamentaryAssembly, national parliaments, numerous NGO’s etc.;* Reinstatement of all sanctions, previously lifted, on Serbia’sBelgrade regime and careful, very cautious use of carrots in theforeseeable future.

We hail the new decision of the US Administration to thateffect, and urge all the other states to do so. The new developmentsand situations are already teaching again the lesson that the interna-tional community is dealing and will have to deal with a dictator, witha very unreliable, a second Saddam in Europe, who is a manipulatorand uses and misuses everything for his own power and for hisregimes political objectives, built on myths and far from any prag-matic realism;* Immediate and entire lifting of the martial law imposed since 1989,and urgent commencement of the gradual withdrawal of the policeand the military from Kosova, unilaterally, before the start of anynegotiations;* Subsequent military confidence building, including full compliance


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with the Articles II, III and IV of Annex 1B of the Dayton Accords,as well as commencement of inspection and verification of compli-ance with full regard to Kosova;* Urgent dispatch of an advanced NATO observation team, possiblyfrom NATO’s SFOR contingents in Bosnia and Hercegovina, as wellas urgent decision on a no-fly zone over Kosova, due to frequentSerbian air raids, attacks and helicopter gunships.* Imposition on and recognition by Serbia’s Belgrade regime of theindispensable need for political talks and negotiations to solve thequestion of the political status of Kosova, under the auspices andmediation of the international community, in order to bring about alasting solution to the pending and unresolved Kosova and theAlbanian question in the Balkans;* Take concrete steps to immediately start consultations and talks,both with Belgrade authorities and with the legitimate Albanianauthorities and institutions, elected and recognised a such, on all themodalities for these negotiations between Belgrade and Prishtina;make all the necessary preparations for the appropriate setting inwhich these negotiations should take place; There is enough legal mandate and justification for the ContactGroup, under the existing relevant UNSC resolutions on the formerYugoslavia, to proceed swiftly and unimpeded, with concrete mes-sages and action. Distinguished Foreign Ministers, The situation today is no longer that during the years 1991-1992.

We confidently hope that the appropriate lessons have beenlearned from certain, long-dragged consultations, discussions andnegotiations, diverging views and interests, that dominated the inter-national scene in 1991-93 when the break-up of the former Yugosla-via started. Belgrade’s policy, objectives, manipulations and intensionsvis-à-vis Kosova are the same as those vis- à -vis other regions in theformer Yugoslavia which experienced a terrible war, and today arebut too clear to repeat the same mistakes of the past. If the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs in thesouthern part of rump Yugoslavia would be transformed from a war-not-fought into a large-scale open conflict, it would surely assumedimensions which, in all probability, would engulf the whole central-


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southern Balkans. It is only through serious political dialogue and negotiations, atall levels, that this impasse situation can be overcome. We expressour profound hope in the democratic values which western democra-cies have developed, stand for and are prepared to defend. We pingreat hopes in their might. What the situation urgently warrants andcalls for is determination and political will. By defending thesevalues, the international community is and will be defending them-selves and their interests and regional long-term security and stabil-ity. There are many examples when such will and determination hasbeen exemplarly displayed, as was the Iraq-UN crisis. We do hope thesame would be the case with the situation in Kosova and its just andfair solution. The Contact Group, its member states, are the only onesinvested with the necessary power and trust to do so. The Government of the Republic of Kosova, the people ofKosova and the entire Albanian people are looking forward toimmediate and appropriate responses to this new tragedy, at the rootsof which lies the Serbian policy, the only one which is catapulting theBalkans from one bloody war into another. The Government of the Republic of Kosova wishes to reiterateits full readiness, commitment and availability to work closely andcooperatively with the international community, to achieve the com-mon goal.

It is fully available, at all levels and any time, to start consul-tations with the Contact Group or the relevant personality or bodycharged by it to act on its behalf, on the points which the Governmenthas been pleased to list above. We would highly appreciate it and begrateful if the Contact Group would take our request seriously intoaccount during its very important upcoming deliberations on Mondayan subsequently.

Rexhep Bajrami


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A proposalof the Expert group which consists of the representatives ofseveral Serbian parties of democratic orientation which took

part in the work of the inter -Serbian dialog.

_______________________________________________________The members of the Expert Group are: Mr Dusan Batakovic, PhD;Prof. Miodrag Jovicic, PhD, the member of the Serbian Academy ofSciences; Mr. Zoran Lutovac, MA; Mr. Caslav Ocic, PhD; Prof.Kosta Cavoski, PhD and Prof. Dragoljub Popovic, PhD.____________________________________________________________________

Taking into consideration the worrisome situation in KOSOVO andMetohija, an inalienable part of the Serbian state, without which thefuture security of Serbia and the equality of all its citizens withoutregard to their religious or ethnic affiliation cannot be imagined, andcertain of the unacceptability of the continuation of the status quo wepresent the following:

THE PROPOSAL FOR THE DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTIONOF THE KOSOVO AND METOHIJA QUESTION

The Kosovo and Metohija region has been a historic, cultural andpolitical part of Serbia for nearly a millennium. During the Middleages Kosovo and Metohija represented the “Serbian Jerusalem”, thecenter of the Serbian state and culture, with some 1,300 churches andmonasteries. This territory as well as the whole of Serbia found itselfunder Ottoman rule from the mid XV century until 1912. During theFirst Balkan War, these territories were liberated and returned to thetwo Serbian states: Kosovo to Serbia, and Metohija to Montenegro,in accordance with international treaties concluded between 1912 -1913.

During Ottoman administration, Kosovo and Metohija, just asthe rest of Serbia, was divided into larger or smaller administrativeunits, “sandzaks” or “vilayets”. Due to wars, conflicts and forcedmigrations during the Ottoman rule, the ethnic structure of Kosovo


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and Metohija was forcibly changed. By the end of the XVII centurythese mostly Serbian provinces were forcibly taken over and inhab-ited by ethnic Albanians who, as opposed to the Serbs, were Muslimsand had a privileged position in the theocratically-constituted Otto-man empire. The number of Serbs slowly decreased, while the numberof ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo vilayet (Old Serbia) reached almosthalf of the total population.

In the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, until 1929,the areas of Kosovo and Metohija were divided into smaller admin-istrative units (oblasti). In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, after 1929,this area was administratively divided between three larger units(banovinas-counties): the Vardarska, Moravska and Zetska county.

During the Second World War, after the Nazi attack onYugoslavia and the subsequent occupation of the country, the largestpart of Kosovo and Metohija was annexed to “Greater Albania,’’which was placed under the Italian protectorate. The northern part ofKosovo was left within German-occupied Serbia, while a smallereastern section was attached to the Bulgarian occupation zone.

Kosovo and Metohija was established as a separate territorialunit within Serbia in 1945 by a decision of the communist authorities.Its borders were arbitrarily drawn without a democratic consensus ofthe population of Serbia and Montenegro. Those Serbs who had fledthe area during World War II were not allowed by the communistauthorities to return to Kosovo and Metohija. At the same time, ethnicAlbanians who had been deliberately brought to the area fromAlbania during the occupation were allowed to settle permanently onthe usurped land.

During communist rule, Kosovo and Metohija first had thestatus of an autonomous area (1946) and was later granted the statusof autonomous province (1963). Constitutional amendments increas-ing the authority of the autonomous province (1968 - 1971 ) allowedthe Albanian minority, as in the Ottoman period, to establish a regimebased on political and ethnic domination. These policies were firstintroduced by the anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav demonstrations in1968: protesters called for the establishment of the Republic ofKosovo as the first part in the process of secession from Serbia andYugoslavia. The name Metohija was erased from the name of theprovince as a concession of the Yugoslav communist establishment


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to Albanian demands (the term “metoh” signifies the property of theOrthodox Church).

The Kosovo Albanian leadership attempted to promote furtheremigration of the Serbian population of the area by using discrimina-tory policies. The ideological framework for this process, influencedby Enver Hoxha’s ethno-communism, was based on the theory thatAlbanians were the descendants of the Illyrians; all Serbs that hadmoved to the area after the VI century were therefore seen, accordingto the official theory, as “aliens on Albanian soil”. Besides “theinventing tradition” and the systematic violation of the civil andhuman rights of Kosovo and Metohija’s Serbian people, ethnicAlbanians also used communist ideology as an excuse to continue theethnic cleansing of the Serb population in the province.

The 1974 constitution fragmented the Yugoslav state, turningit into a union of communist party establishments based on ethnicprinciples. This constitution also broke up the Serbian state with twoprovinces. In this ideological process the ethnic Albanian communistestablishment received Kosovo and Metohija as its fief. The attemptto turn Kosovo and Metohija into a seventh republic as a step towardssecession from Serbia and then Yugoslavia was halted in 1981,although the emigration of Serbs was not abated. The autonomousstatus of Kosovo and Metohija was returned to the standard Europeanframework of autonomous units in 1989.

Ethnic Albanians using demonstrations and a boycott of theSerbian state are attempting to keep the crisis alive. The size of theirpopulation, aggressiveness, high level of national homogeneity, aswell as the continuation of inter-ethnic tensions, are the elements ofa strategy whose goal is secession from Serbia and Yugoslavia andnot respect for human rights. The series of repressive policy measurescarried out by the Serbian Government, in answer to the positiontaken by ethnic Albanians, has caused only further deterioration ofthe situation.

Convinced that the present situation in Kosovo and Metohijadoes not benefit anyone, neither the local Serbs, the ethnic Albanians,the other ethnic communities, the Serbian state nor the internationalcommunity, we critically reexamine in this proposal some ideas forthe resolution of this question, in order to show that they areunfounded and impossible to implement, before finally presenting our


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own ideas in the form of this proposal.

I

1. It is not acceptable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e. toits members: Serbia and Montenegro, that Kosovo and Metohijabecome a third federal unit of the federation since this change wouldusher in the danger of Kosovo and Metohija’s secession from Serbiaand Yugoslavia. This danger is made plainly evident both by theprograms of ethnic Albanian political forces and by the internationalprecedent committed by the international community when it recog-nized the former Yugoslav republics of the SFRY as sovereign statesafter they had unilaterally seceded from the former federation. Just asthe provision (article 5, paragraph 3) of the Constitution of the formerSFRY which banned the unilateral secession of Yugoslav republicswas ignored, future constitutional safeguards would not be able tostop any future secession of a third federal unit.

Two events that shook the former SFRY prove that the strongsecessionist tendencies of the leadership and a large part of the ethnicAlbanian population in Kosovo and Metohija are not the result of thepresent policies of repression and violations of basic human rights bythe present regime. On two separate occasions, strong ethnic Alba-nian aspirations toward secession were manifested, both in the formof demonstrations, in November 1968 and in March and April 1981.In both cases the proclaimed goal of these protests was formation ofthe Republic of Kosovo.

The 1968 demonstrations led to changing Kosovo and Metohija’sname to Kosovo only, and to the Albanization of the province: theAlbanization of the topography, the educational system, the media,commerce and culture, in short, the Albanization of life in theprovince, which only intensified the process of ethnic cleansing andassimilation. In 1981, secessionist demonstrations again rocked theprovince even though the 1974 Constitution gave the province thestatus of a state within a state (Kosovo was, along with Serbia’s otherprovince, given the right to decide on vital questions that concernedthe rest of Serbia; the reverse was not granted). However, this entitywas not a kind of democratic unit based on the rule of law, but wasin fact a fief of the Albanian communist establishment, which was


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systematically furthering a process of, on one side, ethnic cleansingprimarily aimed at the Serbs, and on the other, assimilation of theTurks, Goranis and Romani, and other non-Albanian inhabitants ofthe Muslim faith.

The subsequent disintegration of the SFR of Yugoslavia retro-spectively clarifies the background of the 1968 and 1981 demonstra-tions and the aims of its strategists: the creation of a republic thatwould represent a first step towards secession.

Just as it is unacceptable for Kosovo and Metohija to becomea third federal unit in the Yugoslav federation it is, for the samereasons, even more inappropriate to support the federalization ofSerbia itself, in which Kosovo and Metohija would be granted thestatus of a federal unit within Serbia. This process of federalizationof Serbia would be an anti-historical act: instead of strengthening aunified Serbian state, based on democracy and equal rights for all thecitizens, this would lead to its disintegration. Worldwide commonexperience that says that federal arrangements should be avoidedwhenever possible has just been confirmed by the insurmountableorganizational and functional problems encountered during the lastfifty years of the Yugoslav federation. Having taken this into consid-eration, we emphasize that we do not envisage the resolution of theKosovo-Metohija question by the transformation of Kosovo andMetohija into a federal unit of any kind.

2. A second unacceptable idea is that Kosovo and Metohija retain thestatus of autonomous province, especially if it is given back the rightsof the 1974 Constitution. The establishment of the autonomousprovince in 1946 (then called an autonomous area or “oblast”)represented, along with the aim of weakening Serbia as a federal unit,a concession of the Yugoslav communist regime to its “fraternal”communist regime of Enver Hoxha in Albania. Turning a minorityquestion into a territorial question proved to be a fatal mistake. Theconsequences of this error are still being felt today. The 1974constitution gave the autonomous province of Kosovo the status of a“constituent element of the federation”, and stripped Serbia of manyattributes it possessed as a federal unit equal to other Yugoslavrepublics. The 1989/90 constitutional reforms left intact Kosovo’sstatus as autonomous province, but reduced its rights and authority.


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We advocate that, since the idea that Serbia should be asym-metrically organized has proved a complete failure, the autonomousprovince of Kosovo and Metohija should be abolished. The numericsuperiority of the ethnic Albanian population cannot be an excuse forthe further existence of the province. Taking into consideration theold Latin saying, which is the foundation of the whole legal system -ex iniuria ius non oritur (from the unlawful cannot proceed thelawful), it is clear that the majority ethnic Albanian population ofKosovo and Metohija cannot claim the right to ethnic autonomy, andespecially not the right to any kind of statehood, since their majority,throughout earlier and modern history, has been, for the most part,gained by force, i.e. by using unlawful methods.

The position of the ethnic Albanian minority will be regulatedby laws and the constitution that will guarantee, without any form ofautonomy, their complete equality with all the other citizens ofSerbia.

3. Finally, we reject the idea that Serbia should be organized as acentralized state, which is essentially the way the Republic of Serbiais ordered now. The concept of decentralization of constitutionalarrangement has been steadily gaining ground worldwide; this ideaaddresses both the demands of democratic governance and the needsof a rational territorial organization of the state. Serbia cannot goagainst such broad trends, especially after the negative experiences ofthe communist totalitarianism, and the present rigid centralism.

II

We will start presenting the proposal for the democratic resolution ofthe Kosovo and Metohija problem by emphasizing the importance ofguaranteeing human rights, which will be followed by a descriptionof our vision of the territorial division of the country, with Kosovoand Metohija reorganized as two separate regions. Finally, we willconclude with a summary of other suggestions for the resolution ofthe Kosovo and Metohija problem.

1 . Guaranteeing human rights


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The respect for human rights in Serbia, and especially in Kosovo andMetohija, is highly unsatisfactory, since the present regime is violat-ing the rights of both Serbs and ethnic Albanians, as well as the rightsof other inhabitants of the province. To rectify this situation, Serbiamust be reordered as a democratic, social and rule-of-law state thatrespects and protects human rights.

