236 33 As much' as anyone else, Singapore worries about disruptions in the Uow of ships through the Straits of Malacca., Singapor,e, thollgh agreeing with the and I·ndonesian position that the states should be responsible f?r_ navigatio,n in the Straits of Malacca, has refused to go along wi,th their on the Straits, preferring to take note of ,their Foreign Minister s. Rajaratnam expressed Si,ngapore s conoerns in the context of the follOWing pointst 1. Insuri,ng,the safety of navigation, 2. Avoiding contamination of the .Straits by oil spillages, 3. InSl:1ring the. sec!Jrity of the Straits from great POW6,X' rivalry., 4. "Expressing the view that responsibility' for safety the Straits and, it's "inte;J:'national "tatus are 81 two issues. the impositiqn of .,tolls, the singapore, evening ddly, The .New Nation (reflectillg.the , " " ' "·,,b ;.;" , view) in its editodal of;Marop 1972, .ad.d, .that such an ,would! 1. Slow down 2 • 3. Increase shipping\"costs" 4.,. Not. stop ships fro!1l Sin,llapore (a betuer '" ,
Transcript
236
33
As much' as anyone else, Singapore worries about
disruptions in the Uow of ships through the Straits of
Malacca., Singapor,e, thollgh agreeing with the Malaysi~n
and I·ndonesian position that the littora~_ states should
be responsible f?r_ sa~ety an~ navigatio,n in the Straits
of Malacca, has refused to go along wi,th their p~sition
on de-internatio~alizing the Straits, preferring to ~~~~lY
take note of ,their position~O Foreign Minister s.
Rajaratnam expressed Si,ngapore ~ s conoerns in the
context of the follOWing pointst
1. Insuri,ng,the safety of navigation,
2. Avoiding contamination of the .Straits by
oil spillages,
3. InSl:1ring the. sec!Jrity of the Straits from
great POW6,X' rivalry.,
4. "Expressing the view that responsibility' for
safety i~ the Straits and, it's "inte;J:'national "tatus are 81
two differe~t, issues.
\{e~arding the impositiqn of .,tolls, the singapore,
A. posftl.ve ,(!>c\l1liesce and/or COOl>e~at1on) --in view' ,of littolt<!l: states.
'/: " ,,;, .",' ,
1. Surlley'r~ura~ts and dredge"channe1s with Jali'al\~lIIe"fill'l\noia1 'lind material oontributions, at 1ll)e,,:Lnvl.i:ation of the 11 ttora1 states.
")J;/lIi''IIn",rhas surveyed parts ,of' the Ma1acca ,;S1>lta~"t. rand she is planning toc!lo the sal11O""tor "the Lornbok'llnd Malo" •• "r Strait •• ARJj,,,:'l!ay,l~73; p', 1839.
38
242
2. Assist in formulating separation of traffic Bchemes and contfibute and imp lace channel markers and navigational devices.
sterba, N. Y. Times, March 13, 1972, p. 9. Japanese industries offered to pay all the costs of fitting Straits with radar buoys and navigational aids.
3. Make financial contributions to upkeep of straits.
See Oliver, passim.
4 -. Pay tolls in lieu of the above.
Interview with Japanese Military Official and lmagawa Eiich!.
S. Aid in construction of Semangka Transshipment center.
39
State Department official indicated no action is being taken or anticipated in the near' future. See. also ARB, Sept. 1973, pp. 2049-2050. -
6. Increase littoral states' dependence on Japan, economically.
All information indiQ8tes a trend in this qeneral direction. See Appendix 2.
B. Actions independent of littoral states and having no direct influence on them.
7. Participate in 'the co_nstruc't.io;n of a canal or pipeline""cross the lsthmU$dEt(ra.
i' ,-_ Japanese eXJ?Srts have, al"r:eadY -participated in a survey"'of- partl',16f -;1t:he -tRja'-lsthmus. However, due to'thedMII!(/jI'itnl't:he'l'ha:i government,l" the ,outlOc>k' «!l)i>liatsto be very uncertain. :tn- addition, ,'from the time oonstruetiOn',l:)egine'Uod.t,s'esti1l1ated time of, completi'on W'ou.ldL,-require 'ni-ne to ten years. See ~, J'anuary' 2~,l973,p. 39.
8. Development of alterhati~e sources and types of fuel
Depending on lOcation, amouhts (numbers) and types of energy alternatives to oil and
243
40
the Middle East may prove beneficial to Japan. This includes oil tars in South America, oil fields in Alaska, nuclear -,,' energy, hydroelectric energy, etc'. ARB, January 1974, p. 2386. Quoting a MI~ source ~ "'the Nihon Keizai Shimbun ~Of February 19, 1974 -said that Japan's reliance on oil, "is going to be cut. II March 27,'1974 on page the Soviets have decided to of an oil pipeline and replace second Trans Siberian RailWaY~e' rmioastlch editorial of March 26, 1974 ~ venture as; "too costly. II
9. Circumnavigate Australi~.
According to Miller, circumnavigating Aus:tralia at the present time wou,ld add at least an additional two to three dollars to the cost of a barrel of oil-for Japan. In addition, a Japanese source made it very clear tha:t, so long of a detour ,'WOUld be '''extremely da~gerous" in. a wartim,e situation
'-,since it would add ,an additional 8,000' miles to th_e voyage from' the persian gulf to Japan, e*:posing tankers to increased vernability to both undersea and aerial interdiction.
c. Actions paroel,v'ed as hostile by li~toral states.
10. Any unilate'ral aetion wjJthout the prior consent of the llttoral states (particularly Indonesia and Ma'l~y-sia) not: amounting -to the use of force.
, .,. ' ,. "
. ~uch an-- action might, include issuing statements withclui!:it'l>" prior knowledge of the littoral states'~ ":Se~ Bundy, Newsweek, April 10-; 1972, p. '39. "
11. Refusal to observe known draught limitations.
This would mO,st 'likely ·be the result of an individual actiton rather, .. than the_ concerted policy of Japan.'se 'gov&rnme~t.
12. Failure to pay fair aompensation for damages caused by an ",coide"t or "il spillage •
Although an accident or oil spill is po.sible, Japan is most likely to ,settle promptly.
244
13. Failure to reform eoonomic policies over the long rUJ;l.
It.would seem rational for Japan to do this, but lmaqawa believes that this will be a, difficult and painful process for the Japanese.
14. Cutting-off or _drastically limiting economic aseistanc.e •
41
This of course may be a tactic or retaliatory move on the part of the Japanese to correct some wrong done to them ,by one,of the littoral states. In terms of economic leverage, this strategy might be applied in the hope of gaining some sort of concession.
15. Committing elements of the Maritime Self-Defenoe" Force to the area, either to force the Straits or to coerce one or more of the littoral states.
Irrational. However, as Axelb,ank notes, "Most .conseX'Vstive leaders stress the need to defend- ·the so-called 'Malaoca Straits' defense line." See Axelbank, p. 16. lmagawa see$: this faction as being part. of the ' Keidaren, the Japanese Federation of Economic organization. In addition, there are some in the Ministry of Defense in Japan who feel the need to send ships into the Malaoca Strait& to insure the safety of Japanese: ,tankers. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's Prime Minister, has openly sugges,t,d' ,that a multi-national task force be formed to patrol the' sea lanes in the ,rea. Th,is foro,e, consis~in,9' of J,pan-, Australian, and US nav~l,. ele~t .. wou.1Cl," bunker and base in Singapore. ,The.: .. r:$'SpPDee, to this' idea has been particularly, ,.,0001 11 "'n 'tokyo. Most observers see thi's pro1?osal ,as difficult to imp1ement be<;:!lu~eo~. the "pr<lvailing politioal climate in Tokyo as well as the various legal and constituti9nal -pre .• c;4ptions on deployment of Japanese, ,forees ,over,,~s. HQWever, others have argue.di" that. in sp"tl:e. of theBe prohibitions the possibilities of regular patrols of elements of the Japa1le.e""Mari1;~""'Se1f-l)efense Foroe is not too far .o:ff: ,in tme, futu,re.
