3857879.pdf

8/10/2019 3857879.pdf

1/8

Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective by Norman E. BowieReview by: Joanne B. CiullaBusiness Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 2001), pp. 225-231Published by: Philosophy Documentation CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3857879.

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2/8

BOOK

REVIEW

JoanneB.Ciulla,Ph.D.

Business Ethics:

A

Kantian

Perspective

Norman

E. Bowie

(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1999)

It's

not

easy

to

be

a Kantian.

Doing

one's

duty

acting

in

ways

that

you

would

want to

universalize,

treating

people

as

ends,

and

having

nothing

but

the

pur-

est intentions

requires

a

level of

saintly,

self-disciplined

action that is

beyond

the reach

of

most humans and out of the

question

for

business. For Kant

it

seems

as if an action isn't ethical unless it hurts to do it. Moral

agents

look like

martyrs

who sacrifice their

interests to the altar of

duty

and then let the

chips

fall where

they may.

Given the

high-minded

ideals of Kantian

ethics,

it is

ironic

that

many

of

those

who are

cynical

about business ethics are

cynical

for Kantian

reasons.

They

believe that

in

a

competitive

free market

businesses

act

to

gain

advantage

over their

competitors

in

ways

that

they

wouldn't want to

universalize. All em?

ployees

are,

almost

by

definition,

a means to the

business's ends.

Furthermore,

businesses

can

never be ethical because

they

must

always

act in

their own self-

interest and

not from a

good will?e.g.,

charitable contributions are

for

publicity,

family-friendly policies

are

to

make

employees

work

harder,

etc.

In

his book

Business Ethics:

A

Kantian

Perspective,

Norman E. Bowie

offers

an

interpretation

of Kant's

philosophy

in

which it doesn't

always

hurt

to

be ethi?

cal and

you

don't have to sacrifice all

other interests to have

a

good

will.

By

doing

so,

he

is

able

to

construct

a

plausible

Kantian

theory

of

the

business

firm

in a

capitalist economy.

As Bowie

notes

in

the

preface

to the

book,

Ed

Freeman

and William Evan

initiated the

project

of

applying

Kant to the

modern

corpora?

tion in their

groundbreaking

article A

Stakeholder

Theory

of the

Modern

Corporation: Kantian Capitalism. Over the years Freeman and other scholars

who write

about

stakeholder

theory

have taken a

pragmatic

turn

and moved

away

from the

theory's

Kantian

roots.

Bowie

says

this

is

why

he

decided to

develop

a

full-blown

Kantian

theory

of

the firm. He

does so

by

tapping

into a

wide

range

?2001.

Business Ethics

Quarterly,

Volume

11,

Issue 1.

ISSN 1052-150X.

pp.

225-231

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226

BUSINESS ETHICS

QUARTERLY

of

Kant's

work and recent commentaries on

Kant

by

scholars such as Barbara

Herman,

Thomas

Hill, Jr.,

Christine

Korsgaard,

and

Onora

O'Neill.

The most unfortunate

thing

about this book is its title. While it describes

what the book

is

about,

it does

not

convey

to

potential

readers that this is

a

lively, engaging

book

on

business

that can be understood

by

non-philosophers.

Bowie's

lucid

writing

and careful

argumentation,

combined

with his

mastery

of

Kant and

the relevant literature in

management

and

economics,

make

this book

a model

of

what

work

in

applied

ethics should be.

Business Ethics: A Kantian

Perspective

is one

of the most

important

contributions to business ethics

theory

in recent

years,

not

because Bowie

has

gotten everything

right,

but because

it

opens up

a rich new

way

of

thinking

about business

organizations.

Bowie's book addresses the question How would a business firm in a capi?

talist

economy

be

structured

and

managed

according

to

Kant's ethics?

(p.

1).

He

answers

the

question

using

Kant's three

formulations

of the

categorical

im?

perative.

Bowie then

goes

on

to

discuss

whether the

recognition by

business

leaders that

being

ethical

pays

nullifies Kant's

principle

that a

moral act must be

done out

of

duty,

not

simply

in

conformity

to

duty.

His

last

chapter

outlines

some of the

implications

of Kant's

cosmopolitanism

for

international business.

Kant's first formulation

ofthe

categorical imperative

is that we must

be able

to will

that

a

maxim of our

action

become

a universal

law.

(This

is

commonly

recognized

as

the

golden

rule.)

Bowie notes

that

philosophers

often fail

to no-

tice that the

universalizability

formulation

is

subject

to

empirical support.

