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    Data Dredging or Legitimate Research Method? Historiography and Its Potential forManagement Research

    Author(s): Robert S. Goodman and Evonne Jonas KrugerSource: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Apr., 1988), pp. 315-325Published by: Academy of ManagementStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/258580.

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    ? Academyof ManagementReview, 1988,Vol. 13,No. 2, 315-325.

    a t a Dredging regitimate Research Methodistoriography a n d t s Potential

    o r Management ResearchROBERTS. GOODMANSyracuse University

    EVONNEJONAS KRUGERWidener UniversityHistoriography's potential as a management research technique hasnot been extensively evaluated. This article describes historiography,evaluates criticism directed toward it, and assesses its usefulness formanagement research. It asserts that historiography can make signifi-cant contributions to variable selection and evaluation, theorybuilding, and hypothesis generation.

    Although logical positivism continues to domi-nate management research, other research meth-ods have been advocated. These include multi-ple hypothesis testing (Armstrong, 1979), stronginference testing (MacKenzie &House, 1978;Platt,1964),historiography (Glueck &Willis, 1979), hy-brid methodologies (Harrigan, 1983), and multi-ple methods of analysis (Hambrick, 1980; Snow&Hambrick, 1980). Although historiography hasbeen recommended for use in strategic manage-ment research, the method and its applicabilityhave never been fully explicated and discussedin the management literature.

    HistoriographyHistoriography is difficult to define and ex-plicate. Although it is easy to describe the stepsthat the historian follows, it is significantlyharder to understand the process that he or she

    undertakes. Briefly, the historian rarely beginswith a theory from which hypotheses are de-rived and subjected to test. Rather, a general

    research question is formulated. For example,Chandler (1977), in The Visible Hand, askedWhat were the factors responsible for the rise ofmodern business enterprise in the United Statesand with it managerial capitalism? (p. 4).In order to answer these research questions,the historian examines evidence from both pri-mary and secondary sources.Primarysources are first hand testimonyaboutan historicalevent; secondary sources are de-scriptions of the event derived fromand basedupon primary sources. The primarysource rep-resents the view of the eye witness, the second-ary source the view of the journalist or scholarwho comes along later and tries to reconstructthe story.(Handlin,Schlesinger, Morison,Merk,Schlesinger, Jr., &Buck, 1970, p. 22)Each source is critically examined. First, it isauthenticated. Second, its informational contentis analyzed. Third, its suitability as evidence sup-porting or refuting an interpretation is evaluated

    (Handlin et al., 1970). (Essentially an interpreta-tion, the final result of the historical process isroughly analogous to a theory.)315

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    Authenticated and critically analyzed, sourcesare assumed to be essentially neutral, havingno more prima facie claim to validity than thenext until weighed against one another, checkedfor accuracy against other source material, anddetermination is reached as to which set of factsmost reasonably answers the point in question(Goodman & Pryluck, 1974, pp. 309-310).The researcher then determines if these sourcescan be woven into an argument answering thequestion at hand. Ifso, he or she can then pres-ent conclusions, using these facts as evidencethat best supports these conclusions, along withreasons for asserting the reasonableness of hisposition (Goodman & Pryluck, 1974, p. 310).Historiography, therefore, includes the bodyof techniques, theories, and principles associ-ated with historical research. It is a way of ad-dressing data and sources, asking questions, andbuilding theories based on evidence. It need notbe restricted to producing history, either in thetraditional narrative or the modern analytical so-cial science formats.Cnrticismsof Histoniography

    Opponents of historiography argue that (a)the method lacks objectivity, (b) the methodlacks direction (it is merely data dredging), and(c) the method's conclusions are tentative andnot easily generalized.Lack of Objectivity. The preception that histor-iography lacks ways of ensuring objectivity fre-quently educes feelings of distinct unease amongsocial science researchers. Their concern ap-pears to stem from two beliefs. First, they holdthat social science research is driven by theoryand data, whereas historical research is not.Second, statistical testing and inference are moreobjective than historiography and can be usedto confirm hypotheses, whereas the results ofhistoriography usually offer subjective narratives.These views, however, are not unanimouslyheld by either social science or philosophy of sci-

    ence researchers. Anderson (1983) and Bagozzi(1984) argued that science is more a deductively

    theory-driven activity than it is a data-driven in-ductive process (as summarized in Brown, 1979;Suppe, 1974).Also, scientists now recognize boththe fallibility of observation and the dependenceof observation on a priori knowledge for contextand definition (Hanson, 1958;Kuhn, 1962;Popper,1959). As Anderson (1983) explained:

    The fact that observation is theory laden ...call(s) intoquestion the claim that science is se-curely anchored by the objectiveobservation ofreality. ndeed, theory dependence and falli-bilityof observation constituteproblemsforanyphilosophy of science thatadmits a role for em-pirical testing. (p. 28)This issue of subjectivity also arises when em-pirical testing is examined. Rudner (1953) ob-served that scientists make value judgments ev-ery time they accept or reject hypotheses becausethere is nothing sacrosanct about a .05 level of

    significance per se.Since no scientifichypothesis is ever completelyverified, in accepting a hypothesis the scientistmust make the decision that the evidence issufficiently strongor that the probability s suffi-ciently high to warrant the acceptance of thehypothesis. Obviously, our decision regardingthe evidence and respecting how strong is'strong nough, is going tobe a functionof theimportance .. . of making a mistake in accept-ing or rejectingthe hypothesis. (p. 52)The subjective influence of scientists' personalcharacteristics on their research frequently has

    been acknowledged (Fisch, 1977; Mahoney,1976). Bagozzi (1984),citing Nisbett and Ross (1968)and Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth (1979), con-cluded that presuppositions, biases, and cogni-tive faculties influence and constrain the so-calledimmutable data (p. 18).Social forces and expectations have an im-pact on research in a similar manner (Barnes,1977;Bloor, 1976;Merton, 1973).Bloor and Barnesagreed that the production of scientific knowl-edge is a sociological process. Anderson (1983)concurred that scientific values are as much afunction of cultural, political, social, and ideologi-cal factors as are any beliefs held by membersof a society (p. 24).

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    Mitroff (1975) presented evidence that scien-tific ideas are tested against both theories andnetworks of social and personal relations. Theo-ries are associated with their perpetrators whoserve as personal advocates. This is particularlytrue, Mitroff observed, when theories are bold,provocative, and all encompassing. ' Their ad-vocates are frequently ardent, passionate,and partisan -willing to do anything to mus-ter every bit of evidence favorable (p. 245).Historiographers readily admit that they aredisputatious. Indeed, they thrive on dispute be-cause advocacy and disputation advance theirfields. They are trained to (a) be skeptical of eachsource and its content, (b) attempt to discreditevidence, and (c) challenge theories. Further-more, they openly advocate their positions, andthey expect their theories to be questioned and

    scrutinized by their colleagues, just as they donot hesitate to present evidence challenging ac-cepted theories. Many modern historiographers,for example,agree with the relativist that interpretation isinescapable; they agree with the scientific his-torian, however, thatobjectivity... must standas the historian's ideal. Accordingly, they for-swear all single-valued or dogmatic theories ofhistoryand subject theoryitself to the perpetualcounterattack of facts. . . . The interpretationswhich can hold in suspension the largest num-ber of diverse facts are those most likely to dojustice to the total complexity of a past whichcan never be fully recovered. (Handlin et al.,1970, p. 20)

    Dray (1964) concurred by asserting that it is thehistoriographer's task not only to establish thefacts but to understand them. And this will in-volve him in giving explanations (p. 5).The historiographical interpretation, or ex-planation, is intended to be a postulate or theory.Its validity is determined by how well and howlong it withstands scrutiny and attack by thosewho examine its underlying evidence. This ten-tativeness of the historiographic interpretation issimilar to the strong inference approach advo-cated by MacKenzie and House (1978), who quoteHebb, A good theory is one that holds togetherlong enough to get you to a better theory (p. 13).

    In order for historiographical research to bevalid, objectivity must be one of the researcher'sprimary goals. If it is not, interpretations will notwithstand collegial attack or command respect.Those who use historiography may appear tosubjectively select evidence supporting precon-ceived theories and hypotheses, but their methodrequires a rigorous examination of all possibleevidence before conclusions are reached. As aresearch method, historiography is no more sub-jective than other social science methods.Lack of Direction. The criticism that historiog-raphy lacks direction and is merely data dredg-ing stems from its apparent similarity to class-ical induction. In discussing induction, FrancisBacon, in Book I of Novum Organum (1620),argued:

    We cannot learn about the world by arguing,however skillfully,about abstractprinciples.Onthe contrary, we must interpretnatureby deriv-ing axioms romthe sense and particulars,ris-ing by gradual and unbrokenascent, so thatthemethod arrives at the most general axioms lastof all. This is the true way ... a new InductiveLogic. (Baconsummarized n Magill &McGreal,1961,p. 374)Because induction is so expansive, it is diffi-cult to devise questions that can be investigatedin what Armstrong (1979) described as an effi-cient manner. Unlike Baconian induction, how-ever, in historiography research questions are

    carefully structured before sources are investi-gated so that they can be researched in aninductive, but more efficient, manner. Further-more, historiographers study domains that aremore restricted than those examined through thephilosophical process of Baconian induction.The careful scrutiny of sources prior to hypoth-esis formulation may appear to be data dredg-ing. But historiographic research begins, as pre-viously indicated, with a research question. Theexamination of sources is intended to result inhypothetical explanations accounting for all rele-vant variables and relationships.Lack of Generalizability. Unfortunately, socialscience researchers, other than historians, donot often use historiography due to their ques-317

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    tions about generalizability. Historiography,however, should not be restricted to historicalquestions. Because it places emphasis on under-standing all of the data underlying the hypothe-ses, it can question the generalizability of anyresearch, as has been discussed. Social sciencedata/variables are historically embedded in timeand place. When the researcher has a completeunderstanding of the data comprising the vari-ables, the full extent of the generalizability ofresults can be placed in perspective. These writ-ers suggest that historiography does not limitgeneralizability; it clarifies it.Comparison With Other Methodologies

    Because historiography is assumed to be quitesimilar to other research methodologies, its po-tential is frequently overlooked. Two such meth-ods are strong inference testing and case re-search. Although historiography is similar tothem, there are several significant differences.Strong Inference Testing. Although strong in-ference appears to be similar to historiography,the latter is a broader method. In 1959, Popperoffered an alternative to inductive research andits increasingly confirmatory inference strategies.He questioned whether any number of predic-tions consistent with a specific hypothesis couldever conclusively demonstrate the truth of thehypothesis (Kern, Mirels, & Hinshaw, 1983). Ashe discussed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery:Thereis no such thing as proof in science be-cause some later alternative explanation maybe as good or better-so that science advancesonly by disproofs. There is no point in makinghypotheses thatare not falsifiable, because suchhypothesesdo notsay anything. Itmust be possi-ble for an empirical scientific system to be re-futedby experience. (Poppercited in Platt, 1964,p. 350)Popper suggested that the goal of testing the-ory should be to refute hypotheses. In contrastto the gradually increasing confirmation of in-duction, falsificationism substitutes the logical ne-cessity of deduction (Anderson, 1983, p. 20).

    Thus, if deductively derived hypotheses can bedemonstrated to be false, the theory on which

    they are based can be assumed to be false.Popper's argument that greater explanatory forcecould be attributed to disconfirmatory inferenceinfluenced investigators to design research meth-ods maximizing the likelihood of disconfirmation(Kern et al., 1983).MacKenzie and House (1978) argued that themost effective way to improve a theory is to usestrong inference to identify counter exampleswhich challenge its fundamental tenets. (This issimilar to the way that quantitative historiansuse the counterfactual or alternative hypothesis.)In strong inference, counter examples are used toimprove theory and to provide new ideas andapplications. Thus, a cycle of continuing im-provement related to both theory and practicemay be established (Dunbar, 1983, p. 139).The effectiveness of strong inference testing

    has been questioned. First, several researchershave suggested that since empirical tests involveassumptions about initial conditions, measure-ment, and auxiliary hypotheses, it is almost im-possible to conclusively refute a theory (Ander-son, 1983;Duhem, 1953;Laudan, 1977). Second,according to Anderson (1983), the history of sci-entific advances has rarely coincided with Pop-per's views. Rather, most major scientific theo-ries have been advanced despite refutation byempirical data. Third, the basic understandingof many scientists of the propositional logic un-derlying strong inference has been challenged(Kern et al., 1983). Kern et al. concluded thatperhaps disconfirmation is not the universallyeffective inference technique that philosophy ofscience believes it to be (p. 144).Strong inference and historiography are sim-ilar because both enjoin researchers to bringskepticism to data analysis and criticism to the-ory developmeni. In addition, historiography ad-vocates that accepted theories be aggressivelychallenged. Strong inference alone, however, isinsufficient. In his classic article on strong in-ference, Platt stated that the difficulty is thatdisproof is a hard doctrine. If you have a hypo-thesis and I have another hypothesis, evidentlyone of them must be eliminated. The scientist

