2012 Extended Deterence in East Asia

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EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND

SECURITY IN EASTASIA

AU.S.-JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA DIALOGUE

Paul J. Saunders

January 2012


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CENTER FOR THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The Center for the National Interest is a non-partisan public policy institutionestablished by former President Richard Nixon shortly before his death in1994. Its current programs focus on American national security, energy

security and climate change, Irans nuclear program, maritime security, andU.S. relations with China, Japan, Mexico, and Russia. The Center also

publishes the bimonthly foreign affairs magazine The National Interest. TheCenter is supported by foundation, corporate and individual donors as well asby an endowment.

Copyright 2012 Center for the National Interest. All Rights Reserved.Extended Deterrence and Security in East Asia: A U.S.-Japan-South Korea

DialogueBy Paul J. SaundersCenter for the National Interest1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1250

Washington, DC 20036Phone: (202) 887-1000Fax: (202) 887-5222E-mail: [email protected]

www.cftni.org


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FOREWORD

Following the North Korean sinking of the South Korean frigateCheonan, and North Koreas subsequent shelling of Yeonpyeong Island,the Center for the National Interest proposed a U.S.-Japan-South Koreadialogue on extended deterrence in East Asia to assess whether andhow the three countries could work together to strengthen stability in aregion of vital importance to Americas security and prosperityand, ofcourse, to the security and prosperity of its close allies. Shortly beforethe project began, the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel with a

Japanese coast guard ship near the Senkaku Islands led to a significantpolitical confrontation between Tokyo and Beijing.

These incidents appear in many respects to have reinforced andcrystallized Japanese and South Korean security concernsand to havecontributed to changes in policy. One important goal of this project isto compare American, Japanese, and South Korean perspectives onChinese and North Korean conduct, including its sources andobjectives, and to evaluate policy options.

The project will ultimately include four expert dialogue meetings, two inWashington and two in Tokyo. This report highlights key findings from

the first two sessions and is intended primarily to address U.S., Japanese, and South Korean perceptions of regional challenges. Asecond report will provide policy recommendations in 2013.

The Center for the National Interest organized the dialogue meetingsjointly with the Tokyo Foundation and the U.S.-Korea Institute at the

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies;the first session took place in Washington in February 2011 and thesecond in Tokyo in October 2011. The Japan Foundations Center for

Global Partnership provided essential financial support for the effort.


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I am deeply grateful to Tsuneo Watanabe and Shoichi Katayama at theTokyo Foundation and to Jae Ku at the U.S.-Korea Institute for theircollaboration in the dialogue meetings. I would also like to thank

everyone who participated in the meetings and especially those whotraveled east or west across the Pacific Ocean to do so. Finally, Iappreciate the organizational efforts and formatting, proofreading, andproduction assistance of my colleagues Erin Robinson and KathrynHartzell as well as the research and note-taking help provided byNicholas Myers, Katherine Zimmerman, Katherine Zylinski, and Daniel

Vajdic. Greg Dlaziel produced a transcript of the Tokyo session. Ofcourse, I alone am responsible for the content of the report.

Paul J. Saunders


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INTRODUCTION

In view of their centrality to the Cold War U.S.-Soviet relationship,deterrence and extended deterrence are inevitably loaded terms,

weighted down by history. With this in mind, applying the logic ofextended deterrence in modern-day East Asia requires special care toavoid some of its assumptions; it should be clear, for example, thatChina is not the Soviet Union and that Americas relationship withtwenty-first-century China is fundamentally different from itsrelationship with the U.S.S.R. Despite this, however, close scrutiny ofthe Cold War experience may provide useful lessonsincluding in thedifferences between todays world and the past. Notwithstanding thosedifferences, extended deterrence remains a useful analytical framework

in assessing security and stability in East Asia and a helpful language inconversations between the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

Deterrence generally refers to the ability to discourage an attack throughthe threat of retaliation, while extended deterrence describes deterrenceon behalf of a third party, typically an ally. During the Cold War,analysts often defined deterrence and extended deterrence largely oreven strictly in nuclear terms; for example, John Lewis Gaddis describedextended deterrence as the threat of a nuclear-strategic response in

case of a nuclear attack on the territory or troops of allies.1

As thedanger of strategic nuclear war has receded since the Soviet Unionscollapse, many definitions of deterrence and extended deterrence have

widened to include conventional military threats. Taking into accountthat political and economic considerations also substantially shapetwenty-first-century decision making on war and peace, it may now beappropriate to view deterrence in an even broader context.

1 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar AmericanNational Security(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).


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Closely related to extended deterrence is assurance, the ability toencourage the third party that deterrence on that nations behalf is infact effective and reliable. The distinction between extended deterrence

and assurance is a critical one since each is fundamentally psychologicaland subjective. Thus the United States could succeed in deterring apotential adversary yet fail in assuring an ally or, conversely, succeed inassurance but fail in deterrence. U.S. officials might believe thatdeterrence and assurance are succeeding when its rivals or partners donot. Like beauty, successful deterrence and assurance lie in the eye ofthe beholder.

Discussion during the two dialogue meetings repeatedly demonstratedthe critical importance of understanding the psychological aspects of

deterrence. One South Korean participant stated this simply, sayingthat successful deterrence rests on attacking the mind rather than thebody. Recognizing that deterrence succeeds or fails in the minds ofthose whom one seeks to deter, participants asked frequently whetherthe United States and its allies are creating the proper incentives andhow these incentives are understood. In other words, are ourdeterrence efforts credible and are they evaluated through rational andpragmatic decision-making processes? Each question proved to be asource of concern for some.

Equally fundamentally, participants considered many importantquestions about the goals of deterrence and extended deterrence in East

Asia. Whom do the United States and its allies seek to deter? What arethe limits of deterrence? Is deterrence strictly a military security conceptor does the logic of deterrence apply in other areas as well? Is theresuch a thing as too much deterrence? The answers can profoundlyshape U.S. policy in a critical region.


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COLDWARDETERRENCE ANDEXTENDED DETERRENCE

The differences between the environment in twenty-first-century EastAsia and the Cold War experience are deep and wide-ranging. As notedabove, one fundamental difference upon which participants generallyagreed is that between China and the Soviet Union. An Americanparticipant argued that China does not pose a global or regional militarythreat in the way that the U.S.S.R. did during the Cold War.Conversely, Chinas power in the international economy is considerablygreater than Soviet Russias and the United States and China areeconomically interdependent to a degree unimaginable in the U.S.-

Soviet relationship. And notwithstanding Chinas rise, one U.S. speakersaid, it is not the central organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy inthe way that the Soviet Union was.

