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http://iqq.sagepub.com/ International Affairs
India Quarterly: A Journal of
http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/41/1/28The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/097492848504100105
1985 41: 28India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs R. Rama Rao
India and Pakistan: Differing Security Perceptions
Published by:
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On behalf of:
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What is This?
- Jan 1, 1985Version of Record>>
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INDIA
A N D
PAKISTAN
:
DIFFERING SECURITY PERCEPTIONS
The two fragments into Ivhiclz Britain, before its ivitJidrawalf,.om the sub-
continent, had split
the
Iiidian Empire, carried witli thenz
a
legacy
of ~ i i u r i~ a l
distrust. This could not but irzfliience
the
coiirse
of
sirbseqirent events in
the
sub-continent.
So have the attitudes
of
the erstwliile coloiiial a i d
other
powers towards the new states
iri
the light
of
their respective regional intere-
sts. i the conp ara tirely short period of thirty-seveii j'cars,
short
in
th
life
of
nations, the tw o s ta tes have been involved in hostilitie s on tliree occa-
sions, iiot coiriitiiig Pakistan's attack
on
Iiirlia in tlihKutcli sector in April
196s.
Ttnie no
doubt
is a great healer but
it
takes
s i i ie
tiiire f o r deep
wourids
to
Ileal.
Th e Iiealiiig process
~vorrld
e aided mid succeed
only
if the govern-
nicnts
of
both coirritries are conviriced
t ha t
not
miitiial hostility but at least
co-existence,
if not ntuttrrll
amity , is good for both countries and strive to
create conditioiis f o r peacefiil co-existence. I f only o m side is anxioirs to
niaintairi peace
arid the
otlier wislres to iiiaiiitain teiisioii,
t i e
latter w ill pre-
vaiL Ptrblic opiiiioii iit the f w o
corrrrtries,
if ntobilised
for
proniotiiig co-
exislerice rather than coifroiitatioii,
~rotrlrl
he@.
In
rieiiiocrotic court tr ie s, at
least
iri
theory, public opinion i s aforce t o reckoii with and 110 goveriiiiiciii
con for
long afford
to disregard publ ic opiriion. Tltc itiedia, agairt in theo ry,
reflects piiblic opinioii and serves t o consolidate aitd strenptlieii i t in the
process coiiipelliiig thc
goreriiirient
of tlie day to consider careJrIIy th issues
raised.
I I I
practice, hoivever, goveriiriients, eveit
rt
6cIiberal" democracies
call
influence promimiit segments of the iiiedia to project issues in
the
iiiaiiiier
desired by the foririer, i.e., the niedia can atid regrettably are being irsed t o
misirfornr tlic public at
horiie
arid abroad. Everi so, in de~iiocracios, irltinia-
tely,
goveriiiiiental efforts ot withstandii1g, at least s oi~ ie ections of
the
niedia discover. fa c ts and fi ar le ss ly expose gowrririieiits' earlier efforts to
niisiilforn: the pirblic. Th is is the inhereiit strength
of
democracies.
l i t dictatorships this is diffcirlt. Rut there are dictatorships and dictator-
ships In Pakistan, f o r
esanlple,
b y all accoirnts the goreriimcnt of Genera
Zia ul Hag, in i ts
own
way,
has
managed t o seciire tolerance i f i i o t
tlic en-
thusiastic support of a inajority of urban nt idle and lower niiddle classes
for
the
niartial
law
reginre.
A
sec ion-even a large section-of politically
cons-
cious urban and rirral gtotcps
are
totally urlreconciled to rule by generals f o r
a number of reasoiis. Aiiotlier section of the sa me sira tn
of
Pakistani society
again for
i ts
o wn
reasons, supports the reginie. Tlius General Zia
is
secure,
Col Rama Rao
Retd)
is at
the
Birla
Institute
of
Scientific Research, New Del hi.
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INDIA AN D PAKISTAN
29
provided
h e
continires,
with
the
dexter i ty he has
so
a n p ly denioiistrated
dliririg
eight
tseritjitl
years,
to
steer
his country 11 a
“least
r isIi”
coiirse,
arid there is
a
good
chance
of
prescrvirtg peace,
p r e c n ~ o i r s
lrotigh
i f
rray be,
iri the sirb-contirterit.
