ISSN 2502-0722Issue 27/ September 2017

ASEANCommon

Visa:Will It Work?

ASEAN Cyber Security:

Challenges and Resolution

ASEAN and Rohingya: Potential

for Diplomatic Solution

+INFOGRAPHIC

ASEAN ROUND-UP

A Note From the Editor

Articles

ASEAN Common Visa: Will It Work?

ASEAN Cyber Security: Challenges and Resolution

ASEAN and Rohingya: potential for diplomatic solution

ASEAN Round-Up

Maturing Myanmar: Is Business Still Confident?

How to Save the Rohingya?

Infographic

Fire in Rakhine State

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habibiecenter.or.id

Project Supervisors Rahimah AbdulrahimExecutive Director,The Habibie Center

Hadi KuntjaraDeputy Director for Operations,The Habibie Center

Editor in ChiefA. Ibrahim Almuttaqi

Thinking ASEAN Team Askabea FadhillaFina AstrianaMuhamad ArifHana HanifahRahma SimamoraTongki Ari WibowoVierna Tasya WensatamaWirya Adiwena

A note from the editorDear readers:

Welcome to the September 2017 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN!

As the celebrations of ASEAN’s 50th anniversary are now behind us, the region is immediately confronted with two major issues. First in Myanmar, where Rohingya militants staged coordinated attacks on police and military posts in Rakhine State. The subsequent but disproportionate response by Myanmar’s security forces have seen almost 300,000 Rohingya flee to neighbouring Bangladesh with serious allegations of ethnic cleansing taking place. Second on the Korean peninsula, with worrying news that the North Korean regime conducted a hydrogen bomb test, in violation of UN Security Council sanctions, and have seen tensions heighten to new levels. These two major issues are a reminder that that the peace, security and proseperity that we have enjoyed thus far must be continuously worked for and ASEAN must do all that it can to help resolve them.

Arguably any efforts to do so will depend on ASEAN’s regional relations. In this sense our final article is by Mr. Wirya Adiwena (Head of International Relations, The Habibie Center) who writes on ‘ASEAN and Rohingya: Potential for Diplomatic Solution.’

Meanwhile, our first article explores the discourse on an ASEAN Common Visa. Based on a year-long study conducted by The Habibie Center itself, the writers, Dr. Alexander C. Chandra (Senior Associate Fellow, The Habibie Center) and myself argue that, despite the long and difficult journey towards a common visa regime, the ASEAN Common Visa project is feasible to be carried out by ASEAN and its Member States in the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, our second article is by Mr. Bryan Kumara (independent researcher based in Jakarta) who discusses ‘ASEAN Cyber Security: Challenges and Resolution’, and highlights the disparity of cyber security standards between members of ASEAN and how this creates different levels of challenges from one member to another.

As usual, we present a summary of the goings-on in selected countries from around Southeast Asia for your perusal and an infographic that provides an overview of the Rohingya situation.

Don’t hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, input, or prospective submissions.

Happy reading!

Best regards from Jakarta

Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.

The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.

Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.

The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.

The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.

habibiecenter.or.id

2Issue 27/ September 2017

Travellers moving through the duty free shopping area in the transit lounge at Changi Airport Terminal 3

Source: Strait Times

Alexander C. Chandra is an Associate Fellow of the ASEAN Studies Programme of The Habibie Center

A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi is Head of ASEAN Studies Program,The Habibie Center

ASEAN Common Visa:Will It Work?

Introduction

C onsidered as one of major long-standing projects of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Common Visa

(ACV) project is currently being studied and discussed by ASEAN Member States to be implemented in the foreseeable future. ASEAN’s seriousness in pursuing this project is timely, especially as the Association is celebrating its 50th anniversary this year. Whilst the ACV may not be the most important project that ASEAN could and should do, it represents considerable opportunities for the grouping to deepen and widen its cooperation in areas such as immigration and the wider border management-related issues and tourism.

Commissioned by the Interpol, the implementer of the EU-ASEAN Border Management Programme II, which is a three years programme that was launched in 2015 to improve border security and law enforcement across Southeast Asia to address transnational crimes, such as people smuggling and human trafficking,1 the ASEAN Studies Programme of The Habibie Center (THC) carried out a year-long study to assess the feasibility of the ACV implementation. Composed of the Center’s own research experts, as well as those from the University of Indonesia, the research team mainly argues that, despite the long and difficult journey towards a common visa regime, the ACV project is feasible to be carried out by ASEAN and its Member States in the foreseeable future.

Facts about ASEAN Member States’ existing visa regimes

Diverse visa policies

With generous visa free facility offered by countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, and, more recently, Indonesia, as well as a wide range of visa facilitation measures, such as visa-on-arrival, electronic visa, and visa-free transit facility, the existing visa regimes of ASEAN Member States are relatively very accommodative to international travellers, and this makes ASEAN, according to a Report carried out by the United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), as the most open region in the world as far as visa requirements for travellers are concerned.2 The same Report also shows that Cambodia was the least restrictive destination amongst AMS in 2015, whereas Lao’s People Democratic

Republic (Lao PDR) and Myanmar were two AMS with the highest number of improved visa procedures for 30 or more countries of origin, each with 144 and 87 improvements respectively.3 With the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 21 of 2016, which facilitates the granting of visa-free facility for nationals of 169 countries, Indonesia joined Cambodia as one of the most open destinations in ASEAN and the world.4

Despite this, the ten ASEAN Member States (AMS) apply different visa regimes. Variations, for example, can be found in terms of legal basis and official definitions of visas adopted by AMS, types of visa usually issued, period of stays accorded to foreign investors, visa facilitation initiatives, as well as relevant agencies in visa issuance. Existing regulations in Malaysia and Myanmar, for instance, do not provide specific legal definition for a visa. Instead, the legal bases for a visa in these AMS stipulate definitions for ‘permits’ or passes’. In the case of Malaysia, existing regulations consider a visa as merely an indication that the holder has applied for permission to enter the country. In other words, a visa is not an absolute guarantee that the holder will be allowed to enter Malaysia.5 A number of AMS also make distinction between a visa and a permit or pass. In Singapore, a visa is basically a pre-entry permission for holder to travel to, and seek entry, into the city-state.

