25-June 2013 Compilation

8/10/2019 25-June 2013 Compilation

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Alindogan. Bacolod. Chua. Del M undo. Medina. Oasan. Patulot. Alindogan. Bacolod. Chua. Del Mundo. Medina. Oasan. Patulot. Alindogan. Bacolod. Chua. Del Mundo. Medina. Oasan. Patulot

115. Guevara vs. Guevara (G.R. No. L 5405. January 31, 1956)

Topic: Allowance and disallowance of wills modes of probate

Facts:

Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he madevarious bequests to his wife, stepchildren, and wife in thesecond marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and anatural daughter Rosario. Wherein, he acknowledged Rosarioas his natural daughter.

In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented forprobate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. Itappeared that only his son Ernesto possessed the land whichhe adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will inher custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, aswell as the devise given to her.

Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of herlegitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of landinvoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and basedon the assumption that the decedent died intestate becausehis will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition infavor of Ernesto should be disregarded. The lower court andthe Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with?

Held/ Ratio:

No. It violates procedural law and is considered as an attemptto circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. Thepresentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory andits allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy forwithout probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property

by will may be rendered nugatory.


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116. Gan v. Yap (SUPRA)

Topic: Allowance and disallowance of wills requirement for probate

Facts:

On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died ofheart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leavingproperties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.

On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedingsin the Manila court of first instance with a petition for theprobate of a holographic will allegedly executed by thedeceased.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yapasserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executedany testament during her lifetime.

After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the

Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate thealleged will. A seventy page motion for reconsideration failed.Hence this appeal.

Issue:

WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony ofwitnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that itwas in the handwriting of the testator?

Held/Ratio: NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a

lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by thebare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read suchwill. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the onlymedium of proof. Even if oral testimony were admissible toestablish and probate a lost holographic will, we think theevidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted withimprobabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up

to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.11.


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117. Rodelas v Aranza


Facts:

On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Courtof First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic willof Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentaryin her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, wasopposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, WilferineBonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla onthe various grounds.

Issue:

Whether the holographic will which was lost or cannot befound be proved by means of a photostatic copy.

Held/Ratio:

Yes. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate ofholographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court afterits due execution has been proved. The probate may beuncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifyingwitness is required and, if no witness is available, experts maybe resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnessesare required. However, if the holographic will has been lost ordestroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not beprobated because the best and only evidence is thehandwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that therebe a comparison between sample handwritten statements ofthe testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy orxerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed becausecomparison can be made with the standard writings of thetestator.

The photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed

holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity

of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by theprobate court.


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118. FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant, vs. CESARIOSINGSON, oppositor-appellee. (G.R. No. L-14003. August 5, 1960)


FACTS:

Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died. Francisco Azaola, petitionerherein for probate of the holographic will, submitted the saidholographic will whereby Maria Milagros Azaola was made thesole heir.

Witness Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the holographicwill (Exh. C) one month, more or less, before the death of thetestatrix and witnessed testified he recognized the signaturestherein presenting as evidence residence certificates, specialpower of attorney, mortgage document etc

Testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid

documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix aswell as the signatures appearing in the aforesaid documentaryevidence

An opposition was raised based on two grounds: execution ofthe will was procured by undue and improper pressure andinfluence on the part of the petitioner and his wife testatrix didnot seriously intend the instrument to be her last will

Probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 (3witnesses to proven handwriting and signature)

Azaola appealedISSUE:

Was Azaola bound to present 3 witnesses even though the willwas not contested?

Held:

NO, REQUIREMENT OF 3 WITNESSES APPLIES ONLYWHEN WILL IS CONTESTED Was the requirement under 811

mandatory? ACCORDING TO THE SC IN THIS CASE 1ST

PARAGRAPH IF 811 IS MERELY DISCRETIONARY NOTMANDATORY!

RATIO:

Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was notrequired to produce more than one witness; but even if the

genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are ofthe opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code cannot beinterpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of threewitnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, underpenalty of having the probate denied.

Since no witness may have been present at the execution of aholographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, newCivil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesspossessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond thecontrol of the proponent

There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; oreven if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to givea positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of

Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidentlythe reason why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribesthat in the absence of any competent witness referred to inthe preceding paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary,expert testimony may be resorted to Our conclusion is that therule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is

merely directory and is not mandatory.


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119. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY vs. EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY(G.R. No. 123486. August 12, 1999)


Facts:

On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay and two other deviseesand legatees of the holographic will of the deceased MatildeSeo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the willwho died on January 16, 1990.

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy filed anopposition to the petition alleging that the holographic will wasa forgery. Respondents presented six (6) witnesses andvarious documentary evidence. Herein petitioners filed ademurrer to evidence, which was granted by the lower court.

Respondents filed a notice of appeal and in support they

reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely:1.Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, where the probate of theholographic will was filed; 2. Generosa Senon, electionregistrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produce thevoter's affidavit of the decedent, however, the voters' affidavitwas already destroyed; 3. Matilde Binanay, testified that thedeceased was her aunt, and that she lived with her for eleven(11) years, During those years she acquired familiarity with hersignature as she used to accompany her in collecting rentalsfrom her tenants and the deceased always issued receipts,moreover, she assisted in posting the records of the accounts,and carried personal letters of the deceased to her creditors;4. Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that he handled all thepleadings and documents signed by the deceased inconnection with the intestate proceedings of her late husband,he testified that the signature appearing in the holographic willwas similar to that of the deceased but he cannot be sure;and, 5. Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the DENR whotestified that she processed the application of the deceased for

pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the

deceased; 6. Evangeline Calugay testified that she had livedwith the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by thelatter. She testified that the signature appearing in theholographic will is true and genuine.

The Court of Appeals held that even if the genuineness of theholographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code inrequiring the production of three witnesses is merelypermissive. Thus, the Court of Appeals sustained theauthenticity of the holographic will and allowed the will toprobate.

Issue:

WON the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code arepermissive or mandatory?

Held:

It is MANDATORY under Article 811 of the NCC.