FOUNDATIONS
OF
PAKISTAN’S SECURITY POLICY
E R T A I N
other factors too have to be taken into account in understand-
C
ng Pakistan’s att i tude towards world events an d towards India more
particularly. Firs t, to P akistanis, their coun try was carv ed o ut of undivided
India in or der t o provide M uslims
of
the sub-continent
a
homeland where
they could practice their religion without hindrance. This however has
its qualifications, since Mu slims were by
no
means a persecuted min ority
in India. O n th e contrary they were the favoured group
in
the country,
where tradition ally th e majority c om mun ity ha s been t he silent sufferer. Th e
creato r of Pakistan, Jinnah, wanted his people t o shake themselves free
from earlier prejudices. H e m ad e this clear in his opening ad dress as
President of th e C onsti tutent Assembly of Pakistan when he called o n his
people “to bu ry the hatchet, let bygones be bygones” and to l ive a s free
citizens, con tribu ting their mite for the well being of Pakistan.’ He also
pointed out
that
“you ’are free; you ar e free
to go
to your temples, you
are f ree to go to your mosques’ or to any other place of worship in this
St ate of Pak istan ...y ou may belong to any religion or caste-that has
nothing to d o with the business of the S tate We ar e s tart ing in the
days when there is no discrimination, no d istinction between one commu -
nity an d anoth er. We are start ing with this fun dam ental principle that
we are all citizens and equal citizens of on e State.”
Noble principles, well enunciated and not surprising either, since even
in 1946, before the final shap e-of Pakistan was decided upon, Jinnali
in
an interview with Reuter’s cor res pon den t
a t
New Delhi
h ad
categorically
declared that, the “new state Pakistan) would be
a
modern democrat ic
state
w i t h
sovereignty resting with the p eop le and th e nienibers of th e new
nation having equ al rights regardless of their religion, caste or creed.”‘
However, shortly after Pakistan came into being its architect passed away.
Soo n thereafter, Liaqat Ali K han too dep arted from the scene, having
fallen
to an assassin’s bullet. However pun y Liaqat Ali’s stat ure may
Seem to some Pakistanis,
i n
comparison with that of the founder
of
Pakistan, the fact remains tha t those who succeeded hini proved to be
shorter in s tature and far less competent tha n Liaqat Ali. Shortly there-
after an other respected leader K ha n Sah ib was also assassinated. Mean-
while,
n
nexus was established between “the burcaucracy, arm y an d feud al
and r eac ti ona ry e lements o f t he M us l im L e a g ~ e , ” ~hich grew strong er after
Lia qat Ali’s de ath , and this oligarchy, except for brief intervals, ha s been
running the country since then.
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30
R.
RAhIA
R.4O
Fo;br.irrnlhfi l i tory
Agreetirent
with ilic
Utiiierl
States
After an uneasy three-year period of uncertainty an d m ismanagement of
the cou ntry by its politicians, the directions alo ng which Pakistan might
move becanie evident. In 1955, President Eisenhower’s Adm inistration pro-
posed
a
formal military alliance with Pakistan in terms
of
which the latter
could receive American military equipm ent, training an d othe r form s of
supp ort. Pakistan for its part was to offer bases for the United States and
sup por t i t in th e latter’s crusade against Com mu nism -i.e. , the Soviet
Union and a t t ha t t ime Ch ina as well. On this, however, Pakistan had
its own views an d plans. It wanted American military assistance and poli-
tical su ppo rt *for dealing with India, n ot for enabling it t o fight th e
Chinese
or
even the Soviet Union. China’s Prim e Minister, C ho u En-L ai
received an d accepted Pakistan’s secret assurances to this effect a n d en-
sured th at th e understanding arrived
at
between C hin a and Pak istan would
be kept secret from India and the U nited S ta te s4 Thus the basis of build-
ing u p Pakistan’s military might with Un ited States’ assistance, supple-
mented by tha t from others, was for dealing with India and India alone,
f rom a position o f streng th, no t for fighting others. This has been the foun-
datio n of Pakistan’s foreign an d security policy almost fro m the day it
emerged a s an independent country.