The ten AMS, furthermore, also apply different categories for the types of visa they issue. At three, for instance, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore have the least number of categories for main types of visa categories (e.g. in the case of Malaysia the three main types of visa are: Single Entry Visa, Multiple Entry Visa, and Transit Visa; in the case of the Philippines the three main types of visa are: Non-immigrant, Immigrant, and Special; and in thecase of Singapore the three main types of visa/passes are: for Employment, for Business, and for Individuals and Family), whereas Vietnam has 20 categories of visas. AMS, furthermore, also apply different period of visa-free facility to international travellers. Brunei Darussalam, for example, offers a period of between 14 to 90 days, the Philippines 7-59 days, whilst Myanmar offers no visa-free arrangements whatsoever for nationals from non-ASEAN countries. The most common period of stay given by AMS is 30 days (the only exception is Myanmar).

Discussions towards the creation of an ACV

At the policy level, discussions leading towards to the establishment of an ACV have been long. The initial foundation for this idea can be found in Article 2 of the 2002 ASEAN Tourism Agreement, which calls for Member States to facilitate travel within and into ASEAN by, amongst others, ‘harmonising the procedures for issuing visas to international travellers’, and ‘easing the process of issuance of travel documents and progressively reducing all travel barriers’.6 Despite this, it was only in 2009 at the13th Meeting of the ASEAN Director-General of Immigration and Head of Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGICM) that discussions around visa-free facility for non-ASEAN nationals started to be seriously discussed amongst Member States. At the time, it was the Philippines that proposed the establishment of an ACV.

Taking up the Philippines’ suggestion further, the Indonesian government, which acted as ASEAN Chair in 2011, included in its 19th ASEAN Summit Statement the the importance of the initiative to develop an ACV, and tasked the relevant Ministers to undertake a comprehensive study to identify the necessary timeline for the establishment of such a visa arrangement. Shortly after the establishment of an Ad-Hoc Working Group on ASEAN Common Visa in 2016, the AMS decided to conduct a comprehensive feasibility study on the ACV, which, as mentioned earlier, has been carried out by the THC over the past one year.

What are the pros and cons of a regional common visa?

Along with the increase of globalisation and regionalisation today, countries are increasingly seeking ways to foster greater cooperation and coordination on their visa policies. But, there are problems and benefits associated with the imposition of a regional common visa policy. With regard to its potential negative impacts, countries, to start with, would be obliged to adopt a common visa revenue sharing arrangement, which would reduce potential income that they would enjoy from visa fees paid by visiting travellers. Secondly, security is another concern that revolves around the introduction of a regional common visa policy. This is particularly so given the fact that countries are forced to surrender its control of who enters and exits their territories. Lastly, the increased number of travelers into a region as a result of a region-wide visa regime may also pose significant challenges to a region’s environment, social norms,

and cultures. Similar to many other economic activities, tourism does not only consume resources, but also influence local identity and values, encourage crime and illegal activities to flourish (e.g. forced/child labour, prostitution, and so on), and facilitate drastic demographic change in the long-run.7

Despite these concerns, a regional common visa regime can also bring about opportunities for the implementing countries. Firstly, such a regional policy helps facilitate ease of travel for visitors coming from outside a region, and this can generate spill-over effect on, amongst others, job creation and economic growth. As the experience of the European Union (EU) illustrates, for example, the imposition of a single visa regime has saw the number of international visitors in the Schengen area rise steadily from 230.1 million in 1990 to 478.4 million in 2015. Secondly, a single visa arrangement can also serve as an image booster for the issuing region. This is particularly so especially if such a visa facilitation initiative is complemented by other reform measures, such as single tourism destination.

Thirdly, a regional common visa policy may also pave the way for further reforms in immigration and border-management-related policies, as well as other areas of regional cooperation. In the context of the EU, for instance, the introduction of the Schengen visa helped pave the way for initiatives such as the Schengen Information System, and, more recently, the Visa Information System that increases the quality and speed of visa issuance procedure, as well as beefing up the security of the Union. Linked to the third point above, a regional

common visa can also serve as a model for the deepening of integration in other areas of cooperation amongst countries in a region. If implemented properly, the lessons learned from the imposition of a single visa arrangement can be applied to other functional cooperation areas of a regional grouping.

Finally, a regional common visa may also serve as a collective bargaining tool to enhance a regional grouping’s foreign policy. In its partnership with Eastern European countries, for instance, the EU often promises visa facilitation and liberalisation in return for a detailed set of reforms pursued by the former. Specific to the case of the EU and its Eastern European partners, recent research demonstrates that this form of policy conditionality has been relatively effective in triggering domestic reforms in third countries.8

How would ACV work?

In carrying out a study on the feasibility of the ACV, the THC research team put in place four different scenarios: (1) remaining with the ‘status quo’; (2) applying the single visa system similar to the Ayeyawady-ChaoPhraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS); (3) pursuing a more advance regional common visa policy similar to that of the EU’s Schengen visa system; or (4) adopting a model of its own.

Whilst remaining with the status quo might be an option that AMS are most comfortable with, recent dialogues amongst border management- and tourism-related officials indicate AMS’s increased willingness to move away from

this option. As for the ACMECS model, this single visa arrangement has been relatively poor in attracting international visitors as intended by its original objectives. When first implemented in 2013, the visa arrangement model that is currently carried out by two (Cambodia and Thailand) of five ACMECS members only attracted 11 tourists to Thailand and 63 to Cambodia. By 2015, however, the number of applicants dropped to zero in Thailand and five in Cambodia.9

Meanwhile, the Schengen-based model, which emphasises the abolition of internal border checks across its Member States, can be considered far too aggressive and progressive for countries that are still overtly concerned over sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, despite vast visa facilitation improvements over the years, the existing Schengen visa model remains relatively restrictive for many third countries’ travellers (due mainly to the flood of migration and security concerns), and this is in stark contrast to ASEAN’s relatively more open visa regime described earlier.

So, how would ASEAN’s single visa model look like? The THC research team argues that the ACV should, first and foremost, be implemented in a manner that is acceptable to all AMS, which should also be consistent to existing norms, values, and mechanisms of the Association. As in the case with many other areas of ASEAN cooperation, furthermore, this initiative could also be implemented in a gradual manner, with initial focus to be given to areas that are easily pursued and agreed upon by the ten AMS. One of such possible focus areas is the determination of the so-called ‘whitelist’ (countries that

4

... a regional common visa policy may also pave the way for further reforms in immigration and border-management-

related policies, as well as other areas of regional cooperation.