A modern and democratically ordered Serbia belongs to Eu-rope, and shares its ideals that call for respect for the territorialintegrity of all states which are free, share modern values and allowthe free flow of people and ideas.

Serbia wishes to belong to a Europe in which states and peopleswill never again fight over borders, because these frontiers shouldbecome channels of communication and exchange, and not themarkers of division.

Serbia wishes to belong to a Europe in which nations developfreely in democratically ordered and pluralistic states and thereforedo not have to seek refuge in their mother countries, precisely becauseall states equally value and respect universal human rights.

Human rights in Serbia organized on modern principles will berecognized and protected as envisaged in the founding declarations ofthe United Nations, the Organization for the Security and Coopera-tion in Europe and all other international and European documentsand instruments for the protection of human and minority rights.

2. The regionalization of SerbiaIt has become evident that Serbia, within the framework of a completereconstruction of the legal and state system, should be transformedinto a modern regional state, in which Kosovo and Metohija would betwo distinct regions.

The regional state, which represents a form of state organiza-tion that lies between the unitary and federal system, adopts thepositive aspects of both frameworks while it mitigates the negativesides. It provides the necessary level of state unity, while it givesregions, territorial units of relatively equal size, the authority to begoverned within a legal framework specified in the constitution andset by the regional jurisdiction.

Regions in Serbia must be organized along geographic, com-mercial, and transportation lines, as well as according to historic and


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traditional criteria. The regions would have between 500,000 and1,000,000 inhabitants and would therefore represent the optimalform of territorial organization for complete economic and socialdevelopment as well as a good foundation for harmonious life anddevelopment of all the ethnic groups that inhabit the region. Kosovoand Metohija had never been a single territorial unit until theestablishment of a communist dictatorship in Serbia. In addition, thepopulation size of both areas fits into the suggested framework.

All the regions in Serbia must have equal status and authority.They would be authorized to set policy in the areas of regionalcommerce, transportation, territorial planning, tourism, health, so-cial services and other issues, by the constitution. In effect, theauthority of the regions would be greater than that of the presentautonomous provinces. The regions would have their own institu-tions, including a regional assembly that would be authorized to passregulations within the framework of the constitution and the law.There would be two types of official bodies in the regions: the regionalbranches of the central government, and regional bodies. Their workwould be monitored by the central authorities. The court systemwithin the regions would be integrated within a unified court systemof the country.

The regions would be stripped of any aspects of statehood,which is a characteristic of federal units, but would be represented inone of the two houses of Serbian Parliament, the House of Regions.

The regional organization of the Serbian state would allow allminorities or ethnic communities that live in Serbia and fully enjoy allpersonal and collective rights, in accordance with internationalstandards, such as the right to use their own language in localadministration and the courts, the right to profess their religious faithin their mother tongue, as well as to partake in cultural and otheractivities. These rights are conditional upon the fact that the minoritycommunities maintain loyal behavior towards the state to which theybelong.

It is clear that in Kosovo and Metohija, which developed underspecific historical consequences and suffered the adverse effects ofthe rule of both the communist and the present regime, the Serbs havebecome the minority group, and should therefore be afforded specialprotection within the organization of the two regions. This would be


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accomplished by creating a dual house regional assembly in the tworegions. The members of one house of the assembly would be electedfrom electoral units of the same size (which would therefore give theethnic Albanian community a majority position). The second body ofthe regional assembly would be composed on a parity basis, with onehalf of its members from the ethnic Albanian community, and theother half representing the Serbian and other ethnic groups that livein Kosovo and Metohija (Muslims, Turks, Romani and others). Bothhouses of the regional assembly would have equal say in decision-making, so that the regional assembly could not pass regulations thatwere harmful to any ethnic group or the country as a whole.

The above described distinct organization of the regionalassemblies of Kosovo and Metohija is necessary because ethnicAlbanians do not presently offer any assurance that they are loyalcitizens of Serbia, nor that they are ready to abandon their secession-ist intentions. Once a change in their attitudes becomes evident, it isquite natural that the organization of these two regions would bebrought into accordance with the organization of the other regions.

The establishment of a regional state must be followed byreorganization of the system of local self-government. This systemshould be modified in a manner that would break up all the largecommunes (opstinas) into smaller ones. This would increase thenumber of opstinas, in accordance with the needs of economicdevelopment and the rational functioning of the system of local self-government.

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a) Population census:It would be necessary to conduct a census of the population of theKosovo and Metohija region. Citizens must be allowed to declaretheir national and ethnic background freely and without pressure. Theresults of the census would give the real demographic picture of thearea.

b) The return of exiled SerbsTo alleviate the serious consequences of the prolonged ethnic cleans-


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ing, which began as far back as 1941 and was continued under thecommunist dictatorship, all those who were expelled under pressureor whose return to the area was banned should be offered guaranteesfor a safe return. In addition, conditions should be made to allow thereturn of private property which these persons had been forced toleave behind due to ethnic discriminations.

c) Stopping the assimilation of non-Albanian inhabitantsSince Kosovo and Metohija has witnessed a long-time systematicforced assimilation of Muslims, Turks, Romani and others intoAlbanians, although in truth the only issue they share is their Islamicfaith, such trends must be halted. All those who have declaredthemselves under duress as Albanians should be allowed to freelydeclare their membership in their true ethnic community.

d) Economic and social developmentRapid economic development must be stimulated in the regions ofKosovo and Metohija, with the goal of increased employment, higherliving standards and establishing conditions necessary for successfulwork and living in the regions. This includes, besides the return ofexpelled Serbs, the full economic and social integration of ethnicAlbanians. A special economic program must be instituted for theseregions, which would include measures to stimulate investment andemployment, as well as customs and tax incentives. Denationaliza-tion is another necessary measure for the democratization and freemarket-oriented reform of Serbia. The process of denationalization inKosovo and Metohija would include the return of property not onlyto individuals, but also to the Serbian Orthodox Church and otherreligious communities.

e) Stability of the regionThe settlement of the Kosovo and Metohija problem is a crucial goalfor the Serbian state since the stability of the wider Balkan areadepends on its resolution.

The attempts of part of the ethnic Albanian leadership toinstigate Kosovo and Metohija’s secession against the will of Serbiaendangers the security and stability not only of Serbia and Yugosla-


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via, but that of neighboring states as well. Such goals are in directconflict with the Helsinki agreements and obligations, as well as thefoundations of the OSCE’s vision of security in the XXI century. Theprojected cooperative (common and all-encompassing) security isbased on democracy, the respect for human rights, the rule of law, afree market economy and on social justice. A solution for the Kosovoand Metohija problem should be based on these concepts.

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Two conditions must be met for the successful implementation of ourproposal:1. The true and democratically legitimate representatives of both theSerbs and ethnic Albanians must reach a basic consensus on achiev-ing a peaceful, negotiated resolution for the Kosovo and Metohijaproblem.2. A Constitutional Assembly, freely elected by all the citizens of thecountry should ratify a new constitution that would, along with allother deep structural changes of the constitutional system, establisha new form of state organization - the regional state, in which theregions of Kosovo and Metohija would find their rightful place.


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SENATOR ALFONSE D’AMATO(Republican, New York)

Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperationin Europe

OPENING STATEMENT

Hearing On Kosovo Repression and ViolenceU.S. Congress, Washington, March 18, 1998

Today’s hearing of the Commission on Security and Coopera-tion is called to examine the current, critical situation in Kosovo. Inrecent days, continuing Serbian repression of the Kosovar Albanianmajority population has triggered an escalating spiral of violence thatdemands U.S. leadership now to stop another outbreak of ethniccleansing and achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

This is one of those times when all people of conscience mustspeak out; and we must take action to stop the slaughter of innocentmen, women and children.

Our distinguished panel of witnesses includes Mr. Isa Zymberi,who is the Director of the London Office of the Kosova InformationCenter. Mr. Zymberi is a principal international spokesman for theleadership of the non-recognized “Republic of Kosova”. The HonorableJoe DioGuardi, a former Congressman from New York who is aprominent activist on Albanian issues, is a witness. We also have withus Mr. Fred Abrahams, of Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, who is aleading expert on human rights violations in Kosovo. Joining him atthe witness table are Dr. Janusz Bugajski, the Director of EastEuropean Studies at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, and a leading expert on Balkan affairs, and Ms. NancyLindburg, who is the Director of the Washington Office of MercyCorps International, a leading provider of humanitarian assistance inKosovo. Finally, we have the Serbian Orthodox Bishop in Kosovo,His Grace Artmije (1).

I welcome these witnesses and look forward to learning theirviews on the situation in Kosovo and what we should do to achieve apeaceful resolution of the crisis there.

Before turning to our witnesses, I want to take a few minutesto discuss the situation in Kosovo.

Two steps are needed to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis.The first is U.S. leadership to make President Milosevic believe that


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the world will not stand by while his goons conduct another genocidalepisode of ethnic cleansing. He must know beyond a shadow of adoubt that we won’t stand for it.

He second step is talks between Milosevic and the KosovarAlbanian leadership, without preconditions. Milosevic’s recent offerto talk with “responsible” Albanian leaders was a sham, and wasrejected by President Rugova. The crisis must be settled fairly,democratically, and without coercion between the parties. Any settle-ment reached must respect and protect the human rights of all personsresiding in Kosovo.

The recent violence has claimed the lives of more than seventyKosovar Albanians at the hands of Serbian police and paramilitaryforces. In addition to young men of fighting age, the dead included theelderly, women, and children.

Published reports state that the body of Adem Jashari, thealleged Kosova Liberation Army leader who was the alleged target ofthe massive Serbian assault, looked like he was killed with a knife.

We witnessed the Bosnian genocide. We resolved that theworld would never again stand by while innocent people wereslaughtered. While the recent outbreak of violent oppression has nowcome to a halt, Serbian police and paramilitary units still occupy thecenter of Kosovo. There is no sign that these horrible violations ofhuman rights have actually ended.

The United States, and this Commission, have key roles to playin the effort to restore peace to Kosovo. Clearly, the situation is notnow stable, and after these Serbian assaults, a return to the situationas it was before is not possible. The U.S. must press the ContactGroup, which will meet here in Washington on March 25th, to agreeon a joint, strong stand against Serbian ethnic cleansing. Anythingless won’t deter Milosevic.

So far, the international response to the crisis has been swiftbut far from united and decisive. The Contact Group, comprised ofthe U.S., Russia, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republicof Germany, and Italy, met in London on March 9th. The U.S. calledfor six strong measures against Serbia and Montenegro, but only twowere adopted. These sanctions are: 1) a refusal to supply equipmentto the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which might be used forinternal repression, or for terrorism; and, 2) on the part of the U.S.,the U.K., France, Germany and Italy, a halt to all government creditto Serbia and Montenegro, and a denial of visas for senior FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia and Serbian representatives responsible forrepressive action by FRY security forces in Kosovo.

Stronger measures were not agreed to. Among the proposedsanctions were an international freeze on all Serbian and Montenegrin


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financial assets.The International Criminal Tribunal was invited to begin

gathering information on what had happened in Kosovo, and formerSpanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez was asked to go to the regionto mediate the crisis. The Contact Group also supported the return ofthe OSCE long-term missions to Kosovo and other parts of theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, something this Commission stronglysupports.

Lastly, the Contact Group said, “We demand that PresidentMilosevic commence a political dialogue with moderate, peaceful[Kosovar Albanian] leadership to find a solution.”

The international community can and must do better.Here, today, we will listen to our witnesses tell us what is going

on in Kosovo. Mr. Zymberi will tell us what it feels like to KosovarAlbanians to live under Serbian rule. Mr. Abrahams will tell us aboutthe human rights violations. Ms. Lindburg will tell us about theproblems of getting humanitarian assistance to the people of Kosovo.And Dr. Bugajski will advise us about the prospects for achieving apeaceful resolution to the problem. The Bishop will provide a Serbianperspective on the situation.

At this point, I will turn to my distinguished colleague and Co-Chairman, Congressman Chris Smith from New Jersey for anycomments he may want to make._____________________________________________________________FOOTNOTE(1) Sic. Artemije Radosavljevic, bishop of Raska and Prizren, head of the SerbianOrthodox Church in Kosovo, was allowed a few minutes to present “a Serbianperspective” in which he pointed out that Serbia is a multi-ethnic country. Nodebate was permitted at the Hearing. (Editors’ note.)


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Bojana MaksimovicBelgrade


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LA VISION POETIQUE DE DANTED’APRES PEJOVIC

Thomas TodorovicProfesseur d’université, Japon

Après l’Italie, la France est depuis longtemps le premiercentre de la dantologie, juste avant l’Allemagne. Au cours deces dernières années sont apparues de nouvelles traductionsdes oeuvres de Dante en français. Signalons la plus importante: Dante Oeuvres complètes, La Pochothèque, 1996, traductionnouvelle sous la direction de Christian Bec. (Traductions etnotes de Christian Bec, Roberto Barbone, François Livi, MarcScialom et Antonio Stäuble). Quant à la critique littéraire, c’estl’ouvrage de Milivoje Pejovic Dante Alighieri, La consciencepoétique et l’oeuvre, (Editions du Titre, Paris, 1996), qui aattiré notre attention.

Dans la dantologie, il y a plusieurs explications pour unseul sujet, mais on a l’impression qu’elles ne s’opposent pasavec une extrême acuité les unes aux autres. Ces divergencesdonnent l’impression que chaque critique littéraire s’adresse àtout le monde, qu’il travaille pour tout le monde, mais qu’il“travaille” pour lui aussi. Telle est notre impression de l’ouvragede Pejovic. Nous parlons de cet ouvrage pour deux raisonsprincipales : primo, il est le dernier, à notre connaissance, dansla critique dantesque en français, et secondo, l’auteur s’emploieà y formuler la structure de l’oeuvre poétique de Dante selonune manière nouvelle et à donner une interprétation thématiquenouvelle. C’est une entreprise autant méritoire que difficile,s’exposant aux risques de secouer certains tabous. Dans cetarticle, nous allons essayer de suivre le critique littéraire dansson entreprise, en y faisant nos observations. En parlant de la


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première oeuvre de Dante, Pejovic précise : “Dans la VitaNuova, Dante ne décrit pas la vie, la réalité, les personnages,mais il analyse leurs effets, leurs reflets dans sa conscience etdans ce sens-là, il décrit toujours son sentiment et sa penséepersonnels, c’est-à-dire suo stato”. Il est clair que le critiqueexplique la Vie nouvelle par l’idéalisme objectif de Schellingen voulant faire savoir que ce courant philosophique existaitchez certains créateurs du Moyen Age. D’une certaine manière,par cet aspect de la création de Dante, Pejovic veut dire, bienqu’il ne le fasse que supposer, que l’oeuvre de Dante s’apparente,par sa nature même, à l’âme romantique.

Que Dante soit précurseur de beaucoup de choses enlittérature mondiale, c’est incontestable ; comment pourrait-onexpliquer autrement son aspect de modernité permanente ?Mais nous pensons que Pejovic fait un chemin nouveau dans ladantologie et qu’il reste à faire, à la critique littéraire, d’autresexplorations dans ce sens-là. Un autre problème est soulevédans l’ouvrage de Pejovic se rapportant à la pensée poétique deDante. C’est son caractère dialectique, où Hegel doit êtreévoqué. Mais l’auteur observe la dialectique dantesque dansses aspects d’originalité et d’unicité même.