Predictably, Pakistan’s first military ruler at tac ke d India once he receiv-
ed American military equipment and his troops gained confidence in hand-
ling them.
He
was
wrongly advised by his ebullient Foreign Minister
Zulfiqar A li Bhutto, and he himself had ma de several errors of judgement.
These erro rs eventually caused his dow nfall.
The
Cliitin Fnc to r
After the
1965
debacle, Pakistan once again starte d building its armed
forces an d its second military ruler, G en era l Yahya K han , having achieved
a
diplomatic t r iump h by arranging
a
secret meeting between his American
friends Presiden t Nixon and Henry Kissinger an d the Chinese Ch?’rninii
Mao
an d Prime M inister Cliou En-Lai in 1971, failed
to
display states-
m ans hip in dea ling with the lawfully elected representatives of the then
Eastern Wing of Pakistan. Nor was he well served by his military and
oth er advisers. He, or in his name, Pakistan’s’Arm y let loose
a
reign of
terror in Bangladesh, murdering hundreds of thousands of people
Muslims as well as Hindus-and driving o ut mor e tha n ten mi]lion
Bangladeshis into India.
As
if this d em ogr aph ic aggression against Ind ia
was not enoug h, Pakistani troops began t o car ry ou t forays violating
Indian territory and attacked Indian bord er posts. N or were such attacks
confined to India’s eastern borders. After
all
India had to protect i ts
bor-
ders and In dian t roop s had no opt ion but to resist aggression and support
Bangladeshis in their
struggle
for
national l iberation. W hat was cIear,thea,
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INDIA
AND PAKISTAN
31
and even more
so now, is tha t liad Pakistan’s friends-America an d
China-cau tioned General Yahya Khan , tha t i t would be h w i s e as well as
counter productive t o resort to genocide an d wholesale destruction of
houses and oth er properties of people of his own country
i n
answer to
tlieir legitimate dem and s for provincial au ton om y, Pak istan might hav e
remained intact . T he United States was anxious not
to
displease General
Yahya Klian in any way since he had been ent rus ted with the delicate
mission of opening the pa;h t o China. T he Chinese for their part , realised
the Pakistani Army’s wrong approa ch in dealing with the people of Bang-
ladesh but diplo~natically tayed quiet. A Pakistani analyst notes that this
was because China’s commitment was not to undivided _Pakistan b’ut t o
the area consti tuting th e W estern Wi0g.j
Rhirtto’s
Contribirtion to
Pokistaii’s Eincrgeiice as a
h’ttck~wr
ower
After the events of 1971, and restoration of civilian authority in Pakis-
tan, i t was not unreasonable
to
expect tha t the new Pakistan, a more com -
pact and cohe rent state blessed with hard working and talented men an d
women, would devote i ts energies to develop i ts econom ic potential in
order to enable i t s people to live in com fort and create a base for further
orderly growth
Bhutto himself, having bcen an .impo rtant mem ber of t w o martial law re-
gimes
\\ as
well aw ar e of the pow er exercised by the civil-military bure au-
cracy- f ueda l elite complex-in Pak istan. His
first
s tep
on
assuming office
was
to
restorc
the self.confidence of the arm ed forces. Nevertheless so me
steps werc taken t o tninimise the c hanc es of the revival of BoriupnrtisiiiG by
creating
a
Dcfence Council, presided
over
by the Defence hlioister, and the
appointment of a Cha irma n and Chiefs of Staff, who would be the senio r
most military adviser to the Defence Minister and the Cabinet but
would
have
no
direct control
over
the forces. Likewise th e Chiefs of Army, Navy
and A ir Force woiild not have direct control over troo ps but only
t h e res-
ponsibility for coo rdina tion. Th e objective, as men tioned earlier, was to
raise the odds against individual senior
commanders
staging a
coup.