There are also many structural differences. As one Japanese participantpointed out, East Asias geography is quite different from Europes,

which was the primary focus of Cold War extended deterrence. Theessential character of the Asian theater is naval, this speaker said, andbecause of this there is no fear of armed invasion in Japan (though this

remains a concern for South Korea). Distances are also much greater inAsia. One American speaker noted that a conflict between China andIndia in the Himalayas would not necessarily involve other nations.Europes geography made neutrality difficult in ways that Asias doesnot.

At the international level, participants focused on alliance structure andthe role of nuclear weapons. A Japanese speaker noted that while Cold

War Europe relied upon U.S. extended deterrence through a multilateralallianceNATOAmericas alliances in East Asia are bilateral. Still,like NATO, the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are eachderivative of Cold War competition and conflict and as a result must be


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Extended Deterrence and Security in East Asia

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redefined to suit new challenges. While acknowledging that China is amajor component in these new definitions, one American participantargued that U.S.-China competition is unlike past U.S.-Soviet

competition in that Chinas rise is taking place within a more clearlydefined strategic environment.

The role of nuclear weapons in East Asia also has important historicalroots. Several Japanese participants pointed to their countrysrenunciation of nuclear weapons because of its unique experience as a

victim of the atomic bomb, though one speaker acknowledged that Tokyo had in fact secretly permitted American naval vessels to bringnuclear weapons into Japanese waters. Another Japanese speakerpointed out that South Korea hosted hundreds of U.S. nuclear weapons

during the Cold War (though Washington removed them in 1991).South Korea also considered and ultimately abandoned its own nuclearprogram. Two of the worlds five nuclear weapons states under theNon-Proliferation Treaty are in Europe and the United States continuesto deploy nuclear weapons there as well.

Global norms regarding nuclear weapons also appear to have changedin the decades since the height of the Cold War, though the extent andconsequences of these changes remain unclear. Nevertheless, one

American participant suggested, it is possible to imagine situations in which domestic political pressures could effectively block the use ofnuclear weapons in retaliation.

Notwithstanding these differences, the Cold War experience doesprovide some lessons in thinking about security and stability in East

Asia. Concern over assertive Chinese and North Korean conduct hasprompted growing interest in deterrence and extended deterrence,

which many in the United States and allied nations view as having been

a key component in their victory in the Cold War. Yet perhaps as aresult of the Cold Wars satisfactory outcome, few seem to recall themany serious tests America and its allies confronted before the SovietUnions collapse.

The table below presents a rough hierarchy of Soviet behaviors andillustrative examples. It demonstrates quite clearly that despite thesuccess of deterrence and extended deterrence in preventing a nuclear

war, the U.S.S.R. retained considerable scope for destabilizing and eventhreatening conduct.


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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COLD WAR

Soviet Behavior Examples

Use of nuclear weapons N/ALarge-scale war in Europe N/A

Other large-scale war Afghanistan

Proxy war Vietnam, Arab-Israeli wars

Other use of force Interventions in East Germany,Hungary and Czechoslovakia;shooting down Korean AirlinesFlight 007

Support for revolutions and

terrorism

Arms/training to guerrillas and

terrorists in Europe, Middle East,Latin America, Africa

Other hostile conduct Deployed missiles in Cuba

Economic leverage Use of energy, low-interest loansto recruit/retain allies

Provocative statements Numerous

Americas fundamental problem in confronting the Soviet Union wasthat Washington could deter only certain behavior. Deterrence and

extended deterrence rely upon the threat of escalation to all-out war,including possibly nuclear war. The United States could not crediblythreaten nuclear war in circumstances when vital American interestsincluding the survival of U.S. allieswere not at stake. Conversely,

when Soviet leaders recognized that America saw dangers to its vitalinterests and was prepared to actas in the cases of U.S. extendeddeterrence in Europe and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, whichposed an existential threat to Israelextended deterrence worked.However, the United States could not reliably deter Soviet actions that

did not rise to this level and thus often faced such behavior. ThoughU.S. officials consistently sought to develop policies to solve thisproblem, such as the doctrine of flexible response, America was neverfully able to prevent provocative, destabilizing, or threatening Sovietactions.

In modern-day East Asia, this suggests that despite the concerns of itsallies and partners, and other governments in the region, the UnitedStates cannot reliably prevent many troubling behaviors through Cold

War-style extended deterrence that did not in fact accomplish this aimduring the Cold War. With this in mind, the first step towardstrengthening security and stability in East Asia is to assess potential


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threats and the tools available to manage them. While American, Japanese, and South Korean participants had differing perspectives inmany specific respects, most if not all saw China and North Korea as

their leading challenges.


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CHINA

Broadly speaking, American, Japanese and South Korean participants inthe dialogue meetings expressed considerable concerns about Chinaspower and ambitions in East Asia, tempered with a sense of thecountrys internal difficulties. Perspectives varied regarding Chinasmotives and goals; participants language in describing China and itsconduct ranged across a spectrum including win-win diplomacy,testing or probing, assertive, creeping expansionist, andrevisionist. Some saw Beijing as an unprecedented problem for theUnited States, which has not previously managed a similar challenge toits international or regional leadership.

Participants generally agreed that many other governments in Asiaappeared concerned about Chinas rise but did not see evidence ofefforts to accommodate Beijing. On the contrary, one American said,most governments in East and Southeast Asia are independent-mindedand this will constrain Chinas ability to increase its regionalinfluence, particularly because many continue to look to Washington asa guarantor of stability. Another American pointed out that Russia alsoseems troubled by Chinas increasing wealth and power; Moscowsdetermination to retain large stocks of tactical nuclear weapons appears

to be driven by this rather than by fear of NATO or the United States.

U.S. and Japanese participants were most troubled by Chinas growingmilitary spending and capabilities. One Japanese speaker noted that ifthe United States reduces its defense spending as a share of Americasgross domestic product, Chinas defense budget could exceed the U.S.defense budget in the 2030s. Another Japanese participant pointed outthat Chinas military budget is already twice Japansand could be fourtimes the size of Japans in ten years. (This of course relies upon a

variety of assumptions, including how Chinas budget is counted,Chinas overall economic growth, and the priority that Chinas leaders


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assign to military spending over time.) Despite this, a substantial shareof Chinas current spending is directed to modernizing a distinctly un-modern military establishment, something that clearly increases Beijings

capabilities but is not inherently threatening.

