2.2.2-2.2.3 work of the emergency operations orga- ... mation by comparing data to different refer-...

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2.0. BUILDING MANAGEMENT

TOOLS

2.2. EXAMPLE TYPES OF

TOOLS

2.2.2. PROGRAM

MANAGEMENT

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BUILDING MANAGEMENT TOOLS/EXAMPLE TYPES OF TOOLS/PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

2.2.2.1. GOAL-ORIENTED PLANNING

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2.0. BUILDING MANAGEMENT

TOOLS

2.2. EXAMPLE TYPES OF

TOOLS

2.2.3. EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

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BUILDING MANAGEMENT TOOLS/EXAMPLE TYPES OF TOOLS/EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

2.2.3.1. MANAGING CHANGE—JEAN-AUGUSTE-DOMINIQUE INGRES

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For their responsibility in managing uncertainty, emergency operations organiza-tions need management tools that stand up to today’s heightened scrutiny, increasedopenness, the resultant great expectations, and demand for accountability duringemergency situations.

When an emergency strikes, will the organiza-tion be ready to protect life, property, and theenvironment? Will the appropriate responseresources be available? Will the right infor-mation be available at the right time? Will thehard work of the emergency operations orga-nization (EOO) facilitate the prompt and ef-fective management of this emergency?

An EOO is the foundation of the emergencymanagement structure because it orchestratesthe preparedness, response, recovery, and miti-gation activities of line organizations, emer-gency management teams (EMTs), and theirown staffs before, during, and after emergencyconditions. EOOs are required to ready, coor-dinate, and sustain sudden shifts from normaloperations to emergency conditions.

EOOs face more demands from their constitu-encies than ever before. Coupled with in-creased scrutiny is the difficulty of managingsudden changes in roles, responsibilities, andresources inherent in emergencies and exacer-bated in potential multiple incidents. In switch-ing between managing routine operations andemergency conditions, EMT personnel mustsuddenly transform their managing skills andinformation and resource requirements to meetthe fast-paced emergency context. The EOOmust possess the skills and tools to success-fully make the shift to and facilitate the man-agement of emergency conditions.

EOOs also experience considerable pressurebecause an unknown potential emergency is aperplexity. Perplexities are extreme manage-

ment pursuits characterized by ill-defined,complex, unique, and unpredictable situationswith potentially severe consequences. For afuller treatment of the term perplexity, pleasesee Modules 1.4.5.2.1. and 2.2.3.5. Becauseperplexities involve uncertainty, they requiresudden changes in the amounts, types, andmeans of delivery of information to supportdecision making. EOOs manage the amounts,types, and means of delivering informationbefore an incident, so when the incident oc-curs, managers have the information they need.

The EOO provides the right information tosupport emergency management teams andline organizations when they participate in anyof the four activities: emergency prepared-ness, response, recovery, and mitigation shownin Figure 2.2.3.2. The figure also shows therelative responsibilities of the EOO, line orga-nizations, and EMT. EOO responsibility isconstant and is the foundation for all fouractivities and thereby supports and providescontinuity through all emergency managementroles and responsibilities. The line organiza-tion performs those emergency activities ger-mane to their operations utilizing the founda-tion developed, maintained, and coordinatedby the EOO. Emergencies occur suddenly asdoes a lightning bolt (jagged arrows in thefigure). The response role of the EMT appearsin a flash. The EOO role of readying, coordi-nating, and sustaining line organizations andthe EMT in its response role is subject, beforeand after-the-fact, to intense external and in-ternal scrutiny. Such scrutiny is important todeveloping the ability of the EOO to deliver


2.2.3.2. NEED FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TOOLS

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based on the best information.

Emergency management tools can be definedby starting with successful management tools,proven in managing routine operations. Wecan generate new sets of tools based on theprinciples underlying the successful tools butconstrained to suit emergency managementresponsibilities. A sufficient set of emer-gency management tools and guides doesn’texist.

Mitigation

Response

Recovery

lineorg A

lineorg C

lineorg B

foresight

hindsight

externalscrutiny

internalscrutiny

Emergency OperationsOrganization

EMT

Preparedness

Figure 2.2.3.2. In the face of scrutiny from all directions, the EOO needs the means for providinginformation and support as it sustains and coordinates the emergency preparedness, response,recovery, and mitigation activities of all participants.

the right information and tools at the right timeto the EMT for decision making in prepared-ness, response, recovery, and mitigation. Bal-ancing external scrutiny with internal scru-tiny, as shown in Figure 2.2.3.2., helps manag-ers be responsive to external scrutiny by an-ticipating (foresight) rather than looking back(hindsight). Because of public scrutiny andsudden shifts into emergency conditions, EOOsneed the proper set of tools and guides, sowhen an emergency happens, their constituen-cies are confident the best decisions are made

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2.2.3.3. A NEW APPROACH TO TOOLS AIMED AT PERPLEXITIES

So the EOO can respond to information needs for sudden shifts from routineoperations to emergency conditions, we need a new approach to understanding,developing, and using synergistic tools working through effective guides aimed atperplexities. The tools and guides of this new approach must help EOOs consistentlyget, store, retrieve, see, and communicate information selectively aimed at the appro-priate emergency management activity.

We need a new approach to tools aimed atperplexities so we can assist EOOs in theirefforts to ready, coordinate, and sustain lineorganizations and EMTs as, together, theymanage emergencies. For the new approach tosucceed, it must help EOOs cope better withperplexities and their associated uncertaintyand unique information requirements. What isthe nature of an emergency from a decision-making and information-requirement perspec-tive? What principles guide the selection anduse of the right information? Can we figureout management tools for converting raw datainto useful information as well-suited to per-plexities as we have for our more routinepursuits?

Throughout the four emergency managementactivities (preparedness, response, recovery,and mitigation), EOOs have relative continu-ity in roles, responsibilities, and resource re-quirements compared to line organizationsand EMTs. Line organizations switch fromroutine operations to any of the emergencymanagement activities when called upon. AndEMTs make the most dramatic switch. Theswitch involves different information and dif-ferent tools for recording, verifying, storing,arranging, and accessing data to make infor-mation by comparing data to different refer-ence points.

By selecting and applying the appropriate toolsworking together, EOOs can give EMT per-sonnel acting in emergency management roles

the information they need when they need it.Management tools and the guides throughwhich they work must function within a syner-gistic integrated package if they are to workeffectively in perplexities. Tools designed foruse in routine operations and those tools cur-rently used in emergency management won’tnecessarily work for emergency conditionsunless we understand the underlying prin-ciples behind the tools’ use, and adapt the toolsfor use in perplexities.

What’s more, emergencies require a lot moreinformation than non-emergencies. The closerthe ratio (information EMT personnel need/information they have) is to one, the moreeffectively they can confront perplexities.

The classical management principle (Tushman& Nadler, “Information Processing as an Inte-grating Concept in Organizational Design,”Academy of Management Review, July 1978,pp. 613-624.) for information requirementsfor organizations facing different degrees ofuncertainty is illustrated in Figure 2.2.3.3. andis adapted to highlight the situation encoun-tered by EOOs. Classically, good manage-ment in certain conditions means relativelylow information requirements and in uncer-tain conditions means relatively high informa-tion requirements. As shown in Figure 2.2.3.3.,the problem with an emergency is that thechange in information requirements is a largeand abrupt step function. The sudden changein information requirements includes the

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amount of information; timeliness, accuracy,and relevance characteristics of the informa-tion; and the resources (equipment and trainedpeople) for delivering the information. Theextreme time factor means it’s crucial to beready with the necessary information.

We can help EOOs gain better control of

perplexities by helping them to know: 1) whattools work best in perplexities; 2) what guidesgovern the most effective use of those tools;and 3) how to get, store, retrieve, portray, andcommunicate the right information. WhenEOOs manage effectively day-to-day, if anemergency hits, the right tools and informa-tion are ready.1

Figure 2.2.3.3. When uncertainty increases dramatically, so do information requirements foreffective management. EOOs need management tools to provide information for EMTs duringsituations of high uncertainty and sudden shifts to uncertainty.

1 The emergency manager is like a stage director who must orchestrate preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.

Stage directors set the stage, the actors, and support people by producing, coordinating, and directing all props, cues,script, lighting, sound, and rehearsals for a successful production. When the director pulls all the tools and arrangementstogether with the ability and talents of the actors, their audience and critics respond favorably. We need to know whattools the emergency operations manager needs, how the tools should be used, and why the tools do what they’re supposedto do so the audience (the public) and critics (surrogates of the public—the media and legislative bodies) providesuperlative reviews. The difference is that the emergency operations manager doesn’t know what the play is, where it’sbeing put on, who the actors are, or when curtain time is.

DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY

INFORMATIONREQUIREMENTS

Transition(Time ofincident)

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To effectively address the important issues and information within the context ofurgent conditions, EOOs must direct and channel information using tools well-suitedto the unique characteristics of emergency activities to assist line organizations andEMTs in their managing of perplexities in real-world settings.

