3.3 - d'Entreves, Maurizzio Passerin - Aristotle or Burke¿ Some comments on H. Schnaedelbach's...

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Aristotle or Burke? Some comments on H. Schnaedelbach's "What is Neo-Aristotelianism?"

Aristotle or Burke? Some comments on H. Schnaedelbach's "What is Neo-Aristotelianism?"

by Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3+4 / 1987, pages: 238-245, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=467d4faf-0559-446f-94e8-db67f71c7a00http://www.ceeol.com/


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ARISTOTLE or BURKE?Some comments on H. Schnaedelbach's "What is NeoAristotelianism?"

Maurizio Passerin d'EntrevesThe history of the revival of traditions is, almost inevitably, the history oftransformation, modification, and selective appropriation of the original

corpus of texts taken to be paradigmatic for the traditions in question. It is notsurprising, therefore, that any "renaissance", whatever the claims made on itsbehalf to be an original and undistorted reactualization of a long-forgotten ormarginalised tradition, is always, in some respect, an artificial reconstructionof such tradition, a selective recombination of those elements that fit theperceived needs or the unacknowledged assumptions of the contemporaryinterpreter. The history of Aristotelianism is an example of this, having beenidentified successivelywith Scholasticism and the medieval writings on naturallaw (St. Thomas Aquinas), with the Renaissance tradition of civic humanism(Leonardo Bruni, Lorenzo Valla, Ermolao Barbaro, Pietro Pomponazzi,Francesco Guicciardini, Niccolo Machiavelli, Donato Giannotti, GasparoContarini), with the revival of republican thought in Puritan England andRevolutionary America (James Harrington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson),with the philosophies of Hegel and Marx, with Trendelenburg's critique ofHegel's logic, and today with the so called "Rehabilitation of PracticalPhilosophy". We might agree, therefore, with Schnaedelbach's assertion that"contrived re-births are somewhat absurd, particularly when the new-bornbears little resemblance to that which has developed naturally or historically.The simulated, artificial quality of all renascences since the Renaissance ischaracteristic of philosophical ones as well."! But precisely this simulated andartificial quality should make him aware of the impossibility of reducing aphilosophical framework to a specific interpretation of it which happens to bemotivated by conservative political and cultural values. The fact that neoconservatives have appropriated some elements ofAristotle's political philosophy for their own politically motivated purposes does not, ipso facto, disqualifythe principles and categories of Aristotelian practical philosophy. Indeed, ofthe three pairs of concepts analysed by Schnaedelbach, only the third-theethics-ethos relatIon-is recognised to be distinctive of the neo-conservativeappropriation of Aristotle,2 and what proceeds from it is not a transformedAristotle but a refurbished Burke. It is therefore very rash ofSchnaedelbach tocollapse a tradition of reflection on political matters inspired by Aristoteliancategories and distinctions to the political stance of contemporary neoconservatives in Germany, with the aim of discrediting the validity of thePraxis International 7:314 Winter 1987/8 0260-8448 $2.00


