4.7 Human Health-Risk of Upset...4.7 HUMAN HEALTH/ RISK OF UPSET 651 Addison Street Mixed-Use...

4.7 HUMAN HEALTH/RISK OF UPSET

City of Berkeley 651 Addison Street Mixed-Use Project August 2008 Draft Environmental Impact Report

4.7-1

This section addresses the potential presence of hazardous materials and conditions in the project area, and analyzes the potential risk of such materials in proximity to proposed development and human activities. Existing potential hazardous conditions and materials of the project site include railroad hazards, risk of pipeline upset, and health hazards from existing or historic land uses that utilized or generated these materials. The analysis was based on a Phase I Environmental Site Assessment for 651 Addison Street (Appendix F) prepared by AEI Consultants and the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis (Appendix G) prepared by Kleinfelder for 700 University Avenue.

4.7.1 EXISTING SETTING

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS DEFINED

A material is considered hazardous if it appears on a list of hazardous materials prepared by a federal, state, or local agency, or if it has characteristics defined as hazardous by such an agency. A hazardous material is defined in Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations (CCR) as follows:

“Hazardous material” means any material that, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical or chemical characteristics, poses a significant present or potential hazard to human health and safety or to the environment if released into the workplace or the environment. “Hazardous materials” include, but are not limited to, hazardous substances, hazardous waste, and any material which a handler or the administering agency has a reasonable basis for believing would be injurious to the health and safety of persons or harmful to the environment if released into the workplace or the environment.

Chemical and physical properties that cause a substance to be considered hazardous, including the properties of toxicity, ignitability, corrosivity, and reactivity, are defined in the CCR, Title 22, Sections 66261.20 through 66261.24. Factors that influence the health effects of exposure to hazardous materials include the dose to which the person is exposed, the frequency of exposure, the exposure pathway, and individual susceptibility.

HISTORICAL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT SITE

The project site has been used for several historical uses since the original warehouse building was constructed in or around 1935. The original warehouse was built for a manufacturing company. Based on historical review of the project site, during the 1950s through the 1980s the warehouse was used for warehousing and trucking operations, including by the East Bay Drayage Company, which used the warehouse for a chemical distribution and storage facility. Prior to this use, the warehouse was used as a wood-fiber board facility and warehouse, with one portion used as an oil warehouse until as recently as the 1950s. Beginning in the 1980s, the warehouse building was subdivided into multiple smaller tenant spaces for work, storage, commercial, and light manufacturing. The tenant space uses included art studios, letterpress printing, wood shop, metal sculpture studios, recording studio, construction contractor, a tree trimming service, and some residential. The City of Berkeley’s Fire Department and Building Department declared the structure unsafe for occupancy in 2005, and the building was subsequently vacated. The warehouse building was recently demolished in June 2007.

4.7 HUMAN HEALTH/ RISK OF UPSET

651 Addison Street Mixed-Use Project City of Berkeley Draft Environmental Impact Report August 2008

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Hazardous Materials and Uses Associated with Off-Site Uses

The surrounding area of the project site is comprised primarily of a variety of commercial and industrial facilities beginning at the turn of the twentieth century. Currently, the surrounding land uses to the project site include automotive repair shop, warehouse/office to the north, winery operations to the south, cheese factory, Berkeley Animal Services to the west, and railroad tracks to the east. Additionally, the Takara Sake Brewery is located to the southeast across Addison Street. The area immediately to the east of the site is occupied by railroad tracks owned by the Union Pacific Railroad and a petroleum pipeline owned by Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, LP.

EXISTING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS AND CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROJECT SITE

A Phase I Environmental Site Assessment (Phase I) was conducted for the project site by AEI Consultants (AEI) in March 2005 for the purpose of independently evaluating the possibility of recognized environmental conditions associated with the site. The Phase I Environmental Site Assessment investigated and evaluated potential environmental liabilities associated with the presence of hazardous materials and their use, storage, and disposal in and around the vicinity of the project site.

The purpose of the assessment was to determine if hazardous materials were historically or currently used, stored, or disposed of on the site or in the immediate vicinity. The project site assessment activities included:

• A review of federal, state, and local lists that identify and describe underground fuel tank sites, leaking underground fuel tanks, hazardous waste generation sites, and hazardous waste storage and disposal facility sites within the ASTM approximate minimum search distance.

