2215SCRA 295 G.R. No. 100671 TEODORICO E. MENDIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, RESPONDENTS. DECISION CAMPOS, JR., J.: Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by Petitioner Teodorico Mendiola against respondents Civil Service Commission (Commission) and Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (Bureau). Petitioner seeks from this Court the annulment of the resolutions passed by the Commission on February 1, 1989[1] and June 6, 1991,[2] respectively, and an order for his immediate reinstatement to the service. The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner has been an employee of the Bureau since May 21, 1973. He started as a Covert Agent of the Bureau and was appointed Budget Examiner III in 1978. He held that position until April 30, 1988 although he concurrently performed the functions of Intelligence Agent and Acting Chief, Administrative Branch of the CID.[3] In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 127 mandating the reorganization of the Department of Finance. In accordance with the said Executive Order, the Commissioner of the Bureau issued a memorandum dated January 19, 1988[4] to streamline the Bureau. The said memorandum provided the priority for the separation of personnel, to wit: “CATEGORY I – Personnel with administrative, criminal and/or patently undesirable personnel. CATEGORY II – Personnel above 60 yrs of age as of January 1, 1988, and NOT occupying, sensitive or key supervisory/managerial positions, as fols (sic): a. Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner/or Assistant Commissioner;
Transcript
2215SCRA 295
G.R. No. 100671
TEODORICO E. MENDIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by Petitioner Teodorico Mendiola against respondents Civil Service Commission (Commission) and Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (Bureau). Petitioner seeks from this Court the annulment of the resolutions passed by the Commission on February 1, 1989[1] and June 6, 1991,[2] respectively, and an order for his immediate reinstatement to the service.
The following facts are undisputed.
Petitioner has been an employee of the Bureau since May 21, 1973. He started as a Covert Agent of the Bureau and was appointed Budget Examiner III in 1978. He held that position until April 30, 1988 although he concurrently performed the functions of Intelligence Agent and Acting Chief, Administrative Branch of the CID.[3]
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 127 mandating the reorganization of the Department of Finance. In accordance with the said Executive Order, the Commissioner of the Bureau issued a memorandum dated January 19, 1988[4] to streamline the Bureau. The said memorandum provided the priority for the separation of personnel, to wit:
“CATEGORY I – Personnel with administrative, criminal and/or patently undesirable personnel.
CATEGORY II – Personnel above 60 yrs of age as of January 1, 1988, and NOT occupying, sensitive or key supervisory/managerial positions, as fols (sic):
a. Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner/or Assistant Commissioner;
b. Chiefs of Offices;
c. Division Chiefs (Operations Chiefs);
d. Chiefs of Special Units: Medical, Finance, and Special Operations Group;
e. Regional Directors; and
f. Plantilla Positions which may be exempted by EIIB Commissioner.
CATEGORY III – Personnel with family relations within the Second Degree of consanguinity or affinity.
CATEGORY IV – Personnel directly or indirectly in the management or control of any private enterprise which may be affected by the functions of EIIB, and
CATEGORY V – Personnel other than the above but willing to be separated to take advantage of gratuity pursuant to Executive Order Nr. (sic) 127.”
On March 30, 1988, petitioner received a notice of termination from service effective at the close of office hours of April 30, 1988. Alleging that he was not informed of the cause of his dismissal, petitioner appealed his case to the chairman of the Appeals Board. His appeal was denied. Subsequently, he appealed to the Commission and averred that he was denied due process when he was dismissed from the service. Furthermore, he claimed that he could have been included in Category I of the January 19, 1988 memorandum. However, he contested such inclusion because he had been commended and satisfactorily rated for his performance. On September 21, 1988, the Commission resolved the case in petitioner’s favor and held thus:
“The guidelines for separation of personnel established and adopted by the EIIB are not in accordance with the guidelines prescribed under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988, where employees can be separated from the service as a result of reorganization only for the following reasons:
1. When there is a reduction in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern and the employee separated is the least competent and qualified; or
2. Where there has been a change in the agency functions or orientation rendering the position of the separated employee redundant.
Ms. Leyesa and Mr. Mendiola were not informed of the particular grounds for their separation. Hence, they assumed that they might have been covered by Category No. 1 of the unnumbered Memorandum of the EIIB which pertains to employees with administrative or criminal charges. However, under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988, even employees with pending administrative charges should be included in the evaluation process and should they meet the standards for retention or placement set forth under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 10, s. 1986, they should be appointed. However, they should not be placed in positions higher than what they previously held and their administrative cases shall be pursued until decided.
On the basis of the above findings, it is apparent that appellants were not accorded due process of law and were separated from the service not in accordance with the prescribed rules on reorganization. The actions of the Bureau were violative of the guidelines and procedures set forth under Presidential Memorandum dated October 2, 1987, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 10, s. 1986, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, s. 1988, and Republic Act No. 6656. The appellants’ separation from service is, therefore, considered illegal.
In view therefore, it is hereby ordered that appellants be reappointed to their previous positions or to positions of comparable or equitable rank without loss of seniority and that they be paid back salaries reckoned from the dates of their termination. However, reappointment to the service does not mean exoneration from any accusations of wrongdoing or from any administrative charges that may be filed against them.”[5]
On December 13, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for execution of the cited resolution.
The controversy started when the motion for execution was left unacted upon. This, according to petitioner prompted him to serve on August 16, 1989 a letter prepared by his former counsel, Atty. Nestor Bamba, to the Bureau Commissioner. That letter requested the Bureau to reinstate him. On September 12, 1989, petitioner also filed with the Commission a letter informing the latter of the Bureau’s refusal to reinstate him and requesting for the taking of remedial action by the Commission. These actions on the part of petitioner allegedly remained unheeded. And on July 26, 1990, petitioner found out that the Bureau filed on October 27, 1988 a motion for reconsideration of the September 21, 1988 resolution. On February 1, 1989, the Commission gave due course to the motion for reconsideration thereby setting aside its September 21, 1988 resolution. On July 30, 1990, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[6] with the Commission praying that the motion for reconsideration of the Bureau be stricken off the records and that the February 1, 1989 resolution be set aside. On June 6, 1991, the Commission promulgated a resolution denying the omnibus motion. We quote the relevant portion of the resolution, thus:
“At the outset, the Commission is inclined to dismiss the instant motion for lack of merit. The grounds relied upon by the movant are not any of those provided for under Section 39 of PD 807 as amended wherein a motion for reconsideration may be entertained and/or prosper. Furthermore, the primary ground raised has already been discussed in the resolution sought to be reconsidered. However, the legality of movant’s removal deserves discussion in order to settle this particular issue once and for all.
Record shows that movant was holding a position of Intelligence Agent. As clearly stated in the pertinent provision of LOI 71 dated September 4, 1978, all positions in the Bureau are considered highly confidential in nature and incumbent thereof can be removed for loss of confidence. The Supreme Court, in a number of decisions has consistently ruled that employees holding confidential positions do not necessarily enjoy security of tenure. As such they can be removed for loss of confidence. The removal contemplated is not in the nature of dismissal but merely expiration of term. Hence, such removal does not constitute violation of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure (Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171; Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591). In view thereof, the removal of movant from the office is legal and in accordance with existing civil service law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. Accordingly, the Resolution dated February 1, 1989 is hereby affirmed. x x x.”[7]
This resolution and that of February 1, 1989, are now the subjects of the present petition. Petitioner raises the following allegations before this Court:
“Respondent Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in acting upon EIIB’s motion for reconsideration without notice to the petitioner, thus depriving petitioner of his day in court.”[8]
“Respondent Civil Service Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in altering and/or reconsidering its judgment which has already become final and executory.”[9]
“Respondent Civil Service Commission refused to perform its ministerial duty of issuing a writ of execution to enforce its already final and executory Resolution of September 21, 1988.”[10]
Did the respondent Commission err in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration of respondent Bureau? This is the crux of the instant petition.
Petitioner argues that respondent Commission acted without jurisdiction when it acted upon the motion because the resolution had already become final and executory. According to him, respondent Bureau received the resolution of September 12, 1988 on October 6, 1988 and from said date, the Bureau had fifteen (15) days within which to move for a reconsideration. Petitioner cites Section 39, Presidential Decree 807 and Resolution No. 88-135 of the Commission.[11] Section 39(a), P.D. 807 states:
“Sec. 39 Appeals. – (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is reasonably filed, which petition shall be filed within fifteen days. x x x.”
While Resolution No. 88-135[12] of the Commission contains the following provisions:
“Section 9. PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION. – Any party adversely affected or not satisfied with the decision of the Commission may file a petition for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision. Only one (1) petition for reconsideration shall be allowed.
Section 10. FINALITY OF DECISION. – The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of the copy thereof by the parties, if no petition for reconsideration thereof is seasonably filed. The Commission may, for exceptional and valid grounds, stay its execution.
Sec. 11. EFFECTIVITY – This Resolution shall take effect immediately.
Quezon City, April 8, 1988.”
In refuting petitioner’s claim, respondent Bureau alleges that it had thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the resolution of the Commission within which to file its Motion for Reconsideration. It cites as authorities Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution and Section 12(11), Chapter III, Title I, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code.[13]
“Sec. 7. x x x Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
The cited provision of the Revised Administrative Code (1987) states:
“Sec. 12 x x x
x x x x x x
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings
shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof;
x x x x x x.”
Respondent Bureau also claims that it received a copy of the resolution of September 21, 1988 on October 21, 1988, not on October 6, 1988 as alleged by petitioner. And, according to respondent Bureau, granting that it actually received the resolution on October 6, 1988, it still timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration on October 27, 1988 because the thirty (30)-day period allowed by law has not yet lapsed. Respondent Bureau then concludes that having timely filed its Motion, the resolution of the Commission ordering reinstatement did not become final and executory. Therefore, petitioner cannot compel the Commission by a petition for mandamus to execute the decision and reinstate him to the service.
After a consideration of the legal provisions invoked by the parties to buttress their respective claims, this Court agrees with petitioner that an aggrieved party only has a period of fifteen (15), not thirty (30) days, within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution. Resolution No. 88-135 of the Commission is clear in providing that a party “not satisfied with the decision of the Commission may file a petition for reconsideration within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.” The provisions of this resolution are the applicable rules because they have been especially adopted to govern appeals to the Commission of cases arising from reorganization. Thus, Section 1 of Resolution 88-135 provides:
“Section 1. OBJECTIVES – These rules are promulgated to effect a speedy, fair, and just resolution of appeals relative to the reorganization of the different Departments or Agencies as authorized under their respective Executive Orders.”
Furthermore, the whereas clauses of the resolution state:
“WHEREAS, pursuant to Unnumbered Memorandum Circular dated October 2, 1987, the President directed each Department or Agency which had undergone reorganization to constitute a Reorganization. Appeals Board (RAB) at the Central Office on or before October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints relative to reorganization;
WHEREAS, the foregoing Memorandum Circular dated October 2, 1987 provides for the remedy of appeal from decisions of the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB) of each Department or Agency to the Civil Service Commission;”
It has been established in this case that petitioner was dismissed from service pursuant to the Executive Order No. 127 which ordered the reorganization of the Department of Finance. He contested such separation until his case reached the Commission which ruled favorably for him on September 21, 1988. And the Bureau, according to Resolution 88-135 should have filed its motion for reconsideration fifteen days after its receipt of a copy of the September 21, 1988 resolution.