Ratio:

The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of acontested holographic will, that at least three witnessesexplicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuinesignature of the testator. We are convinced, based on thelanguage used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory.The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order.

In the case at bar, the goal is to give effect to the wishes of thedeceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility thatunscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employmeans to defeat the wishes of the testator. It will be noted thatnot all the witnesses were familiar with the handwriting of thetestator.

In the case of Augusto Neri, he merely identified the record ofthe Special Proceedings. Generosa E. Senon, did not evenproduce the voters' affidavit as it was no longer available. The

will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased


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but with Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in herpossession as early as 1985. There was no opportunity for anexpert to compare the signature and the handwriting of thedeceased with other documents. Even the former lawyer of thedeceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of thesignature. A visual examination of the holographic willconvince us that the strokes are different; there were unevenstrokes, retracing and erasures on the will. In the letters, thereare continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is nohesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We,therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in thehandwriting by the deceased. IN VIEW WHEREOF, thedecision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records areordered remanded to the court of origin.


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120. NEPOMUCENO vs CA


DOCTRINE:

The general rule is that the probate court's area of inquiry islimited to the extrinsic validity of the will, practicalconsiderations may compel the probate court to pass uponmatters of intrinsic validity. A dispositioj in favor of a mistressis void and a probate court, in accordance with the ruling inNuguid v Nuguid, may pass upon such provision for thepurpose of declaring its nullity.

Facts:

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left alast will and testament.

It is clear that the testator was legally married to RufinaGomez by whom he had 2 legitimate children. but since 1952,he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife (RufinaGomez) and had been living with petitioner (nepomuceno) ashusband and wife In the will: petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno isthe sole heir and only executor. Totally Excluding Rufina andhis children.

The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will andTestament but was opposed by legal wife and children.

Respondents: the fact that the last will and testament itselfexpressly admits indubitably on its face the meretriciousrelationship between the testator and the petitioner and thefact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidenceon her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the testator,which led private respondents to present contrary evidence,merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid vsnuguid.

The admission of the testator of the illicit relationship betweenhim and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise.

RTC: denied probate CA: set aside the decision ofRTC.declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor ofthe petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relationto Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Issue/Held:

WON testamentary provision in favor of nepomuceno is nulland void.----> YES. void

Ratio:

The court of appeals is correct. The contention of respondentsare correct. the admission of testator in the will of its illicitrelationship between him and the petitioner put in issue thelegality of the devise.

The donation between persons who are guilty of adultery of

concubinage at the time of the donation intervivos is void andthe prohibition applies to testamentary provisions. The deviseof him to nepomuceno is void, therefore Rufina and hischildren are the right heirs to inherit.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court'sarea of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution ofthe extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is notinflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, theprobate court is not powerless to do what the situationconstrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will.

In Nuguid v Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, thetestator instituted the petitioner as universal heir andcompletely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of thisnature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, wouldbe null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determinethe intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would besuperfluous.

Article 739 CC (void donations) 1) those made betweenpersons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time


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of donation. Xxx Article 1028 provides that 739 apply totestamentary provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a priorexisting marriage when Martin Jugo executed his will. There isalso no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived togetherin an ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until hisdeath.

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code isagainst the making of a donation between persons who areliving in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation whichbecomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that therecipient may receive. The very wordings of the will invalidatethe legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing theproperties to a person with whom he had been living inconcubinage.


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121. Gallonosa vs Arcangel

Topic: Allowance and disallowance of wills Effects of decree ofprobate

SUMMARY:

Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time. He died in1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, hebequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his secondwife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), thesaid share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro& Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He alsogave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.

The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa asexecutor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an action for the

recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissedon the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate,another acton against Gallanosa for annulment of the will,recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As aresult, the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.

FACTS:

Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect when hewas 80 years old. He died. He survived by his brother.

A petition for the probate of his will was filed in theCFI.Florentino bequeathed his one- half in the conjugal shareto his second wifeTecla and should Tecla predecease him, hisone- half share would be assigned to spouses PedroGallonosa (child of Tecla from her first marriage)who grew upwith Florentino.

The testator's legal heirs, the surviving brother,nephews andnieces filed an opposition. However, oppositors did not presentany evidence in support of their opposition.

JUDGE: admitted the probate of the will

The testamentary heirs, the Gallanosa spouses submitted aproject of partition covering the 61 parcels of land. The projectpartition was approved by the Judge.

Leon Hitosis instituted an action against Pedro Gallanosa forthe recovery of 61 parcels of land that they themselves hadbeen in continuous possession of those land. They wanted tobe declared the owner of the land. Later on, another actonagainst Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of thelands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, thelower court set aside the 1939 decree of probate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hitosis have a cause of action in filing theannulment of the will of Florentino Hitosis for the recovery of61 parcels of land even if the will is already probated?

HELD:

No. There should be no annulment of the will once it isprobated.

RATIONALE:

What the plaintiffs seek is the "annulment" of a last will trialtestament duly probated in 1939 by the lower court itself. Theproceeding is coupled with an action to recover the landsadjudicated to the defendants by the same court in 1943 byvirtue of the probated will.

The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the dueexecution or formal validity of the will.

In Manahan vs Manahan--- If the legal requirement in theexecution of the will has been complied with,these factscannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, noteven in a criminal action for the forgery of the will In Austria vs.Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" wasnot entertained after the decree of probate had become final.

That case is summarized as follows: Wills; Probate; Alledged


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Fraudulent Will; Appeal. V. died. His will was admitted toprobate without objection. No appeal was taken from saidorder. It was admitted that due trial legal notice had beengiven to all parties. Fifteen months after the date of said order,a motion was presented in the lower court to have said willdeclared null and void, for the reason that fraud had beenpractised upon the deceased in the making of his will.

Held:

That under section 625 of Act No. 190, the only time givenparties who are displeased with the order admitting to probatea will, for an appeal is the time given for appeals in ordinaryactions; but without deciding whether or not an order admittinga will to probate will be opened for fraud, after the time allowedfor an appeal has expired, when no appeal is taken from anorder probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent

litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating toits due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to itsdue execution trial as to the testamentary capacity of thetestator. IN SHORT,

RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to thedue execution of the will. Due execution means that thetestator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of theexecution and that he was not acting under duress, menace,fraud or undue influence.

Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalitiesprovided by law. The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already

expired, hence the judgment may only be set aside on thegrounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law,and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsiccollateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from thediscovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills andtestament.


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122. Roberts vs. Leonidas (G.R. No. L 55509. April 27, 1984)


Facts:

Grimm, a US citizen living in Manila executed two wills in SanFrancisco, California.

One will disposed of his Philippine estate and the otherdisposed of his estate outside the Philippines. Ethel, Grimmsdaughter from the first marriage, filed a petition for intestateproceeding and was named as the special administratrix.Maxine, Grimms second wife, opposed on the ground thattheir was a pending probate proceeding in Utah, USA.

Maxine later filed a petition for probate of the 2 wills, alreadyprobated in Utah and prayed that she be appointed as special

administratrix. Since the parties wanted it, Maxine, Edward(son Maxine and Grimm), and Ethel were all appointed as jointadministrators of the estate. The joint administrators submittedan inventory of the estate and the project of partition wasapproved by the intestate Court knowing that the testator lefttwo wills.

Issue:

Whether or not the intestate court should continue with the

intestate proceeding and continue with the project of partition?Held/Ratio:

No. A testate proceeding was proper in this case.The probateof the will is mandatory because Grimm died with two wills and"no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it isproved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,Rules of Court).

It was anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate

should be settled in an intestate proceeding. The intestate

case should be consolidated with the estate proceeding andthe judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continuehearing the cases.


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123. Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals


Facts:

Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein heinstituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. Itwas also provided therein that he was married to RufinaGomez with whom he had 3 children.

Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legalwife and her children opposed alleging that the will wasprocured through improper and undue influence and that therewas an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

The lower court denied the probate on the ground of thetestator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will

invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and heldthat the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitionerwhich is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue:

Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of awill

RULING:

Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court'sarea of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolutionof the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is howevernot inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances,the probate court is not powerless to do what the situationconstrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of thewill. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship betweenthe testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the

court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the

nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose onlysince in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily lookinto the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids adonation made between persons guilty ofadultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art,1028 it is also prohibited.


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124. De la Cerna v Rebaca-Potot


Facts:

Spouses. Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca,executed a joint last will and testament. The Court of FirstInstance ordered the petition heard and declared thetestament null and void, for being executed contrary to theprohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Codeof 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but onappeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appealsreversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive onthe due execution of the testament.

Issue:

Effects of validity of joint will as to share of wife who dies laterthan the husband.

Held/Ratio:

Where a husband and wife executed a joint will and upon thedeath of the husband said will was admitted to probate by afinal decree of the court although erroneous, and the wife dies

later, it is held that the said first decree of probate affects onlythe estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of thewife, considering that a joint will is a separate will of eachtestator; and a joint will being prohibited by law, the estate ofthe wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs andnot to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will isshown to exist in favor of the latter or unless the testamentaryheir is the only heir of said wife.

A final probate decree of a joint will of husband and wifeaffects only the share of the deceased spouse and cannot

include the disposition of said joint will, in so far as the estateof the latter spouse is concerned, must be, on her death,reexamined and adjudicated de novo.


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125. TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased, ANDRES PASCUAL, petitioner-appellee, vs. PEDRO DE LA CRUZ,ET AL., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-24819. May 30, 1969

Topic: Grounds for disallowance

FACTS:

2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without anysurviving descendant or ascendant, died. Petition for theprobate of her alleged will was filed by Andres Pascual, whowas named in the said will as executor and sole heir of thedecedent.

Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephewsand nieces of deceased contested the validity of the will on thegrounds that the formalities required by law were not compliedwith; that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of

her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the willwas procured by undue and improper pressure and influenceon the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of thetestatrix was obtained through fraud.

Probate court rendered judgment upholding the due executionof the will and appointed petitioner Andres Pascual executorand administrator of the estate

Oppositors filed directly with SC because estate was worthmore than 300k. Oppositors claim that the lower court erred ingiving credence to the testimonies of the subscribingwitnesses and the notary that the will was duly executed,notwithstanding the existence of inconsistencies andcontradictions in the testimonies

According to the Lower court the inconsistencies wereacceptable since the will was signed in 1954 and thetestimonies were taken in 1962. It was understandable andreasonable to expect that said witnesses will not retain a vividpicture of the details surrounding the execution and signing ofthe will

ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:

1.) Were the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses aground for disallowance of probate? NO

We agree with the trial judge that the contradictionsand inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of thewitnesses and the notary relate to unimportant details

of the impressions of the witnesses about certaindetails which could have been affected by the lapse oftime and the treachery of human memory, and whichinconsistencies.

2.) Was there fraud, undue influence in the signing of the will NO

Neither do we believe that the fact that the witnesseswere better known to proponent Andres Pascual thanto the testatrix suffices to render their testimonysuspect. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that themere fact that a Will was made in favor of a stranger isnot in itself proof that the same was obtained throughfraud and undue pressure or influence, for we havenumerous instances where strangers are preferred toblood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the caseat bar, Andres Pascual, although not related by bloodto the deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely nota stranger to the latter for she considered him as her

own son. As a matter of fact it was not only Catalina dela Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual butalso her sisters held him with affection so much so thatCatalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also hersole heir to her property in her Will without anyobjection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.


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126. Austria v Reyes (G.R. No. L-23079, 27 February 1970)

Topic: Institution of heirs, devisees, legatees - FALSE CAUSE

Facts:

Basilia Austria Vda. De Cruz filed a petition for probate, antemortem, of her last will and testament. The probate wasopposed by the present petitioners who were nephews andnieces of Basilia. The opposition was dismissed and theprobate of the will was allowed.

Under the will of Basilia, the bulk of her estate would pass onto the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, IsaganiCruz, Alberto Cruz and Lyn Cruz-Salonga, all of whom hadbeen assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legallyadopted children. More than two years after her will wasallowed, Basilia died.

