3.2 - Schnadelbach, Herbert - What is Neo-Aristotelianism¿ (EN)

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What is Neo-Aristotelianism?

What is Neo-Aristotelianism?

by Herbert Schndelbach

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1987, pages: 226-237, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=81e7094f-4b22-4aa4-8124-0e322953a745http://www.ceeol.com/


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NEW CURRENTS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

WHAT IS NEO-ARISTOTELIANISM?*Herbert Schnaedelbach

One of the paradoxes of the modern age is that classics have renaissances:but what doesn't die can't be born again. When in the 18th century peoplebegan to speak of "the classical," they meant something that provides a modelor standard for all eternity - something immortal, like the Platonic Ideas,absent only when we now and then lose sight of them. However, the historicalconsciousness of the 19th century discovered that even the classical is mortal,that its rebirth requires midwifery. Since then, the "classical" has becomepeculiarly discontinuous: having become an object of reflection, it is nowmarked by the very subjectivity-as something supposedly objective andsubstantial-it rejects. Measured against the myth of the phoenix or the stoicfigure of an "eternal return," contrived rebirths are somewhat absurd,particularly when the newborn bears little resemblance to that which hasdeveloped naturally or historically. The simulated, artificial quality of allrebirths since the Renaissance is characteristic of philosophical ones as well.In the last 150 years the names of "great" philosophers have often appearedbetween the prefix "new-" or "neo-" and some variety of "-ism": NeoKantianism, Neo-Marxism, and so forth. The perpetrators are unconcernedas to whether this constitutes an act of self-characterization or an act of beingcharacterized by others. What they have in mind is not simply the old, thatwhich has been, but something new and modern-yet something in the spiritof the old. (The prototype of such lexical constructions-which often refer tohistorical positions, e.g. Neo-Positivism, Neo-Realism, Neo-Liberalism-is"Neo-Platonism," coined in the late 18th century and referring solely to thehistory of philosophy).The orthodoxy of such 'neo-positions' lies always in their methodologywhether Otto Liebmann's Neo-Kantianism, Georg Lukacs essay, "What isOrthodox Marxism?", or the Neo-Positivists' empiricist criterion of meaning.(There even exists a similar orthodoxy of the so-called 'Frankfurt School').The methodological self-definition of such orthodoxies has the initial advantage of providing scope to the 'historically enlightened person' in dealing withnew ideas and experiences. Of course the notion of associating the old andclassical with method, the new and modern with subject matter, is particularlyprecarious where, for methodological reasons (as in Neo-Hegelianism andNeo-Marxism), one defends the unity of method and subject matter. Onecannot hide the dilemma encountered by attempts to resurrect the historicalpast and to serve it up as something 're-born'. Neither a simple traditionalismfixated on what has been historically transmitted, nor conceptual decisionismdecreeing what and how we should think, are desirable paths at the present.* This translation is a slightly abridged version of the German original.Translated by Benjamin GreggPraxis International 7:3/4 Winter 1987/8 0260--8448 $2.00


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226 Praxis InternationalAristotle was subjected to Neo-Aristotelianism early on. If we ignore thatAristotelianismwhich was not a renaissance of the classical (theAristotelianism