Respondent Bureau cannot rely on the constitutional nor the Revised Administrative Code’s provisions because they refer to filing of petitions for certiorari of decisions of the constitutional commission concerned to the Supreme Court. The provisions are clear and leave no room for interpretation. Nowhere in the cited provisions can it be seen that the same can be applied to
filing a Motion for Reconsideration before an administrative office which rendered the assailed decision.
It is wrong, however, for petitioner to cite Section 39(a) of Presidential Decree 807. This provision falls under Article IX thereof entitled Discipline. Section 39 refers to appeals of disciplinary administrative cases to the Commission. The present case did not originate from a disciplinary administrative proceeding.
Since only fifteen (15) days are allowed an aggrieved party to file a motion for reconsideration, respondent Bureau should have filed its motion within fifteen (15) days from its receipt of the questioned resolution or on or before October 21, 1988, if the prescriptive period is based on October 6, 1988. And the filing by respondent Bureau of the motion for reconsideration on October 27, 1988 is indubitably too late. But there is an allegation that respondent Bureau received its copy of the resolution on October 21, 1988. This claim, however, is unsupported by evidence. On the other hand, petitioner supported his allegation that respondent Bureau received its copy on October 6, 1988 by a transmittal document[14] of the Commission which was signed by a Bureau agent.[15] Between the two conflicting claims, we accept the latter since it has been adequately backed by evidence. Consequently, We hold that the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration should be reckoned from October 6, 1988. And the failure of respondent Bureau to request for reconsideration of the September 21, 1988 resolution of the Commission within the allowed period made the resolution final and executory by operation of law. And this Court has ruled that “(t)he Civil Service Commission has no power or authority to reconsider its decision which has become final and executory”[16] even if the Commission later discovers that its decision is erroneous. “The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice x x x.”[17] Thus, We have ruled in Young vs. Court of Appeals[18] that:
“x x x Once a decision becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke it. This doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law. To allow courts to amend final judgments will result in endless litigation.”
This doctrine applies equally to quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, in Filcon Manufacturing Corp. vs. NLRC,[19] We also said:
“A judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. Likewise, an executory and final decision cannot be lawfully altered or modified even by the court which rendered the same, especially where the alteration or modification is material or substantial. In such a situation, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except for execution of the final judgment. Any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.”
Since the September 21, 1988 resolution has already become final and executory after October 21, 1988, the Commission could no longer alter the resolution, much less entertain a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution and reverse the same. The only power left with the Commission as far as the resolution is concerned is to execute it. The rule is well-settled that
the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof is the court’s ministerial duty compellable by mandamus.[20]
With respect to petitioner’s contention that he was denied due process when the Commission heard the Bureau’s motion for reconsideration without notice to him, We agree with respondent Bureau’s argument that the defect was cured by the filing by petitioner of his Omnibus Motion on July 30, 1990. Thus, in Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission,[21] We said that the lack of notice to petitioner regarding the pending appeal and the hearing of said appeal was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated February 1, 1989 and June 6, 1990 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. This Court orders respondents Civil Service Commission and Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau to reinstate petitioner Teodorico E. Mendiola to his former position or to an equivalent position if the former is no longer available without loss of seniority rights and privileges granted by law.SO ORDERED.
[16] Marcayda vs. Civil Service Commission, 198 SCRA 447 (1991).
[17] Filcon Manufacturing Corp. vs. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814 (1991).
[18] 204 SCRA 584, 599 (1991) citing Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 353, (1989); Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 94 (1989); Commercial Credit Corporation of Cagayan de Oro vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 1 (1989); United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. Labor Arbiter, 149 SCRA 424 (1987); Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433 (1987); Villanueva vs. CFI of Oriental Mindoro, 119 SCRA 288 (1982).
[19] Supra, note, 17 at p. 822 citing Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Liwanag Paras Briones, et al., 165 SCRA 464 (1988).
[20] Maceda, Jr. vs. Moreman Builder Co., Inc., 203 SCRA 293 (1991).
[21] 194 SCRA 278 (1991).
[22] T. H. Valderama and Sons, Inc. vs. Drilon, 181 SCRA 308 (1990).
190S673
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111088. June 13, 1997]
C & M TIMBER CORPORATION (CMTC), petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, Secretary of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and HON. RENATO C. CORONA, Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification of the order dated February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President, declaring as of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680 hectares of forest land in the municipalities of Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora and the Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province.[1]
It appears that in a letter dated July 20, 1984 [2] to President Marcos, Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation (FLDC), through its president and general manager, requested a timber concession over the same area covered by petitioner’s TLA No. 106, alleging that the same had been cancelled pursuant to a presidential directive banning all forms of logging in the area. The request was granted in a note dated August 14, 1984 by President Marcos who wrote, as was his wont, on the margin of the letter of FLDC: “Approved.”[3]
Accordingly, on September 21, 1984, the Ministry of Natural Resources, as it was then called, issued TLA No. 360, with the expiry date September 30, 1994, to FLDC, covering the area subject of TLA No. 106. In 1985, FLDC began logging operations.
On June 26, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto M. Maceda suspended TLA No. 360 for FLDC’s “gross violation of the terms and conditions thereof, especially the reforestation and selective logging activities and in consonance with the national policy on forest conservation.”[4] On July 26, 1986, Minister Maceda issued another order cancelling the license of FLDC on the ground that “in spite of the suspension order dated June 26, 1986, said concessionaire has continued logging operations in violation of forestry rules and regulations.”[5]
Learning of the cancellation of FLDC’s TLA, petitioner, through its officer-in-charge, wrote Minister Maceda a letter dated October 10, 1986, requesting “revalidation” of its TLA No. 106.[6]As FLDC sought a reconsideration of the order cancelling its TLA, petitioner wrote another
letter dated February 13, 1987,[7] alleging that because of the log ban imposed by the previous administration it had to stop its logging operations, but that when the ban was lifted on September 21, 1984, its concession area was awarded to FLDC “as a result of [FLDC’s] covetous maneuvers and unlawful machinations.” (Petitioner was later to say that those behind FLDC, among them being the former President’s sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, were “very influential because of their very strong connections with the previous Marcos regime.”)[8] Petitioner prayed that it be allowed to resume logging operations.
In his order dated May 2, 1988,[9] Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of the DENR, declared petitioner’s TLA No. 106 as of no more force and effect and consequently denied the petition for its restoration, even as he denied FLDC’s motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of TLA No. 360. Secretary Factoran, Jr. ruled that petitioner’s petition was barred by reason of laches, because petitioner did not file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC until February 13, 1987, after FLDC had been logging under its license for almost two years. On the other hand, FLDC’s motion for reconsideration was denied, “since the findings on which the cancellation order had been based, notably gross violation of the terms and conditions of its license, such as reforestation and selective logging activities appear to be firmly grounded.”
Both petitioner CMTC and FLDC appealed to the Office of the President. Petitioner denied that it was guilty of laches. It alleged that it had sent a letter to the then Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario dated September 24, 1984 protesting the grant of a TLA to FLDC over the area covered by its (petitioner’s) TLA and, for this reason, requesting nullification of FLDC’s TLA.
In a decision dated March 21, 1991,[10] the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos, affirmed the DENR’s order of May 2, 1988. Like the DENR it found petitioner guilty of laches, the alleged filing by petitioner of a protest on September 24, 1984 not having been duly proven. The decision of the Office of the President stated:[11]
As disclosed by the records, this Office, in a letter of June 1, 1989, had requested the DENR to issue a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of CMTC’s aforesaid Annex “A” to enable it to resolve this case judiciously and expeditiously. Said letter-request pertinently reads:
“x x x C & M Timber Corporation has attached to its “Supplemental Petition For Review,” dated June 1, 1988, a xerox copy of (Annex “A”) of its letter to the Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario, dated September 24, 1984, prepared by its counsel, Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting against the award of the contested area to Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation and requesting that it be annulled and voided.
“Considering that the aforementioned Annex “A” constitutes a vital defense to C & M Timber Corporation and could be a pivotal factor in the resolution by this Office of the instant appeal, may we request your good office for a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of said document (Annex ‘A’) to enable us to resolve the case judiciously and expeditiously.”
In reply thereto, the DENR, thru Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Romulo D. San Juan, in a letter of July 7, 1989, informed this Office, thus:
“x x x
“Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged aforementioned Annex ‘A’, no such document could be found or is on file in this Office.
“This Office, therefore, regrets that it can not issue the desired certification as to the authenticity/veracity of the document.”
On September 10, 1990, this Office requested an updated comment of the DENR on (a) the duplicate original copy of Annex “A”; (b) a xerox copy of Page 164, entry No. 2233, of the MNR’s logbook tending to show that the original copy of Annex “A” was received by the MNR; and (c) a xerox copy of Page 201 of the logbook of the BFD indicating that the original copy of Annex “A” was received by BFD from the MNR.
On October 26, 1990, DENR Assistant Secretary San Juan endorsed to this Office the updated comment of Director of Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in a 2nd endorsement of October 25, 1990, which pertinently reads as follows:
“Please be informed that this Office is not the addressee and repository of the letter dated September 24, 1984 of Atty. Norberto Quisumbing. This Office was just directed by then Minister Rodolfo del Rosario to act on the purported letter of Atty. Quisumbing and as directed, we prepared a memorandum to the President which was duly complied with as shown by the entries in the logbook. Annex ‘A’, which is the main document of the letter-appeal of C & M Timber Corporation is presumed appended to the records when it was acted upon by the BFD (now FMB) and forwarded to the Secretary (then Minister). Therefore this Office is not in a position to certify as to the authenticity of Annex ‘A’.
Clearly therefore, CMTC’s reliance on its Annex “A” is misplaced, the authenticity thereof not having been duly proven or established. Significantly, we note that in all the pleadings filed by CMTC in the office a quo, and during the hearing conducted, nothing is mentioned therein about its letter of September 24, 1984 (Annex “A”). Jurisprudence teaches that issues neither averred in the pleadings nor raised during the trial below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (City of Manila vs. Ebay, 1 SCRA 1086, 1089); that issues of fact not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 592, 595); and that parties, may not, on appeal, adopt a position inconsistent with what they sustained below (People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698, 700-701)
The Office of the President also declined to set aside the DENR’s order of July 31, 1986, cancelling FLDC’s TLA No. 360, after finding the same to be fully substantiated.
