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Theoretical and Methodological Problems ofPsychoanalysis and Cognitive Psychologies:Commentary by Eduardo B. Issaharoff (Buenos Aires)Eduardo B. Issaharoff

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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

very remote ones, and this has to be discovered

through the analysis

of

free association.

I wish I could agree with Semenza on the engage

ment between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology,

blessed in a marriage to come. It

is

not a question of

leaving neurology aside but

of

trying to define the

specific space of psychical mechanisms. The relation

between neurology and psychical activity is not direct.

The only suggestion I have for expanding the debate

between psychoanalysis and neuropsychology is the

creation of discussion groups wherein psychoanalysts

report a series of sessions and ask scientists for their

interpretation. Imagination is needed to fill the gaps.

Semenza complains about wild speculations, but he

does not seem to realize that his wild reductionism,

even if he protests otherwise,

is

a gross misrepresenta

tion

of

psychoanalysis. Imagination is also desirable

in the scientific literature about psychical activity. One

must admit that a Shakespearean quotation can be

more enlightening for a psychoanalyst than a ton

of

scientific literature Evidence for the value of the

imagination may be seen in the fact that scientific

findings are frequently outdated two years after they

are issued, whereas people continue writing on Hamlet

400 years after its creation. I am less interested in

keeping up scientific standards than grasping the com

plexities of psychical truth. Freudian psychoanalysis

has a double origin. One origin

is

rooted

in

science;

the other in art, mostly literature. Both aspects are

necessary to form the clinical approach. The exclu-

9

sively scientific attempt was wrong, and led Freud to

reject his own Project for a Scientific Psychology

and to write instead The Interpretation of Dreams. It

is

impossible to go backwards.

References

Dupuy,

J

P (1994), uxorigines des sciences cognitives.

Paris: Editions La decouverte.

Edelman, G M. (1992), Bright Air Brilliant Fire: On the

Matter

of

Mind. New York: Basic Books.

Freud, S. (1891), On Aphasia. New York: International

Universities Press, 1953.

(1895), Project for a scientific psychology. Stan

dard Edition

1:281-396. London: Hogarth Press, 1966.

(1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard

Edition 4&5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.

(1940), An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. Standard

Edition 23:139-207. London: Hogarth Press, 1964.

Green, A., & Stern, D (2000), Clinical and Observational

Psychoanalytic Research: Roots of Controversy. Lon

don: Karnac Books.

Morin, E. (1990), Introduction pensee complexe. Paris:

ESF Editeur.

(2000), Les sept savoirs necessaires a

l

education

du Futur. Paris: Seuil.

Andre Green

9 avenue de l Observatoire

Paris 75006

France

e-mail: andregreen@compuserve.com

Theoretical and Methodological Problems of Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Psychologies:

ommentary by duardo

B

Issaharoff (Buenos Aires)

In order to foster a partnership between psychoanaly

sis and cognitivism, so that they may work together,

it is essential to ask ourselves what trend in cognitiv

ism and what trend in psychoanalysis we should

choose to participate in this partnership. Both sciences

have various schools

of

thought, each of which advo

cates positions using terms that have very different

meanings for each group, and in turn, each group has

divergent ideas about the nature

of

the mind.

In the case of cognitivism,

we

shall consider two

positions related to computation in mental processes.

Eduardo Issaharoff, M.D., is a Training and Supervising Analyst

of

the Argentine Psychoanalytic Society.

There are currently two main schools of psychoanaly

sis: One school conceives of the mind as a system

of

meanings that must be understood by means

of

herme

neutic procedures; the other considers meaning as hav

ing biological structures supported by specific

functions. Only the laws of language and discourse

apply in the first case; in the second, the laws of the

biological sciences complete the explanation of the

functions

of

the mind.

Cognitivism was born from and grew through the

contribution of many techniques and theories. Neuro

anatomy, neurophysiology, experimental psychology,

and computer science are the basic sciences, while

psychophysics, computer programs

of

operations on

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20

internal representation, information processing, and

artificial intelligence are techniques that have provided

deep new insights into these basic sciences. In recent

times, evolutionary psychology has striven to acquire

the status of a basic science.