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    seems to have no choice but to be either soft-headed or disputatious (1964, p. 350).In order to effectively use disproof theory, itmust be both defended and criticized. Stronginference, a younger method than historio-graphy, only provides the skepticism necessaryto evaluate data and to question theory. Classi-cal induction, the oldest of the methods, providesa method for constructing arguments in defenseof theory. Historiography effectively incorporatesboth elements within a balanced research meth-od. By melding aspects of confirmatory induc-tion with skepticism, a critical component ofstrong inference, it provides for the rigorouscreation, critique, and defense of theory.Classical Case Research. Historiography andcase preparation are similar because the periodof time described within each case is ex-postrather than ex-ante. There are, however, majordifferences. First, Culliton (n.d.) asserted that be-fore data are collected for a management case,as a researcher you should know what youwant. He suggested that the best cases followpreviously developed written specifications. Fewresearchers using historiography, other thanthose with a logical positivist orientation, investi-gate questions using written specifications ofwhat they expect to find. It is the search for andanalysis of resources and evidence that shapehistoriographical research. On the one hand,even logically positivist-oriented social sciencehistoriographers remain open in their search forboth supporting and disconfirming evidence.The classical case writer, on the other hand,appears to consider himself or herself to be arecorder, rather than an interpreter, of facts.Watch out, therefore, as a recorder of facts thatyou do not become an editorial writer. It is thefunction of the case writer to present the situation,not to interpret it or pass judgement upon it(Davis, n.d.).Historiographers are not satisfied merely to re-cord facts. The business of an historian is tomake judgments and to [attempt to] establishcausal relationships between facts; [therefore] hemust place them in some significant pattern in

    order and not simply be a reporter (Canter &Schneider, 1967, p. 19). Further, the questionsasked by those developing cases are more nar-row than the questions asked by those usinghistoriography.There is evidence that organization research-ers do not always perceive any difference be-tween historiography and the case method. Forexample, Chandler's (1962) Strategy and Struc-ture is often described as case studies of fourcompanies. It is not four classical managementcases, however, but an example of the applica-tion of historiography to management research.Chandler's study includes data from over 100companies, and his research questions arebroader than What happened at Sears? (theclassical case writer's question). Chandler de-scribed his goals this way:

    Using these data, Ihave attemptedto say some-thing about the history of the large industrialenterprise as a basic, modernAmerican institu-tion. In doing so, this book also provides infor-mation about the historyofbusiness administra-tion in the United States and about the changesin the larger American economy. (p. 4)He continued, the book attempts to providethis information by focusing on the innovationand spread of the modern 'decentralized' form oforganization in American industry (p. 4). A ques-tion such as What caused the spread of the mod-

    ern decentralized [divisionalized] form of organi-zation in American industry? is the question ofa business or an economic historian, not a classi-cal case writer. Chandler used data about corpo-rations to formulate a historical interpretation.His only interest in a particular firm is as a sourcefor evidence to answer his questions.Although Chandler (1962, 1977) is a historianwho uses historiography to develop theory,managerial case writers rarely use historio-graphical techniques to prepare cases. They de-liberately limit their search for evidence and in-terpret their endeavors as recording facts, notexplaining what has happened or why. In gen-eral, they do not formulate questions after ana-319

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    lyzing their data, and they appear to lack theinnate skepticism advocated by historiography.An example is the classic Harvard strategycase, A. G. Brown and Son, Ltd. (Uyterhoeven,Ackerman, &Rosenblum, 1977). Brown, Ltd. is afood wholesaler in the maritime provinces of

    Canada, founded by A. G. Brown, who spendsmost of his time in politics. He tells the case writerthat he is concerned about a steady decline inprofits that has accompanied large increases inrevenues. The case writer emphasizes that thecompany will soon face serious operating diffi-culties due to the decline in profit margins.Yet, when the firm's financial statements, in-cluded in the case, are examined, it is evidentthat through various accounting policies (e.g., asale/leaseback of the building to Brown and de-duction of expenses such as clubs and cars) A.G. Brown is minimizing profits to avoid payingtaxes. Further, Brown's political ambitions influ-ence this strategy because he does not wish toappear too successful to his constituents. Thisinterpretation was confirmed by A. G. Brown ina 1981 interview with an investigator who wasupdating the case. This might have been discov-ered sooner had the case writers employed theskepticism advocated by historiography, or hadthey been aware of the potential difficulties in-herent in interviews and oral history (see Good-man & Pryluck, 1974, for a review of this litera-ture). Historiography is appropriate for the pre-paration of management cases, even those thathave only pedagogical value (i.e., those that ask,What should happen in this company giventhese facts? ).