Petitioner and FLDC moved for reconsideration. In its order dated January 25, 1993,[12] the Office of the President, through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It held that “even assuming that CMTC did file regularly its letter-protest of September 24, 1984 with MNR on September 25, 1984, CMTC failed to protect its rights for more than two (2) years until it opposed reinstatement of FLDC’s TLA on February 13, 1987. Within that two (2) year period, FLDC logged the area without any opposition from CMTC.” In the same order, the Office of the President, however, directed the reinstatement of FLDC’s TLA No. 360, in view of the favorable report of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 23, 1987. Later, the President’s office reconsidered its action after the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Angel C. Alcala, on February 15, 1993, expressed concern that reinstatement of FLDC’s TLA No. 360 “might negate efforts to enhance the conservation and protection of our forest resources.” In a new order dated February 26, 1993,[13] the Office of the President reinstated its March 21, 1991 decision.
Petitioner again moved for a reconsideration of the decision dated March 21, 1991 and for its license to be “revived/restored.” Petitioner’s motion was, however, denied by the Office of the President on June 7, 1993[14] in a resolution signed by Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona. The President’s office ruled:
The above Order of February 26, 1993 was predicated, as stated therein, on a new policy consideration on forest conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the President’s handwritten instruction. Accordingly, this Order shall be taken not only as an affirmation of the March 21, 1991 decision, but also as a FINAL disposition of the case and ALL matters incident thereto, like CMTC’s motion for reconsideration, dated April 16, 1991.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that laches cannot be imputed to it because it did not incur delay in asserting its rights and even if there was delay, the delay did not work to the prejudice of other parties, particularly FLDC, because the cancellation of the FLDC’s TLA was attributable only to its own actions. Petitioner also denies that its license had been suspended by reason of mediocre performance in reforestation by order of then Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro O. Peña. It says that it did not receive any order to this effect. Finally, petitioner claims that the denial of its petition, because of “a new policy consideration on forest conservation and protection, unmistakably implied from the President’s handwritten instruction,” as stated in the resolution of June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President, would deny it the due process of law. Petitioner points out that there is no total log ban in the country; that Congress has yet to make a pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this effect “must be stated in good form, not implied”; and that in any case, any new policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect petitioner’s vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. As already stated, the DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring petitioner’s TLA No. 106 as no longer of any force and effect, was based on its finding that although TLA No. 106’s date of expiry was June 30, 1997 it had been suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTC’s “mediocre performance in reforestation” and petitioner’s laches in failing to protest the subsequent award of the same area to FLDC. There is considerable dispute whether there was really an order dated June 3, 1983 suspending petitioner’s TLA because of “mediocre performance” in reforestation, just as there is a dispute whether there indeed was a letter written on September 24, 1984 on behalf of petitioner protesting the award of the concession covered by its TLA No. 106 to FLDC, so as to show that petitioner did not sleep on its rights.
The alleged order of June 3, 1983 cannot be produced. The Office of the Solicitor General was given until May 14, 1997 to secure a copy of the order but on May 7, 1997 the OSG manifested that the order in question could not be found in the records of this case in which the order might be.[15] Earlier, petitioner requested a copy of the order but the DENR, through Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe, said that “based from our records there is no file copy of said alleged order.”[16]
On the other hand, the alleged letter of September 24, 1984 written by Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting the award of the concession in question to FLDC cannot be found in the records of the DENR either. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR certified that “Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged [letter], no such document could be found or is on file in this Office.”[17] In a later certification, however, Ofelia Castro Biron of the DENR, claimed that she was a receiving clerk at the Records and Documents Section of the Ministry of Natural Resources and that on September 25, 1984 she received the letter of Atty. Quisumbing
and placed on all copies thereof the stamp of the MNR. She stated that the copy in the possession of petitioner was a “faithful copy of the letter” in question.[18]
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of the two documents is indeed a reflection on the sorry state of record keeping in an important office of the executive department. Yet these two documents are vital to the presentation of the evidence of both parties in this case. Fortunately, there are extant certain records from which it is possible to determine whether these documents even existed.
With respect to the alleged order of June 3, 1983 suspending petitioner’s TLA No. 106 for “mediocre performance” in reforestation, the Court will presume that there is such an order in accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions inasmuch as such order is cited both in the order dated May 2, 1988 of the DENR, declaring as of no force and effect TLA No. 106, and in the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the Office of the President affirming the order of the DENR. It is improbable that so responsible officials as the Secretary of the DENR and the Executive Secretary would cite an order that did not exist.
On the other hand, with respect to the letter dated September 24, 1984, there are circumstances indicating that it existed. In addition to the aforesaid certification of Ofelia Castro Biron that she was the person who received the letter for the DENR, the logbook of the Ministry of Natural Resources contains entries indicating that the letter was received by the Bureau of Forest Development from the MNR.[19] DENR Assistant Secretary Romulo San Juan likewise informed the Office of the President that the Bureau of Forest Management prepared a memorandum on the aforesaid letter of September 24, 1984,[20] thereby implying that there was such a letter.
On the premise that there was an order dated June 3, 1983, we find that after suspending petitioner’s TLA for “mediocre performance” in reforestation under this order, the DENR cancelled the TLA, this time because of a Presidential directive imposing a log ban. The records of G.R. No. 76538, entitled “Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary,” the decision in which is reported in 190 SCRA 673 (1990), contain a copy of the memorandum of then Director Edmundo V. Cortes of the Bureau of Forest Development to the Regional Director of Region 2, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, informing the latter that pursuant to the instruction of the President and the memorandum dated August 18, 1983 of then Minister Teodoro Q. Peña, the log ban previously declared included the concessions of the companies enumerated in Cortes’ memorandum, in consequence of which the concessions in question were deemed cancelled. The memorandum of Director Cortes stated:
MEMORANDUM ORDER
TO : The Regional Director Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
FROM : The Director
DATE : 24 August 1983
SUBJECT : Stopping of all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
REMARKS :
Following Presidential Instructions and Memorandum Order of Minister Teodoro Q. Peña dated 18 August 1983, and in connection with my previous radio message, please be informed that the coverage of the logging banin Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya provinces include the following concessions which are deemed cancelled as of the date of the previous notice:
- Felipe Ysmael Co., Inc.- Industries Dev. Corp.- Luzon Loggers, Inc.- C & M Timber Corporation- Buzon Industrial Dev. Corporation- Dominion Forest Resources Corp.- FCA Timber Development Corp.- Kasibu Logging Corp.- RCC Timber Company
- Benjamin Cuaresma
You are hereby reminded to insure full compliance with this order to stop logging operations by all licensees above mentioned and submit a report on the pullout of equipment and inventory of logs within five days upon receipt hereof.
ACTIONDESIRED : For your immediate implementation.
EDMUNDO V. CORTES
(Emphasis added)
It thus appears that petitioner’s license had been cancelled way back in 1983, a year before its concession was awarded to FLDC. It is noteworthy that petitioner admits that at the time of the award to FLDC in 1984 petitioner was no longer operating its concession because of a log ban although it claims that the suspension of operations was only temporary. As a result of the log ban, the TLA of petitioner, along with those of other loggers in the region, were cancelled and petitioner and others were ordered to stop operations. Petitioner also admits that it received a telegram sent on August 24, 1983 by Director Cortes of the BFD, directing it to “stop all logging operations to conserve our remaining forests.”[21] It is then not true, as Atty. Quisumbing stated in protesting the award of the concession to FLDC, that “the logging ban did not cancel [petitioner’s] timber license agreement.”
Now petitioner did not protest the cancellation of its TLA. Consequently, even if consideration is given to the fact that a year later, on September 24, 1984, its counsel protested the grant of the concession to another party (FLDC), this failure of petitioner to contest first the suspension of its license on June 3, 1983 and later its cancellation on August 24, 1983 must be deemed fatal to its present action.
Second. Except for the letter of its counsel to the Minister of Natural Resources, which it reiterated in its letter to the President of the Philippines, petitioner took no legal steps to protect its interest. After receiving no favorable response to its two letters, petitioner could have brought the necessary action in court for the restoration of its license. It did not. Instead it waited until FLDC’s concession was cancelled in 1986 by asking for the “revalidation” of its (petitioner’s) on TLA No. 106.
Petitioner’s excuse before the DENR is that it did not pursue its protest because its president, Ricardo C. Silverio, had been told by President Marcos that the area in question had been awarded to the President’s sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, and petitioner was afraid to go against the wishes of the former President.[22] This is a poor excuse for petitioner’s inaction. In Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary,[23] a similar excuse was given that Ysmael & Co’s license had been cancelled and its concession awarded to entities controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of then President Marcos. For this reason, after the EDSA Revolution, Ysmael & Co. sought in 1986 the reinstatement of its timber license agreement and the revocation of those issued to the alleged presidential cronies. As its request was denied by the Office of the President, Ysmael & Co. filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On the basis of the facts stated, this Court denied the petition: (1) because the August 25, 1983 order of the Bureau of Forest Development, cancelling petitioner’s timber license agreement had become final and executory. Although petitioner sent a letter dated September 19, 1983 to President Marcos seeking reconsideration of the 1983 order of cancellation of the BFD, the grounds stated there were different from those later relied upon by petitioner for seeking its reinstatement; (2) because “the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions [cancelling its license and granting another one covering the same concession to respondent] reviewed by the court through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause.” Such special civil action of certiorari should have been filed within a “reasonable time.” And since none was filed within such period, petitioner’s action was barred by laches; and (3) because executive evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent cancellation in the process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands is a prerogative of the executive department and in the absence of evidence showing grave abuse of discretion courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
This case is governed by the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary.
Third. It is finally contended that any “policy consideration on forest conservation and protection” justifying the decision of the executive department not to reinstate petitioner’s license must be formally enunciated and cannot merely be implied from the President’s instruction to his subordinates and that, at all events, the new policy cannot be applied to existing licenses such as petitioner’s.
The President’s order reconsidering the resolution of the Presidential Legal Adviser (insofar as it reinstated the license of FLDC) was prompted by concerns expressed by the then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources that “said reinstatement [of FLDC’s license] may negate our efforts to enhance conservation and protection of our forest resources.” There was really no new policy but, as noted in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere reiteration of a policy of conservation and protection. The policy is contained in Art. II, §16 of the Constitution which commands the State “to protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” There is therefore no merit in petitioner’s contention that no new policy can be applied to existing licenses.
As to petitioner’s contention that the cancellation of its license constitutes an impairment of the obligation of its contract, suffice it for us to quote what we held in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary:[24]
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR, which were affirmed by the Office of the President, will disclose public policy considerations which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar.
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. . . .
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(33) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MECANO vs.COA Leave a commentMECANO vs.COA
G.R. No. 103982
December 11, 1992
FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. — When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioner’s illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter”.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires”.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC
HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
NOTES:
1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.
2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that “the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.”
Garces v CAFACTS:Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for
Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed “Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte” which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banccancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the “cases” or “matters” referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTC’s dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
“Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELEC’s resolution that triggered this Controversy.
The “case” or “matter” referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that “decision, rulings, order” of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving “elective regional, provincial and city officials.”
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC’s choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves
an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over “all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.”