Different branches have emerged from the above

mentioned sciences and techniques. They are: cogni

tive science, cognitive neuroscience, computational

neuroscience, contemporary neuropsychology and its

three major groups: 1 clinical neuropsychology, (2)

cognitive neuropsychology, and (3) cognitive neuro

science/neuropsychology. Each branch focuses on dif

ferent and specific problems using different tools and

methodologies.

The new synthesis theory in cognitive psychol

ogy, represented by authors such

as

Pinker (1997) and

Plotkin (1998), has generated a perspective in which

the key idea is that the mind is a system

of organs of

computation designed by natural selection to solve the

problems faced by our evolutionary ancestors. I se

lected this theory because it is at the center of current

discussions about the limits

of

computation,

as

we

now know it, in a theory

of

the human mind.

For the new synthesis theory, computation is a

formal operation based on syntactically structured

representations. Concepts such as representations and

computation are at the very foundation

of

cognitivism,

according to Semenza, but he is careful, from an epis

temological point

of

view, when he qualifies the use

of

computation as metaphorical, and modularity

as

strategic.

In a recent book, The Mind Doesn t Work That

Way

(2000),

a reply to Pinker s book How the Mind

Works (1997), Fodor revised the computational theory

of

the mind in cognitive psychology. This commentary

will take a position on cognitivism that is related to

Fodor s; my discussion of psychoanalysis will be re

lated to that of Rubinstein (1967, 1969, 1975, 1976),

and to the idea that some aspects of psychoanalytic

theory can be tested in the clinical situation, while

other aspects can only be tested by means of neuro

science.

Semenza is a researcher, and the use

of

meta

phors and strategies is normal while doing research.

Methodological and epistemological criticism of a re

searcher s work is pertinent only when the work has

reached a conclusion. During the research process,

there are no rules

as

to how to create hypotheses. That

specific part

of

the process, for which we still lack

computational architectures or systems, pertains

strictly to the creative mind

of

the researcher. It is

a nonlinear process that establishes relations among

duardo Issaharoff

elements or structures

of

different levels and aspects

of phenomena, and creates hypothetical entities to ex

plain them. Analogies, metaphors, strategies, and

models are common tools in this activity. Since com

puter theory of the mind andmodularity theory provide

no plausible hypotheses concerning this process, they

are in a certain way, incomplete.

Fodor

(2000)

asserted the existence

of

a funda

mental dichotomy between mental processes that are

local and others that are not. Local processes share

characteristic properties. They appear to accommodate

well to the application of Turing s theory that hypothe

sizes thinking as computational in nature; they appear

to be largely modular, and much

of

their architecture

and their proprietary domain of application appear to

be

innately specified.

The cognitive role

of

a thought in inferential pro

cesses is, therefore, determined by essential syntactic

properties of the corresponding mental representation.

The effect of the logical form of a thought on its role

in demonstrative inferences is what makes it computa

tional in Turing s sense. But there are some other de

terminants, such

as

beliefs and desires,

of

the role a

thought plays in mental processes; in particular, the

properties of thought that are sensitive to the belief

system it is embedded in. Inferences in which features

of an embedding theory affect the inferential-cum

causal roles of their constituent beliefs are what phi

10sophers sometimes call global or holistic in

ferences.

Global inferences are presumptive examples in

which the determinants of the computational role of

a mental representation can shift from context to con

text; hence the computational role of a mental repre

sentation is not determined only by its individuating

properties and

by

its syntax.

From the new synthesis perspective, modules are

the second element in the model of the structure of

mind. With regard to modules: f the information is

encapsulated, it is difficult to conceive how new

hypotheses, or inferences related to context, or cre

ation of theoretical terms, can occur. The use Semenza

makes of the concept encapsulated information

could be an example of the type of risk implicit in

metaphorical uses since, by definition, modules are

informationally encapsulated, and the informational

resources to which a computational mechanism has

access inside the module are not sensitive to global

properties or belief systems. In my opinion, the exam

ple by Semenza refers rather to the difficulty of chang

ing procedural mechanisms and their motor circuits.

Dissociability

of

functions is subject to the same

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Psychoanalysis

and

Cognitive Neuropsychology

problem. Only modules with encapsulated informa

tion and not sensitive to context conditions admit an

exhaustive definition based on their functions. And

there are many functions in most

of

the brain mecha

nisms that require information from many different

metrical and analogical levels and qualities; hence,

they cannot be modules in the strict sense

of

the term.

