2014-06-05 SISA25 NISP Challenges Ahead MZ

SISA Report No. 25

THE NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY OF PAKISTAN -‐ AN ASSESSMENT

Khawaja Khalid Farooq Dr. Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

Oslo, June 2014

Centre for International and Strategic Analysis © SISA 2014 All views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Centre for International and Strategic Analysis. The text may not be printed in full or part without the permission of the author. Queries can be directed to: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Phone: (+47) 932 49 083 E-‐mail: [email protected] Internet: www.strategiskanalyse.no

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Pakistani Government has just recently introduced a National Internal Security Policy

(NISP) for Pakistan – the first ever for the country. It has been receiving mixed reviews; some

observers say it is inadequate to counter terrorism in Pakistan, while the state maintains that it

is a panacea. The most critical issue that is presumably tackled by the document is that of

intelligence coordination between the different law enforcement agencies in Pakistan. But

NISP struggles to conceptualize the ways in which it will lay down procedures for this

coordination, without replication of existing roles and the triggering of jurisdictional turf

wars. In addition, many such forces mandated with this duty exist in Pakistan.

Particularly problematic with the NISP is the envisaged role of the National Counter

Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which is slated to become the premier homeland security

organization in Pakistan. Its main responsibilities will involve coordinating intelligence,

countering extremism, reforming the madrasahs, as well as deradicalizing youth and

prisoners. As such, it is literally tasked with single-handedly pulling Pakistan back from the

brink of extremism. This report highlights the herculean challenges facing NACTA before it

can perform its new duties effectively. Complex political issues which have remained highly

contentious in Pakistan complicate matters. Any new policy – no matter how well drafted –

faces implementation issues in real life, and the Pakistani establishment has yet to even

acknowledge many of these.

Even though the NISP document is a huge improvement from previous ones, it is certainly

over-ambitious to think that NACTA will by default acquire the capability to drive a national

consensus on counter-extremism. Pakistan remains deeply divided by emotive discourses at

variance with each other and many of these narratives are able to command large followings.

Madrasahs are one such issue; organized along sects, they are resistant to adapt to modernity.

Perhaps the biggest hurdle in implementing an ambitious document like NISP is that Pakistan

is a developing country. It has a limited amount of resources as opposed to more developed

states; similarly it is a state which still needs to work out issues concerning the balances of

power between the centre and the provinces in regards to jurisdiction in terrorism-related

cases. The report concludes that Pakistan suffers from a lack of regulatory quality whereby

plans, laws, structures and documents are drawn up, but the practical implementation of these

is far from ideal. These state deficiencies also plague the effective implementation of the

National Internal Security Policy of Pakistan.

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Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 INTER-‐AGENCY COORDINATION ........................................................................................................... 7 NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM AUTHORITY .......................................................................... 17 POLICE AND THE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING APPARATUS ..................... 24 THE MADRASAH CONUNDRUM ............................................................................................................ 33 A COUNTER-‐TERRORISM AND COUNTER-‐EXTREMISM NARRATIVE ................................. 38 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 42 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................... 49

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INTRODUCTION1 The government of Pakistan launched its ‘National Internal Security Policy’ (NISP) on

February 25, 2014, ostensibly to counter terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.2 This is

an unprecedented document, the first ever of its kind in Pakistan. The first part of NISP

is secret, based on administrative and operational matters.3 The second component is

the strategy part which is based on focused dialogue, military operations, and how the

breakdown of dialogue will lead to military operations when needed. The third and last

component is operational, which deals mainly with joint intelligence sharing. The

strategy visualizes a 'comprehensive' plan to counter terrorism and extremism in

Pakistan because, as the document says, close to 50,000 people have been killed,

including over 5,000 personnel of the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) since the

country joined the US-‐led war on terror after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The document

estimates the loss to the Pakistani economy to the tune of $78 billion over the last ten

years.4

The NISP envisages both soft and hard interventions. Political ownership and faith in

the democratic process in Pakistan are stated as major components of the soft measures,

which envisage a Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP).5 The CRP ostensibly aims to win

the hearts and minds of the general populace, and focuses on shaping the national

narrative, development, dialogue, reintegration and related legal reforms, etc. A

Combined Deterrence Plan (CDP) envisages that the approach of the National Internal

Security Apparatus (NISA) needs to change from a reactive to a proactive stance.6

The budget allocated for the NISP for the period 2014-‐18 stands at 32 billion PKR.7

About 22 billion will be available to the provinces in order to improve the capacity of

provincial law enforcement, while about Rs.10 billion have been earmarked for

1 The report has been funded through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). All views expressed are those of the author. 2 The NISP is available on the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan (NACTA) website, at http://NACTA.gov.pk/. The link for the NISP is http://NACTA.gov.pk/Download_s/Rules/030314_NISP_ConceptPaper.pdf. 3 Ejaz Haider, National Internal Security policy and the Road ahead, Newsweek, February 26,2014, http://newsweekpakistan.com/national-‐internal-‐security-‐policy-‐and-‐the-‐road-‐ahead/ 4 Supra Note 1. 5 Saleem Safi, National Internal Security Policy; an analysis, Discussion paper, Pakistan institute of legislative development and transparency (PILDAT), March 2014. 6 Supra Note 1. 7 32 billion Pakistani Rupees equal approximately 326 million US Dollars

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strengthening the Federal counter-‐terrorism (CT) structures such as National Counter

Terrorism Authority (NACTA), by setting up Rapid Response Forces (RRF), Civil Armed

Forces Headquarters in the Ministry of Interior (MOI), and the modernization of Law

enforcement Agencies. 8 NISP implicitly acknowledges the importance of police

organizations in Pakistan, and assumes active involvement of police apparatuses

through specialized Counter-‐Terrorism Departments (CTDs), each of which will have a

RRF.9 Police have a vital role in supplying on ground intelligence to the Directorate of

Internal Security (DIS) through an envisaged National Internal Security Operation

Center (NISOC), both of which shall be managed by NACTA.10 The RRFs are projected as

the specialist counter-‐terrorism tactical wings, created by both the Federal Government

and Provinces for conducting 'Intelligence based operations' with CTD/ police support

where required. Thus, there will be an RRF in each province, as well as one in Islamabad,

the seat of the Federal Government. This Federal RRF within the Islamabad Capital

Territory (ICT) Police will presumably be trained by master trainers.11 Aerial support

would be available to the RRFs through the Air Wing of the MOI, for which a support

grant of about US $ 25 million dollar has already been made available.12

The DIS is at the heart of the Combined Deterrence Plan (CDP), and is supposed to

coordinate the activities of the NISA under the broad counters of NISP, through the

organizational interface of NACTA.13 This intelligence coordination mechanism would

presumably feed into threat assessment, which is supposed to lead to actionable

intelligence. The NISOC at the DIS is supposed to coordinate and collate this intelligence

from all the pillars of the National Internal Security (NIS) apparatus, which essentially

means that intelligence would then be collated under one roof at NACTA, and then

disseminated to relevant stakeholders.14

NISP has been hailed in government circles as a major step forward in Pakistan's quest

for internal security, and is undoubtedly a critical step, if nothing else than for the fact

8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Supra Note 4 13 Supra Note 1. 14 Ibid.

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that it is Pakistan's first such strategy document dealing with terrorism and extremism.

Focal CT structures and institutions have mushroomed globally which coordinate

counter-‐terrorism and counter-‐extremism efforts, like the National Counterterrorism

Center (NCTC) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in USA the Joint

Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the Office for Security and Counter-‐Terrorism

(OSCT) in the United Kingdom, as well as the Australian Council of Australian

Governments (COAG) and National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC), amongst

many others. This has resulted in national strategies like the American 4Ds, Britain's

4Ps,15 etc. Pakistan lagged behind till a policy document was presented, with ex-‐Prime

Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani's counter-‐terrorism policy of 3Ds – Dialogue, Development,

Deterrence – being projected as a major step forward.16 A unanimous resolution passed

on October 22, 2008 by the Parliament of Pakistan gave 14 guidelines for National

Counter Terrorism Policy by the Parliament’s Committee on National Security (PCNS).

The committee also stressed the need for a comprehensive CT Strategy, the need of a

focal institution to integrate CT/CE efforts, and the formation of NACTA to

“coordinate and unify” national CT efforts. However, premier Gilani's 3Ds policy could

not be effected, and focal CT structures like NACTA which sprung from its wake have

remained ineffective till now. The NISP is the latest attempt at a rationalization of a

security policy for Pakistan; ostensibly it is poised to take over from where 3Ds halted,

and puts a much more detailed plan in action. Better yet, it is backed by budgetary

allocation, which implies that the government is at last serious at putting this into

action. However, deeper nuances of the policy space which dominate the sphere of

internal security in Pakistan need to be explored in order to comprehend how the policy

may work out. A factor wise analysis of some of the important features of the NISP is

undertaken below.

INTER-‐AGENCY COORDINATION Ostensibly, NISP was drafted because there was a lack of coordination among the

security and intelligence agencies, and they needed to be brought under one umbrella, a

15 4Ds = Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend; 4Ps = Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. 16 Jalil Abbas Jilani, Pakistan implementing 3D policy to ensure peace, The Nation, April 29, 2009, http://www.nation.com.pk/politics/29-‐Apr-‐2009/Pakistan-‐implementing-‐3D-‐policy-‐to-‐ensure-‐peace-‐Jalil-‐Abbas-‐Jilani.

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fact that has been recognized for the first time through a document of this magnitude by

the Pakistani government. This has been said to be a major accomplishment;17 even

though about two dozen security agencies have been working in Pakistan related in one

way or the other to the security situation, there has been till date little coordination

between them. The NISP proposes that this duplication of roles leading to wastage of

resources would be resolved through the policies put in place through the document.

NISP states that “integrated efforts through an institutionalized monitoring framework

under democratic leadership to elicit support and cooperation of local and international

stakeholders” would be the mechanism used for achieving these objectives.18 This is

indeed an objective to aspire for, but it remains to be seen how the document will be

translated into practice.

17 Maiza Hameed, National Internal Security Policy 2014-‐18, Pakistan Observer, March 26, 2014, http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=237463. 18 Supra Note 1.

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Figure 1-‐LEAs and Intelligence agencies in Pakistan19

19 Replicated from Hassan Abbas, "Reforming Pakistan‘s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure; Is It Too Flawed to Fix?", USIP Special Report, 2011.

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Figure 2-‐ A Roadmap of all LEAs20

Pakistan has a myriad of security agencies, forces, paramilitaries, authorities, bureaus,

etc. which deals with seemingly different spheres, but in practice replicate much of each

other's work. The primary law and order responsibilities in Pakistan’s four provinces

are vested in their provincial governments. In the realm of criminal law and procedure,

however, both central (federal) and provincial legislatures can enact laws (central law

20 Ibid.

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takes precedence over provincial law). The police are supervised at a provincial level.

