4.2 - Seel, Martin - A Defense of Aesthetic Progress (en)

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A Defense of Aesthetic Progress

A Defense of Aesthetic Progress

by Martin Seel

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 4 / 1986, pages: 416-425, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=03554d8d-bd83-4e93-9862-8c5f16fb4d72http://www.ceeol.com/


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A DEFENSE OF AESTHETIC PROGRESS*Martin Seel

"There is no progress in art, although there are many kinds of artisticprogress." For an aesthetics which is centred on autonomous works of art thisminimalist interpretation of the concept of aesthetic progress is commonplace.On this view only the movement of art towards autonomy counts as trueaesthetic progress; such progress takes place to the extent that the creationand perception of art frees itself froIl! pre-existing institutional demands.Aesthetic practice then no longer deals with objects that are to be taken asartistically more or less perfect realizations of a socially given mimetic oranamnetic function; it understands the work of art as a unique production,and its beauty as a beauty free of function. Excellent works of art stand ontheir own; as long as they are perceived as artworks they cannot be conceivedof as stages of a general development (of art or society). Thus, according tothis frequently held view, there is no progress in art, although there is nodoubt progress on the part of the artist in inventing and bringing forth novelforms of beauty.This view is not entirely mistaken; but it has difficulties in answering threequestions with which the uncompromising denial of the progress of art itself isdirectly confronted. First, how can progress in art be measured when there isno progress ofart? Second, how is the relation between works of art-whetherold or new-to be described positively if no general line of development canexplain the coexistence of the forms of beauty? Third, can the problem ofaesthetic coexistence truly be solved without a reformulation of the idea ofprogress? By "aesthetic coexistence" I mean not only the simultaneouspresence of different aesthetic styles at a given time but also the continuingvalidity of works of art which have originated in different periods. I shouldlike to show that only if this last question is answered negatively can the twoearlier questions be answered satisfactorily. The only alternative to the beliefin aesthetic progress is an alternative understanding of aesthetic progress.I. Artistic Purpose and Aesthetic FunctionIn his two lectures on "Ideas of Progress and their Impact on Art" E. H.Gombrich argues that talk of aesthetic progress has a clear sense only when itinvolves the achievement of a particular end, which artistic effort and itsproducts serve. According to Gombrich, this idea of aesthetic progress isbased upon an "instrumentalist" concept of art. This concept plays a role

particularly in the writings of Vasari and his followers in the history of art.* Translated by Cathrine Wilson.Praxis International 6:4 January 1987 0260-8448 $2.00


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Praxis International 417For Vasari, Gombrich writes, painting has "admittedly a technical function,but like every such function, it must serve a purpose. It is the purpose ofChristian art to present the holy personages and above all the holy storiesconvincingly to the viewer and by this means as it were to bring him to witnessthe deeds and sufferings of the saints or likewise the ancient heroes, uponwhich he ought to reflect. The impression of physical presence, the mastery ofcolor and light, the capacity to bring to view supernatural beauty are not endsin themselves, but serve the function which the culture has assigned topainting and sculpture."lFor Gombrich too the idea of the general progress of art is empty-artisticprogress is progress of certain arts at certain times, relative to a purposeassigned to them. Only where art pursues a cultural or even a moral end arecriteria given by means of TNhich progress in art is determinable.2 In opposingan extreme concept of aesthetic autonomy Gombrich in the final analysis tiesthe concept of art to the possibility of progress in his sense, and his argumentcan be summarized as follows: There is artistic progress where a purpose isexternally assigned to art; and art (which deserves its name) only exists wherethe artistic effort is carried out within the context of a cultural purpose and istherefore understandable as the "rational search" for a perfect solution to agiven problem.3Following this line of thought, one might argue that although there is nogeneral aesthetic progress, there are sequences of artistic development whichare determined and determinable by the unity of a simultaneously aestheticand non-aesthetic problem.4 If we overlook for a moment the instrumentalistinterpretation of Gombrich, this suggestion might appear to be an acceptablesolution to the problem of progress as far as it concerns art. It seemsacceptable, however, only on account of a simplification which the recenthistory of art - at least - dramatically contradicts. Sequences, that is, coexistand interfere with one another in a way which makes it impossible to clarifythe central concepts concerning art within the paradigm of only one of thesesequences. In other words, the theory of art must not slide over the problemof aesthetic autonomy so carelessly as it does in Gombrich's lectures. For whatis called "aesthetic autonomy" arises precisely when it becomes self-evident tothose who are concerned with art that styles and developments of art doindeed coexist not only historically but aesthetically.This (in a way still ongoing) process of aesthetic autonomy is not onlyirreversible, but implies essentially a progress in aesthetic practice. With theemancipation of art from (the idea of) a single sequence the function of artsurely changes, without however becoming functionless. Its traditionalfunction is radicalized in that it overcomes its determination by definite ends.Along with the pluralization of aesthetic sequences, an aesthetic purposebecomes identifiable which is no longer reducible to concrete pre-existingdemands. It becomes evident that the fate of art is to give representations ofvalid perspectives on the world that cannot be transformed into mererepresentations of the world. 5 Such an analysis of a generalized aestheticfunction has been the core of the philosophical treatment of art at the latestsince .Kant and his followers. A main result of this point of view is that works