In

his

infamous

article,

Is Business

Bluffing

Ethical? Albert Carr

argued

that

the

golden

rule is not a

practical guide

for business

because,

A

good part

of the

time the businessman is

trying

to do to other as he

hopes

others

will

not do unto

him. 1

Bowie

says

from

a Kantian

perspective

Carr's

argument

is irrational

be?

cause it is

contradictory.

If we universalized the

practice

of business

bluffing,

or

as

Kant

says, making

false

promises,

then we would

destroy

our

ability

to bluff

because no one would be obliged to keep promises and you would destroy the

practice

of

making promises, upon

which

your

ability

to bluff

rests.

If

this seems

too

convoluted,

Bowie offers

a

more down-to-earth

example.

If a

store

accepts

checks and

patrons

start

abusing

this

privilege by

bouncing

checks,

then the

store will

stop

taking

checks,

hence

taking

away

the

opportunity

for

people

to

gain advantage by

bouncing

checks.

According

to

Kant,

telling

the truth

and

keeping promises

are

perfect

duties,

meaning

that we are

always

obliged

to act on them. Acts

that

fail

to

follow

a

perfect

duty

can't be universalized

because

they

yield

conceptual

contradictions?

a universalized deceitful

promise

is a

conceptual absurdity.

Kant also tells us we

have

imperfect

duties,

that we are

not

always

bound to

fill,

such as

the

duty

to

develop

our

talents.

However,

Bowie

points

out

that

even

if

we

don't

develop

our

talents,

the

duty

to do so

rationally

requires

that we

don't do

things

that

will

damage

our

ability

to

develop

our talents in the future.

So,

in

business

we

may

have an

imperfect duty

to trust

people,

but

if we

choose not

to trust someone we


8/10/2019 3857879.pdf

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BOOK

REVIEW:

BUSINESS ETHICS 227

cannot universalize that

notion

to

say

we

won't trust

anyone,

because that

will

deter our

ability

to

fill

our

duty

to trust

people

in

the future. Bowie concludes his

first

chapter by showing

that

unethical

practices

are

inconsistent

with the future

survival ofthe

firm.

They key

word here is

practices.

Bowie demonstrates

that

by

applying

Kant's

universalizabilty

interpretation

of the

categorical impera?

tive,

we are

forced

to

look

at the actions of

business,

not as isolated events but

as

practices

that

exist

in a

broader

system

of shared

meaning.

By

looking

at the

logical

ramifications

of

not

acting

on

duties,

Bowie shows that Kant's

theory

is

not so

rigid

as

to be

impractical

for business.

If

anything,

he demonstrates

why

it

is

impractical

for businesses

not to act

in

accordance with

duty.

Bowie uses Kant's second

derivation ofthe

categorical imperative,

treat

people

as an end and never as a means only, as the moral foundation for employer/

employee relationships.

Kant

says everyone

should be

respected

because

all

human

beings

have

dignity. They

have

dignity

and are

deserving

of

respect

be?

cause

they

have

autonomy

and are

capable

of

self-governance,

and because

they

are moral

agents.

There

are

two

sides to the second derivation. The first is that

people

have

negative

freedom,

meaning

that

they

should not be coerced or de-

ceived. The second is that we are

obliged

to

act

positively

to further

humanity

by treating people

as ends

in

themselves. Bowie's

application

of the first

prin?

ciple

not

only

places

a

stringent requirement

on

business,

but

forces

us

to

rethink

some traditional

assumptions

such as

employment-at-will.

Kant

says

that coer?

cion and

deception

are

wrong

because

they

block a

person

from

choosing

ends

he or she would have

chosen

if

coercion or

deception

had not occurred. Further-

more,

when

you

lie

or coerce

someone,

you

treat them as a tool or instrument of

your

will.

As

Bowie tells

us,

this second formulation

clearly requires

more com?

mitment from

employers

than the

obligation

to be nice to their

employees.

The

standard

way

of

thinking

about an

employer/employee relationship

in a

free market

is that both

parties

freely

consent to

the conditions of

employment.

Employees may

leave

any

time

they

want and

employers may lay

off

employees

any

time

they

want.

Hence,

layoffs

do not violate an

employee's

negative

free?

dom.

This is

a

nice

story

but

according

to

Bowie,

it doesn't

work

that

way.

First

because the

typical

employee

(who

is not

union)

is

virtually powerless

when he

or she enters

into

an

employment relationship.

Second,

employees

usually

don't

want to be laid

off and it is not

always easy

for them

to

get

other

good jobs.

Bowie

believes that the

strongest potential

for

coercion and

deception

in

the

employer/employee

relationship

is the

asymmetry

of

information.

