2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected 1 Responding to the Unexpected Earthquake Case...

2/27-28/2002 NSF Workshop: Responding to Unexpected

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Responding to the Unexpected

Earthquake Case Investigation

2/27/2002


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Panel members

Howard Shrobe Art Lerner-Lam

Fred Krimgold Charles Scawthorn Frieder Seible Laura Steinberg


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Issues

Identifying inadequacies– Preparation– Response and rehabilitation– Mitigation and preparation: identification of threat

environment Cross-cutting themes

– Human resources– IT environment– Policy and legal environment– Cultural– Science and engineering research


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Themes

Policy, regulation, and jurisdiction Prior knowledge base, RT data collection IT infrastructure Human assistance and performance Organizational models (virtual, ad hoc, etc) Security Integration and transfer


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Major questions

Identifying inadequacies Overcoming inadequacies Identifying “unexpectedness”: transition from

routine to unexpected Security and open access to data Integration of RT data Role of standards Role of monitoring and surveillance


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Definition of unexpectedness

Uncertainty trajectories before, during, and after event– “non-linearity” and “discontinuity”, sensitivity

Cascading effects (include. Social) Response

– Impacts not known until after– Incorporation of information in real time: modifying

assessments– Common processes generic to all events that can trigger

action “orgware” et al. as technologies to improve

communication


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Technological challenges on execution– E.g. dynamic integration of information

Dealing with unexpected in absence of planning– Dealing without planning– Search and rescue precedents– “sensory alertness”

Capacity for rapid, flexible response– Not overdefining, but generalizing capabilities

Dealing with unexpected losses of capability Existence of generic processes speed


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Research in public choice and modifying behavior– Anticipate public choice arena– Decision making and drivers– Investment incentives

Reducing the envelope Systematic investigation of eq impacts and experience Reaction in real time, impact on choice, social science research NTSB approach Extreme pressure from public Returning the system to normalcy

– Never the same– Process of recovery lengthy– Expectations are very high


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Providing research in problem formulation Case studies Examples of success

– WTC: understood vulnerability, if not specifics– CA in ‘89 and ‘94

Highway rebuilds OEM learning curve by ‘94

Bringing different organizations together– Orgware– Administrative structures for decision making and response– Adjustable autonomy.

Models and prioritization of efforts to minimize risk, harm, etc Where are there vulnerabilities?

– Eq experience useful: land use and fault maps Resources and characterization of hazards


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Flexibility of response– Composing capabilities out of combinations

Speed of response Robustness of response Scenarios and training Info overload Redundancy of capability, but not complete distribution First response heterogeneity Interoperability Societal issues as well as technological Robustness design of infrastructure couples to robust

response.


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Characteristic design elements of infrastructure to improve robustness– Analogs in cs– Interoperation– Standards, common data elements– Cultural changes in the tech community

Information survivability Redundancy not subject to common-mode failure

– Engineering for variability– Meaningful fault models– Threat models ?

Adaptive vs. dumb threats


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Swiren

unfamiliar hazards in unexpected places (eq in NYC)

Calibration of HAZUS: modification of default database (NY study)

Need more, better modeling e.g. hurricanes (coming out)– Educate decision makers, public

Correlating eq loss to other hazard loss: more “economical” solution


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David

Better modelsExisting databaseAbility to get and incorporate new informationNot coming close to timeline in events

Traffic mgmtBuilding floorplansDeep infrastructureCollapse/ building damage data

Losing communicationsDatabases don’t exist or are not robust enough(fast, redundant)

NYC data lost, new setup.