The respondent Perfecto Cruz was subsequently appointed asexecutor of her estate. However, the petitioners filed in thesame proceedings a petition in intervention for partitionalleging in substance that they are the nearest kin of Basiliaand that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by thedecedent in accordance with law. Such petition in interventionwas allowed. More than three years after they were allowed tointervene, the petitioners moved the lower court to set forhearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of therespondents, rendering these respondents mere strangers tothe decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. Beforethe date of the hearing arrived, one of the respondents

Benita Cruz Meez filed a motion asking the lower court toconfine the petitioners intervention to properties not disposedof in the will of the decedent.

The court granted the said motion. The motion forreconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the lowercourt.

Hence, this instant petition for certiorari to have the order

restricting petitioners intervention to properties that were not

included in the decedents testamentary dispositions annulledwas filed.

Issue:

WON the institution of the heirs would retain efficacy in theevent there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by

the decedent was false?Held:

YES, under Article 850 of the Civil Code provides: Thestatement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall beconsidered as not written, unless it appears from the will thatthe testator would not have made such institution if he hadknown the falsity of such cause. As such the extrinsic validityof the will is controlling (there were no evidence that deceasedhesitated or was mistaken in bequeathing her estate to theadopted children) and the court respects the wishes of thedeceased in giving the bulk of her estate to her adoptedchildren.

Ratio:

Under this provision, before the institution of heirs may beannulled, the following requisites must concur: First, the causefor the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second,the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appearfrom the face of the will that the testator would not have madesuch institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

From the use in the will of the terms sapilitang tagapagmana(compulsory heirs) and sapilitang mana (legitime), thepetitioners contended that the institution of the respondents asheirs was only impelled by her belief that they were hercompulsory heirs. However, the Court made mention of thefact that if such reason indeed prompted the testatrix ininstituting the respondents, Basilia did not make it known in

her will.


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The Court found petitioners theory to be highly speculative ofwhat was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed thewill. The Court could not annul the institution of heirs on thebasis of guesswork or uncertain implications. The phrases,"mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana" wereborrowed from the language of the law on succession andwere used, respectively, to describe the class of heirsinstituted and the abstract object of the inheritance.

They offered no absolute indication that the decedent wouldhave willed her estate other than the way she did if she hadknown that she was not bound by law to make allowance forlegitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estatewhich largely favored the respondents showed a perceptibleinclination on her part to give to the respondents more thanwhat she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Thismay be taken in comparison with the relatively small devise of

land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives,including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and LauroMozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Ifrespondents Perfecto Cruz, et al, were excluded from theinheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews andnieces would succeed to the bulk of the estate by intestacy a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.


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127. AZNAR VS DUNCAN

Topic: Preterition - manner

DOCTRINE:

The concept of total omission from the hereditary estate isexplained in this case. While the traditional concept ofomission, based on Roman Law, means that the compulsoryheir was not instituted as an heir, the same was abandoned sothat if a compulsory heir were given a legacy by the testator inthe will (without instituting him or her as an heir), the saidcompulsory heir can no longer claim the benefit of Article 854.

FACTS:

Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of Californi a with domicile inthe Philippines, died leaving a will. It was admitted to probateby the Court of First Instance of Davao and declared HelenGarcia as his natural child.

CFI approved project of partition. It was divided between LucyDuncan and Helen Garcia, both his daughters. The said orderwas based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia hadbeen preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heirwas annulled, and hence the properties passed to both ofthem as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only thelegacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies

have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed tothe legatees. In the will: it was only lucy duncan who were declared as

daughter and helen not in any way related to him but she wasgiven some legacy.

The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that therehas been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in thedirect line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir,pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code.

Appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition, but isgoverned by Article 906 of the Civil Code which says: "Anycompulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title lessthan the legitime belonging to him may demand that the samebe fully satisfied." And considering the provisions of the willwhereby the testator expressly denied his relationship withHelen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless, althoughless than the amount of her legitime, she was in effectdefectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918

ISSUE:

In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only tothe completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of theinstitution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left tohim in the will "by any title," as by legacy, be granted to him inhis capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In order

words, should he be recognized or referred to in the will asheir? This question is pertinent because in the will of thedeceased Edward E. Christensen, Helen Garcia is notmentioned as an heir - indeed her status as such is denied -but is given a legacy of Php3,600.00.

HELD/RATIO:

(Manresa cited three cases in spanish) In each one of thosecases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy

worth less than the legitime, but without referring to thelegatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest ofthe estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirsbe annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with theexpressed wishes of the testator in the present case as maybe gathered very clearly from the provisions of his will. Herefused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter,and limited her share to a legacy of Php3,600.00. The fact that


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she was subsequently declared judicially to possess suchstatus is no reason to assume that had the judicial declarationcome during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards herwould have undergone any change and that he would havewilled his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alonewas expressly recognized by him.

The decision of this Court in Neri et al. v Akutin, 74 Phil 185, iscited by appellees in support of their theory of preterition. Thatdecision is not here applicable, because it referred to a willwhere "the testator left all his property by universal title to thechildren by his second marriage, and (that) without expresslydisinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing tothem, or at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testatordid not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but lefther a legacy of Php3,600.00.

The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death

consisted of 399 shares of stocks in the ChristensenPlantation company and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth(1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime.Since she became the owner of her share as of the moment ofthe death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she isentitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits orincrements thereof subsequently accruing. These include thestock dividends on the corporate holdings. The contention ofLucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her accordingto the terms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would ineffect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia withrespect to her legitime.

Decision: giving Helen Garcia no more than the portioncorresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4)of the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and chargeswhich shall not include those imposed in the will of thedecedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code


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128. Tirso Reyes vs Lucia Baretto- Datu (Gr. No. L-17818)

Topic: Preterition - manner

Preterition - The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of thecompulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of theexecution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annulthe institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be validinsofar as they are not inofficious.