In discussing Chinas military, U.S. and Japanese participants appearedoverwhelmingly to focus on Beijings pursuit of anti-access/area denialcapabilities, also known as A2AD. One American participant arguedthat Chinas A2AD systems pose a growing danger to U.S. militarybases in East Asia, which are increasingly sitting ducks that could berendered unusable in the first hours of a war. This would not onlyput the U.S. and its allies at a disadvantage in responding to an attack,this speaker continued, but also deliver an extreme psychological

blow to America. While this participant was confident that the U.S.and Japan could deter a Chinese attack on the bases in a peacetimeenvironment, it could be another matter entirely during a crisis. IfChina were to target U.S. bases, this speaker continued, Beijing couldlimit American forces freedom of movement and even cut Japanoff from its ally.

Moving forward, the American participant continued, this dilemmacould press U.S. military and political leaders to reconsider the logic

behind some U.S. bases. While Americas presence in South Korea ismore explicitly a tripwiredesigned less to fight than to deter anattack by making clear that Washington would be immediately involvedin any large-scale aggression against South Koreathe speaker assertedthat its bases elsewhere (including Japan) have a central war-fightingrole. U.S. and Japanese participants both noted that this situation couldencourage the United States to consider a strategy of offshorebalancing by reducing its military presence in the region and insteadsignaling its determination to intervene decisively (if needed) from more

distant bases. However, while this approach may be strategically sound,it could also fuel substantial new anxiety among some U.S. allies aboutthe depth of Americas commitment to their defense in a crisis.

Many participants saw Chinas capabilities as more threatening becauseof Beijings conduct. Several Japanese speakers referred to the 2010Senkaku Islands dispute as key driver of changing attitudes towardChina in their country; some saw Beijings escalation of the crisis after aJapanese Coast Guard vessel arrested the captain of a Chinese fishingtrawler in Japanese waters as especially troubling. One Japanese

participant pointed to the absence of a crisis management systemincluding lines of communication to the Peoples Liberation Army


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(PLA), the PLA Navy, and Chinas civilian maritime agenciesas anexacerbating factor. A Japanese speaker noted that the civilian agenciesin particular often create crises.

South Korean participants did not see similar threats to their countryssecurity emanating from China. Instead, one South Korean speakersaid, South Koreans find Beijings tacit support for North Korea and itsprovocative behavior to be increasingly troubling. Thus Chinas refusalto condemn Pyongyangs sinking of the South Korean navy frigateCheonan or its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island has led many SouthKoreans to reassess their views of China, this participant said. Chinasdecision to side with North Korea has had a disproportionate impacton younger South Koreans who had no significant negative experiences

beforehand with Beijing, one South Korean speaker explained.

U.S., Japanese, and South Korean participants described concern aboutnot only potential security threats, but also economic and politicalpressure. A South Korean participant captured this sentiment in statingthat it is critical for regional security to maintain continued separationbetween economic and political interests and that Chinas conduct hasled to new questions about whether Beijing may be weaponizing itseconomic interests. Chinas reaction to the Senkaku incident

including apparent economic retaliation against Japanwas seen as adisturbing indicator in this context.

Two Japanese speakers were concerned about cyber-security as well; it isvery difficult to deter cyber attacks, they argued, and Japan, the UnitedStates, and South Korea should considerably intensify their discussionsof this as well as how to respond. Shortly following the second dialoguemeeting, U.S. intelligence officials publicly identified China as theleading international source of cyber-espionage directed as American

government agencies, companies, and universities in a report toCongress.2

A Japanese participant similarly drew attention to Chinas legal warfare in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The speakerargued that Chinas legal claims are a form of probing behavior toassess how strongly other states will defend their territories or disputedregions. A second Japanese speaker described Chinas economic,political and legal moves, including minor maritime disputes, as

2 Ellen Nakashima, In a world of cyber theft, U.S. names China, Russia as mainculprits, The Washington Post, November 3, 2011.


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asymmetric strategies to pursue its interests without directly confrontingthe United States.

Japanese participants appeared to find Chinas moves especiallyfrustrating because they are difficult to deter. One Japanese speakeracknowledged that it seems like we cannot deter everything in dealing

with China and North Korea. While the U.S. role is to respond tohigh-intensity crises, the speaker said, East Asia is primarilyexperiencing harassment or low-intensity incidents, to which

America does not and perhaps cannot play a major part in responding.However, this speaker continued, the publics in Japan and perhaps inSouth Korea might expect the United States to be involved even in thelow-intensity scenarios. The clear implication of this is that if America

does not intervene in some manner, it may weaken the sense ofassurance among the Japanese and South Korean people.

Others drew different conclusions, however. For example, another Japanese speaker admitted that a situation in which the United Statessuccessfully deters nuclear war or the invasion of Japanbut Japan isresponsible for everything elsemight be a happier world but wouldalso create problems for Tokyo, which could be continuouslyresponding to low-intensity provocations. The proper solution to this is

not Japans acceptance and management of the problem, this participantcontinued, but rather a streamlined escalation ladder that threatensmajor retaliation to deter such actions. Yet this raises its own questions,the speaker said, because Japan cannot now be sure about Americasresponse in these situations. This requires further discussion at not onlythe political level, but also at the levels of strategies and budgets. Thespeaker argued that exchanges between the two governments in thisarea have thus far been insufficient.

Economic Deterrence

An American participant asserted that the United States and its alliesshould also consider economic deterrence as an aspect of theirrelations with China. Many argue that economic interdependencethrough globalization can prevent conflict by creating strong economicdisincentives for military action. In that context, this participant asked

whether deeper economic integration among America, Japan, and SouthKorea could be understood as creating a virtual economic tripwirethat might deter some behaviors by raising the prospect that economic

pressure on Tokyo or Seoul could provoke economic or politicalretaliation by Washingtona form of economic extended deterrence.


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The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement could provide a significantcontribution in this regard; likewise, success in negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreementespecially with Japans participation

could have strategic as well as economic benefits. Conversely, Japaneseand South Korean participants worried that Americas economic ties toChina might deter Washington in a serious crisis.