Management

usually

makes

decisions on

layoffs

and

salary

freezes

based on financial

infor?

mation that employees do not have in advance.

Bowie

offers

examples

of how a

corporation might

fill

its

respect

for

persons

principle by

not

violating

a

person's

negative

freedom.

He

cites

John

Stack's

open management

program

as an

example

of how a firm

can share

timely

finan?

cial

information

with

employees.

Bowie

says

there is no

room

in

the

Kantian

firm for

arbitrary

dismissal.

He

endorses

firms,

such as

Hewlett

Packard,

that


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228

BUSINESS ETHICS

QUARTERLY

have a

long history

of

no

layoffs.

Bowie also

includes

profit sharing

as an

im?

portant

element of

a Kantian firm.

However,

the

profit-sharing

plan

cannot be

one where

management

dictates the

terms,

without

sharing

information with

employees.

In addition to

profit sharing,

Bowie

says

the

Kantian firm must be

participatory.

To

respect employees'

autonomy, you

must

give

them a

say

in the

policies

that

govern

them.

Bowie's articulation of how a

firm

might respect

a

person's negative

freedom

provides

a

powerful

guide

for

developing

firms that

are far more

democratic

than

the

ones Bowie cites

approvingly

in the

chapter.

A

corporation

that decided to take the Kantian

principle

of

respect

for

persons

seriously

would have to

go

beyond

the usual

rhetoric of

empowering

employees,

it

would

have to

de-power

managers,

which would

mean

taking

away

something

that has long been considered a reward. This would be a difficult cultural change,

but

certainly

a worthwhile one.

In

Bowie's discussion of

positive

freedom under the

respect

for

persons

deri-

vation he

attempts

to construct

a

requirement

for

meaningful

work.

Here he

runs

into

problems

that in

part

stem from his use of the term

meaningful

work. Kant

says

that

we

have the

duty

to be

concerned

with the

humanity

of

others.

Bowie

says

that in the Kantian

corporation

this translates

into

constructing

the firm

so

as

to

protect

and

support

the

humanity

of each

person.

We

have,

according

to

Kant,

only

an

imperfect

duty

to

help

others,

and

the

ways

in

which we

help

others

should

not violate our other duties. For

example,

we

should not

try

to

impose

our

view

on

others

concerning

what

will make them

happy.

So,

a

benefi-

cent

corporation

would not

be

a

paternalistic corporation.

So

far,

so

good.

But

then Bowie

goes

on to

say

that the

way

in which

employers

can

honor

the

posi?

tive

liberty

of

employees

is

by providing

meaningful

work. Since

different

people

find

meaning

in different

activities

and

experiences,

it seems odd

on

the

estab?

lished Kantian

grounds

that

employers

would

be

able to

provide meaningful

work

without

imposing

their ideas of what makes work

meaningful

on

employees.

(Wouldn't this be analogous to imposing their idea of happiness on employees?)

Bowie

gives

meaningful

work these characteristics: work that

allows the em?

ployee

to exercise

autonomy,

enables the worker to

develop

his or

her rational

capacities, provides

sufficient

wages,

supports

moral

development,

and is not

paternalistic

in

the sense of

interfering

with the

worker's

conception

of how she

wishes

to obtain

happiness

(p.

67).

Most of the

things

in

this

description

of

meaningful

work aren't

paternalistic,

but

some

might

be. How

does an

employer

support

moral

development

and

enable

an

employee

to

develop

his or

her ratio?

nal

capacities

without

imposing

his or

her

conception

of these

things

on the

employee?

Here one

might

turn to research done

by

organizational

psycholo?

gists

on

human

needs,

etc,

but what is the status of this

knowledge?

These

three

cases

might

better

fill

the

requirement

of

non-imposition

if

they

were made in

the

negative.

Bowie

later

says

that an

employer

should not

interfere with a

person's

moral

development (p.

70),

but does not use the

negative

case for

rational

development

or

self-development.

The

negative

duty

seems to be more


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BOOK

REVIEW:

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229

consistent

with the Kant's idea

of

human

dignity,

because it assumes that

em?

ployees

come

to

work

as moral

agents

who are rational and have their own

aspirations

for

self-development

(which,

by

the

way,

don't all have to do

with

the

things they

do on the

job).

Hence,

it would

seem the

employer's

first

obliga?

tion is to

respect

(by

not

interfering

with)

the

employees'

moral

development

and

self-development.

Bowie

says

that for a

Kantian,

the true contribution of

capitalism

would be

jobs

that

help provide self-respect (p.

68).

