by Thomas P. Turner, Mastery Flight Training, Inc. National Flight Instructor Hall of Fame inductee
FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In almost all cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference as a scenario unfolds. So apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly. Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.
FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC. www.mastery-flight-training.com
Pursue Mastery of Flight
This week’s LESSONS: Scary fast. The was my first coherent thought after seeing the short video of the Beechcraft Duke crash during takeoff at Fullerton, California last week. I usually do not include photos and videos of aviation crashes, hoping to avoid sensationalism, but I’m making an exception in this case because of the instructional value of seeing how incredibly swiftly things can go wrong. The video has been widely distributed in the media anyway, so no one is getting it first from me. See https://www.asias.faa.gov/apex/f?p=100:96:12204608826774::::P96_ENTRY_DATE,P96_MAKE_NAME,P96_FATAL_FLG:19-APR-19,BEECH
The Duke is pressurized piston twin with 380 horsepower engines on each side. Lightly loaded, it has a thrust-to-weight ratio approaching that of a maximum weight P-51D Mustang. It’s a rocket ship, and pilots love it. The Duke has a comparatively small wing for its size and weight, and is known as a “ground-loving” airplane for typical takeoff distance requirements. It has a fairly short fuselage and corresponding rudder authority, giving it what compared to competing piston twins is a fairly high VMCA (minimum controllability speed on one engine) of 85 knots, which can be lowered by 10 knots with a vortex generator modification. With and without VGs, it’s flaps-up stall speed is only two knots slower than VMCA for a given weight.
The attempted takeoff, like much of modern life, was captured on video. Seemingly at the instant the airplane lifted off it pitched sharply upward and immediately rolled to the left, nosing down tragically onto a taxiway. It was over in a horrifying minute. WARNING, GRAPHIC: See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DvW-zUnC_Ds
The obvious first suspect is engine failure during takeoff. This event certainly has all the signs of a VMC roll, a rapid, rolling departure from controlled flight that occurs when one engine has failed, the other engine is developing power, and the airspeed has decreased to the point that even full control deflection does not have the authority to counteract the effect of asymmetric thrust. A VMC roll can occur at a faster speed if the pilot does not apply full control deflection.
But we don’t yet know whether the left engine (the airplane rolled to the left) was operating correctly or not. There are other possible explanations for what we see in the video. Alternate scenarios include:
• Asymmetric flap extension • Elevator or aileron (if equipped) trim runaway at liftoff • Improperly set takeoff trim
• Blocked flight controls • Attempted takeoff with the control lock installed • Control system malfunction • Pilot’s seat roll-back at liftoff • Excessive angle of attack and stall with no mechanical or system malfunction
What we can learn at this point are the LESSONS prompted by the possibilities. Let’s take a brief look at each:
• Asymmetric flap extension. If one flap is extended and the other is retracted, a sufficiently powerful airplane will experience a dramatic rate of roll as more lift is generated on the flap-down side. Just such an accident occurred in another Beech Duke back in 2007. I wrote about it at the time, including two things:
(1) For example, if the right flap failed in the down position the airplane would roll to the left. The multiengine pilot’s natural response would be to suspect the left engine had failed. In the process of identifying and verifying that suspicion the pilot, following standard multiengine technique, would retard the left throttle control. When he/she did that there would be an even greater lift asymmetry as propeller blast on the right side, with the flap, exceeded the lift on the left, flap-up wing with little propeller blast. The airplane would roll even faster to the left and probably be unrecoverable…unless the pilot did something we’ll come back to in a bit.
(2) If no one is on the right side of the airplane and the right flap is not visible from the pilot’s seat (both being the case in the 2007 Duke event), visually check the flap position before boarding the airplane, and do not test the flap operation before takeoff. There might not be any way to detect a flap failure such as happened in 2007. If the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) recommends using flaps for takeoff (the Beech Duke does not), set the flaps at a time when you can visually check both sides of the airplane.
• Elevator or aileron (if equipped) trim runaway at liftoff. I’ve discussed this scenario several times, including this past FLYING LESSON.
• Blocked flight controls, Attempted takeoff with the control lock installed and Control system malfunction. The common thread here is the Before Takeoff “Controls – Free and Correct” checklist step. I wrote about this in this past FLYING LESSON. This was followed by release of a National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) study that
provided surprising data about Before Takeoff controls checks—and prompted another FLYING LESSON.