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418 Praxis Internationalof art offer articulations of lifeworld experiences in that they reveal constellations of meaning which are constitutive of (or thus come to be constitutive of)life-forms and existential situations.6To be sure, especially in modern art we have many cases where, at a secondlevel of articulation, the aesthetic mode refers to itself, as when the work of artadditionally or exclusively discloses situations or features of aesthetic experience. Nevertheless, it has always been a conceptual confusion to conceive theself-reflective fulfillment of the aesthetic function as the paradigm-case ofaesthetic articulation----even in the age of classical modernity. What is moreimportant in our context is that although the autonomous function of art(before and after classical modernity) remains a cultural one, it is neitherreducible to the elucidation ofmoral value nor is it thinkable that this functioncould be fulfilled by one aesthetic sequence alone.If these remarks are not entirely misdirected, an instrumental conception ofart is rather implausible. It is the purpose of artistic activity to fulfill thepurpose of art-but not to fulfill a purpose which is given independently fromthe activity of artistic invention. When Titian is painting a picture which issupposed to represent the ascension ofMaria, he is painting a picture on thiswell-known subject which reveals an experience which was not availablebefore painting the picture, but which only becomes available with it. Thepurpose of this picture did not exist before; as long as there is any evidence,that is, that the content of this acsension-of-Maria-picture is entirely differentfrom all its predecessors. What is given to the painter and what he was boundto as one of his time, is merely a relatively definite purpose for pictures ingeneral-a cultural interpretation of the aesthetic function. In serving thisfunction, problems of choosing the right means arise in manifold ways; butthe works of art in whose creation these questions arise are not themselvesmeans to achieve the end of art; they are media (or instances) of the aestheticfunction. Correspondingly, the making of an artwork does not fit into thescheme of using means to an end, since the end that is achieved in using a setof specific means is discernable in the best case only at the end of the work.Therefore the central meaning of aesthetic rationality cannot be the use ofmeans for definite ends. Nor can it be limited to the production of aestheticobjects. In its full-blooded meaning, aesthetic rationality is the capacity forthe understanding evaluation (verstehende Beurteilung) of the beautiful andsuccessful (des Gelungenen), a form of rationality in which artists and thepublic participate equally.7In view of the preceding, it can be seen that instances of progress in art aredependent on progress in aesthetic perception, which itself is to be understoodas a specific feature of cognition. This cognition is a twofold one. On the onehand, it is that which is conveyed through the successful (das Gelungene) workof art. This cognition-on the other hand-is possible only together with theinsight that the artwork concerned is indeed successful. Corresponding to thedetermination of aesthetic function already given, those works of art areaccomplished or successful which lend expression to-and thereby conveyan essential perspective on the world we inhabit at the present. Every conceptof aesthetic sequence must always presuppose such an experience or ideal of