For EOOs, emergency management is morethan response. Over all four activities ofemergency management, EOOs need to ad-dress important issues to help deal with urgentissues. EOOs want to help managers in emer-gency conditions work smart, not work fre-netically. They particularly need tools so theycan attend to what’s important before it be-comes urgent.

In terms of addressing the needs of EOOs,emergency management is much like dealingwith a leaky roof. When you have a leaky roofand it’s sunny, nobody worries about fixing it.That’s because, when it’s sunny, people oftenaren’t concerned about preparing for a rainyday. But when the rain comes, it’s too late. Soit is in emergencies. During normal, non-emergency operations the line organization isconcerned with normal activities, but the EOOis concerned with improving the database andother emergency management needs. Whenan emergency strikes, suddenly circumstancesrequire extensive information. In an emer-gency, without good programs and adequateplanning (foresight), good data may be un-available, ineffectively integrated, or inad-equately portrayed. Although EOOs workvery hard, new leaks are constantly develop-ing. An integrated set of emergency manage-ment tools will help EOOs address their leakyroof problem.

Figure 2.2.3.4. shows the cyclic and recursivenature of the four activities for emergencypreparedness, response, recovery, and mitiga-

tion. Figure 2.2.3.4. also shows the integratedset of synergistic tools as being central tofeeding the information, decisions, and under-standing from one activity into any of the otheractivities. EOOs want to plan for the impor-tant to help mitigate the urgent.

To implement emergency management tools,we must understand: 1) what roles, responsi-bilities, and resources EOOs need for the fouractivities of emergency management to ready,coordinate, and sustain sudden shifts fromnormal operations, including potential mul-tiple incidents; 2) the reason why EOOs re-quire the information they do to meet theirresponsibilities; 3) the principles behind theselection of an integrated set of tools to pro-vide that information; and 4) why those toolswork, by applying the principles of decisionmaking and information support and design-ing the tools for emergency preparedness, re-sponse, recovery, and mitigation. Emergencymanagement tools must:

1) recognize the unique qualities of per-plexity management;

2) obtain, integrate, and portray necessaryinformation through an integrated pack-age of tools to support decision makingby EOOs facing sudden change fromnormal operations to emergency condi-tions;

3) facilitate the coordination and integra-tion of efforts among multiple layers of


2.2.3.4. THE FOUR ACTIVITIES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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emergency responsibility—incidentscene, line responsibility, and seniormanagement; and

PREPAREDNESS

RE

SP

ON

SE

MIT

IGAT

ION

RECOVERY

INTEGRATED AND

SYNERGISTICTOOLS

4) provide a support system to handle thecompound effects of multiple emergen-cies within hierarchical organizations.

Figure 2.2.3.4. We need to develop tools well-suited to use in the four activities of emergencymanagement.

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What are perplexities? Perplexities are themost uncertain of all management pursuits.Uncertainty is the ratio of the information weneed to the information we have (See Module1.4.5.2.1.). Emergency preparedness is theclassical example of a perplexity. The EOOdoesn’t know until the event occurs what theemergency conditions might be or what out-come the unknown event might lead to. Ifproblem-solving is knowing: 1) where we are(WWA), 2) where we want to be (WWWTB),and 3) how to get there (HTGT), then theemergency preparedness problem is certainlya perplexity because we don’t know WWA,WWWTB, and HTGT. To solve perplexities,we not only need information about where weare going and how to get there, we also needinformation about where we are at any point intime. We need detective information as wellas corrective information.

When the emergency incident occurs we knowmore: We know WWA. Then we have amanagement pursuit called a problem, whichis more certain than a perplexity. The EOOthen has the first information on the type,severity, and scope of the emergency and canbring the tools and information systems to bearas the perplexity unravels. Managing per-plexities and problems is what EOOs are allabout. Figure 2.2.3.5. shows perplexities andproblems as high on an uncertainty spectrum,while routine operations, like R&D programs,projects, and processes, tend to be lower inuncertainty. To achieve success, EOOs mustmanage information so the amount of quality

information needed by decision makers equalsthe amount of information available. Inequal-ity of information needs and information avail-ability requires EOOs to adjust informationneeds or the amount of information possessed.EOOs need uniquely designed managementtools, high in information richness, to helpreduce uncertainty. Richness is defined as thepotential information-carrying capacity of data(See Module 1.4.4.2.).

Figure 2.2.3.5. illustrates how we manage un-certainty. In managing emergency prepared-ness (perplexities) we assume a number ofdifferent types of incidents (problems) andplan, gather resources, and exercise for a pos-sible chemical release, terrorist attack, com-puter crime, radiological release, or other typeof incident. We make a perplexity into a seriesof possible problems. In emergency response(problems), we work to achieve alternate pos-sible qualitative outcomes to a given incident.For the example problem of a chemical re-lease, qualitative outcomes could be: stop thechemical release, contain the chemical re-lease, evacuate away from the chemical re-lease, or clean up the chemical release. Wemake a problem into the next, more certain,pursuit in Figure 2.2.3.5.

EOOs must address the need for rich informa-tion (e.g., complex, on-the-scene, oral com-munication) and the fact that scrutiny andaccountability require simple, structured andemotionless information interpretation (e.g.,written status boards and press releases).

EOOs need to address perplexity management to achieve success; that is, they mustprepare information sources and delivery systems, the decision environment and thedecision makers, and use management tools to achieve high information richness toassist the decision makers in reducing uncertainty by driving ill-defined or emergencyconditions toward well-defined or normal operating conditions.


2.2.3.5. CONCEPT OF PERPLEXITY MANAGEMENT

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Uncertainty

PERPLEXITY

PROBLEM

PROGRAM

PROJECT

PROCESS

– Can specify neither the start nor the end.

– Can specify the start but not the end.

– Know the start and have qualitative fix for the end.

– Know the start and have specifications for the end.

– Repeatedly achieve the same known end.

Figure 2.2.3.5. EOOs address the uncertain end of the spectrum of management pursuits, whereasthe tools we know best are proven in our routine operations at the lower end of the spectrum.

So what tools can EOOs provide to support thefour characteristic activities in emergencymanagement? How about the managementtools we use every day in routine operations?We use Management by Objectives (MBOs)in managing production and Critical PathMethod (CPM) in managing projects. (Pro-duction, or processes, and projects are the twomost certain management pursuits in Figure2.2.3.5.) MBOs and CPM require knowingwhat the end of the management pursuit is(WWWTB). So do two other tools we useevery day: life-cycle costing and resourceloading. In processes and projects we knowthe end (WWWTB). But perplexities andproblems aren’t like that. In short, the tools welearn to use for success in the processes andprojects of our routine operations will notnecessarily work for emergency preparedness,response, recovery, and mitigation. (They will

work, however, for a project like building anEmergency Operations Center.) Most toolsfor process and project management were nei-ther designed nor tested against the uniquecharacteristics of perplexity management.

Two traditional approaches for finding toolsthat will work for emergency preparedness,response, recovery, and mitigation are: 1) totry tools we use in routine operations (with thepotential for failure just discussed) and 2) todevelop any tool we perceive to be well-quali-fied for emergency management. The newapproach is to address emergency prepared-ness, response, recovery, and mitigation bydeveloping a comprehensive, integrated set ofsynergistic tools, all of which incorporate theinformation requirements and unique charac-teristics of perplexity management.

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Understanding what constraints are unique to perplexity management and system-atically applying these constraints to the fundamental principles underlying man-agement tools proven in process and project management is the first step inunderstanding how to build an Integrated Perplexity Management System.

We manage emergency preparedness, re-sponse, recovery, and mitigation by using in-formation media capable of providing highinformation richness to reduce equivocality(differing interpretations). That is, we want towork down the spectrum to reduce the equivo-cality in what we manage, and work up thespectrum to increase the capacity of our man-agement tools in providing rich information inuncertain conditions. EOOs want tools formanaging uncertain conditions that are at leastas effective as those they use for normal opera-tions.

Management tools convert data to informa-tion. Decision makers convert information toactions. We often suffer from a data-rich,information-poor situation because we don’tunderstand what information we need for thedecisions we make. We end up with notenough good information from credible pri-mary sources.

We can, however, look at tools successful inroutine operations, the processes and projectsat the lower end of the uncertainty spectrum inFigure 2.2.3.6. and identify five types of man-agement tools effective in converting data toinformation: 1) relationships and structures;2) methods; 3) guides and rules; 4) precedents;and 5) the data-to-information chain (Module1.4.2.6.3.). These management tool types areshown across the top of Figure 2.2.3.6. Ex-amples of the types (together with emergencyresponse examples) are: 1) organizationalstructure (EMT organization), 2) hazard analy-

sis (e.g., plume model), 3) plans or procedures,4) social system or culture, and 5) manage-ment information system.