Dans le préambule de son ouvrage, Pejovic précise lechamp de sa recherche : “Considérant la Vie nouvelle (la VitaNuova), le Banquet (il Convivio) et la Divine comédie (laDivina Commedia) comme une oeuvre poétique en trois par-ties, rédigée à la première personne du singulier, nous avonsétudié sa genèse par rapport au Je narrateur, c’est-à-dire àDante-personnage qui est réellement le personnage littéraireprincipal. Notre travail a été effectué à partir d’une lecturenouvelle de cette oeuvre.” Ajoutons tout de suite que le statutdu Narrateur dans la Divine comédie est le problème principalde la dantologie moderne. A propos du Narrateur, qui s’affirmesous forme du Je, Pejovic se distingue en partie de la critiquedantesque contemporaine. D’abord, dans la critique, le Je estobservé uniquement dans la Divine comédie, et non dans la Vienouvelle et dans le Banquet, et ensuite, Pejovic exclut le Je del’auteur dans l’oeuvre poétique de Dante. Il défend son pointde vue, en précisant que dans l’oeuvre se trouve uniquement le


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Je du personnage littéraire, mais le Je de l’auteur est en dehorsde celle-ci. Comme s’il avait le souci de nous faire savoir queDante ne pouvait réaliser autrement son oeuvre que par sonalter ego et qui prend toute la place de l’auteur.

De ce point de vue, Dante se transcende en son alter egoimaginaire qui est dans l’oeuvre mais qui, dans aucun cas, nepeut être confondu avec lui. Le Je, d’après Pejovic, est unefiction que nous concevons comme un être réel, mais qui vit autravers de telles situations qui n’ont aucun rapport avec ce qu’ilappelle “la réalité telle quelle”. Dans ce cas, le Je chez Danten’est rien d’autre qu’un intermédiaire entre l’auteur et lanouvelle réalité poétique, il n’est ni l’un ni l’autre, mais permetà l’un et à l’autre d’exister. Si le Je n’était pas compris commepersonnage littéraire, l’oeuvre poétique de Dante perdrait toutcaractère de réalisme et de plausibilité. L’univers poétique deDante est autonome. Il a sa vie, ses structures psychologiques,mentales et esthétiques. C’est un univers créé, une “réalité”fictive, mais ses qualités nous la rende plausible comme si cette“réalité” existait de fait. “Le thème fondamental chez Dante,écrit Pejovic, est l’état du Je narrateur, qui se divise et génèrel’état de tous les autres personnages”. Le critique voit dans cefait le fondement de la structure de l’oeuvre poétique et sonorganisation linguistique. Le centre de l’univers dantesque esttoujours l’endroit où se trouve le Je.

Dans l’Avant-propos de la nouvelle traduction desOeuvres complètes de Dante, le professeur Christian Bec,éminent spécialiste du Moyen Age italien, dit à propos de laDivine comédie : “Ecrite à la première personne (fait nouveaudans les littératures romanes) -à travers le “je” du personnageet celui de l’auteur- la Comédie vise à la réalisation d’unemission exemplaire”. Il est bien évident que dans son ouvrage,Pejovic s’éloigne de la position de la critique académiqueconcernant les deux faits majeurs suivants : Primo, il exclut,précisons-le bien encore une fois, l’existence du Je de l’auteurdans l’oeuvre, et secondo, il attribue cette particularité à la Vienouvelle et au Banquet et pas seulement à la Divine comédie.Quant à nous, nous pensons que l’auteur de La consciencepoétique et l’oeuvre chez Dante nous doit un peu plus


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d’argumentation. C’est un problème de dantologie qui ne peutêtre tranché par des affirmations allant dans un sens ou dansl’autre. Des recherches plus poussées sont encore nécessaires.

Tout au long de son ouvrage, Pejovic a tenté de distinguerl’auteur et le personnage. Il exprime ce fait même à propos dela conscience poétique. Il écrit : “La conscience poétique deDante auteur ne peut pas coïncider avec la conscience poétiquedu poète-héros. La première est la conscience de l’homme quiest engagé dans la compréhension de la réalité, la consciencequi est variable à tout instant, la seconde est la conscience dupersonnage littéraire qui est contenue dans une matérialitélinguistique invariable mais qui par son contenu même est engrande partie indéterminée et polyvalente dans sa potentialitésémantique inépuisable”. Cette position nous semble être plau-sible mais à notre tour nous voudrions savoir où se trouve, oùcommence cette bifurcation de la conscience de l’auteur ?Quand Pejovic écrit : “..., la création de Dante, ..., se trouvedans l’espace et le temps qui se situent entre l’acte préalable dela conscience du poète et la conscience de l’oeuvre achevée,”,il nous donne en partie la réponse. Cela veut dire que dansl’acte préalable de la conscience de l’auteur, l’oeuvre n’estqu’une présupposition. Mais quand l’oeuvre est définitivementachevée, l’univers poétique est autonome et la conscience del’oeuvre est l’émanation de cette autonomie, d’où le triptyque“conscience-oeuvre-conscience de l’oeuvre.” La notion con-science est consubstantielle à l’auteur, la notion oeuvre sup-pose aussi tout le procédé de création et la notion conscience del’oeuvre est la conscience du personnage littéraire principal, duJe narrateur. La bifurcation s’effectue donc au cours de lagenèse de l’oeuvre de sorte que l’auteur, pendant ce temps, setransforme en son univers imaginé à qui il donne une formelittéraire inédite.

En partant de ce point de vue, Pejovic ne pourrait pasformuler sa théorie sur Dante si le sommo poeta n’était pas alléjusqu’au bout de la réalisation de son oeuvre. Pour donner unfondement à sa thèse, Pejovic ne se limite pas à un réexamende la thématique et de la structure de l’oeuvre dantesque. Ilpropose une redéfinition de toute son oeuvre poétique, en


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reconsidérant même le prénom de l’auteur. Il propose deréhabiliter le prénom de Durante mais de ne pas porter pourautant préjudice au prénom Dante ; aussi écrit-il D(ur)ante.Comme le Je narrateur, ou Dante personnage, est le personnagecentral, il propose d’appeler la Vie nouvelle, le Banquet et laDivine comédie, la Dantéide et de présenter cette nouvelleformulation ainsi : D(ur)ante Alighieri La Dantéide, I la Vienouvelle, II le Banquet, III la Divine comédie. En partant de laDantéide, aboutissement de son étude, Pejovic peut définir lecaractère de l’oeuvre poétique de Dante. Considérant le Paradiscomme la conclusion de cette oeuvre, Pejovic écrit : “Cettepartie de la Dantéide est la preuve la plus évidente que toutel’oeuvre ainsi que l’univers poétique en tant que sa formespatiale qui se meut dans le temps, présente une “réalité”fictive, imaginée. C’est un exemple le plus clair de l’idéalismeobjectif, où la conscience poétique est le seul contenant de laréalité poétique. La poète va de la fiction à sa réalité et de là àune nouvelle “réalité” fictive qui est en forme d’oeuvre d’art.Il est bien évident que si l’on ne prend pas en compte toutes leslois inhérentes à la création poétique, on pourrait prendre laréalité de la poésie de Dante comme une forme de discourséloigné du vrai et du réel, mais en partant avant tout de lalogique de la création poétique, nous arrivons à la conclusionque toute son oeuvre et son univers poétique sont une allégoriemajeure de la réalité de l’histoire de son époque.” Là se trouve,nous semble-t-il, la force principale, esthétique et philosophique,de la poétique de Dante. C’est en réalité une oeuvre littérairegéniale et colossale qui se trouve dans la forme la plus parfaiteet qui, à travers celle-ci, donne aussi une image historique deson époque. Pour arriver à une conclusion pareille, Pejovic faitune distinction nette entre la vérité historique de l’oeuvre et savérité esthétique. Son ouvrage est au fond l’étude de la véritéesthétique de Dante.

L’auteur de cette étude se trouve, comme tous les autrescritiques d’ailleurs, devant une difficulté pour définir leNarrateur chez Dante. Il écrit : “De l’extérieur, nous nepouvons pas trouver de limites précises entre Dante le poète etDante le personnage littéraire, car la fiction se rapporte, d’une


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manière égale, à l’un et à l’autre. Mais si nous mettions unerelation effective entre la fiction et Dante le poète, nous nepourrions pas concevoir la plausibilité de l’action du poème niconstater aucun aspect de réalisme. Mais pour cette raison leNarrateur, accepté uniquement comme personnage littéraire,nous donne la possibilité de concevoir cette plausibilité et ce“réalisme” et d’accepter le poème tout entier comme uneoeuvre réaliste.” Ici le mot extérieur veut signifier l’apparence,c’est-à-dire l’oeuvre telle quelle nous paraît, sans considérerd’abord son essence et son authenticité que Pejovic met aupremier plan dans ses analyses.

En deuxième partie de son ouvrage, Pejovic essaie dedéfinir l’origine psychologique des fameux effets chez Dante.A leur source se trouve l’imagination poétique. A ce propos ilprécise : “Les effets que le sujet provoque par imagination sontde fait les sensations internes. Il les extériorise et les objectivise,dans les structures psychologiques, en les présentant commes’il s’agissait des phénomènes qui provenaient d’une réalité nedépendant pas de lui, d’une réalité effectivement objective.Dans cette perspective, le procédé du poète est perçu par lelecteur comme Dante le sent et le conçoit et la réalité littéraireinventée est acceptée comme une réalité indépendante du sujet,en l’occurrence du poète.” Cette constatation définit en partiel’imagination du poète, c’est-à-dire le caractère de saparticularité. Pour Dante, imaginer quelque chose ne peuts’effectuer que comme un vécu permanent. Ici les sensationsinternes sont réellement la seule explication plausible de pareilsphénomènes psychologiques. Pejovic, par ses analyses, neramène pourtant pas tout à l’auteur, mais lui attribue, en tantque héros principal de sa création, le rôle de consciencepoétique centrale, dans laquelle se reflète la réalité évoquéedans l’univers poétique entier.

Chez Dante, il y a deux caractéristiques dans l’oeuvrepoétique qui provoquent des interprétations diverses. C’estl’oublié et l’ineffable. Pejovic les classe dans la catégorie desqualités et écarte la moindre idée contraire qui diminueraitl’importance du grand poète. A ce sujet il écrit : “L’oublié n’estpas ce que Dante a imaginé d’abord et ensuite a oublié, ou plus


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précisément, l’oublié n’est pas ce que Dante imagine et oublietout de suite. L’ineffable n’est pas ce que Dante voit et qui estune merveille pour laquelle il ne trouve pas, ou ne possède pasde mots, pour la décrire. L’oublié et l’ineffable chez Dante sontdes notions bien précises désignant les quantités et les qualités,les objets et les effets, la matière et l’essence, où dans cesdiptyques de mots seulement le second élément est supposéêtre pris en compte, et comme tel il est évoqué sans plus, sansaucune description réelle.” Ce point de vue de Pejovic estassocié à sa définition de la particularité de la pensée poétiquechez Dante. Il essaie constamment d’écarter tout caractère decontradiction en elle. Dans ce sens l’oublié ne peut dans aucuncas avoir un rapport avec la mémoire défaillante du poète, quine l’est pas, mais uniquement avec son procédé decompréhension de la réalité et de sa présentation dans l’oeuvred’art.

Dans son étude sur Dante, Pejovic s’est toujours servi dutexte du poète pour justifier ses points de vue. Il a utilisé lesvers des Opere minori, repris dans la Divine comédie, commearguments forts pour définir la structure de la Dantéide. Demême, il les a utilisés, avec d’autres textes, pour donner sonexplication des deux grandes énigmes, le veltro et le dux. A ladifférence de la critique courante, Pejovic exprime ainsi sonidée : “... il faut considérer le veltro et le dux comme despersonnages de l’oeuvre, issus des divisions psychologiquesdu Narrateur et non pas comme des personnages extérieurs àelle, soit de cette époque ou d’une époque à venir”. Le Narrateurest constamment considéré dans une double perspective, il estd’abord la source qui alimente la genèse de l’oeuvre et qui créel’univers poétique, ensuite il est la conscience où se focalise cetunivers entier. Dans cet aspect est redéfinie l’oeuvre poétiquede Dante et en même temps elle est revalorisée dans ses qualitésmorales et esthétiques. Ces qualités définissent aussi, d’aprèsPejovic, la vision poétique de Dante.

L’ouvrage de Milivoje Pejovic est une contributionmarquante à la dantologie, ouvrant des voies aux interprétationsnouvelles de recherche sur “la Dantéide”. Il fourmille d’idéesqui pourraient servir facilement de titres pour beaucoup


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d’ouvrages. Vu sous cet angle-là, cette étude donne une nouvelleinterprétation, et définition de l’oeuvre poétique de Dante, desa thématique et de sa structure, mais elle est aussi un outil quinous rend le grand poète plus clair et plus proche.


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Esquisse pour MA VIE SANSMENSONGE

Milivoje PEJOVICParis

Je passe mes journées entières dans l’attente d’une réponsefinale à la question. Et cette question !... Quelle question ? Monproblème ne réside pas dans la recherche de la réponse elle-même, mais il est dans la difficulté à connaître la question, àl’entendre de la bouche d’une personne amie. Pourtant je suisseul, absolument seul. Non, je me corrige. Je suis avec monidée oppressante à connaître la question, la trouver ou, sinon,à l’inventer même. Je suis tourmenté par elle, je n’arrive plusà mettre de l’ordre dans mes idées qui déchirent mon âme. Quefaire ? Supporter la solitude en attendant, ou disparaître. Maisj’aime la vie, ou plus exactement j’aime vivre, exister sanssavoir même pourquoi.

A propos des tourments de ma pensée, le docteur m’a ditl’autre jour que je ne l’inquiète pas. Il a précisé : “Si vous nepossédiez rien d’autre que votre instinct de conservation, ceserait suffisant pour que vous les sublimiez.”Depuis je medemande, sais-je réellement pourquoi je suis au monde ? Si, j’ysuis finalement, c’est, en grande partie, pour définir la questionet en trouver la réponse. Je pense que le docteur s’est bientrompé et qu’il a confondu chez moi l’instinct et l’obsession.

Je sais que ce n’est pas bien de se servir d’un tel moyen,d’une obsession, pour exister, durer. Dans ce sens-là je ne peuxpas être un homme noble, mais cependant mon but est noble :résoudre mon problème, l’écarter de mes idées et être commeles autres, heureux et réconcilié avec le monde. Ce serait le vraibonheur de ma vie. Mais il est bien loin, ce bonheur, je doispatienter encore longtemps. Je dois me demander constamment


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comment est-il possible, et surtout comment est-il normal, devaincre par une mauvaise chose une autre chose encore plusmauvaise, et tout cela, le remplacer par le bien où apparaîtraitune nouvelle aurore dans ma vie. Je crois que je me suis trompésur le jugement du docteur. Dans l’instinct dont il parlait setrouve peut-être ma pensée qui abrite l’étincelle de l’auroreoù je trouverai la clé magique de mon bonheur...