I would like to propose the theory submitted by

A Pellionisz and R. Llinas (1983) as a possible exam

ple, in brain structures,

of

computational architecture,

modules with encapsulated information, and dissocia

bility of functions. In the abstract, the authors say:

Here we present an elaboration and a quantitative

example for a hypothetical neuronal process imple

menting what we refer to as the metaorganization

principle. This process allows the internalization

of

external (body) geometries into the central nervous

system (CNS) and a reciprocal and equally important

action of the CNS geometry on the external (body)

geometry The metaorganization of metric net

works, together with the sensorimotor covariant em

bedding network, provides an explanation

of

the

emergence of a whole sensorimotor apparatus leading

to the feasibility of constructing truly brain-like ro

botic systems [po 245].

I have introduced this example because the func

tions implied are completely described by means

of

mathematics and constitute a complete local system

for that set of functions. This example represents

primitive characteristics, or primordial ones,

of

the

central nervous system. But it is difficult, or maybe

impossible, to imagine the evolution from these kinds

of

modules to the functions of thought and language.

Here, I would like to quote Fodor:

[T]he moral will eventually be conceded, namely, that

the Computational Theory is probably true at most

of

only the mind s modular parts. And that a cognitive

science that provides some insight into the part of the

mind that

isn t

modular may well have to be different

from the kind of syntactical account that Turing s in

sight inspired. It is, to return to Chomsky s way of

talking, a mystery, not just a problem, how mental

processes could be simultaneously feasible, nd ab

ductive, ndmechanical. Indeed, I think that,

as

things

now stand, this and consciousness look to be the ulti

mate mysteries about the mind [po 99].

Another point that Semenza mentions is the im

portance

of

pathological findings, which bring a lot

of

2

diverse information to light, so that sometimes it is

difficult to know which data are stable and which are

not, due to the complexity

of

the functions of the brain

and the variable specificity

of

local phenomena. Labo

ratory experiments restrict this risk, but a t the same

time, they impoverish data. We must deal with com

plexity. In Koch s (1999) words:

it

is dangerous in

neurobiology to study

anyone

mechanism at only a

single, isolated level

of

complexity. Phenomena at

multiple levels, such as ionic channel, synapse, den

drite, neuron, small network, and so on, interact in

highly nonlinear and nonintuitive ways

anyone

computation is carried out using a plurality

of

mecha

nisms at different spatial and temporal scales (p.

474). Regarding Semenza s philosophical reflections

about Freud, I would like to remark that from my point

of

view, Freud opted for a dualistic methodological

posi tion and a monistic ontological one. About the

inclusion

of

Freud in the mainstream

of

Western sci

entific tradition, nothing can be more demonstrative

of this than his belief in the principle that natural laws

govern human mental life. Nothing in the building

of

psychoanalysis makes sense without this principle.

Interdisciplinary Issues

The first problem with interdisciplinary issues is the

concept

of

a discipline itself. Sometimes a discipline

is defined in relat ion to an object, that is, as the theo

retical and experimental activity that relates to a par

ticular object. We find the typical historical example

in light, which is the object of the discipline

of

optics.

Once a new theory changes conceptions of the object,

as the notion

of

electromagnetism changed the concept

of

light, must we consider this to be the emergence

of

a new discipline just because the view

of

the object

has changed? From an epistemological point

of

view,

it is more convenient to consider specific problems

and the corresponding theory or theories as the actual

unit of knowledge. I prefer to use the terms intertheo-

retic l

and

interscientific

in lieu

of

interdisciplin ry

On the other hand, disciplines are not homogeneous

fields. They are comprised

of

different theories and

belief systems at differing stages of evolution. By evo

lution I mean the formalized state of the theory, the

experimental development

of

its hypotheses, and the

more or less explicit belief systems included in each

theory.

This lack

of

homogeneity has favored arbitrary

elections

of

hypotheses or beliefs, resulting in an inad

equate knowledge content. This is the kind

of

sin that

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could be attributed to the authors of some psychoana

lytic papers who have chosen theories and clinical data

according to their convenience; moreover, the lack

of

logical and methodological strictness of the discipline

also admits this possibility,

as

well as any combination

of

hypotheses and data.