FACTS:

Bibiano Barreto was married to Maria Gerardo. During theirlifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of realproperties in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan. When BibianoBarretto died. He left these properties in a will to the following:Salud Barretto, mother of the plaintiff's ward Lucia MilagrosBarretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sistersRosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto

The usufruct of the fishpond that was situated in Hagonoy,Bulacan was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. MariaGerardo was appointed as administratix.

There was a project partition and it was approved by the court. As a result, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of hershare and secured the cancellation of the original certificatesof title and the issuance of new tittles in her own name.

Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the

distribution of the said estate until the widow Maria Gerardodied.

Upon Maria's death, it was discovered that she executed twowills: FIRST WILL: instituted Salud and Lucia Milagros (was aminor when she signed the partition and Maria signed as theguardian of Lucia) as her heirs SECOND WILL: she revokedthe first will and left all the properties in favour of MilagrosBarretto alone. THUS MAKING THE LAST WILL ALLOWED

AND THE FIRST WILL REJECTED

RTC ruled that Salud was not the daughter of the decedentMaria by her husband Bibiano Barretto. As the legitimate heirof Maria Gerardo, plaintiff Tirso falls back upon the remnant ofthe estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was givenin the usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo, Hence, this

ACTION IS FOR THE RECOVERY OF ONE-HALF PORTION. RESPONDENT LUCIA contends that the project partition from

which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and SaludBarretto did not acquire any valid title

RTC ruled that the proceedings for the settlement of the estateof Bibiano Barretto to be null and void ab initio because Saludwas not the a daughter of Bibiano and Maria. Also, the courtREJECTED the contention that since Bibiano Barretto wasfree to dispose of the 1/3 of his estate under the old civil code,his will is valid in favour of Salud to the extent of the freeportion because under the New Civil Code, the property

acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in impliedtrust for the real owner. NOTE: PETITIONER'S CONTENTION: the fact that Salud

happened not to be a daughter of the testator does notpreclude her being the one of his heirs expressly named in thetestament.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SALUD is precluded from acquiring property

from the will?HELD:

No. She was not precluded.

RATIONALE:

Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother andguardian (Maria Gerardo) could not have ignored that thedistributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in

agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud


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on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place,there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barrettowas judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor,Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano'schild: so that if fraud was committed, it was the widow, MariaGerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither Salud norher minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable

therefor. In the second placegranting that there was suchfraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years fromits discovery, and the record shows that this period hadelapsed long ago.

In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Saludand Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement ofthe estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, isnot void for being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the,

Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action tocontest said partition and decree of distribution is barred bythe statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and shouldaccount for the fruits received from the properties inherited bySalud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It followsthat the plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond describedin the complaint should have been given due course.


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129. Acain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72706. October27, 1987)

Topic: Preterition compulsory heirs

Facts:

Constantino Acain filed with the Regional Trial Court a petitionfor the probate of the will of his late uncle, Nemesio Acain, onthe premise that the latter died leaving a will in which theformer and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs.

After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, VirginiaFernandez and Rosa Diongson Vda. De Acain, a legallyadopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively,filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino

Acain had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) Heis merely a universal heir; and (3) The widow and the adopted

daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for

reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the

Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition withpreliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to theIntermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez andDiongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss thepetition for probate of the wi ll. Due to the denial of Acainsmotion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for reviewon certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson Vda.De Acain had been pretirited?

Held:

1.) Yes. (Virginia Fernandez)2.) No. (Rosa Diongson Vda. De Acain)

Ratio:

Article 854 of the Civil Code: The preterition or omission ofone, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,whether living at the time of the execution of the will or bornafter the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are

not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,

the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the rightof representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of theforced heirs or anyone of them either because they are notmentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neitherinstituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not applyas she does not ascend or descend from the testator, althoughshe is a compulsory heir.

However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopteddaughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Childand Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adoptedperson the same rights and duties as if he/she were alegitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted persona legal heir of the adopter.

It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preteritedin the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were

deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied thatthey were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clearcase of preterition of the legally adopted child (VirginiaFernandez).

To tolerate the probate of the will and allow the case toprogress when on its face the will appeared to be intrinsicallyvoid as allowing the petitioner and his brothers and sisters tobe instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious factthat one of the private respondents had been preterited wouldhave been an exercise in futility.


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It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plusadded futility. The trial court could have denied its probateoutright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of thetestamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the willwas resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid,supra.) The remedies of certiorari and prohibition wereproperly availed of by private respondents.

The universal institution of Acain together with his brothersand sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results intotally abrogating the will because the nullification of suchinstitution of universal heirs without any other testamentarydisposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing atall was written.


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130. REMEDIOS NUGUID, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGANUGUID


Facts:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate orillegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, FelixNuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers andsisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

Remedios Nuguid Petitioner prayed to the CFI to admit toprobate a holographic will allegedly executed by RosarioNuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before herdemise and that letters of administration with the will annexed

be issued to her. The will instituted Remedios as universal heirand omitted Felix and Paz completely. CFI held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will

perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceasedRosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

Issues/Ratio:

(1) WON this is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather thanone of preterition. From this, petitioner draws the conclusion

that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". Thisargument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretentionand disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's willof the forced heirs or anyone of them, either becausethey are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expresslydisinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is atestamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir

of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized bylaw. "

Express as disinheritance should be, the same must besupported by a legal cause specified in the will itself.

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix'sparents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their namesaltogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffectivedisinheritance is clearly one in which the said forcedheirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing frompreterition are totally different from those ofdisinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the CivilCode, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir".This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, inaddition, testamentary dispositions in the form ofdevises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under

Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shallalso "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar asit may prejudice the person disinherited", which lastphrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Betterstated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to thatportion of the estate of which the disinherited heirshave been illegally deprived.

(2) WON compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled toreceive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is notinvalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted isreduced to the extent of said legitimes. Yes, they are entitledto their legitimes but the institution of heir is still invalidated bylaw not just merely reduced to the extent of said legitimes.

