3.7 - Botez, Mihai - East-European Intellectuals and the National-Communist State. a View From...

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East-European Intellectuals and the National-Communist State: A View fromBucharest

East-European Intellectuals and the National-Communist State: A View fromBucharest

by Mihai Botez

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 3 / 1988, pages: 350-359, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/


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POLITICAL CHRONICLE

I am a mathematician and futurist living in Romania: I have thus the uniqueprivilege, I guess, to see "from within" how intellectuals and the communist statecan really coexist in an East European context. And I will try to prove that EastEuropean intellectuals do not represent a threat to the existing communist rule.But that they can challenge it.Let me first explain my title.If intellectual means in the broad sense "better-educated people who earntheir living from mental rather than manual labor ' (and therefore including inour technotronic era routine white-collar employees and creative and criticalintelligentsia), then what could the term East European intellectual mean? Areintellectuals living in Eastern Europe a new species of intellectual?Further, if a state is, in Max Weber's definition, "an organization which cansuccessfully claim the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within agiven territory, " and therefore a communist state is a state in which "physical force"is in the hands of the sole ruling Marxist party, then what could national communiststate mean? Is such an organization a new one?My conviction is that both these new categories are now realities, and thatRomanian intellectuals, as well as the Romanian communist state, fully illustratethem. The expression "A View from Bucharest" in my title will remind you thatall my theoretical speculations about the complex relationships between the traditional bearers of societal awareness - i.e. the intellectuals - and the totalitariancommunist power are subjective, and that the image-maker is a critical intellectualwho goes back to Romania. And let me add that, being a professional futurist,I see these relationships in a future-oriented perspective. For the present is notonly the result and final stage of the past; it is also (and maybe most essentially)the starting point for the future. Therefore, I will not describe the past wars with victories and defeats - between intellectuals and communist power; I willonly try to discover, in the present situation, the seeds of possible futuredevelopments.My contribution has four chapters.Chapter 1 introduces the term ' ,East-European intellectuals. " Chapter 2 describesthe "national-communist State. " Chapter 3 deals with the "social contract' , (or"social compact") between East European intellectuals and their national-communist


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Praxis International 3511. East European tnteuectuais:Are They a New Species

Intellectuals belong to so-called "civil society," and usually analyses of therelationships between a Soviet-type regime and its corresponding "civil society"are placed at two extremes.At one extreme we find those analyses which assume a total divorce betweenthe society and the communist system: essentially hostile to human nature, theyclaim, the totalitarian system was introduced by force (first in the USSR, to befurtherexported, by force also, to the other communist countries), and the repressedsocietyhas no other wish but to get rid of it and to resume the course of its natural(i.e., Western-like) development. Representations of this sort are frequent in writingsof dissenting authors - like Solzhenitsyn or Goma. In short, communism is perceivedas the (temporary) illness of a healthy body.At the other extreme we find the analyses which argue that societies in thecommunist countries have been totally pervaded by the Soviet-type system anda symbiosis has occurred, leading to genuine' 'communization." Ironically, hereZinoviev's sarcasms converge with the eulogies of official communist authors.The endurance of the Soviet-type system no longer appears to be based on fear,but on the total assimilation and natural integration of the new structure - in theUSSR and the other communist countries alike. In short, communism is perceivedas a genetic mutation.My personal view is in between. It would be hard to believe that decades ofcommunist rule and imposed-by-force behavior have passed without any consequence: and, finally, adaptation for survival is a sign of health and vigor. Thus,some tenets of communism, and especially some patterns of behavior underdictatorship, have probably been internalized. But that does not mean that, oncefreed from dictatorship, the citizen produced by and for totalitarian society willperformlike a Westerner, produced by and for democracy. Therefore, it is difficultto saywhat exactly' 'health' 'means, if once cured the patient is not behaving likea "normal" human - normal being here understood "by Western standards."In short, I perceive communism as an incurable illness, with some genetic effectson a immature body - like polio in childhood.Intellectuals living in communist countries are infected by this illness like allother citizens of those countries. But their sickness has some additional features.As "products" of a communist regime, their intellectual formation is often imprintedby communist ideology and official culture; obviously, these affect technocratsless than "culturecrats" - if I so call the non-technocratic intelligentsia (i.e.humanists, and artists). As "producers" for a communist regime, their behavioris also influenced by the totalitarian rules of the one-party-controlled society: forinstance, they have little understanding of the intellectual market.Letme also add that by definition the communist power, at least in its first periodof domination, was anti- or a-intellectual. First , I would like to recall that, in the