Bh utto had served his country
well
by securing the return
of
over
90,000
prisoners of war as well as
5000
square miles of territory
t h a t
Pakistan
liad lost during 1971. Rut his statement’ that he
h a d
secured at
t h e
confe-
rence table what the armed forces had lost on thc battlefield, thoug h cor-
rect, caused resentm ent against him am ong sections of thc latter who even
otherwise were per hap s not ue ll disposed tow ard s him. But Dhutte’s ser-
vice
to
his country in this respect cannot be ignored by historians. So was
his work in laying the foundat ion and providing the impetus for Pakis-
tan’s emergence as
a
nuclear pow er, a s h e h ad rightly declared in his
testament shortly before moun ting the gallows? His outspokenness an d
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32
R.
RAhlA
R A O
his persistence in proceeding with the nuclear program me in defiance of
the warnings of US statesmens eventually cost h im his life.
Rcgiorinl De~eloprrreri~siilmrtce
Pnk
Util i ty
for
the U S
After eliminating Bh utto, General Zia-ul-H aq steadily consolidated his
hold on t he cou ntry by removing senior generals who i n his opin ion might
have s taged a
coiip
against him. T h e first tw o years in office were his mo st
difficult. Th ere afte r several regional events served to enha nce Pakistan’s
utility fo r the United S tates; first, the Revolu tion in Iran and th e flight of
the Sha h fro m his country, ironically brou ght abo ut by the United States
itself and the rise
of
fundaiiientalism in tha t country. Th e Shah was
America’s dep enda ble ally in the Gu lf region , whose role was to keep the
Gulf safe for the United States. The successor government cou ld hardly
be considered a friend of the Un ited States, not certainly after the cap-
ture of the American Embassy in T eheran by Iranian s tudents and the
abort ive at tempt by U S forces
to
stage a commando opera t ion to recap-
tur e tkc embassy and secure release of American personnel. T h e continu-
ing Iran-Iraq War, which in the opinion of some Iranians
was
started by
Iraq if not
o n
American instigation, a t least in the hope tha t Iraq would
receive s uppo rt not only from conservat ive Ar ab States but .from USA
as
well, is ano ther cause for Iran’s resen tmen t against America.
A
consequence of the abort ive American operat ion in Iran was that
Pentagon realised the need for building secure bases for i ts
RDF
Rapid
Dep loym ent Forces) at several po ints close to th e Gulf for instant and
effective action in the neighbouring r egion in furtheran ce of its interests.
Second was the presence of Soviet troop s in Afghanistan. Th e only safe
means of entry into Afghanistan for U S agents to organise covert and
other resistance operations is through Pakistan. Pakistan could and has
provided facilities to Afghan resistance pers onne l and their
US
instructors.
As
qiiiri
p r o
giro
Pakistan has sought and received assurance of total
Am erican supp ort in regional matte rs, military assistance to the extent
considered ade qua te by Pakistan’s arm ed forces, economic assistance and
acceptance, at least tacitly, of Pakistan’s nuc lear weapons
This
is because the U nited States needs Pakista n for i ts bases close to th e
Gu lf area and Pakistani tro ops for protecting Gulf Ar ab regimes. Equally
important, with Pakistan firmly tied
to
the United States, the freedom of
ma noeu vre by the Soviet Un ion would be
considerably
restricted not-
withstanding any actions that the United States o r U nited States-aided
local gro up s may take in .Iran. This is the significance of the assurance
given by Vice Pres ident Bush to Pak istani leaders durin g his visit to th at
count ry in May
1984,
to the effect tha t American interest and co mnlit-
ment to Pakistan transcended Afghan istan. M ore recently, US diplo-
mats have assured Pakistan tha t any improvem ent in US-Ind ia relations
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INDIA
AND PAKISTAN 33
will not be a t Paki,stan’s expense.” India’s concern is tha t an add ition al
objective of Am erica arm ing Pak istan heavily, is to utilise the latte r as
a
lever against Ind ia.