245
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The evidence in this paper suggests the existence
of at least a partial state of economic interdependency
between Japan on one hand, and the coastal states of
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on the other. The
littoral states depend a:'~great deal upon Japan for their
aid, commerce and trade, while Japan depends upon them for
a source of certain raw materials, a market for her goods
and their goodwill insofar as insuring the unimpeded paSSAge
of her oil shipments through the area.
This interdependency appears to be threatened by
arrogant economic policies on the one hand by Japan and
by extreme nationalists pronouncements on the other by
the littoral states. Additionally, it appears that no one
nation would receive benefits substantial enough to justify
One form or another of retaliation for "wrongs" oommitted
by one or the other party. The question is more a matter
of rationality and oommon sense, diotating decisions in
terms of national interests, rather than profit and trade.
One of the most commoniy mentioned of the littoral
states' complaints against Japan has been the latter's
so-oalled "exploitive" business practioes. There is
substantial evidence to indicate that Japan has indulged
42
246
43
in practices such as floating loans at excessively high
interest r:ates as well as attaching all sorts of strings
to its aid. Japan has also speculated in various commodity
markets and in the caSe of Indonesia, actively interfered
in the Japanese textile industries. The behavior of the
Japanese (businessmen and tourists alike) too often has
been characterized by South-East Asians as boorish. In
spite of this, suppose as a reac~ion to the hostility
generated by these methods and behavior as well as to the
increasing cost of fuel oil brought on by extra~reqional
factors, Japan decided to pull-up stakes and go home? A
move such as this would result in.e~onomic chaos throughout
the region. While it could certain behoove the Japanese
to reform some of their methods, it would also. be incumbered
upon those receiving the benefits of Japanese aid and
assistance to be a little more tolerant.
The strategic imp~rtance of the Malacca Straits,
although not really disputed by anyone, should no longer
be used by. Japan and other states to justify a wide range
of policies which may have only se.condary relevance. There
are those in Japan, particularly among certain con.ervative
~ements of the· business community, who have been making a
great deal of noise about sending elements of the Maritime
Self-Defense Force, south to insure Japan's continued
access to the Straits. A number of these elements would
benefit by an increase in both the size of the MSOF and
its mission. There are certain groups in Indonesia who
247
44
use the question of co'ntinued passage by the maritime
powers, particularly Japan through the Malacca Straits,
as a vehicle for gaining as much political mileage as
they can. However, it is doubtful that the littoral States
are going to close the Straits to Japanese tankers; although
in the interests of safety and ecology, they will most
certainly impose lim! t8 as to ·the size and draughts of
ships permitted to navigate through the narrow straits.*
Too many nations ,have too,'much t.o lose to permit arbitrary
and unfair restrictions from being imposed by the littoral
States.
If the,; Japanese __ .are truly, ,worrieclt 'about, the Strai,ta
being closed then they perhaps should"think about projecting
a more positive image -6£ themselves in the area. The image
they should -'Glndeav6't' 'tio project sh~uld be one of a fellow
Asian, though materially better off, whQ' lsees a considerable
stake in the region's ~evelopment and political stability.
Economic measures, ;~:r.oitly, handle,d will bring 'returns
measured in more ,thllndiVl.dendll'''8nd>\proUI!B but>more "'-- - "-- -'" .. '!'i ,;.;
appropriately in pOli'tical cooperlltl.ol', a~<I regional l" ':-: "" -':,
stability.
*See Appendix 8.
248
IX. EVIDENCE AND DATA 45
NOTES
1. B. Harrison, South-East Asia--A Short History (London: Maomillan and ,Co. Ltd., 1966), p. 22.
~. Ibid., p. 52.
3. ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 117.
5. Seymour Brown and L,. Fabian" II,Diplomats at Sea,1! Foreign Affairs- (January 1974), p. 364.
6. H. F. Pearson, 1819-1960 (Singapore: Ea,stE;rn:t pp. 6-1.
7. Ibid., p. 8.
9. Harrison, pp. 255-256.
10. Peter Asia (London: Ox.fo;,d
11. Harrison, p. 241.
12. Ibid., p. 244.
13. Lyon, p. 21.
14,. D. G. 'Hall" 'A,'Hist()r~ of S. E' Asia, (Londont Macmillan, 1955), p. 6 i.
pp. 92-130.
16. U.S. Naval Institute 'Proceedings (June 1973), p. 27.
17. Ibid.
18. Richard Policies and Security, Adelphi Iss, 1972), p. le.
19. Oliver, p. 30 •
. 20. Ibid.
249
21. J'8.0k-~D. Salmon, "Japan as a Great Power-The Military and Policy Option," Japan Interpretor (Summer/Autumn, 1972), p. 402.
46
22. Capt. Richard A. Miller, U.S.N., "Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine and Japan's Juqular,"'U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 1972), pp. 30-31.
23. Ellingworth, p. 19.
24. Miller, pp. 29-30. See also Capt. Edward. F. Oliver, "Gargantuan Tankers--Privileged or
(Sept. 1970), p. 40. -;:;, •• '. for a 200,000 dwt tanker are 40 cents' per barrel as compared to 52 cents in a 70,000 tanker.
25. Ibid., p. 3.
26. Miller, p. 27.
~~ra1~,s,n International
28. Miller, p. 28.
29. 'Michael Leiter and Dollivet·, Nelson, "Conflict" of Interest in the Malacaa Str~l~'s," International Affairs· (April' 1973 h
I 30. Miller, p. 29.
the 1973),
31. James Sterba, "Japan Tighten. Her:.:Economic Grip on the Nations ot; B.> & S. E. Asia,'" New ,YOrk. Tintes, 28 August 1972, p. 1.
32. Taira KOji, "Japan and theSmailer Stat&s of Asia, II Current History (NoVember 1973).'
with Seacat SAM). 6 coastal minesweepers. 4 fast patr()~ boats
(less than 100 tons).
24 other patrol boats (less than 100 tons) (4 more to be delivered in 1972).
. 1 landinq ship. A number of river
craft . . RESERVES: 600.
1973, Institute for Strategic Studies, Londott973 Sou,rce .. Mqttary Balance,
,.
261
APPENDIX 7
THE STRAITS OF KALACCA AND THE THREE TENTATIVE
CANAL ROUTES ACROSS THE ItRA ISTHMUS
Souree.; Lawrence Gri~ld. -Bypa.sing Malacca,- U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding. {June 1§7Jj. p. 106. pUblic Information Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affaira, Japan, Infor.ation Bulletin, Vol. XVII. No. 20 (october 15, 1970) •
58
262
APPENDIX 8
TRIPARTITE MEETING ON SAFETY OF NAVIGATION IN
STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE
June, 25-26
In ke~ping with the decisions contained in the joint statemen't. ot,· November 1971, in which the three coastal States had-agreed, to co-operate on the safety of navigation in the Straits of' Malacca and ;Singapore and as a follow-up -to the meeti'ng held in Jakarta in July :\.972, the delegation of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore met in Kuala Lumpur ot:l June' 2,S"and 26, 1973.