Issue 27/ September 2017

can enjoy visa-free facility from ASEAN), ‘greylist’ (countries that are subjected to the actual ACV), and ‘blacklist’ (countries that are excluded from the ACV initiative) countries. This, for example, can be determined through a scoring system that would provide an objective approach in measuring various countries’ standing in relation to their geostrategic importance, economic value, risk to peace and security, and reciprocity vis-à-vis ASEAN.

To further ease the travelling experience of potential visitors, procedures and requirements of ACV application should be made as simple as possible. Unlike the complex EU’s Schengen system that requires visitors to apply in embassies of EU Member States that will either be visited first (first entry point) or where the applicant will stay longest, ACV application could, for instance, be lodged in any of the nearest ASEAN embassies or consulates. Moreover, to accommodate potential changes in a visitor’s travel plans, the switch from normal, or bilateral, visa, to the ACV, and vice-versa, should be permitted;

Of utmost concern amongst AMS is the issue of revenue sharing. In this regard, the THC research team proposes three options, including: (1) no revenue sharing; (2) proportionate share for visa issuing country, and equal revenue sharing amongst the remaining AMS; or (3) proportionate share for visa issuing country, equal revenue sharing, plus a small contribution to an ASEAN common pot, which can be used to further deepen collaboration in the areas of border management and tourism.

The successful implementation of the

ACV will require adequate information management database infrastructure that enables AMS to exchange information and detect potential security threats coming from potential visitors, as well as to facilitate the smooth issuance of the ACV to genuine travellers. To that end, ASEAN may consider developing the ASEAN Common Visa Information Database System (ACVIDS), which can facilitate ACV electronic application, allows relevant agencies to detect and monitor potential threats, record the entries and exits of travelers within the region, facilitate coordination and communication amongst relevant authorities across ASEAN, and, if needed, serves as a crisis management centre.

Will the ACV work?

Well, that really depends on the willingness of the AMS to deepen and widen the scope of its collaboration in the areas of border management and tourism. From the technical standpoint, the implementation of the ACV is absolutely feasible even in the absence of advanced information and communications technology that many AMS lack of. It is also very possible for ASEAN to develop a single visa model that does not require the abolishment of internal border checks as in the case of the EU’s Schengen visa system. Technicality issues aside, if implemented properly the ACV also promises over 900 million visitors to the region in 2027, and this translates around USD 90 billion tourism spending, 45.8 million jobs, and USD 1.5 billion and USD 1.6 billion worth of trade and investment respectively. Whilst acknowledging many potential challenges in implementing the ACV, ASEAN and its AMS need to remind themselves of

vast potential benefits and opportunities that the ACV initiative could bring about to the region. Accordingly, the primary focus of ASEAN and AMS therefore, should be given to potential solutions to the problems, rather than the problems themselves.

Endnotes1 INTERPOL (n.d.), ‘Border Management’, retrieved from

(accessed 21st May 2017): <https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/Border-management/EU-ASEAN-Programme>.

2 _____ (2016), UNWTO Tourism Highlights: 2016 Edition, Madrid: UNWTO, retrieved from: <http://www.e-unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/9789284418145>.

3 Ibid, pp. 9-13.

4 Glaesser, D. (2016), ‘Visa Openness Report 2016’, Presentation material, retrieved from (accessed 18th May 2017): <https://www.icao.int/Meetings/TRIP-Symposium-2016/Documents/Glaesser.pdf>.

5 See, for example, the official website of the Embassy of Malaysia in Ankara (n.d.), ‘Visa Requirement’, retrieved from (accessed 17th July 2017): <http://www.kln.gov.my/web/tur_ankara/requirement_foreigner>.

6 _____ (n.d.a.), ASEAN Tourism Agreement, retrieved from (accessed 18th May 2017): <http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-tourism-agreement>.

7 Azis, A. (2017), ‘Comprehensive Feasibility Study on ASEAN Common Visa: Socio-Cultural Aspect’, Presentation carried out at Workshop on the Comprehensive Feasibility Study on ASEAN Common Visa, which took place in Putrajaya, Malaysia, on 9th-10th May.

8 Börzel, T. A., and J. Langbein (2014), Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood, London and New York, NY: Routledge.

9 Thareechat, C. (2017), ‘Immigration Bureau – Royal Thai Police’, Presentation made at the ‘Workshop on the Comprehensive Feasibility Study on ASEAN Common Visa’, in Putrajaya, Malaysia, on 7th-8th May.

... ACV will require adequate information management database infrastructure that

enables AMS to exchange information and detect potential security threats coming

from potential visitors...

6

ASEAN Cyber Security: Challenges and Resolution

Bukalapak OfficeSource: stackoverflow.com

Brian Kumara is an independent researcher

Issue 27/ September 2017

O ffering smartphones to televisions and even virtual reality (VR), technology has become a central aspect of our lives. By March 2017,

there were around 321,913,948 internet users in the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).1While the ratio of internet usage is lower in Asia than in Europe or North America, the influence of technology and the digital world in ASEAN is very significant. To illustrate, a research published by Temasek Holdings, Singapore’s national wealth fund, and Google revealed that the projected worth of ASEAN’s digital economy would be around USD 200 billion each year by 2025, showing that the digital world is full of potential for ASEAN members.2 For example, Indonesia is tipped to be the region’s biggest digital market, with a growth in user by 19% per annum and e-commerce worth USD81 billion by 2025.3 The emergence of online-based transportation services such as Uber, Grab, and Gojek has boosted Indonesia’s digital economy, making it the biggest in ASEAN and worth USD800 million in 2015.4

However, the rise of the digital economy and technology in general has presented some security issues around the world. For instance, the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS), Home Box Office (HBO), and Sony Entertainment have been hit by cyber attacks that stole sensitive information and demanded ransom from these entities. 5 6 In Malaysia, around USD 900 million was lost between 2007-2012 due to cybercrimes whilst Indonesia lost USD2.7 billion per annum.7 Hence, the threat posed by cyber crimes harms ASEAN’s goal of economic prosperity and security. However, arguably little is being done to address such digital issues that ASEAN currently faces. While, some government ministers have called for a collectivized cybersecurity scheme, no policies have been introduced yet.8 While an ASEAN Chief of Information Officer Association (ACIOA) exists, its scope is very limited.9 Hence, this article will explore what are the current major digital threats that ASEAN members face, alongside the potential solutions that members may use to curb digital threats.