ny


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352 Praxis Internationalthe only' 'owners of a means of production" that cannot be nationalized by force:in fact, intellectual brilliance is personal, and cannot be transferred by simple"decrees. " A capitalistwhose factory has been nationalized is no longer a capitalist;a writer will always keep his "means of production" - even in prison. Finally,at least in Eastern Europe, many intellectuals came from the old bourgeois classes:they were therefore perceived as enemies by the new rulers, and this hostility wastransferred to the whole social group. In my childhood, for instance, the then ala mode adjective "intellectualist" (meaning: sophisticated, not worker- or peasantlike) had very bad connotations.Modern communist society has partly modified this "classical approach": neoMarxist analyses argue that, in the age of scientific-technological and mediarevolutions, both technocrats and culturecrats, masters of these new means ofproduction, should be included in this new, extended, ruling "working class."But I believe that the feeling of marginalization and frustration is still commonamong intellectuals of the communist countries.In addition, East European intellectuals are probably facing the general difficultiesof belonging to a "small culture": with the exception of the Russians (and maybeGermans) they feel that the role of their cultures in the international dialogue ismarginal, and that they themselves are often perceived as "exotic" products ofperipheral areas. A typical inferiority/superiority complex is thus emerging.

All these special conditions have created, I believe, a new species of intellectual:the East European intellectual. In the field of intellectual creativity the specificityis not very visible: sure, geniuses and mediocrities coexist there, like everywhereelse. But the societal behavior of such intellectuals (and possibly their intellectualbehavior) will be perceived as strange by Western colleagues.I think that many people in this room could substantiate my view. Few Westernintellectuals, for instance, could understand what "internal exile" means, andprobably fewer could share the difficulties of en exiled East European intellectual.And even fewer will understand somebody who goes back to his native countryafter expressing such views, like the author of this essay.Definitely, East European intellectuals are strange!2. The National-Communist State:An Emerging Reality

In contrast to the case of Russia, where the communist order resulted from theinternal conflicts of the Czarist Empire, the introduction of the Soviet-type systemin Eastern Europe cannot realistically be separated from the impact of externalfactors, such as the victorious march of the Red Army to Berlin (1944-45) andthe political and military balance of forces prevailing in postwar Europe.The Western views on Eastern Europe changed during these four decades. Inthe 50s, the area was considered a docile family of quasi-identical Soviet satellites.


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Praxis International 353an opportunity to liberate themselves; the corollary of this approach is that, onceSoviet domination is ended, the Soviet-type system in other countries will alsovanish, since the latter cannot survive without a "big-brother" sponsorship.My personal view is in between. It is unquestionable that the totalitarian Stalinist

seeds produced different fruits on the different soils of East European nationaltraditions, but I believe that all these fruits still belong to the same species - namely,the communist state. The fact that communism is more visible in Romania than,say, in Hungary doesn't mean that these two countries became structurally different:the difference is between a primitive and an evolved communist dictatorship. And,from a purely moralistic viewpoint, guided only by the principles of liberalism,let me ask what is "better": a distasteful dictatorship, or a more competent andappealing one. . .?In conclusion, Eastern Europe is now a family of different conununist states,operating in different national contexts.What could national-communism thus mean?It has been said many times that nationalism and communism offer opposite viewsof the world: a set of interacting different nations (including their own social classes)versus a pair of interacting social classes (transcending national boundaries). Thus,national-communism seems to be a contradiction in terms; in addition, nationalismhas right-wing political connotations, while communism has left-wing ones. Letme also add that, in practical terms, in the late 40s and early 50s in East Europe, the"love for the USSR" was perceived as internationalism, while all other nationalismswere called reactionary and condemned. If we recall the role of the external Sovietfactor in the establishment of Soviet-type regimes in the area, we will understandwhy so many East Europeans have associated in their minds "Soviet" with "communism," and "nationalism" with "anti-Sovietism" and thus "anti-communism."That seems to offer new arguments for the logical incompatibility between nationalism and communism, at least beyond the USSR.My point is that , despite these facts, a new reality is emerging in Eastern Europe:a strange marriage betwen nationalism and communism, whose result is nationalcommunism. But why would nationalism be attracted by communism?Many sociologists offer competent explanations for the rise of nationalism and