of High Scholasticism and of Leibniz and Hegel), then Trendelenburg countsas the first Neo-Aristotelian. A conscious, methodologically reflected return toAristotle-motivated by a systematic intent and often with polemical goalshas becomequite common. Trendelenburg's logic was aimed against Hegel, theontology of Nicolai Hartmann against Neo-Kantianism, and the more recentteleological interpretation of nature by Hans Jonas and Robert Spaemannagainst modern mechanistic thought and the ethical vacuum it created.Today the philosophical literature on Neo-Aristotelianism refers tosomething quite different. It refers to the renaissance of Aristotelian thoughtin practical philosophy, which in turn understands itself as the rehabilitationof practical philosophy in general. It also refers to the idea of a causalconnection between this renaissance and the current neo-conservatism inGermany since Helmut Kohl took office in 1982. Yet Neo-Aristotelianism isdifficult to identify. Many who contributed to the well-documented 'rehabilitation of practical philosophy' (Riedel) were not particularly close to Aristotleor Aristotelianism. If anyone who considers the basic ideas of the Aristoteliantradition to be relevant and indispensable is therefore an Aristotelian, thenperhaps anyone who philosophizes is really a Neo-Aristotelian, and perhapsthere is no such thing as "the" Neo-Aristotelian position per se. Should wethen say, with Marx, that a specter haunts the philosophical landscape-andnothing but a specter?I would maintain that Neo-Aristotelianism is more than a ghostly dream.Significant aspects of Aristotle's practical philosophy are alive today in avariety of competing theories, even (as will be shown) in theories whichcompletely reject Neo-Aristotelianism. One still might be able to identifyaspects of the real Aristotle in all this-if one were to ask which elements ofthe newest Aristotle-reception influence contemporary neo-conservatism (tothe extent that it admits of philosophical in influence at all). Conversely, onecan imagine that the Aristotle interpretation on which neo-conservatism isbased is itself politically and culturally motivated. Here the term "conservative" is not one of disparagment; one can honorably be conservative-eventhough we Germans still have certain problems with this.As the existence of an extensive literature suggests, defining conservatismmay be even more difficult than identifying Neo-Aristotelianism. My discussion is confined to two characteristics. Conservatism is a reactive position ororientation which reflects off from what it reacts against. Modern conservatism was born in the French Revolution, as a reaction against it, as arejection of the claims of Enlightenment liberalism and rationalism to providea new foundation for politics and culture. (Germany's most recent neoconservatism sees itself as a necessary counter-reaction to some purportedcultural revolution of the Left). This reactive pattern explains why conservative thought always believes itself to be free of ideology: the real ideologuesof course are the others, those who measure the status quo against exhorbitantstandards and thereby destroy it. The conservative differs from the traditionalist or the blind reactionary in that he wants to be a realist. He concedes that

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Praxis International 227the status quo, including tradition, needs to be developed further, to berenewed, and he therefore considers himself a modern person. Yet he nevertakes the initiative himself, but always places the burden of proof on theinnovator. Then, when the innovation can't be held off any longer, theconservative tries to limit the resulting 'damage'-o r what he takes to be the'damage'. (It is typical of "our" conservative that he doesn't object to policiesof economic and technological modernization. He usually achieves somemodus vivendi with such policies, and views himself as compensating for thecultural side-effects caused by technological innovation).Conservatism cannot easily identify the extent to which conservation of thestatus quo is possible and feasible, since it always charges its opponents withthe burden of thinking abstractly about principles and criteria. The fact that itleaves this task to common sense and prudence explains the conservatives'theoretical insecurity. This insecurity produces on the one hand a measure ofdiscord among the conservatives often underestimated by outsiders. On theother hand, it seduces the conservative into taking the worries of theestablishment upon himself and identifying with the powers that be, powerswhich have successfully opposed all forces which problematize and destabilize. The conservatives' emblem is the Owl of Minerva: reactive thoughtunderstands or legitimizes what is, or what has happened, only after the fact.The reactionary also reacts, yet the conservative reacts not blindly butthoughtfully; he reacts conservatively with deliberation. This means that, sincethe Enlightenment, all conservatives have been enlightened about the true nature ofthe Enlightenment, and today they consider being enlightened about the end of theEnlightenment as the most enlightened thing of all. Not to champion theEnlightenment, but-in the reaction against the Enlightenment-to champion the enlightened denunciation of the Enlightement: this basic pattern ofconservative thought from Edmund Burke to Arnold Gehlen unavoidablyleads to the problem often described as the 'dilemma of conservatism'(Greiffenhagen). Viewed philosophically, it consists in a situation where theconservative is forced to argue-where the only intellectual means available tohim are those of the Enlightenment itself, the very force he seeks to restrain.Conservatism's fundamental intention is not to enlighten the Enlightenmentabout what its goals should be, but to defeat it with its own weapons. Thisgenerates the contemporary renaissances of classics mentioned earlier; asHabermas said ofGehlen, these are "imitation substantiality"-artifical ersatzfor tradition.By itself, the fusion of Neo-Aristotelianism and neo-conservatism does notprovide us with the differentia specifica we seek. In political philosophy it maybe difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish Neo-Aristotelianism fromNeo-Hegelianism. In a certain sense Hegel was himself a Neo-Aristotelian,such that the modern conservative reception ofHegel's legal philosophy mighteasily be tied to that of Aristotelian politics (cf. Joachim Ritter and hisfollowers). Moreover, German political science, which after World War 11developed in reaction to 'Third Reich' ideology, was strongly Aristotelianwithout being thoroughly conservative. Like the later 'rehabilitation ofpractical philosophy', it was one more attempt to situate practical philosophy