If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fallinto the concept of legacies and betterments reducingthe bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of theinstitution, would be absolutely meaningless and will

never have any application at all. And the remaining


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provisions contained in said article concerning thereduction of inofficious legacies or betterments wouldbe a surplusage because they would be absorbed by

Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would bedestroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced isdue mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs

from legacies and betterments, and a general from aspecial provision. With reference to article 814, whichis the only provision material to the disposition of thiscase, it must be observed that the institution of heirs istherein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct fromlegacies or betterments. And they are separate anddistinct not only because they are distinctly andseparately treated in said article but because they arein themselves different.

Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title ofproperty that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specificproperty bequeathed by a particular or special title. ...But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as alegacy. The disputed order, we observe, declares thewill in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of theCivil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution ofheir". Considering, however, that the will before ussolely provides for the institution of petitioner asuniversal heir, and nothing more, the result is the

same. The entire will is null.

Decision: Order affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.


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131. Balanay, Jr. v Martinez


Facts:

Leodegaria Julian died on February 12, 1973 survived by herhusband, Felix Balanay Sr., and by their six legitimatechildren, namely, Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio,Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanabanand Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition for theprobate of his mother's notarial will. In that will LeodegariaJulian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southernhalf" of nine conjugal lots; (b) that she was the absolute ownerof two parcels of land which she inherited from her father, and(c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be

divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and thattheir legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of herproperties.

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after herhusband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) herparaphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which shedescribed as "my properties") should be divided anddistributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. Shedevised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were allowned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.

Felix Balanay Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probateof the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,undue influence, preterition of the husband and allegedimproper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositorsclaimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain propertieswhich he had received from the testatrix.

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attachedthereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay Sr. wherein he withdrew

his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he

was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix BalanaySr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) ofDivision and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein hemanifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived andrenounced" his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of theirsix children. In that same instrument he confirmed theagreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her

death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in themanner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contendedthat the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay Sr. werevoid. The lower court in its order denied the opposition andreset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to theaffidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay Sr.

Issue:

Whether Felix Balanay Sr. could validly renounce hishereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugalpartnership.

Held/Ratio:

Yes, Felix Balanay Sr. could validly renounce his hereditaryrights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Art.179(1) and 1041, Civil Code), but insofar as said renunciationpartakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half

share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1050(1), Civil Code), itshould be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should beadjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance.Or at least his legitime should be respected.


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132. ZONIA ANA T. SOLANO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, BIENVENIDO S. GARCIA, and EMETERIA S. GARCIA,respondents (G.R. No. L-41971. November 29, 1983)


Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of thecompulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of theexecution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shallannul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall bevalid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, theinstitution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right ofrepresentation. (814a)

FACTS:

Undisputed facts: Deceased Solano was married to Pilar Riosa (died),

then married Lily Gorand (french who he laterdivorced), in 1930 he had an amorous relationship withJuana Garcia (mother of petitioners) then in 1935started living with Trinidad Tuagnon (mother ofrespondent)

During the Japanese occupation, Solano divorcedGorand and executed an "Escritura de Reconocimientode Unit Hija Natural" acknowledging ZONIA as a"natural child"

SOLANO executed his "Ultima Voluntad y Testamento"instituting ZONIA as his universal heir to all hispersonal and real properties

During his lifetime, Deceased Solano filed a petition forprobate of his will in which Zonia Solano was institutedas heir and executrix.

Bienvenido and Emerita Garcia (Garcias) filed an action forrecognition against Deceased during his lifetime, the deceased

denied paternity. Deceased died, hence was substituted byZonia as the deceased's sole heir.

ZONIA entered her formal appearance as a "substitutedefendant" claiming additionally that she was the sole heir ofher father, SOLANO, and asking that she be allowed toassume her duties as executrix of the probated Will with theleast interference from the GARCIAS

GARCIAS impugned the recognition of ZONIA as anacknowledged natural child praying the latter be declared asan adulterous child of the decedent and also impleaded theestate of Solano

Trial Court: three (3) children shall share equally the estate orone- third (1/3) each, without prejudice to the legacy given toTrinidad Tuagnon and the right of any creditors of the estate. --

Affirmed by the CA SC -- bound by facts found by TC and SC (above mentioned

undisputed facts)ISSUE/HELD:

(1) Were the Garcia's entitled to a claim in the estate of theDECEASED SOLANO? -- YES

(2) Did the lower court in declaring null and void the institution ofheir in SOLANO's will; in concluding that total intestacyresulted therefrom; and distributing the shares of the parties inSOLANO's estate when said estate was under the jurisdictionand control of the Probate Court in Special Proceedings actbeyond its jurisdiction? -- NO

RATIO:

SOLANO himself instituted the petition for probate of the Willduring his lifetime. That proceeding was not one to settle theestate of a deceased person that would be deemed terminatedonly upon the final distribution of the residue of the hereditaryestate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have


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terminated except that it appears that the parties, afterSOLANO's death, continued to file pleadings therein.

It is settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as toits due execution. A probate decree is not concerned with theintrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the Will.

Lower court had jurisdiction to conclude that, upon the facts,the GARCIAS and ZONIA were in the same category asillegitimate children; that ZONIA's acknowledgment as a"natural child" in a notarial document executed by SOLANOand Trinidad Tuagnon on December 22, 1943 was erroneousbecause at the time of her birth in 1941, SOLANO was stillmarried to Lilly Gorand, his divorce having been obtained onlyin 1943

Being compulsory heirs, the GARCIAS were, in fact,pretended from SOLANO's Last' Will and Testament; and thatas a result of said preterition, the institution of ZONIA as sole

heir by SOLANO is null and void pursuant to Article 854 of theCivil Code.The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of thecompulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at thetime of the execution of the will or born after the deathof the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but thedevises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they arenot inofficious.

The pretention of the GARCIAS should annul the institution ofZONIA as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirsis impaired. It is a plain that the intention of the testator was tofavor ZONIA with certain portions of his property, which, underthe law, he had a right to dispose of by will, so that thedisposition in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half(1/2) portion of the property that the testator could freelydispose of. Since the legitime of illegitimate children consistsof one half (1/2) of the hereditary estate, the GARCIAS andZONIA each have a right to participation therein in theproportion of one-third (1/3) each. ZONIA's hereditary share

will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while

the GARCIAS will respectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 ofthe value of the estate.