• A property and surrounding site reconnaissance with personal interviews to identify environmental contamination.

• A review of historical sources to help ascertain previous land uses at the site and in the surrounding area.

As indicated above, the Phase I assessment included a review of federal, state, and local regulatory agencies’ databases or “lists” of businesses and properties that handle hazardous materials or hazardous waste or are the known locations of a hazardous materials release resulting in soil and/or groundwater contamination. Table 4.7-1 illustrates the records review search of all databases conducted as part of the Phase I and the corresponding distance of the radius search.

TABLE 4.7-1 DATABASE RECORDS REVIEW AND SEARCH DISTANCE

Federal State

Database Distance Database Distance

NPL 1 mile Cal-sites, BEP, AWP 1 mile

RCRA-CORRACTS TSDF 1 mile CORTESE ½ mile

CERCLIS ½ mile LUST ½ mile

RCRA-non CORRACTS TSD ½ mile SLIC ½ mile

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Federal State

Database Distance Database Distance

RCRA-GEN Site and Adjoining SWIS/SWAT ½ mile

CERCLIS-NFRAP Site and Adjoining UST Site and Adjoining

ERNS Site Only

AEI’s investigation concluded that there was no evidence of recognized environmental conditions (RECs) associated with the project site or the nearby properties. Recognized environmental conditions are defined by the ASTM Standard Practice E15727-00 as the presence or likely presence of any hazardous substance or petroleum products under conditions that indicate an existing release, a past release, or material threat of a release into structures on the property or the ground, groundwater, or surface water of the property. The AEI database investigation did not identify any documented hazardous materials cases within proximity to or located hydraulically upgradient from the site that would result in a significant environmental concern. Additionally, the majority of the sites identified were listed as inactive. An inactive status indicates that no violations or releases are associated with the facility. An inactive status may also indicate that the facility is no longer in operation or an extended period of time has passed since a toxic substance release at the facility or site.

The Phase I Site Assessment did identify historical recognized environmental conditions (HRECs) and environmental issues. Historical recognized environmental conditions are defined by the ASTM Standard Practice E1527-00 as an environmental condition which in the past would have been considered a recognized environmental condition, but which may or may not be considered a recognized environmental condition currently. Environmental issues are environmental concerns that warrant discussion but do not qualify as a recognized environmental condition as defined by the ASTM Standard Practice E1528-00.

The historical recognized environmental conditions of the project site include a 550-gallon gasoline underground storage tank (UST) and a 8,000-gallon diesel UST that were both removed from the project site in 1987 and the historical use of the warehouse as the chemical storage warehouse as late as the mid-1970s. The environmental issues including environmental concerns associated with the project site include polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and herbicides and the high pressure petroleum pipeline located parallel with the existing railroad tracks. Further descriptions of the historical recognized environmental conditions and the environmental issues associated with the project site are described below:

Historical Recognized Environmental Conditions

• The 550-gallon gasoline UST and an 8,000-gallon diesel UST were removed from the project site in 1987. Low levels of contamination were detected subsequent to the UST removals. The UST documentation reviewed during a previous environmental assessment met 1997 regulatory standards for closure. Specifically, soil samples collected from beneath the diesel UST contained hydrocarbon constituents at non-detectable levels to a maximum concentration of less than 10 parts per million (ppm). The project site is listed as a “case closed” UST. Based on the low levels of hydrocarbon constituents present in soil at the time of the UST removal and the regulatory status, these historically recognized environmental conditions do not require any further investigation concerning the former USTs.



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• Historical resources of the project site indicate that the previous warehouse building was used as a chemical storage warehouse as late as the mid-1970s. No signs of this former use were noted during AEI’s inspection of the project site. In addition, the site assessment found no information indicating that there was ever a chemical release on the subject property. Based on the information that indicates that chemicals were stored, and not utilized, on the project site and the lack of documented release, the former use of the subject property as a chemical warehouse is not considered to be an environmental concern.

Environmental Issues

• Oils containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and herbicides are typically associated with weed-control activities for railroad tracks. The railroad tracks located adjacent to the east of the subject property are surrounded by gravel. Based on the presence of gravels, the use of oils and herbicides associated with weed control is expected to be minimal and therefore does not represent a significant environmental concern. Furthermore, no documented releases on these railroad tracks were noted on the regulatory database.