Does this assume

that

people

don't

have

self-respect

and need

help

from their

employer? Again

an

even more

im?

portant

goal

is work that does not undermine

self-respect.

I would

push

the

respect

for

persons

farther

than Bowie

and

Douglas

McGregor's

theory

Y,

and have

management rest on the assumption that everyone is moral, rational, and has

self-respect

and

aspirations

for

self-development,

even

though

we know

that

isn't true

of some

people.2

As Bowie

and

theory

Y

assert,

people

often

live

up

to

the

assumptions

we

make of them.

Treating

someone

as

if

they

have

self-respect

may

give

them more

self-respect

than

treating

someone as

if

they

need

help

with

their

self-respect.

A term that

better

captures

what Bowie means

by

meaningful

work

is wor?

thy

work.

Employers'

duty

to

respect humanity requires

them

to

provide

work

that is

morally worthy

of

humanity.

This

is

more than a

quibble

about words.

In

Kantian

terms

employers

are not

supposed

to decide

for

employees

what will

be

meaningful

for others or

make them

happy.

Yet

managers

and

management

theo?

rists do

this

all

the time.

They

often treat the

theories and

research of

organizational

psychologists

as certain

knowledge,

when in

fact

many

of these

assumptions

are limited

observations or

theoretical

frameworks that

do not re?

spect

the

vast

range

of

things

that are

meaningful

to

autonomous

human

beings.

When Bowie

goes

on

to illustrate

what

meaningful

work

means,

he

correctly

draws

on the moral

concepts

of

fairness,

respect,

and

autonomy,

but then he fails

into the language trap of current management thinking. Empowerment, qual?

ity,

and

teamwork all

make

assumptions

about what

makes

people

happy

that

aren't

necessarily

the

case

in

practice.

For

example,

being

on a

team can be a

nightmare

for some

because teams

can be

intolerant

of

difference

and

can

also serve

as

powerful

means

of social

control and

coercion. As Daniel

Sennett

has

pointed

out,

teams

are

a

morally

weak form of

human

community.3

In

fairness

to

Bowie,

a

team of

committed

Kantians

would

probably

not suffer

these

shortcomings.

Another

way

to think

about Bowie's

Kantian

description

of

meaningful

work

is

through

what

Frederick

Herzberg

calls the

hygiene

and content

factors of

the

job.

Herzberg

said that

job

satisfaction is a function ofthe content or the intrin?

sic

value

of

job

that

you

do. That is

where

people

do or do

not

find

meaning

in

their

work.

Dissatisfaction

with

work

is

usually

a

function of

external

factors,

which

he

called

hygiene

factors,

such as

inadequate pay,

dirty

or

unsafe

working

conditions,

and

mean,

disrespectful,

unfair

managers.

If

you

improved

the

hy-

gienic

factors of

the

workplace,

offered

better

pay

and

benefits,

a

physically


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BUSINESS

ETHICS

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pleasing workplace,

and

understanding

managers,

workers

might

not

be

dissat-

isfied,

but this

wouldn't

necessarity

mean that

they

were satisfied.4 Part of what

Bowie calls

meaningful

work

corresponds

to

hygiene

factors.

Herzberg

believed

that worker

surveys

in

which

people

said

they

were satisfied with their

jobs

really

meant that

they

were not

dissatisfied

with

their

working

conditions.

It is

possible

for work

to be

morally

worthy

ofthe

people

who do

it,

but

this does not

mean that the

job

itself

will

be

meaningful

to

every

worker. For some the

mean?

ing

of work

is

the

paycheck,

which

gives

him or her the means to do

meaningful

things

outside

of work.

I

would

argue

that for the

past

20

years

managers

have

spent

more time

try?

ing

to

improve

the content of work so that

they

would not have

to

improve

the

hygiene factors.5 One result of this is a steady 30-year slide in real income, an

increase

in

working

hours,

and

a

veritable

explosion

in

executive

compensation.

The

most

common

complaint

today

of all those team workers

in

companies

with

quality programs

is that families are stressed out

and

there is

no time

for life.

While I

disagree

with his use of

the

term

meaningful

work,

I think

Bowie is

on

to a

radically

new and better

way

to think

about

employer/employee

relation?

ships.

I

would state the

duty

of

positive

freedom

is that

employers

have

an

obligation

to

provide

work that

is

morally worthy

ofthe

Kantian

person,

which

means

work

that does not interfere with

a

person leading

his or her idea of a

good

life.6

In

chapter

three,

Bowie uses Kant's third articulation of the

categorical

im?

perative,

sometimes

called the

Kingdom

of

Ends,

as

a

framework

for

the

corporation

as

a

moral

community.

