2015 NDI 6WS Framework Addendum

Definitions

Framing/Grammar

Government Policy

Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government actionJon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have

slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the

subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into

action through governmental means . 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade,

for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing

diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

Resolved

AOS – Legislation

“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum.AOS 4 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs:

(colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

Parcher – Legislative Bodies

“Resolved” is legislative Parcher 1 (Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution

to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary

wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies .

A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

USFG

Three Branches

“United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government. OECD 87 — Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Council, 1987 (“United States,” The Control and Management of Government Expenditure, p. 179)

1. Political and organisational structure of government The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see

Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

Should

Immediacy

“Should” requires immediacy Summers 94 (Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11-8-1994, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” online: http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 ***TO FOOTNOTES In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or

immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882). ***END FOOTNOTES The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record. Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase

to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless

intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor

bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State.

Federal Action

“Should” requires defending federal action Judge Henry Nieto 9, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary

2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7 A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections

governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find

the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d

940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16]

have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

Framework Impacts

Predictability/Stasis

Galloway

Topical fairness requirements are key to meaningful dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg roleRyan Galloway 7, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is

rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team.

According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other

involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies.

Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their

own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p.

196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008

college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative

case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

Steinberg and Freeley

A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference in order to promote effective exchange Steinberg and Freeley 13, * David, Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League. Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA. And ** Austin, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, JD, Suffolk University, Argumentation and Debate, Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, 121-4

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of

interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy

about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals,

interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For

example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by

a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively,

controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec tive of the debate . This enables focus on substantive and objectively

identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions.

Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci sions , general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For example, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertisements even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audience or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal discourse occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition,

debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates

will offer alternative (pro or con) argumentation calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to identify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is

about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In academic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be

made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly

educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terrible job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their

classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and

emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for

debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In academic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportunity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective

decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example,

the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen tation . If we take this statement to mean Iliad the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with

Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of

debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Dryzek

Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponentJohn Dryzek 6, Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University, Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No. 3, July 2006, Pp. 634–649

2. A more radical contemporary pluralism is suspicious of liberal and communitarian devices for reconciling difference. Such a critical pluralism is associated with agonists such as Connolly (1991), Honig (1993), and Mouffe (2000), and difference democrats such as Young (2000). As Honig

puts it, “Difference is just another word for what used to be called pluralism” (1996, 60). Critical pluralists

resemble liberals in that they begin from the variety of ways it is possible to experience the world, but stress that the experiences and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups are likely to be very different from dominant groups. They also have a

strong suspicion ofliberal theory that looks neutral but in practice supports and serves the powerful. Difference democrats are hostile to consensus, partly because consensus decisionmaking (of the sort popular in 1970s radical groups)

conceals informal oppression under the guise of concern for all by disallowing dissent (Zablocki 1980). But the real target is political theory that deploys consensus, especially deliberative and liberal theory. Young (1996, 125–26) argues that the

appeals to unity and the common good that deliberative theorists under sway of the consensus ideal stress as the proper forms of political communication can often be oppressive. For deliberation so oriented all too easily equates the common good with the interests of the more powerful, thus sidelining legitimate concerns of the marginalized. Asking the underprivileged to set aside their particularistic concerns also means marginalizing their favored forms of expression, especially the telling of personal stories (Young 1996, 126).3 Speaking for an agonistic conception of democracy (to which Young also subscribes; 2000, 49–51), Mouffe states: To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a universal rational consensus— that is the real threat to democracy. Indeed, this can lead to violence being unrecognized and hidden behind appeals to “rationality,” as is often the case in liberal

thinking. (1996, 248) Mouffe is a radical pluralist: “By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life” (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their

work advocates sustained attention to communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences imply “subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics” (1996, 247).

Mouffe raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with respect. Respect here is not just (liberal) toleration, but

positive validation of the position of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing “equal respect,” under “ procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking ” (1996, 126).

Schlosberg speaks of “agonistic respect” as “a critical pluralist ethos” (1999, 70). Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Young’s (2000, 16–51) case reasonable. Thus

neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus. This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply “anything goes” in terms of the substance of positions. Recall that Mouffe rejects differences that imply subordination.

Agonistic ideals demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worries about dogmatic assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks “transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice”

(2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike, regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in

retreating from “anything goes” relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in democratic debate.

Creativity Impact

They’ll say that their aff has better education, but this misses the point. Topical constraints are a better conduit for creative argumentation. Limits incentivizes innovation to find ways to express one’s arguments within the confines of the topic. Intrator 10—David Intrator, President of Strategic Documentaries, Founder of The Creative Organization, holds an M.A. in Music from Harvard University, 2010 [“Thinking Inside the Box,” Training magazine, October 21st, Available Online at http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box, Accessed 02-20-2012]

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and

innovation , is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a

professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth . This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives,

expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact,

creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving , and by definition a

problem is a constraint, a limit, a box . One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by

excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both

intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits , set priorities , and cull

patterns and relationships from a great deal of material , much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the

material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big

mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like . Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You

might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess , organizing those fragments into something real ,

something useful , something that actually works . That’s the hard part . It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box .

AT: Limits Bad

Debate inevitably involves exclusions and normative constraints---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits which solves the case Amanda Anderson 6, prof of English at Johns Hopkins The Way We Argue Now, 33-6

In some ways, this is understandable as utopian writing, with recognizable antecedents throughout the history of leftist thought. But what is distinctive in Butler’s writing is the way temporal rhetoric emerges precisely at the site of uneasy

normative commitment . In the case of performative subversion, a futural rhetoric displaces the problems surrounding agency, symbolic constraint, and poststructuralist ethics. Since symbolic constraint is constitutive of

who we can become and what we can enact, 34 there is clearly no way to truly envision a reworked symbolic. And since embracing an

alternative symbolic would necessarily involve the imposition of newly exclusionary and normalizing

norms , to do more than gesture would mean lapsing into the very practices that need to be superseded. Indeed, despite Butler’s insistence

in Feminist Contentions that we must always risk new foundations, she evinces a fastidious reluctance to do so herself. The forward-looking articulation of performative politics increasingly gives way, in Bodies That Matter, to a more reflective, and now strangely belated,

antiexclusionary politics. Less sanguine about the efficacy of outright subversion, Butler more soberly attends to ways we might respond to the politically and ontologically necessary error of identity categories. We cannot choose not to put such categories into play, but once they are in play, we can begin to interrogate them for the exclusions they harbor and generate. Butler here is closely following Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s position on essentialism,

a position Butler earlier sought to sublate through the more exclusive emphasis on the unremitting subversion of identity.18 If performative subversion aimed to denaturalize identity and thus derail its pernicious effects, here, by

contrast, one realizes the processes of identity formation will perforce proceed, and one simply attempts to register and redress those processes in a necessarily incomplete way. The production of exclusion, or a constitutive outside, is [butler quote starts] “the necessary and founding violence of any truth-regime,” but we should not simply accept that

fact passively: The task is to refigure this necessary “outside” as a future horizon, one in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in the process of being overcome. But of equal importance is the preservation of the outside, the site where discourse meets its limits, where the opacity of what is not included in a given regime of truth acts as a disruptive site of linguistic impropriety and unrepresentability, illuminating the violent and contingent boundaries of that normative regime precisely through the inability of that regime to represent that which might pose a fundamental threat to its continuity. . . . If there is a violence necessary to the language of politics, then the risk of that violation might well be followed by another in which we begin, without ending, without mastering, to own—and yet never fully to own—the exclusions by which we proceed. (BTM, 53) [butler quote ends]Because the exclusionary process is productive of who and what we are, even in our oppositional politics, our attempts to acknowledge and redress it are always post hoc. Here the future horizon is ever-receding 35 precisely because our own belated making of amends will never, and should never, tame the contingency that also begets violence. But the question arises: does Butler ever propose that we might use the evaluative criteria governing that belated critical recognition to guard against such processes of exclusion in the first place? Well, in rare moments she does project the possibility of cultivating practices that would actually disarm exclusion (and I will be discussing one such moment presently). But she invariably returns to the bleak insistence on the impossibility of ever achieving this. This

retreat is necessitated, fundamentally, by Butler’s failure to distinguish evaluative criteria from the power-laden mechanisms of normalization. Yet the distinction does reappear, unacknowledged, in the rhetoric of belatedness, which, like performative thresholdism, serves to underwrite her political purism. As belated, the incomplete acts of “owning” one’s exclusions are more seemingly reactive and can appear not to be themselves normatively implicated. We can see a similar maneuver in Butler’s discussion of universalist traditions in Feminist Contentions. Here she insists that Benhabib’s

universalism is perniciously grounded in a transcendental account of language (communicative reason), and is hence not able to examine its own exclusionary effects or situated quality (FC, 128–32). This is, to begin with, a mischaracterization. Benhabib’s account of communicative reason is historically situated (if somewhat

loosely within the horizon of modernity) and aims to justify an ongoing and self-critical process of interactive universalism—not merely through the philosophical project of articulating a theory of universal pragmatics but more significantly through the identification and cultivation of practices that enable democratic will formation.19 Butler then introduces, in contrast to Benhabib, an exemplary practice of what she calls “misappropriating” universals (Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic is cited here). Now, it is hard not to see this as a species of dogmatism. Bad people reinscribe or reinforce universals, good people “misappropriate” them. Benhabib calls for the

reconstruction of Enlightenment universals, but presumably even reconstruction is tainted. The key point, however, is that misappropriation is a specifically protected derivative process, one whose own belatedness and honorific disobedience are guaranteed to displace the violence of its predecessor discourse. Let me pursue

here for a moment why I find this approach unsatisfactory. Simply because the activity of acknowledging exclusion or

