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Stealth
There has been much media interest in stealth and stealthyaircraft in the past ten years or so, and claims are made that
such targets are invisible to radar. Not surprisingly, much of
this is rubbish !
This section looks at the techniques used to reduce the radar
signature of targets, the reduction in detection performance that
this gives, and some of the radar techniques that might be used
to recover the advantage that reduction of the target signature
has brought.
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The simplest theoretical way of matching an aircraft to free space is to envelop it
in a resistive skin whose surface-resistivity is 377 ohms, and to maintain an air-gap between skin and aircraft of a quarter of a wavelength. !
... The gap between skin and aircraft may be considerably reduced by filling itwith a medium in which the wavelength is less than in free space. !
!To obtain a large bandwidth we need to use a medium of low conductivity witha high ratio of permeability to dielectric constant. If this ratio is 4, the intrinsic
resistance of the medium is
= 750 "
!It is concluded that there is a real scientific possibility of camouflaging an
aircraft over a limited frequency-range at centimetre wavelengths.
How far large-scale use of such camouflaging may be feasible oruseful is for others to decide.
4 377R = !
Camouflaging of aircraft atcentimetre wavelengths
(27 August 1941)
Sir Robert Watson Watt
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Earliest operational use of RAM on WWIIGerman U-boats (1944)
source : Barry Chambers, University of Sheffield
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Stealth and Counterstealth
Stealth- shaping- RAM (Salisbury screen, Jaumann, )- examples- detection range calculations- measurements; ISAR
Counterstealth- bistatic radar (q.v.)
- low-frequency radar (HF, VHF)- UWB
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Stealth
There has been much media interest in stealth and stealthyaircraft in the past ten years or so, and claims are made thatsuch targets are invisible to radar. Not surprisingly, much ofthis is rubbish !This section looks at the techniques used to reduce the radarsignature of targets, the reduction in detection performance thatthis gives, and some of the radar techniques that might be usedto recover the advantage that reduction of the target signaturehas brought.
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The simplest theoretical way of matching an aircraft to free space is to envelop itin a resistive skin whose surface-resistivity is 377 ohms, and to maintain an air-
gap between skin and aircraft of a quarter of a wavelength. !
... The gap between skin and aircraft may be considerably reduced by filling itwith a medium in which the wavelength is less than in free space. !
!To obtain a large bandwidth we need to use a medium of low conductivity witha high ratio of permeability to dielectric constant. If this ratio is 4, the intrinsic
resistance of the medium is
= 750 "
! It is concluded that there is a real scientific possibility of camouflaging an
aircraft over a limited frequency-range at centimetre wavelengths. How far large-scale use of such camouflaging may be feasible or useful is for others to decide.
4 377R = !
Camouflaging of Aircraft at CentimetreWavelengths (27 August 1941)
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Stealth Techniques
There are several techniques that are used to reduce the radarsignature of a target: Cover the surface in Radio Absorbing Material (RAM) Use RF-transparent composite materials Shape the target to reduce edges, surface discontinuities
and corners (dihedrals or tri-hedrals) Shape the target to reflect radiation in directions other than
that of the radar
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Northrop XB-35 (1946)
Northrop YB-49 (1947)
Stealth Techniques
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Stealth Techniques
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Visby
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Type 45
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Stealth Techniques
The ability to accurately predict the RCS of targets of a given shape andmaterial is clearly central to the ability to reduce the radar signature of a target.
This has depended critically on the development of electromagnetic modelsand software to allow this to be done, within the constraints of computing
resource, and huge effort has been expended on doing this.Also, aircraft designed to have a low radar cross section tend not to be veryaerodynamically stable !So it is only the development of sophisticated control systems that can actively
maintain the aircraft in flight that makes aircraft stealth practicable.
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Radar Absorbing Material (RAM)
Essentially a matter of designing materials to present a particularimpedance to an incident electromagnetic wave.
The Fresnel equations for the reflection coefficients at the boundary
between free space and a semi-infinite medium are:
which are a function of angle of incidence and polarisation.
( )( ) !"!"
!"!"
cossin
cossin
212
212
rrr
rrr
+#
##=$
( )( ) 212
212
sincos
sincos
!"!
!"!
#+
##=$
%
rrr
rrr
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Radar Absorbing Material (RAM)
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Better performance can be obtained by coating a metallic surface with a layerof dielectric material. The normalised input impedance is given by :
Then the reflection coefficient Ris given by :
Which can be expressed as a dB reduction in target RCS as:
rrrr djk !!" 0tanh#=
1
1
+
!
=
"
"R
(dB)log20 10 R
Radar Absorbing Material (RAM)
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Salisbury Screen
One of the oldest types of absorber consists of a resistive sheetspaced in front of a metal sheet by a low dielectric constant spacer
(plastic foam or honeycomb)
For zero reflectivity the Salisbury screenrequires a resistive sheet of 377W/sq(i.e. matched to free space), spaced byan odd multiple of a quarter wavelength
d
metalbacking
resistivesheet
incident
wave
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Jaumann Absorber
The bandwidth of a Salisbury screen can be improved by adding additionalresistive sheets and spacers. For best performance the resistivity of the
sheets should vary from a high value for the front sheet to low value for theback. The bandwidth depends on the number of sheets used this can give
good performance over fractional bandwidths greater than unity, but theoverall thickness increases.