An additional problem arises from the insight that

behavioral data alone are not sufficient to characterize

mental processes. John Anderson (1978) proved that

any set of behavioral data could always be explained

by more than a single theory, and suggested that neu

rophysiological constraints would help to ameliorate

this problem.

Because our goal is to understand how the brain

produces behavior, we need descriptions

of

behavior

that can be related in a relatively direct way to under

lying neural mechanisms. Many sorts

of

behaviors re

flect complex interactions among many mechanisms.

Unfortunately, there is no way to know in advance

which regularities in behavior will mesh neatly with

distinct properties

of

the brain, and which regularities

will reflect complex interactions among numerous

properties.

Cognitive Psychology and Psychoanalysis

Semenza says:

One

cannot be but in favor

of

psycho

analysts engaging in poetry. However, when ad

dressing a theory of mental function, a dialogue with

other branches of science becomes desirable. I hope

every psychoanalyst engaged in the enterprise will re

main close to the lucidity

of

thought and sheer read

ability of Freud. I concur with Semenza in the desire

to make psychoanalysis a scientific theory of the mind.

But I do not agree with the proposal of a dialogue

between sciences. What follows represents, from a

methodological viewpoint, a more ambitious aim,

namely, to test psychoanalytic hypotheses by means

of cognitive neuroscience. To do this, it is necessary

to consider psychoanalytic hypotheses and theories ac

cording to the usual methodological standards

of

sci

ence. This means that what the hypotheses and

theories say about the mind is susceptible

of

being

controlled in some way. From what the hypotheses

affirm, we can, using logic as the instrument, derive

consequences that can be observed through pertinent

experiences. This is the basic method

of

science, in

which only logic is not specific; what the hypotheses

affirm, the consequences and the pertinent experiences

are specific for the conditions of the material each

theory manages. So, a first step should involve defin-

duardo

B

Issaharoff

ing the characteristics of our psychoanalytic hypothe

ses, elaborating some classification of them, and

proposing the adequate material to observe conse

quences.

I follow Rubinstein in the division

of

the psycho

analytic hypotheses into two broad classes: clinical

and metapsychological. The hypotheses

of

both

classes are general in the sense that they refer to as

pects of mental functioning, not to specific syndromes,

as is the case in a similar classification by Rapaport

(1959). While the class of metapsychological hypothe

ses includes high-level hypotheses and theoretical

terms, the class

of

clinical hypotheses includes both

high-level and low-level hypotheses, with a mix of

theoretical and observational terms. One difference

between clinical and metapsychological hypotheses is

that the former are more directly relevant to clinical

inference (i.e., clinical interpretation) than the latter.

Clinical hypotheses can be subdivided into particular

clinical hypotheses and general clinical hypotheses.

Particular clinical hypotheses refer to what a person

wishes, feels, and does, and to what happens to him in

the psychoanalytic situation.

If we speak about wishes,

feelings, and thoughts in general, abstracted from a

particular person, or outside the psychoanalytic situa

tion, then we speak about wishes, feelings, and

thoughts

as

phenomena that are the product

of

specific

structures and functions. We might say that, for the

time being, we lack a wide repertoire

of

theories about

these structures and functions in the brain and about

the way in which they interact to produce observable

behavior at the level of the psychoanalytic situation.

But what we now have is enough to propose new

hypotheses and rich experiments related to mecha

nisms that are involved in clinical phenomena. Fona

gy s (1999) paper, quoted by Semenza, is an example

of this.

Our beliefs and theories of different kinds and

levels, which we use to assign meaning to the behavior

of our patients, are essential components

of

the pro

cess that produces interpretations in the analyst s

mind. Ergo, interpretation is a particular clinical hy

pothesis that we arrive at by means of general clinical

hypotheses and metapsychological hypotheses. Test

ing or contrasting each type

of

hypothesis poses differ

ent kinds

of

problems. While particular clinical

hypotheses can be tested o y inside the clinical situa

tion, general clinical hypotheses and metapsychologi

cal hypotheses cannot be tested o y in the context

of clinical observation because they predict attributes,

characteristics, and particularities of universal psychic

mechanisms. The universality of psychic mechanisms

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Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Neuropsychology

implies that they are structures determined by and

transmitted through genetic codes, and that they are

not the product o a particular environment or society.

this is true, then general clinical hypotheses and

metapsychological ones make predictions about hu

man beings as physiological organisms, and more spe

cifically about the structures and functions o the brain

o those organisms. Particular clinical hypotheses refer

to the realization o universal mechanisms in a partic

ular person and his circumstances.