    The Potential of Historiographyfor Management ResearchManagement transpires within a linear timeframe as organizations evolve in response to vari-ous internal and external forces. For example,researchers describe growth, competitive, end-game, and life-cycle strategies, each with a

    genesis and, ultimately, a history. As a linearand, thus, historical concept, the management oforganizations can be studied using evidence of

    past events and decisions. Therefore, both a his-torical perspective (Lawrence, 1984) and histor-iography are appropriate for management re-search.Historiography has three potential applicationsin management research: (a) variable selection

    and evaluation, (b) theory construction, and (c)hypothesis generation.Variable Selection and Evaluation

    Historiography can make significant contribu-tions to the identification and evaluation of datasources and the selection of research variablesin management research. It forces the researcherto question the authenticity, informational value,and merit of each datum as evidence before it isused to construct and support hypotheses (Barzun& Graff, 1977).In strategic management research there hasbeen little in-depth discussion of the merits andlimitations of data and sources with the notableexception of skirmishes over PIMS and portfolioanalysis (e.g., Anderson & Paine, 1978; Raman-ujam &Venkatraman, 1984; Wensley, 1982).Theattitude of most researchers has been to recog-nize the shortcomings of these and other datasources, but to accept them as the best available.There has been a surprising lack of creativity inidentifying and using data to construct variables,although the recent interest in event study meth-

    odologies has led to the use of finance modelsthat utilize a firm's stock price as an indicator ofperformance in some studies (e.g., Bettis, Chen,& Mahajan, 1984; Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986;Singh & Montgomery, 1984).Glueck and Willis (1979) championed the useof historical evidence in strategic managementresearch and recommended that the orientationof historians be adopted when examining docu-ments and constructing variables. They assertedthat historians are the most attuned of any re-searchers to the dangers of bias, inaccuracy,and distortion in documentary sources, and theyurged that strategic management researchersshould approach their sources with similar cau-tion. Unfortunately, the authors' evaluation of the

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    vided the impetus for an entire stream of strate-gic management research (see Galbraith &Na-thanson, 1978, and Chandler & Deems, 1980,for a review of this literature).Similarly, Mintz-berg (1978)used historical data to generate atheory of strategy formulation.Harrigan(1983)placed Chandler'sresearch onthe midpointof a continuumwhich included fine-grained researchmethodsat one end and course-grained research methods at the other.Althoughher discussion is limited to those aspects of busi-ness strategy research methods designed forhy-pothesis testing, placing Chandler's work at themidpointvisually illustrates he potentialofhistor-iography for theorydevelopment. Harrigansug-gested that the fine-grained method of classicalmanagement cases captures the complexitiesof corporate strategy, competition, and uncon-

    trollableenvironmental factorssurroundingstrat-egy formulation (p. 399). The case method,however, by definition, does not develop man-agement theory; tmerely assembles and recordsthese complexities, and it makes no attempt toexplainthem. At theoppositeend of thecontinuum,coarse-grained methods are specifically de-signed to test hypotheses, not to generate theor-ies.Harrigan argued that medium-grained meth-ods (such as historiography) benefit from the de-tail of fine-grained methods that provide metic-ulous attention to detail, relevance to businesspractice, and access to multiple viewpoints(p.399)and the generalizability ofcoarse-grainedmethods intended for large statisticallyorientedstudies. We add that when the two approachesare distilled into medium-grained methods, thedual emphasis on both analysis of sources anddata toanswer the questions Whathappened?What is? and/or Whatwas? and generaliz-ability to answer the question Towhat extent?create the conditions necessary fortheorydevel-opment which addresses the question Why?This is historiography'sgoal.