• Pilot’s seat roll-back at liftoff. This has been implicated in several fatal crashes involving several different types of aircraft—as the nose is brought up the seat slides back, and the pilot—hanging onto the control wheel or stick—pulls the nose up even further, into a stall.. Perhaps the Cessna singles are best known for this as a result of an Airworthiness Directive. Regardless of the airplane you fly, you should rock the seat back and forth when you settle in to fly, to assure that it is firmly locked into place. Do this even in airplanes with fixed seats, to assure they are installed correctly and not broken.
• Excessive angle of attack and stall with no mechanical or system malfunction. This is simply an undisciplined, overly aggressive pull-up for purposes of thrill or to show off in front of others. There is a school of thought that you should climb steeply so you have more options in the event of an engine failure. The Duke video clearly shows us that, if a failure happens right at takeoff, this is a false notion. Altitude may indeed be your friend, but airspeed will save your life…as long as you use the control authority airspeed provides to establish and maintain control of the aircraft.
One “thing that make you go ‘hmmm’”: the gear appears to have been up almost immediately after takeoff. Was this merely an overly exuberant launch?
• Or did the pilot have an engine anomaly during takeoff and, instead of making a rejected takeoff on the runway remaining even if that meant going off the end of the runway under control at a slow speed, was he trying to complete an “accelerate/go” maneuver, that is attempting to lift off with one failed engine? That’s a technique that is rarely successful in piston twins and, if it is to be successful, calls for retracting the landing gear immediately after leaving the ground.
• Engine failure during takeoff. We’ve addressed this more times than we can mention…but we must continue to do so. Central to surviving engine anomalies in the air is the vital need to PUSH the nose down and HOLD heading with rudder, to maintain command and fly the airplane while you determine what you have to do next.
Multiengine pilots train on a maneuver called the VMC Demonstration to earn their twin-engine rating. This demonstration simulates one failed engine with a windmilling (drag-producing) propeller, the other engine at maximum power, and a range of other variables. The pilot accomplishing the “demo” gradually slows the airplane until it reaches the point even full available control deflection cannot overcome the effect of asymmetric thrust, and the airplane begins to depart from controlled flight. At the first indication of this loss of control, the pilot reduces power on the operating engine (removing the asymmetry) while simultaneously lowering the nose/reducing angle of attack and increasing airspeed, reestablishing control authority and therefore directional control.
Many multiengine instructors (MEIs) present and practice this as a stand-alone event, what I call a “checkride circus trick”—a maneuver you learn to perform merely so you can demonstrate you can perform it on a checkride. The reality is that the VMC Demonstration is supposed to be teaching us this: no matter what the problem, if you are having any difficulty maintaining directional control in a multiengine airplane, reduce both throttles and lower the angle of attack to ensure you have control authority while you diagnose and decide your way safely through the emergency. With the added step of removing the possibility of asymmetric thrust, this is just another application of PUSH and HOLD. See http://twinandturbine.com/article/checkride-circus-tricks-aircraft-engine-failure/
One more aside: I happen to know that the pilot of the Duke had recently received training in the aircraft conducted by an excellent Duke training provider. No matter how good the training, however, it’s not possible to both safely and accurately train on engine failures or control anomalies during takeoff in an aircraft. You really can’t present control failures. You can approximate engine failures at altitude. And you can accurately present what happens after securing an engine, including single-engine maneuvering, approach and—using a simulated “zero thrust” power setting—landing. But unless you’ve practiced engine failures during takeoff in a simulator, the first time you ever experience a realistic engine failure is when it actually happens to you. I strongly recommend you seek out simulator training opportunities to practice before you need the skill.
Undoubtedly we’ll learn more about this specific case as the investigation progresses. Regardless of its actual cause, the video gives you many LESSONS to prepare you for takeoff no matter what type of airplane you fly.
Three key concepts apply to all pilots in all types of airplane regardless of the scenario that led to this awful crash:
1. Use your checklists, including flight control checks and autopilot/trim tests before flight.
2. PUSH and HOLD to at the first sign of lost performance or loss of control for any reason. This includes reducing power on both engines, just like a VMC Demonstration.
3. Consider the possibilities and what you need to do every time you line up for takeoff. It’s extremely unlikely, but it is possible, that something will go wrong this time. If it does, it will happen scary fast.
See https://www.pilotworkshop.com/botched-go-around?ad=turner-goaround-botch
I’ve got tons of reader mail but just didn’t have time to get to it this week. Watch for it next time.
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Pursue Mastery of Flight. Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety Flight Instructor Hall of Fame 2015 Inductee 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year Three-time Master CFI