• A high pressure petroleum pipeline (owned by Kinder Morgan) runs along the eastern subject property line. Although available information exists that indicated that this pipeline has leaked in the past, no information exists that indicates that the pipeline portion adjacent to the subject property has ever leaked. This pipeline is not considered to be a current environmental concern. However, the current and/or future owner of the subject property should keep updated in regard to the status and any potential issues associated with the pipeline.

• Due to the age of the previous property building, there is a potential that asbestos-containing materials (ACMs) and/or lead-based paint are present. All suspect ACMs and painted surfaces were observed in good condition and were not expected to pose a health and safety concern to the occupants. The warehouse building previously located on the project site was demolished in June 2007. Therefore, the hazards associated with the building materials, including asbestos, lead, or PBB materials, have been addressed and are no longer an issue on the site.

KNOWN AND UNKNOWN HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN THE PLANNING AREA

PCB Hazards

Concern over the toxicity and persistence in the environment of polychlorinated biphenyls led Congress in 1976 to enact Section 6(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that included prohibitions on the manufacture, processing, and distribution in commerce of PCBs. PCBs are mixtures of synthetic organic chemicals with the same basic chemical structure and similar physical properties ranging from oily liquids to waxy solids. Due to their non-flammability, chemical stability, high boiling point, and electrical insulating properties, PCBs were used in hundreds of industrial and commercial applications including electrical, heat transfer, and hydraulic equipment, as plasticizers in paints, plastics, and rubber products, in pigments, dyes, and carbonless copy paper, and many other applications. More than 1.5 billion pounds of PCBs were manufactured in the United States prior to cessation of production in 1977.



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Asbestos-Containing Building Materials

Structures constructed or remodeled between 1930 and 1981 have the potential to contain asbestos-containing building materials (ACBM). These materials may include, but are not limited to, floor coverings, drywall joint compounds, acoustic-ceiling tiles, piping insulation, electrical insulation, and fireproofing materials. Asbestos is a general name for a group of naturally occurring minerals composed of small fibers. It is common in many building materials. Various diseases have been associated with exposure to asbestos fibers, and the extensive use of asbestos in building materials has raised some concern about exposure in non-industrial settings. Health hazards associated with ACBMs include increased risks of cancer and respiratory related illnesses and diseases. The presence of asbestos in a building does not mean that the health of building occupants is endangered. As long as asbestos-containing materials remain in good condition and are not disturbed or damaged, exposure is unlikely. On the other hand, damaged, deteriorated, or disturbed asbestos-containing materials can lead to fiber release (exposure), and unauthorized removal or disturbance of asbestos materials could result in adverse health effects. There are numerous buildings and structures within the City that were constructed between 1930 and 1981. The potential safety hazards resulting from ACBMs are greatest during demolition activities.

Lead-Based Materials

Exposure to lead from older vintage paint is possible when the paint is in poor condition or during paint removal. In construction settings, workers can be exposed to airborne lead during renovation, maintenance, or removal work. Lead-based paints were phased out of production in the early 1970s. Lead is a highly toxic metal that was used for many years in products found in and around homes. Lead may cause a range of health effects, from behavioral problems and learning disabilities to seizures and death. Young children under six years of age are most at risk to health effects from lead exposure. Research suggests that the primary sources of lead exposure for most children are deteriorating lead-based paint, lead-contaminated dust, and lead-contaminated residential soil.

RAILROAD OPERATIONS HAZARDS

The project site is bordered to the east by the Union Pacific railroad line. Union Pacific Railroad operates two railroad tracks on Third Street that pass approximately 25 feet from the project boundary of the site. The two railroad tracks in the City limits are used for the movement of both freight (Union Pacific) and passengers (Amtrak). This railroad track corridor is an important link in the region’s freight and passenger rail network. Local and regional freight and passenger traffic traveling from the Bay Area to Sacramento, the Central Valley, and along the west coast from Seattle to San Diego rely on this corridor to move goods and people (Berkeley 2007). Amtrak operates both intrastate and interstate passenger rail service on the UPPR track that passes by the project site. Amtrak offers daily operations from Emeryville to Chicago, Seattle to Los Angeles, Sacramento to San Jose, and Bakersfield to Oakland services. The Union Pacific Railroad lines operations representative contacted for the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis prepared by Kleinfelder noted that 32 passenger trains and 28 freight trains use these tracks per day. Passenger trains operate at a maximum speed of 50 miles per hour, and the freight trains operate at a maximum speed of 40 miles per hour. The Union Pacific Railroad would not release more specific information regarding cargo type. According to a City of Berkeley Fire Department representative contacted for the Kleinfelder study, a wide variety of cargo is transported on the trains, including hazardous materials.