With regards to strengthening cyber security, it is important to note that there very few international treaty that addresses cybercrime. The 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime aimed to harmonize local laws pertaining to cybercrime by setting up a proper procedural legal powers for offences

committed through a computer and evidences in electronic forms. However, as of 2017, no ASEAN member has ratified the treaty.10 In October 2016, the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity (AMCC) convened for the first time, and members called for “closer cybersecurity cooperation among ASEAN countries, stronger coordination of regional cybersecurity capacity building initiatives”.11 However, no concrete policies were suggested and as of August 2017, there has been no further announcement from the AMCC. While a step in the right direction, more needs to be done by members to ensure digital safety.

Examining ASEAN members individually, it seems that only Singapore has a comprehensive cyber policy that is already in place. This is outlined in their “Four Pillars” strategy.12 The first pillar focuses on building a strong infrastructure for the digital economy from online banking to e-government. This was done through a cooperation between the private and public sector to raise security standards and also by raising the security standards by which private firms operate. The private sector is also responsible for alerting the government on cyber crimes and conducting exercises to test for weaknesses in the system. The second pillar revolves around the idea of a “safe cyber space”. Again, this is done through the collaboration between the private and public sector. The third pillar aims on developing Singapore’s cybersecurity

workforce. This is done by offering a Cyber Security Associates and Technologists (CSAT) programme that provides a six-month training to IT professionals with three years of experience. The fourth pillar, recently announced, focuses on international cooperation through agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and India.

By contrast, the cyber policy of other ASEAN members are not as sophisticated. For instance, the Philippines has announced their National Cybersecurity Plan for 2022.13 However, it only mentions general statements such as “cybersecurity educated society” and “implementing cyber resiliency” without plans to achieve these goals.14 Indonesia is a member state tipped with the second highest malware threat, coming only behind Pakistan in the world. 15 Compared to Malaysia, which has the Computer Crime Act (1997), Digital Signature Act (1997), Telemedicine Act Multimedia Act (1998), Payment System Act (2003) and a Personal Data Act (2010), Indonesia only has the Telecommunication Law No. 36 (1999) and the controversial Information and Transaction Electronic Law (ITE) (2008).16 17 Worse still, the ITE is used mostly for defamation cases and the country focuses its IT efforts on blocking pornographic sites instead of increasing its cyber security standards. The following chart highlights the use of the ITE:18

Indonesia also has not approved a nation-wide security framework.19 Despite the

Cases using ITE Law (20018-2015)

Source: Safenet (2016)

Tota

l

legal weaknesses, Indonesia has a strong technical capacity. The nation is a member of APCERT FIRST (Asia Pacific Computer Emergency. Response Team - Forum for Incident Response and Security Team), also founding member of OIC-CERT (Organisation of The Islamic Cooperation – Computer Emergency Response Teams). Yet, involving the non-public sector seems to be difficult, and many have noted that it is based on personal relationship as opposed to organizational cooperation.20 Consequently these groups tend to work and establish their own framework different from the government.21 This leads to a wide disparity between security standard in the private and public sector.

Another member of ASEAN that lacks cyber security policies is Cambodia. An article concluded that eight in ten computers did not have security measures as they used non-genuine systems.22 Other nations like Myanmar do not have a cyber policy and instead rely on an emergency team (MMCERT), meaning that they only have a containment policy but not a prevention policy.23 Thailand does not have a specific law regarding data protection but does have the Computer Crime Act (CCA) to prevent fraud and identity theft.24 Worse still is Vietnam. The country is prone to hacks due to the lack of cyber enforcement, with hackers attacking one of its airports recently. On the other hand, the government is reluctant to allow encryption as it prevents the monitoring of citizens’ activities.25 As a result, the cyber security capacities and regulations differ greatly from one ASEAN member to another.

On a collective basis, ASEAN members are involved in the ACIOA. While this is a step in the right direction by offering initiatives such as business-government cooperation and a Chief of Information Officer (CIO) academy training, their activities are limited to CIO. An expanded training program as seen in Singapore’s current cyber policy would be hugely beneficial in creating a cybersecurity workforce in ASEAN members. However, there are some limitations. At the moment, only Singapore seems to offer a comprehensive training scheme. Yet, it would be irresponsible to place the pressure on Singapore alone for training considering the logistical consequences such as manpower and living space. Secondly, funding may be an issue. The lack of government funding will deter people from the lower income spectrum to train in cyber security due to travel and living costs and such. Due to the difference in the availability of government

funds, ASEAN members should look into possible cooperations with outside countries, such as its Dialogue Partners, and find alternative means of financing these individuals through loans.

Currently, Japan is working with ASEAN and has released a CIIP (a national procedure for cyber security).26 The new strategies in this policy should be integrated into an ASEAN wide digital policy after taking considering the current conditions of its members. While Japan and ASEAN has launched a collaborative program of study, more intra-cooperation would be beneficial to the collective cyber security ASEAN needs. A recent research by Accenture published the following digital challenges for ASEAN:27

1. Weak business case for building out broadband

2. Regulations inhibiting innovation in mobile financial services and e-commerce

3. Low consumer awareness and trust hindering the uptake of digital services

4. No single digital market5. Limited supply of local content,

primarily due to a weak local digital ecosystem

While not necessarily specific on cyber security, there are some lessons from the analysis above. For instance, the lack of businesses building better broadband shows a lack of investment in infrastructure. A government scheme can help persuade investors to improve the digital infrastructure, and the option of lower tax should be considered. While offering better broadband connectivity to consumers, companies have a chance to implement cyber security measures such as security-by-design and computer intrusion detection. A weak digital ecosystem does not necessarily apply to all ASEAN members (Singapore comes into mind), but programmes to raise digital awareness and aptitude can go a long way to avoid scams and hacks for all members. Hence the current solution seems to be increasing government expenditure on technology related activities while enticing businesses to build a better system.

Another issue regarding cyber security in ASEAN is the workforce retention. While it is necessary to train capable cyber security employees and form policies to protect the digital world, it would be for naught if employees are quick to move to other countries or other industries. Just as there are different level of cyber security policies and capabilities amongst ASEAN

members, there are different retention rates for skilled workforce. For instance, Singapore does not face a labour retention crisis to the point where the IMF signals worry over falling numbers of foreign workers.28 On the other hand, countries such as Indonesia face a shortage of skilled engineers.29 While the labour situation varies, it is clear that without a stable and sizeable technologically-skilled workforce, it is impossible to protect a nation’s cyber security, let alone for ASEAN. Hence, the development of cyber securities needs to come with the capacity for governments to persuade local and international talents to stay in their countries, which comes from a self-analysis for each member as they have different situations.