The effective tools in certain managementpursuits (e.g., projects) are those that havebeen heavily constrained to meet the specificneeds of the decision maker. But, the more amanagement tool is constrained to do a jobwell in a specific situation, the less useful thattool will be when used for a different situation.

Let’s consider a single management tool like acalendar. To make the calendar work well,Manager A heavily constrains his or her calen-dar to be pocket-sized, to have a page for eachmonth, and to show weekly staff meetings,travel dates, important milestones, and muchmore. However, this calendar won’t workvery well for Manager B, who wants a wallcalendar showing a year at a glance. We needto remove the constraints of Manager A, gen-erate the general principles of a calendar, andapply the constraints of Manager B.

Starting with management tools that are suc-cessful for projects or processes is smart, be-cause managers have invested a large amountof time and effort in developing and under-standing these tools. But, similar to the calen-dar example, we believe tools heavily con-strained to work well for projects won’t neces-sarily work well for perplexities. We have toremove the project constraints, identify thegeneral principles, and apply the constraintsspecific to perplexities.


2.2.3.6. A SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MANAGING PERPLEXITIES

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proven management tools constrained for pro-cesses and projects, carefully investigate andstrip away the constraints to reveal the basicmanagement principle the tool was conceivedto support, and then develop new constraintsbased on our research into perplexity manage-ment. The result will be a new tool reflectingthe basic principle constrained to perplexitymanagement.

The key to working tools up the spectrum inFigure 2.2.3.6. is that we can consider a com-prehensive synergistic set of tools through thecomplementary management principles thepackage represents, and constrain this set toperplexities; thus we will have an IPMS.

CPM

Relationshipsand Structures Methods

Guidesand Rules Precedents

Data-to-information-chain

?

Uncertainty

PERPLEXITY

PROBLEM

PROGRAM

PROJECT

PROCESS

Bottleneck

Tool Types

Figure 2.2.3.6. The IPMS will include an integrated set of tools covering the five tool types andinvestigated by identifying and using tools we have in normal operations, detecting the basicmanagement principles upon which they are based, and remodeling the perplexity management toolbased on the principle and constrained to perplexities.

For the Critical Path Method example dis-cussed in Module 2.2.3.5., the constraint forusing CPM in projects is that projects have adefined and known end. By removing theconstraint, we discover the basic manage-ment principle of focusing management at-tention on bottlenecks. Now we have tofigure out how to constrain managing bottle-necks for perplexities, because emergencymanagers have bottlenecks too. In effect,we’re working from using CPM as a structuretool for projects, up the uncertainty spectrumto perplexities, as shown in Figure 2.2.3.6.

The way to develop an Integrated PerplexityManagement System (IPMS) is to start with

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Tools that make up the IPMS, no matter how effective or efficient, are only asvaluable as their ability to reduce the amount of time programmable decisionscompete for an emergency response manager’s attention.

Behind the IPMS is the realization that for theEMT to be most effective in times of emer-gency, EOOs must be effective both in times ofcalm and in times of emergency. EOOs workin process, project, and program pursuits, aswell as in perplexity and problem pursuits. Theinformation needed for managing pursuits atone end of the spectrum is different from infor-mation needed at the other. When managing atthe certain end of the spectrum, decisions arecalled programmable (Herbert A. Simon, “TheExecutive as Decision Maker,” The New Sci-ence of Management Decision, Harper andBrothers, 1960, pp. 1-8.) and are best made onclear, structured, logical, and verified informa-tion. At the uncertain end of the spectrum, non-programmable decisions (Simon, 1960) aremade based on experience, judgment, and intu-ition. The information supporting these basesis ambiguous, changing, and incomplete. EOOsmust manage information for both program-mable and non-programmable decisions in allactivities to affect the mix of programmableand non-programmable decisions during re-sponse.

The difficulty of managing the mix of pro-grammable and non-programmable decisionsin emergency preparedness, response, recov-ery, and mitigation activities is most acuteduring response because of the relative ur-gency of tasks. By managing the mix duringother activities and linking the programmabledecisions and information through the activi-ties, EOOs manage the mix in response.

To support these differences in decision mak-ing and different information requirementsduring response, the IPMS must have a two-

pronged approach: 1) make the clear, struc-tured, logical, and verified information as crisp,focused, and accessible as possible, 2) makebest use of the increased time for non-pro-grammable decisions by improving and sup-porting the access, storage, retrieval, integra-tion, and portrayal of information for deci-sions that count the most and are scrutinized soclosely.

Figure 2.2.3.7. illustrates the objective of theIPMS. Because of the high uncertainty andimportance of external information during theresponse activity, EMT personnel need to spendmost of their time concentrating on the non-programmable decisions (part (a) of Figure2.2.3.7.) and to have the right information tosupport non-programmable decisions. But,often EMT personnel don’t have enough time.Because of ineffective and inefficient infor-mation concepts and tools supporting pro-grammable decisions, EMT personnel oftenspend too much time on programmable deci-sions (as shown in part (b) of Figure 2.2.3.7.).One crucial problem is that the size of the piesin parts (a), (b), and (c) of Figure 2.2.3.7 isfixed. We aren’t going to generate more timefor EMT personnel, we can only help themwith the time they have. Part (c) of Figure2.2.3.7. shows if we can reduce the time de-manded by programmable decisions even asmall amount, the increase in time availablefor crucial non-programmable decisions canbe increased several-fold.

In developing emergency management tools,we need to know how we can slice the piebetter and how we can make best use of the piewe have. We must learn the environments and


2.2.3.7. THE STRUCTURE BEHIND THE IPMS

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judgmental responses for: 1) bringing theright decision makers together in the rightenvironment supported by the best availableinformation and 2) using planning and infor-mation tools before, during, and after the emer-gency condition to reduce the distractions andequivocality posed by the myriad small-but-necessary issues on the decision maker’s at-tention. In short, EMT personnel must sort outthe urgent from the important.

support for programmable decisions before,during, and after an emergency condition. Weneed to find and address the processes andprojects in emergency management, especiallyin mitigation and recovery, so EMT personnelcan concentrate on the problems in emergencymanagement.

Barnard (1938) and later Simon (1987) foundthat in decision-demanding situations (uncer-tain end of spectrum) we use intuitive and

non-programmable programmable programmable

What EMTsneed

(a)

What EMTshave

(b)

What we want to learn how to do

(c)

programmable non-programmable non-programmable

Figure 2.2.3.7. During emergency response, EMTs need as much time as possible for dealing withnon-programmable decisions, but they have so many urgent programmable decisions the importantnon-programmable decisions get squeezed out of the time available. We want to learn how toincrease time for non-programmable decisions showing the huge leverage of good tools forprogrammable decisions.

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The role of the integrator is one of the most difficult, important, and ill-defined rolesin perplexity management because of the variety of activities and the diversity ofinformation needing coordination at many levels of the organizational complex.

EOOs provide continuity throughout the fouremergency management activities of prepared-ness, response, recovery, and mitigation. TheEOO is the one organization involved in allemergency activities and functions and in alltypes of incidents. It’s responsible for main-taining continuity from one activity to anotherwhen needed. The EOO also ensures thatlessons learned from one type of emergencyare evaluated and, where appropriate, are in-corporated into the management tools for en-tirely different types of emergencies. In short,the EOO facilitates the management of emer-gencies.

The most demanding part of the EOO’s re-sponsibility is to balance the leaky roof prob-lem mentioned in Module 2.2.3.4. That is, theEOO enters into a maintenance role when themanagement tools are in place. This roleinstantly changes when an incident occursfrom that of routine maintenance and opera-tions to full organizational and resource sup-port. Maintaining the balance between themaintenance and development role and thefull-on role required by an incident highlightsthe EOOs role as integrator.

We've shown the emergency management ac-tivities to be interdependent (Figure 2.2.3.4.).The EOO has the ultimate responsibility forintegrating the interdependent activities whilemeeting the sharply changing information re-quirements of line organizations and EMTs.As indicated in Module 2.2.3.3., the emer-gency manager is like a stage director who setsthe stage, the actors, and support people byproducing, coordinating, and directing all

props, cues, script, lighting, sound, and re-hearsals for a successful production.

The EOO needs much more than managementtools aimed at a specific need in one activity orone incident type; it needs an integrated pack-age of tools able to carry over from one activityor incident to another and to selectively fitwhatever situation arises. This selectivity,synergy, and focus demands a comprehen-sively thought-out, tested, and generalized setof management tools.

EOOs have two information tasks that, duringemergency response, compete for the sametime and resources. One information task is toreduce equivocality so the organization sharesa common view of events and alternatives. Wecall this task external interpretation (Weick,1979). The other task is to process enoughinformation to coordinate the organization’sactivities and manage performance. We callthis task internal coordination (Galbraith,1973). EOOs in the role of integrator providemedia high in information richness to reduceequivocality and large amounts of informationto handle interdependence in the organization.Effective integration and portrayal of infor-mation facilitates both external interpretationand internal coordination.