J’étais soumis à un agréable sentiment de cette probabilité,quand soudainement un étrange frisson m’envahit ; je merappelais quelque chose, quelqu’un, mais un voile couvraitencore son visage dans mon esprit. D’abord je me rappelle desmots, des bribes de phrases, et petit à petit, elles devenaientplus claires, avec toute leur gravité...”Vais-je mouriraujourd’hui ?” “Oui, mais pas aujourd’hui”. C’étaient bien lesmots de Sonia qu’elle prononçait en racontant un épisode de savie pendant que je la regardais avec compassion, amitié etamour. Avec une extrême perspicacité, elle savait deviner etmême lire, dans mon regard, mes pensées. Je lui ai dit : “Letragique rapproche les gens”. Elle a compris, me tendit la mainet sortit. Depuis, aucune nouvelle d’elle, je ne sais même passi elle est vivante ou morte. Cette idée inattendue m’effraya etsecoua durement mon corps entier. Et puis, une lumièreindéfinissable éblouit mes yeux, comme un puissant éclair, unecité assombrie, en me rappelant qu’il faut commencer àaccomplir la tâche désirée.

Pendant que je faisais un tel rêve, éveillé, Barine entradans le bureau...


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DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998 149

ALETTRES DE L E T T E R S

PISMA

Privatizacija u Srbiji i“medjunarodna zajednica”

Slobodan Vukovi}Institut za kriminolo{ka i sociolo{ka istra‘ivanja,

Beograd

Medjunarodna izolacija jugoslovenske, odnosnosrpske privrede od strane mo}nih sila Zapada, ili kakoone to retori~ki za sebe ka‘u, “medjunarodne zajednice”,vi{estruko se negativno odrazila na dalji tok proizvodnje,pa samim tim i na tok privrednog razvoja zemlje. Naravnoo problemu pada proizvodnje i zaustavljanja privrednograzvoja kao i ukupnih gubitaka, koji se kre}u dofantasti~nih veli~ina (1), ovde ne}emo raspravljati. Ovdenas, pre svega, zanima koliko je medjunarodna izolacijaJugoslavije u osnovnim crtama uticala na usporavanjeprivatizacije, odnosno koliko je usporeno transformisanje

DIALOGUE (Pisma), N° 25, Printemps/Spring 1998150

jugoslovenske samoupravne u trzi{nu privredu. Samimtim koliko se ovo stavljanje zemlje u svojevrstan karantinodrazilo na usporavanje i razvoj demokratskih dru{tvenihodnosa.

Prvo, pad jugoslovenskog nacionalnog dohotka naispod polovine svoje vrednosti u odnosu na period presankcija, neminovno dovodi do enormnog optere}enjaprivrede. Veliko poresko optere}enje privrede terasposobne u bekstvo van granica zemlje, a {to ujednozna~i i selidbu kapitala. Na drugoj strani, u takoosiroma{enoj i izolovanoj privredi nema zna~ajnijegtr‘i{nog dobitka, ni kod privatnog, ni kod” dru{tvenog”sektora koji bi se, i pod ovakvim prete‘no nepovoljnimzakonskim re{enjima, mogao reinvestirati u kupovinu iprestrukturiranje neuspe{nih “dru{tvenih” preduze}a.

Drugo, u uslovima zatvorenog tr‘i{ta, nesta{icemnogih roba i zadr‘avanje nefleksibilnog dr‘avnog i“dru{tvenog” vlasni{tva kao dominantnih oblika svojine,dr‘ava je bila prinudjena, ne samo da toleri{e nelegalnutrgovinu tim robama, posebno naftom i njenim derivatima,nego ~ak i da je podsti~e. Tako se stvaraju praviorganizovani oblici privrednog kriminala, ne samo u tojsferi, nego i u mnogim drugim. Jedna od klju~nihkarakteristika organizovanog kriminala jeste stvaranjedobiti nelegalnom trgovinom, ili kontrolom proizvodnjeili trgovine robe koja nedostaje na tr‘i{tu, uz saradnju sadr‘avom, odnosno njenim institucijama. Sve je topospe{ilo naglo nelegalno boga}enje i uvelo kao modelpo‘eljnog pona{anja - kriminalno pona{anje. Nelegalnooboga}eni, od straha pred poreskim organima, ili pakpromene politike socijalisti~ke vlasti, {to se kaoalternativa ne sme zanemariti, be‘e u inostranstvo nose}isa sobom brzo ste~eni (oplja~kani) kapital(2). Odliv takoste~enog kapitala je ve}i {to su njegovi akteri bili bli‘ipostoje}oj socijalisti~koj vlasti i njenoj nomenklaturi.

Tre}e, fakti~ki nije data jednaka {ansa svimgradjanima da se oku{aju u privrednoj utakmici. U~e{}eu privrednoj utakmici na legalan na~in, za sve one koji su


do ju~e bili van privatnog sektora, bilo je naj~e{}eskop~ano sa znatnim ulaganjima, ili se pak zasnivalo navezama u nomenklaturi, {to zna~i, bilo je prete‘norezervisano samo za pojedince bliske vlasti. Naravno,ovo u~e{}e se moglo ostvariti i na nelegalan na~in : prekosive ekonomije. Nepostojanje jednakih {ansi za sve,povla~i za sobom posledicu da ne dolaze najsposobniji uprivatni posao, pa samim tim i na ~elo privrede, {to daljeprouzrokuje negativan odnos celih dru{tvenih grupaprema privatnom poslu i privatnoj inicijativi. Da bi jedanprogram privatizacije uspeo, on mora biti prihva}en odglavnih politi~kih aktera i naj{irih slojeva stanovni{tva.Ali, ne samo da bude prihva}en, ve} i da oni u~estvuju unjemu. U~e{}e klju~nih politi~kih snaga i stanovni{tvabi}e obezbedjeno onda, kada oni u tom programu buduvideli svoje interese (Boycko, Shleifer,Vishny, 1995:38-39). To zna~i, da bi u praksi program privatizacije uspeo,on treba da bude prihva}en od strane klju~nih politi~kihaktera (pozicije i opozicije) i prilagodjen interesimave}ine stanovni{tva. Zato, negativan “ imid‘ “ koji jegodinama sistematski stvaran protiv privatnog vlasni{tva,a koji se delimi~no i sada ose}a, ve{to koriste demagoziiz socijalisti~ke i njoj bliskih stranaka, za otvoreniideolo{ki rat protiv privatne inicijative, koji se uglavnommo‘e sa‘eti u jednoj re~enici : po{to se ogromna ve}inaprivatnika obogatila plja~kom, to zna~i, po socijalistima,da je privatna svojina plja~ka (!), i zato je najbolje da idalje ostane “dru{tvena” svojina, a ona }e opstati poduslovom da glasate za njihovu stranku. To }e obezbeditinjihov model regulisane tr‘i{ne privrede, zasnovene naravnopravnosti svih oblika svojine (a to zna~i dominantanpolo‘aj dr‘avnog i”dru{tvenog”sektora), jer je “sastanovi{ta efikasnosti vlasnik irelevantan” {to su u svomprogramu i zapisali (Mini},1993:76,78).

Produ‘enje u nedogled postojanja “dru{tvene”svojine na jednoj strani, i njenu svakodnevnu eroziju nadrugoj strani, svesno poma‘e “medjunarodna zajednica”,stavljaju}i zemlju u medjunarodnu izolaciju. Kakvog li


apsurda! Ta izolacija u potpunosti poma‘e srpskojsocijalisti~koj vlasti da opstane. To ona sama priznaje,jer je u svom programu zapisala da “strani ~inioci uzrokujunegativnu stopu privrednog rasta” (Mini},1993:75). Zanjen opstanak je va‘na jo{ jedna ~injenica : borbaopzicionih stranaka protiv nje (srpske vlasti), u medijimakoje ta vlast kontroli{e, ve{to se predstavlja kao borbaprotiv naroda kojeg su, zapravo, srpski mo}nici stavili ukarantin (D‘uverovi}, Mihailovi}, Vukovi} 1994). Pitanjeje da li je tu potrebna neka velika propaganda. Odnosno,da li bi i jedan ozbiljan narod u svetu u situaciji kada muje prvo, razbijena dràva, drugo, jednom njegovom deluobjavljen rat do istrebljenja (na njemu je isprobano supermoderno oru‘je najmo}nije svetske alijanse) i tre}e, kadaje glavnini tog naroda objavljen ekonomski rat (za vremeDrugog svetskog rata SAD su trgovale sa Nema~kom),dakle, da li bi i jedan narod menjao, usred tog rata, svojuvlast pod diktatom, pa makar ona bila i najgora.

Jedan od klju~eva podr{ke naroda (na izborima)aktuelnom re‘imu u Srbiji, bez obzira na njegovekatastrofalne rezultate u politici i ekonomiji, mo‘emotra‘iti u politici “medjunarodne zajednice” premasrpskom narodu, posebno {to je u ovoj situaciji uzapadnim medijima naj~e{}e optuìvan ceo jedan narod(Brdar,1995). Odnosno, nevidjen spoljni pritisak na tre}uJugoslaviju rezultirao je najvi{e u u~vr{}ivanjupostoje}eg re‘ima na vlasti. Ovu konstataciju potvrdjujurezultati izbora koji se mogu razumeti samo ako se imajuu vidu rezultati istra‘ivanja (Brankovi},1994a), kojipokazuju da je, bez obzira na pona{anje re‘ima javnomnjenje, uslovno re~eno, podeljeno: tj. gradjani zasituaciju u kojoj se Srbija nalazi najvi{e okrivljuju stranesile (35,7%), zatim rukovodstvo Srbije (30,1%),unutra{nje neprijatelje (11,8%) ili pak isti~e kolektivnukrivicu (17,9%). Zna~i, gradjani na prvom mestuokrivljuju strane sile, odnosno gotovo polovina (47,5%)razne neprijatelje (spolja{nje i unutra{nje), a samo nepunatre}ina (Kosovo i Metohija nisu obuhva}eni


istra‘ivanjem) percipira rukovodstvo Srbije kao krivcaza situaciju u Srbiji.

Na drugoj strani, uvode}i blokadu, “medjunarodnazajednica” dala je srpskoj socijalisti~koj vlasti izobiljematerijala za pravdanje svoje neuspe{nosti. Za udaljavanjeSrbije od demokratskih i kulturnih vrednosti Evrope,kriva je ona - “medjunarodna zajednica”. Za sve privredneneda}e, bez obzira da li su one izazvane blokadom ili ne,u propagandnim porukama kriva je ona - “medjunarodnazajednica”. Za odlaganje privatizacije, odnosno izgradnjemoderne trì{ne privrede kriva je ona - “medjunarodnazajednica”. Pored odràvanja na vlasti, ona joj jeomogu}ila da na nelegalan na~in dodje do poseda znatnogdela srpskog nacionalnog bogatstva. Ta plja~ka sprovodise putem organizovanog {verca pod izgovoromzadovoljenja ve}ine stanovni{tva osnovnim, adeficitarnim, proizvodima. Postupci “medjunarodnezajednice” ne samo da odràvaju postoje}u socijalisti~kuvlast, nego joj omogu}avaju produètak u ovom ili ne{toizmenjenom obliku, pomaù}i joj, pre svega, da sepostepeno pretvori u vlasni~ku klasu.

Za{to ba{ tako postupa tzv.”medjunarodnazajednica”? Ne}e ona ba{ ni{ta da rizikuje. Ona ne mo‘eznati kako }e se sutra pona{ati novoizabrana vlast uSrbiji. Tu eventualnu novu vlast ona tek treba da upozna,pa ~ak i da pregovara sa njome, dok je ovu, aktuelnu,upoznala sa vi{e strana. Posebno sa one za njunajzna~ajnije - njene pregovara~ke “~vrstine”. Aktuelnavlast u Srbiji kad god je bila pritisnuta od “medjunarodnezajednice” , popustila je, a ko danas popusti, popusti}e isutra. O svim tim popu{tanjima ne obave{tavaju}i nikoga: ni narod ni Skup{tinu. Zbog svojih uskostrana~kihinteresa, ta vlast propustila je da sebi obezbedi {irokfront podr{ke ; jer tada bi morala da deli vlast. [irokifront podr{ke, posebno klju~nih politi~kih faktora, sa(makar i delimi~no) izvr{enom svojinskom reformom ideljivom vla{}u, prinudio bi “medjunarodnu zajednicu”na ne{to druga~ije pona{anje, ne samo prema toj vlasti,


nego i prema celom srpskom narodu. Medjunarodnimo}nici, shavataju}i da je ta vlast dosta krhka, sve je vi{epritiskaju - a ova sve vi{e popu{ta. Zato je bilo i vrlo lakoda “medjunarodna zajednica” natera srpsku aktuelnuvlast da ostavi na cedilu preko dva miliona prekodrinskihSrba. Tako }e je naterati, ako to njeni interesi buduzahtevali, da se odrekne i drugih vitalnih srpskihnacionalnih interesa. Imaju}i re~eno u vidu, na prvi pogledizgleda potpuno nelogi~no da “medjunarodna zajednica”,zapravo mo}ne sile Zapada, podr‘avaju socijalisti~kuvlast u Srbiji. Ali ova “nelogi~nost” je samo “vidljiva” naprvi pogled. Medjunarodna zajednica je ne samopodr‘ava, iz gore navedenih razloga, nego je i dugoro~nou~vr{}uje poma‘u}i joj da, daljim opstankom na vlasti,njeni predstavnici, putem nelegalne privatizacije, postanupunopravni ~lanovi novoformiraju}e vlasni~ke klase.

Mo}ne zapadne dr‘ave vi{estruko uni{tavaju srpskuprivredu, stavljaju}i zemlju u svojevrstan karantinzajedno sa srpskom vla{}u, koju, kao {to vidimo,podr‘avaju. Ono {to je najgore, pored ogromne direktnei indirektne {tete, one uti~u na sve ve}e tehnolo{kozaostajanje njene privrede. Pored tehnolo{kogzaostajanja, sankcije “medjunarodne zajednice”, uni{tilesu radne navike kod znatnog dela stanovni{tva (na stotinehiljada zaposlenih fakti~ki je ostalo bez posla - odnosno,bilo je poslato na prinudne odmore) i gurnule ga u {verci druge oblike sive ekonomije.