As a short term solution, cyber related events such as hackathon for ASEAN members can be hugely beneficial to quickly identify flaws in the system. However, this should not be regarded as the ideal approach. Instead of having outside parties identify the flaws, ASEAN members should focus on internal development and constant innovation to avoid cyber attacks. Since that is not possible in the short term, hackathons should be a remedy until a competent cyber security workforce is in place to identify flaws and improve security standards. The long term goal of ASEAN members in terms of tackling cybercrime should be to form an organization similar to the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT) in the European Union. At the moment, J-CAT has initiatives to:30

1. Select the most relevant proposals;2. Share, collect and enrich data on the

cases in question;3. Develop an action plan, which is led

by the country that submitted the selected proposal;

4. Go through all the necessary steps to ensure the case is ready to become a target of law enforcement action — a process that involves consulting with judicial authorities, the identification the required resources and the allocation of responsibilities.

Unlike the European Union, ASEAN does not have a European Court of Justice. This clearly causes issues for legal aspects. However, given the current calls for harmonizing cyber securities amongst members, the legal aspects an obstacle that members should be able to overcome quite easily through talks .

Another aspect is collaboration on cyber security should come through the ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration (ADIC).

8Issue 27/ September 2017

Members should expand from selling defence equipment and focus on digital protection equipment and services. ADIC members do not currently buy substantial amounts from other ADIC members, instead opting to source their current defence equipment from outside nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom.31 Should Singapore decide to offer technical services and training, in time, other members may see a rise in cyber security standards by hiring experts from ASEAN and essentially form an interconnected cyber security workforce and start trading internally.

In conclusion, the disparity of cyber security standards between members of ASEAN varies greatly, creating different levels of challenges from one member to another. On the one hand is Singapore, with robust cyber security from the “Four Pillars” strategy that focuses on private-public cooperation on identifying weaknesses, preventing unsafe online content, training new workers, and international agreements. On the other hand are countries like Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, whose lack of cyber security policy and standards have made it an appealing target for hackers. To counteract the disparity, ASEAN members can look forward to expanding their ACIOA to lower ranked employees for cybersecurity education. Members should also act quickly to harmonize ASEAN digital standards and ensure that an organization similar to J-CAT is created. Yet, they must consider the more subtle factors to achieve these proposals. For instance, ASEAN members need to find a way to retain their workforce and ensure that after a certain period of time, the training responsibility is not just concentrated in Singapore. Additionally, short term events such as hackathon can help identify talents, which can then be retained, while also identify system flaws. In the long run, ASEAN members should aim to have a continually innovative cybersecurity industry to prevent hacking and an ADIC that can supply cyber security services to less sophisticated members. Returning to its economic prospects, countries like Indonesia can look forward to enjoying a $85 billion USD digital market if its investors are confident that the cyber security standards and policies can protect confidential information and prevent frauds.32 Looking at the current situation, it seems highly likely that members can progress rapidly so long as cooperation and commitment is maintained for the next few years.

Endnotes1 “Internet Usage in Asia.” Asia Internet Usage Stats Facebook

and Population Statistics, Miniwatts Marketing Group , <www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm>

2 Russell, Jon. “Report: Southeast Asia’s Internet Economy to Grow to $200B by 2025.”TechCrunch, TechCrunch, 24 May 2016, <www.techcrunch.com/2016/05/24/report-southeast-asias-internet-economy-to-grow-to-200b-by-2025/>

3 “Indonesia to Become The ASEAN’s Biggest Digital Economy Country.” Invest in Indonesia, Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, <www.bkpm.go.id/en/article-investment/readmore/indonesia-to-become-the-aseans-biggest-digital-economy-country>

4 Ibid.

5 “NHS under cyber attack.” Financial Times, www.ft.com/content/ced6dd82-6709-11e7-9a66-93fb352ba1fe.

6 Flynn, Conner. “HBO Hack Feared To Be Larger Than Sony Hack.” Geeky Gadgets, 6 Aug. 2017, <www.geeky-gadgets.com/hbo-hack-feared-to-be-larger-than-sony-hack-07-08-2017/>

7 Lee, Stacia. “ASEAN Cybersecurity Profile: Finding a Path to a Resilient Regime.” The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 4 Apr. 2016, <https://jsis.washington.edu/news/asean-cybersecurity-profile-finding-path-resilient-regime/>

8 “ASEAN Member States Call for Tighter Cybersecurity Coordination in ASEAN.” Cyber Security Agency, 11 Oct. 2016, <www.csa.gov.sg/news/press-releases/asean-member-states-call-for-tighter-cybersecurity-coordination-in-asean>

9 Kwek, Hong Sin. “Initiatives.” ACIOA, <www.acioa.com/en/initiatives/>

10 “Budapest Convention and Related Standards.” Cybercrime, <www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention>

11 “ASEAN Member States Call for Tighter Cybersecurity Coordination in ASEAN.” Cyber Security Agency, 11 Oct. 2016, <www.csa.gov.sg/news/press-releases/asean-member-states-call-for-tighter-cybersecurity-coordination-in-asean>

12 Kwang, Kevin. “National Cybersecurity Strategy Aims to Make Smart Nation Safe: PM Lee.”Channel NewsAsia, 9 June 2017, <www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/national-cybersecurity-strategy-aims-to-make-smart-nation-safe-p-7743784>.

13 “National Cybersecurity Plan 2022.” Republic of the Philippines, 10 Aug. 2017, <www.dict.gov.ph/national-cybersecurity-plan-2022/>

14 Ibid.

15 Barrett, Lauren. “Cybersecurity More than Just an IT Issue, It’s a Business Issue.” Phnom Penh Post, Post Media Co Ltd 888 Building H, 8th Floor, Phnom Penh Center Corner Sothearos & Sihanouk Blvd Sangkat Tonle Bassac120101 Phnom Penh Cambodia, 16 Dec. 2016, <www.phnompenhpost.com/supplements/cybersecurity-more-just-it-issue-its-business-issue>

16 “The National Cyber Security Policy.” Oxford Saïd Business School, Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation of Malaysia, <www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/system/files/Malaysia%20Cyber%20Security%20Policy.pdf>

17 Nugraha, Leonardus K., and Dintra A. Putri. “Mapping the Cyber Policy Landscape: Indonesia.” Centre for Innovation Policy and Governance, Global Partners Digital , Nov. 2016, <cipg.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CIPG_Indonesia-Cyber-Policy-Mapping.pdf>