Still, to the extent that the logic of extended deterrence can be appliedto economic relationshipswhich is uncertaincredibility remains acomplex and significant challenge. Though it would not produceimmediate casualties remotely approaching those of a nuclear exchange,a full-blown trade war between the United States and China couldbecome the functional equivalent of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war, with

potentially dire consequences for all involved that would likely have aglobal impact. Washington and Beijing could thus be said to exist in astate of shared economic vulnerability akin to nuclear Mutual AssuredDestruction. Yet, as in the U.S.-Soviet experience, taking the view thatthis is an apocalyptic danger is likely simultaneously to enhanceextended deterrence vis--vis existential threats and to weaken it indealing with lesser challenges; not unlike a senior Chinese generalsreported 1990s comment that the United States would not sacrifice Los

Angeles to attack in order to defend Taiwan, todays Chinese leaders

might not believe that Washington would risk severe economic pain toaid an ally under pressure.

Within this frame, the argument that China would not be prepared topursue an economic confrontation with the United States because of itsrelatively greater dependence on the U.S.-China economic relationshipin some respects echoes Cold War-era discussions of whether theUnited States could fight and win a nuclear war. From this perspective,if the United States has convincing escalation dominance (the ability to

prevail by escalating a conflict) in trade and economic disputes,Washington is in a position to settle differences more or less on its ownterms. One leading U.S. presidential candidate has publicly adopted thisposition.3 However, this logic ultimately confronts an inherent dilemmarevealed during the Cold War, in that reducing ones assessment of thedamage from a full-scale conflictwhich is necessary to consideringones own side the winnermay actually make conflict more likely byreducing its costs, particularly if each side considers the other to be themore vulnerable party.

3 Mitt Romney, China must respect the free-trade system, The Washington Post,October 13, 2011.


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As a matter of history, the fact that the Nixon and Reaganadministrations considered options for limited nuclear war and

prolonged nuclear war (also presumed to be limited in scope) did notultimately produce a nuclear conflict. However, there are two keydifferences between nuclear war and trade war that could makeeconomic conflict more probable in relative terms. First, thedestructive effects of a trade war are typically distributed across a longerperiod; a nuclear warhead inflicts its greatest damage at the moment ofdetonation (though radiation effects will appear later), while an embargoor tariff has continuing impact that may even grow over time aseconomic actors adjust their expectations. Second, the horrifyingconsequences of a nuclear war are basically predictable according to the

laws of physics, while the actual results of a U.S.-China trade war aresurely negative but still sufficiently uncertain to permit debate.4 Both ofthese factors could make deterrence weaker in the economic spherethan it is in the security sphere.

Chinas Internal Problems

Notwithstanding concern about Chinas capabilities and conduct, manyparticipants in the dialogue cited Chinas internal challenges as a

significant constraint on Beijing and its potential ambitions. Forexample, one Japanese participant asserted that Chinas agingpopulation and the rising costs of retirement benefits and health care asa long-term drag on the countrys economy that could force Beijing tomake hard choices in ten to fifteen yearsand might also prevent thecountry from maintaining its past rapid growth. This speaker alsosuggested that China faces shorter-term risks from an economic bubbleand from social inequality. An American participant noted Chinascontinuing corruption and weak rule of law. Nevertheless, noting

Chinas economic interdependence with the United States as well as Japan, South Korea, and other Asian nations, a South Koreanparticipant stated that Chinas neighbors depend upon the countryseconomic success and that the consequences of Chinas economicfailure could be as dangerous as Beijings success-driven assertiveness.

4 Statistically speaking, however, economists have observed increases in mortality dueto job loss, which is in turn a likely consequence for many during a major trade

conflict. See, for example, Daniel Sullivan and Till von Wachter, Job Displacementand Mortality Data: An Analysis Using Administrative Data,Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 2009.


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A South Korean speaker argued that domestic instability may begrowing in China. According to this participant, social unrest isexpanding inside China and is reflected in the fact that 187,000 riots

involving dozens of people or more took place in 2010. In a few cases,the rioters numbered in the tens of thousands. The South Koreanparticipant also argued that Chinese citizens are submitting substantiallymore petitions to the central and local governments to voice theircomplaints and that these petitions are often a prelude todemonstrations. Unrest could intensify if economic conditions worsen.(Not long after the second dialogue meeting, as many as 13,000residents of Wukan, in southern China, drove away village leaders andlocal police to protest local officials seizure and sale of land.)5 Takingall of this into account, one U.S. participant said, it is difficult to see

how China could be dominant in Asia anytime soon.

Sources of Chinese Conduct

Participants had divergent views on the causes and aims of Chinasforeign policy behavior and especially regarding the role that Chinasdomestic politics plays in foreign policy.

One U.S. speaker argued that Beijings leaders are cautious and that

their decisions are calculated and rarely based on hubris. On thecontrary, this participant said, Chinese officials recognize their nationslimitations and must focus their attention primarily on domestic mattersbecause of the Chinese governments legitimacy deficitsomethingthat ensures they think more about internal stability than about Japanor the East China Sea. These domestic concerns prevent Beijing fromtaking a leadership role in international affairs either regionally orglobally. In fact, this speaker said, Chinas recent assertive phase hasalready ended; pragmatic leaders recognize that it has failed.

The same U.S. participant suggested that because Chinese leaders seekprimarily to maintain economic growth and create jobs, Beijingsapproach to regional interaction often appears selfishthough Chinais also prepared to pursue win-win diplomacy. A Japanese speakerdrew a more nuanced picture, stating that notwithstanding Chinasdisputes with Japan, its approach to non-traditional security challengeslike piracy in Southeast Asia is based on coordination and cooperation

with other regional governments. A second Japanese participant made a

5 Michael Wines, A Village In Revolt Could Be A Harbinger, The New York Times,December 26, 2011, p. 4.


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distinction between Chinas non-confrontational probing in the EastChina Seawhere U.S. forces are focused, and Beijings territorialclaims are weakerand the South China Sea, where Chinas approach is

much more confrontational.