Tako vi{estruko uni{tena privreda ne}e biti u stanjuda izadje na medjunarodno tr‘i{te, pa }e biti lak plen,zasada politi~ara sa Zapada, a sutra poslovnih ljudi, i toza bagatelne pare. Ko }e im u tom poslu biti najboljipartner nije te{ko pogoditi. To }e, pre svega, biti ona istavlast koju su do ju~e, na vrlo perfidan na~in prvo podr‘ali,i s kojom su do ju~e pregovarali, pa je zatim prisilili napopu{tanje (3). To mo‘e imati vi{estruko negativneposledice. (i) Stavljanje privrede jedne zemlje podinostranu kontrolu, a posebno ako je re~ o zemljama kojesu prema Srbiji neprijateljski nastrojene, o~ito je da je


jedan vid gubljenja nezavisnosti. Tako }e ta ista“medjunarodna zajednica” poku{ati na indirektan na~inda naplati ne male tro{kove koje je sama sebi nametnularazbijaju}i drugu Jugoslaviju. (ii) Druga zna~ajnaposledica ove izolacije podstakla je proces, koji je ve}dugo vreme bio u toku, a to je odliv stru~njaka, kojim se,takodje, na indirektan na~in napla}uju tro{kovi zarasturanje druge Jugoslavije. Na drugoj strani, odlivstru~njaka pove}ava nau~no-tehnolo{ku zavisnost zemljeod onih istih dr‘ava u koje na{i stru~njaci i najvi{eodlaze, {to je gotovo nenadoknadiv gubitak. (iii) Tre}e,uvodjenjem ekonomske blokade “medjunarodnazajednica”, kao {to smo videli, pomogla je, poredusporavanja transformacije jugoslovenske samoupravneprivrede u trì{nu, da se gotovo razbije, ili preciznijere~eno, rasto~i srednja klasa. Trì{na privreda i stabilnasrednja klasa su u razvijenim gradjanskim dru{tvimaosnovni stubovi na kojima se zasnivaju individualneslobode gradjana. Rastakaju}i srednju klasu, ona jeuspela, ili na duì rok spre~ila, razvoj i izgradnjudemokratskih institucija dru{tva, pa samim tim spre~ila irazvoj demokratije. To jest, zapretala je sve one vrednostina kojima ona sama insistira. (iv) êtvrto, izolacijapospe{uje odliv kapitala, ne samo onog {pekulantskog,nego i onog, da tako ka‘emo, stvorenog pove}animpreduzetni~kim ume}em i radom. Bekstvo kapitalauslovljeno je ve}im povoljnostima koje mogu dati zemljeu samom na{em okru‘enju, a jo{ vi{e one druge koje nisuiskusile blokadu privrede. S druge strane, ta ista“medjunarodna zajednica” svojim merama nesebi~nopoma‘e uru{avanje pravnog sistema, odnosno uti~e nakr{enje pravnih normi (u beznadju i borbi za goluegzistenciju kome je jo{ stalo do prava), ma kakve onebile, iako se stalno deklarativno zala‘e za po{tovanjezakonitosti, naravno, kad njoj to odgovara. Jednom na~etpravni poredak te{ko se ponovo uspostavlja i kod dru{tvasa zaokru‘enim pravnim sistemom, a kamoli kod dru{tva~ija pravna zgrada mora do‘iveti zna~ajne promene.


Ovde je, takodje, neophodno postaviti pitanje - da lise uop{te mo‘e sprovesti iole valjana privatizacija uuslovima medjunarodne izolacije? Za odgovor na topitanje ima vi{e valjanih argumenata i za i protiv(4).(i) Sankcije, kao {to smo videli, smanjuju dru{tveniproizvod, {to uti~e na prelivanje kapitala i dru{tvenogbogatstva u potro{nju, ~ime se smanjuje kapitalneophodan za razvoj (Kova~,1994a:118), odnosno,smanjuje se mogu}nost za neophodna ulaganja uprestrukturisanim preduze}ima.(ii) U uslovima zatvorenog tr‘i{ta gotovo da je nemogu}eutvrditi tr‘i{nu cenu preduze}a kao jedino relevantnu.(iii) Unutra{nje cene su ne samo nerealne, ve~ i"naduvane", jer nisu izloène medjunarodnojkonkurenciji. Pored toga, na delu je ogroman neskladizmedju cena razli~itih proizvoda {to remeti normalneprivredne tokove. To stvara privid uspe{nosti, odnosnoneuspe{nosti, kod mnogih preduze}a. Privid uspe{nostikod onih koji uìvaju dru{tvenu rentu, a neuspe{nostikod onih ~ije su cene duì period depresirane, pa im topove}ava, odnosno smanjuje trì{nu cenu.(iv) Privatizovana preduze}a od samog po~etka nisuizlo‘ena medjunarodnoj konkurenciji, pa samim tim nisuprimorana na smanjenje tro{kova proizvodnje, ve} semaksimizacija profita vr{i na osnovu pove}anja cena, {toje mogu}e jednostavno ostvariti, jer nema inostranekonkurencije.(v) Peto, zatvorena privreda je pravi "raj" za razvoj siveekonomije, koja dvostruko negativno uti~e na privrednuaktivnost, zapravo stimuli{e se uvoz nekvalitetne robepo dampinskim cenama, na jednoj, a dràva ostaje bezzna~ajnih fiskalnih prihoda, na drugoj strani. Zato jedràva prinudjena na ve}a fiskalna optere}enja ~ime sesmanjuje konkurentnost legalne privrede.(vi) Tako se podsti~e, ve} pomenuto, seljenje kapitala.(vii) Novostvoreni privatnici, preko naduvanih cena a~esto u saradnji sa dr‘avom, dolaze do enormnih zaradaza kratko vreme, {to negativno uti~e na radinost, stvara


privid lake i brze zarade i ru{i poslovni moral pre njegovoguspostavljanja.

“Medjunarodna zajednica” blokadom zemljespre~ava, ili bolje re~eno, usporava razvoj finansijskogtrì{ta ("svetinje" u smislu zapadnih ekonomskihinstitucija), pa samim tim i trì{ta uop{te, ili kako se to uposlednje vreme kaè - integralnog trì{ta. Blokadafinansijskih sredstava jugoslovenskih banaka uinostranstvu i zabrana inostranom kapitalu da u~estvuje,makar i simboli~no, na pove}anje tra`nje hartija odvrednosti na doma}oj berzi - prvo spre~ava, a zatim iusporava neophodan razvoj trì{ta. U~e{}e stranogkapitala poja~ava finansijsko trì{te ne samo upsiholo{kom, ve} i u tehni~kom smislu - pove}avaneophodnu finansijsku disciplinu.

Prethodno opisani uslovi vi{e su nego nepovoljniza privatizaciju putem prodaje ili dokapitalizacijom. Onise, pre svega, ogledaju u nepostojanju tr‘i{ta, odatle inepostojanje tr‘i{ta kapitala (5), pa samim tim inemogu}nosti utvrdjivanja realne tr‘i{ne cene preduze}a.Ali, argumenti nedvosmisleno govore da je privatizacijanasu{na potreba srpske privrede, pa samim tim i dru{tva.U takvim uslovima name}e se kao jedino racionalnore{enje besplatna privatizacija putem privatizacionihbonova - vau~era. Prihvatanjem ovog modela, ve}inaprethodno nabrojanih ograni~enja, ostala bibezpredmetna, a danom ukidanja ili suspenzijom sankcija,pretvorila bi se u prednost. Besplatnom privatizacijombila bi, za po~etak, obuhva}ena ne cela privreda, negosamo jedan njen deo, kako bi se dao zamajac razvojutr‘i{nih odnosa i spre~ila masovna plja~ka “dru{tvene”imovine. Ona bi zadovoljila bar dva uslova : brzinu ikoliko toliko pravednost. Prvi uslov bio bi u potpunostizadovoljen. Brzom privatizacijom bila bi u{tedjenaznatna sredstva samoniklog privatnog kapitala zaulaganja u infrastrukturu - pre svega u prodajni prostor utrgovini i hale u industriji. Posebno u situaciji kada upostoje}em dru{tvenom sektoru postoje ogromni


neiskori{}eni kapaciteti. Taj novac, koji se koristi zaizgradnju, uslovno re~eno, duplih kapaciteta, trebausmeriti putem raznih stimulacija u organizaciona itehnolo{ka pobolj{anja, pro{irivanja asortimana roba inaravno, u oskudan obrtan kapital. Ovde se mo‘eprigovoriti da su ta ulaganja strogo namenska i racionalna,pa samim tim i zdravija. Ali to je u ovim uslovima oskudnihfinansijskih sredstava,nepotrebno tro{enje resursa. Drugiuslov, pravednost, bio bi samo delimi~no zadovoljen, jerse postavlja pitanje da li uop{te mo‘e biti pravedneprivatizacije. U takvoj privatizaciji u~estvovali bi svipunoletni gradjani Srbije. Besplatnom privatizacijom,preko centralnih privatizacionih fondova, mogu}e jeobuhvatiti, ako ne celu, ono u prvoj fazi jedan deo (primeraradi, do jedne tre}ine) srpske privrede. To bi tadavi{estruko stabiliziraju}e uticalo na ukupno stanje uprivredi i dru{tvu.

Prethodno nabrojana ograni~enja na poljuprivatizacije proistekla iz medjunarodne izolacije, srpskavlast, zbog svojih ideolo{kih ograni~enja ili pojedina~nihinteresa njenih aktera, nije htela, ili pak, nije umela daiskoristi i da ih preokrene u prednost, i to ne samo zazemlju, nego i za sebe. Besplatnom privatizacijom, makari dela srpske privrede, u onom obimu da sa postoje}imprivatnim sektorom ~ini dominantni vlasni~ki odnos,nastupile bi promene koje bi se ogledale u slede}em:

1. To bi bio prvi korak ka istinskom uvodjenju pravetr‘i{ne privrede i miran prelazak u postkomunisti~kodru{tvo sa dominantnom privatnom privredom.Sprovedenom besplatnom privatizacijom, po{to nemafinansijskih sredstava u narodu za sprovodjenje nekihdrugih modela, izbili bi se iz ruku argumentinedobronamernih zapadnih sila da je Srbija poslednjineokomunisti~ki bastion u Evropi.

2. Po~elo bi se vra}ati potpuno poljuljano poverenjeu dr‘avu i njene institucije. Modelom besplatneprivatizacije bi se, takodje, koliko-toliko zadovoljilapravi~nost, {to za dru{tva kao {to je na{e, koja su pre‘ivela


ovakve katastrofe mo‘e biti jedan od retkih podsticaja zanjegovo ozdravljenje. Tako bi dobila i socijalisti~kapartija dokazuju}i da je raskinula sa svojom, ne ba{davnom, komunisti~kom pro{lo{}u. Time bi ona moglapokazati da se svesrdno zala‘e za modernizaciju, kakoprivrede, tako i dru{tva i da nastavlja tradiciju nebolj{evi~ke, ve}, pre svega, socijalisti~ke orijentacije, ato su na Zapadu stranke socijaldemokratskeprovenijencije.

3. Ja~anjem privatnog sektora pove}ava sekonkurentnost medju privrednim subjektima, {to direktnouti~e na pove}anje profitabilnosti cele privrede i naravnouti~e na dinami~niji privredni rast.

4. Reduciraju se izdaci iz bud‘eta (po socijalisti~komprincipu) za odr‘avanje nelikvidnih “dru{tvenih” idr‘avnih preduze}a. Takodje, smanjuje se pritisak nabankarski sistem (koji je, uzgred re~eno, u potpunomkolapsu, po izjavama gotovo svih njegovih aktera), dadaju kredite preduze}ima za koje se zna da ih ne}e (ilinemogu) nikada vratiti - time bi se, koliko-toliko, smanjioinflatorni pritisak.

5. Velika je verovatno}a, ili sasvim izvesno, da bi utim privatizovanim preduze}ima vrlo brzo do{lo, podprivatnom dirigentskom palicom, do o‘ivljavanja ipove}anja proizvodnje. Sve bi to omogu}ilo brz porastbruto nacionalnog dohotka i legalnije i jednostavnijepopunjavanje dr‘avne kase i raznih fondova zdravimnovcem.

6. U dominantnoj privatnoj privredi dr‘ava lak{esprovodi tvrdo bud‘etsko ograni~enje (jer se mo‘eneutralnije postaviti prema privatnim nego prema svojimpreduze}ima), neophodno za stabilnost i sigurnostprivredjivanja.

7. Brza besplatna privatizacija smanjila bimogu}nost dosada{nje bezobzirne plja~ke “dru{tvenih”preduze}a od strane komunisti~ke nomenklature i njenihsaputnika.

8. Znatno bi se smanjio prostor za aktivnost sive


ekonomije, a to automatski zna~i pove}anje dr‘avnihprihoda i mogu}nost smanjenja fiskalnog optere}enjalegalne privrede.

9. Verovatan dinami~niji rast pozitivno bi uticao napove}anje zaposlenosti, pa samim tim i na smanjenjesocijalnih tenzija.

10. Pove}anje u~e{}a privatnog sektora u strukturiprivrede, uticalo bi na ukupan oporavak privrede, {to bikasnije uticalo na pove}anje cene neprivatizovanihpreduze}a. To zna~i da bi se besplatna podela deonicavrlo brzo vratila kroz pove}anu cenu deonica preduze}apripremljenih za prodaju u nekoj od slede}ih fazaprivatizacije i kroz pove}anje poreskih prihoda na ra~unpove}ane proizvodnje.

Brzom privatizacijom dela srpske privrede, pa makarto bilo i u nenormalnim uslovima, smanjile bi se poslediceizazvane medjunarodnom blokadom tre}e Jugoslavije.Zemlja sa fleksibilnom i dominantnom privatnomprivredom lak{e }e se suprotstavljati pritiscima i apetitima“medjunarodne zajednice”. Lak{e }e se prestrukturisatiproizvodnja neophodna doma}em trì{tu i lak{e }e sezameniti uvozne komponente doma}im, zbog poznateve}e fleksibilnosti, odnosno brèg reagovanja privatnogsektora od dràvnog ili “dru{tvenog”. Ona }e sa takvomprivredom lak{e na}i ili organizovati lobi grupe, kojene}e biti optuìvane da podràvaju komuniste.Fleksibilnost i izdr`ljivost privatnog sektora dokazanaje i u poljoprivredi. I pored medjunarodne izolacije itotalne ekonomske blokade zemlja nije bila gladna, i akosu to svetski mo}nici hteli zahvaljuju}i ne samo prirodnimpogodnostima nego i ~injenici da je poljoprivrednaproizvodnja, pre svega, privatna. Bez zna~ajne pomo}idràve, a ~esto sa otkupnim cenama i tri puta niìm odsvetskih , ona je uspela da prehrani stanovni{tvo. Pri tomse ne sme zaboraviti da je sve vreme blokade hranila ipreko pola miliona izbeglica, a delimi~no i stanovni{tvoRepublike Srpske i stanovni{tvo tada{nje RepublikeSrpske Krajine. Privatna poljoprivredna proizvodnja


stvorila je solidne materijalne rezerve, posebno u ovakote{kim vremenima, za psiholo{ku sigurnost naroda.Naravno, ako to ne bude pro}erdano od strane aktuelnesrpske vlasti . Ne tereba zaboraviti da je privatnapoljoprivreda podnela glavni teret dru{tveno ekonomskekrize i pove}anim anga`manom, na ra~un sopstveneakumulacije, spasla zemlju od propasti.