59
The meeting reviewed the progre~s,of the studies made by the' respective Governments on matters relating to navigational' saf,ety measures raised at the Jakarta meeting last year. The meeting was satisfied that there has '-been_ ste~dy 'progress towards the atta,inment of the objective of ensuring the safety of navigation in the St;ai ts o.f MaJ.;acca and Singapore.
The meeting agreed that there is a need for a limitation of draught of vessels passing through the Straits, having regard to the physical limitations of the St.raits. It was also agreed that-a ,group· ,of e~perts from the three cO\,1ntries:' Should, 'carry out further studies wi~h the view to establiShing a Traff:Le $eparation Scheme for the Straits of'Malacca and Singapo~e. The group of experts would work out'the details of the ,scheme taking into account a safety margin compatible with, ,the interests of the coastal States tQ ensure the safety, of tbe- coastal States, AS well as the interests of the users of the Straits.
The meeting also agreed to establish a body for co-operation and ¢o-ordinat.i:on of effortfS in the Strai t8 o,f.,'Malacca and Singapore as envisaged in the joint statement of November 1971. The de'tails:'of the structure, scope and responsibility of this body will be worked 'Out by the' ' three Governments.
in the The meeting' agreed to oontinue, the
spiritbf tripartite co-operation. oonsultation-
Source I Ministry of Foreign',Affairs, Malaysia', rO~eign Affai,rs
S Malaysia, ,Vol. 6,
No;. 2 {JUlie 191 )"pp. ·1,6-77.
"THE CO-RESPONSIBILITY OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY"
COMMENT
COMMENT, ON' QUESTION £8 TO WHETHER THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAS Co-EQUA'L :OESP'ONSIBILITIES IN THE AREA OF FORErON AFli'AIRS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION;' O'J!' T1fE UNITED 'STATES BASED ON THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS OF THE CONEITITUTION IN 1787
From: Thomas R. Kennedy, Staff Consultant, Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee.
To,: Hon. Robert N .. G. Nix,'M.C., Chairman .. Material :' Hearing Record -of Subcommitte'e during 08rd Congress, Article Seton
Hall Review, "Separation of Powers tn: the'IDomain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent 'of the Constitution Historically Examined," Arthur Bestor, 5 Seton HaU La,w, Review, 527-665, "Imperial Ptesidency." Arthur Schlesinger, Houghton-Mifflin Co., "The Constitution and What It Means'Today," Edward S. Oorwin; 1978 Edition Princeton University Press, and "The Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison, ,Tay, M'enton Book Edition.
PROPOSITION
That' the Oongress of the Un~ted States Ilnd the' President of the United States have a joJ,nt'responsib1Uty in Foreign Affairs, with the full support of the historical evidence as to the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution at the Oonstitutional Oonvention in 1787.
HEARINGS: u.s. POLICY AND PROGRAMS IN CAMBODIA SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN ~ND. PACIFIq AFFAIR~, "MAY 9-1(1, 1973.
;On 'May, 9th, -(in page .15 of the Hearing Record, the following e:x;i;!hange takes place between Mr." Nix,' OhairmRll of the Subcommittee and Mr. Bi-Qwer, Acting Legal Adviser; Department of ,State in regl,lrd to the bombing 'being carried, on in: Oambodia ,by -American forces: '_ , ,,' '
, MIl;' NIX. Mr. Brower, the question put to you was 'by what constitutional " authority'-is the bombing beblg ordered,' ft} :Cambodia,? As I understood your ,'ans-wetl, fI-rst' you said"no ,t\lddlUhnll!}J a1.it:h6rity"'was 'u,ee<ied. the assumption
being the 'authority ,alreadlt,· existed j 'but '~9U' did' notl;,~ive 'us 'the source of '.that ·.uthOrity; You ,folloWed' that by safljjg that article· 20. (Truce Agree
" m~nt}1 ,Wtts."(:not necessary' and it gave' -no independent autiiority for the ,r"""President,'s'(lction,' "
'Mr~ BROWER. Briefly stated, the President's,ntlthority Is' derived from article 2 of the~U.:!h:{~onstitution ,as:' Comlllander-In~Chlef of' the' Armed Forces a-n(1. Ohlef r'mt::ecut1.ve, in the' cot)du'ct of OUr foreign relatioill;f; bO,tli' to guide: aO,d
i(' order'tbe'coiii1uctofoUrtoJ.lces,w:hlch,we'retben' . . J.;. , ,I': .'. " .,' i'~ ·,Senator G.ol<l~~e. who app.eat!'M·,'before the Sl1bcommlttee'on the followl\ig
day,of.thea.~'.MO;rJiI\.· II" $tated 11111. n .. afll. cle.w .. t!I. ttell"~I))·,the Virginia. J. oUfnal of In ..•. ternatlbnalH,,,,w·jim1978 that· (~8'CVlfi'I'ntrr,: 468:·'465,466,·11178): ' . ,... ' ..... The F~"lnorsof tho (J0ll.llt\l1lll)jj'.(ln".Q~.d; the€)hlemll"eeutlve·wtth thO tor'
.. ' eign. poll~'!ll'f)Jklhl pow.r~eca~.0611"':' .eal, ... t1oh;.t!lat~.lllgl.ln:dIV1Q)l~lwtth life ... 1>owe'tl!wo1)id' notlle 'dlstit.i!ea,;by1lh.'WI~t1c.'bt1lbe mOnlent. He would.loo~
. to,tbe)ollg oottr.eof history an:d:u.e .. hl~·'poWe""I,Inllre Wi •• ly that a Oongr ••• wbleh 1o, eonstantly lbOklng toward· the'pol!tlcalr •• ults: 11: Is nlythought that the Founding Fathers_'understlood that- releon:~res)!l.tdlv;J.ae{l, -aJbopgst :minority' jnterestf;! mlirhtln some crucial moment, In'hl8tiJ\')I ~!Floath 1:0·81"0' proper dlreci:lon tiJ a Ringle ·necessary American course. "1'hus!,:tpey- 'f'o'qUQ' it prope~ to place the' power of ,external af&:\irs tn a single person \~ere 'the probahility of minority weight w~UId,be,mu.'b\e.sl!kely to·have this effect;".·· ..,' . . •
, ;:rJ.ihe vle:WS'·'e~p.tessed IbY; tJhose'<favorlpge~e:view at"a neaf)lionopoly of Prest: dentlallnflrteri@ imd 'Powe" III Foreign A1l!.I~.' have. a long 'a.M ·honoral)le h1.t~ry Ill' .4Jmerlcan I1f'Hbilt It 18 'based e •• elitlit)ly 'on a ease byeali. development that ,.i'·.,,,:U . .' '. '(2.~3) , .. ,." ",
;<\ '
264
expands on incidents which took place in the Oivil War, the First World War, Second World War and the Cold War. At such times in 'Our history, Congress and the Judiciary have not sought to assert thei.r jurisdiction against the Executive
. Branch. The point is that the Constitution- as it has developed and .RS it was fO'rmed would not forbid such activity by the Legislative or-Ju,dicial:Branches of Government, There is almost no material in the -Constitutional Convention itself to support the view that the President has Dear plenary powers in Foreign M· fairs. What evidence can be 'Offered for such a view relates to Presidential as~ sertiveness in the more than 180 years since the adoption of the Constitution, wlJthout Congressional 'Or Judicial intervention.
Alexander Hamilton, the leading proponent of a strong executive at the Constitutional IConvention,' in No. 75, of the Federalist Papers, which commented on the new Constitution, said in ,;part: HThe history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and, momentous a kind as those whi'Ch concern its intercourse with the rest of the world to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstances as would be a President of the United IStates."
Tbe Brower-Goldwater view is contradicted by the Arthur BestQr article in the Seton Hall Law Review cited above.