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228 Praxis Internationalnext to (or above) normative ethics and empirical social science-by returningto forgotten intellectual traditions.It is not yet a case of Neo-Aristotelianism when this occurs by recourse toantiquity, where Aristotle is invoked affirmatively-as in the case, forexample, of Hannah Arendt. For one then invokes aspects of our commonheritage, or at least of its dominant traditions (excepting the Sophists andEpicureans). By this I mean the normative orientation of ethical and politicalthought in contrast to the modern value-free logic of self-preservation; theontology of human essence (or the conditio humana) in contrast to theself-determination or even self-generation of the modern autonomous subject;the thesis that the polis takes precedence over the individual, whose veryessence teleologically prescribes participation in social and public spheres(unlike the individualism and subjective utilitarianism of contractariantheories).

The question, "What is Neo-Aristotelianism?", can only be answered byway of ideal-types. The following remarks therefore do not refer to anyone inparticular. We would do well to start with the very points which werethemselves controversial in the 'debate' between Plato and Aristotle, i.e.within the dominant tradition of practical philosophy. In the relevantliterature one repeatedly finds three pairs of concepts which not only recall thehistorical controversy, but which characterize Aristotelianism in practicalphilosophy as well: (1) theory and praxis, (2) praxis and poiesis, and (3) ethicsand ethos. I maintain that Neo-Aristotelianism, in a narrower sense, inconstituted solely by the third pair.Aristotle's critique of Plato in the Nicomachean Ethics culminates in thesentence: "Even if there is some one good which is universally predicable ofgoods or is capable of separate and independent existence, clearly it could notbe achieved or attained by man; but we are now seeking somethingattainable". (NE 1096b, 32-36). Then we read: "It is hard, too, to see how aweaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own craft by knowingthis 'good itself, or how the man who has viewed the Idea itself will be abetter doctor or general thereby". (1097a, 7f). Since the idea of the Good issomething towards which one can take an exclusively theoretical stance,Aristotle's arguments imply theory's limited practical significance-itself basedon praxis' limited theoretical capacity. The pure theory of the Good is uselesswhen one seeks the practical Good, i.e. something which humans can activelyrealize or acquire. The reason is ontological: the objects of theory and praxisare at different ontic levels. One can know only what is general and "in itself';action, (Handeln) on the other hand, is always carried by a particularindividual and is particular in nature, and it lies within our power.For Aristotle, this does not mean that praxis is entirely without theory, orthat a theory of praxis is impossible. Indeed, 11e develops his practicalphilosophy with a practical intent-"for we are inquiring not in order to knowwhat virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquirywould have been of no use" (1103b, 26f). Yet he warns against anyexpectations that a theory of praxis might guide praxis in all its particulars, for"we will have to be content with whatever degree of determinacy corresponds