____________________________________________________________________

l. Direktni gubici procenjuju se na oko 45 milijardi dolara, a indirektni (gubici zbogusporenog razvoja) na jo{ celih 8o milijardi dolara.2. Gotovo da je op{te mesto da je ogroman broj pojedinaca opljackani kapital iz Rusijeizneo u inostranstvo (Djokanovic,1995.). Rusija je, po nekim procenama, u 1992.zabelezila bekstvo kapitala od preko dvadeset milijardi dolara(Boysko,Shlifer,Vishny,1955:39).3. To oni sami priznaju kada ka‘u da }e se prema srpskoj vlasti koristiti principom“{tapa i {argarepe”, odnosno eufemizmom “kooperativnost” zvani~ni mo~nici Zapada‘ele prikriti slepu poslu{nost (Simi},1995:76). 4. Jedno od tih stanovista zalaze se za krajnji oprez jer “vlasnicka transformacija morada bude samostalna i dobrovoljna”, da ona ne mora voditi ubrzanju privrednograzvoja, vec naprotiv( primer zemalja Istocne Evrope), kao i to da u ubrzanjeprivrednog rasta u Kini nije imao udela proces privatizacije. Ovde se ipak priznaje da“ekonomske konsekvence sankcija nisu bile neprelazna prepreka na pututransformacije privrede SRJ” (Kovac,1994:123-138). Isti autor u jednom drugomradu, pored analize otezavajucih okolnosti za prestruktuiranje privrede pod sankcijama,ipak naglasava da one “znacajno otezavaju tranziciju, ali se ne mogu smatratineprelaznom preprekom na njenom putu (Kovac,1994a:118).5. Kada je tr‘iste kapitala savr{eno (kod nas ga uop{te nema) tada je efikasnostodlu~uju}i razlog za prodaje putem aukcija (Boycko, Shiefer, Vishny,1995:39)

_____________________________________________________________LITERATURABoycko,M.,Shleifer,A.,Vishay, W.R. 1995, “Vau~erska privatizacija”, Ekonomika,God. 31 (9-10), str. 38-43.Brankovi}, S.1994a, “O fenomenu podr{ke neuspe{noj vlasti” Srpska politi~ka misao,Vol.I 1-4, str. 197-215.Brdar, M. 1995, “Srbi i/ili nova Evropa,1991-1995: Preispitivanje odnosa”, Srpskapoliti~ka misao, Vol.2 (2-3), str.15-56.D‘uverovi}, B.,Mihailovi}, S., Vukovi}, S., 1994, Izborna upotreba medija, IDN iIKSI, Beograd.Djokanovi}, T. 1995, “Privatizacija na Istoku i Zapadu”, Ekonomika, God. 31 (9-10),str.44-46Glinti}, T. 1994, “Razmatranje buducnosti Evrope kroz njenu sada{nju politiku premasrpskom narodu”, Sociolo{ki pregled, Vol.28(4), str. 463-470.Kornai, J. 1992 , Put u slobodnu privredu, Ekonomski institut, Beograd


Kokolj, M. 1995. Medjunarodni krivi~ni sud za prethodnu Jugoslaviju (kome se sudiu Hagu?), Centar marketing, Beograd.Kova~, O. 1994, “Dosada{nji uticaj sankcija na tranziciju privrede SR Jugoslavije ikako dalje”, U: Institucionalna infrastruktura u tranziciji u tr‘i{noj ekonomiji, IDN,Beograd.Kova~, O. 1994a, “Uticaj sankcija na funkcionisanje i reformu privrede u SRJugoslaviji”, Ekonomska misao, Vol.28(3-4), str. 117-135.Lazi}, M. 1994a, “Dru{tveni ~inioci raspada Jugoslavije”, Socioloski pregled, Vol.XXVIII (2), str. 155-166 .Mad‘ar, Lj. 1992.,”Putevi privatizacije u Jugoslaviji zakonski modalitet”, u:Maksimovi}, I.(red), Transformacija svojinskih odnosa-teorijski i empirijskiaspekti,Ekon. zbor. Knj. X, SANU i IDN, Beograd, str. 45-65.Mijatovi}, B. 1993.,Privatizacija, Ekonomski institut, Beograd.Mini}, J. 1993.,”Komparativna analiza ekonomskih programa politi~kih stranaka u SRJugoslaviji”, Sociologija, Vol. XXXV (1), str. 69-86.Pejovi}, S. 1991.,” Dru{tvene i ekonomske posledice razli~itih svojinskih odnosa uJugoslaviji”, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu,God.XXXIX (5-6), str.619-630.Rankovi}, M. 1995. Sociologija i futurologija, ISIFF, Beograd.Roman, V. 1994. “Imperija i limes”, Ekonomika, God.30(10-12), str.70-75.Simi}, R.D. 1995, “Ravnoteà snaga ili svetska dràva”, Ekonomika, God. 31(9-10),str. 76-78.Tomas.Dz.K.R. 1994, “Balkanski sukob i medjunarodna reakcija: ameri~ke i srpskeopcije”, Srpska politi~ka misao, Vol.1 (1-4), str. 147-166.Vukovi}, S. 1994.,”Javno mnjenje i privatizacija”, Socioloski pregled, Vol.XXVIII(1), str. 37-44.Vukovi}, S. 1995. “Ciljevi i dometi privatizacije u Srbiji”, Lu~a, Vol. 12 (1-2), str.309-316.Vukovi}, S. 1995a, “ Some aspect of the privatization in Serbia”, Socioloski pregled,Vol 29(2) str.184-204.


Nikola Milenkovi}

DOMORODKA OPSENA

Domorodko, vi{njo,s domom sred oblaka- na travnjaku brvnarau }ilibaru rezbarena barka,veslima od zlatajezgru plaveti se pru‘a- ru‘a bela, nevenu}a,vre‘ama lijana se‘e dalji,- brodi opsen,opseni nedostupna- krajolika jarka!..

Stanarko, oblaka laka,milostiva divo, dugo,- si|i, svrati,svemo}na opseno,ro|ako bliska plamte}ihrana dana i sumraka zrâka!..

- Ja sam tvoj sused belosudnji:- konj tvoj lete}i,s kopitama slivenim- iz mulja munja,- od ‘ada ‘arnakaljenim, u bunarima,svetom rasvetom- radosnica-suzica!..

Na krilima papratnimiz ‘íve obzorja i paperja dahau lahor-val spregnuta...


- nosi}u te, ródo,zvezdani zavi~aju,preko belog sveta!..

Vrelo usjalo, ~áro, vilo,medom razmilela boljko,seti me se,- razvigorena jasiko,bela {umo di~na,rane, jutra presvisla,- ~amom neumornom raspela siverna konja tvoga!..

Snom probudnim u predzoru,dahom, bosiljka rosna,prosvetli guju:- utuli uzdah modri!..

Da sladno,- uz grcaj zagu{ni,obdanim dan bakljama,grudi prese~e njisak,- propne konja zenitu- kr{tenje vernik da spozna:u radostima ljubavnikasvo osvetlo sveta!..

Tebi, bela rado, radosti,- mladosti u slavu neprestanu,konj tvoj na ispa{isred milja poja poljuba ljubavnasvilovezom, mazno,venac spli}e,za vekove upam}uje te!..

Konj tvoj osedlan,s krilima, smi{ljanim, pletenim


oputom i pritkom snovi|ena srmlja,- nestrpljiv, trepti, treperi...Ve} sto godina na te ~eka- da se vine,- Veneri let usmeri!...

êka tvoju blagovesnu ruku,pospanih prstiju,s vinogorna puta da naluta,- odazove sesanjivim dodirom lekovita bilja:- pevu{e}a, laka kapda se iz lista istrgne,konju oma|ijanomniz vlasi grive u sr‘ ‘i}a si|e:- ~arobom sunaca‘e|eno podoji srce!..

Ali konj je konj,- bio i s krilima,sve {to zna je:- pase travu i tovar tegli,svejedno, da neumornobdi u njemu,u zlatnoj krletci- ludom ‘udnjom ogranulosamoniklo vrelo ru‘i~njaka!..

O, seti se, selo belo,sun~an-grade, dobri~ino vilo,da negde, uzastopno,samoosedlani konj,- nestrpljive uzengije zvekazove bez prestanka,- da uzleti, stremi krilom:- tebe ~eka!..


Nai|i, iznenada, prazni~na:- vila ~ila, stado rado,mila sliko,- zrelo podne oplodne lepote,- krepka kapi,‘uborom tekla vodo:Domorodka opsena,- izvoru, ‘ivote!..

Tico-pesmarico, p{enico,s klasa ‘ita,iz osja, ispilela svitko,- namu~enoga, od srcahrani konja svoga,daj sudnju pregr{t zobi:- nedra jedra,- vedra bedra...Ot{krini na}ve bo‘anske!..

Konj tvoj, buja, kipti:- uroka reka!..u teskobi srca zemnaboravak tvori,u ‘ilici-damarici, ~ifta se, lomi,- gori, tebe ~eka,da na mig tvoj odgovori:s tobom, u sedlu mu, uzleti,- vatrom zlatnom, posred nebazlatu vrata otvori!..

Sred nemirne, burnenedostupne zari okeana,u zagrljaj bi lagune- da se baci,silinom orkananeumoljive sladostrasti,- s tobom da roni zna}e


u kolutu:- suna{ca - lune,niz koral da se nagoni,kroz biser-sa}e!...

[ta je pelena {ta je melem?Zarodava}e se konj tvojdo mere:- da se mre,od u‘itka krhka!..Slavi}e trenkad te u zene svoje uze:ljube}i neven- uzde zvezde predade!..

A Mrak je vasceli sadbez tebe,Domorodko opsena,- groma pesni sna|en:osaka}en san- opusto{en sâd:sred same smrti izro|en- presvisnuo le‘iopru‘en u bespu}a,- na ledini konj!..Jo{ jedino zagrobnim,meriv ar{inima!..

Lokva - jaruga:- du{a ugu{ena;bez premca rana:- danu belom selacrna smola oko vrata!..

Ma bio i ~arobni,- konj je samo konj,


nji{ti - penu{a, batrga se,u gubici gvo‘|e glo|e- zaludo ~elik i zube mrvi,s munjama krvi,- gnev svoj,uludo silu strvi!..

Samo sevne, zaslepljuju}i- blesne kopitom po kamenu,da opet, u teskobi pe}ine,poklekuju}i,- muklim jekom kotrlja se,niz strmu stenu kobi- te{ka gar mu~nine!..

Sa slepilom se zdru‘uju}ipotonulosti se daje- u ponor udavni le}i }e,gde od trena opakado na veke okapaniko i ni{ta ~ekati ga ne}e!..

Ku‘na jama bezdanaponapukla prenapregom ropca,cvili, podlo, ‘elezou crnoj d‘igerici sja}eno!..

- Java - izdajica,bubama modra usijanja- gmi‘e-stri‘eu koru mo‘danu uranja!..- Java - besna utvaramaljem ga po slepoo~nici,- krvavo u sisuno‘ no‘ presti‘e!..


Ba{ ti je prilika:- crkni crni crve,konju, jadom zgnje~en,- pomrkom munjom uhva}en,kamd‘ijama izmolovan!..

Hajd’ sad i sâm uzmi,- zlobi op{toj ispomogni:- strgni, srubi srpom,sa srca sure stovari srsi,- prepusti se pomornici,dok jo{ poslednjim, u lo‘nici,- snom za njom,posve ne pomeri{ pame}u!..

K nebu sapi izokreni,u srcu lampione ispogasi,- u nemilosti ogreznuo,nemanje proglasi:- {to rosna perivoja ljupka,- {to vrta ljubavni~ka!...

Isti onaj, vazda ponositi,preprekama prkose}i:- vrletima vranac vi~ni,nezadr‘iv div,- predvodnik ve~ni!..

Sad, isto {to i smrvljen:sapet u olovo!.., - evo,- u zanosu zaustavljenstoji, - pregoreo!..

Stoji, konj tvoj krilati,zale|en, otpisan,- u sunovrat posr}e umom:


- izgubljen za smisao!..

Broji, sri~e,stalno uzaludno isto,- jednonoga pomisao,u neverici, u mestu skaku}e,presli{ava se ~isto:- nije mogu}e?!.

Odgurnuto u vrtlog,obru{eno u brlog:- stalo groblje;narastao preko nebacrni glog,- orah-o~aj!..

Celo-celcato sazve‘|e- nakrenulo se,zaglibilo krilimau crnicu-kukavicu!..

Vino rujno pri~esnoizgubilo svetost - sjaj;u gor~icu prelomljeno- zatrovanjem raskr{teno,niz sinju slepu bogazu- obezro|enom du{om suzinevina{ce-krvce gro‘|a!..

Podno leglo, razboljenopodne smrklo,i krunu i oreol izgubilo:- Veli~anstvo Obsjaj!..

Kao golo ni{ta,nemi vrisak voska sve}a- trune se,


- trunu s peteljkomdo u kraj odne}avodolija i mesec maj!...

Raspinje ga mukla kletva:stigla mu je crna ‘etva,- pod plo~u - kopitukonj trene izjedeu rite spominjanjedo bestraga trga!..

Sve {to tlo bilospla~inom splasnulo!..Zbraja u gromuljice srce,najzad je gotovo, tu:- pred njim, u njemu,sve se svelo na rasulo!..

Samosvislo ‘ar-pti~e,- opovrgnulo se:jedno prole}e!..Ono {to ~inja{e let i svetu biti je nepostoje}e:golubice lice- golotinja je avet!..

A da te i bivalo u jasenima,me|u borovima:- krhka jela,- Domorodka opsena,koji tren sla|ani:- konju u sedluda si i bogovala!..

Sad, za svekad,poderanoj ko{uljici zmijskojjedva da {to nali~i,


dok u nemo}i,da magom,- snagom kristala -uverljiva sna zra~i!..

Ako ve} na javinigde te nije i nema,- svom ludom |ila{u-konjuubistvenu si darovalaoglav-gubu: samotinju,- u neprosvetlu gor~inu,bedu, doslovno sro~enu...- u memlu, pepeokrvni~ki zapretala!..

Kad u mahu,- pod svodom bespovrati,prkosno razmahuju}isumanuto daljno- du{mansko-tu|insko,zlobom osoljeno,osiljeno okre}e{ lice...

Dozlogrdilo ti, nevero,s ove strane sudbe,jarima novim stala su~elice:- zaslepljena, hrli{umi{ljenim vidicima!..

Jogunasta vrsta lasta,silaze}u rovove,lomoglave bira{- sle}e{, odziva{ sevratolomnim klancima!..

Zaklju~ano, na vekoveokamenjeno nebo za nas:


- Zapro{ena za sla|e svadbe,drugom nekom, ti od danas|ila{u-bratu o vratu,- podneblju nadmenom,- snom{irom otvara{ vratnice,- na varljive dine,na vejavicom narasle smetove!..

Sejo, rode, izdajo obdanice,- {ta nam se ovo desi?koje li pomamljenosti guje!- guvno ovo odmazde?!..

Ni na tren slu}ene surovosti:- Iz koreni se istrebljujesve {to sveto steklo se- sav mogu}i sadr‘aj radosti!..

Bez pogovora i lekadok na hrbi veka- iskustvom smrti pretovarenakonja tvoga bura tetura...

Vra‘je ~ila:- zolja ushitela,ljuto otrovima nadahnuta,u opijuma korovus konjem-mazgom novajlijom- nova doma ustrojena!...

Niti za mig oklevanja,- bez vlati milosr|a,nehajna, ledena,zakleto nepokajna,- tu, smesta, ne bi li daodanog konja, ragu lete}u


- nogom grobu preporu~i...

Stekne raskomot vidiku- u slavu zaboravu,la‘nim, bla‘enim osmejkomsraste sa spokojem!..