,Mr. Bestor's view is that the United States Congress has joint .powe~ to act in matters of Foreign Affuirs, ,based on the Advice and CQnsent clause which originally empbasized the advice as well as the consent role of the United 'States Senate and the Power 'Of the PUrse which was in large measure the pOwer of the United States House 'Of Representatives, where money 'bills originate.
THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE LANGUAGE OF 'l'HE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIQN
A. The United States 'CQnstitution was the direct descendant of the Articles of Confederation. Business at the Constitutional Qonvention WaS not conducted with the thoughtA.n min,-d that the delegates were there tQ limit 'Or even tQ expand the powers of a. central execut~'ve. There had ,be~n no natiQnal e:x:ecu'tive, since' the Congress cQnducted the national business. The mere creation (Jf a natiQnal executive dQes-not lead to the conclusion that this was; the main thrust of the eonven·tion. The creatiQn of a central government which could deal with, the common interest ~s opposed to' the sec'tionttl interests of·tl;l:e states was the main thrust 'Of the convention and thifJ included the creation of all three branches.
B. The first problem to be solv~d, was,to'establish a national judiciary; and a~ to Foreign Affairs, insure, a strong judiciary capable of establishing judicial supremacy in matters of the interpretation of treaties. State GQvernments had, as it suited them, ignored treaties.
O. ,The, second problem was- to maintain the- unity of the N ortbern and' 'Southern states which h8,-cl' been strained over a commercial treaty: negotiated by the Cpngress with Spain; which was to the dlsadMntag'e of the Sollilhanll the' adl"an· tl1ge, of the .North. South~rn :$ta~es had insisted,' ,as a -condUlion ot' negotiation wi,th, Spain, ,the obtaining' of 1~painls' consent to treating the Mississippi River as an'International Waterway- open to the, AmertC8,'D states where' it flowed through Spani$4 territory .. Voting in the Oopgvess- QQ,'tweaty matters was-'by' State, ,with 'One, vo~ ,per state. A. two-thirds ,majority of',nine',$tates was nee_d~,,~,ratify a treaty. Jobn Jay of. New York negotiated tll,,·,treaty with Spain; 11II\0r!ng the SQuthern' States' desire for terms on ,fr~':p'f,1.,ssage, over ·the ,.Missis$,tppi, 'and t/J,e N<>rthern States attompted to ratify the. treaty . with .eWl voto~ rather than nlne. The treaty ~as signed regardless of the l!IhovtfaU Qf:two.v'otes. This led to-the feelil)g on the ,pa.rt of the Southern states ,lthat they must have a two-thirds requirement written into the .new ,co,nstitution which woul4 make any" other, attemptod treaty with Jess support a null)ty,
D. Because of the suspicion between .~he two sectional blocs,-Q:f Statesj a ,cO:tnpromise was reac»~(1- whereby treat~es 'would only go tnto etreet;, if the United Stlltes S~l\ate ratl!ied sucb, treaties by .. two·thirds vote of t;hos. Senators vresent. The. Senate waschos.n as t)le treaty rattfylng llpdy,sll\ce Senators represen. ted, States;, If the, House, 'Of R~prese. ntati'Ves had been. included in. the ratification process, the power of the· small~r states would have been' diluted, since the House was to represent population rather than, states.
This compromise was balanced by providing that mQney bills would: originate in the Hous. of Representatives. Originally the Committee ot netalls drafl
265
proposal had provided that the Senate might not amend money bills. This pro" vision was struck by the Full Convention.
E. Thus the key issues during the convention were sectional Rnd economic issues. There was little comment on establishing a powerful presidency, let alone one which would have an all powerful role in Foreign Affairs,
THE PRESIDENT AS OHIEF EXEOUTIVE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Article II of the Constitution begins; "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States."
Article X of the Draft Oonstitution presented to the Convention for action. contained similar langutlge but also provided for the appointment of Amb.assadors by the Legislative Body, and provided the legislature with the power to "make war" :and to "make treaties.," Under the Artieles of Confederation, Congress had done both. Thus the change in favor of the Executive Branch by the Convention can only be understood in terms of specific grants of foreign affairs powers since the Oonvention worked by parpeUng out gra;nts of power, and left portions of the "making of war". and:~ :'~aking 'of peace" powers with the Congress.
Edward,iSy-Corwi.n, In -his boOk ''The ':President, Oftlce and Powers," New York Urliversity Press, 1008, page 171, says in part; '~e -,question in which we are interested demands, therefore, a somewhat
precise statement. It-may be put thus: Where does the,Constitution vest authority to determine the course of the United 'States as a sovereign entity at international law_ with respect to matters in which other shnUar entities may choose to take an Jnterest~ Many persons are, inclined to answer "hi the President"; but they ,-would be hard put to it, if challenged., to point out !lUY definite statement to this effect in tbe 'Constitution, itself. What the Constltution does, and aU that it does, is to conter on the Presidept certaPl,powers capable of, affecting our foreign reiationsi!'fJJn(l,(l'ertain other powers .. Q( t~e same general kind on the Senate, and $tJUL othet sucb powers on Congress:, but which of theBe organs shall have the decisive ,and final voice in determi:ning the course of the American Nationls left for events to resolve." .
T~E PliESIDENT ,AS COMMANDER-IN-OHIEF AND. THE WAR POWERS
Alexa.Dder Ham,ilt.on, In No. 69 of the FederaUst Papers, pointed out that the power Oof _ the President to act as Oommander~ In-Chief of the Armed Forces was mucl1"infertof"to the power of the King of England, because he said: "While, that of the. Brili1$JI'Klng'e;nends to theDe<llaring of War and to the raising and ,regulating of,tleets and,'armies;, ,all whiCh by ,the C~nstttution under consideration, would apJ)ertQ,ln to the legtslattlre/'
"In short, ,the power of ,the'-Oommander-Iu-'Ohlef as _firs~',soldier was to issue oroers, to' the Armed Forces within ~ framework established by Congress. The «,-asire -of the Congress in cr,~'ating ,such a post 'was not aqventurism in Foreign Affairs, :but to establish civilian control of-the military. The keen desire of the Convention 'to Umit military power can be ShOWn by the 'tact tllat even the Con~ 1{resB was limited to appropria'ting money to the military for two years at a'time. Congress was to retain not only the' power to declare war but to issue commis-1$:100$ 'tp, privateers, to make rules concerning captures of land'l!.:h'd_ water and to
, 'dedne and punish Piracies and offenses agalJlBt the law of na~ons wllieh mlg)lt be Considered powers dealing with half war situations. (Barb;';ryl'lrates.) ;-.' The debate on war powers in' the drafti!! offered to the Conyenti'on in which Virginia delegates, Madison and ¥asoJ)., u~d successfully that -the Congressional power to "make war" be,a-.J:p.ended to read to "declare war.." -only shows'that the· delegates wiShed to protec!: .the Executive's Right to FIght.llack In matters of surprise attaek and to',protect the Executive's' rower ,To Manage A War once it was declared, from a"future misinter.pJ:etation by- COngress, In, summary, the power of Congress was so strong in the 'matter of national defense,that clarification was needed to- protect new preside~tla:l powers.
GONt:::l~USION
',: The derivation of the terms of tile d~hstltUt1on of the United States ,from the Articles <Y1' Confederation Is the key to .the deliberations of the delegates at the·· Constitutl6nal Convention.