Another American participant disagreed with the view that China isinward-focused, stating that while civilian leaders may indeedconcentrate on domestic challenges, there appears to be a disconnectbetween the civilians and PLA officials pursuing efforts to projectpower beyond the first island chain, a string of larger and smallerislands running from the Kuril Islands (Japans Northern Territories)across Japan to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. This speakersuggested that while the legitimacy deficit is a very real problem for

Chinas government, and the Communist Partys legitimacy hascollapsed, some civilian and military leaders are seeking differentsolutions. Where many civilian officials continue to struggle to maintainthe Partys legitimacy through economic growth, a number of PLAleaders appear to be searching for legitimacy in the nationalism of arising China. Chinas 2012 leadership transition could make some ofthese issues more acute.

Discussion of the PLAs role in Chinas decision-making provoked

considerable debate. Two Japanese participants also argued that PLAleaders sometimes are the ones making decisions on Beijings conduct

vis--vis Japan and that China needs better civilian control of themilitary. A South Korean speaker broadly supported this perspective,noting that Chinas next generation of political leaders have very littlemilitary experience and that this will likely provide the PLA with greaterscope to pursue its top priorityweakening U.S. power in East

Asia. However, another Korean speaker contended that while thePLA may be increasing its influence, China is not a military regime

but a more consolidated one-party regime.

An American participant questioned whether China would define itsnational interests in a manner different from previous rising powers,including Great Britain and the United States. Throughout history,rising powers have tended to define their interests increasinglyexpansively; as their frontiersand horizonswiden, rising powers seemore and more threats to their interests that must be neutralized,controlled, or defeated. The speaker stated that Britains original goal inIndia was not conquest but simply to establish trading colonies.

However, once the colonies existed, British colonial officials saw threatsfrom neighboring Indian princes. And no matter how many princes


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they conquered and assimilated into the British Empire, there wasalways another prince across the border. The speaker concluded byasking whether China would be content with continuing U.S.

dominance of East Asia as its capabilities grow and whether and howChina would act differently from earlier rising powers. Chinese effortsto develop a blue-water navy capable of protecting the countrys sealines of communicationespecially Chinas massive energy importsfrom the Middle Eastcould reflect this process of expandinghorizons. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between developing thiscapability and actually employing force to secure Chinas interests, acourse that Beijing has thus far not pursued in a manner or on a scalesimilar to prior major powers


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NORTH KOREA

The dangers posed by North Korea to the United States, Japan, andSouth Korea appear simultaneously broader and narrower than thechallenges from China. At the same time, geography clearly drivessome differentiation between U.S., Japanese, and South Koreanperspectives and creates special problems for South Korea. SouthKorea is also distinct in its goal of eventual reunification with theNorth.

For U.S., Japanese, and South Korean participants, North Korea was asource of broader dangers in the sense that a wider range of troublingand even threatening futures appear possible, including the potential

collapse of North Koreas regime or its use of nuclear weapons.Conversely, however, these disturbing developments would likely bemore narrowly focused (though still extremely destructive) in theirimpact than would be the case in the dire scenarios involving China. Asone U.S. speaker put it, North Koreas ability to pursue nuclearblackmail is limited, because they cannot destroy the world. This maybe a uniquely American sentiment, however; even Alaska and Hawaiiare four to five thousand miles from the Korean Peninsula.

Regarding North Koreas foreign policy conduct, U.S., Japanese, andSouth Korean participants all expressed considerable concern aboutPyongyangs regular provocative conduct, including its nuclear andmissile tests and the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of

Yeonpyeong Island. A Japanese speaker described these actions asasymmetric challenges, arguing that North Korea had few other tools toadvance its goals in dealing with South Korea or the United States andits other allies. A U.S participant supported this view, stating that

America has overwhelming conventional superiority over North

Korea and that the principal danger lies in Pyongyang attempting touse its tiny arsenal of nuclear weapons to pressure South Korea, the


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United States, or Japan. North Korea does precisely this, a SouthKorean participant said, while its leaders know that as soon as they usenuclear weapons, their life is over.

A South Korean speaker warned that North Koreas foreign policycould become increasingly problematic in 2012, the one-hundredthanniversary of Kim Il-sungs birth. North Koreas leaders havepreviously said that their country would become a great military stateby 2012, this participant said, and will likely see a need to demonstratePyongyangs influence through assertive behavior, including possiblynew nuclear or missile tests or further low-level provocations. Thisspeaker added that many in South Korea view former North Koreanleader Kim Jong-ils son and heir Kim Jong-un as potentially more

dangerous than his father.

Reflecting on North Koreas past actions, a Japanese speaker worriedthat deterrence clearly didnt work in 2010. Other participants asked

whether Pyongyangs decision making was rational and, accordingly, whether North Korean leaders could be deterred. One U.S. speakerasserted that North Koreas decision making is not irrational; however,this participant said, it is often based on incomplete or flawedinformation. Decisions are entirely made at the top, this speaker

continued, but information gets trapped at lower levels in thegovernment bureaucracy because information flows less through formalinstitutional channels than through personal networks. As a result,North Koreas government ministries have little ability to formulatepolicy or recommendations.

More generally, participants saw North Koreas foreign policy as anextension of its leadership succession, but recognized that limitedinformation makes this difficult to analyze. From this perspective,

North Koreas leaders are attempting to legitimize the transfer of powerfrom Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un through provocative behavior thatsimultaneously demonstrates Pyongyangs power as a nuclear weaponsstate and reinforces the existence of foreign threats. Still, one U.S.participant said, this has less to do with competition inside the eliteof

which there is no particular evidencethan with ensuring sufficientpopular acceptance.

In addition to the dangers from North Korean conduct, participantsalso worried about a possible economic collapse leading to the

implosion of the North Korean regime. However, an American speakerdiscounted the possibility of bottom-up instability, because of the lack


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of political space in North Korea, or a serious break between politicaland military leaders, who realize that they are all in it together afterhaving been at war with their own people for decades. Another U.S.

participant suggested that it is best to understand North Korea as amafia state organized on the basis of family-style personal patron-client relationships that ensure loyalty both upward and downward.

This appears to provide North Koreas political system with a degree ofresilience; indeed, a system that was not highly resilient could not haveendured for so long despite widespread deprivation in the country.

North Korea and China: One Problem or Two?

North Koreas relationship to China is also critical in dealing with

Pyongyangand an important consideration in relations with Beijing. As one South Korean participant asked, are North Korea and Chinaindependent, separate threats or a package?