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Praxis International 239former. It is also somewhat implausible to claim a causal connection, ratherthan a contingent one based on an ascribed affinity, between the renaissance ofAristotelian thought in practical philosophy and the current neo-conservatismin Germany since Helmut Kohl took office in 1982.3 The history of radicallydivergent interpretations of Aristotle's political philosophy, which Schnaedelbach himself acknowledges with respect to Arendt4 , to anarchism5, and to earlyCritical theory6, should induce moderation in this respect. Establishing causalconnections between theoretical frameworks and political standpoints is adangerous enterprise, since it can always be used to demonstrate the necessaryrelation obtaining between Jesus and the Inquisition, Rousseau and theRevolutionary Terror, Hegel and Prussian militarism, Marx and the Gulag,Nietzsche and National Socialism. With respect to Aristotle's politicalphilosophy it would seem therefore more advisable to investigate the contingentconnections that have obtained historically between certain of its theoreticalcomponents and specific political standpoints, without prejudging the issuefrom the outset or short-circuiting the connections in question.We might now consider Schnaedelbach's reconstruction of NeoAristotelianism in terms of ideal-types. At first sight this seems the mostappropriate strategy, since it enables one to highlight, albeit in a somewhatstylized form, the 4>distinctive features of a theoretical system. But as apresentation of the Neo-Aristotelian position, especially with respect to itspolitical implications, it is inadequate, since it does not allow for anydiscrimination between the claims advanced by the various representatives ofNeo-Aristotelianism, nor for their differerit political standpoints. Ideal-typicalreconstructions are highly useful for analytical purposes i.e. as heuristicdevices for the ordering of a segment of reality, but cannot be employed assubstitutes for concrete empirical investigation. What Schnaedelbach'sreconstruction ends up doing, in effect, is reducing a complex and multifaceted theoretical constellation to three pairs of concepts which are said tocharacterize Aristotelianism in political philosophy: (1) theory and praxis; (2)praxis and poiesis; (3) ethics and ethos. The distinctiveness of NeoAristotelianism is then made to rest entirely on the third pair, the ethics-ethosrelation, so that for the purpose of Schnaedelbach's critique the first twobecome almost redundant. Neither the theory-praxis distinction nor thepraxis-poiesis one are in fact shown to lead to Neo-Aristotelian (i.e. neoconservative) conclusions. The claim that praxis cannot conform to theprinciples of a strict science (episteme) does not, by itself, result in a scepticismthat benefits the status quo; it can equally lead to a democratic conception ofpolitics based on common deliberation and collectively reached insights.Similarly, the claim that political rule should not be the prerogative ofphilosopher-kings has usually been made by the critics of the status quo; theneo-conservative twist is only made possible by the spurious identification ofphilosopher-kings with the Left in general. The same can be said of thepraxis-poiesis distinction: a praxis model of politics implies the utopia of aself-determining community based on intersubjectively recognized needs andinterests; the neo-conservative version of such model is made possible only byillegitimately unburdening praxis of strong normative claims.7

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240 Praxis InternationalSchnaedelbach therefore acknowledges that his account of the theory-praxisand praxis-poiesis distinctions does not engender Neo-Aristotelianism in thestrict sense (i.e. in the neo-conservative sense). This is the case, he says, "onlywhen we add the Aristotelian model of the ethics-ethos relation"g, a model in

which the role of experience is raised to a paradigmatic status. "The NeoAristotelian ethicist", he claims, "views the recourse to experience as areflective confirmation of life-contexts in which ethical reasoning has alwaysbeen embedded. "9 The moral emphasis is thus entirely on the side ofendorsement (however reflective) of our practices and normative beliefs, ratherthan their transformation. The political implications of Neo-Aristotelianismthen become clear: since it interprets and grounds every ethics from thestandpoint of a given lived ethos, it is highly distrustful of utopias and rejectsany ultimate (i.e. ethos-transcendent) foundation for ethics.Utopias are distrusted because they posit an image of the beyond which isabstract (i.e. has no purchase on the present), dangerous (since its realizationwould require the intrusion of techne into the domain of praxis), and finallyunnecessary, since the Good is already in the world (i.e. it is embodied alreadyin our practices and institutions, even if only potentially). Ultimate ethicalfoundations are rejected because every ethics, or every normative criterion ofaction, must be grounded in the concrete reality of the life-world, that is tosay, in the lived ethos of a community. As in the case of utopias, ultimateethical foundations are illusory (they will always end up drawing upon thegiven moral resources of a society), harmful (in attempting to challenge thedeep structure of our moral life) and in the end dispensable (since hermeneutic insight and prudence will suffice to orient and justify our lifepraxis).The critique of utopia and of ultimate foundations implies in this respect areflective endorsement of the status quo, a conscious relegitimation of the givenethos. At its best, such critique can indicate those possibilities that awaitrealization in the present, in so far as they are already partially embodies inour practices. But there is no escaping of the fact that, as Hegel put in ThePhilosophy of Right: "To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of thepresent and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight whichreconciles us to the actual."IO The reconciliation effected by the modernNeo-Aristotelian is, however, much deeper than the Hegelian one: since heabandons the guarantee offered by a teleological conception of history, he isforced to place a much greater trust in accumulated practical experience (i.e.tradition). If history has no goal, no inscribed telos, then reason in history isessentially reason in tradition. The shift could thus be characterized as thatfrom a teleological conception (reason in history) to an archeological one(reason in tradition). For Neo-Aristotelianism reason appears only in itsretrospective guise, history is reduced to tradition, and tradition becomestraditionalism. How far this if from an authentic understanding of traditioncan be gleaned from a memorable aphorism of Jaroslav Pelikan: "Tradition isthe living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living."11Moreover, if reason itself is restricted to tradition, this should not be taken asmerely a confirmation of the extant tradition (or the given ethos), but as an