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Praxis International 419aesthetic excellence. For it is the very meaning of aesthetic sequences thatthey are a development towards the aesthetically better and best. So even ifone assumes that an aesthetic sequence begins with one type of aestheticexcellence and ends with a new kind of aesthetic perfection, it is never fromthe history of this sequence alone that criteria of aesthetic progress may beextracted. Before the progressive movement of this sequence becomesrecognizable, the original aesthetic event, that is, the more or less excellentproducts of a new' aesthetic project must already themselves have beenrecognized. The internal criteria or standards which allow us to distinguishnormatively between stages of an artistic development ask for and aredependent upon external procedures of justification-procedures, to be sure,not external to art and its perception, but external to the sequence thusestablished. Because this is so, the concept of aesthetic progress cannot beexplained by developments that take place within such sequences. Progress insequences of art history only exists because there exists progress in art betweenthese sequences.This progress is in equal measure one of art criticism and art production.Such progress does not move in a straight line, but takes place in thecontrastive perception of the successful and the beautiful, and thus in theenrichment of our cognitive grasp of the situational features of our presentworld. What the meaning of progress between sequences is, I would like toclarify in the following by means of three rather extreme examples.11. Aesthetic CoexistenceAnyone who has a more than superficial acquaintance with art hasencountered works which are not only entirely different from one another butwhich appear to exist in conflict with one another. Nevertheless they areexperienced as in equal measure successful. In my opinion, an answer to thequestion of aesthetic progress is only possible when one takes as touchstonefor this problem the most tension-filled cases of aesthetic coexistence, that is,

if one takes as paradigmatic for aesthetic evolution the case that is traditionallyregarded as the plain counterexample to it. I begin with an example fromcontemporary literature. The writers John Updike and Thomas Pynchon haveso little in common that they, as represented through their works, have quite alot in common. Their (best) works stand for opposing types of contemporaryliterature. Updike's Rabbit-trilogy belongs to the tradition of realistic narration, while in Pynchon's novels the excessive art of constructing literarypandemonia is revived in a new way. According to the usual understanding,Updike is a "traditional," Pynchon by contrast an "avant-garde" writer. Nowthere may certainly be readers who are of the opinion that the esoteric art ofThomas Pynchon clearly falsifies the commercially-successful word production of his colleague Updike. Such judgments are in fact constantly met withwhen it is said that Musil has eclipsed Thomas Mann, or SchonbergStravinsky, Newman Mondrian, or Bernhard BoIl. But this kind of judgmentin the present theoretical connection is uninteresting. The interesting case isthe one in which both aesthetic antipodes are acknowledged. How is it that we


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420 Praxis Internationalcan include two works which (seem to) exclude one another in the class of thesuccessful?Pynchon's novel Gravity's Rainbow recounts the implosion of a world goingto pieces through over-organization, a world which is to be understood as thelegacy of the persisting rationalistic age bequeathed to us. It is Pynchon's artto transform history into a chaos of stories, and thus to dissolve the belief in anarratable social or cosmic order by means of hypertrophic narration. Thenovel furnishes the experience of a totality which can no longer be experiencedas an articulated whole. Paradoxically, this occurs through an unexpectedrevival of epic naivite-on a highly sentimental level. Like the two precedingparts of the trilogy, Updike's novel Rabbit is Rich recounts by contrast theeveryday life of a thoroughly everyday hero who is at home in the preciselystructured little world of the imaginary city of Brewer (in Pennsylvania,USA). It is Updike's art to transform the fleetingness of our everyday life intothe story of a person, which dissolves the belief in a simple life of simplepeople through the recounting of their highly incompatible passions andbeliefs. The Rabbit-trilogy provides the experience of dissonant forces whichdetermine what appears to be the biographical unity of an unspectacularperson even in his most conventional behaviour. Paradoxically, the modernityof what is narrated gives this rather traditionally written prose a sentimentalconsciousness that is hardly inferior to the most formally extravagant prose.The hidden complementarity of the two opposing methods of writingbecomes recognizable as soon as they are both experienced and evaluated assuccessful. The relationship they achieve does not minimize the contrastbetween them in any way; through their being integrated into the family ofaccomplished works, however, they are both appreciated as revealing animportant way of seeing our present time. In shedding light on our present thetwo systematically opposed artworks are nevertheless allies.It is evident, however, that precisely the difference between Pynchon andUpdike is essential to the experience of our present. Our world is neitherUpdike's nor Pynchon's; through the contrast of both ways of writing itappears as a world in which the choice between these two alternatives shouldnot be made. For the experience of the diffusion ofwell-structured totalities isjust as fundamental as the experience of personal identity which preservesitself as a vector of irreconcilable impulses. Via the contrast of the aestheticallyvalid, the validity of contrast in experience itself is validated. If the definitionof art borrowed from various aestheticians is tenable, then the coexistence ofthe successful works signifies exactly this: the irreversible coexistence ofperspectives on the world, which by those who judge them as excellent is heldto be essential for the authentic experience of the present.Unlike Pynchon, who presumably does not bother about someone likeUpdike, the painter Barnett Newman expressly intended his picture-series"Who's afraid of red, yellow and blue?" to be polemically directed againstidealizing abstraction, especially against Mondrian. But here once again itshould be apparent that the sublime force of these "off-balance" picturescannot invalidate the delicate balance of the best of Mondrian's pictures;indeed for aesthetic perception the destiny ofNewman's series appears bound