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133. Seangio v Reyes (G.R. No. 140372-72. 27 November 2006)


FACTS:

Private Respondents, Alfredo Seangio et. al filed for the settlementof the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangioopposed said petition, contending that Segundo left a holographicwill disinheriting Alfredo for cause. The reason for the disinheritancewas due to Alfredos maltreatment (lapastangan at isang besesnagsalita ng masama sa harap ng kanyang ama dahil siya aynangutang ng 1million noon at ginamit pa ang pangalan ng kanyangama) to his father Segundo.

In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that inthe event the decedent is found to have a will, the intestateproceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by theproceedings of the will.

Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probateproceedings contending that the alleged will of Segundo does notcontain any disposition of the estate of the deceased (thus does notmeet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code) andthat all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir.Devisee or legatee hence there is preterition (disregarding oromitting) which would result to intestacy.

Petitioners countered that the rule on preterition (disregarding oromitting) does not apply because Segundos will does not constitutea universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory

heirs. They argued that the testator intended all his compulsoryheirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the soleexception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.

The RTC dismissed the petition for probate holding: A perusal of thedocument termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy YiengSeangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the onlyheirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirsbeing omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned,

Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the

direct line. (Basing also its decision in the case of Acain vs.Intermediate Appellate Court).

ISSUE:

WON the compulsory heirs in the direct line were preterited(disregarding or omitting) in the will?

HELD: No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited

(disregarding or omitting) in the will as it abide with the requirementsunder Article 810 of the Civil Code which described a holographicwill.

RATIO:

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who isnot learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should beconstrued more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, takinginto account the circumstances surrounding the execution of theinstrument and the intention of the testator.

In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even ifcaptioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended bySegundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him inaccordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the willis probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

According to the SC, it was Segundos last expression to bequeathhis estate to all his compulsory heirs with the sole exception of

Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his

other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of thepetitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute heras the universal heir. Her name was included only as a witness tothe altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.


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134. ESQUIN VS ESQUIN

Topic: Preterition completion of legitime

FACTS:

Jan. 19, 1899. Emilio Antonio Esquin de los Santos executeda will before a notary public of Sevilla, Spain, staging thereinthat he was

a. a Native of Cavite;b. has 2children but one deceased;c. that he was married about six months previously to

Maria Teresa Ponce De Leon;d. Had no lawful descendantse. IN CASE HE HAS DULY REGISTERED

SUCCESSOR, HIS CHILD WOULD BE HIS SOLE AND UNIVERSAL HEIR

f. BUT THAT AS IF, AS WOULD PROBABLY BE THECASE, THERE SHOULD BE NO SUCH HEIR, HENAMED HIS FATHER FRANCISCO ESCUIN, ANDHIS WIFE MARIA PONCE DE LEON AND HISUNIVERSAL HEIRS, THEY TO DIVIDE THE ESTATEIN EQUAL SHARES BETWEEN THEM.

Testator died on Jan. 20, 1899 Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners

were appointed to consider claims against the estate. The lawyer for the widow and for the minors, appealed to CFI

from the findings of the aforesaid commissioners. The proposed partition: testator left only P8k+ pesetas. From

the said sum the following must be deducted the credit alludedto be admitted by the commissioners, 10% remuneration dueto the administrator, all legal expenses paid and approved.Deducted the above mentioned amounts, there remains a 5k+.

The partition and adjudication was proceeded with the sum ofP5k+ into three shares to each one of the parties in interest,that is,

a. the natural son, Emilio Esquin y Batac, in full control asgeneral heir;

b. the widow, Teresa Ponce de Leon, as legatee of onehalf of the two-thirds of the funds of free disposition;and the said widow the usufruct of the other half of theaforesaid two-thirds of free disposition,

c. the bare ownership of the last third held in usufruct by

the widow being adjudicated to Francisco Escuin, aslegatee taking into account the provisions of Article 817of the Civil Code upon making the division.

The representative of the minor natural child of the testatorobjected in writing to the partition proposed by theadministrator, and for the reason he set forth asked that thesame be disapproved, and that in lieu thereof the entire estatebe adjudicated to Emilio y batac, the said minor.

It was also presented that in a certified proceeding, plaintiff

asked that an allowance be granted to him for subsistence foraccount of the estate of the late testator, and that the same bepaid him monthly in advance; that judgment be entereddeclaring that the minor, is a natural child of the testator.

The administrator in answer to the complaint denied all factsalleged.

TC: escuin y batac was the recognized natural child of the lateEmilio Escuin de los Santos, has by Julia Batac. And one ofthe heirs of the late testator.

By an order of the lower court, the judge expressed an opinionthat a natural child is only entitled to one fourth of thehereditary property, the clause in the will being annulled onlyin so far as the amount to be divided should be reduced,taking into account the share due to the natural son and theright of the father and the widow of the testator, each to one -half of the remainder of the property of the estate.

ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:

1. WON there was preterition YES


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There is preterion to1/3 of the estate, which amountconstitutes the legal portion of a natural child;and forthe reason that minor was ignored in the will, thedesignation of heirs made therein was, as a matter offact annulled by force of law; in so far as the legalportion of the said minor was thereby impaired.Legacies and betterments shall be valid insofar as they

are not illegal, for the reason that a testator cannotdeprive the heirs of their legal portions, express in thecases expressly indicated by law.

2. WON the testator could be considered to have died intestate NO

notwithstanding the fact that the said designation ofheirs was annulled and that the law recognizes the titleof the minor. Esquin y Batac, to one-third of theproperty of the natural father, as his lawful and generalheir, it is not proper to asset that the late Emilio Escuinde los Santos died intestate in order to establish theconclusion that the said natural child is entitled tosucceed to the entire estate under the provisions ofarticle 939 cc, in as much in accordance with the law acitizen may die partly testate and partly intestate. It isclear and unquestionable that it was the wish of thetestator to favor his natural father and his wife withcertain portions of his property which under the law he

has the right to dispose of by will, as he has done,provided the legal portion of his general heir was notthereby impaired. The two former persons beingconsidered as legatees under the will.