Multiple emergencies bring a special problemin that we must be able to balance separatingrapidly-changing information about more thanone event to partition and focus resources withcombining the information to reduce redun-dancy and make most effective use of theresources we have—including the time and


2.2.3.8. THE EOO'S ROLE AS INTEGRATOR

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energy of the EMT.

The integrator role underscores the impor-tance of getting, storing, and portraying justthe right information for a given situation inany emergency management activity and anyincident. EOOs must maintain data integritythroughout an organizationally and geographi-cally disparate group of managers and to re-duce conflicting information, decisions, andactions.

Figure 2.2.3.8. shows the inter-relationship ofall four emergency management activities. InFigure 2.2.3.8. the EOO is responsible forincreasing the time available to EMTs for non-programmable decisions in emergency man-agement activities. The EOO does this byeffectively integrating and portraying infor-mation from tools. Thus, the EOO supportsEMTs well despite the increased demandsupon it (e.g., requirements for more openness,and strict compliance).

Opennessrequirements

Greatcomplexity Compliance

Short timeintervals Centralization

MITIGATION

RESPONSE RECOVERY

PREPAREDNESS

EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION AND PORTRAYAL

INFORMATION FROM TOOLS THROUGH METHODS

non-programmable

non-programmable

non-programmable

non-programmable

programmable

programmableprogrammable

programmable

Figure 2.2.3.8. By making best use of time for programmable decisions during all four emergencymanagement activities, EOOs can make significant improvements in the time EMTs have available.

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When dealing with crises related to a project, the project manager must haveavailable and be able to use emergency management tools, which are somewhatdifferent from the project management tools he or she is familiar with.

This module is adapted from Kurstedt, H. A.,Jr., G. R. Patzak, L. A. Mallak, and E. M.Howard, “Crises Amidst Project Management:Strategies for Managing Better, ” Proceedingsof the 11th INTERNET World Congress onProject Management, June 1992, Vol. 2, pp.35-45.

Project managers can’t always foresee everycontingency when planning and managing theirprojects. Many spurious events affectingproject milestones and resource allocationscan surface once the project is underway.Experienced project managers find crises, mis-communications, mistakes, oversights, anddisasters must be managed as part of success-ful project management. Project managersneed effective tools for managing crises. Theseare tools project managers may not use every-day, yet they need these tools to serve them intime of an emergency.

The scope of application for emergency man-agement tools will vary based on the size of theproject. The tools can be quite elaborate, suchas volumes for a risk analysis or reserved spacefor an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)with many dedicated phone lines. The toolscan also be quite simple, such as a 1-2 page listof risks in priority order or a designated officeor conference room (to function as a mini-EOC) with the ability to bring in portablephones. All the tools should be used, even ifjust in simple form. In a small project, usingone hour of a staff meeting to assign roles inthe event of a crisis may suffice for moreelaborate means (i.e., formal EOC) in a largerproject. The elaborateness of tools should bebalanced with the cost and time required for

preparation.

Projects have characteristics that make thedesign and preparation of elaborate tools diffi-cult. First, many projects lack the permanenceof a large plant, mine, or government installa-tion. Second, emergencies in smaller projectstend to be more constrained to the site, whilelarger projects must deal with emergencies ofgreater scope and impact, such as chemicaland radiological releases. Third, in a plant, alarge number of people are affected by anemergency—especially the public as opposedto the workers. When the public or a largenumber of workers are involved, theorganization’s confidence in safe operationshas a heavy influence, and this begets elabo-rateness. A simple tool can afford us most ofthe protection we need (for example, 70% ofmaximum), while a more elaborate tool willbuy us more confidence and protection (per-haps up to 99% of maximum). The moreelaborate tool is worth the investment whenconfidence is at stake.

I’ve chosen five types of tools used primarilyin emergency management to help projectmanagers manage their crises better. I’ll de-scribe and show how to apply: 1) risk analysisand vulnerability assessment, 2) logic charts,3) tabletop exercises, 4) notification, and 5)crisis organization and communication.

Risk Analysis and Vulnerability AssessmentThe primary tool for mitigation is risk analy-sis. Risk analysis helps us find out: 1) whatcan go wrong, 2) what’s most probable, and 3)what has the greatest impact. The combina-tion of an event’s probability of occurrence


2.2.3.9. CRISES AMIDST PROJECT MANAGEMENT

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fore, when the crisis happens, the project man-ager has thought about the crisis and what canbe affected. Plans incorporating this thinkinghelp the project manager be ready when thecrisis occurs and do what is necessary to fix it.If a manager is responsible for a project, he orshe should require someone to conduct a riskanalysis. The risk analysis improves earlyrecognition of warning signs; the vulnerabilityassessment helps identify whom to notify andhow to start support to them early.

Logic ChartsLogic charts employ project flow logic toshow the project flow with all dependencies inan extremely flexible, time-scale independentdiagram. Logic charts are a form of expertsystem because they embody the decisionmaking knowledge of the expert in a systemthat can be followed procedurally. Projectflow logic is the basis for any personal com-puter-assisted project management tool.Project managers are skilled at charting. But,in times of crisis, the charts used are different.

When a crisis occurs, people need proceduresto follow. Logic charts form the basis forwriting these procedures. In project manage-ment, the most commonly used charts areGantt charts for looking at activities againsttime and networks for looking at precedence.Emergency logic charts depend heavily onlogic because of branching due to chainedcontingencies (e.g., “if event X and event Yhappened, then event Z is likely”).

Logic charts force project managers to thinkthrough the critical decisions necessary in acrisis. Project managers won’t have time to gothrough the logic chart when the actual emer-gency occurs—we’re counting on the projectmanager learning from the preparation andthinking required to construct a logic chart andfeeding this into or reinforcing it through atabletop exercise (described later). When thecrisis occurs, the project manager isn’t think-

and severity of consequences (e.g., catastrophicfailure) determines priorities. Incident analy-sis can also help us understand the lessonslearned in an actual crisis and develop plans tomitigate the effects of similar incidents in thefuture.

One key strategy for managing better is toproperly prepare for crises in projects and takesteps to reduce the occurrences of crises. En-gineering analyses support this process of riskanalysis and make up the quantitative portionof mitigation. Cause-and-effect analyses makeup the qualitative portion of mitigation andhelp us assess the systematic effects both for-ward and backward.

In emergency management, we use risk analy-sis to find out the risks beforehand. My use ofrisk analysis should be differentiated from aprobabilistic risk analysis. Establishing theconsequences of accidents or incidents by de-terministic or risk analysis provides effectivetools in emergency management. In projectmanagement, we concentrate on planning andsequencing activities to maximize our effi-ciencies and effectively schedule resources.

Project managers need to sit down and ask“What can go wrong with my project?” Onceidentified, the project manager has a list ofrisks associated with a particular project—theoutput of a risk analysis. Then they should ask,“Which of these risks are most likely to hap-pen?” and “Which of these will have the great-est impact?” “On what or whom?” This lastquestion implies the vulnerability of the orga-nization to the identified risks. Project manag-ers should develop plans which use the datafrom a risk analysis to prepare them and theirorganizations for the broadest range of emer-gencies. Risk analyses support planning byhelping project managers pick the most prob-able and most severe events combined with avulnerability assessment to see who or what isvulnerable and what will be affected. There-

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ing as clearly as usual, and the more that’s beendone before the crisis occurs, the better actionthe project manager can take.

Tabletop ExercisesTabletops and other exercises use the informa-tion from the risk analysis in the mitigationphase to simulate the decision making andaction taking occurring in an actual crisis. Atabletop is where we bring a group of peopletogether and they act out the roles for a givenscenario. These same techniques can helpproject managers prepare for possible crisesthat may occur in their projects.

The events or crises occurring to project man-agers won’t be the things we’re tracking. It’swhat we don’t track that will go wrong. Theneed for tracking illustrates the use of a struc-tured management process to catch the smallproblems through a thorough, systematic, andfrequent review of relevant indicators(Kurstedt, Mallak, & Pacifici, 1992).

Tabletops are generally used in the beginningand focus on managerial information flows—who we talk to, what we do, who needs whatinformation, etc. Issues surface in tabletops.Tabletops are a training device used to elicitunderstanding by carefully guiding the par-ticipants through a simulated emergency re-quiring a response. Although tabletops aretypically less expensive to conduct than drillsor field exercises, they cannot substitute forthe simulation of actual emergency eventsavailable through drills and exercises.

I recommend conducting tabletop exercisesevery quarter to keep the emergency plans,procedures, and necessary thinking fresh inproject managers’ minds. Thinking throughthe decisions beforehand in an evaluative ses-sion such as a tabletop pays off when the realcrisis occurs.