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Praxis International 421to the lasting energy ofMondrian's pictures, which, through the existence oftheir incommensurable offspring, achieve an even greater force. This againdoes not mean that the struggle between an aesthetic of the sublime and anaesthetic of the beautiful, which Newman and Mondrian carry on by aestheticmeans, ends in a draw. We, perceiving the aesthetic force of both Mondrianand Newman, decide not to decide this controversy-for reasons given to usby the best works of these painters.Just as Mondrian is no longer the same after we have come to knowNewman's counterpictures, so too is a Titian no longer the same since we havehad experience with Mondrian and Newman; in any case not with pictureslike the ascension ofMaria, a picture which shows the beauty of the sublime, asynthesis that in our century is split apart into the contrast between Mondrianand Newman. To make an evidently risky claim-out of Titian's picture,Mondrian's message speaks with Newman's force: the certainty of redemptionis instantiated with sublime power. Herein lies part of Titian's greatness forthe contemporary viewer, a greatness which again cannot be understood as theintegration of what comes to be disunified later. For although we need notbelieve in the religious presuppositions of the picture to believe in the picture,the experience of the hostility of the religious domestication of the sublimebelongs to the actual perception of this picture. As long as the beauty of theTitian painting is understood as coexistent with the excellence of Mondrianand Newman, none of these pictures can absorb the aesthetic significance ofthe other, however much one may have taken up from the other or may haveanswered to it. The excellent work does not integrate the expressive capacityofworks that stand beside it, for these are excellent in their own way. It entersinto a tension-filled constellation together with these, a constellation that is tobe understood as one of perspectives bound to experience which the artworldallows us to live through as the world-constituting perspectivality of ourpresent.These few observations on aesthetic coexistence permit us to give apreliminary positive answer to the question of the possibility of progress.Aesthetic progress consists in bringing to life aesthetic difference. Thisdifference is twofold. It involves first the difference between aestheticexperience on the one hand, and theoretical and practical knowledge on theother, and second-and equally important-the difference between theexcellent objects of aesthetic experience.The difference between aesthetic rationality and theoretical and practicalrationality, is most clearly explained again through the formula of ways ofseeing. Aesthetic validity-the validity (or truth) of the excellent and thebeautiful-implies the appropriateness of world-constituting ways of seeingwhich the successful work reveals and the failed work obscures. Thedisclosure of valid ways of seeing is the privilege of aesthetic cognition; it isneither translatable into the theoretical knowledge of propositions nor into thepractical knowledge of the appropriateness of courses of action, nor replaceable through them. As is well-known, the differentiation of these spheres ofvalue is the progress with which modernity began a long time ago; thisprogress is a progress of freedom which had and has particular risks, without


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422 Praxis Internationalthe relapse into the fiasco of transcendental security becomingmore tempting.The external differentiation of theoretical, practical and aesthetic validityimplies a simultaneous internal differentiation not only in the aesthetic realm.As in the realms of theoretical and practical rationality, the untenability of theideal of a linear progression toward the better and finally toward an ultimategood, understood as the final goal of this development, is apparent in theaesthetic realm as well. As becomes clear from the discussion of the problemof aesthetic coexistence, aesthetic practice draws its essential energy preciselyfrom the differences between excellent works. 8 It is one of the basicexperiences of modernity that the right view of the world does not-andcannot-present itself to its inhabitants. And what initiated the post-classicaltransformation of classical modernity some time ago was not in the least thediscovery that such an overall view neither does nor even should exist.9