misappropriating universals is belated or derivative does not mean that such 36 an activity is not itself as powerfully normative as the “normative political philosophy” to which Butler refers with such disdain. There is a sleight of hand occurring here: Butler attempts to imply that because such activities exist at a temporal and critical remove from “founding regimes of truth,” they more successfully avoid the insidious

ruse of critical theory. But who’s rusing who here? Because Butler finds it impossible to conceive of normativity outside of normalization, she evades the challenging task of directly confronting her own normative assumptions. Yet Butler in fact advocates ethical practices that are animated by the same evaluative principles as communicative ethics: the rigorous scrutiny of all oppositional discourse for its own newly generated exclusions, and the

reconfiguration of debilitating identity terms such as “women” as sites “of permanent openness and resignifiability” (FC, 50). Both these

central practices rely fundamentally on democratic principles of inclusion and open contestation. Communicative ethics does no more than to clarify where among our primary social practices we might locate the preconditions for such activities of critique and transformation. By justifying its own evaluative

assumptions and resources it aims not to posit a realm free of power but rather to clarify our own ongoing critiques of power. This does not mean that such critiques will not themselves require rigorous scrutiny for harboring blindnesses and further exclusions, but neither does it mean that such critiques will necessarily be driven by exclusionary logic. And communicative ethics is by no means a “merely theoretical” or “philosophical” project inasmuch as it can identify particular social and institutional practices that foster democratic ends. By casting all attempts to characterize such practices as pernicious normalizing, Butler effectively disables her own project and leaves herself no recourse but to issue dogmatic condemnations and approvals.

AT: Predictability Bad

Breaking down predictability is self-defeating and impossible---pure creativity requires the existence of constraints--- retaining some degree of predictability enables creativity within those constraints without pre-scripting every debate Paul Armstrong 2k, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking. 8 Iser shares Lyotard's concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to

limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard's endorsement of the "sublime"--the pursuit of the "unpresentable" by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms-- is undermined by contradictions , however, which Iser's explication of play recognizes and addresses.

The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser's sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries depends on and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes.

[End Page 220] The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of

the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play. Iser's notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser's analysis of "regulatory" and "aleatory" rules. Even the

regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, "permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own" (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a

game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and open-ended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

AT: Fairness Bad

Procedural fairness is most important—it establishes expectations for preparation and facilitates respectful and productive dialogue between well-prepared opponents. Massaro 89 — Toni M. Massaro, Professor of Law at the University of Florida, 1989 (“Legal Storytelling: Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?,” Michigan Law Review (87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099), August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)B. The Rule-of-Law Model as Villain Most writers who argue for more empathy in the law concede that law must resort to some conventions and abstract principles. That is, they do not claim that legal rules are, as rules, intrinsically sinister. Rather, they argue that we should design our legal categories and procedures in a way that encourages the decisionmakers to consider individual persons and concrete situations. Generalities, abstractions, and formalities should not dominate the process. The law should be flexible enough to take emotion into account, and to respond openly to the various "stories" of the people it controls. We should, as I have said, move toward "minimalist" law. Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. n52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. n53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations. My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. n54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas. Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. n55 As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, n56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal. Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. n57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. n58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle

of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings. A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural

regularity – “law for law's sake" – because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives.

Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [*2113]

party to follow them . n59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt

us deeply , regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements

create expectations , and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest

predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships . n60

DMS/Deliebration

Lundberg

The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threatsChristian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary

pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech

—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the

citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl

Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our

current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediated information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of

important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical

students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of

democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of

terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an

increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive

and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

Rice – USFG Key

Public resistance to surveillance starting at the USFG is critical – creates the most effective advocates and change Rice 15 (Rebecca, University of Montana, “Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy,” pg online @ http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5439&context=etd)//ghs-VA

Public Sphere Resistance Based on these critiques, Greenwald identifies several actors who can change US surveillance policies: the public, the government, and journalists. As discussed above, the first group Greenwald calls on is the public, which he encourages to deliberate to resist surveillance . Greenwald reminds his audience that “it is human

beings collectively , not a small number of elites working in secret, who can decide what kind of world we want to live in” (2014, p. 253). However, aside from average citizens, who can come together to discuss surveillance, Greenwald also names special actors within the public sphere. In the epilogue of NPTH, Greenwald says that Snowden's leaks triggered the first global debate about the value of individual privacy in the digital age and prompted challenges to America's hegemonic control over the Internet. It changed the way people around the world viewed the reliability of any statements made by US officials and transformed relations between countries. It radically altered views about the proper role of journalism in relation to government power. And within the United States, it gave rise to an ideologically diverse,

trans-partisan coalition pushing for meaningful reform of the surveillance state (p. 248). These changes stem from the public sphere, and occurred through public discussion. Greenwald's “trans-partisan coalition” can be conceived of as a public,

which he calls into being as he addresses this group in NPTH. Greenwald's created public. Warner (2002) encourages scholars to frame publics discursively, saying they exist “by virtue of being addressed” (p. 413). Greenwald calls a concerned

public into being throughout NPTH, often by discussing his readers as a collective “we.” Greenwald's created audience is concerned about surveillance, and willing to take public action to advocate for reform . Greenwald

emphasizes the choice readers can make with Snowden's leaked NSA documents. He says that Snowden's leaks can create a new discussion about surveillance, or they can fade due to public apathy. In the introduction to NPTH, he writes That's what makes Snowden's revelations so stunning and so vitally important. By daring to expose the NSA's astonishing surveillance capabilities and its even more astounding ambitions, he has made it clear, with these disclosures, that we stand at a historic crossroads. Will the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political freedoms that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of omnipresent monitoring and control,

beyond the dreams of even the greatest tyrants of the past? Right now, either path is possible. Our actions will determine where we end up. (2014, p. 6). Greenwald gives the audience two choices and links their actions to the two potential paths. In

this way, he begins the process of public deliberation, which Goodnight (2012a) describes as a momentary pause in which we examine political paths, both taken and untaken. “As deliberation raises expectations that are

feared or hoped for, public argument is a way to share in the construction of the future,” he says (Goodnight, 2012a, p. 198). Greenwald shares his interpretation of the choice the public must make with this information. He projects two alternative futures based on the public's deliberation about privacy. This shared future is emphasized through his use of the words “our,” “everyone,” and “we,”

which link readers together as the American public. Greenwald's projected paths put the decision into the readers' hand, emphasizing the public's ability to act and intervene in technical surveillance. Through invitations to

deliberate, Greenwald addresses his readers as part of a public sphere. Greenwald also argues that deliberation is an effective way to resist surveillance and curb surveillance abuses. Greenwald offers an example from his own life. He says he first learned of the power of deliberation when he heard from Laura Poitras, another journalist who accompanied him on the trip to Hong Kong. She said that she had been detained in airports dozens of times as a result of her writing and filmmaking. Greenwald covered the interrogations of Poitras in a Salon article, which received substantial attention. In the months afterward, Poitras was not detained again. In NPTH, Greenwald

writes “The lesson for me was clear: national security officials do not like the light . They act abusively and thuggishly only when they believe they are safe, in the dark. Secrecy is the linchpin of abuse of power, we discovered,

its enabling force. Transparency is the only real antidote” (2014, p. 12). Greenwald generalizes this example to other abuses of

power. He says that power without deliberation is “the ultimate imbalance, permitting the most dangerous of all human conditions: the exercise of limitless power with no transparency or accountability” (2014, p.

169). Greenwald presents public deliberation as the solution and antithesis to surveillance, which he calls for the public to undertake. After addressing readers as members of this public, Greenwald names special actors within the public sphere who can also

help to effect change. Government reform. First, Greenwald says the government must make changes in order to curb abuses from the NSA, and that readers should pressure the government to do so. Greenwald says that public branches of the government do not have enough control over the NSA. Giving examples of reform that occurred after his reporting, Greenwald says that he and Snowden were pleased by a bipartisan bill introduced to US Congress. This bill proposed defunding the NSA, which was “by far the most aggressive challenge to the national security state to emerge from Congress since the 9/11 attacks” (2014, p. 249). The bill did not pass, but only by a small margin, which Greenwald portrays as a hopeful sign of reform. Additionally, Greenwald suggests “converting the FISA court into a real judicial system, rather than the onesided current setup in which only the government gets to state its case, would be a positive reform” (2014, p. 251). Greenwald's suggestions for change go beyond individual acts to put pressure on government policy reform. By

reforming the FISA court, the secrets of the NSA would be public knowledge. Though Greenwald writes about power from a Foucauldian

perspective, he proposes large acts of resistance to the public problems created by surveillance in addition to small acts to resist the discipline of individual bodies. These ideas are compatible with Foucault's (1997) idea of

critique, however, which he defines as “the art of not being governed quite so much” (p. 45). Greenwald asks the audience to resist through public sphere discussion in order to negotiate the way they are governed. He argues that

discussion through the public sphere can alter power relations between citizens and the US

surveillance state . Though the government is considered completely separate from the public sphere by many scholars (Habermas,

1974), others push back on this idea (e.g. Asen & Brouwer, 2001). In the case of the NSA, other government branches are considered members of the public by Greenwald. Greenwald notes that many congressional members were unaware of the tactics used by the NSA, including spying

on Congress itself (2014). For these reasons, Greenwald specifically calls on Congress to be part of the solution .

This should occur through legislative reform spurred by public pressure. Greenwald's summoned public addresses politicians as well as average citizens.