Confusingly, the MOI exercises overall supervision, but provincial Inspector Generals

(IGPs) of the police service report directly to their respective chief ministers, and the

police structures headed by these IGPs are funded from the provincial budgets. In

principle however, the IGPs are Federal Government servants. Accordingly, police and

paramilitary forces in the capital city of Islamabad, and Levies and Khasadars in FATA,

are under the direct jurisdiction of the Federal Government. The police of AJK and Gilgit-‐

Baltistan are managed by their respective governments (somewhat similar to the

situation in the provinces), although the Federal Government has more direct leverage

because of the special legal status of these regions. Among the country’s paramilitary

forces, Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps KP, and Frontier Corps Baluchistan, are often

called upon to support police for tackling law and order situations, in addition to their

routine border duties. All of these forces are led by senior serving army officers. The

training facilities and service conditions provided to these forces are better than those

offered to the police.21

There are two sets of law enforcement organizations in Pakistan: those that operate

under the Federal Government and those under the jurisdiction of provincial police

organizations. Nineteen major organizations operate directly under the Federal

Government, dealing with a variety of law enforcement responsibilities (including

intelligence gathering, border and coast surveillance, and policing), and answering to

different authorities. The capital police, (Islamabad) and the four provincial police forces

act largely independent of each other. The senior command positions are filled from the

ranks of the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) cadre, a central career service organization

that can station officers in any part of the country. A disconnect between senior PSP

police leadership and junior officers (who belong to provincial police services) has

developed over time, as officers who rise through ranks seldom get senior command

positions.

Under the constitution, it is the duty of the Federal Government to protect the provinces

against external aggression and internal disturbance, and for this purpose it commands

21 Ibid. Also, see Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s Frontier Corps.” Terrorism Monitor, March 30, 2007.

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the armed forces to defend the country against external threats.22 Parliament has

constitutionally defined powers23 to enact laws relating not only to the armed forces of

the Pakistani Federation, but also to its various paramilitary forces, commonly referred

to as Civil Armed Forces.24 The parliament also exercises powers to regulate the

activities of federal agencies and institutes for research, training, and can also seek to

authorize specialized research.25 Most of this control is exercised by the MOI of the

Federal Government under Federal Government’s Rules of Business, 1973, formulated

under Article 99 of the Constitution. This sanctions the “Coordination of policy matters

relating to Police” as being the responsibility of the Interior Division (Ministry of

Interior).26 The Rules of Business also say that “Police Commission and Police Awards”

are under the purview of the Interior Division,27 as is the internal security of the

country, including the deployment of Pakistan's civil armed forces, such as the Pakistan

rangers, Pakistan coast guards, and the Federal Investigation Agency. The MOI also have

at their disposal the services of the National Police Bureau to coordinate the activities of

the different police forces across the country, as well as the National Police Academy and

the National Police Management Board. The MOI is furthermore tasked with assistance

in the modernization of the police forces of the provinces. Thus, even this cursory

review of its powers reveals that the MOI certainly does not suffer from any lack of

authority in regulating law and order within Pakistan, which presumably makes sense.

There are many components of the state security apparatus which have been used in

one form or the other to tackle terrorism even before NISP came into existence. There

are many stipulations of the NISP that should have been functioning regardless of when

the policy came in, or whether it existed or not. The mechanisms envisaged under NISP

by setting up new structures could have been handled by effective resource utilization of

already existing organizations. The research and coordination element envisaged in

NACTA for example (see below), could have been handled with an effective National

Police Bureau function, presumably one of the functions of the bureau anyways, at least

22 Article 243 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 23 Entry 1 of the Federal Legislative List (Part I). 24 For a more detailed discussion , see Asad Jamal, Police organizations in Pakistan, HRCP-‐CHRI Report, 2010. 25 Entry 16, Federal Legislative List – Part I, Constitution of Pakistan. 26 Supra Note 21. 27 Ibid.

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relating to the police. The provincial police all have positions known as the R&D wing

under the Central Police Offices (CPOs), which are headed by a senior Additional

Inspector General of Police. Unfortunately, these positions have at best been toothless

talking shops, instead of providing an invaluable data coordination mechanism, for

instance with the National Police Bureau as the focal point for all provincial R&Ds. The

National Police Bureau is an organization that could have streamlined this practice

instead of having a sideline role, but that is apparently now water under the bridge.

These entities could have been made effective, and would have been invaluable as a

means of civilian intelligence coordination mechanisms. The fact that that such

institutions are already there but not performing their mandated functions highlights

that the issue in Pakistan is NOT the absence of institutions, but rather their capacity to

deliver. This issue also highlights the fact that even if mechanisms like NACTA is put into

practice satisfactorily, they will still have to deal with disarrayed coordination

mechanisms within NISA, such as the police. With the police being only one of the grass

roots organizations (needing extensive reforms) which generates and feeds intelligence

into the NACTA-‐driven DIS, the technological adage 'garbage in – garbage out' would

have to be considered more seriously. It also needs to be examined that even though

the parliament has the power to sanction research, why has the NISP been so late in

coming? Any number of institutions predating NACTA could have been mandated with

drawing up the NISP; presumably the issue has more to do with capacity than the

absence or coordination of relevant organizations.

Then there is the issue of duplication of roles, which assumes an even greater meaning

in the context of tactical forces to deal with counter-‐terrorism. Setting up forces like the

FRR force are huge tasks requiring intensive resources, training, capability, and

seamless coordination mechanisms. A developing country like Pakistan has to seriously

consider the immense resources associated with setting new entities like the RRFs,

especially since there already exist many forces which have traditionally dealt with

terrorism and security for a long time, or have the inherent ability to do so.

An organization under MOI which assumes particular importance in this context is the

Frontier Constabulary, which has been at the forefront of fighting insurgency in

Pakistan. Created as an independent force under the North West Frontier Constabulary

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Act, 1915, it serves the purpose of a federal armed force in Pakistan's FATA areas, since

the police cannot enter most of the tribal regions under rules operating since British

times.28 The MOI has at its disposal another force which is of critical importance to

maintaining law and order in Islamabad, the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) Police.

The unit has the strength of more than 10,00029 and is considered one of the better

policing forces in the country.30 The ICT Police also has a specialized counter-‐terrorism

function, albeit of a smaller scale. Even though the Federal RRF has been placed under

the ICT Police, it remains to be seen how it will be assimilated into a conventionally run

police force.

Both the abovementioned forces have been facing the brunt of terrorism in Pakistan,

and have been frontline forces against it, though undoubtedly with chequered histories

of successes and failures. Both these forces could have been capacity built or made

specialists in counter-‐terrorism without raising a new force, which would have been less

resource intensive than setting up entirely new structures. They both perform counter

terrorism functions for the Pakistani Federation, and it remains to be seen how they

would devolve to the RRFs, and whether the new RRFs would be able to perform these

functions without jurisdictional overlaps and inter-‐departmental turf wars. The ICT

Police could have had its capacity built up in counter-‐terrorism, and deployed a much

smaller RRF type tactical force from within itself, since ICT Police already has a

functional police apparatus. Granted, it lacks capacity and potent intelligence

coordination mechanisms at the moment, but efforts at rectifying such concerns could

have been more fruitful than erecting a new and untested force. Since the Federal RRF

would also be under the authority of the MOI – similar to the ICT Police – the same NISA

intelligence coordination mechanisms with NACTA could have been instituted. However,

presence of a force within a force, i.e. RRF within ICT Police, is bound to create friction

between the two, especially as the RRF would ostensibly be better paid. Moreover, it

reveals the proclivity of policy-‐makers to think in terms of quick fixes, creating new

bodies rather than mending flaws in existent ones.

28National Public Safety Commission, Annual Report 2006, April 2008. 29 Islamabad Capital Territory Police website, Total Strength: http://www.islamabadpolice.gov.pk/Pages/CustomPages/TotalStrength.aspx. Also see Supra Note 1. 30 Ibid.

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One can also investigate the previous attempts to set up Specialized Federal Counter

Terrorism forces, like for instance within the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and

NACTA (dealt below in detail). The FIA31 is the federal body dealing with special crimes

that have either a national or transnational spread, such as organized crime, cyber-‐

crime, white collar crime and terrorism often in coordination with international crime

agencies like Interpol. In accordance with the apparent need to create a specialist unit,

in July 2003, the Special Investigations Group (SIG) under the FIA was created to

identify, arrest and interrogate terrorists; detect terrorist financing, and coordinate with

the provincial government in investigating major terrorist incidents. Its strength,

however, was surprisingly low, and till date it has not produced any important results

regarding counter-‐terrorism. SIG was renamed as Counter Terrorism Wing (CTW) in

2003, with training and equipment provided by the governments of USA, Australia, UK

and Germany. However despite such aid, CTW has investigated a surprisingly small

number of cases of terrorism in its role as a specialist CT structure. Correspondingly, the

provincial police CT structures, the CIDs (now CTDs) have investigated thousands of

cases; thus, one of the perceptions of the provincial CIDs is that international donor

agencies 'misplace' their confidence and funds in federally mandated entities like CTW.

CTW is just one of the models of a specialized civilian counter-‐terrorism body that did

not become vibrant enough to take over the CT functions from the centre; the other one

being NACTA (till now). Since federal civilian bodies like the two mentioned above

demonstrate a trend of being incapable of delivering the required expertise, it remains

to be seen how the new federal bodies will come along. However, this time around,

NACTA clearly has sufficient budgetary allocation, which should remove the often stated

rationale for inefficiency according to many officials in such organizations; that they do

not have enough financial resources.

Even at a superficial glance, it seems that there are a number of forces fighting at the

behest of the Federal Government, many of which have been at the forefront of

combating terrorism. There are others as well, for instance the Pakistan Rangers, that

have also been deployed in various troubled areas, like certain parts of Karachi and

elsewhere to quell trouble. However, the Rangers have been beset by allegations of high

31 Federal Investigation Agency website: http://www.fia.gov.pk/.

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handedness and jurisdictional friction with police in Karachi recently, thus raising the

issue that forces acting in aid of civil powers need to have defined limits. Except for

perhaps FIA's CTW which has not been able to reach a certain critical mass, these are

forces which are already thousands strong. It remains to be seen how the new RRFs will

take over terrorism related functions of bodies that are already engaged in fighting

terrorism in the country. How many of these functions would remain with the existing

bodies and how many would be granted to the RRFs? Will there be jurisdictional

overlaps, and how will these be resolved in that case? Will it make sense to pull back

entities like the Rangers for example, who have by now set up infrastructures in their

areas of deployment, and may already have better insight into the local problems than

newly raised bodies like the RRFs? As provincial RRFs will be operating in many spaces

in which federal bodies are already present (Karachi and many parts of KP for example),

will issues of centre-‐province coordination arise? If so, will they be resolved through

new laws? Will the devolution of law and order to provinces through the eighteenth

constitutional amendment affect the process of implementation of NISP (see below)?

What happens to existing mechanisms relating to CT like for example, the CTW within

FIA? What will such forces do with their existing strengths; will there be the usual

duplication, even triplication of roles? If the RRF, especially the federal one, are not

streamlined properly, would they become resource pools to which the government may

intermittently resort for providing VIP security escorts? This brings to mind the

provincially raised elite force phenomenon in Punjab; it began as commendable efforts

to build a tactical force, but now many, if not most, are now solely deployed for VIP

protection duties. Would the RRF, especially the Federal RRF, become a resource pool

for multifarious duties, gradually diluting its CT efficacy? There are many more

questions like these which will be encountered and addressed for the implementation of

the NISP to be successful.