Only general clinical hypotheses form part o the

clinical psychoanalytic theory; particular hypotheses

represent the application o this theory to actual cases.

Only in the psychoanalytic process can

we

test particu

lar hypotheses. When I work with a person, it is with

that person in the clinical situation that I must test my

hypotheses. When I w or k with the brain, it is in the

brain i.e., in the context o neuroscience), that I must

test my hypotheses. One o the conclusions derived

from this argument is that in a global theory o the

human mind I need the brain to theorize about the

mind, and the mind to theorize about the brain.

The aforementioned statement that we need de

scriptions o behavior that can be related in a rela

tively direct way to underlying neural mechanisms is

the challenge we are faced with. Since this will require

an input o knowledge and expertise from both psy

choanalysis and neuroscience, it should be the work

o

a team

o

psychoanalysts and cognitive neuroscien

tists to explore and test the possible elements that may

satisfy the required descriptions.

Here I can only mention the issues that I consider

have greater possibilities o complying with these re

quirements. The field o dynamic processes in memory

systems, and cognitive theories with their rich classi

fication o memories, are concepts that could be very

useful for psychoanalysis at the clinical and theoretical

levels. On the other hand, the patient s increased ca

pacity, acquired through psychoanalysis, to transform

part

o

the nondeclarative aspects o memory into de

clarative sentences, which represents the development

o

his communicative competence, is an interesting

contribution o psychoanalysis to cognitive theories.

We know that behavior is the product of a com

plex process that includes internal states, sensory in

puts, motor outputs, motivation, strategies, planning,

and the peculiarities o each person. Psychoanalysis

is a source o observation o behavior in its complex

ity, in the context o a peculiar asymmetrical relation

with the analyst. The conception o behavior in actual

cognitive neuroscience, incorporating the dimensions

o affect and intentionality, draws us closer to an un-

derstanding o the brain structures involved in human

behavior as we experience it in the psychoanalytic sit

uation.

References

Anderson, J. 1978), Arguments concerning representations

for mental imagery. Psycholog. Rev., 85:249-277.

Fodor, J. 2000),

The Mind Doesn t Work That

Way Cam

bridge, MA: MIT Press.

F onagy, P. 1999), Memory a nd therapeutic action. In

ternat.

Psycho-Anal., 80:215-223.

Holt, R., Ed. 1997),

Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy

of Science. Madison, CT: International Universities

Press.

Koch, C. 1999), Biophysics

of

Computations. New York:

Oxford University Press.

Pellionisz, A., Llinas, 1983), Tensor network theory

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the metaorganization

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functional geometries in the

central nervous system. Neurosci., 16 2):245-273.

Pinker, S. 1997),

How the Mind Works.

New York: W.

W. Norton.

Plotkin, H. 1998), Evolution in Mind. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Rapaport, D. 1959), The Structure

o Psychoanalytic The

ory: A Systematizing Attempt. Psychol. Issues, Monogr.

6. New York: International Universities Press.

Rubinstein, B. B. 1967), Explanation and mere descrip

tion: A metascientific examination

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certain aspects o

the psychoanalytic theory

o

motivation. In: Psychoanal

ysis

n

the Philosophy

of

Science, ed.

Holt. Madi

son, CT: I nt ern at io na l Universities P ress, 1997, pp.

67-122.

1969), Person, organism, and self: Their worlds

and their psychoanalytically relevant relationships. In:

Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy

of Science, ed.

Holt. Madison, CT: International Universities Press,

1997, pp. 415-465.

1975), On the clinical psychoanalytic theory and

its role in the inference and confirmation o particular

clinical hypotheses. In: Psychoanalysis and the Philoso

phy of Science, ed. R. R. Holt. Madison, CT: Interna

tional Universities Press, 1997, pp. 273-324.

1976), On the possibility

o

a strictly clinical psy

choanalytic theory: An essay in the philosophy o psy

choanalysis. In: Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy

of

Science,

ed. Holt. Madison, CT: International Uni

versities Press, 1997, pp. 325-359.

Eduardo Issaharoff

Arenales 87

5

1061 Buenos Aires

Argentina

e-mail: ebis@pccp.com.ar