Mimoso – NSA

Debates over meta-data and the NSA and uniquely key now – outweighs your education claims. Mimoso 14 (Michael, award-winning journalist and former Editor of Information Security magazine, a two-time finalist for national magazine of the year. He has been writing for business-to-business IT websites and magazines for over 10 years, with a primary focus on information security, “NSA Reforms Demonstrate Value of Public Debate,” March 26, 2014, https://threatpost.com/nsa-reforms-demonstrate-value-of-public-debate/105052)//ghs-VA

The president’s proposal would end the NSA’s collection and storage of phone data; those records would remain with the providers and the NSA would require judicial permission under a new court order to access those records. The House bill, however, requires no prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on the request after the FBI submits it to

the telecommunications company. “ It’s absolutely crucial to understand the details of how these things will

work ,” the ACLU’s Kaufman said in reference to the “new court order” mentioned in the New York Times report. “There is

no substitute for robust Democratic debate in the court of public opinion and in the courts. The system of oversight is

broke and issues like these need to be debated in public .” Phone metadata and dragnet collection of digital data

from Internet providers and other technology companies is supposed to be used to map connections between foreigners suspected of terrorism and threatening the national security of the U.S. The NSA’s dragnet ,

however, also swept up communication involving Americans that is supposed to be collected and accessed only with a court order. The NSA stood by claims that the program was effective in stopping hundreds of terror plots against U.S. interests domestic and

foreign. Those numbers, however, quickly were lowered as they were challenged by Congressional committees and public scrutiny. “The president said the effectiveness of this program was one of the reasons it was in place,” Kaufman said. “But as soon as these claims were made public, journalists, advocates and the courts pushed back and it could not withstand the scrutiny. It’s remarkable how quickly [the number of] plots turned into small numbers. The NSA was telling FISC the

program was absolutely necessary to national security, but the government would not go nearly that far in defending the program. That shows the value of public debate and an adversarial process in courts.”

Racism Impact

Dialogic democracy is the best way to dismantle racism—our vision of debate is the opposite of exclusionGooding-Williams 3 Race, Multiculturalism and Democracy Robert Gooding-Wiliams Robert Gooding-Williams (Ph.D., Yale, 1982) is the Ralph and Mary Otis Isham Professor of Political Science and the College. He is also a Faculty Associate of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory and an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture. His areas of interest include Du Bois, Critical Race Theory, the History of African-American Political Thought, 19th Century German Philosophy (especially Nietzsche), Existentialism, and Aesthetics (including literature and philosophy, representations of race in film, and the literary theory and criticism of African-American literature). Before coming to the University of Chicago he taught at Northwestern University (1998-2005), where he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities (2003-2005), Adjunct Professor of African American Studies, and an affiliate of the Program in Critical Theory. Before coming to Northwestern he taught at Amherst College (1988-98), where he was Professor of Black Studies and the George Lyman Crosby 1896 Professor of Philosophy, and at Simmons College (1983-88), where he taught philosophy and directed the program in Afro-American Studies. Issue Constellations Volume 5, Issue 1, pages 18–41, March 1998

I begin with the assumption that fostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of public education in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this

view, successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a

proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view, to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes

mutual understanding across cultural differences, thereby fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has

included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others" in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is

an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, one cultivates a skill which is motivationally conducive to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society.61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group

differences, I have been suggesting that deliberative debate of this sort is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural

America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences through cross-cultural dialogue and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and

Asante's kitsch, because it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or

ethnic identity in the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that cross-cultural educational insights, since they can effect

changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, may alter and further complicate those

persons' identities, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing

that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, specifically race-conscious.

Decolonization Impact

Deliberation key to solve colonization and social inequalityLeung 10 (Cheuk-Hang, Institute of Education, London, “Decolonization through Deliberation Teaching Democratic Citizenship in a Quasi-LiberalDemocratic Society,” November 2010, https://www.ioe.ac.uk/about/documents/About_Overview/Cheuk-Hang_L.pdf)//ghs-VA

Introduction: Civic Education, Decolonization, and Quasi-Liberal-Democracy Issues on decolonization and democratization always provoke

heated debates across different classes, races, religions, political camps, and cultural groups in postcolonial societies. Social struggle for democratic citizenship could be a tough and long process for the post-colonial society, as those domestic elites and

conservative groups with vested interests who succeed the colonial authority do not easily concede power. Furthermore, It is not uncommon to see a re-legitimization of authoritarian rule in some post-colonial states (Grugel, 2002). This paper aims to present a philosophical analysis of democracy teaching in a post-colonial society. My focus will be on approaches to teaching civic and political education in such a contested socio-political environment, given that the transition to full-scale democracy normally takes a fairly

long period of time. In the meantime, transitional politics always creates some forms of injustice, and post-colonial governments may seem resistant to promote the kind of citizenship education that favors democratic reform. Thus, civic education may be confined to, for example national identity building, instead of teaching democratic values. This paper addresses the key question of how to and who should teach citizens about the project of democratization and decolonization, given the apparent retreat of the state from the teaching of democratic citizenship in some postcolonial situations. The main

theme of this paper is to argue that the concept of deliberative democracy represents a cooperative learning

process for the public sphere ; and that this could be essential for the development of democratic culture.

Deliberative democracy should therefore, serve as an educational ideal for democratic citizenship education, whereas deliberation per se

should be embraced as a means of civic education for the transformation to a democratic and decolonized citizenship . My focus on deliberation will highlight the moral salience of teaching „controversial‟ history through public

deliberation. Therefore, as an illustration of the educative function of deliberation, in the later part of this paper, I will consider the moral implications of informal democratic education through the commemoration of a traumatic historic event in a postcolonial society, especially during the period of transitional politics towards the ultimate goal of decolonization. The progress of the decolonization project in part lies in

the maturity and intensity of the democratic civic discourse within a given society, though constitutional reform still ought to be recognized as the necessary indicator. A full-scale democracy not only rests with democratic transformation of political

institutions, but also requires the citizenry to take up a set of (liberal) values that can facilitate democratic operation and consolidate an open minded democratic life. The classical Marxist critique of colonialism, such as writers like Lenin and Hilfreding, that focuses on the imperialism of international trade and the coercive ruling of the colonizers seem to neglect the colonial impacts on the cultural dimensions of the colonized (Law, 2009). One of the key features of postcolonial studies is to reveal the underlying fabrics of colonial impacts on various epistemological, psychological, behavioral, and imaginary perspectives that still linger in the absence of colonial forces under the post-colonial period of time (Law, 2009). The project of decolonization thus should be conceived as both

the reflection of and the rehabilitation from the colonial past. In this sense, the teaching of democratic citizenship is a top priority of the project with a view to developing a robust political culture for democratic public life. After all, democratic institutions cannot work without a robust democratic culture that efficiently conducts a specific liberal version of political morality for the interaction among people in a democratic public sphere. It is, therefore, conceivable to imagine that the teaching of democratic civic values in a postcolonial state, especially given the resistance of the government, is a necessarily contested task. It is not only because of its educational salience and controversy of teaching-learning approaches (one of which, as I will suggest below, is through public deliberation), but also due to the nature that it somehow touches on a sensitive political issue --- a highly reflective citizenry in the postcolonial condition may not always be welcome by domestic elitists, big businessmen, conservative groups, and even the government. In this context, one might note that

the research of postcolonial education needs to be context-sensitive so as to grasp the accurate colonial experience for reflection. The pedagogy of civic values education, by the same token, is constrained by the social and cultural circumstances of individual postcolonial society. In this paper I propose the term quasi-liberal-democracy, which is used exclusively to depict merely some post-colonial societies that well suit the approach of teaching democracy through public deliberation. It portrays a society with semi- or fragile democratic institutions that, for example, were inherited from the colonial master in the later period of

governance. The quasi-nature infers to the unfinished constitutional reforms of governmental settings. It also lies in the relative lack of a thriving political culture in favor of the consolidation of institutional democracy. On the other hand, the term „quasi-liberal‟ implies a critical point of view on the potentially rich liberal resources for these postcolonial societies to further cultivate a desirable political culture and to nurture a robust democratic society. I would suggest that these quasi-liberal-democracies are mainly situated in Southeast Asian societies such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Of course, this classification is subject to empirical challenge, but the basic observation here draws on the relatively „civilized‟ colonial history and the rapid economic development in recent decades of these post-colonial societies, both of which contribute to their acceptance of liberal values and material foundation for democratization. Nevertheless, the term quasi-liberal-democracy is only a conceptual tool to represent the readiness for becoming democratic and to differentiate some post-colonial societies from many others. It does not aim at constructing any epistemological distinction on different postcolonial conditions. Indeed, those post-colonial societies out of the focus of this paper – African and Latin American – can largely fall into the category of quasiliberal-democracy at some level, despite the national variations in democratic constitutional settings and political culture. The term quasi-liberal-democracy, as a conceptual tool, depicts a particular societal configuration in order to illustrate a case for teaching democratic civic values through public deliberation. This is because the main purpose of this paper is to articulate and defend deliberative democracy as an ideal for civic teaching and to illustrate the normative endowment of public deliberation in the setting of informal education. In respect of this chosen context, the case for illustration is selective, though the educational implication of deliberative democracy it carries is thought to be universally applicable to all democratic societies. Therefore, in the following discussion on postcolonial society I will mainly focus on the case of Hong Kong as an example for illustrating a complex and contested political environment in teaching civic values via informal settings. Before that a working conception of deliberative

democracy is needed in order to grasp its philosophical essence. Deliberative Democracy as Ideal for Civic Education Citizenship education in a liberal pluralist society concerns the relevant knowledge of a democratic community and aims at fostering civic virtues of

commitment to a democratic polity. In other words, it emphasizes the civic participation of citizens and their required education. The deliberative turn in democratic theory that emerged mostly in the 1990s can be seen as a response to the increasing

demand for the political participation of citizens. Deliberative democracy addresses the legitimacy issue of lawmaking through the public deliberation of citizens . It also presents an ideal of political autonomy based on practical