Perhaps one of the biggest problems, at least with the civilian side of the NISP, is that of

capacity. A plethora of analysis by expert observers, both Pakistani and international,

has pointed out that especially the Pakistani police forces are “poorly managed, ill-‐

equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized and chronically corrupt.”32 There seems to

32 Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success, April 2009, available at:

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be a deep-‐rooted malaise that has hindered or practically stopped efforts at

implementing reforms in the system, and there is a gradually growing weariness with

the extremely slow capability of the police forces to implement reforms (see section on

police below). This capacity gap obviously impedes police forces in Pakistan’s ability to

step up to challenges, and a mere increase in numbers by raising new forces – the

traditional favored response to crises in Pakistan – has not proved effective in

stemming the tide of terrorism.33 This inertia is also observable in other parts of the

NISA. Assuming that the duplication of roles is somehow eliminated or reduced –

resulting in more resources being streamlined and made available for the NISP – the

issues of capacity gaps and weak regulatory practices still remain. As such, these issues

will be daunting tasks for the Pakistani establishment to overcome in the short run.

NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM AUTHORITY The rationale for NACTA appears to be the need for focal institutions and national CT

strategies as regards to organizations that can coordinate national counter-‐terrorism

efforts after 9/11. Ostensibly, in this spirit, Pakistani government has aimed to give a

tremendous boost to NACTA, making it the most important stakeholder in the

development of the NISP. NACTA will be revived and efforts will be made to improve

coordination between all the intelligence agencies under a joint intelligence directorate,

the directorate of internal security (DIS); a NACTA driven research wing which will lead

national counter-‐terrorism and counter-‐extremism efforts. NACTA was given legal

standing through a piece of legislation passed by both the houses of the parliament in

November 2012 as the cabinet finally approved the draft NACTA bill which had been

proposed in 2009. The NACTA Act thus came into effect on April 11, 2013, finally giving

legal status to the organization, which had in fact been lying dormant since its inception

in January 2009. The bill mandated NACTA to be an independent authority, but placed it

under the administrative control of the Pakistani MOI. The head was designated as

'National Coordinator,' a nomenclature carried over from its previous existence as a

body struggling for organizational identity. As such, NACTA is not a new phenomenon,

but has been around for some years now. In its establishment, NACTA was tasked with

drawing up national CT and CE strategies in accordance with a consultative process with

relevant stakeholders. Ostensibly, even then, the main purpose of NACTA was to http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20-‐%20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf. 33 Ibid.

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organise loosely coordinated efforts to combat terrorism, thereby improving

coordination and reducing clutter in the system. However, till now, it has not been able

to do much on that front, mainly due to a lack of resources and legal status. When it was

set up, there were statements issued by the MOI that NACTA would work as a think tank;

it would conduct research and propose measures for a national counter-‐terrorism action

plan. However, although many such plans were chalked out, they never saw the light of

day.34 There were national coordinators who did not stay for more than a couple of

months, or in some cases even less. For example, the organization experienced a swift

turnover of four national coordinators in 2011. As such, as a result of NACTA’s many

problems, the interest of international donors faded away. Proposed funding such as the

15 million Euros pledged by the EU never saw the light of day; many other promises

were also gradually withdrawn.35 Furthermore, international bodies, such as Interpol,

which initially had expressed their enthusiasm in supporting the organization also lost

interest, as NACTA seemed immersed in legal issues involving its identity and

structure.36 At various times it was proposed to be an authority, an attached department

of the MOI, a corporation, etc.

The new NACTA Act37 envisages NACTA as being presided over by a high level Board of

Governors(BOG) headed by the prime minister; its members will be chief ministers of

all provinces and Gilgit-‐Baltistan, the prime minister of AJK, minister for law and justice,

one senator to be recommended by the Senate chairman, one parliamentarian (MNA) to

be recommended by the National Assembly (NA) Speaker, Ministry of Interior secretary,

Inter-‐Services Intelligence DG, Intelligence Bureau DG, Military Intelligence DG, national

coordinator, Federal Investigation Agency DG and the inspectors general of police of all

provinces, AJK and Gilgit-‐Baltistan. The board will be endowed with the power to

exercise all functions of the authority, and will also be responsible to approve policies

and annual budgets prepared by the authority. The bill requires all federal ministries

and provincial departments including corporations, bodies, set ups, controlled or

administered by or under the authority of Federal or Provincial Governments, to

34 Qaiser Butt, Civilian or military outfit? Tussle over who should lead counter-‐terror body, Express Tribune, June 1,2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/179949/civilian-‐or-‐military-‐outfit-‐tussle-‐over-‐who-‐should-‐lead-‐counter-‐terror-‐body/. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Can be found on the official NACTA website, Supra Note 1.

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provide information and data required for carrying out the purposes of the law. This

was deemed essential to give teeth to NACTA; before the promulgation of the new

NACTA law and NISP, whenever NACTA would consult stakeholders, it was not taken

seriously. Now it might finally be in a position to demand compliance in order to meet

its official obligations. However, it remains to be seen how the NACTA BOG will

coordinate with the premier parliamentary oversight body – the Cabinet Committee on

National Security (CCNS) – which also carries National Security Division's (NSD)

representation. The coordination interface and mechanism has not yet been clearly

defined, and may therefore cause jurisdictional overlaps and power struggles between

NACTA's BOG and the CCNS. The only oversight mechanism elaborated so far by the

government is that NISP agenda items would have priority in every cabinet meeting, but

such privileges hardly describe an elaborate device of civilian oversight by the

parliament. It might have been better that the relationship between the parliamentary

oversight body (CCNS) and NISP could have been set down in detail.

The issue of civil-‐military relations also assumes critical importance in this regard. The

role of the Pakistani Army reveals its distrust of politicians, which is sometimes more

than vindicated by lackluster performance of the civilian machinery. This highlights the

state's inability to construct an acceptable political framework for the management of

the state, including the acquisition and exercise of state power. The military's powerful

position within Pakistan's political system makes it the most formidable and

autonomous political actor in Pakistan, capable of influencing the nature and direction

of internal and external politics; in the strategic, foreign and even economic dimensions.

In this case, in practical terms it is difficult to see NACTA taking a dominant role in this

new security policy unless the military allows it, but why would the army give away a

sizeable chunk of its power to a civilian led body like NACTA? It is pertinent here in this

regard to mention that a stipulation built into the NACTA bill gives veto powers to the

security agencies if they deem any action not in consonance with NACTA's mandate. If

NACTA does not acquire the required abovementioned teeth, it will just be another body

with a glorified name attached to it, nothing more. This will merely become a cosmetic

touch like many others. Correspondingly, if NACTA does indeed obtain the authority it

needs, will it be able to stand at par in terms of capability with the decidedly more

effective military-‐driven entities with which it portends to coordinate? Judging from

20

previous experience, NACTA may require a long time before getting up to speed

(presumably if it gets there, in an ideal world) in terms of resourcing, capability,

delineation of hierarchy and jurisdiction, and other administrative matters which have

plagued fledgling organization in Pakistan for years. Will the more effective players have

the patience and the margin to wait for NACTA to sort itself out? Does Pakistan have the

margin of time when the precarious problem of terrorism is escalating in width and

breadth?

There have many times been a disconnect between intent and action when Pakistani

policymakers develop strategies in security-‐related matters. For instance, there has

been plenty of talk about madrassah-‐reforms during President Musharraf's reign.

Furthermore, NACTA has been in consistent birth throes ever since 2008 with

continuous claims of being 'reborn' every year. Therefore, concerted focus from most of

the administrative machinery of the Pakistani state apparatus is needed to implement

the 'wish lists' envisaged in the NISP; sometimes this reasoning seem more like wishful

thinking than facts on the ground. Would it not have been more logical to augment the

capability of existing forces rather than creating new ones from scratch? Given the vast

resources needed to train, equip, and operationalize the NISP, consuming tremendous

amounts of time, intent, capability and expertise; where will all these factors come from?

All these questions demand answers, and these will not be easy to come by.

NACTA has published an organogram on the NISP document,38 which shows a three

pronged hierarchy; headed overall by the national coordinator and assisted by the

deputy national coordinator, there will be three streams of DIS, Research and an

administrative function carried out by a chief of staff. The NISP implementation plan39

reveals NACTA's role not only with NISA, but also with multifarious persons, ministries

and departments like politicians, civil society, scholars, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

planning division, Ministry of Education, vocational assistance department like TEVTA

and NAVTEC, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Council of Islamic ideology, Ittehad ul

madaaris Pakistan, provincial education departments, Ministry of Law and Justice,

prisons, prosecutions, Ministry of Information and broadcasting, Pakistan 38 Supra Note 1. 39 Ibid. It is shown as a table showing various ministries and departments with which NACTA would interact to implement the plan.

21

telecommunication authority, PEMRA, Saffron Ministry and many others. In an ideal

world, NACTA would receive cooperation from all government departments, regardless

of which sphere they are in. In the practical world of Pakistani politics, however, it is

never that simple. Tensions between Federal and Provincial Governments exacerbate

the lack of coordination, driven by which political party heads the province, and how its

relations with the Federal Government are.

Particularly problematic is the issue of province-‐centre cooperation seen through the

lens of the 18th Constitutional Amendment of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of

Pakistan. The devolution process that followed this amendment in has entailed a major

shift in Federation-‐Provinces’ relationship, fulfilling a long standing demand of

provincial autonomy and fiscal space for community, as well as area specific

development. It was unanimously passed with the support of all political parties in the

Parliament and was promulgated on April 20, 2010. The Act includes 102 amendments

in all, which amended, substituted, added or deleted various provisions of the

constitution. During this devolution, seventeen federal ministries were devolved to the

provinces, but at the same time new divisions and ministries were created at the federal

level to absorb the retained functions of the devolved ministries. However, there have

been pot-‐holes from the very beginning; the provincial governments were eager to get

the additional powers and possibly resources, but there were serious concerns about

their administrative and financial capabilities, legal and contractual requirements and

human resource. For example, devolution of the Agriculture Ministry raised the major

question of national targets set for cash crops and commodities, their pricing and

subsidies. Similarly, devolution of Higher Education raised the issue of uniformity of

curriculum in an already politically polarized environment. In fact this devolution has

raised more questions than it answers. However, the major challenge for the provinces

is to create fiscal space to adjust to new financial liabilities and absorb the workforce. It

requires not only capacity building, enacting enabling laws, amending procedures and

revenue generation, but also fighting their cases for transfer of assets in the Council of

Common Interest (CCI).40 Lastly, the devolution puts an onus on the provinces to

continue this process of decentralization and bring the government as close to the

40 The Council of Common Interest is a constitutionally defined body that has the specific mandate of resolving inter-‐provincial and coordination of province-‐center relations.

22

people as possible, but that is far from being achieved due to the reasons above, as well

as many others.

Most importantly, law and order is a devolved provincial function, and thus the

provincial governments have authority over it. The issue of political ownership thus

raises its head; if the province is ruled by a political party which is sympathetic to the

Federal Government and NACTA (it being a federal body), then coordination will be

better, or vice versa. Since many of the departments with which NACTA envisages

cooperation have been devolved to the provinces, it remains to be seen what kind of

coordination mechanisms NACTA would be able to generate, especially in provinces

ruled by a party in opposition to the government. If NACTA faces more hurdles in one

province compared to the other, would it be able to claim being the convener of national

consensus on an issue? Even more importantly, would NACTA be able to handle an

entire spectrum of issues? Indications like this were tangible even during the drawing

up of the NISP, when officials from the opposition party Tehreek-‐e-‐Insaaf – which leads

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province – complained that they were never formally

consulted in drawing up the NISP.41

To put things into perspective, if NISP was to be rolled out effectively, NACTA would be

instrumental not only in implementing NISP, but also at raising public awareness on

the perils of letting terrorism and radicalization grow and on ways and means to curb it.

