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2014 CYBERCRIME ROUNDUP - RSA Security€¦ · 2014 CYBERCRIME ROUNDUP The Year of the POS Breach....

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FRAUD REPORT 2014 CYBERCRIME ROUNDUP The Year of the POS Breach More than any other cybercrime or fraud threat, the breach of retail chain Point of Sale systems and the theft of credit card data from millions of shoppers was in the headlines most in 2014. The vast majority of those breaches can be attributed to POS malware attacks. Despite the ease of targeting payment cards and banking information of individual users, fraudsters are finding that compromising retailers is much more lucrative and that smaller merchants can also be easily breached. A common attack/infection method is to leverage the POS vendor’s remote access connection (via RDP/VNC) to run routine maintenance on the device. Most of the POS malware attackers enumerate running processes and use pattern matching (mostly RegEx) to identify and extract payment card information from the running process memory. Figure 1: Colorful Chewbacca admin panel login screen
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F R A U D R E P O R T

2014 CYBERCRIME ROUNDUP

The Year of the POS Breach

More than any other cybercrime or fraud threat, the breach of retail chain Point of Sale

systems and the theft of credit card data from millions of shoppers was in the headlines

most in 2014. The vast majority of those breaches can be attributed to POS malware

attacks.

Despite the ease of targeting payment cards and banking information of individual users,

fraudsters are finding that compromising retailers is much more lucrative and that smaller

merchants can also be easily breached. A common attack/infection method is to leverage

the POS vendor’s remote access connection (via RDP/VNC) to run routine maintenance on

the device. Most of the POS malware attackers enumerate running processes and use

pattern matching (mostly RegEx) to identify and extract payment card information from

the running process memory.

Figure 1: Colorful Chewbacca admin

panel login screen

page 2R S A M O N T H LY F R A U D R E P O R T

Featured POS Malware include:

Chewbacca – a private Trojan featuring two distinct data-stealing mechanisms: a generic

keylogger and a memory scanner designed to specifically target POS systems. Identified as

a possible agent of the enormous scale POS system breaches that hit retail chains in 2014.

Backoff POS – features a keylogger, memory scraper, and magnetic Track1/Track2

harvester, with added support for integrated keyboard magnetic card readers.

LusyPOS – features a magnetic Track1/Track2 harvester that communicates over the TOR

network, making the communications and the C&C servers harder to detect.

MOBILE MALWAVE EVOLVES

With the steady adoption of mobility and BYOD, mobile threats continued to gain

significant traction in 2014. The combined amount of mobile malware/high risk apps has

reached 2 million, a growth of 170,000 per month.

In Q2, 2014, 85% of the mobile device market was occupied by Android, and 98% of all

existing mobile malware targeted the users of Android devices.

Featured Mobile Malware Cases:

iBanking mobile bot – an SMS hijacker designed to work in conjunction with banking

Trojans. Discovered in underground chat rooms by the RSA Research Team in February,

2014 leaked source code revealed advanced capabilities and anti-SDK protection

mechanisms.

The bot has several features including enumeration of all installed apps on the infected

device, harvesting images from the device, and collection of precise geo-location data.

An added feature is the growing support for additional targeted entities – recent analysis

identified nearly 30 graphic templates for iBanking.

Mobile BOT APK – In May, an update to an Android mobile application package (APK) was

discovered to be a malware bot application. The app disguised as a token generator for

mobile online customers of an Eastern European bank. New features include SQLite table

for stolen data saved on the victim’s phone.

Figure 2: Control panel for iBanking –

available in various colors and themes

Figure 3: Example of fake token

generator mobile app

page 3R S A M O N T H LY F R A U D R E P O R T

THE UNDERGROUND MARKETPLACE DEVELOPS

The underground marketplace is continuing to develop, allowing fraudsters to outsource

services with increasing ease. The RSA Research Team has identified notable trends over

the year: the emergence of forum specific currencies (MUSD, UAPS, United Payment

System); a new, anonymous payment system knows as LessPay; a supply and demand

that is not only driving down the cost of credentials, but also bringing about the advent

of a CC store mobile app.

REGION SPECIFIC LOCALIZED FRAUD

One trend that seems to continue developing is region specific fraud that targets a

particular geographic region and/or language. LATAM countries seem to be experiencing

a rise in financial fraud in 2014, with fraudsters beginning to develop the sophistication

of their tools and methods.

Featured LATAM fraud case:

Bolware and Boleto fraud – In July, the RSA Research Team discovered a large fraud ring had

compromised the popular Boleto payment method in Brazil, deploying malware that is

estimated to facilitate the theft of billions of Dollars from innocent victims. Bolware and

Boleto fraud continue to evolve, as an ‘Onyx’ version of Bolware, and a non-malware related

DNS poisoning method that compromised Boleto transactions was also uncovered.

FRAUDSTERS LEVERAGE LEGITIMATE FINANCIAL PORTALS

Fraudsters searching for vulnerabilities or weaknesses in a financial system occasionally

find ways of abusing legitimate services or portals to perform fraudulent transactions or

gather background information on their intended victims.

Abused legitimate financial portals:

Voxis Team – a team of fraudsters created an automated cash-out platform that enables

automatic online transactions using stolen credit card data and forged or stolen

transaction IDs to make purchases via the compromised merchant IDs, and transfer the

payment funds to fraudster mule accounts. The fraud platform includes a control panel

and uses algorithms that imitate real online consumer behavior – staggering purchases

and fund transfers, as well as randomizing the amounts of each transaction to minimize

suspicion and detection.

Financial Data Aggregators – the RSA Research Team reported on fraudsters who use

legitimate financial data aggregation (personal money management) services to gain

insight into a potential victim’s financial profile and balance, as well as their online

transaction behavior patterns.

page 4R S A M O N T H LY F R A U D R E P O R T

Phishing Attacks per Month

RSA identified 46,747 phishing attacks in

December, marking a 24% decrease from

November. Based on this figure, RSA

estimates phishing cost global

organizations $453 million in losses.

US Bank Types Attacked

Regional banks were targeted by one-quarter

of all phishing volume in December while

U.S. nationwide banks experienced an 8%

increase in phishing volume – from 50%

to 58%.

Top Countries by Attack Volume

The U.S and Canada accounted for over

75% of attack volume in December,

followed by the UK, India, and Spain.

46,747 Attacks

Credit Unions

Regional

National

64%

12%

8%

4%

UK

India

Canada

U.S.

DECEMBER 2014Source: RSA Research Team

www.emc.com/rsa

CONTACT USTo learn more about how RSA products, services, and solutions help solve your business and IT challenges contact your local representative or authorized reseller – or visit us at www.emc.com/rsa

Top Hosting Countries

US hosted 48% of phishing attacks in

December, followed by UK, Germany and

China. 5%7% 3%

48%

GLOBAL PHISHING LOSSESDECEMBER 2014

©2015 EMC Corporation. EMC, RSA, the RSA logo, and FraudAction are trademarks or registered trademarks of EMC

Corporation in the U.S. and/or other countries. All other trademarks mentioned are the property of their respective

holders. JAN RPT 0115


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