A second South Korean speaker argued that Chinas preferences vis-- vis North Korea are close to those of the United States and SouthKoreafocused on stability both internally and externally. However,this participant said, North Koreas leaders prefer a strategy of stabilityinside, instability outside. Pyongyangs sinking of the Cheonan and

attack on Yeonpyeong Island reflect this strategy and indeed were abrilliant strategic move that forced China to choose between Northand South Korea. South Koreans believe that China chose the North

when it failed to condemn North Koreas actions; an American madethis point differently, saying that South Koreans now see China as partof the problem rather than part of the solution. A South Koreanparticipant likewise asserted that Beijings non-response wouldencourage further North Korean provocations.

From Chinas perspective, participants saw North Korea as a frustratingbut essential partner requiring careful management. For example, oneSouth Korean speaker stated that China has little apparent influenceover North Koreas nuclear policy. Another South Korean suggestedthat Chinese leaders likely regretted their loss of strategic ambiguity indealing with Seoul after their limited reaction to the 2010 crises, butprobably saw the two incidents as skirmishes rather than seriousattacks. Unfortunately, this speaker continued, this may be that China isbecoming more accepting of regional instability caused by North Korea.

An American participant partially explained Beijings conduct bysuggesting that Chinas policy toward North Korea is driven


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overwhelmingly by fear of uncertainty and especially collapse. As aresult, this speaker said, Beijing has essentially adopted a looser versionof South Koreas past Sunshine Policy that expands economic and

other interactions and imposes no particular conditions on NorthKoreas nuclear program or other activities. China may have gone sofar as to offer positive assurances regarding the survival of NorthKoreas government.

South Korean participants in particular saw Chinas protection of NorthKorea as based on its fundamental opposition to reunification of thetwo Koreas on Seouls termsor possibly on any terms. As one SouthKorean speaker put it, China will never give up the DPRK and willkeep it as a buffer against U.S. influence in Northeast Asia. Thus it is

essential for Beijing to prevent the collapse of North Korea, whichcould lead to its absorption by the South. Another South Korean notedthat this would be especially disturbing for Beijing because Seoul would

very likely want to maintain a continued U.S. military presence on theKorean Peninsula after reunification, if it eventually succeeds. In thenearer term, North Korea can be a critical military ally for China inresisting perceived U.S. and allied efforts at containment, this speakersaid.


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U.S.-JAPAN-ROKRELATIONS

Three broad challenges emerge in maintaining and strengtheningextended deterrence in East Asia: declining defense budgets, insufficientcoordination between the United States and its allies, and structuralchallenges in the U.S. alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region.

Dialogue participants generally expected reductions in U.S. and allieddefense budgets in the foreseeable future due to slow economic growthand mounting fiscal pressures. As one Japanese speaker put it,advanced industrial democracies will find that it is too difficult toincrease the defense budget from now on. A U.S. participant echoedthis, projecting increased pressure on budgets in all advanced industrial

countries and arguing that we will have to learn to do less with less.

American speakers described multiple factors that could producedisproportionate impacts on U.S. capabilities as the overall budgetdeclines. One speaker explained that the political constituenciesfavoring higher defense spending do not have the same priorities; onekey groupveteransfocus heavily on pensions and health care andother benefits as opposed to procurement. The U.S. militarys costs foractive duty and retired personnel are already rising sharply, another

noted, meaning that any reductions in spending would be concentratedin areas that undermine U.S. capabilities. At the same time, one of the

Americans added, some U.S. political leaders appear increasinglytempted to view military spending as a jobs program rather than asecurity issue, which could further distort spending priorities.

Looking to U.S. capabilities, one American asserted that missile defensehas become the U.S. militarys largest program, absorbing an increasingshare of procurement funds and reducing what is available for other

new systems. In addition, this speaker said, concluding U.S. operationsin Iraq and Afghanistan is unlikely to produce a Middle East security


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dividend in view of growing insecurity due to uncertainty about theArab Spring, Syria, and Iran. As a result, it is far from certain that thePentagon will be able to reallocate resources from the Middle East to

East Asia. Another American participant worried that defense cutswould take place in top-down fashion without any supporting strategy,further damaging U.S. capabilities. Since the discussion, theDepartment of Defense has released its broad priorities in reducing thedefense budget.6 The report states explicitly that the Pentagons newstrategy will advance the national security imperative of deficitreduction through a lower level of defense spending and rebalancetoward the Asia-Pacific region. Press reports state that PresidentBarack Obama has rejected reducing the U.S. Navys complement ofeleven Carrier Strike Groups due to this focus on Asia.7 The strategys

further implications for U.S. forces in the Pacific remain unclear at thistime.

In this context, a Japanese participant expressed concern about earliercomments by U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta urging Americasallies to assume a greater share of responsibility for security in East

Asia. Panettas remarks were shocking, this speaker said, because hefailed to acknowledge that Asian countries face similar if not morebudget pressure.

Taking into account this problem, most participants saw closercoordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea as anessential response to declining budgets; greater integration of strategyand planning could produce greater efficiency and allow savings whilepossibly even strengthening some capabilities. In general, participantsconsidered the U.S.-South Korean alliance to be the most advanced inthis respect; one American described it as arguably the mostdeveloped, clearly articulated, best planned operational alliance in the

world today. Still, this participant continued, the 2015 transfer ofwartime control of South Korean forces from the U.S. to South Korea will require extensive discussions between Washington and Seoul tomaintain and expand its effectiveness.

In contrast, the U.S. speaker said, America and Japan are years andyears away from a similar level of strategic dialogue and operational

6 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21stCentury Defense(Washington, DC:

Department of Defense, 2012).7 Scott Wilson and Greg Jaffe, In creating new defense strategy, Obama seeks tooutflank Congress, The Washington Post, January 7, 2012.


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clarityand the level of mutual understanding has actually declinedsince the end of the Cold War, when the division of labor between theU.S. and Japanese militaries was clearer. Several Japanese participants

agreed with this assessment. One Japanese participant specificallycomplained that Japans military does not know when and with whatcapabilities the United States will contribute to Japans defense. Thereare a certain number of fighters we need to establish control overcertain areas of Japans islands, the speaker said, but what is not clearis how much the U.S. is going to bring and at what point the U.S. isgoing to come in; that affects both budgetary and strategic decisions in

Japan.