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Praxis International 241extension, amendment and transformation of tradition. Indeed, since tradition is never singular but always plural, the notion of tradition itself ismisleading: not one but many traditions are constantly undergoing modification, extension and revision. 12

It comes as no surprise, then, to find neo-conservative appeals to traditionas both anachronistic (the tradition in question being no longer available) andantiquarian (attempting to sustain the dead faith of the living). Schnaedelbach's formulation of the neo-conservative dilemma is correct:One cannot hide the dilemma encountered by attempts to resurrect the historicalpast and to serve it up as something "re-born". Neither a simple traditionalismfixated on what has been historically transmitted, nor a conceptual decisionismdecreeing what and how we should think, are desirable paths at the present.13

Equally correct is his formulation of the other dilemma of conservatism,which consists in the fact that conservatives are forced to argue, and thus toemploy the intellectual means of their opponents:

The conservative reacts not blindly but thoughtfully; he reacts conservatively withdeliberation. This means that, since the Enlightenment, all conservatives have beenenlightened about the true nature of the Enlightenment, and today they consider beingenlightened about the end of the Enlightenment as the most enlightened thing of all.Not to champion the Enlightenment, but - in the reaction against theEnlightenment-to champion the enlightened denunciation of the Enlightenment:this basic pattern of conservative thought from Edmund Burke to Arnold Gehlenunavoidably leads to the problem often described as the "dilemma of conservatism".14

In trying to defeat the Enlightenment with its own weapons, the conservativeis forced to fight against himself, or rather, against his better judgment thatreason should not play too great a role, lest tradition (i.e. custom) bedestroyed. His only escape is to resurrect tradition artificially (to imitatesubstantiality, in Habermas' phrase), or to become a traditionalist in JaroslavPelikan's sense (defending the dead faith of the living). Either way, theauthentic notion of tradition is lost, and with it, a genuine sense of the pastand an active notion of historical consciousness. For tradition, properlyunderstood, means tradere, an active passing on, a living transmission of theresources of the past into the present so as to enable us to consciously shapethe future, not a passive acceptance or re-endorsement of everything that ismerely given. "Ill every era", wrote Benjamin, "the attempt must be madeanew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpowerit".15 Without a conscious reappropriation of the past, the conformism thatlurks behind the conservative's notion of tradition will emerge triumphant. Inthis respect:

to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it "the way it reallywas" (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memoryy as it flashes up at a moment ofdanger. . . . Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope inthe past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from theenemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious. 16


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242 Praxis InternationalTo preserve the genuine meaning of the past requires therefore the breakingof the hold that traditionalism has imposed upon it, the rediscovery of thosemoments that have been silenced or marginalised, the refusal to go along withthe verdict of the victorious. 17 And the crucial resource that enables us tore-appropriate the past in this way is an active historical consciousness thatlegitimizes the choices we make vis-a-vis competing traditions (acceptingsome and rejecting others). The appeal to tradition can never rest on traditionitself, as Burke maintained; rather, it always has to be made on the basis of acritical historical perspective that selects from the past those moments worthpreserving. In its role as a vehicle for the legitimation of traditions historicalconsciousness stands opposed to the forces of traditionality and to all thosewho would uphold the status quo.If the foregoing characterization of tradition and historical consciousness isaccepted, then it becomes clear that Schnaedelbach's critique of NeoAristotelianism is actually a critique of Neo-Burkeanism. The restriction ofnormative criteria to the conditions of a given lived ethos, the subsumption ofprivate morality under the political ethics of institutions, the reduction ofpraxis to a matter of practical (i.e. conservative) prudence: all these features ofNeo-Aristotelianism have no intrinsic connection to Aristotle's practicalphilosophy, but are rather a reformulation of Burke's political vision. It is inBurke, in fact, that we find a prescriptive notion of tradition, an understanding of the past as an inheritance passively transmitted rather than activelyappropriated, and a presumption of validity for the norms and customs of agiven community. As he declared in a speech that he composed in 1782:Our constitution is a prescriptive constitution; it is a constitution whose sole-authority is that it has existed time out ofmind ... Prescription is the most solidof all titles, not only to property, but, which is to secure that property, togovernment . . . It is accompanied with another ground of authority in theconstitution of the human mind-presumption. It is a presumption in favour ofany settled scheme of government against any untried project, that a nation haslong existed and flourished under it.18Burke's prescriptive constitution (for which read: tradition) has two characteristics: it is immemorial, and that is what makes it prescriptive and gives itauthority, and it is customary, rooted in something better than choice, since "itis made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, andmoral, civil and social habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves onlyin a long space of time."19Burke's attitude toward the past as an inheritance to be handed down ratherthan reclaimed critically can be found in many of his writings, but especiallyin his Reflections on the Revolution in France. The following passage isinstructive:

The very idea of the fabrication of a new government is enough to fill us withdisgust and horror. We wished at the period of the [Glorious] Revolution, and donow wish, to derive all we possess as an inheritance from our forefathers. Upon thatbody and stock of inheritance we have taken care not to inoculate any cyon aliento the nature of the original plant ...


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Praxis International 243You will observe, that from Magna Carta to the Declaration of Right, it hasbeen the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties as anentailed inheritance derived to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted toour posterity ... We have an inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage; and a

house of commons and a people inheriting privileges, franchises, and liberties,from a long line of ancestors.This policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection; or rather thehappy effect of following nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and aboveit. 20The understanding of the past as an inheritance that we receive and transmitaccording to the wisdom of nature; the prescriptive attitude toward traditionthat disallows conflict and innovation21 , the presumption that customs andhabits are inherently valid, that the persistence in time of certain practices andbeliefs constitutes by itself an argument for their retention-these are thecornerstones of Burke's philosophy of sceptical conservatism and of hispolitics of traditionalism. They are also, to a surprising degree, the domainassumptions of Neo-Aristotelianism or, rather, of that version of NeoAristotelianism put forward by conservative political thinkers in Germany,whose individual pronouncements and specific standpoints are unfortunatelynot provided in Schnaedelbach's ideal-typical reconstruction.It would have been much preferable, therefore, if Schnaedelbach hadacknowledged that his critique of Neo-Aristotelianism actually pertained tothat model of the ethics-ethos relation in which Burke, rather than Aristotle,plays the leading role. Had he done so, it would have been impossible tocollapse a tradition of thought inspired by Aristotelian categories Ca tradition,incidentally, that is undergoing a profound and stimulating revaluation in thewritings of A. MacIntyre, C. Taylor, S. Hampshire, P. Foot, M. Midgley, J.Wallace, J. Flynn, M. Walzer, M. Sandel, R. Beiner, R. Bellah, W. Sullivan,B. Barber, W. Galston, J. Charvet, S. Salkever, T. Spragens, R.M. Unger, C.Larmore, T. Pinkard, J. Budziszewski, A. Brown, to name the mostimportant)22 to the political stance of contemporary neo-conservatives inGermany.The criticisms Schnaedelbach offers of the latter, and in particular of theiridentification of ethics with the lived ethos and of the lived ethos with theinstitutional order, are pertinent and valid; nothing I have said is meant todiminish their force. My main disagreement centers on whether Aristotelianpractical philosophy, with its distinction of theory and praxis and praxis andpoiesis, is necessarily responsible for the political outcomes that Schnaedelbach has so incisively criticized.

NOTES1. H. Schnaedelbach, "What is Neo-Aristotelianism?", p. 225.2. Ibid., p. 228; p. 232.3. Ibid., p. 226.4. Ibid., p. 228.5. Ibid., p. 231.


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244 Praxis I ntemational6. Ibid., p. 232.7. Cf., Ibid., p. 232. I say illegitimately, since the normative presuppositions of action, after the loss ofan objective teleology, can be reformulated in terms of a communicative model of action, as Habermashas shown. The criteria of successful action (eu prattein) would neither be functionalist, nor external to

action. Rather, they would be normative and immanent, linking action to internal validity claims (e.g.truth, rightness, sincerity).8. Ibid., p. 232.9. Ibid., p. 233. I t may be open to dispute to what extent this is the only legitimate interpretation ofAristotle's appeal to experience. In Aristotle's practical philosophy experience does indeed play acentral role, but not necessarily on the side of the endorsement of the given ethos. In somecircumstances it may justify the breaking of certain conventions for the sake of a higher good (forexample, in those cases where looking back to precedents indicates that extraordinary action isneeded). Moreover, experience by itself is not sufficient to guide action or to determine our moralreasoning; for this we need also the intellectual faculties (or virtues) of sunesis (understanding), gnome(judgment), bouleusis (deliberation) and phronesis (practical wisdom). In exercising these faculties orintellectual virtues it is always an open question whether we will end up reaffirming the status quo or