It would also undertake efforts at generating realization of the issues of radicalization,

religious extremism, and terrorism, and secondly, at countering radicalization and

terrorism by creating required responses on ideological, educational, academic,

legislative and social fronts. It would also be mandated to create a constituency for

counter-‐terrorism and peace among a cross section of Pakistani intelligentsia, media,

policymakers and religious scholars. A comprehensive implementation of the strategy

would involve educationists, who could be required to evaluate outmoded Islamist

curricula and replace them with more tolerant non-‐sectarian versions. Scientists can be

involved to jam illegal FM radio transmissions; the media can generate public service

messages and programs promoting tolerance. Threat priorities need to be established,

41 Ismail Khan, Pakistan most terror-‐hit nation , Dawn, February 23, 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1088864.

23

which stands true for the future of the War on Terror not only in the Pakistani, but in the

global context as well. Intelligence coordination in the 21st century will keep growing

more complex, as counter-‐terrorism in the future will require complex investigations

involving multiple countries, a variety of types of communication, and numerous

sources of intelligence. As such, it entails a collective requirement for an ever evolving

need for more sophisticated forms of counter-‐terrorism and greater resources. Add to

that the potential for 'managing' a Federal RRF, NACTA increasingly starts to resemble a

'Jack of all trades'. It is the era of specialized bodies, and ostensibly NACTA has been

created as a focal point for CE and CT efforts. However, the plethora of roles that have

been thrust upon it – from tactical issues, to terrorism research, to deradicalization

programs and preventive measures aimed at countering extremism – by their very

nature convert NACTA into a 'non-‐ specialist' entity. This is because these are all distinct

disciplines with certain overlapping contexts, but sometimes very different approaches.

Such concerns are why bodes like JTAC in UK for instance, remain essentially

intelligence coordination bodes; or why tactical forces remain tactical forces with the

'brains' bring located somewhere else, but in close coordination. The NISP itself lists

down a number of focal bodies of different nations, and it is clear from the list itself that

most of these bodies have focused, or at least sharply overlapping roles, making them

specialist bodies.42 So, a body which does intelligence coordination will only perform

such a function, while deradicalization regime enforcers would work under a different

environment and so on. National Counter Terrorism Centre (USA), Joint Terrorism

Analysis Centre (JTAC, UK), Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (JCTC, Germany), Australian

Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO, Australia), National Security Coordination

Secretariat (NSCS, Singapore)43 are such specialized bodies mentioned in NISP.44 The

NISP mentions only four entities which have more expansive functions in addition to

coordination mechanisms: National Counter Terrorism Centre (India), Counter

Terrorism Coordinating Agency (Indonesia), Directorate of Counter Terrorism

Coordination (Turkey), and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service.45 Ostensibly,

NACTA has been poised to have more expansive powers beyond just coordination of

intelligence, since its research wing will presumably interact with almost the entire

42 Supra Note 1.Annex 5, global counter terrorism models. 43 The entities from Singapore are duplicated in the table for unknown reasons. 44 Supra Note 39 45 Ibid.

24

gamut of administrative structures in Pakistan. This is besides the fact that it might

possibly be steering the Federal RRF as well, giving it a tactical oversight role, even

though that has not been forthcoming in the document as such. For an organization like

NACTA that has had a chequered past, in a developing country like Pakistan which faces

a huge number of challenges, perhaps a more limited but more specialized role would

have been better. A holistic homeland security role is a more ambitious target that

NACTA could have gradually aspired to. If NACTA does succeed in fusing all these

capabilities together, all the meanwhile resolving issues of civilian-‐military relations,

resources and capability, it might just be a novel (and a very successful such) body in the

world. If it does not, there is the potential of NACTA being swamped by the huge number

of roles being thrust upon it.

POLICE AND THE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING APPARATUS NACTA would presumably oversee the organizational restructuring and creation under

the NISP of a Directorate of Internal Security (DIS), wherein 33 civilian and military

intelligence and operational agencies would be represented to integrate tactical,

operational and strategic ‘levels’ of civil and military ‘verticals’. Essentially, this means

that all civil and military intelligence agencies would coordinate intelligence data

amongst themselves. This would probably be one of the most important restructuring

that would come out of the NISP, as the level of disconnect between these entities

remains quite large, as does the variance in their level of capabilities. It seems that the

only intelligence agency which has been comparably more successful at countering

terrorism in Pakistan is the military driven Inter-‐Services Intelligence (ISI).46 Its civilian

counterpart, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), used to have a thriving counter-‐terrorism

wing, but is currently not comparable to ISI's more expansive CT capabilities. The

civilian intelligence apparatus lags far behind in capability, especially the police, which is

unfortunate since they are supposedly the first responders to terrorism. They should

ideally be poised to generate invaluable intelligence due to ubiquitous presence of police

stations throughout the country. Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) has proven to be the

most viable mechanism for especially investigating terrorism, and the grass roots

presence of police in Pakistan should ideally be a huge factor for adopting this model.

ILP should be a collaborative exercise, that starts with information-‐gathering – at all 46 A majority of stakeholders involved in the intelligence coordination apparatus agree to this. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make value judgments.

25

levels of the organization – that is then analyzed in order to create useful intelligence

and an improved understanding of the operational environment.47 This is especially

useful in context of intelligence coordination within police, effectively strengthening the

NISA at large, with the police potentially being one of the biggest intelligence generating

sources from the civilian angle.

The strengthening of police has been stated to be primary goal in the NISP. Previous

trends, however, demonstrate that the progress in equipping the police in Pakistan with

better skills has been slow, done mostly in terms of sporadically increasing manpower.

In 2009, it was stated by the previous government that the Federal Government would

raise an additional 20,000 policemen, ostensibly to fight terrorism which had hit its

peak in Pakistan.48 Presumably, the target was not achieved, since the Pakistani Police

faces not just problems of under resourcing, but also of capacity gaps, which often

preclude many reforms.49 Hence, it remains to be seen how the RRFs in provinces and

federation will be recruited, and what their capacity levels will be. However, since the

reform package visualized in the NISP comes with a purse attached, there may be some

improvements in the recruitment accountability standards compared to those of the

police. The province of Punjab has for instance started the process of recruitment of the

RRF under CTD through an ostensibly independent National Testing Service (NTS),

which may yield positive results. However, there are issues which will need to be

resolved which go beyond mere numbers or recruitment.

The tactics and targets of the various terrorist groups operating in Pakistan are in a

constant state of flux, posing a formidable challenge to a Pakistani police force with

limited resources, poor training, and inadequate equipment. Pakistan’s police services

have failed to develop any systematic and advanced counter-‐terrorism strategy owing to

the lack of modern investigative tools, requisite skills and incentives. Law-‐and-‐order

issues, as well as the cumbersome and time consuming VIP protection responsibilities

47 Practical Guide to Intelligence-‐led Policing, new jersey state police, center for policing terrorism at the Manhattan institute , September 2006, http://www.newjersey.gov/njsp/divorg/invest/pdf/njsp_ilpguide.pdf 48 Supra Note 21. 49 “Pak police ill-‐equipped against terror”, Agence France-‐Presse, 31 March 2009, http://www.hindustantimes.com/Pak-‐police-‐ill-‐equipped-‐against-‐terror-‐analysts/H1-‐Article1-‐395066.aspx

26

devour a significant chunk of police resources.50 The police culture is synonymous with

corruption, nepotism, and political manipulation. The police in Pakistan is one of

Pakistan’s most poorly managed organizations. Recent half-‐hearted measures like the

Police Order of 2002 emulated the Japanese National Safety Commission system, seeking

ensure oversight of the police by both elected and nominated members at the local

(district), provincial, and national levels. Police complaints authorities at the provincial

and federal levels were also planned. The police still retained operational autonomy,

while various responsibilities and tasks (ranging from investigations, intelligence, watch

and ward, and guard duties) were divided among separate police departments in order

to improve the overall efficiency of the system.51 However, much of what was envisaged,

like giving powers to neutral and independent safety commissions, was eventually taken

back, or never materialized.52 Especially proposals related to accountability were never

properly implemented, and the supervisory mechanisms at the district, provincial and

national levels remained in limbo or were mainly talking shops. The committees which

were supposed to provide grass root oversight and accountability of police – the district

Public Safety and Police Complaints Commissions (DPSPCCs) – have had almost a

negligent existence, and where they exist, are merely convened meetings by the district

police officer (DPOs) to show that the formality has been fulfilled. The provincial

oversight body, the Provincial Public Safety and Police Complaints Commission

(PPSPCC) was authorized under the order to “take steps to prevent the police from

engaging in any unlawful activity arising out of compliance with unlawful or mala fide

orders.”53 Unfortunately, the notification and establishment of PPSPCCs throughout

Pakistan has also been very poor. Similarly, beyond releasing periodic reports, the

National Public Safety Police Complaints Commissions (NPSPPCs) have existed more on

paper than on ground, and have done very little beyond a few reports produced to

reform the police into an independent, accountable and efficient force.

50 The budget for VIP protection varies in urban and rural areas, but on average consumes around 30 percent of the functional operating (as opposed to total budget, more than 90% of which is said to be consumed by salaries) police budget. It is estimated to be around 50 percent in major urban centers of the country. 51 See, The Police Order, 2002 (with amendments and updates) (August 2007). Available at: www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/Police_order_2002_with_amendment_ordinance_2006.pdf 52 For details, see “Reforming Pakistan’s Police,” International Crisis Group Asia Reports, no. 157(July 14, 2008). 53 Article 80(1)(b) of the Police Order, 2002.

27

The police only numbers 350,000 policemen for a population of around 172 million, a

ratio of 1:477.54 The police are so involved in performing guard and VIP duties for an

increasing number of foreign dignitaries, politicians, and officials that it has no time for

'real work.'55 Law and order is now a provincially devolved subject, and there is a feeling

by the police in provinces that they do not get their due share of attention. Sometimes

the focus get unduly diverted to the federal scene, while many feel that the real work lies

with the provincial law enforcement agencies, i.e. CIDs and the police. The Pakistani

police investigate terrorism cases very badly at the court, and present these to the court.

Hence most of issues related to trying terrorism trials relate to this poor initial

investigation which determines most of all how the case would look at the prosecution

stage. The prosecution can only manage whatever investigative leads have been given to

it, while the judiciary can only rule on how the case is presented to it by the prosecution.

Thus, the biggest responsibility lies with the police; it must come up with cogent and

acceptable levels of investigation, which can be presented properly by the prosecution

in court. This is exactly what the police in Pakistan has not been able to do for so many

reasons, and that is precisely why many, if not most of the capacity gaps in indicting

terrorists lawfully, are due to the inability or incompetence of police to present its case

through proper a investigation or not following procedure.