reasoning of participatory citizens seen as a way to attain rational legislation, participatory politics, self-governance, and even accommodation of moral differences (Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Deliberation here means a social process that is distinguished from other forms of communication. During the process of deliberation, people can propose ideas and listen to each other‟s opinions. It is also an interaction that allows for changes in judgments and preferences throughout the whole process. In this sense, deliberative democracy is a model, which objects to seeing democracy as consisting merely in voting or the aggregation of citizens‟ preferences; it also rejects the

definition that confines democracy to simply constitutionalism. Instead, deliberative democracy encourages the political participation of citizens and proclaims „the authenticity of democracy‟ --- a substantive democratic control by „competent citizens‟ (Dryzek, 2000). Nowadays, in real politics, some political institutions have been developed in the name of deliberative democracy, such as deliberative polls, citizens‟ juries, consensus conferences, and national issues forums (Goodin, 2008). Deliberative democracy is not only an ideal proposal by political philosophers; it has been gradually implemented in some of our ordinary political practices. As citizenship education aims at promoting active civic participation, deliberative democracy should become its ideal form of democratic citizenship that educational theorists apply. It carries robust moral salience for educating democratic citizen. Deliberative democracy in its ideal form can foster democratic life in at least three ways. First, the reason-giving character of deliberative democracy can

enhance citizens‟ understanding of public debates through information sharing and public deliberation. Reasoning and arguments are appreciated during the process of deliberation (Cohen, 2009). In an ideal speech situation, public deliberation is free from coercion, distortion, deception, and manipulation; that is, to use another Habermasian term, a „lifeworld‟ would be formed where free

and equal citizens can take part in public affairs with a sense of communicative rationality. An ideal formulation of deliberative democracy resembles the lifeworld, in which democracy would be enriched with communicative actions through the public deliberation of reasonable citizens (Habermas, 1996). In this sense, democracy cannot be simply reduced to voting; and voting itself is not merely a means for aggregating private interests, as we can, ideally, see the reasons behind each preference. The reason giving character and the communicative features embedded in deliberative democracy promote an educative environment for citizens to respect reasons and practices acting as politically autonomous participants. Secondly,

deliberative democracy can help to promote social justice . Public deliberation can efficiently expose

how certain preferences are potentially linked to sectional interests, as public deliberation is more

capable of comprehending complex problems than individual contemplation . Citizens can figure out those

partial interests underlying specific preferences and seek those that represent the interests of many (Held, 2006: 237-8). As deliberation

enhances better understanding of arguments and reasoning (see above), it could help to build up a more open, fair and dynamic platform for collective reasoning. Public reasons prevailing through public deliberation are those could pass the scrutiny of common goods and public interests. In this regard, the requirement of transparency generates a sense of impartiality among

deliberative participants. Public deliberation thus helps transcend the language of interest to the language of reason (Elster, 1998: 101-5). In deliberative context, the outcome can sometimes be shaped independently of the motives of participants, since there are powerful norms to

oppose the appeal to interest or prejudice (Elster, 1998: 104). Citizens and politicians are required to justify their proposals by public interest. Deliberation is not only a form of information exchange, but also a process of justification and presentation of reasoning on various public proposals and opinions in order to maintain a just society. Third, deliberative democracy requires a communal setting for a realization of fair public interaction among free and equal citizens. In this particular public setting for deliberation, given under fair conditions, citizens are encouraged to develop a sense of justice, by which they can take part in deliberation in accordance with

public reasons that all are expected to follow. The effect of this communal setting of public deliberation is also, it is argued,

to cultivate citizens with a sense of belonging and caring about other fellow citizens. The more they practise

discussion, debate, negotiation, and interaction in public deliberation, the more citizens will come to acknowledge the virtues of accommodation of differences. Deliberative democracy, as both the ideal of democratic citizenship and the method of collective decision-making, requires individuals to always be responsive to other‟s interests and needs. Talking cannot always settle disputes, but it helps us to clarify things and to put ourselves into others shoes. By knowing more about each other‟s positions, we can develop codes of

mutual respect in public forum. The essentiality of reciprocity is a top priority of democratic civility in deliberative political settings; and the sense of justice and of belonging and caring all help consolidate the reciprocal mindset of citizens. Deliberative democracy, apart from legitimizing collective decision and promoting social justice, cultivates reciprocal citizens who acquire liberal civility and duty that enhance their willingness to accommodate moral differences (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). In a nutshell, deliberative democracy aims at strengthening the legitimacy of democratic decision-making procedures by the input of deliberative elements in the life of public participation. Citizens thus cannot simply state their preferences in public dialogues; they have to be prepared to provide reasons and arguments in supporting their points of view. Political deliberation is an ideal, that is, it is a circumstance where citizens are free from distortion, manipulation, coercion, strategizing or bargaining in motivating rationality and arguments (Cohen, 1989: 22-26). Deliberative democracy therefore offers free and equal citizens a way of dealing with moral disagreement about public affairs. It prescribes a set of principles on fair terms of cooperation that could enhance the accountability and legitimacy of decision-making for public affairs (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). A new paradigm of citizenship education should, I argue, follow this shift of democratic theory to fit in with the account and the requirement of implementing deliberative democracy.

Surveillance Deliberation

Deliberation is critical to resolving pressing issues of the status quo Rask and Worthington 15 (Mikko Rask, Senior Researcher, National Consumer Reserch Centre in Finland, Richard Worthington, Professor of Politics at Pomona College, “Governing Biodiversity through Democratic Deliberation,” 2015)//ghs-VA

'Deliberation' is a term used extensively in democratic theory and environmental governance, referring to the style and nature of problem-

solving through communication and collective consideration of relevant issues.6 Deliberation welcomes different types of argumentation and communication such as exchanging observations, weighing and balancing arguments, providing reflections and associations and setting facts into a contextual perspective (Renn 2008: 285). Due to its emphasis on argumentation and public dialogue, deliberation is often characterized as a 'talk-centric' rather than 'vote-centric' approach to decision making (Chambers. 2003). Increased public deliberation on political matters is also seen as a way to complement and deepen practices of representative and direct democracy, which are minimalist in the sense that they tend to offer a role for the average citizens merely as a voter, who influences public

policy issues rarely, perhaps once in two or four years, when parliamentary or congressional elections take place. As for 'deliberative democracy', it can be understood as a political orientation that aims at deepening democracy by enhancing the discursive quality and effectiveness of collective decision making. Supporters of deliberative democracy perceive severe problems in the established institutions of representative and direct democracy, such as the superficiality of political discussion, non-transparency of decision making and selfishness in the definition of political interests (Held, 2006). Celebrity politics,

disclosure of mass surveillance and government secrecy by whistleblowers such as Edward Snowden or

Julien Assange, and widespread political corruption are examples of these problems. To remedy them, the supporters of

deliberative democracy call for more informed dialogue, public reasoning, and objective weighing of

political matters (Held, 2006).

Civic Education Impact

Deliberation is key to revitalizing democracy Kavanaugh et al 6 (Andrea L. Kavanaugh, Philip L. Isenhour Matthew Cooper, John M. Carroll, Mary Beth Rosson, Joseph Schmitz, Virginia Tech, USA, Pennsylvania State University, USA, Western Illinois University, “Information Technology in Support of Public Deliberation,” 2006, http://www.sozioinformatik.org/fileadmin/IISI/upload/C_T/2005/Paper1C_T2005.pdf)//ghs-VA

Civic Participation and Social Ties Civic participation encompasses a broad range of basic rights, duties and responsibilities (e.g., Davis and Fernlund, 1991). Duties of citizens are not voluntary and include attending school, obeying laws and paying taxes. In contrast, basic rights and responsibilities are voluntary and include voting, holding elected office, influencing government, practicing one's own religion, expressing what one thinks in speech and in writing, attending public meetings, serving the community, and

contributing to the common good (e.g., helping neighbors and fellow citizens). It is crucial that citizens read, write, and evaluate

political arguments if they are to participate in democratic decision-making processes . The aspiration for an

informed, engaged populace is one of the most constant elements of democracy in America (Dahl, 1989, and others). The requirements and consequences of public education with an attendant freeing of minds underlie the protections of free speech (Meikeljohn, 1948).

Democratic theory typically envisions a system of government designed to foster deliberation just as much as

it is to enhance participation (Schudson, 1992). Deliberation differs from participation in that it involves more public discussion, negotiation, prioritizing, consensus building, and agenda setting (Barber, 1984; Coleman and Gotze, 2002; Coleman, 2003). It is a multifaceted group process, one that typically occurs in public spaces, such as voluntary associations and public meetings that transpire in what Oldenburg (1991) characterizes as “Great Good Places.” For most people, citizenship is not this multifaceted and active (Pateman, 1970; Verba and Nie, 1972; Milbraith and Goel, 1982; White, 2001). Few citizens participate actively in political processes, as indicated by low voter turn out and other civic engagement indicators such as those itemized by Putnam (2000), and others. Classical political theory posits that our democratic system of government works despite ill-informed and inactive citizens. According to elite theories of democracy, this successful functioning derives from the active, well informed, participation of a minority of citizens - often

referred to as political 'elites' (Lasswell, 1948; Fishkin, 1991; Bottomore; 1965; Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). People who belong to multiple groups act as bridging ties across groups (Simmel [1908]; Wolf, 1950; Wellman, 1988) and contribute towards 'bridging' types of social capital (Putnam, 2000) - or what Granovetter (1973) calls weak social ties. Bridging (or weak) ties increase the pace and flow of information and ideas throughout a community. Citizen engagement tends to be higher in communities that have dense social networks, high levels of trust and both 'bridging' (across groups) and 'bonding' (within groups) types of social capital (or what

Fischer (2001) and others refer to as 'in-bound social networks'. When people with bridging ties use communication

media, such as the Internet, they enhance their capability to educate community members and organize for collective action. Communities with a rich organizational life (i.e., numerous voluntary associations) provide many opportunities for bridging social capital to develop and grow. Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969) found that along with social class (high SES), rich organizational life

represents the economic development component that most strongly affects mass political participation. Groups educate members, both cognitively and experientially, and generate satisfaction (or spur opposition) to political action, especially in local politics (Newton, 1997). Presently, the capability of Internet technology to facilitate deliberation is much less clear than its capability to facilitate participation - more private, passive, and individual activities. Keeping informed and participating take time, a scarce resource for the better educated, political elites and for the general populace. Much evidence suggests that the Internet can alleviate constraints of time by providing anytime/anywhere information and discussion. For these and other reasons, the Internet may serve as a medium with great potential to revive civic participation (Milbraith and Goel, 1977; Barber et al., 1997; Davis and Owen, 1998; Wilhelm, 2000; Norris, 2001; Horrigan, Garrett and Resnick, 2004).