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La Fayette
source : http://www.fas.org
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Sea Shadow
source : http://www.fas.org
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Stealth Techniques
Of course, we will also need to be concerned with the infra-red signature of the target,
which means shielding the hottest parts of the platform, such as the engine exhausts onan aircraft of the funnels of a ship, and minimising the temperature of exhaust gases. It
is also possible to include additives in fuels so that emissions are centred in regions of
the spectrum in which atmospheric transmission is low.
Similarly, the engine intake and exhaust are shaped to shield the rotating parts of the
engine, to avoid Jet Engine Modulation (JEM) of radar echoes.
We should also consider the optical signature. Low reflectivity or mimetic paints may be
used.
And equally, for ships, we will also be concerned with the acoustic signature, both
active and passive.
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Sensor Signatures
We need to be particularly concerned about the signatures of sensors theres no
point in making the platform stealthy if the sensors become the dominant contributionto the overall signature.
The sensors can be mounted inboard, and only deployed when needed.
There is a particular problem with antennas (comms, radar, ! ). A mechanically-
pointed tracking radar antenna will deliberately point directly at the object it is tracking.This can present a very large RCS to that object !
Antenna RCS is made up of two components: the structural mode RCS, made up of
scattering from the antenna structure, and the antenna mode RCS.
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Antenna Mode RCS
Assume an incident power densitypW/m2.
The power reaching the antenna feedpointis then
The power reflected from the feedpoint is
where!is the voltage reflection coefficient. This is reradiated, so the antenna
mode RCS in the direction of the main beam is
But whilst may be low within the operating band of the radar, outside that
band it may be close to unity, so the antenna mode RCS can be very high !
!
"
4
2G
p
!
"#
4
22 pG
!
"#$
4
222G
A =
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Structural Mode RCS
This can be defined as the RCS obtained when the antenna is terminated in a
matched load (note that the various definitions in the literature are not totally
consistent).
Consideration of the antenna mode and structural mode RCS leads to the
concept of the minimum scattering antenna1.
1Kahn, W.K. and Kurss, H., Minimum scattering antennas, IEEE Trans. Antennas and
Propagation, Vol.AP-13, September 1965, pp671-675.
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Radar Cross Sections
Small, single engine aircraft 1 m2
Jumbo jet 100
Small open boat 0.02
Frigate (1000 tons) 5,000
Truck 200Car 100
Bicycle 2
Person 1
Bird 0.01
Insect 10-5
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Measurements of Target Signature
This is extremely important, not only in the design and manufacture stage,but also in operation, since only a small amount of damage may increase the
RCS dramatically.
Signatures are measured in special ranges. Scale models may be used inthe design stage.
One important technique is Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR), inwhich the target is rotated in a known manner, and the motion used to obtain
a high-resolution image of RCS, allowing hot spotsto be identified.
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Stealth and Detection Range
We saw that the basic radar equation can be written in the form whichshows the maximum detection range for a given target :
This means that a reduction in target RCS from (say) 100m2 to 0.01m2
(which on the face of it sounds like a huge reduction) reduces the
detection range by a factor of 10
This reduces the time that a defence system has to react and can makethe difference between success and failure.
( )
1 42 2
max 3
0 min
4
tPG L
r
kT BF S N
! "
#
$ %= & '
& '
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Counterstealth
There are several radar techniques that may be used to attempt to restore the
advantage that comes from making a target stealthy :
Bistatic radar, since energy scattered in directions other than themonostatic direction may be intercepted by a bistatic receiver
Low frequency (VHF or HF) radar, since the target signature is increasedat frequencies at which the target dimensions are resonant, and RAM isless effective at low frequencies
Ultra wideband (UWB) radar, which may exploit any target resonances,and because it is difficult to make a target stealthy over a very broad
bandwidth
Networked radars There are also several techniques that can be used to win performance in
conventional radars, such as improved clutter models, reduced phase
noise, improved tracking algorithms, and several ways of exploiting the
flexibility of phased array radars.
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Bistatic Radar
RCS reduction techniques aimed principally at minimisingmonostatic RCS; bistatic geometry can intercept energyscattered in other directions;
Forward scatter geometry can give high RCS, even with trulystealthy targets;
Passive receiver, immune to interception; Can utilise illuminators of opportunity
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Low-Frequency Radar
Issues with resolution, both in azimuth (antenna size) and range(bandwidth).