American participants disagreed regarding the implications of

Washingtons budget woes on U.S. bases in East Asia. One Americanspeaker argued that pressure is building to relocate U.S. forces,particularly where host communities appear opposed to the bases.

According to this participant, some members of Congress havesuggested relocating the Africa Command from Germany to SouthCarolina and have questioned whether Stuttgart citizens shouldbenefit from U.S. and DOD money that could go into the U.S.economy instead. (In January, 2012, the Obama Administrationannounced a decision to withdraw two U.S. Army brigades from

Europe as part of a plan to reduce the size and cut the cost of theArmy.)8

Other U.S. speakers sharply disagreed with the possibility that theUnited States could withdraw from East Asia. One argued that it isludicrous to assert that America could substantially reduce itscommitments due to U.S. security interests, extensive militarydeployments, and a web of ties between the U.S. and Asian countriesextending beyond security to economics and social ties due to large

numbers of Asian-Americans. Another American participant claimedthat members of Congress who have proposed moving the AfricaCommand to the continental United States are extreme and are notconsidered to be experts on national security by their colleagues.9Moreover, this speaker said, the loss of host nation support$4 billionper year in Japans casewould actually make American bases more

8 Greg Jaffe, 2 Army brigades to leave Europe in cost-cutting move, The WashingtonPost, January 13, 2012.9 Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) proposed an amendment to a defense authorization bill

requiring this. South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham (R) and Virginia SenatorsMark Warner (D) and James Webb (D) have all sought to bring the base to their homestates, as have several members of the Texas delegation, among others.


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expensive. Nevertheless, skeptical American politicians could make astrong case to move U.S. bases due to their vulnerability to Chinasincreasing military capabilities. This may ultimately prove a more

serious political danger to the U.S. presence, this participant concluded.

Structural Challenges

Participants focused extensively on the structure of Americas alliancerelationships in East Asia as a critical component of deterrence,extended deterrence, and security. In general, U.S., Japanese, and SouthKorean speakers saw East Asia as fundamentally different from Europeandas a resultdid not see a need for a large and formal alliancesystem analogous to NATO. As one American participant put it, Asia

today relies less on military capabilities and less on nuclear weaponsspecifically than Cold War Europe for security. In this context, anetwork system of communication could be more appropriate todemonstrate political unity that can simultaneously assure U.S. allies anddeter potential adversaries. Other participants saw a cohesive alliancesystem as unlikely due to differing priorities. For example, one Japanesespeaker said, the U.S.-South Korea alliance is aimed overwhelmingly atNorth Korea, while the U.S.-Japan alliance has a broader focus onregional security.

Nevertheless, many participants suggested that the currently existingalliance structurea so-called hub-and-spoke system, with the UnitedStates serving as the core and coordinator through individual bilateralrelationshipsis no longer adequate. As one U.S. speaker put it, thehub-and-spoke system worked in the past, when the United States wasunchallenged, but is insufficient in dealing with a rising China. Citingthe prolonged U.S.-Japan negotiations over the Futenma Marine AirStation, this participant noted that notwithstanding the important part

the base plays in overall U.S. force posture in the region, its future is astrictly bilateral topic. Likewise, the speaker continued, the transfer ofoperational control in South Korea will have profound implications for

Americas military role in East Asia, but is discussed only in Seoul andWashington. Progress beyond this is unlikely, however, in the absenceof strategic conceptualization or working sets of relations to move itforward.

Japanese participants in particular saw the hub-and-spoke alliancesystem evolving through a combination of coalitions of the willing

that could include the United States and somebut not allof itsAsian allies and partners, on the one hand, and growing interconnection


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between the spokes that is not channeled through Washington, on theother. In the latter area, one Japanese participant asserted, while thebasic architecture of the hub-and-spoke system has not changed,

there has been increasing networking between the spokes that theUnited States may not have noticed because it has not necessarily beeninvolved. This is occurring in Japans relations with Australia, thespeaker stated, and to a lesser degree in its ties to South Korea.

Another Japanese participant suggested that the improving Japan- Australia relationship could allow for movement from the secondcategory to the first, i.e., from closer Japan-Australia ties within the hub-and-spoke construct to a more structured trilateral relationship amongthe United States, Australia, and Japan.

Several Japanese speakers called for greater JUS+ cooperation withother nations along these lines, meaning specific efforts undertakenjointly by the United States, Japan, and one or more other partners.One Japanese participant argued that Japans naval deployment to theIndian Ocean had already provided Tokyo with important opportunitiesand experience working with new partners.

Japan and South Korea

Japanese and South Korean participants generally agreed that relationsbetween Tokyo and Seoul have improved significantly in recent years,but differed substantially (without regard to their nationality) about thefuture limits to their ties. Nearly all saw the historical legacy of Japan-South Korea relationsJapan ruled Korea as a colony from 1910 to1945as a source of continuing resentment in South Korea and thegreatest obstacle to closer cooperation. Notably, most South Koreanand Japanese participants shared this view. However, South Koreanparticipants also referred repeatedly to a lingering territorial dispute over

a cluster of small rocky islands known variously as the Liancourt Rocks(by the United States), the Dokdo Islands (by South Korea, whichcontrols them), and the Takeshima Islands (by Japan, which claimsthem). One South Korean participant referred to the confusion thatthis dispute introduces into Seouls defense policy, saying we have toclarify who and what we are trying to deter. Is it China or the DPRK?Or are we deterring Japan over Takeshima? Approximately one monthbefore the meetings, a South Korean parliamentarian announced thathis government would spend nearly $300 million to build a naval baseon one of the islands, not long after three Japanese Diet members were


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blocked from visiting them by authorities in Seoul.10 Another SouthKorean speaker speculated that an alliance between his country andJapan would be possible only if Koreans were to perceive a considerably

greater threat from China. If there were a Chinese aircraft carrierfloating in the Eastern Sea [the Sea of Japan], this participant said,South Koreas conservatives [might] think sincerely of a more formalalliance or security arrangement.

However, another South Korean participant explained that thecountrys 2012 elections have introduced considerable uncertaintyregarding Seouls future foreign policy. Describing the current SouthKorean government as the most pro-American in the history of theROK, the speaker argued that a victory by progressives, who view the

United States as basically an imperialist power, could substantiallycomplicate efforts at cooperation with both Washington and Tokyo.Because South Koreas progressives would focus on peacefulcoexistence with China and North Korea, this participant concluded,they would have little interest in trilateral projects, particularly thoseemphasizing military-to-military ties. The U.S-Korea Free TradeAgreement would help little in this respect because it derives less fromany love for the United States than from the fact that America is theleast distrusted nation for many South Koreans.