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Praxis Intemational 229to the matter at hand." (1194b, 12). The point is that exhorbitant demands onthe practical significance of theory would actually destroy the theoreticalcapacity of praxis. Scientific or scholarly theory could focus only on generalfeatures within particular praxis situations, thereby missing what is specific inpraxis. The theory of praxis would then become practically irrelevant-asAristotle says of the physician or general who, during an operation or inbattle, seeks practical consequences from dwelling on the idea of the Good.For Aristotle, the fact that, in terms of scientificity, the theory of praxis lagsbehind the theory of the cosmos, is for all practical intents actually anadvantage. The practical irrelevance, for praxis, of a pure knowledge ofprinciples means that practical philosophy must reduce its claims to scientificity; yet it thereby becomes all the closer to praxis.A consideration of the political consequences of this Aristotelian theorypraxis model leads us back again to Aristotle: philosopher-kings and theirdictatorship of theory become obsolete. For Aristotle, the possession oftheoretical insight is not in itself an adequate basis for the legitimate exerciseof power: the capacity for scientific knowledge (episteme) has no appreciationfor the contingent, the contextually dependent-in other words, preciselywhat it needs in praxis. By 'appreciation' I mean 'prudence' (phronesis),which can be sharpened by, but not replaced with, scientific knowledge. TheAristotelian philosophy of phronesis gives 'healthy reason' (orthos logos), i.e.common sense, a chance vis-a.-vis the elitist knowledge of experts. It thusforms the basis of our understanding of liberal democracy, where theacceptability of political arguments and decisions is not measured exclusivelyor even primarily in terms of theoretically defined truth. It is Aristotelian toplace greater hope in the public sphere than in the authority of science, to relyon the consensual or majority decisions of experienced, upright citizens with ahealthy sense of reality, to keep technocrats and intellectuals in their place.Implausible, however, are the reasons why those with the greatest understanding should not therefore be the decision-makers. It has always been difficultto explain this to others, and Aristotle has always been helpful here.If Neo-Aristotelianism were nothing more than the revival of this theorypraxis concept, its connection to neo-conservatism would be difficult toestablish. When speaking of philosopher-kings, our Neo-Aristotelians meanthe Left above all, and they overlook the fact that the majority of the NewLeft had a radical-democratic, not a Stalinist, orientation, that it was thereforecloser to Aristotle than to Plato. Only indirectly does the concept seem to beconservative. A leitmotif of theory about the humanities since the last centuryhas been the extent to which praxis admits of theory, and the extent to ~ w h i c htheory can be relevant to praxis. It does battle on two fronts: against Hegel'sphilosophy of history and its logical deduction of the Historical from theAbstract-Rational; and against a "social physics", i.e. the concept of a naturalscience of the human world. Within this opposition, Hegel and Newton areseen as representatives of the pure theory from which praxis and phronesisneed to be protected (a position now occupied by orthodox Marxism andsystems theory).At the same time, the humanities-above all, history-were understood in


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230 Praxis Internationalthe nineteenth century as the only real praxis-orienting disciplines. That theybecame "purely theoretical" reveals the decay of their original ethos, a decaybrought about by the historical convergence of historicism and humanisticAristotelianism. The ontological framework of Aristotelian practical philosophy (found in Aristotle's psychology) has also been historicized, namelywhen interpreted as a mere relatively valid foundation for ethics and politics.The degree to which praxis admits of theory-the degree conceded byAristotle in his general statements about man and his world-is even furtherreduced. The humanitites then become value-free as well-something resolutely opposed by politicizing historians. In the end, the historicization ofAristotelian anthropology theoretically strengthens conservatism. What canno long be tied to strong normative claims can no longer ground radicalcritique.Of course theoretical scepticism benefits the power of the status quo; it is nocoincidence that Descartes also invented provisional morality. The historicallyenlightened Neo-Aristotelian cannot be anything but a sceptic. Following anAbschied vom Prinzipiellen ["taking leave of normative foundations"] (OtterMarquard), and located equi-distantly between Kantian imperative ethics[Sollensethik] , Plato-izing value-ethics and theoretical social science, theNeo-Aristotelian makes praxis a matter ofpractical prudence. He thus frees usfrom normative demands and expectations.The distinction between praxis and poiesis is the foundation of actiontheoretical Aristotelianism. One can show historically that the Aristoteliantradition in practical philosophy faded away to the very degree that theconceptual distinction between action and production, doing and making,ceased to be useful. To understand this difference in Aristotle himself, onemust begin with his critique of Plato. Action-guiding knowledge, saysAristotle, is not purely theoretical, nor is it general and universally applicabletechnical knowledge (what we now call "know how").As the capacity for practical knowledge, phronesis is fundamentallydifferent from both episteme (science) and techne (art)-for an ontologicalreason: since action and production differ, so too must the correspondingdianoetic capacities of phronesis and techne (cf. NE 1140a, Iff.). Thedifferences between praxis and poiesis follow from the fact that both types ofhuman activity exemplify both types of possible movement: the perfect andthe imperfect. According to Aristotle, that movement is perfect whichcontains its telos within itself, whereas the one whose telos is external to itselfis imperfect. In the language of means and ends-the language of everydaypractical-discourse-this means that action is itself a goal-and not aself-goal-whereas production for some goal occurs as a means to a goal notinternal to it. This structural difference has significant consequences for thenormative stance one takes toward human activity in general.Action and production are not subject to the same criteria, since an actionwhich is its own goal must contain within itself the conditions and standardsfor its own success, whereas the criteria for successful production are externalto that production. Action for Aristotle is life, not merely a means to life (likeproduction), and therefore has a higher status ontically and in terms of value.