*Petition denied
Citation: GSIS vs. Civil Service CommissionG.R. No. 96938202 SCRA 799October 15, 1991
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to review the order of the Civil Service Commission(CSC) dated June 20, 1990 which directed the Government Service Insurance System(GSIS) to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of their demise. TheOrder dated November 22, 1990, however, denied herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of CSC’s Order dated June 20, 1990. Deceased Elizar Namuco andEusebio Manuel were illegally dismissed by the GSIS for allegedly being involved inirregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the power to execute its judgments, final orders or resolutions?Whether or not the writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because itvaries with the Court’s Resolution of July 4, 1988?Ruling: The Civil Service Commission has the power to execute its judgment, finalorders or resolutions. The CSC is a constitutional commission invested by theConstitution and relevant laws not only with the authority to administer the
civil service but is also vested with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decideadministrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. Thegrant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power or the authority to hear and adjudgecases, normally and logically is deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders unless the law otherwise provides. It is quiteobvious that the authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by theauthority to see that what has been decided is carried out.The writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is valid. The Court upholds thesame, simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. The binding force of Resolution of July 4, 1988, for all intents and purposes, is that it makesexoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of said back salaries, it can not however exact an impossible performance or decree a uselessexercise such as that the subsequent disciplinary proceedings is an empty, and inutile procedure as to the deceased employees, they can not possibly be bound by anysubstantiation in the said proceedings of the abovementioned charges.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129132. July 8, 1998]
ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE, respondents.
This is a sequel to our decision[1] of 5 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, entitled Isabelita Vital-Gozon v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., which held that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, in a special civil action for mandamus against a public officer (docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 and entitled Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente v. Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, et al.), to take cognizance of the claim for damages against respondent public officer.
Specifically, the instant petition seeks to reverse the Resolution of 7 May 1997[2] of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 awarding to petitioner below, now private respondent, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees after hearing the evidence thereon sometime after this Court’s decision in G.R. No. 101428 became final.
The factual antecedents then, as found by us in G.R. No. 101428, must be restated, thus:
In the early months of 1987 -- and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino -- reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected.
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a position to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving as Medical Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971).
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health that he would be re-appointed “Medical Specialist II.” Considering this to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In the meantime “the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr.”
Dr. de la Fuente’s case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution dated August 9, 1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the following conclusion and disposition, to wit:
“xxx (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of appellant dela Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialist II as null and void: hence, illegal. Considering further that since the National Children's Hospital was not abolished and the positions therein remained intact although the title or the position of Chief of Clinics was changed to 'Chief of Medical Professional Staff' with substantially the same functions and responsibilities, the Commission hereby orders that:
1. Appellant dela Fuente, Jr. be retained or considered as never having relinquished his position of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights; and
2. He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and housing allowances and such other benefits withheld from him from the date of his illegal demotion/transfer.”
No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal therefrom essayed to the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed therefor by the Constitution. Consequently, the resolution became final, on September 21, 1988.
De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of the National Children’s Hospital, demanding implementation of the Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred “de la Fuente’s claims to the Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate advice and/or action xxx (She did this allegedly because, according to the Solicitor General, she was) unaware when and how a CSC Resolution becomes final and executory, whether such Resolution had in fact become final and executory and whether the DOH Legal Department would officially assail the mentioned Resolution.” But she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente’s letters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary. She chose simply to await “legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department.” On the other hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In fact, de la Fuente claims that Vital-Gozon had “actually threatened to stop paying xxx (his) salary and allowances on the pretext that he has as yet no 'approved' appointment even as ‘Medical Specialist II’ x x x.”
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would be obeyed, and apprehensive that the funds to cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert to the General Fund, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce its judgment. He was however “told to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission had no coercive powers -- unlike a court -- to enforce its final decisions/resolutions.”
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of “mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction” to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution of the Civil Service Commission. He prayed for the following specific reliefs:
“(1) (That) xxx a temporary restraining order be issued immediately, ordering the principal and other respondents to revert the funds of the NCH corresponding to the amounts necessary to implement the final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 in favor of herein petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay such sums which have accrued and due and payable as of the date of said order;
(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, that the restraining order be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction; and that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering principal respondent and the other respondents to implement in full the said final resolution; and
(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that judgment be rendered seeking (sic) permanent writs issued and that principal respondent be ordered and commanded to comply with and implement the said final resolution without further delay; and, furthermore, that the principal respondent be ordered to pay to
the petitioner the sums of P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
x x x
The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It also issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for, and required the respondents to show cause why it should not be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction. The record shows that the respondents prayed for and were granted an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer “through counsel, who,” as the Court of Appeals was later to point out, “did not bother to indicate his address, thus notice was sent to him through the individual respondents xxx (However, no) answer was filed; neither was there any show cause [sic] against a writ of preliminary injunction.” It was a certain Atty. Jose Fabia who appeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf.
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a “Supplemental/Amended Petition” dated February 2, 1989. The second petition described as one for “quo warranto” aside from “mandamus”, added three respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter alia that he (de la Fuente) had “clear title” to the position in question [by] virtue of the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission; that even after the Commission's judgment had become final and executory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latter allowed “Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as ‘OIC Professional Service’ to further usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold and exercise the public office/position of petitioner (under a duly approved permanent appointment as ‘Chief of Clinics’ since 1978). De la Fuente thus prayed, additionally, for judgment:
“(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the office of ‘Chief of Clinics’ (now retitled/known as ‘Chief of Medical Professional Staff,’ NCH), ousting him therefrom and ordering said respondent to immediately cease and desist from further performing as ‘OIC Professional Service’ any and all duties and responsibilities of the said office; (and)
(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., is the lawful or de jure Chief of Clinics (now known as ‘Chief of the Medical Professional Staff’ and placing him in the possession of said office/position, without the need of reappointment or new appointment as held by the Civil Service Commission in its resolution of August 9, 1988, in CSC Case No. 4.
xxx."
Copy of the “Supplemental/Amended Petition” was sent to “Atty. Jose A. Favia, Counsel for Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etc., National Children's Hospital, E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City (Atty. Fabia's address not being indicated or mentioned in his motion for Extension of Time).”
Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents. Again, none was filed. The petitions were consequently “resolved on the basis of their allegations and the annexes.” The Appellate Court promulgated its judgment on June 9, 1989. It held that --
“The question of whether petitioner may be divested of his position as Chief of Clinics by the expedient of having him appointed to another, lower position is
no longer an issue. It ceased to be such when the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 became final. The said resolution is explicit in its mandate; petitioner was declared the lawful and de jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of the Medical Professional Staff) of the National Children’s Hospital, and by this token, respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the office. Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. It was ill-advised of principal respondent, and violative of the rule of law, that the resolution has not been obeyed or implemented.”
and accordingly ordered –
“xxx respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, xxx to forthwith comply with, obey and implement the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 (and) xxx Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled to the office, xx to immediately cease and desist from further performing and acting as OIC Professional Service.”
But de la Fuente's prayer for damages -- founded essentially on the refusal of Gozon, et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a different forum -- was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the “petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for xxx (said) claim of damages.”
Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the Appellate Tribunal's Decision of June 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989. Respondent de la Fuente acknowledged receipt of his own copy on June 15, 1989. Neither Vital-Gozon nor her co-party, Dr. Merencilla, Jr., moved for reconsideration of, or attempted to appeal the decision.
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment, by motion filed through new counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. He insisted that the Appellate Court had competence to award damages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such a claim for damages might not have been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court “before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals had authority to issue such writs only ‘in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,’ ” the situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts -- the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals -- were conferred concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require him to separately litigate the matter of damages, he continued, would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.
While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 -- directing his reinstatement pursuant to the Civil Service Commission’s Resolution of August 9, 1988, supra. He filed on July 4, 1989 a “Motion for Execution,” alleging that the judgment of June 9, 1989 had become final and executory for failure of Gozon, et al. -- served with notice thereof on June 16, 1989 -- to move for its reconsideration or elevate the same to the Supreme Court. His motion was granted by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated July 7, 1989, reading as follows:
“The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and executory, as prayed for, let the writ of execution issue forthwith.”
The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, on the invoked authority of Section 9, Rule 39. The writ quoted the dispositive portion of the judgment of June 9, 1989, including, as the Solicitor General’s Office points out, the second paragraph to the effect that the petitions “are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor is denied.”
The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989 judgment was not effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20, 1989, an “Urgent Ex Parte Manifestation with Prayer to Cite Respondents for Contempt,” complaining that although Gozon and her co-parties had been served with the writ of execution on July 14, they had not complied therewith. By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Court required Gozon and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3, 1989 to answer the charge and show cause “why they should not be adjudged in contempt for disobeying and/or resisting the judgment.”
At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves, accompanied by their individual private lawyers -- one for Gozon (Felipe Hidalgo, Jr.), two for Merencilla (Bernardo S. Nera and Moises S. Rimando). One other lawyer appeared in their behalf, from the Health Department, Artemio Manalo, who stated that he was there “in behalf of Jose A. Fabia.” They explained that they had no intention to defy the Court, they had simply referred the matter to their superiors in good faith; and they were perfectly willing to comply with the judgment, undertaking to do so “even in the afternoon” of that same day. The Court consequently ordered them "to comply with their undertaking xxx without any further delay,” and report the action taken towards this end, within five (5) days.
On August 9, 1989, Gozon, as “Medical Center Chief,” sent a letter to Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special Order No. 31 dated August 3, 1989, de la Fuente had been directed to assume the position of Chief of the Medical Professional Staff, and that a voucher for the payment of his allowances had been prepared and was being processed.
More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27, 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de la Fuente's motion for reconsideration of June 29, 1989. It modified the Decision of June 9, 1989 by (a) deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b) consequently describing and treating it as a “PARTIAL DECISION,” and (c) scheduling “further proceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence (of damages),” since said question “cannot be resolved by mere reference to the pleadings.” This was done in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by de la Fuente, which reads as follows:
“SEC. 3. Mandamus. -- When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and topay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.”
At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez entered his appearance for Isabelita Gozon. At his instance, the Court gave him an “opportunity to xxx file a motion for reconsideration” of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. That motion he filed by registered mail on November 10, 1989. His basic contentions were (a) that the decision of June 9, 1989 could no longer be altered, having become final and executory and having in fact been executed, and (b) that under BP 129, the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus action.
The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in Gozon's behalf at this juncture, saying that the case had been referred to it only on November 14, 1989. It, too, sought reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. It filed on November 16, 1989 an “Omnibus Motion: I. For Reconsideration of Resolution dated September 27, 1989; and II. To defer hearing on petitioner's claims for damages.”
Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated January 11, 1991. In that Resolution, the Court –
1) declared that the amended decision had already become final and could no longer be re-opened because, although “a copy of the amendatory resolution was received by counsel who was representing Gozon on October 3, 1989,” the first motion for reconsideration was not mailed until November 10, 1989 and the Solicitor General’s “Omnibus Motion” was not filed until November 16, 1989; and
2) prohibited the Solicitor General from representing Gozon in connection with xx (de la Fuente’s) claim for damages,” on the authority of this Court’s ruling promulgated on March 19, 1990 in G.R. No. 87977 (Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No. 88578 (Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig).
Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the Solicitor General’s Office on January 18, 1991. Again the Solicitor General sought reconsideration, by motion dated January 25, 1991 and filed on January 30, 1991. Again it was rebuffed. In a Resolution rendered on August 7, 1991, served on the Solicitor General’s Office on August 20, 1991, the Court of Appeals denied the motion. It ruled that the “question of the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for respondent Gozon xxx (had already) been extensively discussed,” and that its “jurisdiction xxx to hear and determine issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9, Batas Pambansa 129 as amended.”
In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of Appeals -- and obtain “the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing respondent de la Fuente’s claim for damages” - the Solicitor General’s Office has instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar. It contends that the Court of Appeals is not legally competent to take cognizance of and decide the question of damages in a mandamus suit. xxx[3]
On 5 May 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[4] which noted that our decision in G.R. No. 101428 had become final and left the option to reopen the case to de la Fuente.
In its resolution of 26 October 1995,[5] the Court of Appeals, inter alia, set the hearing for reception of evidence on the matter of damages on 7 December 1995.
After de la Fuente presented his evidence, the Court of Appeals set reception of Vital-Gozon’s evidence on 16 and 17 January 1996.[6]
At the scheduled hearing on 16 January 1996, Conrado M. Dela Fuente sought to block the presentation of Vital-Gozon’s evidence on the ground that the former had not filed an answer, which the latter refuted. The hearing was then reset to other dates for the parties to prove their respective claims. Vital-Gozon submitted, on 18 January 1996, copies of a “Manifestation and Motion” dated 10 September 1992 to which was attached an Answer likewise dated 10 September 1992. It was claimed in the Manifestation that the answer to the claim for damages could not have been filed earlier as the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over de la Fuente’s claim for damages had been questioned before the Supreme Court. Vital-Gozon likewise claimed that copies of the Manifestation and Motion were received by the Court of Appeals on 18 September 1992 at 3:40 p.m. and sent by registered mail to counsel for dela Fuente. [7] The filing of the Manifestation and Motion with the Court of Appeals was confirmed by Remigio M. Escalada, Jr., Division Clerk of Court of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in an undated Report.[8] He further disclosed that the pleading was transmitted to the Archives Section on 19 September 1992.
The Court of Appeals then ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda, [9] after which, the Court of Appeals promulgated, on 20 March 1997, a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to admit her Answer to the petition and supplemental/amended petition for mandamus with damages, on the ground that the period to file the answer had long prescribed, thus:
It was too late that the answer was filed in this Court on September 18, 1992, after promulgation on August 5, 1992, of the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 101428. The prescribed period to file such answer as well as the extended period had long expired on January 24, 1989 (pp. 35, 37, 55, Rollo) by the time respondent’s answer was filed in this Court on September 18, 1992. She had another opportunity to answer when petitioner filed a supplemental/amended petition. (pp. 57, 72, Rollo). Still, she filed none. It is evident respondent just ignored the case filed against her or gave no importance to the petitions and the notices sent to her by this Court. The delay in filing her answer is inexcusable.
After promulgation and upon finality of this Court’s decision granting the principal relief sought by the petitioner, the instant case for mandamus was virtually disposed of with theexception of the incidental damages that petitioner has claimed. It was uncontested in view of respondent’s failure to answer the petition setting up her defenses. Consequently, the allegations in the petition and supplemental petition were deemed admitted; unpleaded defenses were deemed waived and any counterclaim not set up, barred (Sections 1, 2 and 4, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court). Such procedural rules would become meaningless unless strictly complied with by litigants. As clearly indicated in the proposed answer, respondent’s purpose is to set up a counterclaim already barred and to plead defenses already waived.
Besides, the parties as well as this Court are bound by the comprehensive findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court in its final decision in G.R. No. 101428, based on the uncontroverted allegations of the verified petitions. So are they bound thereby in this proceeding which deals with the lone issue of incidental damages claimed by petitioner. What remains to be done by this Court is but the determination of whether respondent’s wrongful act or refusal/failure to perform an official duty caused injury to the claimant and the amount of the damages that may be awarded in his favor.[10]
Respondent court then set the hearing of the case on 22-23 April 1997 “for the presentation of [Vital-Gozon’s] evidence to controvert or rebut that of [de la Fuente] which he has adduced in support of his claim for damages.”
In its resolution[11] of 21 April 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider[12] the 20 March 1997 resolution.
Petitioner then opted not to present her evidence, as she intended to file a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the 20 March 1997 resolution and 21 April 1997 order of the Court of Appeals.[13]
On 7 May 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution[14] finding petitioner liable for damages and ordered her to pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moral damages,P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. In support thereof, respondent court quoted our finding in G.R. No. 101428,[15] to wit:
The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the following acts and events:
1) the proceeding commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service Commission in protest against his demotion;
2) the Commission’s Resolution of August 9, 1988 as well, particularly, as the direction therein that de la Fuente be reinstated and paid all his back salaries and other monetary benefits otherwise due him, this being couched in fairly simple language obviously understandable to persons of ordinary or normal intelligence;
3) no less than two (2) written demands of de la Fuente for implementation of the CSC’s aforesaid Resolution of August 9, 1988;
4) the petition filed by de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for enforcement of the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988;
5) the extension granted by said Court of Appeals within which to file answer, notice thereof having been sent directly to her and her co-respondents since the attorney who sought the extension in their behalf (Atty. Fabia) did not set out his address in his motion for extension;
6) the “supplemental/amended petition” subsequently presented by de la Fuente, copy of which was sent to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and
7) the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to her counsel on October 3, 1989.
To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the Health officials concerned accorded said acts and events any importance. She never bothered to find out what was being done to contest or negate de la Fuente’s petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, de la Fuente’s efforts were being met with success.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits relief from the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. This Court will not disturb that Resolution. It is satisfied that no procedural or substantive errors taint that Resolution, or its becoming final and executory.
The Court of Appeals then considered the evidence for private respondent and the applicable law, thus:
Upon respondent’s continued refusal without justifiable cause to implement the final resolution of the Civil Service Commission upholding petitioner’s right to the position he has been claiming with back salaries, transportation, representation and housing allowances and other benefits withheld from him, petitioner is entitled to the damages he claims. Testifying in his own behalf petitioner declared that he was greatly disturbed, shocked and frustrated during the three months preceding the filing of his petition; that he had sleepless nights and suffered from mental anxiety, mental anguish, worry, tension and humiliation when respondent ignored and disregarded the final resolution of the Civil Service Commission; that he felt harassed by her refusal because he had to go to court to obtain relief and had to incur additional expenses for litigation which he could hardly afford; and that he had to spend no less than P5,000 for court fees and incidental expenses and to pay his counsel P10,000 at the end of the litigation (pp. 6, 7, 12, 13, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1995). All these respondent has not successfully rebutted by her evidence since she adduced none in her behalf.
Petitioner, therefore, is entitled to recover moral damages from respondent for her refusal and neglect without just cause to perform her official duty to reinstate petitioner to the position he was entitled, as ordered by the Civil Service Commission in its decision. While he was reinstated to his position, petitioner had to seek the aid of the courts for that purpose. In point is the case of San Luis vs. Court of Appeals, decided by the Supreme Court on June 26, 1989 (174 SCRA 258, 276), which involves the unlawful suspension and dismissal by a Provincial Governor of a quarry superintendent and the Governor’s obstinate refusal to comply with the final decisions of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President which declared said suspension and dismissal unlawful or without just cause. The Supreme Court held that the Governor (who was sued both in his official and private capacities) was personally liable for the damages claimed and awarded in favor of the offended party P50,000 as moral damages and P20,000 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Tan Kapoe vs. Masa, decided January 21, 1985 (134 SCRA 231), is also pertinent. There the Supreme Court upheld the award of moral damages although it was “made on the basis of documentary evidence x x x without supporting oral testimonies.” And the award of exemplary damages, in addition to moral damages, was also deemed proper “even if not expressly pleaded in the complaint nor proved.” Such award of exemplary damages is by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral damages (Article 2229, Civil Code). Inasmuch as petitioner is entitled to exemplary damages, he should be awarded attorney’s fees. The award in favor of petitioner of moral and exemplary damages are attorney’s fees in the amounts of P50,000, P20,000 and P10,000, respectively, is but fair and just and not excessive.[16]
Unsatisfied, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She prays that we reverse and set aside the challenged Resolution on the following grounds:
1. There is absolutely no ground for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
2. Petitioner’s right to due process was violated.
Anent the first ground, petitioner asserts there is no factual basis for the award of moral damages for, concretely, private respondent was unable to show any causal connection
between his supposed injury and petitioner’s alleged actionable wrong. Petitioner argues that while testifying, private respondent simply made generalized statements that he had sleepless nights and suffered mental anxiety, mental anguish, worry, tension and humiliation. Petitioner next reiterates her stand that she had nothing to do with the Civil Service case relative to respondent’s original position, as she was not yet connected with the NCH when said case was filed. Moreover, the failure to immediately reinstate private respondent was caused by the directive of the Legal Department of the Department of Health, to which office she forwarded the decision of the Civil Service Commission for guidance, pursuant to standard procedure. Petitioner, therefore, acted in good faith. She likewise faults the Court of Appeals for considering our observations in G.R. No. 101428 as factual findings which bound respondent court.
As to exemplary damages, petitioner asserts that she did not act with vindictiveness nor wantonness, hence the award of said damages was unwarranted,[17] as such, there could likewise be no basis for the award of attorney’s fees.[18]
Anent the second ground, petitioner contends that she was sued in her official capacity, hence could not be held liable for damages, and to hold otherwise would violate her right to due process as a private individual, citing Cariño v. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration[19] and Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office.[20]
Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals denied her due process by refusing to admit her answer, considering that: (a) she personally attended each and every hearing of themandamus case; (b) in its decision of 9 June 1989, the Court of Appeals explicitly declared that it was not the proper forum for the claim for damages, at which point then the necessity of an answer had become moot; (c) it was only on 27 September 1989 that the Court of Appeals reconsidered its decision of 9 June 1989 thereby upholding its jurisdiction to hear the claims for damages; (d) but then, consistent with her stand that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the claims for damages, she assailed such ruling before this Court, hence she could not have been expected to file an answer; (e) nonetheless, upon receipt of the adverse decision of this Court of 4 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, she immediately filed her answer with a corresponding motion for its admission; and (f) while her motion for admission of the answer had been pending since 18 October 1992, the Court of Appeals did not act on it until it was already her turn to present her evidence on the claim for damages.
In his comment on the petition submitted in compliance with the Resolution of 21 July 1997, private respondent contends that: (a) petitioner’s incomplete and slanted version of the facts of the case cannot be relied upon; (b) the factual findings of this Court in G.R. No. 101428 are conclusive and binding, hence the Court of Appeals did not err nor abuse its discretion in relying on said findings; (c) petitioner’s invocation of state immunity is untenable as she was sued not in her official capacity, and assuming otherwise, petitioner could nevertheless be held liable for damages under Articles 20, 27 and 2176 of the Civil Code and Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (d) the Court of Appeals did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to admit her answer; and (e) the Court of Appeals’ awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees were proper, fair, reasonable, justified and in accord with the law and precedent.