Switch Side Debate

Dominant Ideology

Switch Side debate breaks ideology and solves decision making skills with cost-benefit analysisDame and Gedmin 13 (John Dame, Chief Executive Officer of Dame Management Strategies, and Jeffrey Gedmin, Chief Executive Officer of the Legatum Institute, 2013 (“Three Tips For Overcoming Your Blind Spots,” Harvard Business Review blog, October 2nd, Available Online at http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/10/three-tips-for-overcoming-your-blind-spots/, Accessed 10-10-2013)

Confirmation bias refers to our tendency, when receiving new information, to process it in a way that it fits our pre-existing narrative about a situation or problem . Simply put, if you’re already inclined to believe that the

French are rude, you will find the examples on your trip to Paris to validate your thesis. Disconfirming evidence – the friendly waiter, the helpful bellman – gets pushed aside. They’re just “the exception.” Warren Buffett says, “What the human being is best at doing, is interpreting all new

information so that their prior conclusions remain intact.” He knows he is prone to it himself. Attorneys, debaters, and politicians engage in a kind of confirmation bias when, in order to make a case, they select certain data while

deliberately neglecting or deemphasizing other data . But confirmation bias can cause disaster in

business and policy when it leads a decision-maker to jump to conclusions , fall prey to misguided

analogies , or simply exclude information that inconveniently disturbs a desired plan of action . What to

do? The only remedy is to make sure you have a full and accurate picture available when making

important decisions. When you have a theory about someone or something, test it . When you smell

a contradiction – a thorny issue, an inconsistency or problem – go after it . Like the orchestral

conductor, isolate it, drill deeper . When someone says – or you yourself intuit – “that’s just an exception,”

be sure it’s just that. Thoroughly examine the claim . Dealing with confirmation bias is about reining

in your impulses and challenging your own assumptions . It’s difficult to stick to it day in and out.

That’s why it’s important to have in your circle of advisers a brainy, tough-as-nails devil’s advocate

who – perhaps annoyingly, but valuably – checks you constantly .

State Debate

State Inevitable and Key

State is inevitable and necessary part to get rid of current mechanisms that exist and cause violenceWelsh et al 10 (John F. Welsh, Independent Scholar (Louisville, KY, USA), E. Wayne Ross University of British Columbia Kevin D. Vinson University of the West Indies, “To Discipline and Enforce: Surveillance and Spectacle in State Reform of Higher Education,” Vol.3, No. 2 (February 2010) Pp. 25-39)//ghs-VA

At the base of the society of the spectacle is the division of labour produced by the specialization of political power. “The specialized role played by the spectacle is that of spokesperson for all other activities … and the source of

the only discourse which society allows itself to hear” (Debord 1994:28). Politically, the spectacle is an endless discourse “upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise. The spectacle is the self-portrait of power in the age of power’s totalitarian rule over the conditions of existence” (29). The spectacle’s division of society into those who wield power and those who passively observe or

contemplate the spectacle “is inseparable from the modern State , which, as the product of the social division of labor

and the organ of class rule, is the general form of all social division” (30). For Debord, the spectacle maintains its own regime of control and discipline, differentiated from surveillance and the Panopticon. The spectacle exists for its own reproduction and, through the economic and political realms, subordinates all human life to its needs. It controls by isolating and fragmenting, distorting communication, alienating human action, and restructuring communication to ensure oneway, instantaneous messaging. It operates to mitigate community and dialogue and,

thus, to control image, conflict, and change. Those who control images have the ability to mystify being and hierarchical power relations within the spectacle. Both Foucault and Debord articulated libertarian and

antistatist visions of power, authority, and control in contemporary society. Both are centrally concerned with the role

of the state and the mechanisms it uses to ensure direct and ideological social control in a society

characterized by a loss of community and the structures of civil society that mediate relationships among people. Foucault’s studies envisioned a Panopticon of surveillance. Debord’s studies envisioned society as a collection of spectacles where appearance is more important than being. What is unique today is the merging of surveillance and spectacle where it is technologically possible and culturally desirable to see and be seen

simultaneously and continuously. The potential of a totally administered society becomes more real as culture and technology become media through which everyone can watch everyone across all time and space. At the extreme, society becomes nothing more than a totality of isolated individuals incessantly under surveillance whose relationships are mediated by images. Postsecondary reform provides one case in which the merger of surveillance and spectacle can be understood, and which can itself be understood as surveillance and spectacle. One example of the operation of surveillance is the hierarchical observation of the attitudes, behaviours, and performances of institutions, programs, faculty/staff, and students within higher education. An example of spectacle occurs in the presentation and reporting of institutional and system performance to higher education’s many constituencies. Both surveillance and spectacle elevate image above authenticity and operate as vehicles of social control, political domination, and cultural conformity.

State K2 Solve Surveillance

Individual acts of resistance reinforce the surveillance state apparatus – legislative change is keyMonahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “Surveillance in the time of Insecurity,” 2010, Chapter 9 pg. 128-130)//ghs-VA

Resistance to surveillance, especially to dominating forms of surveillance, is a vital dimension of power negotiations. As Michel Foucault observes, “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of

exteriority in relation to power.”1 Put differently, resistance is not reactive or in dialectical relationship to power; rather, it is co-constitutive of it. There are clearly many forms that resistance to surveillance can take; they range from civil society organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union challenging government spying programs in courts, on one end of the spectrum, to

individuals not complying with marketers’ requests for personal information like zip codes and e-mail addresses, on the other. People are not simply passive subjects compliantly succumbing to demands for their behaviors, preferences, and beliefs to become more

transparent to and controllable by others. Nevertheless, when the field for social action and identity construction is radically constricted, opportunities for effective resistance—at least effective resistance without great personal risk—

are diminished. One dominant argument of this book, for instance, is that neoliberal policies and practices have transformed public spaces and rights into private ones and have individualized what might be thought of as collective problems. Demands for people to become insecurity subjects fit neatly within this neoliberal framework because these demands push responsibility onto individuals to meet security

needs through consumption, regardless of the veracity of security threats or their probability of actualizing. Resistance to surveillance can also function within and therefore unintentionally reinforce these security cultures if

it does not also challenge the rules that govern possibilities for resistance . To make this case, this chapter

analyzes practices of countersurveillance by activists and media artists—particularly against video and closed circuit television (CCTV) systems in urban areas—and theorizes their political implications. Countersurveillance activism can include disabling or destroying surveillance cameras, mapping paths of least surveillance and disseminating that information over the Internet, employing video cameras to monitor sanctioned surveillance systems and their personnel, or staging public plays to draw attention to the prevalence of surveillance in society. In some cases, marginal groups selectively appropriate technologies that they might otherwise oppose when used by those with institutional power.2 These examples illustrate the underdetermination of technologies and suggest further avenues for political intervention through countersurveillance. However, because surveillance systems evolve through social conflict, countersurveillance practices may implicate opposition groups in the

further development of global systems of control. Countersurveillance operates within and in reaction to ongoing global transformations of public spaces and resources. According to social theorists, a crisis in capital accumulation in the 1970s precipitated a shift from mass production to flexible production regimes, catalyzing organizational decentralization, labor outsourcing, computerized automation, just-in-time production, and, increasingly, the privatization of that which has historically been considered “public.”3

These structural transformations aggravated conditions of social inequality, leading to the development of new mechanisms of social control to regulate bodies in this unstable terrain . Some of the most effective forms of social control are those that naturalize the exclusion of economically or culturally marginalized groups through architecture or infrastructure. Mass incarceration of over 2.3 million individuals in the United States alone is one extreme measure of such postindustrial exclusion.4 Less dramatically, but perhaps more pervasively, fortified enclaves such as gated communities, shopping malls, and business centers have multiplied exponentially over the past decade and seem to be as prevalent in “developing” as in “developed” countries.5 Additionally, privatized streets, parks, and security services effectively sacrifice civic accountability and civil rights while increasing affordances for the monitoring of public life.6 Finally, telecommunications and other infrastructures unevenly distribute access to the goods and services

necessary for modern life while facilitating data collection on and control of the public.7 Against this backdrop, the embedding of technological surveillance into spaces and infrastructures serves to augment not only existing social control

functions but also capital accumulation imperatives, which are readily seen with the sharing of surveillance operations and data between public and private sectors.8 Through a range of interventions into the logic and institutions of global capitalism,

countersurveillance tacticians seek to disrupt these trends in the privatization, sanitation, and elimination of public

spaces, resources, and rights. While the ideologies and intentions of those engaging in countersurveillance are manifold and disparate, they are unified in the mission of safeguarding— or

creating—the necessary spaces for meaningful participation in determining the social, environmental, and economic conditions of life. Because of this orientation, the term countersurveillance will be used here to indicate intentional, tactical uses or disruptions of surveillance technologies to challenge power asymmetries. In this chapter I review several countersurveillance practices and analyze the power relations simultaneously revealed and reproduced by resistance to institutionalized surveillance. The emphasis here is upon the framing of surveillance problems and responses by activists, or on points of symbolic conflict rather than physical

confrontation. Thus, it is assumed that while countersurveillance practitioners may have immediate practical goals, such as circumventing or destroying video cameras, that they are foremost engaged in acts of symbolic resistance with the intention of raising public awareness about modern surveillance regimes. I analyze two categories of countersurveillance efforts—interventions into the technical and social faces of public surveillance—and then theorize the efficacy and implications of countersurveillance more generally. The data are drawn primarily from Web sites, video productions, and publications, but I conducted several interviews with activists in the United States to corroborate the critical readings offered here. The main argument is that

activists tend to individualize both surveillance problems and methods of resistance, leaving the

institutions, policies, and cultural assumptions that support public surveillance relatively insulated

from attack . Furthermore, while the oppositional framing presented by activists (that is, countersurveillance versus surveillance) may

challenge the status quo and raise public awareness, it also introduces the danger of unintentionally reinforcing the systems of social control that activists seek to undermine.