III Regress in ArtIt follows from the preceding considerations that the received view ofaesthetic progression rests upon speculative assumptions about history whichin the self-critical age of modernity are no longer tenable. For the traditionalconcept of progress the ideal of the total work is a regulative principle blindlyadhered to. The total work is that work in which the right view of the world isrepresented in such a way that the totality of appropriate forms of life isaesthetically manifested by it. This ideal has many variants. One of these

variants is the conception of distinct developmental sequences at the end ofwhich the perfect work of a certain kind succeeds, because it gives perfectexpression to the forms of life of its time. Another variant of this conception ofprogress is the case where the success of the perfect work falls together withthe "Aufhebung" of art in a world which would no longer know artworks,because here the transparency of unalienated forms of life would have come tobe realized in the splendid reality of human existence. The reservation aboutprogress prevalent today, I believe, is perfectly right against the utopian aswell as the relativistic variant of the conception according to which progress isa progress of perfection. The defeat of this belief in progress is indeeddecisively progress-and not only in art. Nevertheless, this is not the finalword on progress.Not all progress is a progress toward something, which is present to theactors as the goal of their behaviour. Equally important are those forms ofprogress which take place within a context, e.g. the broadening of a capacity,which emerges in the improvising employment of this capacity. The progressofart is mainly of this kind. This progress must be understood as a change ofaesthetic behaviour, which is directed productively and/or receptively to thedeveloping and developed works of art. 10 This progress follows a logic ofenrichment, not of execution. The "telos" of this aesthetic progress is not theunification or perfection of art in one work or in the social work of liberation.Its movement is that of a pluralization of media and of the intensification ofthe possibilities of representing world-constituting experiences. Aesthetic


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Praxis International 423progress is progress in the cognition of the worldliness of the world commonto the contemporaries of a culture and society.The enriching of aesthetic perception has to do essentially with theliberating effect of this cognition. Together with the perception of theirexcellence, the manifold of accomplished works opens up a field of experiencedefined by the possibility of a confrontation with experiences constitutive ofthe lifeworld. Aesthetic experience can figure the complex meaning-or inHegelian words, familiar to Heidegger, Benjamin, and A d o r n ~ a n figurethe "substance of experience" of lifeworld situations outside actual involvement with these situations. As distinct from other forms of lifeworldexperience this one is essentially undergone voluntarily; in aesthetic experiencewe do not have to experience in order to overcome disorientation-we areinticed to disorientating experiences in order to become aware of meaningconstellations underlying our existential orientations and disorientations. Theliberating quality of aesthetic perception is not only grounded in a liberationfor experience, but is at the same time a liberation from experiences which inthe aesthetic realm are experienced as narrowing and changeable. 11 Aestheticprogress, one can then say, consists in the achievement and broadening of thisfield of experience and cognition. This progress is in principle incomplete, forit must be won time and time again for every historical present.This progressive retrieval always has defensive requirements as well:namely the defense of aesthetic validity against domination by theoretical andpractical claims (claims which nevertheless play a legitimate role in thelanguage-game of aesthetic criticism). Therefore the condition of aestheticprogress today is not only the affirmation of the aesthetic coexistence ofsuccessful artworks, but to the same extent the liberating coexistence ofvarious dimensions of truth. To maintain the world in a liberating state ofcontrasting realities is the progressive mission not in the least of aestheticpractice.The idea of a progress of "enrichment" becomes clearer when we look at theforms of regress by avoiding which progress is accomplished. It would be aseparate theme to show how in a theory of emancipation, which is oriented nolonger by linear models of execution and appropriation, the concept ofregression becomes the central notion of progression. Such at least is the casein the aesthetic sphere. With the defeat of perfectionistic theories of progress,the concept of progress turns out to be secondary in relation to that of regress.Of course it would be misleading to take immediately every misunderstanding, every false judgment, every bad artwork as a step backwards in art;insofar as this is actually a matter of regress instead of a harmless failure, wehave to do here at best with backward steps in art and its regions. Only thatdevelopment can be identified as regress of art, whose occurrence decisivelythreatens the previously sketched function of art. In conclusion, I would liketo identify four serious forms of regress by which art (together with aestheticpractice) is permanently threatened in this century-in order to make thesense of defending aesthetic progress also more concrete.First, aesthetic practice becomes regressive when historical interest beginsto dominate aesthetic interest; when the works of art are conceived merely as


