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Religion

and

Science:

Beyond

the

Epistemological

Conflict

Narrative

John

H. Evans

andMichael S. Evans

Department

of

Sociology,

University

of

California,

San

Diego;

email:

[email protected],

[email protected]

Annu. Rev.

Social.

2008.34:87-105

First

published

online

as a Review in

Advance

on

April

,2008

ThtAmttS?iRnitwofSodologjf

is

online

at

sccannuafaevicwaxirg

This article, doi:

10.U46/_nnurevjoc34.040507.134702

Copyright

2008

by

Annual eviews.

All

rights

reserved

0360-0572A)8A)8U-0087$20.00

KeyWords

secularization,

rationality,

TS, institutions,

alues

Abstract

Studies of die

relationship

between

religion

and

science

have tradi?

tionally

ssumed that

any

conflict that

exists is

based

on

epistemology.

This

assumption

is

built

into

the

history

fWestern academic

thought,

the

founding

of

sociology

itself;

s

well

as

die

common

definitionsof

religion

used

by

social

scientists.

his

assumption

has

hindered

the

ex?

amination

of the

relationship

between

religion

and

science.We

catego?

rize studies

of

the

relationship

between science

and

religion

into

three

groups:

the

symbolic epistemol?gica

conflict

studies,

the

symbolic

di?

rectional

influence

tudies,

and

the

social-institutional tudies.

e

find

that the

social-institutional

studies,

which

most

closely

examine

actual

public

conflicts,

o

not

presume

that

ie

conflict

s

over

epistemological

claims and offer

more

general

and

fruitful

approach

to

examining

the

relationship

between

religion

and

science.

*7






INTRODUCTION

Although

we

know of

no

study

of the

compar?

ative coherence of

sociological

research

areas,

we

suspect

that

the

field

of

religion

and sci?

ence

is

one

of the muddiest

in

all

of

sociology.

The

conceptual

source

of

this muddiness

lies

in

the

long-running

academic

assumption

that

re?

ligion

and

science

always

conflict and that

they

conflict

over

competing

truth claims about the

world.

It is

therefore

hard for

sociologists

to

analyze

the

relationship dispassionately

because

sociology

itself

was

born

as a

scientific alterna?

tive

to

religion.

Before

we

begin

a

review

of

the literature

in

science

and

religion,

we

must

outline the

sources

of

this

conceptual

morass.

We do

not

attempt

to

define

religion

and

sci?

ence

here.

Rather,

we

focus

on

how

scholars

have used these

categories

to

generate

findings.

It is

our

general

position

in

this review

that the

epistemological

conflict

assumption

built

into

many

sociological analyses

has

hindered

exam?

ination

of the

relationship

between

religion

and

science

by blinding

analysts

to

more

subtle

em?

pirical possibilities.

The Dominance

of

the

Epistemological

Warfare Narrative

There is

a

deep assumption

spread

through

most

academic

writing

about

religion

and

sci?

ence:

the

warfare

narrative.

In

popular

ac?

counts,

religion

and science

are

fixed

categories

of

thought

that

have

always

been

at

war,

with

the first

skirmish

being

between Galileo

and

the

seventeenth

century

Catholic Church. For

example,

a

textbook

on

the

relationship

be?

tween

science

and

religion

identifies

four

his?

torical landmarks in the debate: the medieval

synthesis,

the

Copernican

and

Galilean

con?

troversies,

debates

over

Newton's

ideas,

and

Darwinism

(McGrath

1999).

The

political

rhetoric of

contemporary

scientists

and

their

supporters

also often

portrays

a

situation of

war?

fare,

with

complaints

about

religion

shutting

down

legitimate

stem

cell research and

so on

(Mooney

2005).

As

one

recent

article

by

a

scien?

tist

enumerating

the

results of

scientific

con

tro

versies

was

titled,

"science

three,

religion

zero"

(Mazur

1996).

The

warfare

narrative

does match older

aca?

demic

accounts

in

which

military

metaphors

were

dominant

in

descriptions

of the relation?

ship between religion and science (Numbers

1985,

p. 59).

This

narrative

is

classically

indi?

cated

in

the title

of

an

1896

text

by

the

for?

mer

president

of Cornell

University,

Andrew

Dickson

White,

A

History of

the

Warfare

of

ci?

ence

with

Theology

in

Christendom

White

1960

[1896]).

However,

historians

no

longer

accept

the

warfare

narrative.

For

example,

examining

American

history,

Numbers

(1985, p. 80)

con?

cludes

that

"the

polemically

attractive

warfare

thesis [is] historically bankrupt." Or, even more

strongly

and

specifically,

"the

war

between sci?

ence

and

theology

in

colonial America

has

ex?

isted

primarily

in

the

clich?-bound minds of

historians"

(p.

64).

Indeed,

there

was

a

"pre?

vailing

harmony

between

science

and

religion

in

the

antebellum

period"

(p.

68).

This

analy?

sis

suggests

that

if

and

when

there

is

conflict,

it is

not

an

inevitable

or

permanent

feature

of

American

life

and, further,

that

the idea

of

con?

flict

s

tied

to

specific

efinitions f

religion

and

science. Note that the warfare narrative implic?

itly

assumes

that

the

warfare

is

over

the

author?

ity

to

establish truth claims

about

the

world?

about how

planets

move

(Galileo)

or

where

hu?

mans came

from

(Darwin).

When

historians

say

that conflict

was

not

an

inevitable

feature

of

American

life,

it

is

because,

for much

of

American

history,

religion

and sci?

ence

agreed

on

how

to

establish

truth.

In

fact,

historically

science

used

to

be

a

very

religious

endeavor.

For

example,

according

to

Tourney,

"early in the nineteenth century, evangelical

Protestantism

and science

were

so

intellectually

compatible

in

the

United

States

that

a

natural?

ist

and

a

minister

could

easily

agree

on

what

they

believed

about

nature"

(Tourney

1994,

p. 14).

God

was

revealed

twice in

this

view:

once

through

scripture,

and

once

through

nature.

Drawing

on

an

idea

that

may

go

back

at

least

to

Aquinas,

the

details

of

nature were

evidence

of

God's

wonderful

design,

it

was

thought,

and

88

Evans

?

Evans






further

that "nature

contains

clear,

compelling

evidence

of

God's

existence

and

perfection"

(Hovenkamp

1978,

p. ix).

Epistemological

Warfare

at

the Birth

of

Sociology

Despite

the

historical lackof

inevitable

conflict

between science

and

religion,

its

existence

has

been

a

deep assumption

in

American

culture

and

particularly

in

American universities.

Al?

though

it

is

possible

that

conflict

over

the

secu?

larization of American

universities

is

the

source

of

the

conflict

narrative,

whatever the

source,

the

narrative

has

filtered

into

much of the

soci?

ological

work that

we

have been

able

to

identify.

It is nearly always a deep, unexamined theoret?

ical

assumption

that

we

try

to

unearth

in

this

review.

One

reason

for

this

assumption

is

that

the

founders of

the

discipline

of

sociology?the

creators

of the

metaphors

we

rework

year

af?

ter

year

(e.g.,

culture,

rationality)?actively

op?

posed

religion

and

saw

the

two

systems

as

in?

compatible

means

of

making

claims

about the

world

(Smith

2003b).

This

vision of

incompatibility

was

the

result

of

the

new

field's

Enlightenment

assumptions.

We

should

not

forget that it

was

Comte, the

supposed

father of

sociology,

who

thought

he

was

going

to

replace

the

religion

of

the

time

with

a

new

religion

of

science

called

sociology.

Societies

would

evolve

from

a

primitive

theo?

logical

stage,

and

as

society

acquired

a

more

rational

understanding

of

the

world,

theology

would

be

displaced

by

philosophical

thinking

and

ultimately

by

the

"queen

of

the

sciences,"

sociology

(Wernick

2005).

A

conflict

between

science

and

religion

over

truth

was

then

en?

shrined

in

the

earliest

conception

of

the

socio?

logical enterprise.

Once

institutionalized,

sub?

sequent

sociologists

did

not

need

to

have

this

motivation

for

the

religion-science

conflict

as?

sumption

to

continue.