This lack of proficiency lies embedded in structural problems within the police, the most

important of which being a lack of capability. The police officers in Pakistan are inducted

at the level of a constable56 and progress to inspector – the highest investigating level –

without any special training or even a proper notion of concepts concerning the

legalities involved in prosecution. To give the devil his due, the incentives given to police

are grossly inadequate as compared to the hazards faced by operational police officers

facing the eye of the storm. For instance in Balochistan, the CID till recently got a hazard

allowance set according to 2002 pay scales, which come down to about

Rs.1500/month.57 It has since been revised, but is still hardly adequate to attract the

best talents to a profession in which the officers have to stand in the frontline against

54 Statistics from National Police bureau. 55 “Pakistan: Police Weakness Mars Fight against Extremism,” Oxford Analytica, February 5, 2009. 56 This does not apply to the PSP, who are inducted as Assistant superintendents of police (ASPs) through the Federally conducted Civil services Exam (CSS). However, the PSPs rarely if ever investigate an Anti terrorism case personally; they prefer to be 'supervisory' officers. 57 12 GBP/month at exchange rates for that time

28

suicidal militants and deadly organizations. The level of work required is

disproportionate to the resources given. The police officers working cases often

complain that they lack the necessary resources (money, fuel, food, vehicles) for the

investigative process, causing them to sometimes use funds coming from their own

pockets; an experience they come face to face with on a regular basis in their

professional careers(hence the proclivity of police towards corruption). However, the

pressure of senior police officers forces the Investigating Officers (IOs) to get cases to

closure by putting up challans (cases sent to court), no matter what. Reporting a

terrorist case as untraced is frowned upon, as the senior officers themselves experience

a lot of pressure from higher echelons within the police, who in turn face pressure from

their political masters. Thus, many terrorism suspects are usually incriminated on flimsy

evidence, the consequence of which being the failure to convict terrorists in special anti-‐

terrorist courts (ATCs). This is because sending a terrorist case as 'untraced' reflects

badly on the police officers and their superiors. This lack of credibility of police is

reflected in the courts; the judges, as well as prosecutors, sometimes do not take

evidence tendered by police seriously.

The police does not have jurisdiction in all areas, especially in most of the troubled areas

like FATA. There are a few other non-‐policing areas as well, such as the 'A' and 'B' areas

in Balochistan. 'A' areas are controlled by police, and the district attorney has some level

of coordination with police, albeit of a very unsatisfactory level. 'B' area is policed only

by locally (mostly local tribes) raised levies, and they have virtually no comprehension

of prosecution or investigation. Indeed The level of policing in this area is so poor that

revenue officials are tasked with investigating high profile terrorism cases. Many

Tehsildars and Naib Tehsildars58 have been given powers of judicial magistrates

throughout the 'B' area in Balochistan for instance, due to shortage of qualified people

on ground. It is therefore not hard to imagine that investigations and the subsequent

coordination with prosecutors would be very unsatisfactory. Across the board in

Pakistan, there is complete disconnect between the pillars of prosecution; all work in

almost total isolation from each other, with hardly any overlaps.

58 Revenue officials at the lower rungs of the service, but critically important as the basic tier of revue collection since British times.

29

There is a huge issue of lack of coordination even within the police, as they do not

necessarily cooperate even with each other regarding terrorist challans (forwarding of

case to court), which the (operations) Station House Officer (SHO, officer in charge of a

police station) has to produce before the court. He does not help in adducing the

evidence, and since the investigation wing is grossly under prioritized compared to

operations, the case suffers as a consequence. Most police officers want to be posted in

the operations wing, as the operations wing has more powers; like the power of the SHO

to register a case, which gives him leverage on liberty of a person. Few people desire to

join the investigation wing due to the lack of resources compared to the operations

wing, even though the salaries are exactly the same. Also, the operations wing is

considered much more 'lucrative' (regarding corruption) than the investigations wing.

It is widely considered that the 'cream' of police gravitates to the operations side, since

it is ostensibly more lucrative, carries more clout, and attracts better talent. The

investigations wing is considered to be staffed with either incompetent people, or with

persons who do not have the clout to obtain job in other areas within the police. This

perception is rampant among policemen throughout Pakistan. This has a direct bearing

on terrorist cases, since it is the operations wing SHO which registers the case, but the

investigation wing which is supposed to investigate them; often the investigation wing

IO or person in-‐charge have to practically run after the operations SHO concerned in

order to complete the formalities of challan. In short, the investigations wing of police

does not have the same capability, resources or even motivation as the operations wing.

The investigation wing do not get too much cooperation from the operations wing,

which makes life harder since the operations people command most of resources in the

mutual administrative areas of both wings. As such, they are forced to practically pursue

their cases to be sent to court by the operations wing. Not only do the different wings

not coordinate with each other, but there is hardly any inter-‐provincial coordination

either. There is no coordination mechanism in actual practice which operates on

Standard Operating Procedures to allow officers of one provincial police to carry out

operations in another province. Generally, the Home Departments of both provinces

carry out lengthy communications before such operations materialize, which may make

timely investigations redundant. Therefore, the policing mechanisms of the provinces

communicate poorly even though the high level boards consisting of IGPs meet on a

periodic basis. The CIDs (precursors of CTD, who are to be owners of the provincial

30

RRFs) are beset by resource problems, both in the human dimension and in terms of

logistics. The CIDs (re-‐designated as CTDs) have traditionally had a 'hand me down' role

in terrorism cases, whereby suspects are handed to police for arrest and presentation in

court, after they have been grilled by security agencies. This is because the agencies are

not covered by legislation which gives them powers of arrest. Such a system creates a

vacuum between the investigation and the intelligence generation process, because the

prosecution ceases to have the assistance of people who know the actual facts on

ground. This vacuum enormously affects the trial. Police are supposedly the first

responders to the crime scene, but in actual practice tend to be more of an ambulance

service than an investigation unit, often destroying the evidence at the crime scene.

Since the security agencies are presumably much more efficient than the police in

working out cases, they do not necessarily trust the police with them. Therefore, when

the military authorities investigate cases, they have largely done the needed work; little,

if any evidence, is handed down to the LEAs.

The 'purest' civilian CT organization that has traditionally existed in the provinces have

been the provincial CIDs, which predate 9/11; some like the Punjab CID have faced

sectarian terrorism since the early nineties, long before terrorism became so widely

prevalent. They are in essence the face of the civilian CT in the provinces. However,

paradoxically, they have always been dependent on the district police’s powers in order

to make arrests. The scenario in which CT investigations are carried out by this

institutions is as follows: they investigate or generate intelligence in terrorism cases,

and then hand down the case for registration or challan to district police, who in many

instances, are improperly briefed or disinclined to work on terrorism cases. This

disinclination or lack of briefing is relevant in the context concerning how security

agencies hand over terrorism suspect to police as well. Concerning the apprehension of

such suspects, the police, even though cursorily briefed about the manner in which the

recoveries took place, how confessions were recorded to the military, etc, has to start

the investigation from scratch. As such, they look for stories that fit with the facts given

to them by security agencies. Thus, the police often has to concoct stories in order to

cover these lacunae, which sometimes border on the ludicrous; they range from what is

known as 'mukhbari' or 'spy information,' to officers having seen the principal accused

just 'standing around' five minutes after the blast, to just overhearing someone

31

conspiring to perpetrate terrorist activity in a crowded area.59 It is presumably with this

poor performance in mind that the Punjab Government decided to reorganize its CTD

with what it called its provincial anti-‐terrorism force (ATF).60 Apparently, this would

become the new RRF under NISP. Other CID forces have hardly fared any better. It needs

to be remembered that it is these CTDs which are proposed to be reorganized as the

group to which the provincial RRFs will have to answer.

There is the other side of the mirror as well; it is a considered opinion of some

investigators that keeping the accused with the army agencies is useful, as the police

cannot do enough in the remand period that they are given to hold the terrorists. This

has been recently corrected in the form of extending the custody period to 90 days in the

latest anti-‐terrorism act amendments, but the poor capability of the police to investigate

terrorism remains essentially unchanged.

It is an established fact that besides the (variable) capability of the CIDs that the police

does not have any credible intelligence about militant organizations. In fact, many police

officers shy away from inquiries, since this takes them into the realm of 'fruitless and

dangerous' investigations. Thus, much of this 'mukhbari' comes from the agencies,

which have a tremendously larger intelligence network regarding terrorism than the

police. However, since the police only has vague ideas of how this information was

generated, they tend to fumble with these cases in court, fabricating most of the

evidence in the case, called 'padding’; Consider this judgment from an ATC: "This is one

of those routine cases where the police use spy information to fill in the blanks without

any legal basis or morality. By bringing out accused already in jail and making him an

accused in this untraced case is nothing but a mockery of law."61 Thus, it's discernible

that spy information does not carry any credible lineage with the ATCs, who view it as a 59 State vs. Imdad Hussain and others, Offences Under Section 302, 324, 109, 427, 337(a), 1(III) PPC. Section 3, 4 ESA 1908. Section 6, 7 ATA 1997. P.S. Margala, Islamabad. Terrorist attack on welcome camp of chief justice of Pakistan. Case was heard in Anti terrorist Court 1, Rawalpindi, and the suspects were acquitted because of what was described as defective investigation by the Police, a very common happening in anti-‐terrorist courts. 60 Asad Kharal, Poor performance: Punjab to merge counter terrorism dept in new force, The Express tribune, October 23,2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/621222/poor-‐performance-‐punjab-‐to-‐merge-‐counter-‐terrorism-‐dept-‐in-‐new-‐force/ 61 This was in the case of a terrorist attack on the army, presumably a terrorist offence which the army would have taken seriously but the Police could not take up as required. See State vs.Sulman Shaukat, U/S 3/4 Expl.Act,324 PPC,7ATA. Case acquitted from Anti Terrorist Court Kohat.

32

device by the police to cover up corruption and incompetence. This does not make life

any easier for the police, even when they actually have been handed bonafide terrorists

by the army to 'pad' and present them to court.

Recent pieces of legislation legalizing eavesdrop-‐powers through intercept warrants like

Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2012 could also shrink some of the grey area in which the

ILP can legally operate if rolled out properly. The Investigation For Fair Trial Bill, 2012,

is a piece of legislation which has drawn a lot of attention, as it allows certain law

enforcement agencies to use modern evidence gathering techniques and surveillance

devices against terrorists. It potentially makes various forms of modern evidence

admissible in court, which obviates the need to rely heavily on ocular-‐based direct

evidence, which has been the norm in Pakistan for decades. The bill has also drawn a fair

amount of criticism due to the potential of posing a direct threat to the privacy and civil

liberties of citizens, since it is feared that security agencies would be empowered to

intercept communications as they see fit. It has been said that this may come in clash

with constitutional guarantees like Article 14 and 8 of the Constitution of Pakistan,

which guarantee inviolability of privacy of citizens. However, the government essentially

claims that this law plugs gaps, since “existing laws neither comprehensively provide for

nor specifically regulate use of advanced and modern investigative techniques such as

covert surveillance and human intelligence, property interference, wire tapping and

communication interception that are used extensively in other countries, including the

US, the UK and India.”62 Thus, even with this superficial review of the situation, the

possibility of the police becoming a major and reliable supplement in civilian

intelligence generating to NISA seems low. Recent legislations like the abovementioned

Fair Trial Act and the recent amendments to the 1997 Anti Terrorist Act have

supposedly rectified some of the deficiencies in the system. However, they have also

been blamed for correspondingly rendering these laws more draconian and less human

rights compliant, in effect adding additional procedural loopholes in some cases. In any

case, the CTDs and police structures would have to undergo drastic re-‐invention to

become even remotely efficient within the NISP.