Also with interference with and from other users of these frequencies
Note also foliage penetration (FOPEN) properties of low frequencies
cf Swedish CARABAS SAR system
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SPOON REST
The Spoon Rest A-band warning and target acquisition radar has a range of 275 km
using a large Yagi antenna array. At regimental HQ for the V-75 SA-2 GUIDELINEthere is a fourth Spoon Rest, a van-mounted P-15 Flat Face 250 km range C-band
search and tracking radar with two elliptical parabolic reflectors and a PRV-11 Side
Net 180 km range E-band nodding height-finder radar mounted on a box-bodied
trailer. There is also a radar control truck and a Mercury Grass truck-mounted
command communications system for linking the HQ to the three battalions.
source : http://www.fas.org
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Function: Target acquisition, early warningRange 275 km
Frequency A versions: A band (VHF)
B versions: VHF below A band
Power 314 kW, BW 6x22.5
PRF 310-400pps
PW 4-6 #sMax Alt 32 km
Scan 2-6 rpm
Associated weapon system SA-2 GUIDELINE
FAN SONG fire control radar
Recognition Six yagi array with bisecting crossbar
mast mounted on 6x6 truck;
in transit, two truck carry array and generator
source : http://www.fas.org
SPOON REST
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TALL KING
Function Early WarningRange 605 km
Frequency A BandScan 2-6 rpm
source : http://www.fas.org
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TALL KING
TALL KING ti t d t (D id
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TALL KING estimated parameters (DavidBarton)
VHF band != 1.8m Pav= 10 kW
w= 32m h= 12.5m Ar= 240 m2
"a= 3.5 "e= 8.9 ts= 10s
Ts= 2000K Ls= 100 #= 1 m2
$s= 1.0 sr PavAr= 2400Wm2 Rm= 460 km
(exceeds typical 300 km requirement)
VHF d
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VHF radar
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Another VHF EW radar: JY-27
JY ti t d t
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JY-27 estimated parameters(David Barton)
VHF band != 1.4m Pav= 10 kW
W= 11m h= 5m Ar= 55 m2
"a= 6 "e= 13 ts= 10s
Ts= 1000K Ls= 100 #= 1 m2
$s= 1.5 sr PavAr= 550 Wm2
Rm= 340 km
(exceeds typical 300 km requirement)
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HF Radar - CHAIN HOME
Ult Wid b d R d
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Ultra Wideband Radar
Can be defined as a radar with a fractional bandwidth greater than 0.25 (DARPA).
UWB radar systems are divided essentially into two types.
The first are so-called impulse radars, which transmit a very narrow high-power impulse,
and process the received echo in the time domain. The hardware involved in such radars
tends to be rather specialised, especially for anything other than short-range applications,
calling for techniques to generate high peak power impulses, and components with veryhigh instantaneous bandwidths. The bandwidth of the impulse, though, extends almost
down to dc. There is considerable work in several countries going on in high-power short-
pulse electromagnetics, and it is arguably a subject in its own right.
The second type uses pulse compression techniques to obtain the high range resolution,
typically with wide-bandwidth chirp or step-CW waveforms. The peak power requirements
are correspondingly lower, and the hardware doesnt necessarily have the samerequirement for instantaneous broad bandwidth.
Note also spectral interpolation techniques, in which data from two or more
discontinuous bands can be combined together.
Ult Wid b d R d
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Ultra-wideband radar gives very high range resolution, which can be useful in target
classification, and is potentially useful as a counter-stealth technique because it is
difficult to make a target stealthy over the whole of the radar bandwidth.
It is also important to state that fundamentally, for the same waveform spectral
content, and as long as there are no non-linear effects, there is no difference in
target signature between the impulse approach and the pulse compression
approach.
Ultra Wideband Radar
I l R d
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Impulse Radar
In the late 1980s, a study was commissioned by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) in the USA, into Ultra-Wideband Technology, since it had been
suggested that such technology might offer a counter-stealth capability. The panel
undertaking the study included many well-known names from the US radar research
community.
The report was published in July 1990 [1], and concluded, amongst other things, that
impulse radar !is not inherently anti-stealth, !has no special LPI characteristics,
and! does not offer a major new military capability, nor correspondingly does it
present the threat of a serious technology surprise.
The report caused concern in some quarters, owing to its impact on emerging stealth
technologies, and an investigation of the panel and its activities was undertaken. This
investigation concluded that ! the panels report was credible and the panel
balanced. An account of the panels work and of the investigation was published in the
IEEE AESS Magazine [2].
[1] Assessment of Ultra-Wideband (UWB) Technology, DTIC No. ADB146160, 13 July 1990. The Executive
Summaryof the report was published in IEEE AESS Magazine, pp45 49, November 1990.
[2] Fowler, C.A., The UWB (impulse radar) caper orpunishment of the innocent, IEEE AESS Magazine, pp3 5,December 1992.
F h R di
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Further Reading
Knott, E.F., Shaeffer, J.F. and Tuley, M.T., Radar Cross Section(second edition), Artech
House, 1993.
Bhattacharyya, A.K. and Sengupta, D.L., Radar Cross Section Analysis and Control, Artech
House, 1991.
Jenn, D.C., Radar and Laser Cross Section Engineering, AIAA Education Series, 1995.
Goodall, J.C.,Americas Stealth Fighters and Bombers, MBI Publishing, 1992.
Aronstein, D.C. and Piccirillo, A.C., HAVE BLUE and the F117A, AIAA, 1997.
Lynch, D. Jr, Introduction to RF Stealth, Scitech/Peter Peregrinus, 2004.
Taylor, J.D. (ed.), Introduction to Ultra-Wideband Radar Systems, CRC Press, 1995.