This

nineteenth

century

notion

that reli?

gion

was

primitive

and both

deserving

and

due

to

have

an

imminent

death

was

also

common

among

the

founders

of

American

sociology.

When it

came

to

founding

sociology

as

an

ac

tuai

discipline

with

departments

in

universities,

the

boundary

drawing

against

religion

inten?

sified.

Although

several

key

American

sociolo?

gists

were

personally

religious

(Swatos

1984),

the

commitment

to

positivism

as an

epistemo

logical stance inAmerican science created a sit?

uation

in

which

religion

detracted from scien?

tific

credibility

nd

therefore

ad

to

be excluded

in

order for the

new

discipline

to

gain

respect

in

the

university.

Irrespective

of

their

personal

commitments,

sociologists

took

action

to re?

move

religion

as a

contributor

to

the

developing

discipline

through

such tactics

as

the

develop?

ment

of

textbooks

that

described

religion

as an

object

of

study

rather than

a

source

of

knowl?

edge

(Smith

2003

b)

and

through

the active

ex?

clusion of religious sociology and its supporters

from

the

field's

core

institutions

(Evans

2008).

By

excluding religion

as

a

source

of

sociological

knowledge,

early

American

sociologists hoped

to

promote

sociology

as

a

respected

academic

scientific

discipline.

Epistemological

Conflict

in

the

Definitions

of

Religion

and

Science

The

narrative

of

religion

and

science in

conflict

over truth claims is so deeply entwined with so?

ciology

that

sociological

definitions f

religion

presuppose

it,

making

it

almost

impossible

to

find

a

perspective

outside of

this

tangle

from

which

to

analyze

the

relationship

between

reli?

gion

and

science.

There

are

two

dominant

tra?

ditions

in

defining

religion:

the

functional and

the

substantive

(Berger

1967,

pp.

175-77).

A

functional

definition of

religion

holds

religion

to

be

any

cultural

system

at

its

most

abstract.

Luckmann

(1967)

and

Geertz

(1973)

have

fa?

mously advocated such definitions. As has been

pointed

out,

this

then

means

that

any

ultimate

system

of

meaning

becomes

a

religion:

femi?

nism,

Marxism,

secular

humanism,

analytic

phi?

losophy,

the

world of

Star

Trek,

or,

as

pointed

out

by

Berger

and

to

add

to

our

confusion,

"modern

science

[as]

a

form

of

religion"

(Berger

1967,

p. 177).

There is

no

conflict

ere

because

the

content

of

religion

and

science

have

been

radically

relativized.

Although

this

would

avoid

www.annualreviews.org

?

Religion

and

Science

89






the

problems

with

assuming

conflict

over

truth

(as

we

note

below),

thisdefinition f

religion

is

not

commonly

used.

More

common

in

actual

empirical

analysis

are

substantive definitions

of

religion,

and

these

typically involve splitting the world into some

version

of

the

sacred and the

profane.

The

pro?

fane

world

operates

rationally, explainable

by

human

reason

and

able

to

be

observed. The

sacred,

commonly

called the

supernatural

or

transcendent,

operates

outside

of

the

ability

of

rationality

(e.g.,

science)

to

explain

it. As

one

popular

textbook

in

the

sociology

of

religion

puts

it,

"religion

can

be

defined

as

a

system

of

beliefs

and

practices

by

which

a

group

of

people interprets

and

responds

to

what

they

feel is sacred and, usually, supernatural as well"

(Johnstone

1997,

p.

13).

Weber,

who

was

fa?

mously

reluctant

to

provide

a

definition of

reli?

gion,

nonetheless

thought

that

religion

has the

function of

"rendering

rational the

irrational?

ities

of life

through

the

provision

of

mean?

ing_Unlike magic,

therefore,

religion

is

po?

tentially

capable

of

transcending

the mundane

gains

and losses of

practical

life

through

a cu?

mulative

rational

systematization

of

ideas

con?

cerning

the

supernatural

and

on

the

basis

of

progressive preoccupation with other-worldly

goals"

(O'Toole

1984,

p. 142).

These

substantive

definitions

of

religion

have

essentially

defined

religion

as

concerning

the

"irrationalities,"

the

"not

science."

There?

fore,

in

theological

terms,

sociologists

tend

to

define

religion

like

a

"God of the

gaps,"

where

God exists in

the

phenomena

that

science

can?

not

(yet)

explain

(Verhey

1995).

However,

religion

is

about much

more

than

truth,

on

both

an

institutional and

an

individual

level. In an underappreciated article, anthropol?

ogist

Buckser

(1996)

makes

this

point

while

ex?

amining

secularization

on a

Danish

island. The

declining

amount

of

religious

activity

was

not

due

to

an

encounter

with

science

and scientific

ways

of

understanding

nature,

but

rather

due

to

a

transformation

in

social

relations

on

the is?

land

brought

about

by

agricultural

mechaniza?

tion,

which

reduced the

population

of

villages

and

weakened

social

ties.

He

concludes

that

the

problem

with

secularization

theory

is

its

defini?

tion of

religion

as

"a method of

explaining

the

physical

world

through

the

supernatural."

He

concludes,

citing

Geertz,

that

"in

any

religion,

explaining

the

physical

world

is

only

a

subordi?

nate task; it is explaining the social world, giving

it

meaning

and

moral

value,

which is

religion's

primary

concern"

(Buckser

1996,

p.

439).

We

note

here

that

although

religion

is

often

recognized

as

complicated,

plural,

and multi

faceted,

science

has

usually

been considered

as

a

stable, uniform,

and

unproblematic

category

in

the

sociological

literature.

Work

challenging

a

uniform

vision of

science has

emerged

from

the

subfield of

science

and

technology

studies

(STS)

in

recent

decades but has

not

yet

pene?

trated the discussion of religion and science be?

cause

such

work

usually

does

not

engage

ques?

tions

of

religion.

We

discuss relevant

recent

STS

work

in

the

social-institutional section

be?

low.

Nevertheless,

we

maintain

that the

dom?

inant

assumption

in

sociology

that

religion

is

about

truth

claims

is

the

factor that has

hobbled

the

more

subtle

investigation

of

the relation?

ship

between

religion

and

science.

However,

as

we

highlight

below,

not

all examinations

of

re?

ligion

and

science make this

assumption,

and

these studies seem to offer the most promise.

Demarcating

the

Field for

this Review

We

need

to

draw

tight

boundaries

around

our

subject,

for

parsimony's

sake.

Most

notably,

there

is

an

extremely

large

theological

literature

that

discusses

what the

proper

theoretical

rela?

tionship

between

religion

and

science

should

be

(Barbour

1990,

Polkinghorne

1998).

We

take

this

to

be

outside

of

the interests

of

most

so?

ciologists, and it has had little influence on the

literature

we

are

concerned

with. We

do

include

research

from

the

fields of

cultural

anthropol?

ogy,

history,

and

medicine,

but

only

when

the

research

has

implications

for the

contemporary

science-religion

relationship

that

most

sociol?

ogists

are

concerned with.

This

generally

ex?

cludes,

for

example,

the

voluminous

literature

on

the

Galileo

conflict,

the

religious

beliefs of

early

scientists,

and

so

on.

9

o

Evans

?

Evans






When

examining

the

existing

literature

on

religion

and science

in

sociology,

we

use one

clear

distinction

to

further

organize

this

paper:

the

distinction

between

symbolic

and social

institutional

Lamont

&

Molnar

2002,

p. 168).

Symbolic analyses of religion and science treat

them

as

systems

of

ideas,

beliefs,

or

discourses.

Social-institutional

analyses

of

religion

and

sci?

ence are

concerned with

the institutions

that

propagate

these

ideas,

beliefs,

or

discourses.

We

begin

with

the

symbolic

accounts.

SYMBOLIC:

INCOMPATIBLE

EPISTEMOLOGICAL

CONFLICT

LITERATURE

The existingsymbolic literature an be divided

into

two

families:

the

epistemological

conflict

and

the

directional

influence families.