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Praxis International 231The praxis-poiesis distinction endures with a remarkable persistence evenwhereAristotelian ontologyhas longbeenabandoned: examples include Kant'sdistinction between the Technical-Practical and the Moral-Practical, Hegel'sdifferentiation between labor and action, and Max Weber's ideal-typicaldistinction between value- and purposive-rationality. (Hannah Arendt's furtherdistinction between laboring and producing represents a systematic development of action-theoretical Aristotelianism). It follows that the praxis-poiesisdifference is independent of whether any given action-theory is teleological orcausalistic. For Kant as for Max Weber, actions are causal occurrences in theworld; they differ from other occurrences in that the actor associates them withhis own subjectiveorientations. Whether this "subjective sense" (as the action'sgoal) actually effects the action, is an empirical question which can never beanswered definitively. At the same time, Kant and Weber are concerned withactions worthy of being done for their own sake and not for any external goals:

either specifically moral or value-rational actions. Aristotle so clearly graspedthe intuitively plausible difference between that which we do for its own sake andthat which we do towards a detenninate goal, that the distinction has neverentirely disappeared from the tradition of practical philosophy.The most obvious theoretical consequences of the praxis-poiesis distinctionlies not in ethics, but in the theory of politics. If politics is action and notproduction, then not only can there no longer be any philosopher-kings whoare both politically successful and have technical expertise in matters ofcontrol; the technical understanding of politics must in praxis lead to thedestruction ofaction, and therefore of human life at a political and social level.Poiesis in the political sphere is violence; to achieve goals which lie outside ofaction itself, the conditions for action must remain constant and controllable.Other humans are then nothing but material-"human material"-and cannotthemselves act, as that would endanger the success of political production.For Aristotle, of course, the endangerment of freedom is not the primaryargument against a technical understanding of politics; he, too, considers thetechne of founding a polis, or the techne of constitutional reform, to be one ofthe virtues of great political figures.Decisive for him is that human life, in the sense of man's fundamentalpolitical and linguistic essence, can succeed only in an intersubjective lifecontext; a man who does not need beings like himself is either a god or ananimal. A human being cannot act alone, he can only produce. Purepoiesis-politics would therefore mean the tyranny of a monologizing, superhuman sovereign, whereas praxis-politics implies the utopia of a selfcontained, self-regulating, polyvocal and multi-dimensional concert of interests and initiatives. Not only political liberalism, but economic and socialliberalism is Aristotelian. And lest one take Aristotle to be the patron saint ofthe conservative trend in West Germany since Helmut Kohl became chancellor, one should recall that anarchism, as the most radical form of liberalthought, was born of the Aristotelian spirit.Production and action, the Technical-Practical and the Moral-Practical,purposive rationality and value rationality, instrumental and dialecticalreason, labor and interaction, instrumental and communicative action, system