even chauvinism and zenophobia in our modern trans-national world. I will onlymention that Eastern Europe is not different from other areas. In addition, the"nationalistic myth" remains one of the few myths that has resisted the contemporary iconoclastic criticism - and also benefited from the failure of other myths, likethe communist utopia of social equity. One should also note the role of nationalismfor small, marginal nations - like the majority of East-European nations, whichhave felt historically threatened by "integralist" Empires and superpowers.After forty years of communist rule, and so many unsuccessful challenges tothis rule, probably the large majority of the population in Eastern Europe shares

the conviction that there is no realistic alternative to the communist regime in thearea. It is also to be noted that the imperfect democratic regimes of the pre-war


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354 Praxis InternationalTherefore, a new mass feeling emerges: that the only possible patriotic involvementincludes the acceptance of the dominant communist rule. If the only realistic versionof Romania or Bulgaria is the communist one, then to accept the communist socialcontract becomes synonymous with accepting one's national heritage, and to deny

it, with abandoning one's national background, condemning oneself to internal/external exile.I have now explained why active nationalism is attracted by communism in EasternEurope.But why do communist elites become attracted by nationalism?First, after forty years of domination, such elites have usually created their ownnational instruments for preserving power (like a powerful party apparatus, politicalpolice and so forth) and therefore are now able to govern without explicit Sovietsupport.Second, perceived for years as "Soviet puppets, " these regimes can find theiremancipation from the Soviets and in their emphasis on nationalist feelings and traditions the internal and external legitimacy any unelected government is looking for.Third, the use of the nationalistic feeling already existing in the masses to achievecommunist goals can establish some resonance and even a genuine alliance betweenrulers and ruled, unthinkable otherwise.To sum up, a new, fresh form of communism is now on the march in EasternEurope: national-communism. An updated version of "communism in a singlecountry," national-communism means "unavoidable communism in my mostbeloved country."Let me briefly mention some features of this new approach.No longer viewed as "Moscow-guided;' no longer associated with Soviethegemony - and therefore no longer perceived as a threat by the West - , no longerresponsible for past crimes and mistakes (explained by the perfidious' 'externalfactor") and thus enjoying all the possible benefits of any new beginning, but byno means clearly less totalitarian, such a new form of communism could look quiteappealing, to rulers, ruled, and foreigners too.Simultaneously, married to a traditionally transnational ideology like communism,pure nationalism and even chauvinism/xenophobia could appear less dangerousthan in their natural rightist milieu.In conclusion, national-communism appears more attractive than nationalism andcommunism taken separately; both communism and nationalism seem diluted, lessideological and more pragmatically oriented - and therefore quite' 'humanized."Does this image resist a deeper analysis? I don't believe so. Let us pass overthe first historical success of national-communism - the Soviet mobilization ofthe masses, during World War 11, on behalf of "Mother Russia." My countryis probably the first contemporary successful experience of national-communismin Europe: and what I can observe is that in Romania orthodox communism andsharp nationalism strengthened each other, thereby strengthening the existingsupreme-type leadership. The old adagio changed: the classical "whoever is notwith us, communists, is against us" was replaced by "whoever does not cheer


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Praxis International 355nd left-wing and right-wing dictatorships coexist in the same totalitarian structure.et us hope that other experiences will be more fortunate.But let me finally mention the tremendous success of this new version ofcommunism in the world arena, at least at its beginning - in the late 60s. Theest saw here more anti-Soviet nationalism than communism - and cheered. TheEast saw in the same place more communism than nationalism - and acceptedt. The international milieu thus strongly encouraged the last-born of the communistfamily.Let me also speculate that, as a consequence of Gorbachev, new centripetalnationalisms will emerge in the near future - both within and beyond the USSR,in particular in Eastern Europe. The natural consequence of that is the emergenceof national-communist states. It is also plausible to see these states inheriting all

the historically unsolved traditional "national problems" of the area. A periodof latent and even open conflicts among national-communist states in Eastern Europeis thus to be expected.3. East-European Intellectuals and the National-Communist State:A More Appealing "Social Contract"?

No political system is either fully supported or totally rejected by the population,and communism and intellectuals are no exception to this general rule. In addition,intellectuals and (any) power are often in conflict: claims of many Westernintellectuals prove that. .