The

epis?

temological

conflict

literature

assumes

that

re?

ligion

and science

are

inherently incompatible

and

that

a

growth

in

science

leads

to

decline

in

religion

because

they

are

competing

ways

of

es?

tablishing

truth.

The

directional

influence

liter?

ature

is

more

subtle

and

complicated.

This

liter?

ature

tends

to

ask

whether

a

particular

religious

discourse

or

belief

leads

to

the rise of

science

or

a

change in science. The epistemological con?

flict

literature

presumes

that

the

categories

of

religion

and

science

are

fixed,

whereas the

di?

rectional

influence

literature

does

not.

We

should

note

that

the

symbolic

literature

is

often

difficult

to

recognize

as a

science

and

religion

literature

because,

although

religion

is

clearly

labeled

as

a

system

of

thought

that

in?

cludes

references

to

the

transcendent

and

so

on,

its

opposition

is

often

described

as

modern

sec?

ular

rationality.

It

is

then

explicitly

noted

or

im?

plicitly

assumed that

science is the

embodiment

of

modern

secular

rationality.

We

start

with

the

epistemological

conflict

literature.

The

Rationalization of

Religion

A

field

of

research

concerning

the

relationship

between

religion

and

science

where

the

epis?

temological

conflict

model

is

very

evident is

Weber's

concern

with

the

rationalization

of

re

ligion.

Weber's

concerns

here

are

intertwined

with his

more

general

concern

with

an

increase

in

formally

rational

systems

in

which action be?

comes more

calculable.

Weber

postulated

the

increasing

rationalization of

religions,

of

which

the Protestantism of the Reformation was a

particularly

strong

example.

In

the

words of

Peter

Berger,

probably

the

most

influential

in?

terpreter

of

Weber's

sociology

of

religion:

The

Catholic

lives in

a

world in

which

the

sacred is

mediated

to

him

through

a

variety

of

channels?the

sacraments

of

the

church,

the

intercession of

the

saints,

the

recurring

eruption

of

the

"supernatural"

in

miracles?a

vast

continuity

of

being

between

the

seen

and

the

unseen.

Protestantism

abolished

most

of

these

mediations_This

reality

then

became

amenable

to

the

systematic,

rational

penetra?

tion,

both

in

thought

and in

activity,

which

we

associate

with

modern science

and

technology.

A

sky

empty

of

angels

becomes

open

to

the

intervention of

the astronomer

and,

eventu?

ally,

of

the

astronaut.

It

may

be

maintained,

then,

that

Protestantism

served

as

a

histori?

cally

decisive

prelude

to

secularization,

what?

ever

may

have

been the

importance

of

other

factors

(Berger

1967,

pp. 112-13).

Rationalization

in

religion

had

contributed

to

the

disenchantment

or,

more

literally,

the

demagification

of

the

world,

resulting

in

a

sit?

uation

in

which

mysterious

forces

and

powers

have

been

replaced

by

the

calculation

and

tech?

nical

means

embodied

in

modern science.

Ow?

ing

to

this

rationalization,

religion

reduces

the

number of

truth

claims

about the

world

that

are

not

compatible

with

the

"systematic,

ratio?

nal

penetration"

that

we

"associate

with

mod?

ern science and

technology."

Religion

does

not

change

except

by

becoming

more

like

science.

We

are

not

claiming

that this

account

is

wrong

but

that

it

focuses

only

on

the

epistemological

claims

of

religion

and

science.

Secularization

Closely

related

to

the

rationalization

of

religion

are

debates

about

secularization.

Of

course,

www.annuahrviews.org

?

Religion

and

Science

ci






secularization

theory

is

itself

a

recognized

morass

in

the

sociology

of

religion.

We believe

there

is

consensus

that

secularization

should be

split

into

two

components

that

are

related

in

contested

ways,

which

we

describe

as macro

and micro. The macro component of secular?

ization is

institutional

differentiation,

in

which

religion

becomes

separated

from

other

institu?

tional

spheres.

Whereas

at

one

time the

state,

the

family,

education,

and other

institutions

were

legitimated

by

religious symbols,

secular?

ization

occurs

when

this

is

no

longer

the

case.

Despite

some

evidence of

its

reversal

in

politics

(Casanova

1994),

we

believe that the

consensus

among

scholars

is

that this

process

has occurred

over

time.

The

remaining

debates

are

about

ex?

plaining this secularization (Smith 2003a).

A

second,

micro

component

of seculariza?

tion

concerns

changes

in

individual

belief

and

practice

(Stark

1999).

This

research

most

often

includes

measures

of

participation

in

religious

organizations

(Finke

&

Stark

1988,

Chaves

&

Gorski

2001,

Norris

&

Inglehart

2004).

There

is,

of

course,

a

theorized

relationship

between

these

two

components,

which for

our

purposes

we

can

simply

say

are

related and

reinforcing.

Whereas there

is

consensus

that

macro

secular?

ization has occurred, there remains a debate as

to

whether

micro

secularization

has occurred

in

the

nited

States

(Norris

&

Inglehart

2004),

and

even

in

Europe

(Stark

1999).

The literature

on

the

relationship

between

religion

and science

in

secularization

theory

emerges

in

the

explanations.

We

divide these

explanations

into

three

families,

with the

first

being

an

example

of

symbolic epistemologi?

cal

conflict and

the other

two

fitting

into

the


theories

below.

In

the

first,

the traditional and dominant secularization ac?

count,

growth

of

certain

types

of

rationality?

embodied

in

modern

science?plays

a

central

role

in

secularization.

In

one

concise

summary,

"the

era

of the

Enlightenment generated

a ra?

tional

view

of

the

world

based

on

empirical

stan?

dards of

proof,

scientific

knowledge

of

natu?

ral

phenomena,

and

technological

mastery

of

the universe.

Rationalism

was

thought

to

have

rendered the

central

claims

of

the Church

im

plausible

in

modern

societies,

blowing

away

the

vestiges

of

superstitious

dogma

in

Western Eu?

rope"

(Norris

&

Inglehart

2004,

p. 7).

Probably

the

most

infamous and

explicit

de?

scription

of this

version

of secularization

comes

fromWallace (1966), who directly attributes

secularization

to

the

greater

explanatory

power

of

rational

science:

[T]he

evolutionary

future

of

religion

is

extinc?

tion.

Belief

in

supernatural beings

and

super?

natural

forces that affect

nature

without

obey?

ing

nature's

laws

will erode

and become

only

an

interesting

historical

memory.... [B]eliefin

supernatural

powers

is doomed

to

die

out,

all

over

the

world,

as

the

result

of

the

increasing

adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge

(p.

265).

We

again

see

in

both of these

works the

epis

temological

conflict model

on

display.

An

in?

crease

in

the

ability

of science

to

make credible

truth claims

leads

to

a

decline

in

religion's

abil?

ity

to

make truth

claims. This

literature

is

also

symbolic

in

that

it

does

not

examine

conflict be?

tween

institutions,

but rather

concerns

a

change

in

the

ideas

or

beliefs of

people.

Degree

of

Symbolic

Incompatibility

on

an

Individual Level

Another

literature,

related

to

the

traditional

secularization

literature,

tries

to

demonstrate

the

epistemological

conflict between science

and

religion, typically

by examining

how

religious

scientists

are

and

how

scientific the

religious

are.

Given

the

assumption

in

this

lit?

erature

that

they

are

incompatible

systems

de?

signed to make competing truth claims about

the

natural

world,

people

who

are

the

most

ex?

pert

in

science

or

religion

should then

exhibit

the

least

adherence

to

the

opposing symbolic

system.

Early

studies

of

the

religiosity

of sci?

entists,

beginning

with

Leuba's

survey

of

American scientists n

1914,

indeed

found that

scientists

were

disproportionately

less

religious

than nonscientists

and,

even

more

importantly,

ci

Evans

?

Evans






that scientists

with

higher

status

tended

to

be

less

religious

than

other scientists

(Leuba

1916,

1934).

The

better the

scientist,

the less

reli?

gious

they

ere

likely

o

be.