The" 'OOll'gress, as has been previoQsly\ said, conducte'-' the national' business lnclud;t}r.:torei,gn, affairs under_the :A)jtldles of Confederation. 'Foreign Affairs was condnct&l):,through:the Secretary of, its Department of For,elgn Affairs. John Jay
.'.",:!.-' " " '.-' -, ';if' . . :;\>
266
of New York, one of ~he authors of the Federalist IJapers, served ill this post, and he Was a convention ,delegate. Notes ,Oll' the convention" debates were kept by James Madison, -tater President of -the 'United States. His views as to what o~urred 'at the convention'"are con1h1m:ed by the FederaUst Papers and correspondence of those associated with the convention ..
'~'nere is almost no historical evidence,that the delegates intended' to create a .presidential monopoly in foreign affairs. Thett,e Is every reRson to "believe that they meant that "Advice and COllseht" were tWo concepts and that the-Senate should participate in treaty matters ,before the raUOcation stage was reaOhed. 'As it turne(i out, the Senate itself, 'hI its procedural formula, 'lAter took the' position tha,t it 'WQUld,' rat1~y Ohly ahd disapprove lJy means' of -:l.'eservatioll; The :l;ormula used is l\~,.fonows: "Resolved ('l'wo-thirds of ,the Senators present concurring therein),,_ that the Senate adviS'e',ana: consent to the ratttl'cation of"IThe Treaty'·lln question.," > • '" :
I Chang,es demanded in a' treaty are-li'sted as reservations., _, '__ ) The uhiquely, American view 'of"Ex~utive Power', (bl' at least its vieW- contrasted
wltp England's, can be exaJuined ~n: l1~ht _'of, the, dIt,'l'erences between ,Blackstone's 'views and those of the Con'stitutiohal "d~leg'ates.· They: regarded fDreign at'tairs as not a matter Df rOY,a} or ex;e,cut1ve prerogative; this was in di,reet '(~Dn:flict wlth the English or Blackstone position: In::c<mtrast, they did U'se some of'the experience o~ their EngU~h forf{bears!:in pf(rlh,\m~nt's battle with'lKings. 'The phrase, Advls,e and Consent, has ,.betlh 'contained h'l':lthe enactit1!{"clause' ot, every }!Jngl1sh statute since the late 17tleCentury., that is': "Be,it enacted ''by the 'King's most excellen_~:jtUa'j~sty-, b,Y artd ,*,1th, the advie,e and consent of"the' Ltords Spiritual and Tempora" ~and the CoIrt~Qns, in this pi'~~nt parliament assembled, and by the ~.uthority of the same." '" .,' "" ,";'. ' ," .,
Therefore;' it would seeJll that 'the origitud iltt~lit of ' the Framer.e -of the CDn .. st\tutfon' was, to cr,~~te branches ot GOVe1',Otilent 'cb:.eq'Ual'1n ForeigivAttatrs as in Domestic At'tair,s.)jjvent~ have c'reated ~ 'prlnlttry place for the',Ex~cut1ve Branch In Foreign Affairs, but It I. only pollCl' con$lder.tlons which restrain the. Judl-
, cia,ry and the Legislature tr.om playing a more active role. '
.:"
THE DEFENSE MONITOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, ARTICLE ENTITLED "U.S. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN: BUILD UP OR REDUCE?"
DEFENSE MONITOR IN BRIEF
• There are 200,000 U.S. troops In Asia aftcr U.S. Withdrawal from Vietnam and the Pentagon plans to build new bases In the Pacit1c and Indian Oceans. The time is at hand to make some tough choices about the nature uftut:ure U.S. mUliary involvement in Asia. The Center has reached the following c()ncluslons: • The U.S. could bring home the 88,000 mlHtary personnel
from its bases on tile mainland of Asia and Taiwan without having any impact on the U.S. defense posture. There Is no military threat to the area unless it be the Soviet·Chlne«: dispute along China's border, and it would not he in tlie best Interests of the U.S. to become Involved in a war between China and the Soviet Union. • Then: Is much sentiment throughout Southern Asia and
the Padllc for U.S. military withdrawal from the ar(la. Japan has nogteat need for the U.S. ships and troops based there, Nuclear weapo;Tls on any U.S. ships based In Japan are in ~iolat!un of Japan's polley that prohibits the presence of nudear weapons. • The constru¢tlon orand e~panslon of U.S. military base~
In the Pacific and IndIan <k~an ar(l unIWcessary and probably will increase mllltary tensions In the area. Coun· tries that rlnl the Indian Ocean W<luld like It to be a nuclear·free demilitarized zone. • U.S. F'on:es stationed In countries controlled by die·
tatorshlps such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Sooth Vietnam, do not enhance U.S. foreign ot domestic pol/cles,
Well tlver haifa million out of a total of ~.Z million active duty U.S. military personnel are deployed outside the United Slates, Three hundred twenty, thi>usand are in Europe and "the North Atlantic and 250 thousand ,in Asia and the-Paclfic area. Forty·five thtlusand ,mmtat}r:~rsonmjl are based in HawaU. There 4.te ~~2 ~ajor'" U.S; military installations \'Iverseas. excluding Southeast,Asia} 13'111'<: hI the Pacilic command; In southellst Asia thei-e'are j major bases' in Thall~nd, ' " ','!'
:ni,Il'U~S; Paci,fic 'Command ~lth headquartdrs hi' Ha~n _,re~~hes:ha_lfway ro~nd the w~rjd and 'i~dlld'e,s' the PIl.dJlc Ocean, Bering Sea. Indian Ocean, lapan, KOfet\, Clilba,
- India and !Ill coulitrl¢s in Southeast and Southern As.la, aWd all islands from the west cbast of North and South America to the East Coast of Africa. At present the Pacillc Com· niand is headed by Admiral Noel Gaylor, USN,
"'A major base is defined as one which employs a minimum of SOIl milltary personnel
The U.S, spends about $20 billion anmially to prepare fur war in the Pacific Command area, and maintains a force of 650;000 military personnel for, that contingency, Pacific Command forces located in the U,S, include three Army divisions and three brigades, a Marine Division and Air· wing,
New Bases
Indian Oceanl Diego Garcia
Since March, 1973, the U,S, has maintained a low fre· quency communications station for contacting strategic missile SUbmarines at Diego Garcia, a small Island in the middle of the Indian Ocean, There are similar stations at Australia's Northwest Cape and at Asmara, Ethiopia, on the eastern coast of Africa (see map), The Pentagon wants to expand Diego Garcia and has requested 529 million to ex' tend the Island's airfield runways, add fuel depots for ships and planes, and deepen and, widen the barbor.
Expansion ofthe Diego Garcia base will signal a growing U.S, military presence in the Indian Ocean,_even though most nations that rim the Ocean would like to see It com· pletely demilitarized, Expansion of the Diego Garcia base will also enhance its' capabilities to serve as a base against Soviet subs which may come in search of U.S. missile sub· marines. It announces the beginning of a new navat arms race in the area,
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India claims U.S. and British plans to develop a nuclear base at Diego Garda adds to India's external dangers. Diego Garcia will Increasingly assume "strategic" importance as the U.S, increases the military utility of the base, and within a few years will prob· ably require the formation of a permanent Indian Ocean Fleet to protect the new base.
The Indian Ocean is an additional convenient area from which to operate ballistic missile subs, but U,S, submarines have been operating In the Indian Ocean for years without a land base as contemplated on Diego,Garcia.
p.elnc Ocellonl~~tI!aIl'''Ian.d The MicronesiAn Islands inclUding Tlnian were given in
trust to the U;S. bythe'U,N. to adminIster after World War II. The U,S. is converting many o,f them to military use,
speaklng'of Tinian Island. U.S. Ambassador Williams said. "U,s.land needs are'extensive ",' so much so that we feel we shOUld acquire t,he northern two, thirds of the island
COPYRIGHTC 1974 by the Center fOlr Defense Information. All rights reserved. The Center for Defem.e InfOlrmation encourages ~uo1<llion of uny uf the material herein without permission, provided the Center is credited. The Center,requests a copy of any such use.