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232 Praxis Internationaland lifeworld-these distinctions, used critically, all imply a critique of homofaber as the archetype of modernity. His image is tied to the reversal of thehierarchical relationship between praxis and poiesis-a reversal which, in thehistory of metaphysics, follows from the complete loss of an objectiveteleology. If all goals to be sought through action are based on man's freeself-determination, and if his own being is added to the list of ' things' he cancontrol, then the objective context of meaning, in which human action canitself be a goal, has been exploded: poiesis becomes almost total. Hence wefind it difficult, after this revolution in thought, to specify what constitutessuccessful praxis (i.e. the good life) if not the achievement of self-chosengoals. In conditions of modernity, the good life can no longer be separatedfrom what humans with a free will believe to be the good life. This difficulty ispoignantly demonstrated by older Critical Theory. The Aristotelian inspiredcritique of pure purposive rationality cannot by itself restore value-rationality,as no one can simultaneously assume both individual autonomy of the will anda hierarchy of universally valid, highest values. As Hobbes showed, one canassume a descriptive, observing stance towards the value-orientation of humansonly if one concedes them a free will.Mere, reflexive contemplation of the natural history of homo faber does notof itself fill the normative vacuum left behind by the emancipation of poiesisfrom Aristotelian praxis. Since then, there have been various attempts byNeo-Aristotelians and others to reconstruct criteria for the good life on thebasis of a modified concept of praxis. This raises two problems. First, theclaim that action is more valuable than production would have to be redeemed,since "Prometheus forever unbound" (Hans Jonas) is supposed to be resocialized into the practical life-world-something for which the ontology ofperfect and imperfect movement hardly suffices. One would then need acriterion for the success or failure of action itself, and it could not be solelyfunctionalist-otherwise it would be applicable to any given context of socialfunctioning whatsoever. What functions is not for that reason necessarily good.The action-theoretical Aristotelian cannot allow for external normative perspectives, since normative orientations external to action would move thepraxis model of action closer to poiesis. Hence the praxis-poiesis differentiation generates a concept with extraordinary weak normative consequences.This temporarily unburdens praxis of strong normative claims-and strengthens conservatism.My remarks on the theory-praxis relation and on the praxis-poiesis relationare intended to show that a return to Aristotle, even if it strengthensconservatism, does not itself engender Neo-Aristotelianism in the strict sense.This is the case only when we add the Aristotelian model of the ethics-ethosrelation. As Aristotle says: "Each man judges well the things he knows, and ofthese he is a good judge.... Hence a young man is not a proper hearer oflectures on political science. For he is inexperienced in the actions that occurin life, and yet its discussions start from these and are about these". (NEI095a, Iff). The anti-Platonic argument-that there cannot be any 'pure'theory of praxis-here reveals its other side. If the theory of praxis is not pure,then it may properly treat of praxis only to the extent that theory proceeds from


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Praxis International 233praxis. Theory becomes empirical in the sense that even its receptionpresupposes the pre-scientific, lived experience of its object. It also followsfrom the praxis-poiesis distinction that theoretical knowledge of action cannever attain the same degree of precision as knowledge of production-which,qua control over the general conditions of successful poiesis, is on the sametheoretical level as episteme. Phronesis is not itself the medium of practicalphilosophy, since the latter recognizes only the general, whereas phronesisknows the particular as well. Yet the theory of praxis could never guidephronesis if it did not leave a dimension open; phronesis serves to fill out thisdimension. Once again, knowledge of the particular is experience-which isneither producible theoretically, nor replaceable by theory.That Aristotle's practical philosophy is directly linked to life-experiencemeans for every Aristotelian or Neo-Aristotelian that ethics is linked to a livedethos. In methodological terms, this is the concept of 'hermeneutics as practicalphilosophy' (Gadamer). Unlike the empiricist who objectivistically reinterprets the Aristotelian empeiria of praxis, the Neo-Aristotelian ethicist viewsthe recourse to experience as a reflective confirmation of life-contexts in whichethical reasoning has always been embedded. He interprets this process as beingitselfa life-process; as a historically enlightened person, he expects to transformand develop the ethos. At the same time he feels he must warn Platonists of allstripes against systematically underestimating real praxis in their ethics. Hedistrusts "pure" theories of praxis, considering them products of a "freefloating" intelligentsia alienated from a lived ethos. The fundamental conservatism of this notion of ethics is revealed by its own polemical consequences: acritique of utopia and a rejection of any ultimate foundation for ethics.In the Aristotelian tradition, criticism of a practical "Beyond," of an idealimage ofthe Good or a pure Ought, is not based on arguments from the theoryof science against the possibility of a pure theoria-or poiesis-knowledge ofpraxis. The basis premise is that the Good is already in the world, that there isno need to introduce it from some abstract ideal sphere. The idea that we mustrealize the Good in the world through action raises no problems for theNeo-Aristotelian, since he distinguishes between action and production.Therefore action can never be understood as the realization in this world ofsomething otherworldly, but only as a realization of real possibilities. ForAristotelianism, this anti-utopian motif outlives the historicalEnlightenment-since the historicist understanding of history excludes utopias as "unhistorical" even when they function, within a philosophy ofhistory, as an ideal or telos of history. The modern Neo-Aristotelian replaceswhat Aristotle conceived in a static manner, as lived ethos, by 'reason inhistory'. The central task of philosophical ethics is then to interpret reason inits practical reality. The Neo-Aristotelian differs from Hegel in that heforegoes the guarantees offered by a philosophy of history, yet this forces himto place an even greater trust in accumulated practical experience (i.e.tradition) than would the Hegelian, convinced that history has a goal. Ifhistory is open, then 'reason in history' is essentially reason in tradition.Traditionalism for the Neo-Aristotelian is almost unavoidable.In Neo-Aristotelianism the critique of utopia corresponds to a rejection of a