PAKISTAN’S
SECURITY
CONCERNS
Every co unt ry has certain basic security con cern s arising from its geo-
st rategic locat ion, the character, s t rength an da t t i tu de s at any given t ime
of neighbouring countries, and equally on the country’s own internal poli-
t ical dynamics and att i tudes of the ruling elite or party. In the case of
Pakistan, threats fro m external sources have been minimal if not altogc-
ther absent. Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan since December 1979
but judging from Pakistani troo p disposit ions which are not close t o the
Afghan borders but to those of India, it is difficult to maintain that
Pakistan fears aggression fr om across its Western borders. N or
does
i t
have any concerns regarding i ts borders with China since the two coun-
tries havd repeatedly affirmed that maintenanc e of close friendship w ith
each other is,one
of
their principal foreign policy objectives.
This leaves Ira n and India. Ira n und er the Shah was closely allied to
Pakistan both as a non- Ara b Muslim country a s well as a partne r in th e old
Central Treaty O rganisation formed under
U S
auspices. T he new Ira nia n
regime is fund am entalist, based o n Shiite principles. Pakistan is an Islamic
StateI2 and Genera l Zia-ul-Haq ha s been extremely careful in adopting an d
declaring, whenever necessary, Pakistan’s neutrality in the Ira n-I raq co n-
flict. Hence Iran has no c a w fo r com pla in t. Fur the rm ore, I ran has its
hand s full with several problems an d has n o reason
to
confront Pakistan,
despite the latter’s alliances with th e U nited Sta tes an d A ra b States. It
could, in fact, be argued that sllould Iran so much as consider confronting
Pakistan, America using that
as
a n excuse might land i ts
RDF
on the
coast of Iranian Baluchistan and establish positions inland as well. Hence
Pakistan has nothin g to worry abo ut i ts Iranian frontier also except tha t
in the event of Am erican overt o r covert intervention in Iran, the Shiite
minority of Pa kist an may feel extremely insecure an d niay react, He nce
the only -frontie r from which, for the sake of argu me nt, Pakistan could
feel threatened is tha t with India. Here a t the risk
of
stating the obvious,
i t must be said tha t Ind ia has not in the past an d is no t going to, now or
in the future, attack any country. It has been the victim of aggression all
along. At best it reacts and tries to repel aggression.
General Zia-ul-Haq is not unaware of this but given th e different pulls
within his c oun try, the India bogey,
as
in the past, could be, resurrected,
and once resurrected could make Pakistan’s ruler
a
prisoner of his own
actions.
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34
INDIA’S SEARCH FOR PEACE
R R A h l A R A O
There is increasing conc ern in India o n this coun t. Several factors tend
to reinforce this concern. First , P akistan has already secured extremely
powerful air, naval and land attack weapons in the form of aircraft , des-
troyers, o the r surface craft an d sub marines an d heavy guns that have dual
atom ic a s well as conventional) capabili ty.
A
section
of
opinion, largely
based on information fi ltering through from abr oad, consider t h a t Pakis-
tan is relatively weak in lan d atta ck wea pon s i.e., tanks). This, however,
is no t the case
;
Pakis tan has secured large numbers of tanks from China
as well as West Euro pe an d elsewhere and must have methodically “u p
gunn ed” them . Second, Pakistan’s electronic surveillance systems, sup -
plemented by information provided by those established by America
aro und th is country, would enable Pakistani forces
to
destroy any Indian
forces air, na val and land) found, thu s dealing a crippling blow o n India.
Subsequently, Pakistani forces could also mo unt attacks on India’s key
political, defence and indus trial centres, f ur the r crippling the cou’ntry.
Third, an d most serious, Pakistan is already a nuclear p o ~ v e r ’ ~nd its
capabili ty
may
be approaching that of Israel i n this regard.
A s
early as
April
1979,
Genera l Zia-ul-Haq had frankly indicated to
U S
Deputy
Secretary of S tate, Warren.Cliristoplier, tha t Pakistan intended t o develop
nucle ar w eapo ns because Ind ia alread y possessed nuclear capability an d
the situation in neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan was unstablc and
hence it was essential for Pakistan to have the weapon. Similar statements,
directly as well as
off
the record, have been m ade by Pakistani spokesmen
on several occasions since then.