(267)
268
for military purposes. We feel we should also ask to acquire the southern third. "
There are current plans to build, 1975-1982, an airfield, port, logistics complex. training area, and support facilities, all of which will cost an estimated $188 million. When the base is completed, there will be 2600 U.S, military pel'sonnel on Tiniml.
U.S. Military Bases In Pacific Command There are at least 73 major U.S. military bases spread
throughout the Pacil1c area; most are in Korea. Japan, and Okinawa. Others are in the Philippines. Taiwan, Thailand, the Marianas. Australia. New Zealand, Midway Island, and Wake Island.
The Navy has based one carrier in Japan. and 14 other ships in Japan. the Philippines and Guam. The U.S. main· tains 925 military aircraft at major air bases in seven roun· tries: Guam. Japan, South Korea, Okinawa. Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. There are Military Assistance Advisory Groups in nine countries: Japan. Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, India. Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, and Iran.
There are 8 U.S. naval carrier task forces stationed in the Pacilic with 720 aircraft: three of these carriers make up the 7th ileet in the Western Pacilic and one of them periodically now patrols the Indian Ocean. Sixteen submarines and 32 surface ships are based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The U.S. Strategic Air Command base~ 50 long·range B-52 bombers in Thailand and 25 in Guam. for combat with non-nuclear weapons, although there are nuclear weapons available for them.
Special Forces (Green Berets)
Fifteen hundred military personnel in the lst Special Forces Group (Green Berets) based' at Okinawa have helped in counter·insurgency in the southern Philippines and are activc in the Marshall Islands. A Battalion (300) of the 5th Special Forces Group is In Thailand, divided amollg 6 detachments at 9 locations . They train Thais in counter·insurgency operations. and advise and assist the Royal Thai Army Special Warfare Center which includes training Cambodian Special Forces and Cambodian infantry units. Special Forces are trained in the SPARTAN (Special Profi· ciency at Rugged Training and Nation Building) program at the JFK Center for military assistance at Fort Bragg, N.C.
CIA The Central Intelligence Agency operates its own airline,
Air AmerIca. from Taiwan for intelligence missions about the Far East: its subsidiary, Air Asia, provided service and overhauls for jet I1ghters that fought In Vietnam. Air America operates in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. As reductions have occurred in Southeast Asia in U.S. military personnel, CIA's Air America has doubled its Defense De· partment contracts from $17.7 million in 1972 to 541.4 mil· lion in 1973. The CIA contingent in Thailand numbers ISO personnel. CIA also maintains paramilitary advisors in Cambodia and Laos, who train and pay thc Lao "irregu· lars".
Strategic Submarines
Ten U.S. strategic ballistic missile-carrying submarines are based at Guam. Thirty-one ballistic missile submarines are based in Spain, Scotland, and South Carolina. Nor· mally, 10 U.S. ballistic missile subs are available in the Pacinc and Indian Ocean in position to attack the Soviet Union and China. Thesc ten Paclfic and Indian Ocean subs can carry about 480 ready nuclear weapons.'"
Construction is underway of a fleet of ten of the huge Tri· dent missile submarines to be based at Bangor, Washington. for operations in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Each Tridenl sub is to carry 24 nuclear missiles, every missile with about '17 separate nuclear weapons. These subs will bring a total of 4,080 additional nuclear weapons to the Pacil1c and Indian Ocean area. By the mid 1980's the U.S. would have about 4,500 undersea nuclear weapons in the Pacitlc and Indian Ocean . • When Poseidon subswilh MIRVed misslles are in the area
the number of nuclear weapons will be much larger.
Treaties The most frequently given reason for stationing troops in
Asian countties is the SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Or· gnni7.lltion) treaty, signed in 1954 by Australia, France, New Zeuland, Pakistan, Philippines. Thailand, the United Kingdom and the U.S. It does not call for the stationing of U.S. troops in any country. SEATO at present, is useless as a military alliance. Pakistan withdrew from the organization in November 1973, France has long been inactive and is stopping dues payments; New Zealand is phasing out its ]lHticipation: Australia did not participate ill 1973 naval maneuvers: Secretary·General Sunthorn Hangladarom has suggestcd that SEATO begin to serve more as a deterrent against subversion and insurgency. and be a clearing house for intelligence information for the benel1t of member COUII
tries and an aid in their economic development. SEATO is a weak excuse for stationing troops abroad if the signatory countries themselves are questioning its proper role.
The many separate bilateral mutual security treaties and executive agreements that have been signed by the U.S. with China (raiwan), Fiji. Indonesia, Cambodia, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam. 'Singapore. and Thailand do not provide for the stationing of U.s. troops in any particular country.
269
Under the !flu!l.!al,sec}ll'ity treaty signed with I!lpan, there is a further agreement on facilities and status or 0.5. forces in Japan; and thel1lts an agreement signed In 1963 which permits the U.S. to:station a Nlke and 2 'Hawk air defense missile batalllons in' Japan. A provision of the "mutual defense" treaty with the Republic of China gives the U.S. the rlgM to station military forces In and about Taiwan; ,the "Formosa Resolution", passed by Congress In 1954 gave prior authority to the Presldent"lo employ U.S. fo~s to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores. Since the renewilill of U.S. retations with China, h(jwever, the "Formosa Resolution" is no longer considered a valid authority.
MlDtary Alslltance and S,les
U.S. Military Assistance and Sales to Paclfio :and East Asian countries In FY 1972 amountq<j to over $5 billion. the bulk going to, Vietnam. In FY 1974 Over $3 billion (not',lnclu~ing cash sales) will,be provided for mnltary aid,and ,assislll;nce to Ea~t,Asla and PaclRc area. Under thl' naval vessen/)~n program, 118 naval vessels are on loan to the Pacific
.,countries, In almost all cases ships loaned are never re-turned. ; . • "
, ':"i Fu,nds lor aid and'traitimg of Internal P?lice forces, under Ihb beading, ~bltc Safety. wi!1 be golnll:lo ThaUllnd,', Laos ~nd _t~e ,Jlhlflpp1nes·ln 1974,-, although Congress Is having Ihls prog,ratnwfl'ased out beginning ,FY ,1974. allOWing no now conlr~~:':qr _e~t~nslons of existing contracts to be fundll4 "y tb~~i.\;S. _8_oVernment. _ '
Largt:lliereaseS,-'.ln,;c«s)l sales 'of'mlllt!iry equipment are . ~enttpl:.'t(l, the. N1x9,U,_'iloctrlno;!. DoO'111UJt(uy cash sales , ''worldwltflrlilive:-It\¢'N!aied from $2.9 bllUonrln' 1972 ·to an
e$tlmateq:,$'3::V)llIlon 'in~ 1274;,rommllf9I.I, arms sales In~~~~ fI'b~~$~~:?IIII.o~,to:"n estlro.~l~ $726 million In
Office, reported 'that the :'U.S. t4om-1n Qunboota,ha,s belln
petformllJlI as 'a mUltir¥'Is- i,
with milltary.plan$, operat· I system.
ll;S,
U.S. Pays to Train ForeJan,Mlllt.!l,';'(
Requested' FY. 1974 military training ""~"". m"'A~" and ihe Paclf1~ were: .