Tabletop exercises force managers to think

through the decisions made during a crisis inadvance, thereby reducing the need for deci-sion making during the crisis and reducing thetime needed to make those decisions. “Atabletop is accomplished in controlled phasesto allow discrete, individual answers, whichfocuses group attention on each point andthereby promotes a common understanding ofroles and responsibilities and the entire re-sponse sequence by all participants” (Walker& Middleman, 1988). The tabletop exercise isa versatile tool that can be applied to all phasesof project management. The overarching ben-efit of tabletops is they require response sys-tem elements to pay attention both duringdevelopment and as the system evolves (Walker& Middleman, 1988).

NotificationEmergency managers often have elaborateplans for notification in the event of an emer-gency. They’ve thought out and provided forconsensus decisions on who to notify and inwhat order. Project managers, once they havecompleted a risk analysis and identified thetypes of crises that may occur, should convenea group of representatives from the affectedparties (e.g., neighborhood, city council, me-dia, police, fire, medical, rescue squad) tocome to a consensus on who should be notifiedand in what order they should be notified. Thepolitical consequences of calling in the wrongsequence can be severe and each party shouldknow and agree on its standing in the notifica-tion.

Crisis Organization and CommunicationCrisis organization and communication con-cerns internal communication about the crisiswhile the crisis is occurring. Communicationsto and from the field must be reliable andquick. The technologies chosen for communi-cation must be robust to crisis conditions andmust have enough range to cover the distancebetween the emergency operations office andthe furthest point in the field from which we’d

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terfere, 5) the distances we want covered bysuch a system, and 6) what to do in the event ofsystem failure (e.g., backup systems, batterypower). Consideration of these issues before-hand will increase the likelihood of communi-cation needs being met during the crisis.

A crisis communication system is only asstrong as its weakest link. If part of thecommunication system involves hand-carriedmessages, then electronic sophistication willonly help us marginally. We should planahead to ensure the communication systemmeets our needs. We should test the commu-nication system frequently to ensure it worksproperly.

A related type of communication, risk com-munication with the public, plays a significantrole in managing the risks and perceived risksassociated with a project. Effective risk com-munication to the public is critical. The publicmust feel they have some influence over man-aging or controlling the risk conditions. Thepublic must have the feeling that they’ve sup-plied input considered by project managers intheir risk analyses. The public must be invitedand empowered to participate in decisions thataffect them. During a crisis, the project man-ager must put good information in the public’shands immediately (a public information task).For large projects, the project manager orspokesperson should have a place (not theEOC) to meet with the media and other publicstakeholders.

expect to receive communications.

An emergency operations center (EOC) coor-dinates and organizes communications andinformation to and from the field. Each personhas a telephone, often with direct access to keyresponse units. For example, the medicalperson may have a direct line to the hospitaland the technical person’s telephone may belinked to the laboratory.

A single status board gives everybody thesame information at the same time at the sameplace. This reduces equivocality and improvesquality of response. The EOC houses backupinformation, such as slides of the facility. TheEOC gives managers rapid access to manydifferent types of information, based on theexpert models, to support real-time decisionmaking throughout the course of a complexproject.

When the crisis occurs, those who respondmust know their roles and responsibilities andlearn where to go to exercise them. Theresponsible people are pre-identified as anemergency management team (EMT) and theygather in the EOC to respond in ways they’velearned and exercised before.

An effective crisis communication system de-sign will take into account: 1) who must talkto whom, 2) how they should communicate, 3)what the requirements are for speed of com-munication, 4) how potential crises might in-

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To manage crises better, the project manager needs to adapt emergency man-agement tools and practices for his or her use and fit those tools and practicesto the characteristics of his or her project.

This module is adapted from Kurstedt, H. A.,Jr., G. R. Patzak, L. A. Mallak, and E. M.Howard, “Crises Amidst Project Management:Strategies for Managing Better, ” Proceedingsof the 11th INTERNET World Congress onProject Management, June 1992, Vol. 2, pp.35-45.

While I don’t have a closed set of comprehen-sive strategies to offer other project managersto manage crises better, I do have severalrecommendations I can offer based on myexperience in emergency management. Con-sidering the uncertainty involved in crisis man-agement, I would be wary of any closed set ofstrategies. Crisis management, by definition,is perplexing, constantly changing, full of un-certainties, and challenging to any manager,especially the project manager. There is nosimple solution to the complex problems posedby crises. Here are my recommendations.

1. Even for small projects, assign the job ofdeveloping at least a two-page risk analy-sis and vulnerability assessment before theproject begins.

2. Assign somebody the job of producing anotification sequence.

3. Use logic charts to design procedures thatwon’t go awry during a crisis.

4. Use tabletop exercises because few peoplewill look at a logic chart or even a proce-dure when a crisis occurs. Project manag-ers will depend on what they’ve practiced,


2.2.3.10. STRATEGIES FOR PROJECT MANAGERS TO MANAGE CRISESBETTER

and this underscores the need and value oftabletops.

5. Decide on a gathering place for decisionmakers to congregate in the event of acrisis. Backup gathering places should bearranged in case the primary gatheringplace is involved in the crisis. Gatheringsites should have information and commu-nication systems ready for immediate use.

6. Establish authority for crisis managementbefore the crisis. The project managerisn’t always the best emergency manager,so choose a person who has greatest knowl-edge of the operational issues associatedwith the crisis.

7. Establish an emergency operations center(EOC) and an emergency managementteam (EMT). The EOC should coordinatethe communications to and from the fieldand provide information on key indicatorsof the crisis. The EMT mobilizes at thecrisis onset to provide specialized person-nel and resources for effective responseand to minimize the consequences of thecrisis.

8. Follow the steps used by emergency man-agers to progress from risk analysis toemergency management: risk analysis,problem identification, scenario develop-ment, response training, and emergencyoperations.

9. Design effective, accurate, and timely feed-

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back systems to provide early warningsigns of failure and impending crises. Astructured management process mentionedearlier can help in focusing attention onregular tracking of relevant and criticalindicators to surface the little problemsbefore they become big ones.

10. Be mindful of the social and political con-sequences of crises or events. Critics, orstakeholders, bear significant influence onproject success regardless what the indica-tors of cost, schedule, and quality show.Learn how to satisfy stakeholders (cf.Mallak, Patzak, & Kurstedt, 1991). Iden-tify one spokesperson as a liaison with thepublic and prepare a procedure for quickdissemination of information to all affectedparties.

11. Become sensitive to indicators of impend-ing project failure. Pay special attention tountracked indicators because these are themost likely to go wrong. Develop anten-nae and know when the project is goingwrong.

12. Adopt a systems view and separate thecrisis from the origin of the crisis. Con-sider the basic good performance prin-ciples now popularized as total qualitymanagement. Look forward and back-ward to assess the potential overall effectsof the crisis.

13. Choose a project manager indigenous tothe country where the project is being

conducted. An indigenous project man-ager will be sensitive to the social andpolitical aspects of the project and its pe-ripheral issues and will catch more prob-lems while they’re small or otherwise un-detectable to the outsider.

A valuable contribution of a professional soci-ety or association (at the committee level)would be to organize a team to design generictools with directions for customizing each toolto a specific project manager’s needs. I be-lieve such a committee would be the appropri-ate group for effective tool design becausethey wouldn’t have the proprietary concernsthat a corporate consortium would have. Thesetools, such as a checklist for producing a rank-ordered risk analysis, wouldn’t give organiza-tions a competitive advantage—they would beshareable commodities. The development ofgeneric tools would improve the quality, ac-cess, and cost of emergency management toolsused in project management. All organiza-tions must prepare themselves for potentialemergencies, and this preparation is scruti-nized by the public who expect socially re-sponsible corporate behavior.

These are just a few of my recommendationsor strategies for project managers to managetheir crises better. The more we focus on themitigation and preparedness phases of theemergency management model, the less we’llhave to deal with the response and recoveryphases. And that, I believe, is the best strategyfor managing better.

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What we typically term emergency manage-ment tools are tools we use to support deci-sions in uncertain pursuits: perplexities andproblems. Once we determine a domain ofresponsibility is a perplexity or problem, wehave an indication we should customize typi-cal emergency management tools to that do-main. This module addresses a situation wherea holding company (I call it Holding Com-pany) is responsible for a number of divisions,each of which is responsible to operate a gov-ernment reservation. (I call the divisionsHerbert, Sandy, Frances, William, Wesley,and Ingrid.) The term GOCO (GovernmentOwned-Contractor Operated) stands for anorganization that operates a government site. Icall a previous GOCO at the Sandy site theChemical Company. I call a comparable sitenot the responsibility of the Holding CompanyRonald. The following discussion explains areal situation and how we should distinguishwhere emergency-management-type tools(tools designed for problems or perplexities)will help in situations not typically consideredemergencies. The discussion is adapted froma letter written to the Holding Company per-son responsible for all the GOCO sites whoasked the question: How do I distinguish man-agement approaches among such vastly dif-ferent sites?