Eq are good project because of complexity, spatial extentEvaluation for habitabilityDebris management and taskingGaps in regional operations coordination (Northridge had 60 jurisdictions)Field checking before FEMA assistance/ dataConnection between loss estimation and govt assistanceDemographic dataOverwhelming dispatch centers (unanswered 911 calls in CA)Quick environmental evaluationProcesses in response environment (generic; analysis of timelines and meet them technologically)Monitoring systems not in placeValidating and verifying socio-economic data, data integration issuesEnd-user systems have to be simple: stress = stupidity

Ubiquitous sensoring Scale, granularity, can change in time Process


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Data issues

New information vs. recasting of existing info Process context should drive database research Integration of different data formats Recast software discussion in terms of characteristics of

response processes Problem solved for inter-company integration: what’sspecial

about unexpected events? Undesired linking / security and access management Micro-metadata. Reliabiltiy, calibration of sensor nets Common datga elements Connecting operational data with incoming data, and modeling

data Information integration


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If we had the data and could provid info:

What would they do differently? For an unexpected event.

What have we learned from the past that helps us deeal with data integration

Different groups operating in pararllel with different tasks, with operational integration

Tension arising from information overload Active real time data integration, decided by

ebd-users: not just passive.


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Try to formalize exchange between practitioners and research


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Concept of triage in information management

Info overload Training to improve dialog


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Feds don’t understand state and local aresponse

How do state and local governments respond to disasters?

How do policies and info get down to local level

Heterogeneous local response


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Military AI model

Decisions in high-risk environments Stand-off decision making / robotics/ stand-off

sensors/ AI


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NSF and practitioner interactions

Applications and bridging culture Mel: what is the form of the research?

– Pilots, test beds, scenario– Mission agencies– Private sector

Program structure is a challenge


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Case study

Observer participants in response


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Recent experience

Use certain examples to bring IT and social science community together– Airline security, communicalbe diseases– Half-life lessons, learn from experience, but take

advantage of timing


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Tech transfer access to practitioners


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Flexibility

Improve interagency organization and coordination Multiple agencies wil always be involved Some organization streuctgure better than others Best interagency structures Improving adaptive behavior: analogy to war games

and simulation tools Factor in heterogeniety of population: need to be

sensitive to feedback related to heterogeneity


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Drawing in practitioners

“clinical” track Working with regional govt agencies Formal and informal Tech partnerships Testbeds with locals and regionals Get some data from them, some infromation Professional organizations Effort to get eq simulation of Kobe (whole sim city)

challenge posed as a competition “rescue simulation” robocup.org

Simulations should be used to generate unexpected event


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Classified material

Data may not be available: dilemma Access to infrasystems may be denied “sanitized” data, abstracted form Reduced precision, dithering Policies on what can be shared govt: no risk approach CoE invnetory

of dams off the web Infrastructure security Security clearance situaion has changed Civilian classification systems Privacy-preserving data mining Study implications of classifying data on ability to respond to

unexpected. Time varying need to know and thus time-varying classification Dithering context specific


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Modality issues

Classification of data Structure of reserasch program Issues of transition


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Cahan

9/11 Research issues– Redundancy, mutual-aid, drills, pulling the trigger

on contacts and technology– Management logistics and communications


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Case study

Spirit of Pier 92: 9/11 case study Folios for each specialty


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Documentary of behind the scenes


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Companion website to feature lessons and clips


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I-Teams Implementation strategy: OMB geospatial initiative: state

plans.


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Consensus portal elements (life-cycle of 9/11 has not eneded)

Team lists Calendar Authoritites GIS Security Public comments


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Joe Picciano FEMA Reg 2

Need to consider worst-case scenario: out of box, not capable of predicting

Federal partnership Initial priorities

– Life-saving support– Mobilization centers– Infrastructure– Devbris assessment


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Effort coordination: existing capabilities (7000 people)


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Driven by IT

Wireless Dfo setup Coordnation with major providers Portable satellites


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Possibilites

National all-response information management system for local and state governmentsResource links

Existing databases

Critical first response availability

Mainatined by public-private consortium

R&D for high-rise and dirty fires

Enhanced personal communications for first responders

Real time computer simulation for first responders

Review of crisis managmenet educatgional programs


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48-72 hours to set up: critical need for local and stgate first response


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Federal response plan

Interagency

WMD and terrorism

Earthquaes


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Transportations

Lead agency DoTFAA closed down airspaceDistribution of emergency supplies and officialsDevelopment of standards and models for catastrophic

events in urban environmentsPre-identification of critical routesEvacuation alternatives and event-dependence (NYC and

hurricanse)Cricitacl asset transprotation planningLinkages to regional planning for wide-=spread events