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424 Praxis Internationaldocuments rather than as media of actual experience. Beyond the fact that anartwork is a cultural product-a circumstance which is also of interest for anunreduced aesthetic experience-the historicist fallacy is the result of forgetting what artworks are made for and what their calling is; it confuses thegenesis of art with its validity. Closely related to this deformity is the otherfallacy, which concerned us in the previous argument. It might be called thefuturistic fallacy, because it takes every single artwork principally as a steptoward a future art (no matter whether this future lies before or behind us).This fallacy confuses the validity of art with its genesis-a blindness which isexactly complementary to that of the historicist. A third danger to art lies in away of perceiving that reduces the individual artwork to merely insularsignificance, and by this means robs it of its uniqueness of expression amongother forms of aesthetic articulation. This singularistic blindness abandons theuniqueness of the great artworks in favor of their uniform singularity. Afourthstep backward, finally-and maybe the most dangerous one-is to be seen inthe widespread tendency to treat works of art not primarily as media ofexpression, but above all as souvenirs-that remind everyone of his own mostpersonal concerns. This solipsistic delusion no longer perceives the significantobjectivity of the works of art.I cannot elaborate here the disastrous consequences of these regressions.Rather I would like to add that these four approaches are to be identified ascorrupted forms of aesthetic perception only when they supplant aestheticperception or begin to dominate it. As long as they are limited to anaccompanying role in aesthetic perception they constitute quite unsuspect andpartly even necessary approaches to art. As forms of aesthetic misbehaviour,however, these approaches thus characterized have one thing in common: thatin aesthetic perception-in the face of the work of art-they refuse aestheticperception. In the four forms of aesthetic regress a thoroughly conservativeaspect of aesthetic progress becomes apparent-its tendency to conserve (andextend!) the described capacity for aesthetic perception. In order to succeedhere, the perception as well as the production of art must not come to an end.To be sure, art in modernity is not necessarily compelled to a permanentone-dimensional innovation of its techniques alone-it is compelled to apermanent renewal of art. To this end new works will still be needed-as wellas an appreciation of the continuing novelty of the new and of the old in lightof ever changing experiences.

NOTES1. E. H. Gombrich, The Ideas ofProgress and their Impact on Art, ed. by The Cooper Union School ofArtand Architecture (New York, 1971); my quotation is retranslated from the German edition, E.H.G.,Kunst und Fortschritt (Koln: Du Mont, 1978), pp. 15 ff.2. Ibid., p. 122.3. Ibid., p. 114.4. Enlightening remarks on the concept of aesthetic sequence are to be found in H. Belting, Das Ende der

Kunstgeschichte? (Munchen: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1983).5. Cf. A. C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,1981).


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Praxis International 4256. An extended reconstruction is given in my book Die Kunst der Entzweiung. Zum Begriff der

aesthetischen Rationalitiit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985).7. Thus, i t seems to me, that in aesthetics we have to avoid the tendency to separate an aesthetic ofreception from an aesthetic of production. This contention as well as the following argumentation arebased on the assumption that art-critical interpretations and evaluations can in principle be justified

without depending on strict criteria, cf. Die Kunst der Entzweiung, Ch. Ill.8. I am here passing over the additional aspect of aesthetic difference, which is founded on thedistinction between the aesthetic quality of ar t and that of nature.9. The necessity of (at least) two concepts of modernity is illustrated in my review of Habermas's latestbook: "Eine zweite Moderne? Zu ]urgen Habermas: Der philosophische Diskurs der Modeme," in:Merkur, 40 (1986), pp. 245-251.10. Moreover, this progress is not bound to the aesthetic perception of artworks, as I assume for the sake

of simplicity in this paper.11. On the double meaning of aesthetic freedom cf. H. R. ]auss, Asthetische Erfahrung und literarischeHermeneutik I (Munchen: Fink, 1977), pp. 62 ff.

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