Summary of the Philosophical PerspectiveA crisp statement of the difference in manage-ment challenges among the Holding CompanyGOCO sites is: The sites differ in degree ofuncertainty. Herbert (and Sandy) are rela-tively more uncertain than Frances, William,Wesley, and Ingrid. I define uncertainty as theratio of the information you need for managing

well to the information you have. So, Herberthas a greater disparity between what you needand have than do the others. More obviouscauses of uncertainty at Herbert (higher num-ber of workers, diversity of operations, scru-tiny, etc.) increase the numerator of the ratio.Less obvious causes of uncertainty (lowerquality information systems, communication,networks, etc.) decrease the denominator ofthe ratio.

The easy answer to the more uncertain chal-lenges (i.e., Herbert) is to improve informationrichness up and down the line through bettercommunications and networking, thereby driv-ing up the information you have in relation tothe information you need. The difficult an-swer to the more uncertain challenges is how toimprove information richness. The how re-lates to management tools we use to provideinformation for decision making. Our more-familiar management tools have been devel-oped for managing relatively more-certain re-sponsibilities, like projects and processes.These should work well for Wesley and Ingridand perhaps for Frances and William. But tomanage Herbert, you need management toolssimilar to those that work for more-uncertainresponsibilities, like emergencies or researchand development programs. My discussionwill focus on tools for 1) improving informa-tion and communication, 2) designing com-plex organizations, and 3) responding tochronic emergencies.

GOCO Sites and UncertaintyConsider the Holding Company GOCO siteson an uncertainty scale shown in Figure2.2.3.11.1. As we evaluate each site more,


2.2.3.11. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT TOOLS APPLIED TO DIFFICULTMANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

When we discover our domain is a perplexity, we then know we need to adaptemergency management tools to help us manage.

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knowing where our management responsibil-ity is on the scale in Figure 2.2.3.11.3., we getclues to the types of management tools weneed and how to best use them.

Causes of UncertaintyLet’s examine the sources of uncertainty at theHerbert site. Start with three factors affectingthe numerator in the ratio of information youneed to information you have. First, the num-ber of employees you manage at Herbert islarge. The increase in number of interactionsand therefore the decrease in quality of com-munication changes significantly as you in-crease people. Second, the diversity of opera-tions you manage at Herbert is large. There aremany different simultaneous operations tomanage at Herbert, while sites like Williamand Ingrid are more focused toward a singlemission. Third, the scrutiny you receive fromthe government and relevant stakeholders atthe Herbert site is large. The Holding Com-pany has better relations with stakeholdersaround the Ingrid site than they do aroundFrances or Herbert. Factors like these influ-ence each other. For example, great scrutinyof diverse operations means the media’s pen-etration into a problem in one operation atHerbert affects public opinion about an en-tirely different operation at the Herbert site.

Management Tools for UncertaintyI believe the Holding Company’s GOCO sitesrange from Herbert being more like a problemto Ingrid being more like a project as shown inFigure 2.2.3.11.4.

The management tools that work for perplexi-ties and problems that we can consider using ormodifying for Herbert are: risk assessment,vulnerability analysis, crisis communications,notification schemes, Emergency OperationsCenter (EOC), table-top exercises, and others.As an example, we can translate the idea of anotification scheme into the need for rapid andeffective dissemination of information to the

we’ll improve our guess of the relative posi-tion of the sites on this scale.

Now consider management’s problem-solv-ing task as knowing 1) where we are (WWA),2) where we want to be (WWWTB), and 3)how to get there (HTGT). Our involvementwith different management responsibilitiessuggests the combinations of knowledge fordealing with uncertainty shown in Figure2.2.3.11.2.

I’ve coined terms for the five combinations ofknowledge in Figure 2.2.3.11.2. and shownthese terms in Figure 2.2.3.11.3.

The key point in all of this is: The managementtools managers need for each of these differentpursuits (perplexity, problem, etc.) are differ-ent; and, of course, vastly different at theextremes. So, tools for managing perplexities(where the ratio for uncertainty is high) arevery different from tools for managing pro-cesses (where the ratio for uncertainty is low).

For any given pursuit, to be successful, we usewell-suited management tools to drive thepursuit to a more-certain condition. For ex-ample, in a perplexity, we consider and pre-pare for potential problems. (We help preparefor an unknown emergency by writing plansfor alternative possible occurrences and ourresponses to them.) Likewise in a research anddevelopment program, we render the programinto one or more projects to get the understand-ing and results we want. Therefore, if theHerbert site is more like a problem, we want touse well-suited tools to render it more like aresearch and development program, then oneor more projects, and ultimately a process.

Successful leadership styles differ for the pur-suits. Task-oriented leadership is more effec-tive at the top and bottom of the scale forpursuits, and relationship-oriented leadershipis more effective in the middle. In short, by

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tures that can either reduce the need for infor-mation or increase the capacity to provideinformation, either of which would contributeto improving the uncertainty ratio throughorganizational design. To reduce the need forinformation, we can create slack resources orset up self-contained tasks. To increase thecapacity to provide information, we can de-velop vertical information systems or createlateral relations. The easiest thing to do withthe greatest return is to create lateral relations.And when we consider affinity groups, fieldcoordination meetings, or other interactionsincreasing communication across the organi-zational hierarchy, we’re considering creationof lateral relations. One of the objectives of theinfamous matrix organization is to have amulti-directional organization so more infor-mation flows more quickly in more directionsto the people who need the information.

The challenge in implementing lateral rela-tions is two-fold. The first is that you have togather, store, retrieve, and disseminate richinformation quickly and effectively, whichmeans you must have good support systems.The second is that once you start dancing witha bear you can’t quit just because you’re tired.That is, if you set up lateral relations or use afield coordination meeting, you must get sup-port systems in place and you must followthrough or you’ll suffer backlash. One man-agement tool for effectively helping manageany pursuit is organizational structure, but thecharacteristics you place in the organizationalstructure must be designed to accomplish whatyou want. For the Herbert site, we want goodand timely communication of rich informationto the people who need it.

The Holding Company’s Management Per-spectivesOne of the types of tools we consider forincreasing information richness and commu-nication is interactions for lateral relations—one-on-one, group, informal, and/or formalinteractions. As we consider lateral relations,

right people in the right sequence about theright subjects, which is another way of sayingnotification in a timely fashion. You may needsuch a tool at Herbert. As an example ofanother tool, the Management Systems Labo-ratories at Virginia Tech (MSL) is building anemergency-operations-center-like facility,called an Intelligent Information Center, tosupport large-scale project management.

In learning about managing emergencies,we’ve found some are acute (poof emergen-cies) and some are chronic (plume emergen-cies). The plume emergency applications aremore in tune with Herbert. These tools empha-size information richness and communicationneeded for plume emergencies.

Dealing with Interaction and Communica-tionAs we consider specific tools and tasks forincreasing information richness and commu-nication for Holding Company managementand for the Holding Company’s stakeholders,we ask the following sorts of questions. Howis the communication best done? What infor-mation is rich? Communicate with whom?How often? For what purpose? We sortquestions like these into what we believe is aclosed set by using Figure 2.2.3.11.5. Theprecipitator motivates or causes a need forinteraction. The purpose defines the expectedoutcome for the interaction by the people whointeract. Participation describes how peopleintend to interact on a problem of commonconcern. These five elements set up the physi-cal process for interaction and communicationwe use to get a physical product as a result ofthe interaction. As we consider tools forcommunicating rich information, often wegather people together and, in so doing, wemust factor the elements of Figure 2.2.3.11.5.into the design and use of our tools.

Organization Structures for SupportingCommunicationWe know characteristics of organization struc-

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information richness, and communicationsthrough different interactions, we’ll focus onHerbert and the special needs there. Whenthinking about the Herbert site, we’ll considerboth Herbert and Sandy to help us keep fromoverlooking something. We first look at simi-larities and differences between the Sandy andHerbert sites.

Similarities between the Herbert and SandySites

Similarities between the Herbert and Sandysites influence management strategies:

1. Herbert and Sandy have many diverse mis-sions resulting in multiple government head-quarters organizations having a vested in-terest (management and budget functions),which increases the opportunities for tur-moil, confusion, and disunity. William,Wesley, Frances, and Ingrid have singlemissions and single government headquar-ters points of contact, allowing manage-ment to be more focused and manage exter-nal factors more effectively.

2. Herbert and Sandy are more difficult tomanage than the other Holding CompanyGOCO operations because they have a muchlarger number of employees.

3. Herbert and Sandy, with large land areas,are always prospects for new governmentprojects or programs and therefore newmissions. A new project can be placed atHerbert or Sandy and be a good drive awayfrom all other projects at those sites.

4. Herbert and Sandy have many missionsfrom which they receive constant guidanceand direction from a number of federalgovernment agencies. The larger sites re-ceive more attention because they’re largerassets for the government. The new gov-ernment emphasis on centralization is a

change in the rules. In the past Herbert andSandy were more independent of day-to-day government headquarters directions.