An

influential

study

of

graduate

students

by

Stark

(1963)

also

sup?

ported Leuba's broader finding. Stark argued

that

those

students who

were

better

educated,

attended

better

schools,

and

generally

did

what

was

necessary

to

achieve

higher

scientific

sta?

tuswere

less

likely

to

be

involvedwith

their

religious

tradition,

ven

if

they

still

nominally

claimed

affiliation

Stark

1963).

But later

studies

found

important

contradic?

tory

patterns

in

the

beliefs

of

academic scien?

tists.

For

example,

Lehman

&

Shriver

(1968)

and

Thalheimer

(1973)

found

that

social

scien?

tists

were

less religious than natural scientists,

despite

their

lower

position

in

the

scientific

sta?

tus

hierarchy.

Although

this

evidence still

sup?

ported

the

epistemological

conflict

thesis,

it

seemed

to

subvert

the

linearity

of

the

model.

Being

more

scientific

did

not

necessarily

equate

to

being

less

religious,

at

least

at

the

margins.

Scholars

explained

this

variously

as

an

effect

of

"scholarly

distance from

religion"

(Lehman

&

Shriver

1968)

or as

a

"boundary

postur?

ing

mechanism"

by

social

scientists

trying

to

appear

more

scientific by being less religious

(Wuthnow

1989,

pp.

142-57).

The

most

current

research

suggests

that

al?

though

scientists

are

less

religious

than

non

scientists,

just

as

in

Leuba's

day,

religiosity

(in

varying

forms)

is

persistent

among

scientists

(Larson

&

Witham

1997).

Several

recent

pop?

ular

books

by

scientists,

including

the

leader

of

the

Human

Genome

Project,

evince

a

vi?

tal

thread

of

religiosity

within

academic

science

(Collins

2006).

Moreover,

results

from

a

recent

national

survey

of

scientists

show

that

differ?

ences

in

religiosity

across

the

scientific

status

hierarchy

are

flattening,

so

that

scientific

disci?

pline

is

a

less

useful

predictor

of

the

religiosity

of

scientists

than

are

many

other

variables,

in?

cluding

age,

marital

status,

and

childhood

reli?

gious

background

(Ecklund

&

Scheitle

2007).

In

addition

to

the

studies

of

religiosity

f

sci?

entists,

a

few

studies

have

attempted

to

address

directly

the

question

of

whether

religiosity

in

terferes

with the

acquisition

of

scientific

knowl?

edge, again

assuming

the

two

systems

make

in?

compatible

truth

claims

about the

world. For

example,

on

the

one

hand,

Lawson

&

Worsnop

(1992)

find that

tudents

ith

stronger

eligious

commitments are less likely to change to a belief

in

evolution

after

being

taught

a

unit

on

evolu?

tion

and

natural

selection

in

biology

class. On

the

other

hand,

Verhey

(2005)

finds

that

even

students

with

prior

commitments

to

creation

ism

became

more

sympathetic

to

evolutionary

theory

after

being

exposed

to

both

intelligent

design

and

evolution in

the

classroom.

Efficacy

of

Prayer

Perhaps the subfield that most clearly assumes

the

conflict

over

epistemology

is

the

efficacy

of

prayer

debate. This

debate has

its

roots

in

ar?

guments

between

clergy

and

scientists

in

nine?

teenth

century

England

over

the

usefulness

of

public

days

of

prayer (Turner

1974,

Mullin

2003).

In

1873,

Francis

Galton

published

an

analysis

showing

that

monarchs

and

clergy,

who

presumably

received

the

most

prayer,

did

not

live

as

long

as

merchants

and

lawyers,

who

pre?

sumably

received

less

prayer.

On

these

grounds,

he claimed that religious practice had no ef?

fect

on

the

real

world

and

that

public

days

of

prayer

were

therefore

not

worthy

of the

state's

endorsement.

By

implication

and

later

by

direct

claim,

only

science could

provide

grounds

for

intervention

in

health

matters.

The

modern

day

version of

this

contest

began

when

Byrd

(1988)

conducted

a

double-blind

randomized

experi?

ment

in

which

groups

engaged

in

intercessory

prayer

for

patients

in

a

coronary

intensive

care

unit.

Byrd's

finding

that

prayer

had

some

posi?

tive health effects triggered a host of studies fur?

ther

evaluating

whether

health outcomes

could

be

affected

through

intercessory

prayer (Astin

et

al.

2000,

Benson

et

al.

2006).

Here

we

have

a

direct

epistemological

con?

flict

between

religion

and

science,

fought

on

what is

currently

the

epistemological

ground

of

science,

in

that

currently

institutionalized

scientific

methods

are

being

used

to

evalu?

ate

claims.

This

literature

does

not

describe

a


?

Religion

and

Science

93






conflict

like the

debates

about Darwinian evolu?

tion,

but rather

is

the

conflict

between

religion

and

science.

SYMBOLIC: DIRECTIONAL

INFLUENCE

The Merton

Thesis: Particular

Religious

Ideas

Lead

to

Modern

Science

Although

the

research

described

above

assumes

that

religion

and

science

are

symbol

systems

in

conflict

specifically

over

truth claims about

the

world,

other

research

is

focused

on

how

other

aspects

of

the

religious

symbol

system

in?

fluence the symbol system of science. At the

end

of

The

ProtestantEthic

and

the

Spirit

of

Capitalism,

Weber

suggests

that future

studies

might

investigate

connections

between

Protes?

tantism

and "the

development

of

philosophical

and

scientific

empiricism"

(Weber

2002

[1905],

p. 122).

In the

1930s,

Robert

K.

Merton

took

up

Weber's

challenge.

The

argument

was

pub?

lished

first

in

Osiris

and

later

in

book

form

as

Science,

Technology

and

Society

in

Seventeenth

Century

ngland

(Merton

1970

[1938]).

Contrary to the dominant warfare narrative

of the

historians of

the

time,

the

Merton

Thesis

proposed

that certain

dominant

cultural

values

expressed

in

Puritanism

contributed

to

the

rise

of science.

At

the

social-psychological

level,

Pu?

ritanism

provided

external

motivation

and

pro?

moted

a

particular

style

of

scientific

practice

through

its

expression

of

cultural

values

such

as

the

glorification

f

God,

diligence

and

industry,

choice

of

vocation,

"blessed

reason,"

"profitable

education,"

empiricism

rather

than

rationality,

and experimentation over idle contemplation

(Merton

1970

[1938],

pp.

60-80).

At

the

social

structural

level,

the

emerging

social

institution

of science

drew

on

religion

for

legitimacy

until

it

could

establish itself

as an

autonomous

do?

main. As

Merton

put

it,

religion

"consecrated

science

as

to

make

it

a

highly

respected

and

laudable focus of

attention"

(p.

106).

Merton's

sociological approach

to

science

and

religion

broke

from

existing

historical

methods

in

three

important

ways.

First,

he fo?

cused

on

how

religion complemented

science

rather than

on

specific

instances of

conflict,

avoiding

"the

short

leap

from

such

empirical

episodes

of conflict

to

a

belief

in

the

logi?

cal and historical necessity for such conflict"

(Merton

1970

[1938],

p. xxxviii).

econd,

he de?

fined

religion

in

nonessential

terms,

as

"dom?

ination

by

a

particular

group

of

sentiments"

rather

than

"adherence

to

the

logical

impli?

cations

of

a

system

of

theology"

(p.

59).

Be?

ing

nominally

Protestant

mattered less

than

the

extent to

which one's

Protestantism

expressed

dominant cultural

values.

Finally,

in

contrast

to

Great

Man

approaches

to

history,

Merton

em?

phasized

that the

instinationalization of science

(in societies, universities, high schools, and oc?

cupational

training)

was

equally

as

important

as

the

personal

characteristics

of

those

individuals

involved

in its

practice.

Many

historians and

a

few

sociologists

have

lodged

objections

to

the

Merton

Thesis

on

the

basis of

competing interpretations

of

Merton's

historical

evidence

(Becker

1984,

Cohen

1990).

And

as

both

Abraham

(1983)

and

Shapin

(1988)

have

noted,

the

Merton

Thesis in

practice

is

usually

whatever

simplified

version

of

Merton's

argument seems most amenable to one's pre?

ferred

analytical

tools.