Vilo, divo neponovljiva,a da bi se okrenulai tek ispod okaza sobom virnula?..

Videla bi:- tvog zaljubljenog konjau ~ami polja sagorela,uklje{tena d‘ombama puta- oduzeta,okamenjena krila- nepomi}nost ga sna{la!..

Stoji, zane{en,gleda:- duboka jedna urvinakonju u grudima:- u bogovetnu nedogledstisnuo se led!..

Stoji, zane{en,gleda- duboka jedna urvinakonju u grudima:- u bogovetnu nedogledstisnuo se led!..

Stoji:- kamen, kremen:- zazid!..


Da nikad ne poveruje vi{ezadu{nom miri{ljajuotkosa mladih livada,- opet opijen da bi bio,uzne{en svetlostima pio- dah tople letnje ki{e!..

Ravno pred hridbleska da sine sen:- novosvane, uranila,uvek ista ona- Domorodka opsena!..

- Da ga zove,ispo~etka ~eka!.

Raspasana haljina:pevaju}a jedna njiva,- ‘e{ka sjaja {uma zlata,bujaju}e vru}e,plavno rasplamsuju}e,gordo ispr{eno- rasno pleme suncokreta!..

Pariz, septebra 1997.


MAR[ PO LED !

Bo‘idar Violi}, Zagreb

Bo‘idar Violi} re‘irao je i zapisima propitavao dramuMate Mati{i}a Andjeli Babilona (praizvedenu 14. prosinca1996. u Dramskom kazali{tu Gavella)

Slike apstraktnog slikarstva, koje je mar{al FNRJbio ‘estoko napao, u SFRJ su visjele na zidovimaapartmana i vila partijskih funkcionera uz slike naivnihslikara. Jugoslavija je postala zemlja ~upavih hipika irokera, avangardnih festivala, ultralijevih marksista kojisu pu{tali bradu, pijuckali whiskey i pozivali sa namladoga Marksa. “Demokratski centralizam”, apsurdnispoj liberalnog pridjeva i totalitarne imenice, bio binepotpun bez dekorativne intelektualne opozicije.

Biv{i bravar Jo‘a Broz prona{ao je klju~ za pobo~navrata{ca u ‘eljeznoj zavjesi, koja su bila dovoljno velikada propuste dotok gastarbajterskih i turisti~kih deviza usaveznu blagajnu. Sve drugo ostalo je ~vrsto zaklju~anopod kontrolom Partije, armije i policije. Socijalisti~kaJugoslavija nastavila je putovati u komunizam premazana{arenim kapitalisti~kim bojicama na skerletnom licu.Kostimirana u politiku nesvrstanosti simulirala jekoegzistenciju dvaju nepomirljivih sustava. Takodotjerana i uljep{ana dobivala je obilne dolarske zajmovena ra~un putnih tro{kova. Najvi{e je putovao Velikivodja: u odori Admirala na svom je Galebu oplovio svamora i oceane Tre}ega svijeta, presvla~io se u afri~ke,indijanske i mongolske poglavice, hinduske maharad‘e iburmanske mudrace, navla~io na glavu svakojakapokrivala, kitio se oko vrata ogrlicama od cvije}a i metala.S tih je putovanja pored skupocenih drangulija dovozioi egzoti~ne ‘ivotinje kojima je napu~io {umovite, zeleneBrijune, najblagotvornije i najljep{e svoje leno. Goli,


kameniti otok rezervirao je za neposlu{ne protivnike, dazaslu‘enu kaznu ispa{taju na ‘arkom suncu, uz more, ane kao drugovi {to u Sibiru skapavaju u snijegu i ledu.Iako sitna, ta pa‘nja pru‘a uvid u “ljudsko nali~je”jugoslavenskoga samoupravnog socijalizma.

Andjeli Babilona komad su o travestiranomkomunizmu koji je u Jugoslaviji simulirao reformacijuprije svoje op}e, kona~ne propasti. êsi, Madjari, Poljacii ostalo komunisti~ko roblje {to su kao bijedni paradajz-turisti silazili na na{e more i zavidjeli nam na demokracijii standardu, nisu u strukturama tada{njegajugoslavenskog socijalizma mogli naslutiti sli~nost sbudu}im strukturama vlastitih zemalja u tranziciji. Ona,medjutim, postoji iako je “tranzicija” u ono vrijeme uJugoslaviji bila simulirana. U prijetvorbi komunizma ukapitalizam u osnovi se radi o strukturno identi~nomsklopu, i materijalnom i mentalnom, kod travestita ireformista. Eventualna razlika samo je u tome {to su na{itravestirani reformisti u prijetvorbu u{li pripremljeni, spredratnim iskustvom. Rat koji je u nas bio usmjeren naobranu i uspostavu nacionalnog integriteta i suverenitetatek je periferno utjecao na proces tranzicije. Crveneknjiìce dinarske {tednje zamijenjene su plavima,kunskima, dok su plave devizne udvojene na staru i novu{tednju. Sve su knjiìce otada iste boje, ali razlike medjunjima time nisu poni{tene. U jeku Domovinskog ratanacionalni je kostim mogao posluìti kao idealnomaskirno ruho za unosnu reformisti~ku travestiju poposljednjoj modi. Godinu dana poslije Daytonskihsporazuma Andjeli Babilona su, dakle, s razlogom moglibiti pro~itani kao aktualan tekst. Politi~ka stvarnost kaoda je slijedila Mati{i}ev komad. Kona~no, nisu lireformirani komunisti~ki rukovodioci i prije rata igralitenis?

(P.S. - Nedavno sam ~uo ovaj vic:Za vrijeme Drugoga svijetskoga rata Saveznici su

na{im partizanima bacali padobranima iz aviona paketes municijom, odje}om i hranom. Grupa je partizana


otvorila jedan takav paket. Jedna je boca ~udno izgledala,otvorili su je, naizmjence pomirisali, nisu znali {to je tou njoj: nije {ljivovica, a nije ni votka. Nisu se usudiliku{ati to nepoznato, zagonetno pi}e. Vojnici su odnijelibocu komandiru ~ete, drugu kapetanu. I on je od{arafio~ep i pomirisao: nije {ljivovica, nije votka. Bocu suproslijedili komandiru bataljona, drugu majoru, pa drugupukovniku, komesaru. Obojica su je od{arafila,pomirisala: nije {ljivovica, nije votka. Po kuriru je bocadostavljena komandantu divizije. Kad je drug general-major dubokim uzdasima pomirisao to problemati~nopi}e ni on nije znao {to je: nit je votka nit je {ljivovica?!Telefonirao je u vrhovni {tab i uz propratnu depe{uuputio drugu Mar{alu sumnjivu Savezni~ku bocu. DrugTito hrabro je od{arafio bocu, pomirisao pi}e i ozarenalica rekao: “To je whiskey, drugovi!” I smjesta je izdaokomandu: “[esta li~ka mar{ na Igman po led!”

Postavlja se pitanje: {to je autor vica njime htio re}ipo~etkom 1997?)________________________________________________*Ovaj ~lanak pozajmljen je iz ~asopisa “VIJENAC”, broj 93-94, 1997, novine Maticehrvatske za knjièvnost, umjetnost i znanost. “ Vijenac ” izlazi dvotjedno, cijena 6.00kn. Uredni{tvo: Ulica Matice hrvatske 2, 10000 Zagreb, tel. 385 (0)1 275 117. Ubroju 93-94 (31 srpnja 1997) pi{u i govore: Juri~i}, Gall, Radja, Oègovi}, Matu{i},êgec, Kalini}, [tajduhar, Beck, [vab, Bratuli}, Jareb, [porer, Donat, [pani~ek,Lasi}, Mandi}, Bo{njak, Juri}, Moja{, Vukov-Coli}, Govedi}, Kurelac, Luki}, Peri~i},Katalini}, Davidovi}, Posari}, Movre, Hundi}, Attenborough, Gili}, Berkovi},Lovrenovi}, [tiks, [impraga, Ramadan, Veli~kovi}, Kebo, Zaimovi}, Pecoti},Vojkovi}, Plei}, Djordjevi}, Mudrov~i}, Pinterovi}, Crnkovi}, Mer{injak, Violi}. Naprvoj strani, sjajni uvodnik (Borisa Marune) u dana{nju Hrvatsku - “Raj na zemlji”.Na zadnjoj, kratki “ izvodnik” Boìdara Violi}a, direktno iz “Raja”.

_______________________________________________________________________________UPUTSTVA AUTORIMA

(stampana u svakom broju "Dijaloga")

"DIJALOG" je tromese~ni ~asopis o idejama, time podrazumevaju}i sve ideje.Po{to je sadràj veoma raznovrstan i zahvata sve {to u naj{irem smislu spada u dru{tvenei prirodne nauke, kulturu i umetnost, autori bi trebalo da su svesni da je malo ~itaoca kojisu eksperti za sve oblasti. Treba izbegavati nepotrebne stru~ne izraze, a tamo gde su takviizrazi nu`ni detaljno ih objasniti prilikom prve upotrebe. Prilozi bi trebalo da budu urednokucani pisa}om ma{inim ili laserskim {tampa~em, sa duplim proredom samo sa jedne stranepapira. Tekstovi pra}eni kompjuter disketom i pisani u ASCII, Word ili nekom uobi~ajenom


formatu i bez posebnog oblikovanja teksta (bez komplikovanih tabela i grafi~kih prikazau samom tekstu) olak{avaju posao redakciji i imaju vi{e {ansi da budu {tampani. Urednicismatraju da jezik sluì komunikaciji i zato vas molimo da upotrebljavate dijalekt koji ve}ina~itaoca razume. Ukoliko sama forma jezika ~ini ono {to se ̀ eli saop{titi, takav tekst spadau literarni odeljak na{eg lista.

Autori bi trebalo da imaju na umu da }e "analize i duì komentari" kao i "originalni~lanci" biti pregledani od vi{e (naj~es}e 2 - 3) ~lanova uredni{tva i stru~nih savetnika odkojih neki ̀ ive u udaljenim krajevima sveta. Putovanje po{tanske po{iljke moè da trajeod tri nedelje do nepuna dva meseca. S toga bi sadràj tekstova trebalo da bude takav daostane aktuelan i posle 6 meseci od njihovog podno{enja redakciji.

Svi tekstovi moraju biti potpisani, navedena profesija i afiliacija (institucija) autora- ukoliko je nau~ni rad iz oblasti profesije autora a ne sasvim nezavisan autorski tekst, datapuna adresa, broj telefona i eventualno faksa i e-mail adresa.

AUTORSKE IZJAVE. i) Autor bi morao da u propratnom pismu ili u posebnomparagrafu odvojenom od teksta ~lanka dâ kratku pismenu izjavu da dati tekst podnosi za{tampu "Dijalogu" i da ~lanak nije u istoj formi i na istom jeziku podnesen drugom ~asopisuza ~tampu. ii) Ukoliko to nije druk~ije ugovoreno, AUTORSKA PRAVA (copyright)zadràva "Dijalog", Ukoliko autor ̀ eli da zadrì autorska prava morao bi to posebno danaglasi.KATEGORIJE ^LANAKA I RUBRIKE

1. PISMA ÎTALACA. 1/2 strane po pismu.2. ORIGINALNI ^LANCI.. To su argumentovana izlaganja novih vidjenja

pojedinih problema sa eventualnim originalnim re{enjima. Duìna i struktura kao "analizei duzi komentari". Autori bi trebalo da vode ra~una da naslov opisno odgovara sadràju~lanka. ̂ lanak bi trebalo da po~ne kratkim rezimeom (80 do 100 re~i). Naslov i rezime bitrebalo prevesti na francuski i engleski. Jedan ili vi{e po~etnih paragrafa bi trebalo daposluè ~itaocu, koji nije stru~njak za predmet o kome se pi{e, kao uvod, kako bi razumeokasniji tekst, a stru~njaku da posluì kao vodi~ kroz relevantnu nau~nu literaturu iz oblastikoja se obra|uje. Tekst treba da se zavr{i kratkim zaklju~kom. Ako je vi{e elemenatazaklju~ka, treba spomenuti samo one najva`nije. Ograni~ena relevantna literatura je datana kraju, citirana po redosledu po kome je spomenuta u tekstu. Fusnote, koje ne spadajustriktno u literaturu, su takodje dozvoljene. Autorima se preporu~uje da, u idealnom slucaju,u ~lanku dokazuju samo jednu ~injenicu, pri tom koriste}i argumente koji su u nauci opsteprihva}eni i koje ne treba naknadno dokazivati. Tekst mora da ima oblik ZAKLJUÎVANJA.Posebno je va`no da se uzme u obzir da "Dijalog" objavljuje kao centralne ~lankeargumentovane studije koje nekad mogu i da budu ne dva suprotna MI[LJENJA (kojaobjavljujemo u posebnoj rubrici "kratki komentari") ve} dva suprotna argumentovanaZAKLJUÎVANJA. Premise na osnovu kojih se zaklju~uje moraju zadovoljiti kriterijumerelevantnosti, prihvatljivosti, biti dovoljno osnovane za zaklju~ivanje, a zaklju~ivanje morada poseduje elemente za uspe{nu odbranu od suprotnih tvrdnji.

3. KOMENTARI.i) KRATKI KOMENTARI. To su kra}i komentari, napisani od strane urednika,

ure|iva~kog saveta, ili izuzetno, ~italaca. Odnose se na va`nije ~lanke u datom "Dijalogu"ili na momentalno aktuelne probleme. Po{to autor izraàva svoje MI[LJENJE, strukturaje slobodna, novinarska, mada je poèljno da tekst ima izvesne elemente ZAKLJUÎVANJA(videti opis originalnih ~lanaka, kao i niè "Posebne napomene"). Literatura, ako je citirana,data je u tekstu. Duìna teksta je prose~no 1 strana "Dijaloga".

ii) KOMENTARI ÎTALACA. To su komentari (1 do 2 strane "Dijaloga" pokomentaru), koji imaju strukturu ~lanaka, ali ne produbljuju}i suvise predmet o kojem seradi. Rezime nije potreban, mada je citiranje literature poèljno.


iii) ANALIZE I DUZI KOMENTARI. Komentari{u najnovija dostignu}a uizvesnoj oblasti. Poèljno je da ne budu duì od pet stranica "Dijaloga". Struktura kaostruktura ^LANAKA.

4. AKTUELNOSTI.. Prikazi, bez dublje analize, povodom kulturnih i nau~nihdogadjaja (1 strana po prikazu). Prikazi novih knjiga koje ne spadaju striktno u literaturu(1 strana po knjizi).

5. LITERATURA I UMETNOST. Proza i Poezija. Originalna neobjavljenaknjizevna ostvarenja. Maksimalno ukupno 10 strana "Dijaloga". Izuzetno bi}e omogu}enoobjavljivanje duìh priloga ili ODLOMAKA knjiga u nastavcima. Knjièvna i umetni~kakritika. Obuhva}ene su sve umetnosti. ̂ lanci 3 do 5 strana "Dijaloga" Likovna kritika.3-5 strana. Likovni prilozi. Kratki prikazi Prikazi novih knjiga koje spadaju u literaturuu {irem smislu (1/2 do 1 strane "Dijaloga" po prikazanoj knjizi).