The Holding Company needs to have uni-fied management at Herbert and at Sandy.The missions need to be separated so aproblem with one doesn’t affect another.For the public who is going to create prob-lems for these missions, how does the Hold-ing Company 1) separate them so a prob-lem with one doesn’t affect another and 2)at the same time organize the missions in aunified way?

Differences between the Herbert and SandySites

Differences between the Herbert and Sandysites also influence management strategies:

1. Herbert has traditionally been the site ofmultiple prime contractors. A few yearsago they pared down from about seven tothree. Even today, Herbert has more primecontractors than the Sandy site.

2. There is a greater degree of employee-contractor loyalty at Sandy than at Herbert.The Herbert site has historically had a turn-over in prime contractors approximatelyevery ten years. The employees have noloyalty to a contractor, but rather to the site.The employees have learned to be flexiblewhen it comes to what contractor affectstheir paychecks. By contrast, Sandy wasbuilt and operated solely by the ChemicalCompany, so it became part of the em-ployee culture to be loyal to the contractor.So far, this loyalty has carried over to theHolding Company. At Herbert, the lack ofloyalty or unity of purpose could be a bar-rier to communicating effectively.

3. Herbert is unique because of the number of“whistle blowers.” This is a reflection of

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the lack of employee trust. At Sandy andRonald, problems are dealt with internally,not in the media or a politician’s office. TheHerbert site has such a high number of theseincidents that the government agreed tosupport an independent and unbiased re-view of whistle blower complaints.

4. At the Herbert site, most of the surroundingpopulation moved to the area and has grownwith Herbert. They take interest in andscrutinize everything Herbert does. AtSandy, the surrounding population wassparse and generally poor. They have ben-efited economically from Sandy and viewSandy as a positive influence in their lives.The way Herbert and Sandy have evolvedhas caused two differences in managementstyle. First, Herbert managers must bemore involved in local community affairs.Herbert management budgets for muchlarger goodwill expenditures to their sur-rounding communities than Sandy budgetsfor theirs. Second, because the surroundingcommunities display more confidence inSandy than Herbert, there is a much greaterneed to involve stakeholders in decisions atHerbert. To make sure stakeholders par-ticipate in the right way in the process,techniques such as flow charts can be usedto plan and track stakeholder involvement.

5. The Herbert site’s mission has changedfrom production to remediation. TheHerbert people are probably having diffi-culty accepting the new role and change inmission. Employees will not enthusiasti-cally back a mission if they feel completionof the mission means they’ll lose their job.There’s a lack of understanding amonggovernment and Holding Company topmanagement on what’s necessary to retaininterest and enthusiasm for the new mis-sion. Also, the politicians in Washington,D.C. and at the state level, as well as thepublic, probably don’t have a clear under-

standing of what’s happening at Herbert.The Holding Company should work againsta “plant shutdown” mentality.

6. The reassignment of Herbert from one gov-ernmental program responsibility to an-other may be confusing to both the govern-ment and the Holding Company. They nowhave to deal with a new hierarchy of gov-ernment “landlords” and new lines of com-munication and direction.

7. The Sandy site has many groups focused onit. The Herbert site has only one grouplooking at it. That may help Herbert.

Centralizing Authority at Government Head-quarters

The government’s efforts to centralize author-ity at headquarters also presents some man-agement issues:

1. The government field office role is beingreduced and changed. Traditionally, offi-cial communication and program directionto the contractor came through the fieldoffice manager. In the past, contractorsrarely talked to government headquarterspersonnel unless they had a field officerepresentative with them. Now, as thegovernment headquarters directly commu-nicates with the contractor, the contractorasks the field office for interpretation, butthe field office may be out of the loop andmay interpret what the government head-quarters wants incorrectly.

An effort should be made to increase infor-mation shared among the Holding Com-pany, the field office, and the governmentheadquarters. There needs to be more of theright kinds of interfaces. The governmentheadquarters information should be sharedwith the field office and the Holding Com-pany. If not, the Holding Company may

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head in one direction and find out monthslater that the government headquarters haschanged direction. Also, the governmentheadquarters may be months behind onimportant issues the contractor has identi-fied. This lack of sharing of informationleads to increased opportunity for miscom-munication at all levels.

2. An effort should be made to increase face-to-face contact between the Holding Com-pany and the government headquarters. TheHolding Company needs more-direct com-munication lines at all levels of manage-ment.

3. Since the government headquarters has re-cently reorganized, there is confusion atheadquarters, and that confusion simplypasses down. There are new governmentmanagers trying to make their own mark.New relationships between the governmentand the Holding Company should be de-fined soon to result in greater stability in thegovernment management process.

4. The atmosphere of fear and suspicion be-tween the government headquarters andcontractors contributes to disunity. TheHolding Company position against the re-cent reorganization initiative by the gov-ernment further exacerbated the poor rela-tionship between the Holding Companyand government people.

Things to Be Considered

There are several things to be considered thatmight assist the Holding Company manage-ment:

1. Improve communication within the Hold-ing Company: more emphasis on the newmission at Herbert; focus on morale andunifying employees (i.e., constancy of pur-pose); drive out fear; emphasize opportuni-

ties for cooperation.

2. Improve communication with the govern-ment: focus groups; scheduled meetingsfor communication; Holding Companyrepresentative at government headquarters.

3. The Holding Company should considerbringing together one or more groups toimprove information sharing:

a. Field Coordination Meetings—bringtogether government program officials,field office managers, and Holding Com-pany officials to discuss responsibili-ties, expectations, status, and progress(programmatic and budget). Discussspecific problems and solutions. Usestatus and planning presentations fromspecific sites. These meetings wouldhelp the field office managers in theirroles as much as the Holding Company.Another purpose of these meetings is tohave the Holding Company and the gov-ernment redefine their relationships atall levels.

You should not jump right into a full-scale field coordination meeting, butrather take one step at a time. You maywant to begin by using an existing regu-larly scheduled gathering of your sitemanagers to set up the foundation or thepreliminaries to making this field coor-dination meeting concept work well.Then investigate the possibilities of gov-ernment headquarters participation.

Consider coordination meetings forHerbert, at first separate from the othersites. Contractors and government par-ticipants in these meetings have specialconsiderations different from the othersites. Then bring all sites together for ajoint coordination meeting. Perhaps theother sites should meet together prior to

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c. Quarterly Meetings—have the HoldingCompany GOCO site managers meetquarterly to discuss their problems andlessons learned. Have the meetings ro-tate among the sites, so they visit everysite every year and a half.

Once participants for the groups are identified,the real challenge is to convince the variouslevels in government headquarters that infor-mation sharing is a good thing to do.

Figure 2.2.3.11.1. We can contrast the types of management tools best suited to a particular siteby comparing the sites according to their uncertainty.

Uncertainty

Herbert

Sandy

FrancesWilliam

WesleyIngrid

the joint coordination meeting.

b. Focus Groups—maybe a group like theState and Tribal Government WorkingGroup (STGWG) to look specifically atHerbert. Talk about plans and the mis-sion of Herbert and share frustrations.Try to build trust among governmentheadquarters, the Herbert site, and localpolitical subdivisions like the Indiantribes and the state and local govern-ments.

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Figure 2.2.3.11.2. We can convert the uncertainty scale to divisions reflecting how much weknow about a domain of responsibility in terms of information needed for problem solving.

Uncertainty

don’t know WWA and WWWTB; thus don’t know HTGT

know WWA but not WWWTB; thus don’t know HTGT

know WWA and qualitatively know WWWTB; thus qualitatively know HTGT

know WWA and WWWTB specifically; thus figuring HTGT is straight-forward

know WWA, WWWTB, and repetatively do HTGT

Figure 2.2.3.11.3. The different pursuits reflect what you know and what you don’t.

Uncertainty

Perplexity

Problem

Program

Project

Process

PURSUITS

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Figure 2.2.3.11.4. The Holding Company’s sites are fit in the pursuits framework.

Uncertainty

Perplexity

Problem

Program

Project

Process

Uncertainty

Herbert

Sandy

FrancesWilliam

WesleyIngrid

Uncertainty

Herbert

Sandy

FrancesWilliam

WesleyIngrid

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Purpose

People

Participation

Problem

Process

Precipitator

Products

Figure 2.2.3.11.5. We model group interaction or communication using seven components.

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2.2.3.12. THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK.

We can manage risk by applying management system analysis and managementsystem synthesis.

This module was taken from “The Engineer’sApproach to the Management of Risk,” Ameri-can Nuclear Society’s Embedded TopicalMeeting on Risk Management.