62 Sultan Hali, How fair is ‘Fair trial bill?’Pakistan Observer, December 28, 2012, http://pakobserver.net/201212/28/detailnews.asp?id=189007

33

THE MADRASAH CONUNDRUM On the topic of religious schools or madrasahs, the NISP says: “It is important to mention

upfront that not all madaaris are a problem and therefore these must not be viewed

negatively as a whole. However, there were problems within some madaaris which have

spread extremism,” it adds, noting “financing from unidentified sources” and the

“publication and distribution of hate material.”63 The document notes that the vast

majority of madaaris in Pakistan fall outside government control, and that there are

allegations that some madaaris are also involved in preaching violence and propagating

hatred toward other sects and non-‐Muslims. “A large number of terrorists, either are, or

have been students of madaaris where they were brainwashed to take up arms against

the state,” the paper adds.64 There is no doubt that radical reformation of the madrasah

system in Pakistan is needed, as they have been at the eye of the storm regarding

terrorism, militancy, extremism and sectarianism, as well as for creating divisions

within the society.

However, it needs to be remembered that this is not the first time that the Pakistani

State has attempted to introduce madrasah reforms. Reforms in madrasah education has

been underway for some time, but post-‐9/11, the United States and other Western

countries have forced the Pakistani government to take more immediate measures in

this regard. Since then, irrespective of being elected or non-‐elected, the government has

been trying to introduce some reforms in the madaaris,65 but these attempts have failed

to materialize in any substantive way, mainly due to differences between the

government and the madaaris.66 Aspects of the madaaris reforms pertain to registration

of madaaris, curriculum reforms, inclusion of modern subjects and the presence of

foreign students; all of these suggestions have been discussed in order to bring madaaris

education at par with mainstream education systems. In the backdrop of reforms, the

government initially drafted the “Model Deeni (religious) Madaaris and Madrassa Board

Ordinance 2001,” which was passed by the Federal Cabinet on June 21, 2002. According

to the ordinance, the government would issue a gazette notification for the

63 Supra Note 1. 64 Ibid. 65 Lexically, the plural of singular Madrassah. The words madaaris can be used interchangeably. 66 Manzar Zaidi, The Madrassah challenge in Pakistan, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis( SISA)Norway, Report no. 3 -‐ 2013, March 2013, http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-‐03-‐04__SISA3_Madrassa_Education_-‐_Syed_Manzar_Abbas_Zaidi.pdf

34

establishment of Pakistan Madaaris Education Board. Such reforms would ostensibly

have modernized the education system by setting up “model” religious schools. Their

affiliations would be approved on the recommendation of Council of Islamic Ideology,

the official mouthpiece of the state on religious matters. 67 The board visualized

obtaining the authority to set curriculum and examination systems, and to hold teacher

training programs. However, the implementation of these reforms has not materialized;

only 449 out of the almost 25,000 madaaris under this law have been registered, while

only three “model” madaaris have been established throughout Pakistan. In June 2002,

the government drafted “Voluntarily Registration of Regulations Ordinance 2002” and

passed it through the Federal Cabinet. It could nevertheless not be promulgated as

staunch resistance from the madaaris prevented President Pervez Musharraf to sign the

decree.. Through this ordinance, the madaaris were to be asked to register voluntarily,

while funding through foreign financial assistance was banned. In October 2004, as a

next step, the government introduced the “Government Madrassa Reforms Program

2004.” According to this document, the madrasah curriculums must include English,

Mathematics, Social Studies and General Science, besides religious subjects on the

primary and secondary level. On the higher level, English, Computer Sciences,

Economics and Pakistan Studies were also to be taught. This program remained only

marginally successful.68

The issue of madrasah registration is very important in the current debate. In this

context, the Directorate of Research and Coordination (DRC) within NACTA has been

tasked with this for maintaining databases of them. However, it remains to be seen how

the DRC will approach this problem in a way that is different from past attempts.

Historically, madaaris are registered as charity organizations under the Societies

Registration Act 1860, but requirements for registration were removed in 1990. The

issue of registration once again surfaced during Musharraf’s time in office in the form of

heated debates, culminating in the government’s promulgation of the Societies

Registration (Amendment) Ordinance 2005 for the registration of madaaris; an

amended version of the ‘Societies Registration Act 1860.’ This act stipulated oversight of

madaaris by requiring them to issue annual reports of their activities – including the

67 Ibid. 68 Ibid.

35

annual budget and receipts of revenue and expenditure – to the registrar. All madrasahs

were prohibited to teach or publish any literature or material that promoted terrorism,

sectarianism or religious hatred. However, this ordinance too did not work out as

planned. The Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaaris Pakistan (ITMP) – the umbrella body

representing madaaris – resented this intervention by state, claiming that the

government was unduly seeking credentials from madaaris.69

These attempts at madaaris reform predate Musharraf times; during the Benazir Bhutto

era, the government tried to ban the registration of new madaaris, but did not succeed.

Registration remained closed for many years after the Bhutto's regime, and the

government propagated that madaaris were not willing to register themselves. During

the Musharraf era, negotiations started with the madaaris in order to get them

registered. This was attempted in the ambit of Societies Registration Act 1860, under

which madaaris were registered since 1950; resulting in an amended version of the

document with the addition of section 91.

The main problem concerning madaaris is the presence of unregistered or ghost

madaaris. The total number of madaaris affiliated with the wafaqs70 is approximately

28,000; besides them, a large number of unregistered madaaris are also present in the

country. Scores of these unregistered madaaris escape scrutiny of the government since

those are usually built as an ‘additional’ room in mosques, where students get Nazira

Quran and Hifz (learning Quran by heart) lessons. For the abovementioned reasons, the

mushrooming of unregistered madaaris has become a severe problem for the

government, particularly since many of these unregistered madaaris are located beyond

the reach of the Federal Government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

or other remote areas of the country. Tremendous growth of madaaris has been

witnessed in the last 25 years – especially in the era of Zia-‐ul-‐Haq. His Islamization

policies resulted in an explosion of madaaris in order to obtain a large recruitment base

of fighters to support the Afghan Mujahedeen in their war against the Soviet Union.

69 Ibid. 70 Wafaqs are madrasah boards, which are groupings of madrasahs organized along sectarian lines. So there will a wafaq for Shia sects, the Wafaq ul Madaaris Shia and so on for every sect. Wafaqs are the mouthpieces for that sectarian style of teaching, and they usually nominate spokespersons which interact with the state if required.

36

There is no credible information for the number of unregistered madaaris, particularly,

since these are generally located in remote areas. Thus, many such ghost madaaris

escape detection.71

The state has tried many times to implement reforms, but it seems that even the systems

of education in madaaris have not been completely understood by the policy makers,

who have merely tried to plug in perceived gaps. Detecting these ghost madrasahs will

be exceedingly difficult, but have cross cutting implications if successful. The madrasah

stakeholders will be reluctant to register or will attempt to hide these ghost madrasahs

from the fiscal authority, and may even mobilize religious street power in the shape of

mass protests if steps are forcibly taken. Religious entities in Pakistan may not have the

electoral power often claimed by analysts, but they can certainly mobilize very effective

street power in furtherance of religious or political agendas. It remains to be seen how

DRC will overcome this inevitable resistance in regards to how the registration of

madrasahs will play out. Furthermore, there is the issue of stigmatization of reforms; the

government started madrasah reforms in the backdrop of 9/11, commonly perceived by

madaaris as under pressure from Western powers. Thus, any efforts in this regard are

perceived as part of a ‘foreign agenda’ by the madaari religious establishment. Not

enough research was done to understand these Islamic systems of education, and the

term ‘reform’ was used even when there was no consolidated pool of knowledge about

the madaaris education system. This lack of vision and strategy created differences

between the stakeholders. Irrespective of concerned ministries and departments, the

debate about these systems gained an emotive element. This mitigated the impacts of

any proposed reforms, since it was unclear what was needed to be done to control the

madaaris in order to curb terrorism, and what substantive reforms were needed to

upgrade this education system.

Initially, different Wafaqs held negotiations with the government individually. Later on,

they developed an umbrella organization consisting of five Wafaqs, the ITMP mentioned

earlier. It needs to be noted here that Wafaqs are constituted on basis of religious sects,

so the very basis of madaaris is sectarian in nature. They differentiate between each

other on this basis, but are pragmatic enough to come together on issues of reform,

71 Ibid.

37

which the ITMP terms as a conspiracy of the West. ITMP admits that even though there

have been few arrests of terrorists from madaaris: most neither produce terrorists, nor

are hideouts for extremists. They argue that the condition of the public sector

educational institutions concerning radicalization is also very bad, but question why the

government is concentrating on madaaris instead of improving the mainstream

educational system in the public sector.72 The ITMP are of the view that the government

has consistently failed to take any concrete decision regarding madrasah reforms, since

it does not appear to be serious in this regard. As the main government arm

spearheading these reforms, ITMP holds the bureaucracy responsible for the lack of

progress, and further claims that since madaaris are in the realm of the private sector,

the government cannot effectively control them. Reform in accordance with

government aspirations are thus not possible; ITMP puts forward the argument that the

government is privatizing its various institutions, but it is surprising that it is trying to

control religious seminaries.73 The situation is complicated by the fact that madaaris are

hugely popular due to being a form of social NGOs; a perception which gives them the

potential to mobilize street power against the state if it tries to implement reforms.

Many madaaris provide free board, lodging and meals for the ultra-‐poor who have no

other means of subsistence. Furthermore, these people even have a chance at earning a

livelihood as Imams in mosques or religious teachers after they graduate. Added to this

is the fact that even though there is a huge aura of producing terrorists, a very tiny

minority of them actually have been implicated in such crimes,74 except for some

madaaris in FATA, KP and border area of Balochistan. However, as elaborated earlier,

they are organized along sects, which undoubtedly contribute to increasing sectarian

tensions in the country. Sectarian terrorism gains fuel from unabashed propagation of

one's own sects, while relentlessly bashing others. Furthermore, any attempt at reform

will have to cater to the fact that a huge number of people who get their livelihood from

the madaaris' social NGO function will need alternate means of livelihood and support, a

herculean task for Pakistan. The madaaris are religious entities, and will use the

inherent religiosity in Pakistani ethos to generate resistance against what they perceive

as foreign sponsored attempts at reform. The DRC of NACTA will have to grapple against

72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid.

38

these odds to be successful in order to achieve the necessary reforms in madaaris

outlined in the NISP.

A COUNTER-‐TERRORISM AND COUNTER-‐EXTREMISM NARRATIVE The policy document offers a candid and introspective look at where Pakistan has been

failing in its efforts to fight terror, calling on the government “to build a national

narrative on extremism and terrorism.”75 Opinion polls in the past have shown that

there is no overwhelming public consensus on tackling extremist groups. Most of the

emphasis of the government has been on strengthening laws in a series of legislative

developments, the most recent of which is the promulgation of the Pakistan Protection

Ordinance. However, many issues need rethinking within NISP to develop a national

narrative that go beyond mere laws. Pakistan has since its inception been beset with

internal contradictions and continues to remain unstable, unsure, and insecure about its

future. This insecurity has manifested itself in Pakistan looking for regional co-‐operation

and an enhanced optimism about its military capabilities. A narrow survivalist model of

national security has dominated the political discourse of the country and continues to

be the central pillar in Pakistan's strategic calculations. National security is a larger

concept than just defence. It comprises the utility of power and the psychology of

national vulnerability that go far beyond the mere protection of its territory.