our given ethos--we may also decide on rational grounds that it requires changing.10. Hegel, Philosophy ofRight, translated with notes by T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1967), p. 12.11. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 65.12. As Maclntyre has correctly remarked:"Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict. Indeed when a tradition becomesBurkean, it is always dying or dead." A. Maclntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1981), p. 206.13. H. Schnaedelbach, op. cit., p. 225, emphases mine.14. Ibid., p. 227.15. W. Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History", in Illuminations, edited and with anintroduction by Hannah Arendt, (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 255.16. Ibid.17. This enterprise of reclamation of the past has been aptly characterized by Hannah Arendt, who usedthe following quote from Cato:

"Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni" ("The victorious cause pleased the gods, but thedefeated one pleases Cato") H. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, (New York: Harcourt BraceJovanovich, 1978), vol. 1, p. 216.18. E. Burke, "On a Motion Made in the House of Commons ... for a Committee to Enquire into theState of the Representation of the Commons in Parliament", in Works, (Bohn's Libraries ed.,London: George Bell and Sons, 1877), VI, pp. 146--147, cited in J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language

and Time, (New York: Atheneum, 1973), p. 226, emphases mine.19. Ibid.20. E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, edited with an introduction by Conor CruiseO'Brien, (Penguin English Library, 1982). pp. 117-119.21. "A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish temper and confined views", in E. Burke,

Reflections on the Revolution in France, op. cit. , p . 119.22. A. Maclntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

C. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vo!. 2, (Cambridge; CambridgeUniversity Press, 1985). "Justice after Virtue," in M. Benedikt and R. Berger (eds.): KritischeMethode undZukunft der Anthropologie, (Vienna, 1985). "Sprache und Gesellschaft," in A. Honnethand H. Joas (eds.): Kommunikatives Handeln: Beitraege zur Habermas' Theorie des KommunikativenHandelns, (Frankfurt, 1986).

S. Hampshire, Morality and Conflict, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).P. Foot, Virtues and Vices, (Berkerley: University of California Press, 1978).M. Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots ofHuman Nature, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).J.D. Wallace, Virtues and Vices, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).J.R. Flynn, Humanism and Ideology: An Aristotelian View, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).M. Walzer, "Philosophy and Democracy," Political Theory, 9, 3, (August 1981), 379-399. Spheres ofJustice, (New York: Basic Books, 1983). Interpretation and Social Criticism, (Cambridge, Mass.:


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Praxis International 245Harvard University Press, 1987).

M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).R. Beiner, PoliticalJudgment, (London: Methuen, 1983). "On the Disunity of Theory and Practice,"Praxis International, 7, 1, (April 1987), 25-34.R. Bellah et aI., Habits of the Heart, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).W. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public Philosophy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982)."Shifting Loyalties: Critical Theory and the Problem of Legitimacy," Polity, 12, (Winter 1978),253-272.B. Barber, Strong Democracy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).W. Galston, Justice and the Human Good, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).J. Charvet, A Critique ofFreedom and Equality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

S. Salkevher, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics," American Politcal Science Review, 68, (March 1974),78-92. "Freedom, Participation, and Happiness," Political Theory, 5, 3, (August 1977), 391-413."Aristotle's Social Science," Political Theory, 9, 4, (November 1981),479-508. "Beyond Interpretation: Human Agency and the Slovenly Wilderness," in N. Haan et aI., Social Science as MoralInquiry, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). "The Crisis of Liberal Democracy:Liberality and Democratic Citizenship," in K. Deutsch and W. Soffer (eds.): The Crisis ofLiberalDemocracy, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).

T. Spragens, The Irony of Liberal Reason, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).R.M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1975). Law in Modern Society,(New York: The Free Press, 1976).C. Larmore, Patterns ofMoral Complexity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).T. Pinkard, Democratic Liberalism and Social Union, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).J. Budziszewski, The Resurrection of Nature: Political Theory and the Human Character, (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1986).A. Brown, Modern Political Philosophy, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986).

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