6. DOGA\AJI.. Kalendar kulturnih i nau~nih dogadjaja.7. OGLASI. Spiskovi i cenovnici novih knjiga. Reklame i oglasi.

Posebne napomeneMada se bavi svim temama od op{teg zna~aja, ~asopis }e

pokazivati malo ve}i interes za teme koje se ti~u Evrope i Balkana.^lanci bi trbalo da imaju prete`no formu argumentovanih zaklju~ivanja.Mi{ljenja, li~na uverenja, neargumentovai stavovi nisu tipi~ni za"Dijalog" i autorima savetujemo da izbegavaju takve forme. Mi{ljenja,stavovi, deklaracije, izlivi psiholo{kih stanja, i sve neargumentovanetvrdnje, ili suvi{e op{te - te nepogodne za dokazivanje, ili konkretne -ali nepoduprte dokazima, ostavljaju malo ili ne ostavljaju uop{teprostora za dijalog. Op{te prihva}ene ~injenice nije potrebno posebnodokazivati sem kad se radi o specijalnim znanjima. Nasuprot, sve novetvrdnje moraju biti poduprte argumentima. Kori{}eni argumenti mogubiti druge op{te prihva}ene ~injenice, ali i nove ~injenice koje, ako nepredstavljaju direktna iskustva, moraju biti poduprte argumentima.

[ta su "op{te" prihva}ene ~injenice nije uvek jednostavno odrediti.Snaga rezonovanja na kojima te ~injenice po~ivaju ~ini ih "op{te"prihva}enim. Broj ljudi koji ih prihvata nije sam po sebi kriterijum.êsto samo ponavljanje nekih "~injenica" (u {iroko uticajnim medijima)ostavlja laàn utisak da su one "op{te" prihva}ene. U tom smislu o snazirezonovanja moè se suditi samo ako se prikaè ceo tok rezonovanja tj.ako tvrdnja bude pra}ena kompletnim dokazivanjem - ako ima dijalo{kuformu. Dijalo{ka forma je tipi~na forma u kojoj dolazi do merenjaargumenata, upore|ivanja, proveravanja i najzad zaklju~ivanja o tomekoje je rezonovanje bolje.

Pisani tekst, u odsustvu direktnog sagovornika, rekonstrui{e tu"dinamiku" dijaloga unapred eksponiraju}i celo rezonovanje i timeeksponira najja~e ali i najslabije delove rezonovanja, omogu}avaju}imerenje argumenata od strane ~itaoca. Kompletano argumentovanozaklju~ivanje omogu}uje ~itaocu potpunu rekonstrukciju saznajnogprocesa autora. Snaga dokaza ne leì u koli~ini dokaza (recimo citiranjudugih listi kori{}ene literature), ve} u njihovoj snazi kao primenjenogrezonovanja tako|e sa~injenog od sna`ne argumentacije. Ima tekstovakoji sadrè kompletne argumentacije te tu nije potrebna dodatna listadokaza, izvora tj. literature. Premise na osnovu kojih se zaklju~ujemoraju zadovoljiti kriterijume relevantnosti, prihvatljivosti, biti


dovoljno osnovane za zaklju~ivanje, a zaklju~ivanje mora da posedujeelemente za uspe{nu odbranu od suprotnih tvrdnji. Sama ~injenica daje jedna tvrdnja snabdevena eksplicitno svim elementima koji su dovelido njenog nastajanja otkriva potencijalne slabe ta~ke argumenata te~italac moè da proveri sam argument ne bi li verifikovao njegovuvalidnost i uporedio sa eventualnim li~no razvijenim argumentom.

Sadràj i formma teksta su jedini faktori koji se procenjujuprilikom odlu~ivanju o objavljivanju. Li~nost autora, autoritet ireputacija, u pozitivnom ili negativnom smislu, nisu uzeti u obzirprilikom dono{enja odluke o prihvatanju ili odbijanju teksta za {tampu.Svi tekstovi podleù najmanje dvema recenzijama. Preporu~ujemoautorima, bez obzira na njihov eventualni autoritet za oblast kojom sebavi njihov tekst, da u idealnom slu~aju prihvate, ili odgovoreargumentovano na SVE primedbe recenzenata. Ignorisanje primedbirecenzenta moè da dovede do definitivnog odbijanja teksta, ili, ako seradi o solitarnim primedbama, tekst bude objavljen ali pra}enkomentarom urednika koji bi ukratko izraàvao mi{ljenja stru~nihrecenzenata. Takodje, ~ak i u retkim slu~ajevima kad autor striktnopo{tuje "uputstva autorima", trebalo bi o~ekivati ponovljene kontaktesa urednikom i, gotovo redovno, zna~ajne izmene i dopune tekstova.

Objavljivanje autorskih tekstova u "Dijalogu" primarno ostvarujeveoma va`nu informativnu funkciju ~asopisa i nema, samo po sebi,karakter odavanja priznanja autoru za njegov, veoma ~esto, zna~ajanistraìva~ki i nau~ni rad.

Prilozi se redovno ne honori{u sem posebno naru~enih tekstova,~ije je honorisanje predmet posebnog dogovora.Tro{kovi {tampe,ukoliko zahtevi ne prevazilaze redovnu formu lista, se ne napla}uju.Ako prilozi zahtevaju posebne {tamparske usluge (preduga~ak tekstkoji zahteva pove}anje broja strana broja, posebne sveske, prilozi uboji, posebni grafi~ki prikazi), ukoliko odobreni od uredni{tva,napla}uju se po specijalnoj ekonomskoj tarifi.


~asopisi, knjige, nova izdanja

SVEDOÂNSTVA O PRO[LOSTI

Dimitrije \or|evi}, Portreti iz novije srpske istorije,Bigz, Beograd 1997.

Dimitrije Djordjevi} je, besumnje, jedan od najve~ihsrpskih istori~ara u XX veku, pisac ~uvenih istorijskihstudija o poku{aju Srbije da 1912 dobije izlaz na more, ocarinskom ratu s Austro-Ugarskom, o balkanskimrevolucijama i pisac mnogih priloga koji su, sabrani urazne knjige, dobar pokazatelj njegovih {irokih ipouzdanih znanja. Malo je poznato, takodje, da jeDimitrije Djordjevi} i pisac jedne istorije moderne Srbije,koja je objavljena samo na gr~kom jeziku. Dugogodi{njiprofesor istorije na Kalifornijskom univerzitetu u SantaBarbari, Dimitrije Djordjevi} je, na vrhuncu karijere,izabran za ~lana Srpske akademije nauke i umetnosti.Posebno vredne u njegovom bogatom i razgranatom opususu dve knjige se}anja “Oìljci i opomene” u kojima je,perom rasnog memoariste, opisao najva`nije dogadjajeiz svoje mladosti, obeleène borbom u redovimaJugoslovenske vojske u otad`bini. Pisani bez mr`nje ipristrasnmosti, memoari Dimitrija Djordjevi}a su, s mnogorazloga, odmah uvr{teni ne samo u red naj~itanijih knjigau Srbiji, nego i u najbolja dela na{e posleratne memoarskeproze. U skra}enom obliku, memoari su, nedavno,objavljeni i na engleskom jeziku u SAD, pod naslovom“Scars and Memoirs”.

Biografija je ‘anr koji u na{oj istoriografiji imasjajnu tradiciju. Portreti Slobodana Jovanovi}a uposthumno objavljenoj knjizi “Moji savremenici”, kao injegovi monumentalni spisi o vladavini poslednjihObrenovi}a, uzorni su primeri kako biografski metodmo‘e biti zahvalan u portretisanju ~itave jedne epohe. S


naro~itim uspehom biografije istorijskih li~nosti novijegdoba pisali su, jo{ i Dragoslav Stranjakovi}, JovanMili}evi}, Dragoljub @ivojinovi} kao i mnogi drugi piscina{e istorije, uklju~iv i strane autore, poput DejvidaMekenzija i Gejla Stouksa. Portreti koje u svojojnajnovijoj knjizi donosi Dimitrije \or|evi}, ulaze u redonih knjiga koje sladokusci neprestano i{~itavaju, aradoznali ~itaoci posredstvom njih otkrivaju danas jednuzaboravljenu etapu u burnom razvoju moderne Srbije.

Sredi{nje mesto u knjizi zauzima biografijaMilovana Milovanovi}a, pariskog doktora prava, piscaliberalnog Ustava od 1888, teoreti~ara parlamentarizma,radikalskog prvaka i ministra, arhitekte Balkanskogsaveza iz 1912. Napisana jo{ davne 1958, biografijaMilovanovi}eva bila je, u to ideolo{kim ograni~enjimaobele‘eno vreme, ona dragocena spona sa istorijskimmetodom i literarnim stilom koji je u srpskoj istoriografijiuspostavio Slobodan Jovanovi}. Malo je primera u na{ojistoriografiji druge polovine XIXI veka, da je portretjednog politi~ara dat u izvanrednom spoju nau~ne akribijei knji‘evne sposobnosti da se re~ljefno ocrta njegovkarakter. \or|evi} je pi{u}i Milovanovi}ev ‘ivotopis,sav sazdan od preokreta i isku{enja, gde su se privatni‘ivot i dr‘avni poslovi pro‘imali bez ostatka, reljefnoprikazao njegove afinitete prema Zapadu, izrazitusklonost ka ugodnom ‘ivotu i bogatu ma{tu koja pletepoliti~ke kombinacije uvek kada one daju izvesnogizgleda za uspeh. Nimalo doktrinaran u sklapanjupoliti~kih kompromisa, Milovanovi} je bio podjednakouspe{an kao ustavopisac, teoreti~ar nacionalne politikeili pragmati~an ministar spoljnih poslova, Milovanovi}je, zaista, bio najizrazitiji izdanak onih nara{taja koji su,{kolovani prete‘no u Francuskoj, u Srbiju preneliideologiju liberalnog nacionalizma, na~ela francuskogradikalizma, britanske obrasce parlamentarizma i, uop{te,kulturne standarde civilizovane Evrope.

\or|evi} je sjajno zapazio da se Milovanovi} bionajslabiji kao politi~ar: kao “gospodsko dete”on se, ipak,“nije moga potpuno sna}i u lavirintu doma}e politike...kaove}ina intelektualaca, te{ko je razbijao prepreku koja ga


je delila od }udi njegovog reda i nikad nije imao prisnogkontakta s na{om selja~ko-trgova~kom skup{tinom...”Najuspe{niji, Milovanovi} je bio kao diplomata:“Klemanso je rekao 1909 da ne poznaje evropskogdràvnika njegova kalibra. Ambasadori sila otimali su seo njegovo prijateljstvo i pa`ljivo slu{ali njegova izlaganja.Njegov makijavelizam, koji je podbacio u doma}oj praksi,dobio je u diplomatiji svoju punu vrednost; on se kretaou svetu evropske diplomatije slobodno i neusiljeno, kaoda je za njega ro|en.”

Uz obimnu Milovanovi}evu biografiju, kojazauzima polovinu knjige portreta, Dimitrije \or|evi} jeprilo‘io kra}e biografije niza istaknutih li~nosti koje su,svaka u svom vremenu, obele‘ile istoriju Srbije: Radi seo portretima pisanim za stranu publiku, preciznim i li{enimsuvi{nih detalja, sa dubinskom analizom njihovogukupnog istorijskog doma{aja. Me|u njima, posebnupa‘nju zaslu‘uju biografije vojvode Putnika, VukaKarad‘i}a, Slobodana Jovanovi}a i Stojana Novakovi}a,ali i prve biografske skice va‘nih delatnika istorije kakvisu bili radikalski prvak Andra Nikoli}, diplomata ipoliti~ir Jovan M. Jovanovi}, poznatiji pod nadimkom“Pi‘on” ili Ljuba Davidovi}, prvi predsednikDemokratske stranke. Posebnu vrednost knjige ~iniuporedni portret dva Jovanovi}a, oca i sina, Vladimira iSlobodana, koji u preseku daje ne samo profile ~elnihljudi srpske kulturne i politi~ke elite, nego u sebi sa‘imai glavne etape razvoja politi~ke misli u Srbiji.

Sudbina najistaknutijeg liberalskog ideologa,Vladimira Jovanovi}a, i njegovog sina Slobodana, prvogSrbina koji je poneo to ime - u ime na~ela o slobodi kojaje ispovedao njegov otac - obuhvata razdoblje od sredineXIX do sredine XX veka, u kojem su i otac i sin svetionicislobode i mudrosti u jednoj maloj balkanskoj zemlji kojase tek oslobadja orijentalnog nasledja i ulazi u porodicurazvijenih, kako se onda govorilo, civilizovanih evropskihdr‘ava. Posebnu vrednost knjizi daje portret jednog unizu mnogih stradalnika iz redova srpskog sve{tenstva,prote Bo‘idara Luki}a, ~iju li~nu dramu u ‘rvnjunemilosrdne komunisti~ke “revolucije” \or|evi}


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U dvobroju 2/3 1996 pi{u:Milovan Danojli}, DraginjaUro{evi}, Vasa Pavkovi},Mihajlo Panti}, MilanDjordjevi}, Milenko Paji},@ivorad Nedeljkovi}, VladimirJagli~i}, Sne‘ana Jakovljevi},Sa{a Radoj~i}, BorislavRadovi}, Teofil Gotje, MarioLuci, Ronald Harvud, Mi{elTurnije, Piter Akrojd, TamikiHara, Miroslav Egeri} . . .

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Novine Matice hrvatskeza knji‘evnost, umjetnost iznanost. Izlaze dvotjedno,cijena 6.00 kn. Uredni{tvo:Ulica Matice hrvatske 2, 10000Zagreb, Tel 385 (0)1 275 117.U broju 93-94 (31 srpnja 1997)pi{u i govore: Juri~i}, Gall,Radja, O‘egovi}, Matu{i},êgec, Kalini}, [tajduhar,Beck, [vab, Bratuli}, Jareb,[porer, Donat, [pani~ek,Lasi}, Mandi}, Bo{njak, Juri},Moja{, Vukov-Coli}, Govedi},Kurelac, Luki}, Peri~i},Katalini}, Davidovi}, Posari},Movre, Hundi}, Attenborough,Gili}, Berkovi}, Lovrenovi},[tiks, [impraga, Ramadan,Veli~kovi}, Kebo, Zaimovi},Pecoti}, Vojkovi}, Plei},Djordjevi}, Mudrov~i},Pinterovi}, Crnkovi},Mer{injak, Violi}.

Na prvoj strani, sjajniuvodnik Borisa Marune udana{nju Hrvatsku - Raj nazemlji . Na zadnjoj, kratkiizvodnik Bo‘idara Violi}a,direktno iz Raja.

rasklapa ne samo kao istori~ar nego i kao najbli‘isvedok. Knjiga portreta Dimitrija Djordjevi}a, odi{ejednostavno{}u izraza i lako}om ioslikavanja dogadjajhai likova koju mogu da dostignu samo retki znalci iprovereni majstori istorijske analize. Dobar psiholog isuveren u tuma~enju istorijskih meandara, DimitrijeDjordjevi} je ovom zbirkom istorijskih portreta, jo{jednom potvrdio da je ne samo vrhunski istori~ar nego italentovan pisac.

Du{an T. Batakovi}


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