Individual Reflection Bad

Institutional change is key – abstract post-modernism ignores the reality of everyday peopleMonahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “Surveillance in the time of Insecurity,” 2010, Chapter 9)//ghs-VA

This countersurveillance intervention is explicitly conceived of as an art project that appropriates surveillance

technologies to challenge their dominant meanings and uses. Mann mobilizes a tactic he calls “reflectionism,” or reflecting experiences of being surveilled back on the surveillers, with the goal of destabilizing store

employees to make them realize that they are merely “totalitarianist officials” involved in acts of blind obedience and conformity. 21 Mann writes: “It is my hope that the department store attendant/ representative sees himself/herself in the bureaucratic “mirror” that I have created . . . [and that this helps them] to realize or admit for a brief instant that they are puppets and to confront the reality of what their blind obedience leads to.”22 Beyond this somewhat dubious educational goal, the Shooting Back project further aspires to explode the rhetoric behind systematic public surveillance in places of commerce. For example, the project raises the question: if surveillance is intended for public safety, then would not more cameras increase the potential for such safety? The answer is an obvious no, because the primary intended function of cameras in stores is theft prevention, and they are as often trained on employees as on customers.23 Shooting Back is a provocative project because it calls attention to the embodied experiences of watching and being watched, of recording and being recorded. Usual uses of video surveillance, in contradistinction, tend to erase all sense of embodied action and interaction through their ambiguity (you do not know who is watching or when), through their integration into infrastructure (they become the taken-for-granted backdrop to social life), and through their mediation of experience (camera operators may feel a disconnect from those they are watching, and vice versa). Shooting Back disrupts the illusion of detached, objective, impersonal, disembodied monitoring—a camera in one’s face personalizes the experience of being recorded in a very direct and uncomfortable way. One can speculate that the project is especially destabilizing and annoying for employees, because for them store surveillance systems and monitoring practices are institutional projections

that they are relatively powerless to alter. Mann’s rather unforgiving denouncement of individuals working in stores,

however, reveals certain assumptions about the problems of modern surveillance. First, by criticizing employees as being “puppets” who blindly accept their companies’ explanations for surveillance and comply with company policies, Mann implies that all individuals are rational actors with equal social and economic footing. Thus, if low-income employees elect not to fight the system as he does,

then they must be either ignorant or weakwilled, or both. Second, by calling store clerks and security guards representatives of totalitarian surveillance regimes, Mann conflates individuals with the institutions they are a part of, effectively sidestepping the important but more difficult problem of changing institutional relations, structures, or logics. Both these assumptions lead to the conclusion that one can contend with the problem of rampant surveillance by intervening on the level of the individual and by educating people about their complicity with the systems.

Unfortunately, the fact that people have very real dependencies upon their jobs or that vast power differentials separate workers from the systems they work within (and perhaps from activists and academics as well)

become unimportant issues once the critique of surveillance is abstracted and individualized in this way. Surveillance Camera Players The Surveillance Camera Players (SCP) is a New York–based ad hoc acting troupe that stages performances in front of surveillance cameras in public places.24 Founded in 1996 with a performance of Alfred Jarry’s Ubu Roi in front of a subway station, it has since performed numerous play adaptations of famous (and not-so-famous) works of cautionary fiction or troubling nonfiction, ranging from George Orwell’s 1984 to Wilhelm Reich’s The Mass Psychology of Fascism.25 Because most surveillance cameras are not soundequipped, the troupe members narrate their performances with large white placard signs, which they hold up for remotely located camera operators to read. A performance of 1984, for instance, uses placards describing scene locations (for example, “ROOM 101”) or key lines from the book (for example, “WE ARE THE DEAD”).26 When possible, fellow troupe members document the plays with video cameras and distribute information brochures to curious spectators. The players are routinely confronted by security guards or New York City police and asked to disperse, often before the conclusion of their performances. Up close, it appears as if SCP is directing its messages at camera operators, police, or security guards. The troupe’s determination to notice and respond to video surveillance, rather than let it fade uninterrogated into the urban landscape, places it in confrontation with institutional representatives. By speaking to cameras (and their representatives), the actors become perceived as threats to the political and economic systems that support and indeed demand public surveillance, so institutional agents move in to contend

with the perceived threat. As with Steve Mann’s concentration on individuals, SCP performances force interactions with others, and, because of this, they draw attention to the always present embodiment

of surveillance technologies and the social relations they engender. If one takes a step back, however, the Surveillance Camera Players are really performing for the public : they enroll the unwitting police and security

personnel into their play so that the public can witness the spectacle and perhaps the absurdity of modern surveillant relations. The troupe acknowledges this staging explicitly: “The SCP no longer consider their primary audience to be the police officers and security guards who monitor the surveillance cameras installed in public places. Today, the SCP concentrate on the people who happen to walk by and see one of their performances.”27 In a mode true to its “situationist” theoretical orientation, SCP affirms that the revolutionary potential of art thoroughly

infuses everyday life because everyday life is a complex artistic performance. In this vein, SCP seeks to repoliticize the everyday by inviting the public to participate in its performances, by inviting all of us to recognize that we are already enmeshed in political performances and that we are required to act—and act well. The primary adversary for SCP is the state. SCP is concerned about the erosion of public space and personal privacy brought about by the state’s support of police surveillance and its permissive non-regulation of private surveillance. Its members write: The SCP is firmly convinced that the use of video surveillance in public places for the purposes of law enforcement is unconstitutional, and that each image captured by police surveillance cameras is an unreasonable search. We also believe that it is irresponsible of the government to allow unlicensed private companies to install

as many surveillance cameras as they please, and to install them wherever they please.28 The implication is that the state is not living up to its responsibility to safeguard civil liberties through improved regulation of public surveillance. Thus, SCP performances confront individual agents of public and private sector security, but the

troupe’s primary audience is the general public, whom it hopes to cast as transformative actors who can collectively agitate for social change, especially on the level of public policy . Both Steve Mann’s Shooting Back project and the

Surveillance Camera Players’ performances intervene on an overtly social level by challenging institutional agents of surveillance. Mann draws upon relatively sophisticated technical apparatuses to place store representatives in uncomfortable positions. By doing so, he aims to reflect back to them the hypocritical logics and empty rhetoric that they impose upon others and to raise their awareness about their complicity with the surveillance society. SCP, on the other hand, employs decidedly low-tech countersurveillance props such as signs and costumes to address police and security guards with the aim of creating a public spectacle—and to raise public awareness about the everyday surveillance spectacle of which we are all already a part. These two interventions share in common their focus on individual representatives of institutionalized surveillance. By engaging with store employees or speaking to those behind the cameras, Mann and SCP seek to reveal and challenge the larger structures and rationalities that those individuals represent. A key difference is that SCP overtly enrolls members of the public in activist performances, whereas Mann’s project invites public involvement only through the technical mediation of Web sites. Because of this

difference, SCP seems more successful at moving beyond its initial site of intervention (the individual) to critique institutions for their dominance over the public, which is a relationship betrayed by the ironic juxtaposition of police removing SCP performers from public streets while private companies remain free to monitor the public at will. While each of the four countersurveillance interventions discussed in this chapter so

far seeks to raise public awareness and to mobilize for social change, none is completely successful at moving its critique from the individual to the institutional plane. SCP comes closest to doing this, but so far its plays remain too isolated and discrete to

effect long-term change. This deficiency may be in part because activists construct surveillance problems in individualized and abstracted terms in order to make them somewhat tractable and receptive to

intervention . The challenge lies in ratcheting up the unit of analysis to the institutional level so that

lasting change can be achieved . The desired outcomes might take the form of better regulation and oversight of surveillance

and/or meaningful democratic participation in the process of setting surveillance policies, for instance. In the long run, as I will argue in the next

section, the oppositional framing of surveillance versus countersurveillance may be counterproductive for meeting these goals.

AT: Knowledge First

Exposition and “opening space” don’t translate into political proposals---it’s their burden to bridge that gap Z Al-Mwajeh 5, Indiana University of Pennsylvania The School of Graduate Studies and Research Department of English, CRITIQUE OF POSTMODERN ETHICS OF ALTERITY VERSUS EMBODIED (MUSLIM) OTHERS, https://dspace.iup.edu/bitstream/handle/2069/23/Ziad%20Al-Mwajeh.pdf?sequence=1

These ethical infringements do not merely result from flaws in the superstructural or foundational assumptions of such ethics as much as from the clashes between ethical edicts and political interests. Do we exploit or idealize the other because of following reductive egoistic ethics? Or do we violate our established ethical values for the sake of power, money, prestige, or any other desirable objective; this alternative entails that we can uphold these ethical values even if they limit our power and wealth. Examining Self-Other relations in context, one is bound to notice the prevalence of economic and political injustices, all forms of oppression, and physical clashes. However, one also can find cases of cooperation and mutual recognition. Lived realities expose postmodern limited descriptive and prescriptive utility. Very often the political supersedes the ethical, although it may not completely eclipse it. Rather, the political is cast in ethical terms, although in deconstructive, cultural studies, or discourse analysis, such a move is exposed as a logocentric or political ruse.