Th e posi tion
now is
that P akis tan
is
set to make not a few but
a
size-
able number of nuclcar weapons. Senator Crauston, after a visit to
Pakistan, had pointed out in the Senate that , that country was producing
enriched uran ium on an “assembly line” basis.14 The senator’s obse rvation s
have been confirmed by the crea tor of K aliuta and the architect of
Pakistan’s bo mb , Dr. Abdul Qad eer himself.15 I t
is
difficult to resist the
conclusion that Pakistan has already pilcd up a modest-sized nuclear arse-
nal based o n the design provided by Ch ina in. its
1964
test and is now
fabricating some hydrogen bomb s as ~ ~ 1 1
All these a re relevant in the context of Indian sfcurity. India n defence
plan‘ners will no t be wrong in assuming th at Genera l Zia ul Ha q is an
extremely careful comm ander. He may be expected
to
follow the principles
of
Mao
Ts e Tung , namely, to attack when victory is certain, to avoid
attacking when victory is uncertain and absolutely refuse to consider
arm zd conflict if such a conflict has any cha nce of adversely affecting the
country’s integr ity and safety.
Even
a
minor engagement or a local
war as Ayub Kha n had
wanted his
1965
at tack on Ind ia to be, o r
a
punitive action for
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INDIA
AND
PAKISTAN
35
quelling a l o k rebellion,
as
Yahya Khan wanted his operation in Bangla-
desh to be, could ultimately get ou t of co ntrol. Gen eral Zia is not going
to make similar mistakes. However,
his
advisers may argue that with
the formidable conventional strength that they have built up with A merican
and Chinese assistance and the nuclear might tha t i t has acquired
in
a
decade of intelligent and hard work, Pakistan ca n indeed deal I ndi a a
crippling blow an d furthe r, th at if Ind ia is allowed time the prospective
victim too might build some nuclear weapons and a preemptive strike
may become difficult. These arguments are,
no
doubt, reminiscent of
those used by Ayub Khan’s advisers two decades ago. Hopefully, G eneral
Zia ul Haq will not allow himself to be pushed
to
the point
of no
return.
The reasons for hope are that given Pakistan’s internal dynamics, unless
Zia secures
a
victory over India in the man ner tha t Israel demon strated
in Egypt in
1967,
by destroying th e latter’s a ir- an d grou nd forces before
they could move, Zia’s posit ion a t home may become untenable, Furth er,
if Ind ia is no t wiped ou t in the first wave of atta ck , India may suffer, bu t
the shock waves that would arise in the w ake of the first phase
of
Pakistan’s att ac k would no t only have their impact o n India but far more
perhaps on Pakis tan. Here comes the uncertainty of victory. In a dictator-
ship-although Pakistan is set to transform itself into a state with a
civil ian head-the main source of concern for the ruler are the disgruntled
members of th e arm ed forces. Several of these have been rounded up from
time to t ime in Pakistan. This dang er will arise again at the first sign
of
trouble at the fro nt. Additionally, there is th e problem of minority pro-
vinces and this problem added to the others could consti tute the proverbial
last straw o n th e camel’s back.
India’s interests as well as the true interests of all
i n
the subcont inen t
are clear-namely
to
prevent
a
war, conventional a nd even more earnestly,
a nuclear war. Furtherniorc, India is eager to promote posit ive coopera-
t ion am ong the countr ies of the subc ont inen t , big and smal l, in mat ters
of trade, exchange of scholars and generally to bring about condi t ions
unde r which fanlilies in onc coun try could visit their relatives in an ot he r
without irksom e restrictions, newspapers and literature published in on e
country may be available
in
another and at least over a period
to
ensure
tha t mutual suspicious are replaced by inutual trust .
Lest impetuous elements on the other side may be tempted with
prospects of easy victory, I ndi a would need to buiId up its defence-
conven tional a n d n ucl ear --while persevering in its efforts
to
establish
cordial relations with Pakistan as well as other neighbours.
March
1985.
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36
REFERENCES
R
RAh4A
RAO-
1
Mo hamm ad Ali Jinnah‘s Address to Pakistan’s Co nsti tuen t Assembly, August
1937 at Karachi, reproduced in Speeches of
Quaid-i-Arant Muoliaiitmad
AIi
Ji/rnah.