However, the relationships between intellectuals and communistpower are special.It has been said many time that intellectual means freedom - of thinking withouttaboos, of expression without a priori constraints, of travel without borders, andso on; criticism is also a genuine characteristic of intellectual awareness. Theexpression "critical intellectual" is often perceived as a tautology, for intellectualsare by definition critical. But communist power means totalitarianism, thereforeexplicit taboos (like criticizing Marxist ideology or the one-party system). Inconclusion, intellectuals and communism seem logically incompatible.However, it would be stupid to claim that in the communist world there areno intellectuals: Soviet music, Polish mathematics or Romanian poetry prove thecontrary.That means that many intellectuals accepted the invisible' 'social contract" ofthe Soviet-type regime. But this contract seems more painful for intellectuals thanfor other people. "Living within the Lie," as Havel would say, could also becomeimpossible. History proves that the intellectuals have been the principal sourceof criticism of the regime (in the USSR, GDR, Czechoslovakia or Romania), andifby "dissident" we understand, with Medvedev, "someone who disagrees . . . withthe ideological, political, economic, or moral foundation that every society restson . . . openly proclaiming his dissent and demonstrating it . . . to his compatriots


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356 Praxis Internationalterrible choice between being courtiers or dissidents. That looks to me to beexaggerated. To accept the communist "social contract" does not mean it isobligatory to become a courtier - and many East European technocrats can provethat. There exists also a true "art of survival" under dictatorship - combiningwell-calculated submission, self-limited criticism, tactical keeping of a "low profile"and use of opportunities. For Western intellectuals such' 'strategies" frequentlyseem strange if not disgusting. I can only express my hope that nobody will forcethem in the future to learn such an art.All these remarks concern the relationships between intellectuals and the"traditional" communist state. What does national-communism introduce that isnew within this scheme?My point is that especially inEastern Europe the national-communist state proposes

to intellectuals a more appealing' 'social contract" than the traditional communist one.In fact, in the frame of a national-communist regime honest intellectuals couldwell find communism distasteful but will be commited to the endowment of nationalvalues and prestige: thus, being motivated by patriotic reasons they will not rejectthe communist social contract.For intellectuals from small or medium-sized countries such reasons can playan important role.Let us imagine "from within" the cost-benefit analysis of the alternatives thatthe East-European intellectual is facing: positive support, positive acceptance,negative acceptance and active rejection of the national-communist social contract.

The moral "cost" of support and acceptance is lower in this case than in a standardcommunist regime: decent intellectuals often persuade themselves that patrioticfeelings fully motivate their (active or passive) cooperation with power. The"benefits" of positive support are obvious: promotion and professional and socialachievement. The "benefits" of positive acceptance do include normal nationalprofessional life and permission to participate in international professional life.The benefits of "negative acceptance" usually do not guarantee access to theinternational arena. As for the active rejection of the social contract, the resultis clear: internal or external exile.Obviously, this scheme seems oversimplified. Sociologists who are studying thedifferent forms of "second society" now emerging in Hungary, Poland, orCzechoslovakia will probably argue that the social contract could be only formallyand partially accepted. That is true. And even the sad experience of Romania where the "second society" is not parallel, like in Poland or Hungary, but mixedup and entangled in the texture of the visible one - does substantiate the difficultiesof such elementary taxonomy. But it is also true that decision-makers are alwaysplacing intellectuals in the above mentioned' 'boxes. " And that their behavior, andits consequences for the ruled, is guided by such oversimplifications.The support-acceptance of the national-communist social contract seems naturalfor a technocrat: and, if fortunate, our subject can also benefit from the internationalization of intellectual life, so much politicized in the last decades. In fact,