In a sense, postmodernist thought exposes modernism’s originary blindness toward alterity although this exposition does not necessarily translate into action or penetrate modernist institutions in any straightforward effective manner, relatively speaking. The assumption is that our current realities and institutions have been shaped by Enlightenment and modernist thought of Kant, Descartes, Hegel, Hobbes, and others. Such thought foundationally privileges the Same and undervalue the different. By the same token, it is assumed that the postmodernist alternative will change, or is already changing, our realities toward more balanced institutions. Yet five minutes of NBC, ABC, CNN, FOX, or "Aljazeea.net" challenges humanistic metanarratives and postmodernist micronarratives. The present has not significantly changed for the better; past prejudices and foundations—deconstructed now and then—have not disappeared; rather, they have mutated into healthier and subtler modes, although usually posing as inclusive and humanistic. Religious and secular fundamentalisms, capitalistic exploitive logics, global hegemony, mediatization, simulation, and consumerism, all define and limit our realities. I do not deny that social activist movements and academic practices are carving more room for alterity and marginalized, ecological, and environmental concerns. Many people all over the globe realize that we are all connected and that our actions and inactions may either help prevent natural disasters or improve human conditions. Such stances may resort to general categories such as human welfare; they do not use these as merely rhetorical ruses.

To best tackle such thorny issues, I dislodge postmodern theorizations from their polemical abstract mode so as to test them contra and through lived realities so as to make sense of the apparent schism between the ethical-utopian postmodern focus on alterity and the grim realities that we witness on a daily basis.1Accordingly, Elizabeth Ermarth contends that the “political implications of postmodernity have not often received sustained analytical attention, although a certain amount of unspecific anxiety

concerning such implications has been expressed” (34). Nevertheless, Keith C. Pheby argues that (deconstructive) postmodernism is a form of political praxis because,

The unmasking and demystification of unconscious or naturalized binary oppositions in contemporary and traditional thought, together with a demonstration that they grow out of a particular mode of disclosure (logocentrism or a metaphysics of presence) is of itself a formidable political weapon considering that the legitimation of the centrality of a particular term is effected by means of the marginalization of the inessential one. (4)

Despite the above statement about the formidability of postmodern deconstructive thought, Pheby tones down his appraisals of postmodernism’s transformative potential, the moment hard practical questions are raised. Postmodernism does not have any blueprint of how it will work in lived realities. Besides, it not clear if postmodern thought can affect the public sphere or if it may remain a theoretical matter, an academic fad, or personal styles, of course depending on how one understands and uses it. This realization makes Pheby stress that postmodern thought has to exceed stylistic, personal, academic niches to bear on “international relations” where “sovereignty and autonomy have not been sufficiently critiqued” (88). For he thinks that postmodern alterity ethics can diffuse conflicts and amend mistakes on the international level. Hopefully, translating postmodern ethics into praxis may help avert global disasters rendering the “deployment of nuclear weaponry obsolete” (Pheby 88).

AT: Rejection Solves

Individual approaches reify neoliberalism and can’t solveMonahan 10 (Torin, Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, “Surveillance in the time of Insecurity,” 2010, Chapter 9)//ghs-VA

Countersurveillance and Global Systems of Control When viewed from a distance, surveillance and countersurveillance appear to be engaged in a complicated dance, with the larger, cumbersome partner pushing and pulling while the smaller,

defter dancer negotiates her- or himself—and others—out of harm’s way. The oafish leader is, of course, the state and corporate

apparatus surveilling the public, and the partner is the collective of activist adversaries circumventing or destabilizing surveillance systems. Drawing upon Michel Foucault’s insights about the disciplinary potential of modern

bureaucratic regimes, one could read surveillance societies as bringing about disciplinary or panoptic relationships.29 But Foucault was

also insistent upon the productive capacity of power to generate and sustain social relations apart from any property of control that might be possessed by individuals. As Gilles Deleuze expresses it: “Power has no essence; it is simply operational. It is not an attribute but a relation: the power-relation is the set of possible relations between forces, which passes

through the dominated forces no less than through the dominating.”30 Therefore, the metaphor of the panopticon is not a static or transcendent statement of disciplinary power but is instead a contingent and situated

articulation of modernity in a fluid field of production regimes .31 In specific response to Foucault’s work, Michel de

Certeau’s book The Practice of Everyday Life provides a point of departure for thinking about the agency of individuals and groups within

disciplinary power structures.32 For de Certeau, the practices of the dominant dancer clearly would be strategic ones of building control structures to regulate the activities of those in the field of power, whereas the practices of the defter dancer would be much more tactical, poaching off the existing structures to create new meanings and possibilities. The two dancers may be in opposition, but that does not change the fact that they are engaged in a reciprocal relationship and collective activity—although without comparable degrees of influence or control. It is this tense connection that is worth probing, even if there is never an embrace or a union, because after all the exchanges of strategic structuring and tactical appropriation, the dance has moved somewhere across the floor and created a pattern, or a logic, or a world that was not there before.33 Examples of this problematic, if not dialectical, relationship between surveillance and countersurveillance practitioners abound. The capture on videotape of the beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 did not necessarily catalyze correctives to actions of police brutality, nor did it motivate greater police engagement with urban communities. Instead, police have seemingly used this event to further distance themselves from and maintain antagonistic relationships with communities,34 while learning from the blowup that they must exert greater control over the conditions where brutality occurs. This enhanced and learned control can be seen in the torture case of Haitian immigrant Abner Louima by the New York City police in 1997. Louima was beaten in a vehicle on the way to the 70th Precinct stationhouse and was then sodomized with the stick from a toilet plunger in the police restrooms. 35 Regardless of the fact that the story did finally emerge, the police officers obviously exercised extreme caution in regulating the places of abuse (a police vehicle and a police restroom), and one can speculate that this level of control was a response to their fear of being surveilled and thus held accountable for their actions. Another example of the dance of surveillance and countersurveillance can be witnessed in the

confrontations occurring at antiglobalization protests throughout the world. Activists have been quite savvy in videotaping and photographing police and security forces as a technique not only for deterring abuse but also for documenting and disseminating any instances of excessive force. According to accounts by protesters of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the police, in turn, now zero in on individuals with video recorders and arrest them or confiscate their equipment as a first line of defense in what has become a war over the control of media representations.36 Similarly, vibrant Independent Media Centers (IMCs) are now routinely set up at protest locations, allowing activists to produce and edit video, audio, photographic, and textual news stories and then disseminate them over the Internet, which serves as an outlet for alternative interpretations of the issues under protest.37 As was witnessed in the beating of independent media personnel and destruction of an Indymedia center by police during the 2001 G8 protests in Genoa, Italy,38 those with institutional interests and power are learning to infiltrate “subversive” countersurveillance collectives and vitiate their potential for destabilizing the dominant system. A final telling example of the learning potential of institutions was the subsequent 2002 G8 meeting held in Kananaskis, which is a remote and difficult-to-access mountain resort in Alberta, Canada. Rather than contend with widespread public protests and a potential repeat of the police violence in Genoa (marked by the close-range shooting and death of a protester), the organizers of the mountain meeting exerted the most extreme control over the limited avenues available for public

participation: both reporters and members of the public were excluded, and a no-fly-zone was enforced around the resort. It could be that

grassroots publicizing of protests (through Indymedia, for example) is ultimately more effective than individualized countersurveillance because such protests are collective activities geared toward institutional change . While the removal of the 2002 G8 meetings to a publicly inaccessible location was a response to previous

experiences with protesters and their publicity machines, this choice of location served a symbolic function of revealing the exclusionary elitism of these organizations, thereby calling into question their legitimacy. So, whereas mainstream news outlets seldom lend any sympathetic ink or air time to antiglobalization movements, many of them did comment on the overt mechanisms of public exclusion displayed by the 2002 G8 meeting.39 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri would describe these ongoing exchanges between dominant and subordinate groups as a mutual and perhaps unwitting advancement of Empire—the larger system of global capitalism and its colonization of lifeworlds.40 They note, for instance, how humanitarian efforts by Western countries first establish discursive universal orders—such as “human rights”—as justification for intervention, and how these universals are then capitalized upon by military and economic institutions as rationales for imperialistic invasions.