Enhanced Remote sensing systems for evac and id of critical assset requirements


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Communications

NeedsStadards

Protocols

Modernization

training

Develop a national emergency managmenenmt communications systems with applications at state and local levels


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Public works and engineering (ACOE)

Debris managmgnetNew technologies for sseparation and managmenet

Study on existing infrastufcture load impact and project life


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Firefighting

Incident managmenet teams


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Information and planning

FEMA lead on infomration

Decision support


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GIS

Hot spots

Site hazard analysis

Estimate total debris


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possibilities

National response information managmenet system

Enhanced urban infrrastrucgure database (911, hazus, etc) and loss modeling

More use of remote sensing


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Resource support

GSA

Development of immediate resource requirment list linked to national data base


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Health and medical

Us public health service


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Urban search and rescue

Nre first responder strategies


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Hazmat (EPA

New strategies for:Health registries

Indoor and outdoor residential hazards


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Food

Disaster food stamp program


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Energy

Con ed coordination

Radiation monitoring


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DOD

Colocate with defense coordinator

Trained FDNY teams on specialized demolition equipeRobotics teams

New technology

Med assistance


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Public assistance

First funding

Debris removal ($4B)

Remibursement for OT

Replacement of equip

Cost estimating tames

Review infrastructure recovery as it relates to insurance industryImpact of future coverfage

Improved methodoloies in gov and industry coordinatio

Insurance risk and its relationship to future urban development


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Mitigation

5% added to mitigation fundNYC metro area projects

Mitigation models forf WMD loss prevention

Building performance standards for post 911 env

Urban strategies for mitigation in high density communities

The establishment of mitigation banks

Insuracne cost incentives for mitigation beyond floodplain management


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Public affiars

Info vs perceived risks

Media strategies

Terrorism thrives on media impact and message


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Long trem recovery


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Missing response links

Workable expedient housing program

Enhanced management systems for domestic distribution of life sustaining goods

Critical examiniation of urban risk in post 911 env.

Enhanced corporate planningAccess control and identification standardization

Multi-organizational planning and shared resource

Enhanced utilization of encrypted Web resources and portals


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Response initiatives

Fire support branch

Forward coordinating teams

External logistics: supporting state and local govt capabiliteies (NYClost its teams)


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Alan Leidner

Oem had no operating GIS system on 911Standing start on 911“Orgware” technology: learned how to interact and work togetherLocals had more accurate basemap, feds had better technologyLocal didn’t know about existing technologyNeed to be ahead of technology, particularly sensors

Needed thermal sensors

Ability to deploy immediately: need to know what’s availableAsset databased and queries neededBreakdowns

Effect of smoke and ash on health : no knowledge, no env mechanisms and testing, no trust, community panic

Anthrax panic: threat not defined, procedures not definedHow to work with neighborhoods and ocmmunity groups to make local leaders collaborators to calm

panic, identifiy vulnerability. Local networks not developed.

Need better ORGWARE to synch communications and agendas, and public communication

OGC permanent NYC testbed


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Edward Hammer (energy)Con Ed

Used to Focus on just power. And customer

Not appropriate way to respondObstructions and obstacles arisign from coordination

Incident command system: ICS very effective in field.

Become part of team


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Fred Krimgold

Analogies to 911Eqs are localized so expected to some extent, but unexpected somewhatInsurance has decided main terrorist threat in five cities NY, DC, LA, SF, ChicagoVulnerability due to land use, interdependent urban systemsStandards sometimes wrongCascading failuresQuestions

Wha happened: how big and extent of impactsWhat has to be sentInitial reconnaissance: examples, but not a solved problemSearch and rescue implementationTime as critical factor in response: shorten and focus on critical locationsThink about designing for failure: think about how to take them apart, how to protect

occupants, removalSimulation and public awarenessMitigation / deflectionUnexpected by whom?


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Denton

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