Gove rnor Gene ral of Pak istan, p. 10. Karachi, 1948. See also Stanley W olpert ,
Jinnah
of
Pakistan London, 1984 . and Chief Justice M ohamm ad M unir,
From
Jiniiafi
t o Zia
New Dellii, 1981 .
2 See Moham mad Munir ,
Front Jiniiah
t o Zia n .
1,
p. 29.
3
“Pakistan
:
ub-Continent,” South London), February 1985, pp. 8-9.
4
On
23 April 1955 at Bandung, China’s Prim e Minister Cho u En-Lai state d that h e
had received assurances fro m the Prime M inister
of
Pakis tan , Mohammad Ali
Bogra, tha t although Pakistan was a member of a military treaty i t was no t against
China and f urth er that if th e United Sta tes too); aggressive action under th e
military trea ty o r if i t launched global war. Pakistan would not be involved in
i t
just as i t was not involved
in
t h e Ko r e a n Wa r , Ch i n a
and
Pakistan also agreed
to keep th is unders tanding seere t f rom both th e Uni ted Sta tes and India .
From
“Documents on nternational Affairs for 1955” pp. 421-2, cited in Sangat
Singh,
akistan’s
Fore /?Policy Bombay 1970 , pp. 105-106.‘
5 Naveed Ahm ed, “Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1971-1981,” in Pakistarr Horisott
Karachi), Vol. XXXlV, o. 3, 1981, p. 59.
“White Paper” o n Kash mir issued by th e Pakistan Government reproduced in
Pakistait Tiiires Lahore), 16 January, 1977.
7 Ibid.
8 Prem Chopra Ed.) : f
I
iir
Assasci/ratt‘rf
Delhi, 1979).
9 He nry Kissinger warned Pakistan, at a m eeting in Paris \ \ i t11 Pakistan’s then
Minis ter fo r F oreign Affa i rs,
Aziz
Ahm ed tha t, should Pakistan proceed with i ts
nuclear weap ons programme, th e U nited Sta tes mould, make “a horrible example”
of th at co un try i.e., Pakistan). See JWIS Karachi) and news report in
Sfatesnmrr,
New Delhi), 10November, 1977.
1 The
Suirduy
Telegraph London), as early as January 1980, had suggested that
Pakistan ha s probably received tacit approval from USA and C hina fo r going
ahead with i ts nuclear programme. See news report in
Patriot
New Delhi),
14 January, 1980.
Vice President George Bush’s statem ent reported in Statesriran New Delhi).
9
May, 1984 an d Armacost’s interview at Islamabad in
Tiriles
of I d i u New Delhi),
3 March, 1985.
12 As Chief Justice Moham mad Munir has noted,
i t
is difficult
to
define precisely
what Islam is since no wo schools of Islamic theology agree on the subject. There
a r e
73
sects in Islam. According t o Sheikh Abdul Q adir J i lani there are as many
as
150
sects an d according to th e followers of on e sect those of
all
other sects are
heretics. H enc e the difficulty in prescribing Islamic laws in a country where
members
of
m ore t han on e Islamic sect may be living. See n. 2,p.
140.
13 I n t h e Hindus fan Times New Delhi), 8 April 1979, Gene ral Zia’s stand was rein-
forced by th e Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affa irs C ommit tee, Sena tor Zab-
b lock when hepoin ted ou t to the Sec re ta ry o f S ta te th a t secur ity conce rns w r e
a
factor in Pakistan’s drive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
14 Senator Craoston’s address in the Senate on 21 J u n e 1984 eproduced in Strutegic
D i g e s t New Delhi), August 1984, p. 827 833.
15 Dr. Qadeer has c lear ly pointed out that Pakistan is among the top f ive or s ix
countries which have uranium enrichm ent facilit ies on
a
large scale. In this respect
Pakistan is on par with Britain an d West Germany , he said, adding that the capa-
.
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:NDIA A N D PAKISTAN
37
cities available
in
Japan and India. for example, are quite small.
Hc
also added
significantly that
Pakistan
has the
capacity
to enrich
uranium beyond 9 per cent
which
s
needed for
the bomb-A
or
H.
Tiriles
of
Indiu,
14
March,
1985.
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