The threat of extremism and radicalization has exponentially risen in Pakistan in the

course of the last decades. These phenomena are much more confusing in the sense that

they are widely diffused but sufficiently ambiguous in Pakistan inasmuch as they are not

identifiable as an enemy per-‐se. Conservative values are cherished in Pakistani society,

and a stream of reports in the Western media about ‘‘extremism,’’ ‘‘fundamentalism,’’

and the conservative mind-‐set of the Pakistani public as a monolithic entity does nothing

to reveal the nuances of the problem. Most Pakistanis continue to live peaceful and

mundane existences marked by a mixture of progressiveness, conservatism, and

traditional Islamic values.76 A society that displays such values is not easily understood

by the West, and sometimes even by itself. Bearded men or veiled women are not signs

of extremism in Pakistani society by default, but the presence of extremist and fanatics

75 Supra Note 1 76 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, 'Hating the Taliban, Hating the United States: Trajectories of Pakistan's Anti-‐Americanism', American Foreign Policy Interests, 2009, 31: 6, 376 — 388.

39

who arise from within the population cannot be denied. Since the factors which give

rise to this 'spawning' is not even properly understood by the Pakistani public and

policy makers alike, it is not surprising that they continue to remain ambiguous for the

world at large.

The problem is compounded by the fact that even identifiable terrorist entities in

Pakistan have morphed into fluid command and control structures that do not show up

on the security radar clearly. Al-‐Qaida particularly remains elusive partly because of its

propensity to rapidly alter its command and control structures in response to changing

circumstances.77 The difficulty in substantiating linkages is that the organization has

become decentralized in Pakistan by integrating itself into local jihadist movements.

Even Bin Laden's death may not reveal much more about the changing structure of al

Qaeda in Pakistan, since it probably exists in a networked structure composed of small

'cells' found in jihadist organizations such as Lashkar-‐e-‐Jhangvi(LJ), as well as in

'clusters' of these cells within the larger Taliban umbrella organization.78 Thus, even

though the entity is clearly recognizable as an enemy, the structure of the entity is not,

since it is so fluid. Many militant entities have transformed into more ambiguously

demarcated organizations, such as the LJ, which has expanded its ambit of sectarian

terrorism significantly in the last few years. What was previously a hit and run entity

seems to have become more organized, but its organizational structure nevertheless

remains unknown. Even more confusingly, the TTP – the biggest enemy of the state – is

not a monolithic entity but rather a constantly morphing conglomerate of loosely

connected 'militant franchises' which could be formed from anything from a few

militants to organized bands of thousands.79 Thus, even on superficial scrutiny, such

kind of fluid structures of the enemies clearly present a dilemma of comprehension to

the state.

77 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, Pakistan's Security Dilemmas; On Doctrines, Perceptions and Institutional Interests, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA) Norway, Report no.6, June 2013, http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-‐06 14_SISA6_Report_PakistansSecurityDilemmas_Manzar_Zaidi.pdf 78 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, ''Geographic Trajectories of Al-‐Qaida and Taliban Terrorist Groups in Pakistan', Journal of Strategic Security, Journal Volume 3, Number 1-‐ Spring 2010 Issue. 79 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, 'The Taliban Organization in Pakistan', RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 5, October 2009.

40

The parameters of setting out a national security doctrine thus need to be

comprehended in their intensity, which can be defined in terms of how much

preparation is needed to cater to the scale of activities by the enemy which constitutes a

certain quantum of threat.80 A state facing a dilemma of comprehension of what its

opponents look like (in terms of structure, intent , capability etc.) will not be able to

make a rational choice decision as to when and how to prepare for a full out war,

counterinsurgency, engagement or any other measure to counter the enemy. Trends

now show that the Pakistani military is much more successful in tackling the militants

head on. Of course, the state may get to learn about these enemies gradually, but the

learning curve has been and will continue to be painful as long as ambiguity about the

enemy remains. This is a major challenge for the state.

The civilian criminal justice structure has correspondingly remained incapable of

lawfully convicting terrorists, allowing many to escape through the judicial process,

despite the many laws which are enacted but not properly implemented. Civilian

structures, like the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) and the

NACTA, had largely been talking shops till now, which is a general reflection of poor

governance by civilian structures across the board. Politicians have not been able to add

much clarity to this unsatisfactory state of affairs so far. They have also failed to mobilise

the Pakistani public properly in eradicating the twin menace of terrorism and

extremism, even though the public itself is now overwhelmingly against terrorism and

seems to long for peaceful existence. Even though legal frameworks such as robust

counterterrorism laws are needed, ideological sanction is also important in the fight

against terrorism in order to ease the apprehensions of the common Pakistanis. Even

though there have been fatwas issued by the federally-‐driven Council of Islamic Ideology

(CII) as a religious narrative by the state, the council needs much more public

credibility; especially after the negative publicity it has accrued regarding its

controversial fatwas about women and allowing child marriage.81 The CII has recently

declared that Pakistani men would not need to seek permission from their wives for re-‐

80 Supra Note 1. 81 The Council was established to review Pakistan's existing legislation to be in line with religious Shariah laws, but many analysts believe its constitutional mandate is against the principles of the modern nation-‐state. See Wajahat Ali, Ideological battle brews in Pakistan between religious, secular factions, Channel News Asia, May 2, 2014, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/ideological-‐battle-‐brews/1092492.html

41

marrying, and has declared the ban on child marriages as against Islam.82 Other

ministries such as the now provincially devolved youth, women’s affairs and the

religious affairs ministries could have been galvanised to take up traction following from

the initiatives of the CII (if it had remained non-‐controversial), within the ambit of a

security doctrine. However, one can clearly see that there are religious tensions even

amongst the pinnacle of state driven religious entities, and it remains problematic to

grant to such bodies ideological steer on policies regarding counter-‐extremism and de-‐

radicalization. On the other hand, stand-‐alone initiatives by NACTA will not go in any

concerted direction as has been demonstrated by various such initiatives before. For

that very reason, some form of parliamentary committee on national security may be

used by the government to reinvigorate the parliamentary oversight, so that top level

ownership of NACTA-‐driven initiatives can take place; a BOG, no matter how powerful,

may not be enough. Complete sincerity in politico-‐religious engagement at the very top

levels may be required.

On the other hand, extremism as a philosophy is by now deeply ingrained and rapidly

spreading in large sections of Pakistani society. Representations of extremism in the

media, both local and international, are blurred by an indistinct categorization of origin

and purpose. This may be affecting strategies and policies towards containment of

extremism and radicalization of certain groups and communities. Constraints in

carrying out extensive research of extremism are due to lack of resources and

information, whereas even if information is made available, its reliability is

questionable. Also, the politics of research may not allow for accuracy of information,

whereas sources of accurate information may not be available for academic analysis due

to security constraints. Subjectivity of opinions is another issue affecting objective

analysis, especially since historical data is not available in the majority of areas which

need to be investigated. Furthermore, there has to be dependence on subjective analysis

and hypothetical conclusions. NACTA will have to bridge all these gaps, and the DRC,

which is responsible for implementing the soft measures will be put to the test.

It should be the government’s priority to identify and document reasons for growing

extremism within Pakistan and list identified extremist groups through available

82 Ibid.

42

sources of information. Furthermore, it is paramount to identify vulnerable groups and

individuals with tendencies to join extremist factions. These groups will include male

and female students of public and private education centres/madrasahs/unemployed

youth/under trial and imprisoned juveniles and adults. This should be the thrust of

NACTA's implementation of the DRC within NISP. This would still require extensive

consultations from opinion leaders and information gatekeepers throughout the country

in order to make the strategy implementation more representative of the national

consensus about terrorism in Pakistan. This would entail widespread consultations with

experts, LEAs, religious scholars, interviews with interred terrorists, civil society, etc.

This component would require that DRC becomes integrated and comfortable in not

only the domain of the public sector, but should also aim to win over the confidence of

the wider sphere of citizens and civil society.

One of the solutions has been the establishment of a counter-‐terrorism environment

created by politicians through legislation, budgets and policy decisions. Legislation will

be a part of the directing tangential forces of counter-‐terrorism. In Pakistan, such

legislation is resonated by the anti-‐terrorist acts passed by the government, which

sometime gives sweeping powers to the law enforcing agencies. The inherent global

challenge in these developments will be balancing the rights of citizens and fundamental

constitutional guarantees against the increasing threat from terrorism. This is the

delicate balancing act that counter– terrorism and extremism in the future will continue

to face, especially for the security agencies directly involved in these operations. Thus,

the main challenges for CT and CE in the future will be the level of coordination

required, which seems to be exponentially increasing in scale. These are huge

challenges, and it remains to be seen how they will be dealt with by the NISP.

CONCLUSIONS NISP certainly has enormous significance, which a news article succinctly sums up by

saying: "The significance of the 100-‐page document is not trivial. Is the first time that

not just a serious effort has been made to capture key challenges to national internal

security in a seamless single narrative by an elected dispensation but that it identifies

gaps between the state’s responsibilities and actions and offers solutions to address

these deficiencies. But perhaps the most important aspect of NISP is that it offers the

43

first integrated sweep of the challenges and solutions from a civilian

perspective…..(which is a departure from the vaguely defined) threats facing ‘Islamic

Pakistan’ from obscure or imagined sources based outside Pakistan rather than the

internal threats that the NISP focuses on. NISP is not just a first by being a clear civilian

perspective on a turf traditionally dominated by the security establishment but also bold

in its diagnosis in policy articulation…..it is a big step forward in weaning control of the

narrative that defines the purpose of the state as being in service of its subjects rather

than vice versa.”83

However, one of the significant factors that need to be examined is NOT the document,

but rather the long time it took for the government to articulate it. This fact is telling for

the implications of the fundamental challenges facing the political forces in Pakistan

when trying to create a new narrative.84 Admittedly, these are wish lists that seem to

have been produced as though a hurried study of existing international models was

carried out. However in the case of Pakistan the country may not be able to undertake

such ambitious models in its current state of development. The dilemma escalates when

there are other challenges with which the state has to cope, such as economic problems

commonly faced by developing countries. These concerns will exacerbate the

uncertainty horizon for such states, since what may be a perfectly viable strategy for a

financially secure state may not be feasible for one facing economic hardship. Socio-‐

cultural factors also cause limitation of choice; such as the religious environment of the

state when facing national security uncertainty, ethnic and nationalist violence, etc.85 As

Michael Mandelbaum, an academic and analyst of the phenomenon has argued, “Similar

security policies recur throughout history and across the international system in states

that, whatever their differences, occupy similar positions in the international system. . .