Similarly, activist struggles appear to teach the system of global capitalism, or those manning its operations, how to increase strategic efficiency by controlling spaces available for political opposition. From this perspective,

the flexible ideologies of the 1960s counterculture movements may have disturbed the capitalist system, but in doing so they also described a new territory (the self) and a new mode of operation for the growth of capitalism: Capital did not need to invent a new paradigm (even if it were capable of doing so)

because the truly creative moment had already taken place. Capital’s problem was rather to dominate a new composition that had already been produced autonomously and defined within a new relationship to nature and labor, a relationship of autonomous production.41 The postindustrial colonizations of public spaces and resources today are outgrowths of an earlier colonization of “flexibility” as a viable and successful challenge to the rigidities of technocratic bureaucracies. I would build upon

these observations to say that the conflicts between surveillance and countersurveillance practices today represent a larger struggle over the control of spaces and bodies. It is doubtful that most police or security forces are manipulating spaces and bodies with surveillance and other strategies because they intentionally wish to neutralize democratic

opportunities; in fact, they probably believe that their actions of social control are preserving democracy by

protecting the public and safeguarding the status quo. Be that as it may, such activities advance neoliberal agendas by eliminating spaces for political action and debate, spaces where effective alternatives to economic globalization could

emerge and gain legitimacy if they were not disciplined by police and corporate actions. Therefore, it should not be seen as a coincidence that the demise of public spaces is occurring at the same time that spatial and temporal boundaries are being erased to facilitate the expansion of global capital. The two go hand in hand. Whereas one can readily critique Hardt and Negri for their attribution of agency to capitalism or to the amorphous

force of Empire, their systemic viewpoint is worth preserving in what has become a contemporary landscape of social fragmentation, polarization, and privatization. Dominant and subordinate groups serve as asymmetrical refractions of each other in emerging global regimes. Surveillance and countersurveillance are two sets of overlapping practices selectively mobilized by many parties in this conflict, but the overall effect is unknown. Perhaps non-governmental organizations are the best place to look for effective countersurveillance movements on the institutional level. There are a host of remarkable groups tackling surveillance abuses in societies and lobbying for accountability and policy reform. Some of the best-known organizations are the American Civil Liberties Union, Privacy International, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Statewatch, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Other organizations represent niche issues of concern to specific audiences, such as Katherine Albrecht’s fundamentalist Christian organization Caspian, which opposes RFID technologies on the grounds that they are the “mark of the beast” (see chapter 5). According to surveillance studies scholar Colin

Bennett,42 who has done extensive research on civil society groups, their narrow focus on particular issues, especially on privacy, hinders coalition building for widespread policy changes or lasting social movements. In fact,

focusing on privacy alone may hamstring such organizations at the outset because privacy is a highly individualized rather than collective concept, and it cannot meaningfully account for issues of power or domination.43 This does not mean that such groups or similar ones do not attempt to challenge surveillance from a collective

standpoint, but in an individualistic political, legal, and cultural climate, such an approach meets with serious difficulties in generating support, especially financial support, for their efforts.

AT: Aff = State Good

A curtailment especially in context of surveillance calls into question the legitimacy of the state and doesn’t affirm itNewman 10 (Saul Newman, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event Volume 13, Issue 2)//ghs-VA

There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the state – say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war, or an end to draconian policing – is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups . Making such demands does not necessarily

mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy. On the contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific measure.

They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate and deny them.

AT: Identity

Reform has to be methodologically based around structural reform -- not a purely identity based responseWills 12 (David Barnard, Research Fellow in the Department of Informatics and Sensors at Cranfield University, “Surveillance and Identity: Discourse, Subjectivity, and the State,” 2012, pg. 24-28)//ghs-VA

Resistance to Surveillance There is a rich emerging literature on resistance to surveillance, which Lyon positions as an important corrective to the dystopian trends in surveillance research (2007:160). Much of this research necessarily involves paying attention to subjects of surveillance, their experience and activities. Lyon identifies a number of caveats when considering resistance to surveillance: firstly that

surveillance is ambiguous, it is not a purely negative phenomenon, secondly that surveillance is complex, with different institutions or perspectives playing a large part in the specific politics of surveillance. Thirdly, that surveillance technology is not infallible (Lyon 2007:162). In analyzing surveillance, we should be wary of taking the claims of those designing or promoting surveillance technologies and practices as social fact, although intentions of technologists are important. Marx suggests that the existence of a potential for surveillance does not mean that this surveillance occurs, and that much of the reason for this is resistance of various types (Marx 2003:294). These three factors affect the way that surveillance is complied with, negotiated, and resisted. As the converse of resistance, surveillance is frequently complied with for reasons of: the widespread presence of surveillance practices, that many practices are taken for granted, that we are unaware of many surveillance practices, and that many systems are accepted as legitimate and necessary (Lyon 2007:164). Resistance can range from ad hoc and individual, (avoiding CCTV cameras by walking a different route) to organized and collective (joining a group to campaign against the introduction of identity cards), instrumental or non-instrumental, direct or strategic. Marx presents a typology of eleven forms of resistance to surveillance These include discovery, avoidance, piggy-backing, switching, distorting, blocking, masking (identification), breaking, refusal, cooperative and counter-surveillance moves (Marx 2003). These moves can be contrasted with explicitly political strategies to remove surveillance systems and practices through democratic political process or direct action. Work in political theory on resistance to surveillance often tends to take the form of analyses of privacy and practices of the regulation of personal data, emphasizing the individual, owned nature of privacy rather than collective or social resistance. Sociology has also contributed research into the experiences of the subject under surveillance. Insights have been drawn from the work of Goffman on the presentation of self (Goffman 1990). including the social work done by individuals to present an appropriate public face to other members of their social group. Additionally there are accounts drawing upon phenomenological and psychological approaches focusing on differing degrees of scopophobia and scopophillia (the fear and love of being watched) (Jay 1994). Many analyses of resistance to surveillance emerge from this level of analysis, focusing on the experience of the individual under surveillance (Ball & Wilson 2000; Koskela 2006; Matheson 2009). as do many of the artistic contributions to a cultural understanding of surveillance practices (Levin et al. 2002; MeGrath 2004). Lyon argues an important part of understanding resistance to surveillance is the subjectivities of those resisting surveillance, especially the alternate identities which can be mobilized against imposed and attributed surveillant representations (Lyon 2007:67). There is a politics of resistance associated with (he subject's own understanding of their

identity or identities and interaction with the data double. Another important question involves the connection between individual and collective responses - understanding the ways in which individual resistance acts become taken up

in collective and organized ways (Marx 2003:304). Monahan is concerned that current modes of activism tend to leave

institutions, policies and cultural assumptions supportive of surveillance in place because of their focus upon individualistic resistance to specific instances of surveillance (Monahan 2006a: 1). Sieve Mann (Mann 2002) has popularised the practice and concept of sous-veillance, watching 'from below" in which surveillance technologies are turned upon those in power. Mann has built and advocated wearable cameras to facilitate this. This approach suffers from simple binary models of power, in which 'the powerful" do surveillance, and the less powerful are surveilled. Surveillance is not automatically effective in supporting the ends to

which it is put. Sousveillance is therefore best understood as surveillance that is being used to draw attention to power relations (of surveillance) and as a type of consciousness raising activity. There is nothing wrong with this, but to assume the automatic success (or subversiveness) of sousveillance is to perpetuate some of the myths about the automatic functioning of

surveillance and visual power. Photojournalists have long realised that simply documenting or creating an image of some immoral or harmful practice is not sufficient to bring about its end . Mann argues that photographing low level

clerks in department stores1 is an effective way of getting to speak with the manager. This misses that the clerk is already likely under surveillance by in-store CCTV system. Surveillance, as we have seen is not simply an up/down binary Mann's form of resistance is also not

available to all, being based upon technological literacy, but also on social capital. Rose identifies a problem with identity based responses to surveillance. He argues experience of the actuarial processes of contemporary

surveillance practices does not produce collective identities in the same way as the collective experience of workplace exploitation or racism (Rose 1999:236). Anticipating the same impediments, Ogura provides a potential

solution to this problem. He suggests that "identity politics" should be drastically transformed. Rather than attempting to 'establish the collective identity of social minority groups against cultural, ideological or political integration or affiliation by social groups' he points in the direction of a "de-convergent politics' able to resist methodological individualism and biological determinism he sees as present in information technology identity systems. Whilst he acknowledges that we have not yet seen such a social movement or politics based on identity, he identifies "criminal* identity activity, such as fake ID cards and identity theft as manifestations of a surveillance orientated society's focus on methodological individualism and biological determinants of identity (such as biometrics). He predicts the possibility of a politics based around self-determination of identity, potentially associated with the (non-criminal) use of multiple identities, collaborative identities or anonymity (Ogura 2006). If the exploitation of identity expands and deepens, resistance against it to achieve self determination rights of who 'is' will also follow. In the very near future, we may grab hold of an alternative identity politics based on an identity of identities that is against identity exploitation. (Ogura 2006:292) Brian Martin suggests that a sense of unfairness is not inherent in the act of surveillance, but rather people's sense of unfairness is subject to a continual struggle between interests. He places privacy campaigners on one side, trying to increase a sense of concern about surveillance, with surveillance purveyors on the other side. This suggests that motivations for resistance come from understanding and evaluation of the practice of surveillance, as well as the meaning of fairness, the possibility of resistance, subject positions and political alternatives, all of which are contested discursively. One of the key elements of interpretative struggles is language (Martin 2010) Aaron Martin, Rosamunde Van Brakel and Daniel Bernhard conducted an insightful review of the literature on resistance in international relations, social psychology, information systems and education, to counter a tendency in surveillance studies accounts to focus exclusively on the resistance relationship between the surveyor and the surveilled. They address an assumption that the resisting actor, is an autonomous agent capable of interaction with technology and observers, resistance emerging because surveillance is recognised and rejected. They also find this binary in the sousveillance literature. They find instead that resistance is multiple and rhizomatic, and that many actors beyond the surveillance subject are capable of resistance. This includes powerful actors seeking to prevent other resistance, and. drawing upon information systems perspectives, technologies themselves. They find that resistance is not an unavoidable consequence of surveillance, but the result of interpreting surveillance as overbearing, and that this representation is dependent upon specific relational histories of the actors involved, including the content of previous interactions. The ability of an actor to resist, the ways they resist and the actors at whom their resistance is directed are determined in large part by the power relations of the resisting actor to others as well as by the context. (Martin et al.

2009:226) From education contexts they draw the insight that not all authority is resisted, and that authority can be allowed if it is perceived as legitimate and just. On the other hand, resistance is problematic if there is no clearly identifiable figure of dominance. They also identify the way that structural roles affect resistance, showing how different actors are likely to resist at

different stages of a technology development and introduction lifecycle. For Martin et al, understanding resistance to surveillance requires understanding the context, roles and relationships of various actors. We can expand this account by suggesting these shared histories and contexts also depend upon conventional representations of the world, and of the structures of legitimate and illegitimate power. Roles are not just structural but are subjective.