The Soviet Navy Is no match ,for the .U.S. Navy, In the Pacific. In addition, the Soviet Navy may have to contend with a number of submarines and other ships of the Chinese tleet. The threat to U.S. fOmls and interests In the Pacific from China lind the Soviet Union has been greatly diminished in recent years because of growlqg antagonism be· tween those two countriei<
,T~e: Soviet Pacific Fleet has no aircraft carriers to project 'powey as~ore or to allllck the U.S. fleet.
',' 01l,land. the Soviet Union has about 40. divisions along the,(lhlnase border, and,another 5 to 10 divisions elsewhere
. In Asiatic Russia.
ladlan Ocean
S.ovlet ships first appeared frequently in the Indian Ocean in 1968. and they h!lve operated from 8. to 1I10glsllc ships
sm,all .warship'~ In the a~a. On rare occasions the
.~i:;~;.',~:;;!~t;:'~;'~':"I"~'::'}I.~n. the Indian Ocean.
Indian 0ceM (lannot-be Soviet Unl(ln all~lnst its
United States. ;,'
U ••••• R.
x~ --, ...... Ocoon
-
t- .... 'I .. ,. . ......
U •• • T ..... T ..........
",'.
..... -.: ,-• 1 1-..
U.S. FOfcee In thII PIICHk:
• u,., ....., "--nMI
)( U ••• CIII'I'II Ic",_ .. -I"u .•. a-
1 ........ -...... --
271
Strategic :Submarlne Nuclear Weapons In the Padne Area
USSR
II submarines carrying 137 strategic nuclear missiles (includes 3 H·class with 3 mbslles each)
os' 10 sub'marines carrying 160 missiles that bave multiple nuclear weapons: 480 In all '
• The US.al~~ has tho~sands (If'tacttcal nuclear weapons on ships and on land in Korea, Okinawa and·Guam for use in missiles lind Air Force aircraft. ' , ..,
Iflhere Is a wllr, the major Soviet naval effort-will Okinawa were deployed to the Southern Philippines in the be directed against the Atlantic, Paciflc, and Medi. later part of 1973. In addition, there are 14,000 U.S. mill· tetranean lifelines of the Western powers: and the taty personnel at 6 bases In the Philippines. The U.S. Naval Indian Oceani~,an only he of ml\rQlnallnterest to Base at SUble 'Bay"is the'largest naval base in II foreign them. ' country In the Paultlc.' It'ls frequently used bY',Navy ships for
On the other, band, for the United States the repair' and oVerhauls 'an'd one submarine Is permat).~ntly Indian Ocean is a major offensive development based there. area for their ballistic submarines against the Sovl· Clark Air Force base Is home for a large number of et Union" ._," U,S.A,F. aircraft and personJilel.
U.S. Troops Defend Dlctatonhlps Thailand Soutb VletlIatt..
u:t tr~~'p!i have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, yetthe~' are over &,000 "non·milltary" U.S. personnel and approximately 200 m!litary personnel there. Most of the non'mllitarY,afe Defense Department contract person,nel. \Vho~'f)l;nctl~jlIS military training, Intel1lsen~, operations \lndWa~on with Vietnamese forces. Many former U.S.
. ~1II1~rji tne" are employed In these roles.
South Kol'Q-
South Korea has' beent under martial law since October .1912'. Setilite FsSreign Relations Committee stall members
,',~hO vls,lted there In November, reported "The Assembly 'had been dl5solved, an action not. provld~d for In the constitution, and there were tanks (p'rovlded by the United
-States U)lder the MIlitary Assistance Program) in front of the National Assembly buUding. ,government ministries, newspaper'-offices and universities." President Park has been giv,en greater powers a\ld there i~ __ no limit to the numberof b·year terms tQ which he can;~~Je.elected. The U,~-. has spent 536.9 biIUM, In South ~oNa 1946·1972 for,· war costs. er:onom1c and,ilrl'_ll,tar): as~lslllnc'c)-i\liiJ 'to maintain forces th~l'e. Cu!"en$l1't~,l\Iril a~ 4,~qOp~~\SHtooPS at over 4O.facmt.I~~ III I\Ql'lIl\ K;o.~l .. '''I. ,~,~._~i.lit:j411uaffeB. f()r;tl;itl'8t.~:> Artny, t~e U.~: ¢pmmamlltb,lhtIU.S. Foree', and Arltly.tl ~ofps', 'with ,~1445'-,m,IUtati·, l~rsonl\l\Il ,assl~ed to,,,theso hl\ladquat16r~~" - i" -' , 'fhe Philllt~~"'.
: :::,. Jlresld~ -,,~tC'os instituted' martial law. jp, Sbptembet ; t.f1:2, A:n,ew:jl!,!:l)stit,utlon gave Marcos the p!)wers-'of'bpth p.~,lden~ and prime. mlnlsler for lis long as he likes. Arrest and 'suppression' of rebels contlnu~; particularly In the Solitherp ,Phmppines, 'looale 'of Muslenf Insurrection.
. Special ~or~s from the 1st Special Forces group based on
ii';·
There are 39,000 U.S. troops In Thailand, ,the 13th Air Force with 50 8·52 bombers, 19 KC·135 fuel tankers" and 230 combat aircraft. The U.S. bas 6 air bases in Thailand, 3 are major bases. The' U.S. bases in Thailand p.r:~lVide loglstlcs support to Laos and Cambodia. Also in Thailand are the U.S. Support Activities Group (which replacClC! the Ml11t!lry Assistance Command, Vietnam), a U.s: Special For~1IS Battalion, the U.S. Military Assi~hlnce Command, apd 2,300 U.S. m!lItary internal security personnel.
Republie of China tralwaa)
There are 8.000 l:l.S. officers and men,on.'Talw~~'an'd 54 aircraft at ,three major bases. Taiwan Is 'also the head· qUarters- for Air Asia; subsidiary'to Ihe CIA·owned ~Ir America airline, which carried out overflights of China and Tibet and was Involved In CIA's secret war In Laos.
The' U.S. commitment to the-defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands Is lessening since Congress withdrew tbe prior authotlty previously given to the President. It is doubtful If Taiwan-contributes in any way to the defense of the United States, --The, .U.S •. h.as 85 "~,~Sj, at1(\. military 'In'stallations, and l,q,OOl,ftnl1lta'ry pellonnel .. stftt_ionedJn Japan., The Navy for the IlrsHime In history tills, based III Japan I attack carrier and assocla'fed a!nying,),;j,J1ld~ mlssll.e Iitlht cruiser, 6 destroyer·type shlp,s"lInd:,Z,.'¢OmPat stOJil_,,·ships. The U.S. alrqrllrt carrier caplibio':Of.c~~rxt.~8, n,""l~~;w~apQns ,violates, the Japanese pollCY',wh!\ih ,prohibits -nuclear weapons In lapan. There has',b~n: opposition ~n Japan to the U.S. -Jap$l)ese allreefl1~f!t:t~at.,a_uthoflz.es :the U.S" to ,maintain I1).Ui!,iIry force".,ln' Jllpan/MQI'Qover, sln~ Japan's recog' nition of Chlnidn 1972, the 'continued need for large U.S . . .
military forces in Japan is no longer as Important as It once was. Tile U.S. plans a token reduction of military personnel of lO%and the relocation of some Japanese bases ove,r the next three years. There will be'some construction of new fa· cllitles at semi·permanent U.S. bases to replace those that the U.S. is giving up elsewhere, Planned reduction of mlli· tary personnel in Japan Is only 2,100. Japan herself has a modern growing military "self·defense" fOl'Ce of:
13 submarines (newly constructed In Japan) 166 surface combatants 110 naval aircraft 386 Air Force aircraft 266,000 military personnel 39.00q, reserves
120 surface·to·air missile launchers for HAWK mls· slles
Thll constitution of 1947, prohibits the Japanese.from maintaining armed forces. Japa)lls·ln the process ofdeeld· Ing Y{~at level of U.S. presence is n~ded. A ,sign,flcaht reo
U ,5. M1l1tllry Pt1'8Ol\Jlellb the Pacific
South Korea Thailand Japan Okinawa Philippines Taiwan Guam Australia Midway u.~
Vietnam Cambodia At1(lat ~W~I p;a~lfic)
Total
42,000
,,""" 19.000 37,000 14,000
.""" 14,000 1,000 1,000
237 22S 111 '
29,000
204~l3' '.