In

this articulation Kant

says

that

you

should

act as

if

you

were a

member of

an

ideal

kingdom

of ends in which

you

were both

subject

and

sovereign

at the same time

(p.

87).

The

Kingdom

of

Ends

provides

a

formula for

democratic

organization

were

employees

choose the rules

and are

subject

to the

rules,

and all

rules

are

acceptable

to

all

rational

beings.

The

Kingdom

of Ends articulation yields a kind of common good in a community without the

utilitarian drawback of

having

numbers override the

principle

of human

dignity.

After

laying

out Kant's

position,

Bowie constructs his

seven

principles

for a

Kantian

corporation.

The first of

these is that the

firm

has

an

obligation

to

con?

sider the

interests of all

stakeholders. Next Bowie

says

that

those affected

by

a

firm's rule

and

policies

should

have a

say

in the

policies.

Third,

one

stakeholder's

interests

cannot

take

priority

over others.

Fourth,

Bowie

says

that when

there

are

decisions in which

the

humanity

of

one set

of

stakeholders must be

sacri-

ficed

for

the

humanity

of

another,

these

decisions cannot be

made

on

the

basis

of

numbers. His fifth

principle

is that no

principle

can be

adopted

that

goes

against

the first two

formulations of the

categorical imperative.

The

sixth

principle

is

that

every

profit-making

firm

has

an

imperfect duty

of

beneficence.

Lastly,

ev?

ery

firm

must

design procedures

of

justice

that take

into account

principles

1

through

6

and are

endorsed

by

all

stakeholders.

Bowie

then examines

existing

organizational

structures to

see how

they

measure

up

to these

principles.

Most

do not fare well in

practice,

though

some

do in

theory.


8/10/2019 3857879.pdf

8/8

BOOK

REVIEW:

BUSINESS

ETHICS 231

In

answer to

critics

who

say

that the

Kantian

approach

to

business

is

imprac?

tical,

Bowie is

careful to show

why

his

Kantian

theory

of the firm

would be

desirable

(meaning profitable)

and

practical

in

business. But

by

arguing

that

moral

conduct has a

beneficial

payoff,

Bowie

realizes

that he

is

open

to

the

charge

of

not

having

pure

motives.

In

the fourth

chapter

of his

book

Bowie

cites

various

passages

in

Kant's

work to

support

his view that

just

because

you

have a

prudential

reason

for

doing

something

doesn't mean

that it

cannot be done

from

duty.

Bowie

sums

up

the

problem

this

way: Ironically,

it

is

often the

public

that

is more

Kantian than

Kant

with

regard

to

motivation

(p.

146).

If

there can be

only

one

motive

for

acting

from

duty?the

desire

to

act

from

one's

duty,

regard-

less of

any empirical

information

in

the

case?then we

have

a

model

of moral

behavior that is so high, it discourages people from even trying. Hence, some

believe

business

ethics

is

impossible,

because

everything

business does

is self-

interested.

Bowie

ends his book

with a

discussion of

how his vision

of Kantian

business and

Kantian

capitalism

will

provide

a

moral

foundation for

business and

support

the

goal

of

building

an

international

business

community

that is

free of

national,

ethnic,

and

religious

conflict.

Bowie

realizes,

This

claim

may

be

incredibly

optimistic,

but

then

again

so

were Kant

and the

other

Enlightenment

thinkers

(p.

174).

Bowie

need

not be

apologetic

about

his

optimism.

Business

ethics scholars

should be

optimists.

The whole

point

of the

profession

is

to make

business better

for

people

in

the

local

and

global

community.

One

thing

that

comes

through

clearly

in

this

extraordinary

book

is

that

although

Kantian

ethics are

hard to live

by,

they

also

might

be

the

best

to

live

under.

Notes

Albert

Carr,

Is

Business

Bluffing

Ethical?

Harvard

Business

Review

46

(1968):

145,

148.

2Douglas

McGregor,

The

Human

Side

of

Enterprise

(McGraw-Hill,

1985).

3Richard

Sennett,

The

Corrosion

of

Character

(W.W.

Norton,

1998).

4Frederick

Herzberg,

Work

and

the

Nature

ofMan

(T.

Y.

Crowell,

1966).

5See

Joanne

B.

Ciulla,

The

Working Life

(Times Books,

2000).

6See,

Joanne B.

Ciulla,

On the

Demand for

Meaningful

Work,

in

People

in

Organiza?

tions,

ed.

Brenda

Almond,

George

Enderle,

and

Antonio

Argendona

(Kluwer

Academic

Publishers,

1990).

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