But the

more

general

idea that

religion

leads

to

the

methods and insti?

tutions

of

modern

science

has

proven

attractive

to

many

scholars,

even

if

they

do

not

directly

respond

to

Merton's

careful

argument.

The

most common

response

from

sociol?

ogists

has

been

to

fit the

Merton

Thesis into

conventional

understandings

of

cause

and

ef?

fect.

The

thesis

is

often

tested

through

cross

national

comparisons

in

which

the

growth

of

science is the dependent variable and religious

affiliation is

one

of

several

independent

vari?

ables. For

example,

Sorokin

(1937)

claimed

that

predominantly

Catholic countries

also

had

high

levels

of

scientific

activity

in

the

seven?

teenth

century,

whereas

Thorner

(1952)

argued

that

Protestants

were

doing

the

contributing

in

those

Catholic

countries.

Working

with

more

recent

data,

Cole

&

Phelan

(1999)

find

that

countries

with

lower

levels of

Catholicism

have

94

Evans

?

Evans






lower levels

of

total scientific

output,

while

Schofer

(2003)

shows

that rotestantism

had

a

positive

effect

on

the

institutionalization

of

geo?

logical

science.

Schofer

(2004)

also

argues

more

generally

that

Protestantism

had

a

historically

positive effect on the worldwide expansion of

scientific institutions

but that this

positive

effect

did

not

persist

after

1970.

By

finding

the lim?

its

of

religion's explanatory

power,

such studies

have also

been useful

in

pointing

to

other

im?

portant

factors

contributing

to

the

institutional

legitimacy

of

science,

such

as

political

decen?

tralization

(Ben-David

1971)

or

patronage

and

state

support

(Wuthnow 1987,

pp. 265-98).

Merton's

contribution

suggests

a

basic

com?

patibility

and

indeed

a

positive,

if

complex,

re?

lationship between religion and science at a

particular

historical

moment.

It

also

provides

a

way

to

explain empirical

instances

of

conflict

without

assuming

an

epistemological

conflict

model.

Other

lines

of research

take

seriously

the

idea that

religion

influenced

science.

For

ex?

ample,

one

ambitious

recent

argument

com?

bines

elements of

Weber and

Merton

to

suggest

that

Christianity's

focus

on

systematic

forward

looking

theology,

combined

with

an

empiri?

cist focus and an understanding of the physi?

cal

world

as

God's

creation,

led

to

the

rise of

Western

science,

capitalism,

and

modernity

as

we

know it

(Stark

2003,

2005).

Another

ap?

proach

proposes

that science

has

sometimes

benefited from

struggles

within

religion.

For

example,

Hollinger

(1996)

tells of

several

cases

in

which

secular,

autonomous

science

became

positively

associated with

democracy

in

mid

century

America,

in

part

as a

reaction

by

(secular

and

nonsecular)

Jews

against

Protestant

hege?

mony

in

universities

(see also Cantor 2005).

Finally,

a

seemingly

unrelated

yet

comple?

mentary

literature

highlights

how

science

draws

on

religious

metaphor,

language,

and

imagery.

At

a

more

abstract

level,

scholars

suggest

that

metaphor

and

myth

are

centrally

important

to

religion

and

to

science,

both

as

ways

of

ordering

knowledge

(MacCormac

1976)

and

as

impor?

tant

sites

of

cultural

production

over

which

re?

ligion

and

science

contend

(Gilbert 1997,

Stahl

et

al.

2002).

More

concretely,

scholars

repeat?

edly

find

that

religious

themes

of

immortal?

ity,

transcendence,

and

omniscience

figure

in

the

description

of

important

scientific

goals,

such

as

finding

the "God

particle"

or

decod?

ing the "Holy Grail" of the human genome

(Nelkin

&

Lindee

1995,

p.

39).

Such

themes

and

metaphors

may

even

help

define

research

agendas

in

scientific fields such

as

space

ex?

ploration,

genetic

engineering,

and

artificial

intelligence

(Noble

1997).

Islamic

Science

The

Merton-inspired

literature

focuses

on

the

influence of

Western

religion

on

post

Enlightenment science. There is also a litera?

ture

on

the

non-Western

religious

influence

on

science

that

presumes

compatibility.

In

North

America

and

Western

Europe,

the

study

of

re?

ligion

and

science is

largely

bound

to

the

cul?

turally prominent

traditions of

Christianity

and

Judaism.

Islam

and science

have

had

an

equally

complex

relationship.

Yet

the

common

view

is

that

Islamic

science is

one

historical

stage

of

scientific

development,

sitting

between

classical

Greek

thought

and

the

Renaissance

in

Western

Europe. This suggests a fundamental compat?

ibility

between

religion

and

this version

of sci?

ence.

In

this

view,

science

continued

to

develop

in

the

West

but

not

in

the

Muslim

world,

and

this

is

possibly

due

to

conflict

with,

or

subor?

dination

to,

some

feature of

Islam

such

as

reli?

gious

law

or

orthodoxy

(Huff

2003).

But

historically,

s

Sabra

(1987)

has

noted,

Islam

did

not

just

transmit

information

from

the

Greeks

to

the

Renaissance

Europeans.

Rather,

it

transformed and

expanded

scientific

knowl?

edge in the process. This is not necessarily a

rebuttal

of

the

common

view.

In

the

stronger

version

of

this

view,

however,

Islam

and sci?

ence

have

always

been

intertwined,

with sci?

ence

emerging

in

Islam

as

scholars

attempted

to

reconcile

observations of the

physical

world

with

beliefs

about

the

spiritual

world

(Nasr

1968,

Iqbal

2002).

Consistent

with

anthropo?

logical

views

of

religion

and

science

(below),

there

is

an

important

trend

in

this

analysis

to


?

Religion

and

Science

95






treat

science

as a

cultural

product

rather

than

a

universal

project

and

to

represent

Islamic

science

as

an

explicitly

religious

version of

scientific

knowledge production

rather

than

an

Islamic

interpretation

of

existing

scientific

knowledge. There are important consequences

to

treating

Islamic

science

as a

specific

cultural

product,

not

least

of which

is

the

potential

for

such

an

approach,

if

sufficiently

developed,

to

challenge

Western

science's

guise

of

value

neu?

trality

Sardar

1989).

Critics

of the

idea of

Islamic

science

note

that

a

commitment

to

culturally

specific

sci?

ence

is

just

another

method of

putting

Islam

in

the

way

of

universal

scientific

progress.

For

example,

Hoodbhoy

(1991)

notes

the

relatively

low scientific production in Islamic countries

during

the

twentieth

century

and blames

the

reluctance

to

embrace

non-Islamic

science

on

a

fundamentalist-influenced education

system

that

emphasizes

religious

rather

than

scientific

achievement.

Yet,

as

Roy

(2004)

argues,

Islamic

fundamentalism

is

not

simply

a

nostalgic

hear?

kening

to

an

idealized

religious

past. Rather,

it

is

both

a

product

and

agent

of

modernity

whose

key

role

models

are

Western-educated

scien?

tists who

enthusiastically

embrace

cutting-edge

technology Roy2004). So it snot entirely lear

that

fundamentalism

is

responsible

for

limit?

ing

scientific

development

in

Islamic

countries.

The

question

of

whether

Islamic science

is

a

useful

way

to

approach

scientific

development

remains

open.

Although

there

are

clearly

ways

in

which

science

is

historically

compatible

with

Islam,

answers

to

questions

of

conflict

depend

largely

on

the

definition

of

science

one

is

en?

gaging.

Anthropological

Analyses

of

Religion

and

Science

Unlike

sociologists,

anthropologists

have

not

started

from

an

assumption

of

incompatible

truth

claims.

For

the

most

part,

focusing

on

local

cultural

features

rather

than

global

ana?

lytical

categories

has

given

anthropology

a

dif?

ferent

perspective

on

religion

and

science,

such

that

it

is

more

helpful

to

think

f

religions

and

sciences

as

multifarious, local,

and

contingent

rather

than

universal,

essential,

and

enduring.