    Hypothesis GenerationBecause of its unique perspective of contex-tual analysis in which theory is the result of acareful reconstructionof events and the identifi-cation of all variables and their interactions,

    historiographyhas exciting potential forhypoth-esis generation. Its broad view of the relation-ship between events and theory suggests bothmultiplecauses and multiple perspectives. Oneof the major research questions addressed byChandler (1977), Whatwere the factorsrespon-sible for the rise of the modern business enter-prise in the United States? can be fully ad-dressed only by examining issues such as tech-nologicaldevelopment, transportationnfrastruc-ture, economic growth, and political considera-tions.The historiographical approach to assessingfactsnaturallyresults in multiplehypotheses. Al-though it may be impossible to test all variablesand hypotheses, by being forced to articulatethem the researcher avoids emphasizing empiri-cism to the detriment of theorydevelopment andhypothesisgeneration. Empiricalresearch is con-ducted only aftercarefulconsiderationof mediat-ing variables, the impact of excluded variables,and the implicationsof testing selected hypothe-ses. The researcher has artificiallyrestructuredcitheory in order to test a small segment. This isthe task of normal science (Kuhn, 1962). Yet, it

    should be accomplished withfull recognitionthatlimitedvariables and hypotheses may be insuffi-cient to support or reject theory.The historiographicalorientation, with its em-phasis upon multiple causes and hypotheses,enables the researcher tocarefullyand creativelyenvision research hypotheses within the largercontext of theory. Rumelt (1974) demonstratedthis approach when he formulated a series ofhypotheses from Chandler's theory of strategyand structure. The hypotheses identified multi-ple dependent and independent variables incor-

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    porating the complexities of the theory. Whetheror not individual hypotheses were accepted isnot as important as the way in which Rumeltused theory to generate his hypotheses and theway in which the hypotheses taken as a groupreflect the totality of the theory.MajorLimitation of Historiography forManagement Research

    Althoughthe applicabilityofhistoriography ornonhistorical research is advocated, it has onemajor limitation. Frequently, due to the natureof the research questions asked and the vari-ables employed, quantitative research tech-niques provide the most efficient and effectivemethods oftestinghypotheses about relationshipsbetween multiple variables. Thus, the impor-tance of statisticalhypothesis testing under thesecircumstancescan only be emphasized. Itshouldbe remembered, however, thatstatisticalhypoth-esis testing is the final methodological step, notthe first.What we have discussed in this paper,then, is the way that historiography can contrib-ute to the many other steps in the researchprocess. Table 1 presents a summary of thesecontributions.

    ConclusionThis paper has critically examined historio-graphy's utility for selected stages of manage-ment research. The method'sadvantages are in

    variable evaluation and selection, theory con-struction,and hypothesis generation. Criticismsof subjectivity, limitedgeneralizability, and datadredging as well as the method's inappropriate-ness for most hypothesis testing have been ad-dressed.In keeping with recommendations for the useof multiple methodologies, historiography has

    great potential for management research. Itshould be considered a supplement to more tra-ditional research techniques, especially thoseareas in which methods are required to assessmultiple causes from multiple perspectives. In-deed, management researchers may even bene-fit from the creativity, skepticism, and humilitydemanded by historiography.

    Table 1Applicability of Historiography toManagement ResearchContributionsof

    Research Stage HistoriographyResearch question Definition fa general questiondevelopment to guide and focusresearch;avoidance of datadredging.Analysis and evaluation Identificationand criticalof sources analysis of all possiblesources in termsof content,suitability,and reliability:explanation of context.Variableselection Recognitionof data limitations.and evaluationTheoryconstruction Constructionof a theoryreflectingthe totalityofcontext.Hypothesis generation Generation of multiplehypotheses and multiplevariables.

    Implicationof testing selectedhypotheses with selectedvariables understood.Hypothesistesting No majorcontribution.Formulation Generalizabilityplaced inof conclusions perspective. Relationship ofthe research and conclusionsto theory clarified.

    ReferencesAnderson, C. R., &Paine, F. (1978)PIMS:A reexamination.

    Academy of Management Review, 4, 602-612.Anderson, P. (1983)Marketing,scientificprogress, and thescientific method. Journal of Marketing, 47(4), 18-31.

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    Robert S. Goodman (Ph.D., University of Minnesota)is Assistant Professor of Organization and Manage-ment, Syracuse University. Correspondence regard-ing this article can be sent to him at: 615 Crouse HindsManagement Building, Department of Organizationand Management, School of Management, SyracuseUniversity, Syracuse, NY 13210.Evonne Jonas Kruger (Ph.D., Temple University) is As-sistant Professor of Management at Widener Univer-sity.An earlier draft of this paper was presented at themeeting of the Academy of Management, Manage-ment History Division, August, 1984. A subsequentdraft of this paper appeared as Discussion PaperNumber 11, Strategic Management Research Center,University of Minnesota, April, 1984. The authors thankBalaji Chakravarthy, George Green, Angus JamesJohnston II, and Andrew H. Van de Ven for their help-ful comments on earlier drafts.

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