The security policies of very strong states are different from those of very weak ones,

and both differ from those of states that are neither very strong nor very weak.86” Thus,

83 Adnan Rehmat, In the driver’s seat, finally?, The News on Sunday, March 9, 2014, http://tns.thenews.com.pk/drivers-‐seat-‐finally/#.U2MrCPmSy8B 84 Ibid. 85 Manzar Zaidi, Pakistan's Security Dilemmas; On Doctrines, Perceptions and Institutional Interests, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA) Norway, Report no.6, June 2013, http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-‐06-‐14_SISA6_Report_PakistansSecurityDilemmas_Manzar_Zaidi.pdf 86 Michael Mandelbaum,' The Fates of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 2, 4.

44

there are certain structural paradigms that will nudge a state towards a certain national

security and foreign policy path which resonate with their international standing. As

that standing improves or deteriorates, the choices for a national security and foreign

policy trajectory expand or shrink simultaneously. Academic Robert Gilpin sates that, “a

more wealthy and a more powerful state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and

welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state,”87, which implies that its

foreign policy goals and national security goals will be broader and more expansive.

Correspondingly, states with fewer resources at their disposal will have fewer choices in

rationalizing an expansive security doctrine. It is only when states reach a certain level

of development that they can attempt to explore possibilities of expansive doctrines

with more international outreach.88 Such resource constraints may also be relevant in

context of NISP.

There is certainly a Pakistani context to implementing the NISP; mere cognizance and

admission of facts may not be enough to make the policy materialize. From centre-‐

province relations to civilian-‐military relations to devolution to stakeholder reticence or

inertia to move out of status quo, NISP would have to overcome obstacles which have

proved insurmountable till now. For instance, NACTA’s birth pangs reveal the

organizational ethos, when federal entities (the MOI and Prime Minister's Secretariat)

were involved in turf wars over which one would take primacy in leading NACTA. The

problem is exacerbated when it is taken to the next level; centre-‐province relations,

which remain tenuous in Sindh, KP and Balochistan, three of the four provinces.89 When

Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar presented the 100-‐page policy in the presence

of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the minister stated that it was a debatable policy, and

every parliamentarian had the right to discuss it since it was a national policy, and not

solely the ruling party Pakistan Muslim League –Nawaz's (PML-‐N) initiative.90 Before

drafting the NISP, the government had written letters to the chief ministers of all the

four provinces and the leaders of all the national parties. However, even though the

87 Robert Gilpin, 'War and Change in World Politics'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 22–23, 94–95. 88 Fareed Zakaria, 'From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role'. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 2–3. 89 Leaving aside AJK and Gilgit Baltistan, which have special administrative structures. 90 Hadi Aziz, Much-‐awaited ‘National Security Policy’ presented in National Assembly to handle terrorism, The News tribe, Feb 26th, 2014, http://www.thenewstribe.com/2014/02/26/much-‐awaited-‐national-‐security-‐policy-‐presented-‐in-‐national-‐assembly-‐to-‐handle-‐terrorism/

45

policy was prepared in six months, no political party except the MQM gave suggestions

on how it should be formed.91 This put questions marks on stakeholder ownership of the

NISP when it reaches the implementation phase.

Another issue is the 'force paradigm'; ever since insurgency raised its head in Pakistan,

the armed forces have been the most effective (some would say the only) force deployed

in a counterinsurgency campaign against the terrorists. The presence of foreign jihadis,

and Afghan trained jihadis returning to Pakistan complicates the issue. Value judgments

aside,92 the Pakistani army is a critical player in the country’s struggle against terrorism.

Not only because they are supposed to, but also because they have been thrust into

these roles as civilian structures like the police are at the moment inept to handle such

roles. The only operational deradicalization campaigns erected in the aftermath of the

incursions in Swat in 2009 – the projects Sabahoon and Mishal – were both military

driven initiatives, and there have never been any viable civilian projects to compare.

Thus, lofty ambitions and principles aside, pragmatically, any civilian initiative will have

to start on a learning curve and has to win over the military as a willing partner in order

to be successful. The civilian-‐military debate seems to be raised more and more in

Pakistan now, but mere slogan mongering will not get anywhere unless both the entities

sit down and decide to work in complete harmony, rather than the isolated silos that

they are accustomed to.

The interplay between power and politics also needs to be considered. Politics plays a

huge part in any security strategy, since internal conditions may be as instrumental as

shaping doctrine as external ones. Put simply, national strategy may become the flag

bearer of political stances rather than rational choice strategic ones. Such aspirations for

gaining and retaining power may also evolve into hegemony.93 Hegemonic postures will

tend not only to give a global orientation, but will also intentionally diffuse the context of

the enemy. Thus, instead of clearly identifiable enemies, esoteric threats such as chaos,

'terror', instability, etc. will become dominant themes. As then President George Bush

articulated US strategy even before the Persian Gulf War, “As the world's most powerful

91 Federal Cabinet approves National Security Policy, Pakistan Defence, http://defence.pk/threads/Federal-‐cabinet-‐approves-‐national-‐security-‐policy.301782/ 92 Which are beyond the scope of this paper anyways. 93 Supra Note 72.

46

democracy, we are inescapably the leader, the connecting link in a global alliance of

democracies. The pivotal responsibility for ensuring stability of the international

balance remains ours.”94 This resonates with the fact that America now has multiple

enemies and its alliances like the Global War On Terror has tended to see waxing and

waning periods. Thus, as seen with the American case, no matter how much it is glossed

over, power struggles and turf wars play a huge part in national security doctrines, as

they may for Pakistan.

Even then, bold admissions of problems plaguing the security establishment are a first in

Pakistan. "From acknowledging that religion in its worst avatars such as sectarianism is

tearing the country apart to emphasizing that the two dozen security agencies are

competing for resources rather than supplementing efforts for shared outcomes; from

finally confirming that hate is indeed being taught in educational institutions leading to

intolerance to rejecting demands for extremist interpretations of religion by the state;

from accepting the compulsion of building institutional capacities on counter-‐terrorism

to pledging to eliminate implementation gaps that allow margins for militant groups to

dictate terms to the state, NISP looks like it is not just some stop-‐gap style as a substitute

for substance.”95

Perhaps the biggest issue to overcome will be that of regulatory quality, which may be

defined in governance parlance as an official body exercising authority over some area

of citizens' activity in a supervisory or governing capacity. Regulatory agencies typically

should be concerned with making and supervising implementation of rules and

regulations, and imposing supervision or oversight for the benefit of the public at large.

Such tasks in the modern world now require sometimes great expertise, since the

rapidly changing world requires rapid implementation of public authority in certain

sectors, especially when reform is to be effected in government service delivery. This

reform is indicated by governance indicators. Such indicators measuring the robustness

of governance in Pakistan have tended to dramatically decline over the past decade; for

example, Pakistan’s World Bank World Governance Indicator ranking fell from 15.9 in

2000 to a low of 0.5 in 2009, placing Pakistan lowest in South Asia, even behind 94 National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, March 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/national_security_strategy_90.pdf 95 Supra Note 85.

47

Afghanistan. 96 Even though the transition to a democratically elected civilian

government in 2008 was initially hailed as a giant leap forward, there was not been

much progress even though the 2008 government completed its tenure, the first

democratically elected government to do so. Even with the second government in place,

indicators of economic performance and the state of democracy have not improved

significantly enough to indicate robust governance. For instance, the Bertelsmann

Transformation Index (BTI) of ‘stateness’ marginally declined from 4.6 to 4.5 (out of 10)

between 2006 and 2010.97 Even now, little seems to have changed. State responsiveness

tends to remain static, and state capability concerning the provision of public goods has

significantly declined.

Pakistan was ranked at the 35th percentile of the World Bank’s World Governance

Indicators (WGI) on Regulatory Quality in 2008, considerably up from 29 in 2007, but

down from 38.5 in 2006.98 After a series of plateaus and dips, in 2013, it was still quite

bad. Pakistan’s regulatory systems are weak, primarily because regulations are often

poorly specified, regulatory agencies lack capacity, policy is inconsistent and there is a

lack of transparency. Legislation is sometimes passed, but then not fully rolled out or

implemented. This raises several questions: Where are the key bottlenecks in the

system? Is failure to implement legislation due to lack of capacity or other politico-‐

economic reasons?

One consequence of patronage politics is that people’s direct experience with the state

is extremely limited. The public education system, land revenue administration, courts

and police remain the primary interfaces. Yet incorporation of the law and order system

into local patronage networks has created a market for dispute resolution. Inequality

has shrunk in urban areas, contributing to poverty reduction, while in rural areas

inequality has increased. This trend occurred while growth was still robust indicating

that inequality is widening for the unskilled rural poor, and closing for the more

educated and skilled urban population. Growth levels are currently not sufficiently high

to reverse this trend, and the 2010 floods have pushed more rural people below the

poverty line. Although there have been reform interventions to protect gender and 96 Supra Note 72. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid.

48

minority rights, this remains an area where progress is constrained by deep-‐set

structural inequalities and the rise of conservative values. The gulf between the political

elite and the majority is mirrored by civil society, and indirect rule has opened up an

unregulated chasm in state-‐society relations which civil (and uncivil) society of one form

or another has often filled. At one level, Pakistan has an impressive history of activism to

protect gender, minority and democratic rights and advocate for social improvement,

yet at another level Pakistan has a history of violent community-‐based political and

sectarian organizations.99

Regulatory reform proves difficult as specialization, role separation and coordination is

perceived as threatening or unnecessary, especially within bureaucracy in Pakistan.

Regulation is a hot issue in all sectors in the country and the challenge is to move the

exploration of reforms beyond the tendency to think either of departmental silos or

large additional bureaucracies. In this environment, successful implementation of the

18th Amendment will be determined by the ability of legislators and the bureaucracy to

properly align incentives for reform, which has not been forthcoming so far.

Notwithstanding the need for NISP, and 'its heart being in the right place', there will be

immense challenges posed when trying to institutionalize it. The strengthening of

institutions and peace-‐building work are needed to address the key issues of indirect

rule, regionalism and radicalization. Challenges such as contested religious values,

ethnic divisions and insecure boundaries, as well as the lack of institutional and fiscal

capacity pose severe challenges to institutionalizing robust structures. Unless regulatory

frameworks are drastically improved or redefined, the typical knee jerk reaction of

creating large bureaucracies to deal with rising challenges will keep failing.

99 Ibid.

49

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir ATA Anti Terrorist Act ATC Anti Terrorist Court BOG Board of Governors CAF Civil Armed Forces CCNS Cabinet Committee on National Security CDP Combined Deterrence Plan CE Counter Extremism CII Council of Islamic Ideology CRP Comprehensive Response Plan CT Counter Terrorism CTDs Counter Terrorism Departments CTW Counter Terrorism Wing DG Director General DIS Directorate of Internal Security DRC Directorate of Research and Coordination FATA Federally Administrated Tribal Areas ICT Islamabad Capital Territory ILP Intelligence Led Policing IO Investigating Officer ITMP Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaaris Pakistan LEAs Law Enforcement Agencies LJ Lashkar e Jhangvi MNA Member National Assembly MOI Ministry of Interior NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority NISA National Internal Security Apparatus NISOC National Internal Security Operation Center NISP National Internal Security Policy PSP Police Service of Pakistan PTI Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf R&D Research and Development RRF Rapid Response Force SHO Station House Officer TTP Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan VIP Very Important Person

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2014-06-05 SISA25 NISP Challenges Ahead MZ

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