Two principal issues thus confront us, viz: (a) whether petitioner was denied due process when her answer to the petition was not admitted; and (b) whether the awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees were proper. These will be resolved in seriatim.
I
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner was not denied due process. The record of CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 shows that in the resolution of 29 December 1998, the Court of Appeals
gave due course to private respondent’s petition and required herein petitioner and the other respondents to answer the petition within 10 days from notice of the resolution. [21] On 9 January 1988, petitioner and the other respondents, represented by Atty. Jose Fabia, filed a motion for an extension of 15 days from said date within which to file their answer, which respondent court granted in its resolution of 17 January 1989.[22] Likewise, on 17 January 1989, private respondent, as petitioner below, was granted leave to file a supplemental/amended petition.[23]
The Supplemental/Amended Petition was filed on 3 February 1989,[24] and in the resolution of 9 February 1989,[25] the Court of Appeals required petitioner herein and her co-respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 to file their answer thereto within 10 days from notice. However, no such answer was filed, and on 9 June 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision. [26] De la Fuente seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration,[27] principally as regards the holding that “the petitions are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of damages.” A copy of this motion was furnished counsel for respondents. Respondents therein were then required, in the resolution of 5 July 1989,[28] to comment within 10 days from notice. However, respondents below once more failed to comply. Thus, on 27 September 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution[29] granting the motion for reconsideration by deleting therefrom the challenged portion of its decision of 9 June 1989. Respondent court then set reception of evidence on the claims for damages on 9 and 11 of October 1989.
Respondents below, represented by new counsel, Atty. Pedro Martinez, and the rest by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed motions to reconsider the resolution of 27 September 1989, primarily on the ground that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the claim for damages in the petition for mandamus. The incidental issue of the authority of the Solicitor General to appear for herein petitioner in respect of the claim for damages against her in her personal capacity was also raised. These matters became the subject of various pleadings.
Eventually, on 11 January 1991, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution[30] which gave rise to G.R. No. 101428, after the Court of Appeals denied herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s failure to file the answer to the petition was due to her fault or negligence. She was, by formal resolutions of the Court of Appeals, required to file answers to both the original petition and the Supplemental/Amended Petition; yet, she failed to heed both resolutions. As regards the resolution to answer the Supplemental/Amended Petition, herein petitioner totally disregarded the same. And if only to further evince that herein petitioner had no one to blame but herself for her plight, as regards the resolution to answer the original petition, this she spurned despite the fact that she asked for and was granted an extension of 15 days within which to do so. That she questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the claims for damages is entirely irrelevant, considering that she did so only after the Court of Appeals promulgated its Resolution of 27 September 1989. Up to that time, petitioner had absolutely no responsive pleading setting forth her defense.
It may likewise be stressed that under Section 2.c.(4) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals then in force, after the expiration of the period for filing the answer or the reply in special civil actions, a case is deemed submitted for resolution. Thus, after the expiration of the 10-day period granted to herein petitioner to file her Answer to the Supplemental/Amended Petition, and in light of her failure to file her answer to the original petition despite the grant of her motion for extension of time to file it, then the case was automatically deemed submitted for decision. After the decision was rendered, she could then no longer be heard to raise a defense which, by her inaction, she indubitably expressed no desire to raise.
It cannot then be successfully maintained that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion, when it denied admission to an answer that was filed only after this Court’s decision in G.R. No. 101428 had long become final and immutable.
What further militates against petitioner’s advocacy is that the Court of Appeals, aside from affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard through the filing of pleadings, likewise sustained petitioner’s right to due process at the hearing. What petitioner neglects to mention is that respondent court did not deprive her the right to cross-examine private respondent when the latter testified as to the matter of damages. Through the exercise of the right, petitioner could have negated private respondent’s claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis therefor. Moreover, the Court of Appeals explicitly allowed petitioner to present her evidence against the claim for damages. However, petitioner again failed to take the opportunity to have herself heard.
It may be pointed out that in her Answer,[31] she interposed the following defenses against the claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, namely: (1) the claim was effectively and exclusively a suit against the State, but without its consent; (2) she had not committed any actionable wrong as she acted in good faith and without malice or negligence; and (3) whatever injury private respondent may have suffered were mere consequences of his indiscretion, negligence and/or ignorance of the law which, at best, constituted damnum absque injuria. From the nature of these defenses, they could very well have been taken up, even indirectly, on cross-examination of private respondent or in the course of petitioner’s testimony had she chosen to present her evidence. All told, the above discussion should readily refute petitioner’s claim of a denial of due process.
II
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. They may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.[32] The instances when moral damages may be recovered are, inter alia, “acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code,” [33] which, in turn, are found in the Chapter on Human Relations of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code. Relevant to the instant case, which involves public officers, is Article 27, [34] which provides:
ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Article 27 must then be read in conjunction with Section 1 of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution,[35] which provides:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate result of petitioner’s wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or neglect in the performance thereof. In
fact, if only to underscore the vulnerability of public officials and employees to suits for damages to answer for any form or degree of misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance, this Court has had occasion to rule that under Articles 19 and 27 of the Civil Code, a public official may be made to pay damages for performing a perfectly legal act, albeit with bad faith or in violation of the “abuse of right” doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations.[36]
Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[37]
Attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when, inter alia, exemplary damages are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim, and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.[38]
There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be restored to his position as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and executory decision of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner, as head or chief of the National Children’s Hospital, then had the duty to see to it that the decision be obeyed and implemented. This she failed to do and private respondent’s two official demands for compliance with the Civil Service Commission’s decision were merely referred by petitioner to the Legal Department of the Department of Health; and as further noted by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 101428, “she did not answer [private respondent’s] letters not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary [for Legal Affairs]. She chose simply to await ‘legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department.’” This Court further noted:
To all these, [petitioner’s] reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the Health Department officials concerned accorded said acts and events any importance. She never bothered to find out what was being done to contest or negate [private respondent’s] petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, [private respondent’s] efforts were being met with success.
That petitioner then committed an actionable wrong for unjustifiably refusing or neglecting to perform an official duty is undeniable. Private respondent testified on the moral damages which he suffered by reason of such misfeasance or malfeasance of petitioner, and the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses he incurred to vindicate his rights and protect his interests. The Court of Appeals which heard him gave full faith and credit to his testimony. Private respondent declared that by reason of the “unjust action” or “refusal” of petitioner when she did not recognize, ignored and disregarded the final and executory Civil Service Resolution, he:
[W]as actually greatly disturbed, shocked and frustrated during those three ... months. [He] had sleepless nights and ... suffered from mental anxiety, worry, tension and humiliation...[39]
Private respondent’s anguish even continued during the 5-month period while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, thus:
During this period my sleepless nights and my moral sufferings continued. As a matter of fact, even worsened. I just could not understand, actually I could not understand the action here of Dr. Gozon for having not followed the decision of the Court of Appeals. And that is why I felt very much aggrieved during this period. I could not sleep at all and this has weakened me.[40]
Private respondent further testified that he “spent not less than P5,000.00 for court fees and as incidental expenses” and had committed himself to pay “P10,000.00 to his counsel at the end of the case.”[41]
While private respondent did not quantify the extent of his moral damages, the Court of Appeals fixed the same at P50,000.00. Since moral damages are, in the language of Article 2217 of the Civil Code, “incapable of pecuniary estimation,” courts have the discretion to fix the corresponding amount, not being bound by any self-serving assessment by the claimants. On the other hand, a claimant’s failure to state the monetary value of moral damages suffered presents no legal obstacle to a court’s determination thereof, as long as there is factual basis for the award such as the claimant’s testimony as to his sufferings. As a matter of fact, it is not unusual for claimants to leave the determination of the amount of the award to the discretion of the court.
Under Article 2233 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00. Considering that a public official is the culprit here, the propriety of such an award cannot be questioned. It serve as an example or deterrent so that other public officials be always reminded that they are public servants bound to adhere faithfully to the constitutional injunction that a public office is a public trust. That the aggrieved party happened to be another public official will not serve to mitigate the effects of petitioner’s having failed to observe the required degree of accountability and responsibility.
As to attorney’s fees as actual damages, the Court of Appeals’ determination of its propriety in this case and the extent thereof were well within its discretion. The agreement between private respondent and his counsel as to the amount does not control.
Petitioner’s contention that she cannot be liable for damages since she was sued in her official capacity is without merit. Whether petitioner was impleaded as respondent in an official capacity, i.e., solely in her capacity as Chief of the National Children’s Hospital, is best determined from the Petition as well as the Supplemental/Amended Petition. For one, in the captions in both, she is named as one of the respondents without any express mention that she was so sued in her “capacity, as Chief of the National Children’s Hospital.” For another, the allegations in the body of the Petition clearly show that she was sued in both her official and private capacities. As to the former, paragraphs 1 and 7 respectively allege petitioner’s position as a public official, and specifically as “Head of the Children’s Hospital;” her duty to restore private respondent to his position by virtue of the final decision of the Civil Service Commission; and her refusal to allow private respondent to perform and discharge his duties and responsibilities as Chief of Clinics. As to the latter, paragraph 16 of the Petition explicitly speaks of petitioner’s personal liability, thus:
16. For causing such mental suffering and anguish, etc., [42] principal respondent [herein petitioner] ought to and must be, in accordance with the Civil Code, held personally answerable and liable to the petitioner in the sum of not less than P100,000.00 as moral damages, and another sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, by way of example or correction for the public good.[43] (emphasis supplied)
In maintaining then that she was sued merely in her official capacity, petitioner has either overlooked paragraph 16 or sought to deliberately mislead this Court.
WHEREFORE, for utter failure to show that respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error in the challenged resolutions, the instant petition is denied.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-10759. May 20, 1957.]
LEONARDO MONTES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS and THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents-Appellees.
Gonzalo U. Garcia for Appellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS; DECISION OF, REVIEWABLE BY THE PRESIDENT; JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRESIDENT’S DECISION DOES NOT MAKE EXECUTIVE SUBORDINATE TO COURTS. — When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement the law. A judicial review of the President’s decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers.
2. ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF; EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FIRST BEFORE RESOLVING TO COURTS. — The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. If, as in this case, the President, under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system as head of the executive department may be able to grant the remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be made to him before recourse can be had to the courts.
D E C I S I O N
LABRADOR, J.:
Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case No. R-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his care), the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.
Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted the action. The case is now before us on appeal against the order of dismissal.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598, which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to hear and decide all administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by the President of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is urged on the appeal that there is no duty imposed on a party against whom a decision has been rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to the President, and that the tendency of courts has been not to subject the decision of the President to judicial review. It is further argued that if decisions of the Auditor General may be appealed to the courts, those of the Civil Service Board of Appeals need not be acted upon by the President also, before recourse may be had to the courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action should be final and not reviewable by the courts because such a course of action would be derogatory to the high office of the President.