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234 Praxis Internationalnormative foundation of action independent of practical reality. Vis-a.-visPlatonic or Kantian apriori-ism, the Neo-Aristotelian remains an"empiricist." He does not reject all foundational claims, no more thanAristotle foregoes writing an ethics, but "foundation" does not here meanwhat it usually means in modern philosophy: foundations signify hermeneutically guided arguments suggesting individual agreement on the foundationsof any given lived-ethos. Consistent with this is a critique of particulars, not adistancing in general. Hegel calls this a "reconciliation with reality"-whichmeans knowing, among other things, that the "rose at the crossroads of thepresent" is thorny. The exclusion of a presuppositionless ethics necessarilyimplies the categorical exclusion of ultimate ethical foundations-a point onwhich Neo-Aristotelians and Neo-Hegelians agree. If ethics is tied to an ethos,then an ultimate ethical foundation which questions the basis of this ethics isnot only ignorant; it is immoral.

The Neo-Aristotelian reduction of strong foundational claims in ethicsinfluences the content of those ethics-not only in the sense that the principlesof aprioristic models have weaker validity claims. We need but think of Kantto see that hermeneutic ethos-ethics could never ground imperatives whichimply a categorical imperative. Ethos-ethics itself would not want this, as thiswould detach categorical-claims from the sole conditions making themethically relevant for Neo-Aristotelians: conditions of the lived ethos.At best, ethos-ethics can realize hypothetical imperatives, which arenothing other than situationally specific rules of prudence that Kant wouldscarcely have called moral. Aristotle's oft-noted amorality has its roots here.Just as he subordinates all of practical philosophy to its usefulness for man, sohis doctrine of virtues offer instruction more for a happy life than for a moralexistence. Not surprisingly, the Neo-Aristotelian has a deeply rooted mistrustof morality. When Hegel says of true morality that it "is a subjectivedisposition, but one imbued with what is inherently right", and then calls it"ethical life" [das Sittliche] (Philosophy of Right, Paragraph 141A), he isobjecting (by means of this "but") to a moral consciousness become independent of its ethos-background, an instantiation of evil. (There extends anunbroken tradition from Hegel's philippics against theBurschenschaften to theterrorism-hysteria of the 1970s).This suggests how Neo-Aristotelian ethics views the autonomy of theindividual. The view differs from Aristotle's own by recognizing autonomy inprinciple, while reducing it from a principle of morality to a mere moment ofSittlichkeit; Hegel is again the ideal. In ethos-ethics, an unconditionalconscience, like the categorical imperative, has no place whatsoever: theNeo-Aristotelian considers it an Unsittliches. Hence he believes that individualautonomy is secure in our "moral world," while excluding from the "moralworld" anyone attempting to make serious use of it.For the Neo-Aristotelian turned conservative, autonomy is the same asfundamental opposition. If we recall Kant, whose moral philosophy undertookto deduce a categorical imperative under conditions of individual autonomy,we realize at what high price the hermeneutic reduction of strong validityclaims is bought: Kant took for granted that autonomy and the categorical