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Barrett, Lauren. “Cybersecurity More than Just an IT Issue, It’s a Business Issue.” Phnom Penh Post, Post Media

Co Ltd 888 Building H, 8th Floor, Phnom Penh Center Corner Sothearos & Sihanouk Blvd Sangkat Tonle Bassac120101 Phnom Penh Cambodia, 16 Dec. 2016, <www.phnompenhpost.com/supplements/cybersecurity-more-just-it-issue-its-business-issue>

23 “Myanmar Computer Emergency Response Team | Myanmar Computer Emergency Response Team.” Myanmar Computer Emergency Response Team | Myanmar Computer Emergency Response Team, <www.mmcert.org.mm/>

24 Ramiah, Rajen. “Data Protection and Cybersecurity Laws in Thailand .” Chambers and Partners, 21 Mar. 2017, <www.chambersandpartners.com/article/1570/data-protection-and-cyber-security-law-in-thailand>

25 Gray, Michael L. “The Trouble with Vietnam’s Cyber Security Law.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 22 Oct. 2016, <thediplomat.com/2016/10/the-trouble-with-vietnams-cyber-security-law/>

26 Matsubara, Mihoko. “Japan’s Cybersecurity Capacity-Building Support for ASEAN.” Palo Alto Networks Blog, 25 July 2017, <researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/07/cso-japans-cybersecurity-capacity-building-support-asean-shifting/>

27 Yan , Janet. “Digital ASEAN.” Accenture Blog, Accenture, 10 June 2016, <www.accenture.com/sg-en/blogs/blogs-preparing-asean-digital-workforce>

28 Nation, The. “IMF Raises Eurozone Growth Forecast despite Brexit.” The Nation, 4 Oct. 2016, <www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/IMF-raises-eurozone-growth-forecast-despite-Brexit-30296910.html>

29 Cochrane, Joe. “Indonesia’s Dire Need for Engineers Is Going Unmet.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 18 Dec. 2016, <www.nytimes.com/2016/12/18/world/asia/indonesias-dire-need-for-engineers-is-going-unmet.html>

30 Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT).” Europol, 4 Nov. 2016, <www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/services-support/joint-cybercrime-action-taskforce>

31 “Sneha Raghavan and Guy Ben-Ari (2011, September 7) Current Issues- No. 25: ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration”. www.csis.org/ISP/DIIG/.

32 “Indonesia to Become The ASEAN’s Biggest Digital Economy Country.” Invest in Indonesia, Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, <www.bkpm.go.id/en/article-investment/readmore/indonesia-to-become-the-aseans-biggest-digital-economy-country>

10

ASEAN and Rohingya: Potential for Diplomatic

Solution

An ethnic Rohingya Muslim refugee breaks down during a gathering in Kuala Lumpur on December 4, 2016 against the persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.

Source: Manan Vatsyayana/AFP/Getty

Wirya Adiwenais Head of International Relationsat The Habibie Center

Issue 27/ September 2017

R akhine State is in fire. Hundreds and thousands of Rohingya refugees have fled Myanmar in the wake of escalation of conflict

between the Tatmadaw or the Myanmar military and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA formerly Harakat al-yaqin). Dozens of Rohingya majority villages were set ablaze, allegedly, by members of the military as clashes between the army and militia continues. This situation has put Myanmar into global spotlight with world leaders and international NGOs quick to point out the possibility of an ethnic-cleansing happening against the Rohingya. At the same time, the Myanmar government has protested against this global response, claiming an unfair treatment.

Myanmar has turned into a global pariah with many criticisms about their lack of ability to stop the escalation of violence. At the same time, regional norm of non-interference has made it difficult to have common regional position vis-à-vis the situation in Rakhine State. This paper aims to highlight the way forward to stop the violence in Rakhine State by bringing Myanmar closer to ASEAN through an Indonesian led diplomatic effort.

International spotlight

Myanmar does not want foreign meddling in their domestic affairs. To enforce this, they are limiting access into Rakhine States for foreigners, this is mostly true for foreign journalists but also for

humanitarian aid. This situation has made it difficult to ascertain what truly happens. International civil society organisations have been instrumental in ensuring that there is continuous monitoring on the situation in Rakhine State. Human Rights Watch has provided satellite imagery that shows at least 1,500 buildings destroyed between October – November 2016.1 Amnesty International detected at least 80 large-scale fires in inhabited areas across northern Rakhine States since August 25, with 27 of them happened during September 2017.2 Both of these organisations have been very focal in ‘naming and shaming’ the Myanmar government, citing government sponsored ‘ethnic cleansing’. They are also joined by prominent leaders such as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres who echoed the allegation of ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State.3 The United Nations high commissioner for human rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein has also stated that the situation is, “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing”.4

One of the few exceptions to the limitation for foreigner to Rakhine State is the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, which was a joint collaboration between the Ministry of the Office of the State Counsellor—Office of Aung San Suu Kyi—and the Kofi Annan Foundation. The Commission was chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan comprising of six Myanmar experts and another two international experts. The Commission presented its final report to Myanmar’s President Htin Kyaw on August 23rd 2017,

only a few days before ARSA led its raid against government’s border posts.

The Commission made a number of important recommendations to the government, including opening up access for journalists and humanitarian aids to Rakhine State. Furthermore, they also recommended to close down three Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in Rakhine State. The Commission, however, works under limitation as it focuses on resolving the current conflict and promoting future development in Rakhine State. However, they did not address past human rights violations.5

Indonesia led response in Southeast Asia

Meanwhile, Indonesia is leading regional efforts to address the conflict and persecution in Rakhine State, though with mixed results. Its initial efforts in 2016 managed to bring all ASEAN Member States to hold a meeting in Yangoon at Foreign Minister level. However, this meeting did not manage to produce an outcome document, signalling the difficulties to reach a common regional position in regard to the issue.

It is therefore not surprising that when conflict erupted again in Rakhine State, ASEAN is not able to reach a common position. Indeed, when conflict erupted again in Rakhine State in August 2017, Indonesia seemed to be the only ASEAN Member States who actively approached Myanmar to help resolve the conflict and provide humanitarian aid out of goodwill. Its neighbouring country, Malaysia, is also active in voicing their criticisms of Myanmar—although they seem to be more politically motivated to garner domestic popular support for the current regime.