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135. Palacios v Ramirez (Gr. No. L-27952)

Topic: Substitution of HDL Kinds (a) simple; (b) compendious; (c)reciprocal; (d) fideicommisary

FACTS:

Jose Ramirez, a Filipino national died in Spain with only his

widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate bythe CFI Manila

Petitioner Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed asadministratrix of the estate. She submitted a project of partitionas follows: the properties of the deceased shall be divided intotwo parts: ONE PART shall go to the widow in satisfaction ofher legitme THE OTHER PART or free portion shall go to therespondents Jorge and Roberto Ramirez and 1/3 of the freeportion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining

2/3 with a usufruct in favour of Wanda. Respondents Jorge and Roberto opposed the partit ion on thefollowing grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitutionof usufruct in favour of Wanda is invalid; (b) that the provisionfor fideicommisary substitutions are also invalid because thefirst heirs are not related to the second heirs or substituteswithin the first degree based on Article 863 of the NCC; (c) thatthe grant of usufruct over real property in the Philippines infavour of Wanda, who is an alien, violates Section 5 Article III;(d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the

Escolta Building between the widow Marcelle and theappellants, violates the testator's express will to give it to them.

RTC ruled to approved the project of partition. Therespondents appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents' contention as regards thefideicommisary substitution in favour of Wanda over two thirds

of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v.Ramirez is invalid?

HELD:

Yes. The respondents are correct, the fideicommisary isinvalid.

RATIONALE:

They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as voidbecause Wanda survived the testator or stated differentlybecause she did not predecease the testator. But dying beforethe testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for italso includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance asprovided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgarsubstitution is valid.

As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, theappellants are correct in their claim that it is void for thefollowing reasons:(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V.

Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originallyinstituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates afideicommissary substitution "provided such substitutiondoes not go beyond one degree from the heir originallyinstituted."

What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is

explained by Tolentino as follows: Scaevola Maura,and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court ofSpain has decidedly adopted this construction.From this point of view, there can be only onetranmission or substitution, and the substitute neednot be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell andSanchez Roman, however, construe the word"degree" as generation, and the present Code hasobviously followed this interpretation. By providing


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that the substitution shall not go beyond onedegree "from the heir originally instituted." TheCode thus clearly indicates that the second heirmust be related to and be one generation from thefirst heir.

From this, it follows that the fideicommissary canonly be either a child or a parent of the first heir.

These are the only relatives who are onegeneration or degree from the fiduciary

(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmitthe usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that thetestator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissarysubstitution when he permits the properties subject of theusufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of theusufructuaries and the naked owners.

The usufruct of Wanda. The appellants claim that the usufruct over real

properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is voidbecause it violates the constitutional prohibitionagainst the acquisition of lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling providesas follows: SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditarysuccession, no private agricultural land shall betransferred or assigned except to individuals,

corporations, or associations qualified to acquire orhold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.(Art. XIII.)

The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufructgiven to Wanda on the ground that the Constitutioncovers not only succession by operation of law butalso testamentary succession. SC pointed out thatthe Constitutional provision which enables aliens toacquire private lands does not extend totestamentary succession for otherwise the

prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Anyalien would be able to circumvent the prohibition bypaying money to a Philippine landowner inexchange for a devise of a piece of land.

This opinion notwithstanding, SC uphold theusufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct,albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in

the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to landin favor of aliens which is proscribed by theConstitution.


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136. Vda. De Mapa vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-38972.September 28, 1987)


Facts:

Concepcion Mapa De Hidrosollo died leaving a will anddesignating her spouse Ludivico Hidrosollo as the universalheir of her estate having died without any descendant orascendant. Ludivico was designated as universal heir but withthe obligation to hold the residue of her estate in trust for theirnephews and nieces.

Issues/Held/Ratio:

a.) Whether or not a trust was created? YES

Although the word "trust" did not appear in the will , thetestatrix's intent to create one was nonetheless clearlydemonstrated by the stipulations in her will. Indesignating her husband as universal and sole heirwith the obligation to deliver the properties topetitioners and private respondents, she intended thatthe legal title should vest in him, and in significantlyreferring to petitioners and private respondents as"beneficiarios" she intended that the beneficial orequitable interest to these properties should repose inthem.

These designations, coupled with the other provisionsfor co-ownership and joint administration of theproperties, as well as the other conditions imposed bythe testatrix effectively created a trust in favor of theparties over the properties adverted to in the will.

"No particular words are required for the creation of anexpress trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearlyintended. " (Art. 1443, Civil Code of the Philippines).

b.) Whether or not a trust can be created without consideration ofthe legitimes of the compulsory heirs? - NO

However, we must not lose sight of the fact that as thesurviving spouse of the testatrix, Ludivico was entitledto a legitime of one-half (1/2) of her hereditary estate.

As that portion is reserved by law for the compulsory

heirs, no burden, encumbrance, condition orsubstitution of any kind whatsoever may be imposedupon the legitime by the testator. (Art. 904, secondparagraph Civil Code of the Philippines).

The trust created by Concepcion should therefore be,as it is hereby declared to be effective only on the freeportion of her estate; that portion not covered byLudivicos legitime.


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137. CRISOLOGO v SINGSON


FACTS

Action for partit ion by Sps Crisologo against Singson. This

involves a lot and improvements thereon. Complaint allegedthat Singson owned half pro-indiviso of said prop and thatFlorentino owned the other half by virtue of the duly probatedlast will of Singson (the orig owner).

Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was amere usufructuary of and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso ofthe property in question, and that therefore, she was notentitled to demand partition thereof.

Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson

appealed. At the time of the execution of the will , the nearest livingrelatives of the orig owner were her brothers Evaristo, Manueland Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad,and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.

ISSUE/HELD:

Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucionvulgar or for sustitucion fideicomisaria? SUST

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