Of

greater

interest

to

anthropology

is

how

cul?

turally

specific

manifestations

of

religion

and

science,

as

modes

of

knowing,

are

enacted

and

how certain modes of knowing are able to travel

across

and

through

cultural

boundaries.

So,

for

example,

it is

not

particularly

prob?

lematic

to

say

that,

in

Western

Europe

and

later

in

North

America,

the

Protestant

form of

Christianity expressed

dominant

cultural val?

ues

that

also

contributed

to

the

development

of

science

and,

more

generally,

of economic

ratio?

nality

in

the form

f

capitalism.

Sahlins

(1996),

for

example,

has

pointed

out

the

tight

relation?

ships

between

Judeo-Christian

principles

and

specific types of consumption-oriented

capital?

ism.

But

more

importantly,

as

Keane

(2002)

has

noted,

the

penetration

of

modern ratio?

nality

into

local

cultures is

not so

much

based

on

the merits

of the

more

esoteric

Western

modes of

thought

such

as

science,

philosophy,

and

literature

or

even

in

the

blunt

application

of the

Protestant ethic

to

local

cultures.

Rather,

Protestantism

provides

a

conceptual

apparatus

that

places

in

the

hands

of

ordinary

people

the

cultural

framework

for

imagining

themselves

and their actions as part of the

project

ofmoder?

nity.

In

this

sense,

it

is

religion,

not

science,

at

the

vanguard

of

Western

rationality

(Keane

2002).

Although

there

are

efforts

in

anthropology

to

treat

religion

and science

debates

as

spe?

cific

sites

of

cultural

contention

(Spuhler

1985,

Scott

1997),

the

most

fruitful

discussions

have

come

from

connecting

the

insights

of

Sahlins,

and

later

Keane,

to

anthropology's

own

devel?

opment

as

part

of

a

modern

scientific

project.

Robbins (2006) andCannell (2006) both point

out

important ways

that

anthropology's

own

classifications and

conceptual

apparatus

are

tied

to

specifically

Western

versions

of

Christian?

ity,

so

that

standard

anthropological

concepts

like

the

other

and

interiority

are

themselves

products

of

one

particular

mode of

knowing

grounded

in

one

form of

Christianity.

In

sum,

there

are

two

families

in

the

sym?

bolic

tradition:

the

epistemological

conflict

9

6

Evans

?

Evans






family

nd

the directional

influence

family.

he

epistemological

conflict

family

resumes

fixed

categories

of

religion

and science

and

presumes

they

are

in

conflict

over

ways

of

knowing

about

the

world. The

directional

influence

family

re?

sumes that religion influences science in some

way

and

broadens the

conception

of

religion

beyond

truth claims.

For

the

most

part,

how?

ever,

neither

family

broadens

the

conception

of

science.

Further,

it is

interesting

to

note

that

there is

no

literature

(of

which

we

are

aware)

of

science

influencing religion

in

which

science is

predicted

to

lose.

All the

literature

we

have

en?

countered

uses one

of

two

perspectives

on

the

influence

of

science: the

epistemological

con?

flict

perspective,

in

which science

leads

to

the

decline of religion (the traditional seculariza?

tion

literature),

or

the

religious

rationalization

perspective,

in

which science

makes

religion

more

like

science

in

the

truth

claims

it

is

will?

ing

to

make and its

form

of

reasoning.

Future

scholars

should

ponder

why

this

is

the

case.

THE

SOCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL:

CONFLICT

STUDIES

DOWNGRADING

EPISTEMOLOGICAL

DEBATES

A

number

of

intellectual

maneuvers

avoid

as?

suming

epistemological

conflict

between

reli?

gion

and science.

One

perhaps

unintentional

theoretical solution

was

to create

the

functional

definition

of

religion

such

that

religion

is

not

about

the

supernatural

or

anything

that

falls

outside

of the

aegis

of

science,

but

rather

re?

ligion

is

the

most

abstract

of

symbols.

Thus,

the

assumptions

of

science

itself

could be

a

re?

ligion.

Scholars

rarely

label

symbol

systems

as

religions

unless

they

fit

the

common

usage of

the

term

because,

quite

pragmatically,

people

think

that Roman

Catholicism,

analytic philos?

ophy,

Marxism,

and science

are

indeed

qual?

itatively

different

phenomena.

Or,

differently,

as

we

discuss

below,

they

intuit

that

religion

is

about

more

than

the

most

abstract,

assumed

truths.

However,

a

slightly

different

approach

than

labeling

science

a

religion

has

been

to

treat

the

epistemological

status

of

scientific knowl?

edge

as

potentially equal

to

the

epistemologi?

cal

status

of

religious

knowledge.

This

means

that

the

truth

or

falsity

of

religion

or

science

is

bracketed,

and

contests

for

authority

or

the

power to determine truth between science and

religion

are

recast

as

power-inflected

discursive

struggles.

The

earliest

canonical

texts

in

what

became the

sociology

of

scientific

knowledge

(SSK),

published

in

the

late

1970s and

early

1980s,

made the

case

that

scientific

knowledge

is

socially

constructed,

like

any

other

knowl?

edge

(Bourdieu 1975,

Latour

&

Woolgar

1986

[1979],

Knorr-Cetina

1981).

Science therefore

does

not

inherently

have

more

believability

than

religion,

but

rather scientists

have

to

make

efforts and spend resources to claim that au?

thority.

Such

studies examine

religion

and sci?

ence

not as

feuding

symbol

systems,

but

rather

as

social

conflicts

between

institutions

strug?

gling

for

power,

with

the

content

of

the

symbol

systems

definitively

bracketed.

Institutional

Conflict

The

earliest

studies

that

examine

a

conflict

be?

tween

religion

and science

that

make

use

of this

new intellectual move are those of Gieryn and

colleagues. Gieryn

was

interested

in

how scien?

tists

struggle

to

demarcate

science from

non

science,

and

therefore

garner

societal

authority

(Gieryn

1983,

Gieryn

et

al.

1985).

In

this

view,

science

is

not

a

monolithic,

unchanging

system

of

knowledge,

but

rather

this

system

of

knowl?

edge

is

transformed

for

tactical

advantage,

de?

pending

on

which

profession

or

institution

sci?

ence

is

competing

with

(such

as

religion).

Similarly,

vans

(2002)

examined

a

conflict

between theologians and scientists over the

authority

to

promulgate

the

ethics of

human

genetic

engineering.

He

also

gives

scientific

symbol

systems

no

inherent

power

but

rather

focuses

on

how

one

group

obtains

the

re?

sources

with

which

to

wrest

jurisdiction

over

ethics

making

from

the

other

group.

As

in

the

rest

of

the

studies

in

this

category,

there

is

no

essential

definition of

religion

or

science?

religion

is

what

people

associated

with

religious

www.a7inualreviews.org

?

Religion

and

Science

97






institutions

do;

science is

what

people

associ?

ated with

scientific institutions

do.

In the

case

studied

by

Evans,

scientists

indirectly

efeated

the

theologians

by nurturing

the

subsidiary

pro?

fession of

bioethics,

which

in

turn

furthers

the

scientists' interests.

Other studies

are

similar.

Mulkay

(1997),

in?

vestigating

the

debate

over

embryo

research

in

the

UK,

shows how the

debate became

por?

trayed

as

"a

conflict between those who wish

to

enforce

unthinking

obedience

to

out-of-date

religious

beliefs and

those

who

are

determined

to

defend

scientists'

right

to

continue

their

search

for truth"

(p.

97).

Contrary

to

the

por?

trayals

by

scientists,

Mulkay

finds

that the

argu?

ments

on

the

two

sides

"cannot be

distinguished

in terms of their rationality, their reliance on

dogma

or

in

terms

of

other

features

central

to

the

stereotyped

contrast

between

religious

and

scientific

styles

f

thought" (Mulkay

1997,

p.

97).

Proponents

of

embryo

research

won

the

debate

owing

to

fragmentation

among

religious

opponents,

as

well

as

the

power

of

their

own

dogmatically

asserted

beliefs

(Mulkay

1997,

p.

114).

They

did

not

win

because of

the

na?

ture

of

their

symbol

system.