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Praxis International 357The rejection of the national-communist contract also seems less painful for atechnocrat than for a culturecrat: internal/external exile is generally supportable,and does not imply obligatory professional silence. By contrast, for a culturecrat- and especially for someone produced by and for a small, marginalized culture- internal/external exile means silence - and looks merely like professional suicide.The acceptance of the national-communist social contract, in comparison to thealternative - rejection, appears now as merely normal. And if we add here thepatriotic motivations, so important for frustrated intellectuals of marginal areas,we will no longer be surprised by the fact that the number of "dissident culturecrats" is relatively small in Eastern Europe, in comparison with those of "consentculturecrats.' ,In conclusion, the intellectuals of Eastern Europe seem to be tempted to accept

the national-communist contract more than were their predecessors, or, at least,not to reject it actively. That looks rational not only from an opportunistic perspective; and the patriotic motivations play an essential role in this new strengtheningfactor in the communist system in Europe.These patriotic feelings usually grew up in periods of crisis. As I mentionedin the last chapter, old and new national hostilities and rivalries are to be expectedin Eastern Europe in the near future. It is plausible also to expect that nationalcommunist governments and elites will try to use these conflicts, mobilizing peopleagainst (always foreign) enemies. In such conditions of "national wars," when"national identity" appears to be in danger due to the "perfidy" of neighbors,to accept the national contract (even in its communist form) seems to become apatriotic duty, and intellectuals will probably perceive that in this manner. Socialcriticism and dissent will look like second-order futilities in comparison to commitment to national heritage and values. As a result, national-communist states willbe strengthened. In addition, national-communist states will be tacitly accepted onthe world stage as simply nation-states: the old dream of introducing "communist"into the' 'national option" of people, to be accepted as an unavoidable adjective,will then come true.I don' t see this scenario as a highly improbable one. But if it is realized, thenthe results will be extraordinarily fruitful for the regime.In Romania we experienced that situation,some years ago. Many decent intellectuals cheered and joined the patriotic and xenophobic leadership, motivated bynationalist commitment. They also adopted the government's views and campaignedin some nationalistic "wars of the worlds" against other, Hungarian or Russianintellectuals. Their intellectual prestige strengthened and even legitimized thecommunist leadership. But once "in the army," they were treated like soldiers.And many of them are now facing the painful situation of belonging to a "nationalistarmy" which, this time following communist goals, is destroying our historic andirrecoverable cultural heritage.


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358 Praxis Internationaland communist power and also suggested some strategies for a more-balancedcontract. As a starting point - more visible probably in Romania than in othercommunist countries - it is to be noted that the intellectualsare, directly or indirectly,State employees - because the communist state is the only legal employer of intellectual work. The communist state is also a totalitarian one: that means it ismonopolistic and never accepts free trade-unions protecting the rights of employees.Therefore, an essential condition for a more balanced renegotiation of intellectuals'social contract with communist power is increased autonomy and even liberationof intellectuals from their patrons. In Madrid in 1985 I primarily advocated theselective use of Western opportunities for the endowment of autonomy of "criticalintellectuals" living under communist rule. I tried then to prove that it is to ourcommon advantageto keep a criticalconsciousness on a planetary scale (and without"holes" and "blanks" introduced by dictatorships); I also expressed my conviction that a world with such "internal feedback" is less dangerous and morepredictable than a world only partly self-regulated by internal feedback, like theworld of today.I would now like to add to this strategy a new element: the selective use of ourEastern opportunities to reach the same goals. That becomes really important, ifwe are also taking into account the real danger of "nationalization" - and then"atomization" - of Eastern European critical intellectuals, as we have seen inthe previous chapter.It is not an easy task. Theoretically, it would be possible and useful, Criticalintellectuals repressed in their own countries can be backed by their more fortunatecolleagues from other communist countries (e.g, translated, published, sponsored,etc.) Or, the tools of liberation - i.e. samizdat, or underground press - can alsobe used by critical intellectuals from abroad, favoring the development of solidaritynot only within the ruled class of a nation, but also of the "united" ruled classesof the communist system. But in practice such strategies face major obstacles:the unbalanced development of the "second society" in different communistcountries, as well as the difficulties of communication.It would thus seem unfair for intellectuals from some countries to benefit fromsuch an alliance, without the realistic possibility of compensation of those lessfortunate - like for Romanians, for instance.In addition, some destructive nationalistic ingredients have become visible inthe community of East European critical intellectuals. When the, Dissident JointCommunique on the 1956 Events was made public, Romanians and Bulgarianswere simply ignored - apparently, for historical reasons: in these countries' 'massunrest" against communist rule had been unknown. This is not the time or theplace to debate whether such an argument can be substantiated by facts: the pricepaid by the Romanian people in the '50s is probably comparable with the priceby other "Mittel-European" countries in the same period, and I guess for Bulgariathe situation is similar. Let me also add the difficulties of a logic which assertsthat if something didn't happen, then it will never happen. But it is clear to me


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