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President’s decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) The doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. (Ibid.)
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598 above-quoted is a clear expression of the policy or principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the President, under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system as head of the executive department, may be able to grant the remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be made to him before recourse can be had to the courts. We have applied this same rule in De la Paz v. Alcaraz, Et Al., 99 Phil., 130, 52 Off. Gaz., 3037, Miguel, Et. Al. v. Reyes, Et Al., 93 Phil., 542, and especially in Ang Tuan Kai & Co. v. The Import Control Commission, 91 Phil., 143, and we are loathe to deviate from the rule we have consistently followed, especially in view of the express provision of the law (section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 598).
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Appellant.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13744 November 29, 1918
JOSE LINO LUNA, petitioner-appellant, vs.EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, respondent-appellant; SERVANDO DE LOS ANGELES, respondent.
Ramon Diokno and Agapito Ygnacio for petitioner.Sumulong & Estrada for respondent.
JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that an election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held on the 6th day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast in the various municipalities were counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of canvassers, who, after a canvass of said returns, proclaimed the following result:
(a) That Eulogio Rodriguez received 4,321 votes; (b) Jose Lino Luna 4,157; (c) Servando de los Angeles 3,576 votes; and (d) that Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said votes, was duly elected governor of said province.
Against said proclamation Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the Court of First Instance. Upon said protest issue was joined, hearing was had and a decision was rendered which was, on appeal, set aside and a new trial ordered. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez and De los Angeles, 37 Phil. Rep., 186.) Complying with said order, a new trial was had at which the Honorable William E. McMahon, judge, presided. Additional evidence was adduced. After a consideration of all of the facts and the evidence adduced at both trials, Judge McMahon reached the conclusion that the ballots cast for the various candidates were as indicated in the returns of the inspectors of the various municipalities except those in the municipality of Taytay and Binangonan. In the municipality of Taytay, Judge McMahon found from the evidence that 50 ballots cast for Eulogio Rodriguez should not have been counted for him, and ordered that number of votes deducted from his total. In the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon found that the inspectors did not close the polls at 6 o'clock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time, and directed that the total vote of Eulogio Rodriguez should be reduced by the number of such votes, without ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna. By deducting the said votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast after six o'clock p.m. in the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna had received a plurality of the legal votes cast at said election and ordered the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly. From that conclusion both parties to the contest appealed to this court and made several assignments of error.
Considering all of said assignments of error, we find that they present, in fact, but three questions:
(1) What is the effect of holding the polls open after the hour fixed for closing the election?
(2) What is the effect of assistance rendered by the inspectors of the election to incapacitated persons, without first requiring of such persons an oath to the effect that they are incapacitated to prepare their own ballots?
(3) What is the effect of a failure on the part of the authorities to provide proper voting booths?
With reference to the first question, the law provides that "at all the elections held under the provisions of this Act the polls shall be open from seven o'clock in the morning until six o'clock in the afternoon, during which period not more than one member of the board of inspectors shall be absent at one time, and then for not to exceed twenty minutes at one time." (Sec. 21 of Act No. 1582; sec. 11 of Act No. 2045; sec. 543 of Act No. 2657, and sec. 445 of Act No. 2711.) Are the provisions with reference to the time of opening and closing the polls mandatory? It is admitted in the present case that the polls were not closed at 6 p.m. The record shows that at 6 p.m. a large number of voters had not yet been able to vote and that, for that reason, an agreement was made between some of the candidates for office who were present and the board of inspectors, to the effect that the polls should be kept open in order that such electors might vote. No objection whatever to that agreement was made by any person at that time.
One of the reasons why all of the voters of the municipality had not voted before 6 p.m. was that the board of inspectors failed to have the list of voters properly prepared at 7 a.m., and therefore but few of the voters were able to vote before eleven or eleven-thirty in the morning. That failure, on the part of the board of inspectors, made it impossible for many of the voters of the municipality of Binangonan to vote before the regular time for the closing of the polls.
Shall the ballot of an innocent voter, who is prevented, through no fault of his, from casting the same before 6 p.m. be annulled for the simple reason that the polls were kept open, after the hour designated by the law, for the purpose of giving such voter an opportunity to vote?
Experience and observation has taught legislatures and courts that, at the time of a hotly contested election, the partisan spirit of ingenious and unscrupulous politicians will lead them beyond the limits of honesty and decency and by the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation, despoil the purity of the ballot and defeat the will of the people at the polls. Such experience has led the legislatures to adopt very stringent rules for the purpose of protecting the voter in the manner of preparing and casting his ballot to guard the purity of elections. (Paulino vs. Cailles, 37 Phil. Rep., 825.)
The infinite ingenuity of violent partisan spirit in evading the rules and regulation of elections and the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation has made necessary the establishment of elaborate and rigid rules and regulations for the conduct of elections. The very elaborateness of these rules has resulted in their frequent violation and the reports of the courts are replete with cases in which the result of an election has been attacked on the ground that some provision of the law has not been complied with. Presumably, all the provisions of the election laws have a purpose and should therefore be observed. (Detroit vs. Rush, 82 Mich., 532; 10 L. R. A., 171; 9 R. C. L., 1091; Patton vs. Watkins, 131 Ala., 387; 90 Am. State Rep., 43, 72.)
It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. (Patton vs. Watkins, 131 Ala., 387; 90 Am. State Rep., 43, 72; Jones vs. State, 153 Ind., 440.)
In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo (26 Phil. Rep., 521), we held that when the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an honest mistake or misrepresentation of the Election Law, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held to be directory and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. However, the irregularities may be so numerous as not to be attributed to ignorance or honest mistake, but to a design to defeat the will of the voters or to such careless disregard of the law as to amount not only to laches but to fraudulent intent. In such cases, the election officers should be punished, the election should be declared null and a new election held.
It has been held, therefore, very generally, that the provisions of a statute as to the manner of conducting the details of an election are not mandatory, but directory merely, and irregularities, in conducting an election and counting the votes, not proceeding from any wrongful intent and which deprives no legal voter of his vote, will not vitiate an election or justify the rejection of the entire votes of a precinct. (Behrensmeyer vs. Kreitz, 135 Ill., 591; Hankey vs. Bowman, 82 Minn., 328; Sprague vs. Norway, 31 Cal., 173; Webre vs. Wilton, 29 La. Ann., 610.)
The purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make the manner and method of performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself. (Loomis vs.Jackson, 6 W. Va., 613.)
The errors and irregularities which warrant the rejection of ballots and the annulment of an election and thus deprive lawful voters of their legal right to vote, should be such as to fully justify that result. (The People vs. Cook, 8 N. Y., 67; 59 Am. Dec., 451.) It has been held that even great irregularities on the part of election officers will not of necessity vitiate an election, where no fraud is committed or attempted, or no illegal vote was polled was no legal voter was deprived of his vote. (Morris vs. Vanlaningham, 11 Kan., 269.)
No complaint is made that any fraud was committed nor that any person voted who had no right to vote, by reason of the fact that the polls were kept open after the hour fixed by the law. It is admitted that the polls were kept open after the hour, by the consent of all parties concerned, for the reasons and purposes above indicated. In view of such facts, should the vote of the innocent voter be annulled and he thereby deprived of his participation in the affairs of the government when he was guilty of no illegal act? If the inspectors may, for one reason or another, prevent the opening of the polls or delay the commencement of the voting until 11 o'clock in the morning and then close the polls in the evening so as to prevent all those who desire to vote from voting, without incurring criminal liability for a violation of the election laws, the same motives will induce them to delay the opening of the polls until later and thus prevent any to vote except those whom they desire.
The polls should be opened and closed in strict accord with the provisions of the law. Voters who do not appear and offer to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote after the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter
is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after the regular hour. (People vs. Prewett, 124 Cal., 7; Packwood vs. Brownell, 121 Cal., 478; Pickett vs.Russell, 42 Fla., 116.)
The decisions in the various States of the United States are not uniform upon the effect of a failure to open and close polls at the time specified by the law. In some States such a provision has been held to be mandatory, in others directory. The decisions seem to be based upon the language of the particular statutes discussed.
We are not inclined to the belief that the legislature intended that a failure to comply with the law in this jurisdiction should render the entire election void, nor nullify the votes cast after the period mentioned in the law, unless the polls were kept open after the hour for the purpose of permitting some fraud to be committed, or for the purpose of permitting some person to vote who had not appeared during the regular voting hours.
The section of the law which we are discussing provides that 'not more than one member of the board of inspectors shall be absent at one time and then for not to exceed twenty minutes at one time." Suppose that the evidence showed that two of the inspectors were absent at one time and for a period longer than twenty minutes, would the courts be justified in holding that the entire election was void, in the absence of fraud, for the reason? There is little justification for holding that one provision of said section is mandatory and the other directory.
Our conclusion upon the first question, in view of the foregoing, is that in the present case there seems to be no justification, under the facts, there being no fraud committed, for annulling the votes of innocent voters who were permitted by the election inspectors to cast their votes in a legal manner after the regular hour for closing the polls. In this conclusion, however, we do not desire to be understood to have decided that in no case should the courts not annul and set aside an election, where fraud is clearly proved, for a violation of the section under discussion. When the polls are kept open after the hour prescribed by the law for the purpose of defeating the will of the people, such a violation of the law should result in annulling and setting aside the election of that precinct. No such facts exist in the present case. It is true, perhaps, that a number of the votes cast after the hour for closing the polls were sufficient to change the result of the election, but the result would have been the same had those same voters been permitted to vote, except for the negligence of the inspectors, during the regular hours for voting. There seems to be no more reason for annulling the votes cast, after the hour for closing the election, than for annulling the election for the reason that the inspectors failed to provide the means for voting at the time fixed for opening the polls in the morning.
We are firmly of the opinion that instead of depriving the innocent voters of their right to participate in the affairs of their government for irregularities committed by the election inspectors, the latter should be proceeded against in a criminal action for failure, on their part, to comply with the law and be punished in accordance with section 29 of Act No. 1592; section 2632 of Act No. 2657 and section 2639 of Act No. 2711.