272
ductlon ofthe u.s. military presence In Japan would seem a logl~al course in any event. The U.S. has withdrawn from Vletnam"and boQ! the U.S. and Japan are on Improved terms with the People's Republic of China. Japan is strong enough economically and advanced technologically to mainlain, her own defense again's! any likely Chinese threat.
Okinawa
Once again part of Japan, Okinawa has a lolal of 77 U.S. bases. properties, and facilities, and 37,000 U.S. military personnel. The 1st Marine Airwing is based,there, with 92 aircraft. Air Force high flying long range ,oleclronic In· c
lel1lgence,aircraft rotale through Kadena, Okinawa. The flrst Special Forces Group (Green Berets) Is ~ased' on Okinawa. U.S. Installations (In Okinawa are'to.be reduced oVer the_next three years to 70 and of th,9Se, 13 will be reo duced In size. There is no planned reduction in numb61'S of military personnel.
South Korea Thailand Philippines Taiwan Laos Vietnam Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Relllo~al
Total
31,6,000,000 99.000,000 31,000,000 69,000,000
372,000,000 2,i33,ooo.ooo
381',000;000 3J.,000,()~)(L 19,000,000 9,000,000
53,460,000,000
273
U8 PORIION ICONOMIO AND MILITARY AB.ISTANCI TO lAST A81A AND TNE PACIFIC 1041·10' ........ , ..• 100 BILLION
Vietnam "41
Korea 531
THE STAFF
D~IN:
; Rear Admiral ~ne R. La -Rocque,' US Navy (Ret.)
f)lnctlll' if Res"",..,", David 1OIIn500
Dirutof' if Publ{~ J/lftmltg'WnI Duan Rudoy ,
~~~~!~I\l"n Bill Gulledge Cons'","", Matthews
SmlotEdltof'. ,"blSlUe S.lLyAndellon
Re.!~"'Adl3umce, Robert QUIIIIIIQ
The Center for Defense Information is a'project'ofthe'Futl'~ for :Pellce. ' .
(Sourcs- House of Representattv8s ,Rapor! No. 93·694
December 4.1973)
Other $4
Indonesia S:2 Thailand $2 Laos $2 Philippines $ 2 Japan $4 Republic of Chln~ $6
ADDITIONAL INI!~ORMATION PROVIDED BY THE CE-STER FOR DEFENSE INFORMA1'ION
HOll. ROBEBT N. C. NIX, M.C.,
ClilNTER' FOB DEFENSE INFOBMATION, WasMngton, D.O., October 30, 1974.
Ohairman, Asian ana ,Pamfl,o AfJa4!rs Subcot1'll1rltittee, O(;m,rn;ittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, WasMngtoo, D.O.
DEAR REiPltESENTATIVE NIx: When I testified before the committee earHer thIs month, you asked me if I could substantiate Admiral La Rocque's remarks about the danger of the theft of American nuclear:weapons abroad by terrorist groups. I indicated at that time that I would like. to· provide tbat .information for the record. That information follows. ,r would 'greatly appreciate if you would add it to the record of the hearings. Tom Kennedy also asked for an explanation of the statistics of 'm1Utary and economic aid reported on p'age eight of the March, 1974 Defense Monitor. That infQ,mation is also provided below.
The danger that U.S. nuclear weaPQns abroad could be 8tol(>11 by terrorists and used for nuclear bhickmail is real.
1. Recent press ··repor,ts indicate tl},at in an exercise, U.S; Green Ber",ts suc~ ceeded in penetrating the security s,vstems designed to protect nuclear w",apomo!. If the Green Berets cQuid do it, te~t:orist8' could do it.
2. The U.S. has at least 15,000 mi,~leal" weapons in the U . .s. and around the world. Periodically, they have to be ~sted. If one proves defective in some way. it 'has to be replaced by another weapon. As ,a r~s\\1t, U.S. nuclear weapons are regularly transported to m,any loca·tions around the world., The danger of ac~ cident ,or theft increases ,in direct proportion to' the frequency of these ship~ ments. Furthe,.rmore, ,these' weapons are moved frequ~ntly al'! part of varlouA mmtary exet:~~es. This also increaBes the danger.' "
3.' Another;,l)l,dication tbat this "1s a serious problem Is the concern recently sbown by the::';Pentagon for hnproving weapon security alld safeguards. In a statement be:(ore the Senate Foreign Relat1lms Committee Subcommittees on U.S. Security Agi~eements and CornmJtments Abroad and"A;rins Control, .Inter~~tional Law aoOd' Organization, on. April 4, 1974, Secretary i-of Defense Schlesinger de· scribed a.1Qng list of steps'that the Pentagon.is tR'kihg'totmprove nuclear weapon security. 'The tact that the ,Pentagon is undertaldng these stepR iB' clear evidence that they 'regard the problem as_, serious. The stePB 'in('lude:- 1) reduction of weapon movements, 2) consol1daUon of Weapon storage sites, 3) increased Bite defense and improved training for security: for®s, 4) improvements in the siteR thern:iselves ·~uch as llghtlng, road barrie,rs. ft:nd weapons security devices. Re/:Iea·rcb is being conducted on ,,-:ays of deteqtln~PJIlallt,llor,:i~ed intrmdon, denYing ,access to anQ" disabling (denial/disable'systems) nuclear,weapon$,. Ba<:8.use this problem is so important" the Congress should .,closely monitor the progress of these'l programs to in$utte: fgl1 and complete implementation. '
The military and ec:ohomic asRistan,ce fhcul'es provIded in the March 1974 Defense Monitor, page' eight, are from the House' of' Repr:~sentat1'Ves Report No. 98-694. They lnclude net economic and mUitary assistance, including that military ,asSistance fi:nanced frop} the DepRrtment of Def~nse, and are for the fiscal years ,1946 to 1978. There are essentially two dill'eren~s between the figures provided by earlier witnesses ·before the com~ltt~e, and mir' 'figUres :"~l) :figures g1~en ,to thf' committee are ,for the yMrs ,1946 t().191~,i :whi~,e our:fi~re$ are for 1946 to 197,', 2) the $87 b!llUm fI~ure that we,g~v~ fO~:B:orea Inr\M~ $21! blll!on financed by the Department of·Defertse Which I~ not IhCluded Inth~"1Igt\re8 given to the committee by earUer witnesses, Whs,1f the .$21$ b!U!on 'flIillncedby the Defense Department 18. addedto:,the ftPl>rdi,ihnateLv$12 b!Ulon·'!n rumt.:1';\' and economic d!l to' Korea reported~!by .~I\'Vl1er WItnesses one arrtve-s at the figurp of $37 b!lllon: reported II) page elght'~t'a'''. fMf¢n8e M onittYl'.
TIlankY0)l forg\!1ng ni.,,'t4~'Nllii<1rtun!ty of tesUfylng on thl. Important matter. I share your 'i!<mcern('iw:JilJh!·: A.rher.i9au., 'Forces, in Asia. I hope we haye the opportunity to'sbare our viewf!:: ,W)'t.h' you 1n the near future.