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Praxis International 235imperative belong together, that they cannot be had separately.The neo-Aristotelian ethic of prudence, with its weak foundationalprovisions and relativization of the principle of autonomy, is ultimately aneminent political ethic. The hermeneutic coupling of ethics to ethos producesnot only a habitual bias to the advantage of that which exists; it also produces asystematic mistrust of the individual, who can exemplify but never alone canyan ethos. For this reason, neo-Aristotelians tend to reduce ethics to politics;what indeed is ethos other than political reality in the widest sense of theterm? The reality of the ethos is that of the institutions of ethical life [dersittlichen Welt]. Hegel's critique of contract theory and his deification of thestate appear again in neo-Aristotelianism in the form of an Institutionalism,which easily gets tied to functionalistic thinking and by which neo-Aristoteliansfind common ground with our more recent "Hobbists." Admittedly, onlyafter one has left behind the hermeneutic preconception that lived-ethos [dasgelebte Ethos] itself is som


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236 Praxis Internationalthe Neo-Aristotelian runs the danger of conjuring up a mere reverse-image ofthe purposive-rationally constituted world; he runs the danger of strengthening the traditionlism which the neo-conservatives recommend as a remedy forthe undesired side effects of technical-scientific modernization.

This is not to speak against a return to phronesis, nor is it to speak in favorof a serene belief in techne. It is perhaps old fashioned to recall the concept ofreflection: "Only the wounding spear itself can heal the wound it made", asAdorno often said. Today we cannot prove prudence in theory by playing offthe idea of phronesis against techne, but only by exceeding the limits of techneby its own means.In systematic terms this means that, in practical philosophy, we should notabandon those validity claims which in Aristotle correspond to episteme andtechne, and which in the modern age correspond to a strong concept ofrationality. Central here is the claim to universality. For the ethos-ethicist, hispoint of departure-the practical and sittliche universal-is always a mereconcrete-historical action-context, a mere pragmatic universal. In Aristotle,the universal knowledge implied by phronesis is also mere pragmaticuniversal knowledge. If this were not the case, it could then be replaced bytheoretical knowledge-which is impossible. The Neo-Aristotelian argues thisby denying that the universality of the ethos (which practical philosophy canuncover and examine) is an abstract quantity of principles, and he warnsagainst so interpreting it.In methodological terms, this means that he must accord phronesis a statuseven lower that what Kant calls 'judgment'. According to Kant, in judgment anindispensible role is played by viewpoints which are not merely pragmatic,but universally valid. Yet principles-and not only pragmatic universals---arewhat, in a thoroughly rationalized world, can be guaranteed only byindividual autonomy. This can be shown with respect to basic rights. Thephilosophy of phronesis can avoid the danger of being a merely conservativeideology if it reconstructs phronesis itself as practical judgment in Kant'ssense. This logically includes progressing from a merely pragmatic-generalethos to a principled-universal of practical reason.The dispute over morality and Sittlichkeit, long fought out betweenKantians and Hegelians, can be settled only if all participants agree on aconcept of freedom. If, like Kant, one understands freedom as subjectiveself-determination, then ethos and Sittlichkeit can only be heteronomy; if, likeHegel, one understands freedom as Being-in-and-of-oneself-while-being-withan-Other, then subjective autonomy is a misleading goal. Significantly, thedifference between phronesis and judgment is independent of this controversy:in real life one need not conjure up phronesis in order to Be-with-an-Otherwhile Being-in-and-of-onself. A lifeworld institutionalizing universalistic principles which guarantee freedom embodies not only a historical-contingentethos, but a rational-universalistic one as well. This is something to which therational individual, someone who insists on his rational goal, can certainlyreconcile himself.It is incumbent upon the ethical theorists of discourse here not to surrenderthe theme of "institutions" to the "institutionalists" and finally to supplement


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Praxis International 237their views with an appropriate ethic of institutions. This will only bepossible when they begin to talk not only about morality and the ethical life,but also about legality. Legality-taken as a principle or as an ideal-typeconcerns the conditions of freedom in the external relationships of humanbeings to one another. Precisely this moment of externality, which thetraditionalists deplore, we experience subjectively as the precondition for ourindividual freedom in the modern life-world. Legality is the most importantnon-Aristotelian element of what we could grasp as our ethos.

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3.2 - Schnadelbach, Herbert - What is Neo-Aristotelianism¿ (EN)

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