The various and numerous provisions of the Election Law are adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government, and not to defeat that object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed, under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of elections,
have not done their duty. The law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.lawphi1.net
It may be noted in this relation that, under the law, the polls are kept open from 7 a.m. until 6 p.m. or, for a period of eleven hours only. In the municipality of Binangonan the record shows that there were 375 analfabetos (illiterate persons) and 164 other voters. The law requires an analfabeto to take an oath and that the oath shall be filed. Naturally the inspectors require some time in (a) ascertaining whether or not the voter is in fact an analfabeto; (b) in administering, preparing, signing and filing the oath. Suppose one minute only is allowed for that work. Then two inspectors must accompany such a voter to the booth, there assist him in preparing his ballot and then return to their position occupied by them as inspectors. We do not think that work could be accomplished in less than another minute and it would more than likely occupy nearer two minutes. But admitting that it could be accomplished in one minute, we have, at least, two minutes occupied by two inspectors for each analfabeto. There being 375 analfabetos, it would require 750 minutes to vote, or 12 ½ hours. If the inspectors had strictly complied with the law, not all of the analfabetos of said municipality could have voted in the eleven hours provided by the law, not to say anything of the time necessarily occupied with the 164 other voters of the municipality who would, at least, occupy one minute each of the time of the inspectors, or nearly 2 1/2 hours more. With reference to this particular question of the time necessary for each analfabeto to vote, some of the judges have estimated that it would take, at least, five minutes of the time of the inspectors for each analfabeto. (Hontiveros vs. Mobo, R. G. No. 13959, p. 230, post.)
From the foregoing, it was practically an impossibility for all of the voters of said municipality to have voted in the eleven hours prescribed by the law even though the polls had been opened promptly at 7 a.m. instead of at nearly 11 a.m. The above time is computed upon the theory that no time whatever is lost, that the voters arrive one immediately after another and that no time is lost waiting for the arrival of the voters.
With reference to the second question above presented, the law provides that:
A voter otherwise qualified who declares that he can not write, or that from blindness or other physical disability he is unable to prepare his ballot, may make an oath to the effect that he is so disabled and the nature of his disability and that he desires the inspectors to assist him in the preparation of such ballot. The board shall keep a record of all such oaths taken and file the same with the municipal secretary with the other records of the board after the election. Two of the inspectors, each of whom shall belong to a different political party, shall ascertain the wishes of the voter, and one of them shall prepare the ballot of the voter in proper form according to his wishes, in the presence of the other inspector, and out of view of any other person. The information this obtained shall be regarded as a privileged communication. (Section 12, Act No. 2045; section 550, Act No. 2657; section 453, Act No. 2711.)
Said quoted section provides the method by which a person who cannot prepare his ballot may be assisted. The conditions are:
(a) That he must make an oath to the effect that he is disabled and the nature of his disability together with the fact that he desires the inspectors to assist him in the preparation of his ballot;
(b) That a record of said oath shall be filed with the municipal secretary with the other records of the board of inspectors after the election; and
(c) When said oath is taken, then two of the inspectors, each of whom shall belong to different political party, may assist him in the preparation of his ballot.
In view of said conditions, what shall be the effect of a failure to comply therewith? Suppose, for example, that the voter is incapacitated; that the board of inspectors are fully aware of that fact; that they failed to require of him the oath; that they failed to keep on file the oath taken, or that one inspector only assisted said voter in the preparation of his ballot, or that two assisted him which belonged to the same party, shall the ballot of such an incapacitated person be rejected? Shall all of the votes of the precinct be nullified because of the failure of the inspectors to comply strictly with the letter of the law?
We held in the case of Paulino vs. Cailles (R. G. No. 12753, 37 Phil. Rep., 825) that the ballots of incapacitated persons who voted without taking the oath or were assisted by one inspector alone, or by two belonging to the same party, should not be counted if such ballots could be identified. We further held that, in the absence of fraud, all of the ballots of the precinct should not be invalidated by the mere fact that the inspectors did not comply with their duty. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in an election for a violation of the law for which they were in no way responsible and which they could not prevent.lawphil.net
The incapacitated persons mentioned in said section above noted are usually persons who are unable to acquaint themselves with the provisions of the law. They are, therefore, absolutely dependent upon the advice and counsel of others. Generally, they have no idea whatever as to the form and requirements in casting their ballots. Their ignorance, however, does not relieve them from their responsibility under the law, nor from the effect of their failure to comply therewith. (Manalo vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil. Rep., 609; Gardiner vs. De Leon, R. G. No. 12382 decided March 15, 1917, not published; Paulino vs. Cailles, R. G. No. 12763, 37 Phil. Rep., 825.)
The law intended that those votes only who are incapacitated in some way should be assisted. To insure a compliance with the law an oath of incapacity is required. To prove that only such persons have received assistance, the election board is required to keep a record of such oath. To guarantee that such voters should not be imposed upon, the law wisely provided that two inspectors of different political faith should assist them. Upon the other hand, if the inspectors have failed or declined to perform a duty or obligation imposed upon them by the Election Law, they may be punished.
The record shows that in many of the municipalities of the Province of Rizal, during the election in question, a great many incapacitated persons voted without taking the oath required and were assisted by one inspector only in the preparation of their ballots. But, in view of the fact that such ballots have not been identified they cannot be rejected. The voter cannot be punished. The remedy is by a criminal action against the inspectors for a failure to comply with the law. (Section 29, Act No. 1582; section 2632, Act No. 2657; section 2639, Act No. 2711.)
Said section (2632) provides, among other things, that any member of a board of registration, or board of inspectors, or board of canvassers who willfully declines or fails to perform any duty or obligation imposed by the Election Law, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
one month nor more than one year, or by a fine of not less than P200 nor more than P500 or both.
With reference to the third question above indicated, relating to what is the effect of a failure on the part of the authorities to provide proper voting booths, it may be said that we have held in the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo (26 Phil. Rep., 521) that the requirements of the Election Law providing for the location of polling stations and the construction of booths and guard rails for the latter may be departed from in some particulars and yet preserve, in substantial form, the secrecy which the law requires. But the failure to provide doors and guard rails for the booths and the placing of the writing shelf so that it faces the side instead of the rear of the booths are, combined, a fatal disregard of the law, inasmuch as such an arrangement does not offer, even in substantial form, the secrecy and seclusion which, according to the purpose and spirit of the Election Law, is its most mandatory requirement.
Section 9 of Act No. 1582, as amended by section 512 of Act No. 2657 and section 415 of Act 2711, provides that there shall be in each polling place, during each election, a sufficient number of voting booths, not less than one for every fifty voters, in the election precinct. Said section further provides how such voting booths, not less than one every fifty voters, in the election precinct. Said section further provides how such voting booths shall be constructed. The purpose of said provisions is to furnish each voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in secrecy. Suppose the board of inspectors does not prepare the voting booth in exactly the form prescribed by law, what shall be the effect? Support, the example, that they construct a booth less than one meter square as is provided by the law but yet sufficiently large to enable the voter to enter and to prepare his ballot in secrecy; or suppose that the door swinging outward to the booth shall extend to the floor instead of within fifty centimeters of the floor; or suppose that the shelf upon which the voter shall prepare his ballot shall be less than thirty centimeters wide, shall the entire election be declared null and void for such failures when it is admitted and proved, beyond question, that even with such defects in the fulfillment of the requirements of the election law they were in fact constructed in a manner which provided the voter a complete opportunity to prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy? While there is no provision in the law, relating to the construction of booths, they shall be constructed in such manner as to afford the voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in secret, that must be the primary and ultimate object of having the booths constructed in the manner indicated.
When we held that the law requiring the preparation of the booths in a particular manner was mandatory, we did not mean to hold that unless they were prepared in exact conformity with the law, that the election would be nullified. We simply held that if they were not constructed in a manner which afforded the voters an opportunity to prepare their ballots in secret, the election would be declared null and void on that account. If, however, upon the other hand, the booths were so constructed, even though not in strict accord with the provisions of the law, as to afford each voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in secret, the election should not be declared null and void. Secrecy is the object of the booth. An opportunity to prepare his ballot in private is the purpose of the provision. When the booth affords that protection, the purpose of the law is fulfilled. To hold otherwise — to establish a different rule — would make the manner of performing a public duty more important than the performance of the duty itself.
In the present case, while there is some conflict in the evidence, and while the proof clearly shows that the booths were not constructed in strict accordance with the provisions of the law, we are of the opinion that a large preponderance of the evidence shows that the booths were constructed (defectively perhaps) in a manner which afforded each voter an opportunity to
prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy. That being true, we find no reason for changing or modifying the conclusion of the lower court.
The defendant-appellant alleges, and attempts to establish the fact, that in the municipality of San Felipe Nery many irregularities were committed which should invalidate the election. For example, he alleges the different columns of the polling list were not properly filled. Even granting that fact, the voter was in no way responsible. The voter not being responsible, his ballot should not be nullified on that account. Filling the different columns of the polling list is a duty imposed upon the election officers. If they fail to perform their duty they are responsible; and as we have frequently said, the ballots of innocent voters should not be nullified for a failure on the part of election officers to perform their duty in accordance with the provisions of the law. The remedy is a criminal action against the inspectors if they have violated the law and not to nullify the votes of innocent voters.
The defendant-appellant further alleges that in the municipality of San Felipe Nery, a number of voters voted who were not residents of said municipality. That question was presented to the court below, and upon a full consideration he refused to nullify the election in said municipality upon the grounds alleged. While it is true that the proof shows that some grave irregularities were committed by the board of inspectors, we are not persuaded that the evidence is sufficient to justify this court in nullifying the entire vote of said municipality. In view of that conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other allegations of the defendant-appellant with reference to the striking out of certain allegations in his answer.
The lower court, after hearing the evidence and after examining the ballots cast in the municipality of Taytay, found that 50 ballots which had been counted for the defendant-appellant should not be counted for him and ordered that the total vote of the defendant-appellant should be reduced by that number. The defendant-appellant in fact admits that the said 50 votes should be deducted from his total vote. In view of that admission of the defendant-appellant, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the reasons therefor.
Upon the various errors assigned, our conclusions are:
(1) That the total votes cast in the municipality of Binangonan should be counted for the respective candidates; that for the special reason given, the board of inspectors was justified in keeping the polls open after the hour for closing. But this conclusion must not be interpreted to mean that under other circumstances and other conditions, where the polls are kept open after the hour for fraudulent purposes, that such act on the part of the inspectors might not nullify the entire election (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. Rep., 521);
(2) That while it is irregular for the board of inspectors to permit incapacitated voters to vote without taking the oath and for one inspector only to assist such voters, yet the ballots of the innocent voters should not be nullified on that account; that the ballots of such persons only should be annulled when identified;
(3) That inasmuch as the voting booths in the municipality of Antipolo were prepared in a manner and form which permitted the voter to prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy, the vote of that municipality should not be nullified; and
(4) That the judgment of the lower court reducing the total vote of the defendant-appellant by fifty identified fraudulent ballots counted for him, in the municipality of Taytay, should be affirmed.
As a result of the count of the ballots, cast in the various municipalities by the provincial board of inspectors, Eulogio Rodriguez received 4,321 votes, Jose Lino Luna received 4,157 votes and Servando de los Angeles received 3,576 votes. Servando de los Angeles did not protest the election. From all of the foregoing, the total votes of Eulogio Rodriguez must be reduced by 50 votes, leaving him a total of 4,271 only, or a clear majority of 114 votes.
Therefore, with the modification herein indicated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed as modified, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the record be immediately returned to the lower court with direction that a judgment be entered directing and ordering the provincial board of inspectors to amend its count accordingly.
It is so ordered, without any finding as to costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street, Malcolm and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