All of these points out that ASEAN has no mechanism to effectively stop the conflict. The usual suspect that halt effective efforts from ASEAN is the norm of non-interference. On top of this norm, the conflict also echoes two issues that are still prevailing challenges in the region: separatism and human rights abuses. The region is particularly allergic to international spotlight toward these domestic challenges. Even the relatively more democratic and progressive Indonesia is careful to navigate these issues as experience of its past human rights abuses in Timor Leste is still fresh in the memory of its diplomats, while at the same time they are still facing constraints Image 1. Arson attacks on villages in Rakhine State (Image source: HRW)

in Papua provinces with a separatist group demanding independence amidst alleged extrajudicial killings and torture by the hands of Indonesian military forces.6

Nevertheless, Indonesia has potential allies in the region. For example, Thailand is willing to help just like their previous assistance with the 2015 refugee crisis in the Andaman Sea, even when it has to manage more than 500,000 refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons—with significant numbers coming from Myanmar.7 Thailand’s focus is its domestic security and stability. They would want to minimize irregular movement of people and refugee influx that can happen following the crisis in Rakhine State. They are also an influential voice in the region with active civil society who are concerned with the development in Rakhine State, particularly in the case of refugees.

Geographically smaller countries such as Singapore and Brunei Darussalam are also potential allies. Brunei as a Muslim majority country would pay close attention to the plight of the mostly Muslim Rohingya. And Singapore always puts high importance in ensuring the security and stability of the region.

Indonesia, most assuredly, does not stand alone in trying to resolve this situation. However, as Indonesia is actively approaching Myanmar to put a stop to the conflict, they also have to knock the doors of their other neighbours to push them to be more actively involved. In the past, Indonesia had been able to move the region past a deadlock on diplomatic crisis in regard to the South China Sea through

creative implementation of shuttle diplomacy. They can still do it again.

What is also important is to ensure that ASEAN has a coordinated response. In this context, Malaysia should follow regional efforts to stop the conflict in Rakhine State and cease their megaphone diplomacy. Avoiding megaphone diplomacy is important to show to Myanmar that ASEAN Member States approach the issue with goodwill. This does not mean that the region turns a blind eye toward any crimes and violations of human rights in Rakhine State. It only means that the region puts a priority in stopping the violence and further atrocities while opening up future channel for democratization in Myanmar and the region.

ASEAN should remember its history

If the region fails to stop persecution of Rohingya and to mediate the conflict in Rakhine State, this will be another dark spot in Southeast Asian history. Countries in the region have even built museums and monuments to remind its peoples of the harms they can inflict to their fellow human when angers and grievances are left unchecked; a museum to remind us on the brutality of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the indiscriminate impact of Agent Orange in Vietnam, and the shrouded executions during Communist Party rebellion in Indonesia.

The region is no stranger to mass atrocities, government sponsored or otherwise. On paper, it has an aspiration to move past its dark history. However, recent history shows more and more challenges toward

this aspiration.

Failure to halt the conflict and stop future persecution of Rohingya and other ethnic minorities will mean that the region is still grappling with the same spectres as it has been for the past decades. Therefore, ASEAN needs to show to itself that its progress thus far, its commitments toward human rights, and its aim for a people-centered region are real and meaningful. Otherwise, it will only show that ASEAN is not able to fulfil its promises to maintain peace and stability in the region, as well as to enhance the well-being and livelihood of the people of ASEAN as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter.

Endnotes1 Human Rights Watch. 2016. Burma: burned villages in

Rakhine State. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/13/burma-military-burned-villages-rakhine-state

2 Amnesty International. 2017. “Scorched earth campaign fuels ethnic cleansing of Rohingya from Rakhine State”. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/myanmar-scorched-earth-campaign-fuels-ethnic-cleansing-of-rohingya-from-rakhine-state/

3 Independent. 2017. Un Chief calls for an end to ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Rohingya Muslims as Security Council condemns violence. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rohingya-ethnic-cleansing-genocide-latest-aung-san-suu-kyi-refugees-burma-myanmar-un-bangladesh-a7945806.html

4 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/11/un-myanmars-treatment-of-rohingya-textbook-example-of-ethnic-cleansing

5 Advisory Commission on the Rakhine State. 2017. Towards a Peaceful, Fair, and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine. http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf

6 Febriana Firdaus. 2017. ‘A Tragic, Forgotten Place’: Poverty and Death in Indonesia’s Land of Gold. http://time.com/4880190/papua-poverty-shootings-justice-paniai/

7 UNHCR. 2017. Thailand. http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2552#_ga=2.172293099.977723275.1505725191-788854619.1505725191

12

Image 2. Arson attacks on villages in Rakhine State, August - September 2017 (Image source: Amnesty International)

Issue 27/ September 2017

Imagine ASEANat your fingertipsthcasean.org

14

“Back in 2013, there was a rush of excitement in Myanmar as investors and businesses poured in — wanting to take advantage of one of Asia’s last frontier markets. As the country opened-up in 2013, the economy grew at a breakneck 8.5 percent. This has now slipped to 6.5 percent in 2016 with projections of around 7 percent for this year.”

Why it Matters?

As one of the most promising economies in the Southeast Asian region, Myanmar’s business climate has long attracted the attention of foreign investors. After the government of Myanmar decided to implement economic reforms since 2011, Myanmar has become an attractive business destination for foreign investors. It is even more appealing after the United States lifted some sanctions on Myanmar back in 2016.

Myanmar’s economic growth is one of the highest when compared to its neighbouring country in the region. From 2010 to 2015, Myanmar recorded an average growth rate of 7.4 percent, making it the second highest in the region. Myanmar has a lot of important assets to further boost its economy. It has abundant natural resources, such as natural gas, water, fisheries, agriculture products, and forestry, that have not yet been fully utilized. In addition, Myanmar will enjoy demographic dividend since its youth population will account for nearly

40 percent of the working-age population.

Myanmar has made some notable progress in its infrastructure development for the past few years. According to the Logistics Performance Index by the World Bank, Myanmar was ranked 113th out of 160 countries in 2016, a quite significant increase from 147th in 2007. Infrastructure development in Myanmar used to be neglected because it experienced prolonged underinvestment. Inadequate infrastructure led to high economic costs and constrained economic growth.

The ease of doing business in Myanmar has also been improving over the years. In 2014, Myanmar was ranked 182nd out of 189 countries. Later in 2017, Myanmar’s position rose to 170th based on the Doing Business Report by the World Bank. The increased in its ranking was due to several reforms that had been undertaken by the government such as reducing the number of documents required for exports and imports, eliminating the minimum capital requirement for local companies, reducing the cost to register a company, and streamlining incorporation procedures.