From a management perspective, I see riskmanagement, vulnerability analysis, and riskassessment in simple terms. Risk manage-ment involves vulnerability analysis, risk as-sessment, and the relationship between thetwo. The decisions relating to where you’revulnerable and where you want to assess riskconstitute a vulnerability analysis. Moraleproblems, communication issues, and otherinfluences diverting employees’ attention fromtheir work produce areas of vulnerability. Riskassessment concerns the determination of typesand related probabilities of an emergency. Wecan’t assess risk on everything everywhere.That’s why we do a vulnerability analysisfirst—so we can focus our risk assessmentefforts on our vulnerabilities. I link vulner-ability and risk through the evaluation of theconsequences of a particular risk applied to agiven vulnerability.

In a vulnerability analysis, a manager decideswhich elements in the domain of responsibil-ity are vulnerable to the effects of any type ofpotential incident. Decisions for specifyingand quantifying the risks to which the domainis vulnerable constitute the risk assessment. Ina vulnerability analysis we identify where ourdomains are open to risk—the weaknesses.The dictionary definition of vulnerable in-cludes “open to attack or damage.” Risk, asopposed to vulnerability, suggests exposure todangerous elements or factors. The vulner-ability analysis doesn’t tell us what we’re

vulnerable to; it just tells us where we’revulnerable. I’m addressing risk managementdecisions in terms of the Management SystemModel. The risk manager will first want todelimit his or her domain of responsibility. I’lldescribe a procedure for building and usingrisk management tools based on the Manage-ment System Model (Figure 2.2.3.12.1.).

The processes for risk management are closed-loop processes. See the control loop in Figure2.2.3.12.1. We first identify where we’revulnerable (domain decision [plant in the con-trol loop]). We follow with assessing typesand probabilities of risks associated with thosevulnerabilities (disturbance decision [distur-bance in the control loop]). Then, we relatethese by examining the effect (consequences)of the risk on the situation where we firstconducted the vulnerability analysis (distur-bances on the plant in the control loop). Thelinkage between vulnerability analysis andrisk assessment is the disturbance on the plant.The disturbance is the risk and the plant iswhere you’re vulnerable. In risk management,managers use and improve vulnerability analy-ses, risk assessments, and their linkage throughtesting, evaluating, and modifying their do-mains under the consideration of a crisis toform a feedback loop (the rest of the controlloop). Later, I’ll extend the management pro-cess cycle of Plan-Do-Study-Act, so populartoday in managing quality, to risk manage-ment based on the cyclical relationship of riskmanagement processes.

Applying the Engineer’s Approach to RiskManagementI focus on two fundamental techniques used by

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management systems engineers that can helprisk managers better understand their domainsof responsibility and therefore practice higher-quality, more-comprehensive risk manage-ment. The first technique involves delimitingyour domain of responsibility to understandwhat you manage and what tools you use tomanage. I’ll introduce the Management Sys-tem Model and briefly cover the steps in-volved in management system analysis andmanagement system synthesis.

We all make decisions affecting what we man-age. By my definition, then, anyone whomakes decisions affecting what they manageis a manager. Managers must know what theymanage and what tools they use to managewith. We use the Management System Model(MSM) to define the domain of responsibilityfor an individual manager (Figure 2.2.3.12.1.).The MSM balances the interfaces between thethree components of who manages, what ismanaged, and what is used to manage. Avulnerability analysis asks you to identifywhich of your responsibilities is vulnerable.Failure to gain a good understanding of yourresponsibilities prior to the vulnerability analy-sis means you’ll overlook some vulnerabili-ties or you’ll confuse some vulnerabilities—itall starts with knowing where you’re vulner-able.

Once we’ve defined our domain, we use man-agement system analysis to build managementtools for risk management (i.e., decisions aboutvulnerability or decisions about risk). Man-agement system analysis represents a counter-clockwise progression through the MSM, start-ing at what is managed (Figure 2.2.3.12.2.).Management system analysis has five steps:1) delimit your domain, 2) determine deci-sions and actions, 3) define information fordecisions, 4) outline data for information, and5) list measurements for data. When we de-limit our domains, we carefully specify what is

in the domain and what is not. For example, ifwhat is managed is office supplies, the riskstend to be minimal: paper cuts, thumbtackstabs, etc. But if what is managed is a nuclearpower generation station, the components ofwhat we manage present known risks to healthand safety (e.g., leakage of underground wastestorage tanks; discharge of harmful effluentsinto the biosphere) that should be character-ized in a risk assessment.

In management system analysis, once we’vedelimited the domain, we should determinewhat decisions we should make and whatactions we should take to manage the domain.The range of decisions we make defines thescope of our responsibilities. We can refer toa formal job description to get an idea of whattypes of decisions are expected to be made, butthere’s usually no good substitute for askingthe incumbent or having him or her log thedecisions made and actions taken for a speci-fied period of time. Work sampling proce-dures may prove useful for collecting thesedata.

Identifying the decisions made and actionstaken in a domain leads to the next step inmanagement system analysis: determine theinformation required to support the manager’sdecision making. Determining informationrequirements to support decision making de-pends to a large part on who manages. Themanager’s cognitive style bears implicationsfor how the information should be portrayed tobest suit the manager and support decisionmaking.

Once we’ve defined the information needed tosupport the managers’s decision making, wemust outline the data needed to develop theinformation by developing the data require-ments to generate the desired information. Inmanagement system analysis, I view the whatis used to manage component as a process

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converting data into information for decisionmaking.

This leads us to the fifth management systemanalysis step—listing measurements to obtainthe data from what is managed. We mustdesign measures to capture the data we need inan efficient and timely manner.

Cycling through the management system analy-sis steps helps you build effective manage-ment tools for converting data into informa-tion. Risk managers have much to gain frommanagement system analysis if they can usethe process to mitigate crises.

Management system synthesis gives us thefunctions for using management tools. Ninefunctions, working clockwise around the MSM,characterize management system synthesis(Figure 2.2.3.12.3.). These nine functionsmake up a structured management process. Igroup the nine functions into three groups:planning functions, executing functions, andcomparing functions. Planning functions ad-dress what you want to do; executing functionsaddress what you did; and comparing func-tions address whether you did what you wantedto do.

The planning functions are: setting expecta-tions, surveying your work, and determiningindicators and reference points. Risk assess-ment and vulnerability analysis work heavilyinto the planning functions. For setting expec-tations, we try to identify what could happenand what the consequences would be. Bothrisk assessment and vulnerability analysis arevery strong in setting expectations. For sur-veying our work, we flowchart potential risksand use cause-and-effect charts for conse-

quences. Defining indicators gives us earlywarning and detection of incidents.

The executing functions include collecting andlogging data, converting data to information,and organizing and presenting information. Atabletop exercise is an example of an executingfunction. When you look at cause and effect,what you do during that incident is part of thecause-and-effect linkage. You can reduce theeffect of the cause by taking the right action.You can increase or make worse the effect ofthe cause by taking the wrong action.

The comparing functions include reviewingstatus and progress, exercising personal effec-tiveness, and verifying performance. In mycontext, comparing functions encompass learn-ing, improving, and updating risk assessmentand vulnerability analysis.

What is the engineer’s approach to risk man-agement? I say it’s Deming’s Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycle. Plan includes the manage-ment system synthesis planning functions; Doincludes the executing functions; Study in-cludes the comparing functions; and Act makesthe sequence an iterative cycle—the basis ofcontinuous performance improvement.

In risk management, vulnerability analysesand risk assessments make up the Plan. Hy-pothesizing what will happen as a result of therisks is the Do. Risk managers using tabletopexercises combine Do and Study to generateinformation to improve their risk managementprocesses. Improving the processes for deal-ing with the risk is Act. Then the cycle startsover: What is the vulnerability and risk nowthat we’ve taken action to improve our pro-cesses?

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InformationPerception

InformationPortrayal

Measurement

Data

Decisions Actions

Controller

ReferenceInput

Plant

Disturbance Input

Sensors

OutputResults

WHOMANAGES

WHAT ISMANAGED

WHAT IS USEDTO MANAGE

Figure 2.2.3.12.1. A control loop is analogous to the Management System Model.

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DETERMINE DECISIONSAND ACTIONS

DELIMIT YOURDOMAIN

LISTMEASUREMENTS

FOR DATA

OUTLINE DATAFOR INFO

DEFINE INFOFOR DECISIONS

CCW1

CCW2

CCW3

CCW4

CCW5

WHAT

WHAT WITH

WHO

Figure 2.2.3.12.2. Management system analysis has five steps working counterclockwise aroundthe MSM.

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SETTINGEXPECTATIONS

SURVEYINGYOUR WORK

COLLECTING ANDLOGGING DATA

CONVERTING DATATO INFORMATION

ORGANIZING ANDPRESENTING INFO

REVIEWING STATUSAND PROGRESS

EXERCISINGPERSONAL

EFFECTIVENESS

VERIFYINGPERFORMANCE

DETERMININGINDICATORS AND

REFERENCE POINTS

CW1

CW2

CW3

CW4

CW5

CW6

CW7

CW8

CW9

WHAT

WHAT WITH

WHO

Figure 2.2.3.12.3. Management system synthesis has nine steps working clockwise around theMSM.

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