A Japanese speaker agreed that historical issues such as theDokdo/Takeshima island disputes are huge challenges to Japan andSouth Korea forming any kind of alliance. Several Japaneseparticipants identified this as a major problem and asserted that anti- Japanese sentiment in South Korea would block a formalized securityrelationship. One Japanese participant went further, however,expressing doubt that either government would accept a mutual defensecommitment. If we have a chartered formal alliance with the ROK,

will we have an article five [defense] commitment that includes theKorean Peninsula? I think that is too great a commitment from the Japanese side. And for South Korea, will the ROK protect all of Japanese territory? Another Japanese speaker asked rhetorically whether South Koreas soldiers are prepared to fight shoulder toshoulder in combat with Japans Self-Defense Force.

10 South Korea to build naval base on island disputed with Japan lawmaker, BBC

Monitoring Asia Pacific Political, September 28, 2011; Voice of America,www.blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2011/09/28/south-korea-to-build-naval-base-near-disputed-islands/.


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An American speaker urged further efforts at Japan-South Koreadialogue, noting that in a worst-case scenario Seoul, Tokyo and

Washington would face intense pressure in a crisis with no

experience working together. Notwithstanding broad skepticismregarding a formal alliance, many Japanese and South Koreanparticipants insisted that Tokyo and Seoul have in fact made realprogress in their relations, including in military-to-military ties, and wereoptimistic that deepening practical cooperation could eventuallyproduce what one South Korean speaker described as a virtualalliance. A Japanese speaker noted that Japan and South Korea hadfinally moved beyond side-by-side naval navigation to conduct formaljoint exercises. Another Japanese participant added further historicalcontext, explaining that military intelligence confidence-building began

in the 1960s and 1970s and only after twenty years, in 1994, didoperational consultations begin. Moreover, this speaker continued,

while Japan cannot share specific information with South Koreabecause of constitutional limits, Japan can share information with theU.S. knowing that it might be shared with other allies. A third

Japanese speaker saw a realistic basis for limited functionalcooperation between Japan and South Korea that could continue untilboth countries have the right match of administrations to move tothe next phase. Ideas for this functional cooperation included closer

collaboration in missile defense and in intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance as well as joint capacity-building efforts involvingSoutheast Asian militaries.

Despite the sense that Japan and South Korea could significantlyimprove their ties without reaching the limits of what is now practical,participants remained sensitive to Chinas possible reaction to theevolution of relations between the two countries. One Japanese speakerurged caution against efforts to move too quickly that, should they fail,

would undermine deterrence rather than buttressing it by demonstratingthe weakness of the Japan-South Korea relationship rather than itsstrength. Conversely, an American participant warned that visiblycloser military contacts between Seoul and Tokyo could actuallyundermine stability if Beijings leaders saw their nation as less secure.Chinas reaction over time to the Obama administrations increasingactivity in East Asia, including its recent announcement of a new Marinefacility in Australia, could provide an opportunity to evaluate this.


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KEYCONCLUSIONS

The dialogue discussions produced several broad conclusions that areimportant in considering U.S. policy in East Asia.

First, while it may seem obvious, it bears repeating that East Asia isnot Europe, the Cold War is over, and China is not the SovietUnion. While Chinas economy is growing rapidly, Beijings militarycapabilities are increasing, and its conduct has heightened tensions,Chinese leaders have not pursued an aggressive Soviet-style campaignfor global dominance. Moreover, China is integrated into the globaleconomy to an extent that Soviet officials may never have imaginedpossible for their own country and in a manner that creates constraints

and pressures that neither Washington nor Moscow faced during theCold War. Finally, the vast geography of East Asia and the Pacificshapes the dynamics of the competition that is occurring in waysfundamentally different from what took place between the United Statesand the Soviet Union in Europe.

Second, while acknowledging the profound differences between todayand the past, Cold War deterrence and extended deterrence dooffer useful lessonsespecially the fact that deterrence is credible

only in extreme circumstances and cannot reliably preventprovocative conduct. The threat of escalation to war is unlikely to beeffective when vital national interests are not at stake. Recognizing thisis essential both to developing policy and to managing publicexpectations.

Third, understanding the China-North Korea relationship isimportant to U.S. policy toward both countries and to U.S. effortsto work with Japan and South Korea. Japan and South Korea

naturally have different interests and priorities based on their differingcircumstances and perspectives. For the United States to forge a tri-


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lateral relationship with Tokyo and Seoul, it will be necessary to assesswhether China and North Korea are one problem or two. The answerto this question will shape U.S. strategy in approaching these two key

allies.

Fourth, despite real and ongoing tensions, Japan and South Koreaappear capable of improving their political and militaryrelationships in concrete and useful ways. Though the historicallegacy of Japans occupation of Korea will continue to feed mutualskepticism, Tokyo and Seoul seem to define their interests increasinglysimilarly and to see the benefits of functional cooperation. Needless tosay, this process will depend heavily upon domestic politics in eachcountry.

Finally, American and Japanese anxiety about Chinas rise isintimately interconnected with mounting frustration overdomestic economic problems and political gridlock that preventssolutions. These concerns have less to do with the Chinas capabilitiesand conduct today than with Beijings possible future power and goals.

With this in mind, successful domestic policies that produce growth andreduce deficits and debts could simultaneously address those worriesand change Chinese perceptions, lending greater credibility to U.S.

efforts at deterrence and assurance.


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ABOUT THEAUTHOR

Paul J. Saunders is Executive Director and Chief Operating

Officer of the Center for the National Interest. He directs itsprograms on U.S.-Japan relations and U.S.-Russia relationsand works on other issues, including energy and climatechange, U.S.-European relations, and the role of democracyin U.S. foreign policy. He is also Associate Publisher of theforeign policy magazine, The National Interest, published bi-monthly by the Center for the National Interest. Saundersserved in the Bush Administration from 2003 2005 as

Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs. In that capacity, he worked on a broad range oftransnational issues, in particular with respect to Russia,Ukraine, the former Soviet Union, as well as Iraq, China andIndia.


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2012 Extended Deterence in East Asia

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