Despite those improvements, Myanmar is indeed still lagging behind its neighbours such as Cambodia (131) and Lao (139) in terms of ease of doing business. There were some setbacks in its regulation regarding tax and trading across borders. In 2016, companies should pay more tax since the rate paid by employers increased.

Additional paperwork when they have to report corporate income tax also adds the burden of the company. It was a reverse situation compared to 2014 when the government decided to reduce corporate income tax. Furthermore, in terms of trading across borders, despite government’s efforts to reduce the number of documents required for export and import, companies are still experiencing delays and need to pay higher cost for processing incoming cargo at the Port of Yangon.

In order to reap the benefits from the ASEAN Economic Community, Myanmar should accelerate its economic reform and improve its infrastructure quality.

While it is important to improve its economic condition, it is also crucial for Myanmar to maintain political stability in its country. Foreign investors and trading partners will not only consider the business climate but also its political stability. Recently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives decided to cut all trade ties between Maldives and Myanmar due to recent situation in Rakhine state. The government of Maldives will restore trade ties if the Myanmar government takes actions to protect the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.

The policy makers should realize that Myanmar has so many economic potentials that if the government can maximize it, the country will be more prosperous and eventually will increase the quality of life of its people. The government cannot lose the momentum to grow, especially when the ASEAN Economic Community is already taking place. All eyes of investors are on the region right now and seek for potential place to expand their businesses.

To maintain foreign investors’ confidence in the country, the government of Myanmar should prove that the current administration is capable in handling its economy. Economic reform should be accelerated so that Myanmar’s economic potential can be unlocked.

Maturing Myanmar: Is Business Still Confident?

The Diplomat, August 28http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/maturing-myanmar-is-business-still-confident/

A S E A N R O U N D - U P Fina Astriana is an Economic Researcherof the ASEAN Studies Program of The Habibie Center

Issue 27/ September 2017

A S E A N R O U N D - U P Askabea Fadhilla is a researcher at The Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies Program

Nearly 90,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled to Bangladesh since violence erupted on August 25. This mass exodus culminates after suspected Rohingya insurgents attacked police posts and an army base in the western part of Rakhine State. The Myanmar government claimed the Arakan Rohingnya Salvation Army (ARSA) as the main actor causing the violence. However, Rohingya civilians believed that the Myanmar army uses rapes, murders and acts of arson to force them out of the country, leading to the accusation of ethnic cleansing by Aung San Suu Kyi’s administration.

Why it Matters?

Despite having lived in Rakhine State for generations, Myanmar’s government denies Rohingya’s citizenship and considers them as illegal settlers from Bangladesh. Meanwhile,as a non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Bangladesh has refused to register the Rohingya as refugees, nor allowed them to lodge asylum claims. This has been a problematic situation for the Rohingyas—stay in Myanmar and face persecution or leave for Bangladesh and be denied their ancestral homeland.

The recent mass exodus has once again placed the Rohingya’s plight under international scrutiny.However, as a regional conflict settlement mechanism, ASEAN has minimum ability in solving this issue due to the key principle that

it upholds. Historically, ASEAN’s non-interference principle has proved effective in keeping all the Southeast Asia member states to stay out from others’ domestic affairs in order to avoid conflicts and confrontations. However, the silence from the ASEAN has sparked some doubts on the relevance of this principle.

While ASEAN with with its non-interference has yet to make comments on the current outbreak, the international community has done its part in putting Myanmar in the spotlight. The United Nations Secretary General, António Guterres has appealed to Myanmar’s authority totake determined action to put an end to this vicious cycle of violence and to provide security and assistance to all those in need. State leaders, humanitarian organizations, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureates convey similar message to end “this tragic and shameful treatment” towards the ethnic minority. Human Rights Watch provided the real-life update on the ground through satellite imagery from the region, which shows the total destruction of burned down villages.

One would expect that these international pressures would push Myanmar to respond and take the required action. However, in the wake of the recent incident on August 25, Myanmar is blocking access for humanitarian aid as well as preventing independent observers from entering the conflict area. In fact, a statement from the

How to Save the Rohingya?

Al Jazeera, September 7th 2017http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/subjects/rohingya.html

UN resident coordinator in Myanmar confirmed that vital supplies had been suspended “because the security situation and government field-visit restrictions rendered us unable to distribute assistance”.

When a morally and ethically right intention has been translated into an offensive gesture, what would be the most appropriate approach to respond to this issue? Indonesia might have taken the lead as Aung Sang Suu Kyi welcomed Indonesia’s foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, to discuss the matter. Interestingly, Marsudi managed to persuade Myanmar authorities to allow humanitarian aid from Indonesia and several other Southeast Asian nations. This is a significant step from the previously restricted access from other non-governmental groups. At the same time Marsudi had an audience with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who as commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw, arguably wields most influence in preventing the conflict from escalating.

Now, what has Indonesia done differently in light of this humanitarian crisis that Myanmar remains unthreatened by Indonesia’s involvement? First and foremost, Indonesia does not point finger to Myanmar’s nose for these humanitarian offenses. Unlike the majority international community, Indonesia simply urged Myanmar authorities to de-escalate the situation in Rakhine State, without having to point out the cause of the violence. Myanmar does not feel cornered by Indonesia’s diplomacy.

Secondly, Indonesia is fully aware that communal mistrust between ethnics is the major source of conflict. By making the aid available for all people in need without exception, despite their religions and ethnicities, Indonesia has shown Myanmar that it does not take sides on any parties.

One important thing we can all learn from the recent Rohingya conflict: there is no one-size-fits-all prescription in dealing with this issue. The international community’s statement and condemnation might be very effective in raising global awareness towards Myanmar. However, a delicate yet effective approach performed by Indonesia might have been the one that the Rohingya people need right now.

The Guardian, September 4th 2017https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/myanmar-blocks-all-un-aid-to-civilians-at-heart-of-rohingya-crisis

Data Compiled by The Habibie Center2017 | Wirya Adiwena & Tongki AW

ASEAN STUDIES PROGRAMThe Habibie Center

Jl. Kemang Selatan No.98, Jakarta Selatan 12560(P.) 62 21 781 7211(F.) 62 21 781 7212

www.habibiecenter.or.idwww.thcasean.org

facebook.com/habibiecenter @habibiecenter

The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the

development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same

goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.

The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also

to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the

establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

Cover:A Muslim man rides his bike through an IDP camp in Rakhine State.

Source: Maro Verli / Frontier