The

religion

and

science social

conflict that

is most readily available in the public mind

is

probably

the debate

over

Darwinian

evolu?

tion

owing

to

legal

cases

and

political

debates

over

public

schooling

(Binder

2002).

Again,

like

other

studies

of

the


(instead

of

symbolic)

relationship

between

religion

and

science,

studies

of

conflicts

over

Darwinism

fo?

cus

on

institutions

and

power.

Tourney

(1994)

and

Numbers

(1992),

for

example,

spend

great

effort

discussing

the

organizational

strength

and orientation

of

various creationist

and

cre?

ation science organizations over time. Binder

(2002)

makes the

case

that

it is

not

the

con?

tent

of

religion

or

science

per

se

that

results

in

the

defeat

of

religiously inspired

creationists

in

public

school

debates,

but rather

the

nature

of the

institutions

they

are

arguing

within

(see

also

Lienesch

2007).

In

sum,

if

the

scientists

win

these

battles

it

is

not

directly

due

to

the

inherent

power

or

truthfulness

of

science

as

a

system

of

ideas,

but

rather

due

to

how

institu

tions

have resulted

in

science

being

considered

more

truthful.

Religious

Belief

and

Opposition

to

Interests

and Conclusions

of

Scientists

Another literature

that tends

to

bracket

truth

claims examines

how

religious

individuals

eval?

uate

the

interests

and conclusions

of

scientists.

For

example,

Ellison &

Musick

(1995)

find

that

conservative

Protestants

are

more

likely

than

are

other

Americans

to

have

moral

criticisms

of

science.

Probably

the

first and

largest

literature

n

this

area concerns

the

accuracy

of

White's

(1967)

article,

which

linked

Christianity

to

the

cultural notion of "subduing the earth" derived

from

a

traditional

Christian

reading

of

the book

of

Genesis. This

notion,

according

to

White

(1967),

led

to

the

current

irresponsibility

n

en?

vironmental

policy.

Here,

we

describe

respon?

sible

environmental

policy

as a

policy proposal

from

the mainstream

of

the scientific

commu?

nity,

and the

question

was

whether

average

re?

ligious people

really

hold

this view

of

creation

and,

if

so,

whether

it

results

in

an

unwilling?

ness

to

engage

in

environmental

stewardship,

to use one of the terms in the debate. Research

was

designed

to

determine

whether,

for

exam?

ple,

Biblical

literalism,

religious

tradition,

or

belief

in

God

lead

to a

lack of

support

for

lib?

eral

environmental

policy

(Eckberg

&

Blocker

1989,

Greeley

1993,

Woodrum

&

Hoban

1994,

Sherkat

&

Ellison

2007).

Although

such

re?

search

has

recently

engaged

religious

complex?

ity

(e.g.,

which

aspects

of

religious

belief

would

lead

one

to

be

opposed

to

liberal

environmental

policy?),

it

remains

largely

silent

on

the

com?

plexity of science.

Non-Epistemological

Secularization

Theories

A

newer

strand of

secularization

theories avoids

assuming

that

religion

and science

are

strug?

gling

over

truth,

but

focuses

on

religion

as

an

institution

with

multiple

tasks

and

interests,

struggling

with

other

institutions.

The focus

9

S

Evans

?

Evans






here

is

on

power

and

agency

of

individuals

within institutions.

n

Smith's

(2003a)

account,

there

is

not

secularization

so

much

as

there

are

secularizers,

individuals with

a

vested

interest

in

the

discrediting

of

religion.

Many

of

these

secularizers are scientists, but that is not neces?

sary

to

the

account.

For

example,

the

secular?

ization

of

the

institution

for the

promulgation

of

public

morality

in

the

1920s

was

a

conflict

that

did

not

involve

scientists,

rationalization,

or

truth

at

all.

Rather,

it

was a

response

by

pub?

lic

intellectuals

to

censorship

originating

from

religious

social

reformers who

sought

to

ban

"pernicious

books"

(Kemeny

2003).

Similarly,

the

secularization

of

the

journalistic profession

responded

to

a

demand for

objective

institu?

tions to assume responsibility for public edu?

cation,

for which the

rejection

of

subjective

re?

ligious

perspectives

in

public

newspapers

was

a

necessary precursor

(Flory

2003).

Although

this

approach

to

professionalization

mirrored

scientific

models,

the

secularization

process

did

not

depend

on,

or

necessarily

include,

the

par?

ticipation

of scientists

or

appeals

to

scientific

authority

see

also

Roberts

&

Turner

2000).

This

secularization

explanation

does

have

a

basic

conflict narrative

when

religion

and sci?

ence do encounter each other, but this explana?

tion

avoids

the

epistemological

conflict

model

by

relativizing

the

content

of

religion

and sci?

ence.

The

groups

are

conflicting

over

differen?

tial

interests,

not

differential notions

of

truth,

and

therefore

the

content

of the

symbol

systems

in

each

group

is

not

important

to

the

analysis.

These

conflicts

are

won

by

the

group

that ob?

tains

greater

power

and

resources.

Another

secularization

explanation,

associ?

ated

with

rational

choice

theory,

is

interested

not

in

differentiation but only in individual

religiosity.

It

posits

a

constant

demand for

re?

ligion

by

the

public,

with

secularization

in

par?

ticipation

occurring

where

religious

organiza?

tions

are

not

effectively

providing

services

to

meet

this

demand

(Stark

&

Bainbridge

1985,

Finke

&

Stark

1992,

Warner

1993).

Western

Europe

is

then

more

secular

than

the

United

States

because

in

Europe

monopoly

churches

have

become

lazy

and

have

only

produced

one

religious product.

In

the

United

States,

com?

petition

between

religions

makes

the

religions

effective

producers

of varied

religious products

(Finke

&

Stark

1992,

p. 19).Therefore,

where

secularization

occurs,

it

has

nothing

to

do with

science but rather with institutional restrictions

on

religious

organizations.

Additionally,

some

rational

choice advocates

have made

further

assertions

of the

compatibil?

ity

of

religion

and

science

(Stark

et

al.

1996;

Stark

1999,

pp. 264-66).

Religion

is

still de?

fined

in

a

way

that makes

it

incompatible

with

traditional

conceptions

of science

[e.g.,

"Any

system

of beliefs

and

practices

concerned with

ultimate

meaning

that

assumes

the existence

of

the

supernatural"

(Stark

&

Iannaccone

1994,

p. 232)].This assertionof compatibility s itself

supported

by

following

the

lead

of

economics

in

not

theorizing people's preferences

or

beliefs,

but rather

by

only

being

interested

in

showing

that

both

religion

and science

use

instrumental

rationality

in

their

decision

making.

This also

allows

an

end

run

around the conflict

over

epis?

temological

claims:

The

comparison

is

not

be?

tween

religions

as

ultimately

about

the

super?

natural

(e.g.,

unverifiable

through

observation)

and science

about the

natural

(e.g.,

empirically

observable), but rather that, whatever a person's

conception

of natural

or

supernatural,

he

or

she

makes

decisions

using

the

same

form

of

ratio?

nality.

Therefore,

religion

and science

are

com?

patible

because

religious people

and scientists

are

both

instrumentally

or

theoretically

ratio?

nal

in

their

reasoning.

In

sum,

the

secularization

literature

has been

the location

ofmuch of the

sociological

work

on

the

relationship

between science

and

religion.

The

earlier,

yet

still

dominant

tradition

assumes

epistemological conflict between a fixed science

and

a

fixed

religion,

such

that

an

increase

in

sci?

ence

mechanically

leads

to

a

decline

in

religion.

An

emergent

tradition

embodied

by

the

authors

found

in

Smith

(2003 a)

typically

till

sees

reli?

gion

in

conflict

with

science,

because of

histor?

ically

contingent

interests,

not

out

of

necessity,

and

not

necessarily

about

truth.

A

final

ratio?

nal

choice

tradition

sees

religion

as

compatible

with

science

and

sees

instances

of

secularization


?

Religion

and Science

99






as

due

to

institutional

regulation.

This

view

would

seem

to

open

paths

for

more

subtle

and

contingent

examinations

of the

relationship

be?

tween

religion

and

science,

in

that

religion

can

decline

owing

to

factors

unrelated

to

science

and Enlightenment rationality.

CONCLUSION

It

is

our

contention

that

the

epistemological

conflict

assumption

has

limited

our

understand?

ing

of

the

relationship

between

religion

and

science.

First,

it

seems

problematic

to

make

truth

claims the

center

of

interaction

between

a

static

religion

and

a

static

science

when reli?

gion

and

science

are

dynamic

and

concerned

with much more than truth claims. Indeed,

in

another

paper,

we

make the

case

that

pub?

lic

debates

between

religion

and science

are

no

longer

about

truth,

but rather

about values

(Evans

&

Evans

2006).

Similarly,

Buckser and

Geertz,

cited

above,

make

a

similar

claim that

religions

are

not

primarily

about

explaining

the

physical

world,

but

rather "it

is

explaining

the

social

world,

giving

it

meaning

and

moral

value,

which is

religion's

primary

concern"

(Buckser

1996,

p.

439,

see

also

Greeley

1972,

pp.

248-49;

Smith 1998,pp. 90-91).We shouldadd that ur

claim

that

religion

is

decreasingly

concerned

with the

truth of

the

natural

world is

also

a

nor?

mative

position

of

some

in

the

theology

and

sci?

ence

debates,

most

notably

Gould

(1997),

who

argued

that

religion

and

science

should be

en?

gaged

in

different

activities

of

truth

making

and

meaning

making.

One

could

object

by

saying

that

the

specific

religious

traditions

that

have

had the

most

ob?

vious

conflicts

with

science do

think

of

them?

selves as being concerned with epistemology.

But

even

fundamentalists

involved

with

cre?

ationist

debates

not

only

cede

authority

to

the

scientific

method

(if

not

contemporary

scien?

tists),

but also

are

motivated

by

their

concerns

that

Darwinism

leads

to

corrupt

societal

values

(Tourney

1994).

One

could

also

object

by

saying

thatwhile

religions

are

indeed

concerned with

many

mat

ters,

claims

of

truth

are

the

keystone

that

keeps

the

entire

edifice

intact. This

seems

false

in

that

the

incompatibility

of

at

least

core

Christian

truth

claims with

science

has

not

had

a

negative

effect

on

religious

practice

in the

United

States

in the past few hundred years.

Knowing

that

science

cannot

prove

that

Jesus

was

resurrected

does

not seem

to

have

had

an

impact

on

be?

lief

in

the

resurrection

of

Jesus.

As

is

obvious,

people

have the

ability

to

maintain

a

number of

seemingly

inconsistent

ideas

at once.

What

seems

most

likely

is

that

publicized

scientific claims

about

the

world

are

so

incon?

sequential

to

belief

and

practice

in

American

religion

that

they

do

not matter.

The

truth

of

global

warming,

how birds

fly,

or

whether

nu?

clear energy plants are safe have no

impact

on

religion.

Also

note

that

most

of

the truth

claims

of

religion

are

not

publicly

contested

by

science.

There is

no

research

agenda

within

science

to

show

that human

resurrection

is

impossible,

so

the

incompatibility

f

truth

laims

on

this

topic

remains

fully ypothetical

and

thus

unlikely

to

enter

the mind of

the

average

religious

person.

Only

a

few

issues,

constructed

as

important

by

activists with

resources,

merit

such

attention.

The

social

studies

outlined

above

show

how

rarely

religion

and science conflict at all and

how

even

more

rarely they

conflict

over

truth,

giving

further

reason

to

abandon

the

assump?

tion. In

the

twentieth

century,

only

truth

claims

about the

book

of

Genesis have

resulted

in

ac?

tual

social

conflict

with

organized

institutional

struggles

and,

in

this

case,

only

for

a

minority

of

the

religious

citizens

of

the

United

States.

The

review

of

the

literature

clearly

demon?

strates

that

whereas

religion

is

considered

in

all

its

incredible

variation,

science

is

more

typically

conceived of in static and monolithic terms.

Science

typically

means

the

positivist,

materi?

alist

practices

that

are

admittedly

dominant

in

the

contemporary

West. Of

course,

historically

other

conceptions

of

knowledge

creation

such

as

Baconianism

were

influential,

but

there

is

certainly

more

variation

under

the

title

of

sci?

ence

than

analysts

are

accounting

for.

This

is

probably

because

the

field

of the

sociology

of

ioo

Evans

?

Evans






science

has

not

been

interested in

religion,

and

this

s

thefield

that

questions

whether

the

naive

realist

position

really

describes

scientific

prac?

tice.

The studies

of

religion

and

science

we

have

cited

above

are

more

likely

to

be

conducted

by sociologists of religion than sociologists of

science.

If

we

leave the

question

of

conflict

over

truth

open

rather than

building

it into

our

defini?

tions

of

religion

and

science,

then

we

can

imag?

ine

breakthroughs

in

our

understanding

of

long

stalled

debates.

As

an

example

of

the

possi?

bilities,

consider

a

new

book

on

secularization

written

by

two

political

scientists

outside the

so?

ciology

of

religion

and

science:

Norris

&

Ingle

hart

(2004)

begin

with

a

non-epistemological

definition of religion, that "a key factor driv?

ing

religiosity"

is

"feelings

of

vulnerability

to

physical,

societal,

and

personal

risks"

(p.

4).

In

this

definition,

religion

clearly

is

not

primarily

about

explaining

the

natural

world

but

about

the

meaning

of

events

outside

of

one's

control.

Implicit

in

their

analysis

is

the notion

that

sci?

ence

would

lead

to

secularization

with

the

de?

velopment

of

knowledge

that

reduces

vulnera?

bility,

such

as

improved

medical

care.

However,

it

is

not

automatic?the

fruits of

science

would

actuallyhave to be distributed to thepeople

through

something

like

a

social

welfare

state.

Knowledge

alone

is

insufficient

to

lead

to

a

de?

cline

in

religion.

The

authors

seemingly

can

then

explain

the

classic

deviant

case

in

the

secu?

larization

debate?the United

States?because

it is

the

one

Westernized

democracy

where vul?

nerability

is

high

owing

to

the

lack

of

a

welfare

state

and

other

features.

This

openness

to

other

conceptions

of

religion

and

science,

we

argue,

not

only

helps

the

authors

explain

seculariza?

tion

data

better

than

previous

efforts,

but

also

provides

a

model for

the

way

forward

in

study?

ing

religion

and science.

At minimum, we suggest that future sociol?

ogists

who examine

the

relationship

between

religion

and science

not assume

the

episte?

mological

conflict

model,

but

rather

leave

the

source

of

contestation

as an

empirical

ques?

tion.

We maintain

that attention

to

science

as

a

complex,

plural,

and

multifaceted

object

of

study

is

necessary

for

producing

useful

stud?

ies

of

religion

and

science.

Such

studies

may

come

from

STS

or

they

may

come

from

other

sociologists

who

incorporate

STS

approaches.

Either way, we argue that the best empirical

work

comes

from

treating

religion

and sci?

ence

not

as

predetermined

categories

but

as

the

words

and actions

of

institutionally

embedded

persons.

Finally,

we

note

with interest

that

some

of

the

best

sociological

work

on

religion

and

sci?

ence

happens

when

scholars

are

not

explicitly

studying

religion

and

science. We

have

high?

lighted

ork

by

anthropologists,

olitical

scien?

tists,

and

social

movements

scholars

who

treat

religion and science not as the only categories

to

be

studied but

as

pieces

of

larger

puzzles.

Such

studies

often

provide

the

most

insight

with

the

fewest

essential

assumptions.

We

encour?

age

such

work

in

the

future

nd

humbly predict

that

the

best

insights

into

religion

and

science

will

emerge

as

scholars

find

ways

to

incorporate

the

complexity

of

religion

and

science

into

their

work.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The

authors

are

not

aware

of

any

biases

that

might

be

perceived

as

affecting

the

objectivity

of

this

review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks

to

Alper

Yalcinkaya,

Ron

Numbers,

Joan

Fujimura,

Mark

Chaves,

and

Tom

Gieryn

for

comments.


?

Religion and Science ioi






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