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Railroad Engineering Design and Safety Controls

Railroad engineering design and the presence of safety controls affect the probability of a hazardous event occurring along a railroad. For example, accidents are more likely on curved than on straight track, more likely at railroad switch locations (switches direct trains from one track to another), and less likely at crossings that have automatic gates, audible warning devices, and warning lights.

The Union Pacific line in Berkeley is a Class 3 Railroad, as defined under the Code of Federal Regulations (Title 49, Subtitle B, Chapter 2, Part 213). The Federal Railroad Administration promulgates maximum speeds for railroads based on track strength and curvature. Class 3 tracks have a maximum allowed speed limit of 60 miles per hour (mph) for freight trains and 80 mph for passenger trains (Hess, 2007). The Union Pacific line in Berkeley has a standard track gauge to measure speed and the track alignment to ensure uniformity for Class 3 Railroads. Additionally, Union Pacific inspects the tracks periodically for vegetation, drainage, crosstie integrity, defective rails and joints, turnouts, and track crossings in accordance with federal and state regulations to ensure the integrity and safety of the track is not compromised.

The Union Pacific tracks adjacent to the project site are straight with an unobstructed view. There are no switches at this location. A railroad crossing is located on Addison Street near the intersection of Addison and Third Streets on the southeast border of the project site. This crossing is equipped with active warning devices including an automatic gate and lights.

Railroad Regulatory Agency Records of Past Incidents

The history of train accidents provides a basis for providing the probability of future train accidents along a given track. Additionally, the record of violations or deficiencies noted by inspection agencies about a railroad operation provides a basis for estimating the probability of future incidents along a given track.

Since 1976, records indicate that ten accidents have occurred at the railroad crossing located on Addison Street on the southeast border of the project. The Federal Railroad Administration has recorded 19 incidents involving train-related collisions in West Berkeley between 1975 and 2005 (Berkeley 2007). Additionally, the Addison Street crossing has the highest number of reported at-grade crossing collisions (9 incidents out of 19 collisions reported). These accidents were attributed to human factors, including stalling within the railroad right-of-way and stopping in the railroad right-of-way. One death and two injuries were reported as a result of these accidents. The most recent accidents occurred on May 8, 2002, and August 18, 2001, and were attributed to human factors which caused one injury.

In 2006, there were six train accidents reported in Alameda County. No deaths and no injuries were reported as a result of these accidents. Five of the six train accidents were on Union Pacific tracks. Four of the accidents were attributed to human factors, and two of the accidents were attributed to track defects. Nationwide, over the five-year period from 1999 to 2003, there was an average of 15,444 railroad accidents on the approximately 233,000 miles of track in use.

The Federal Railroad Administration conducts regular inspections of all aspects of railroad operations. The Federal Railroad Administration inspectors specialize in five safety disciplines: hazardous materials, motive power and equipment, operating practices, signal and train control, and track integrity. Table 4.7-2 presents the results of the Federal Railroad Administration inspections on Union Pacific operations nationwide and compares the ratio of defects per unit inspected for Union Pacific to all of the railroads in the United States from January 1999 to December 2004.



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TABLE 4.7-2 INSPECTION RATIO OF DEFECTS PER UNITS INSPECTED JANUARY 1999 TO DECEMBER 2004

Type of Inspection Union Pacific Railroad Ratio

of Defects per Unit Inspected

All Railroads Ratio of Defects per Unit Inspected

Ratio of Union Pacific Ratio per All Railroads

Ratio*

Track 0.2045 0.1840 1.111

Signal 0.0981 0.1611 0.609

Operating Practices 0.2362 0.3304 0.715

Mobile Equipment (locomotives, cars, etc.)

0.0808 0.0669 1.208

Hazardous Material 0.0282 0.0538 0.524

Miscellaneous Areas 1.0 0.9091 1.100 Source: Kleinfelder 2005

The Union Pacific Railroad ratio of defects per unit inspected is slightly above the national ratio for all railroads for track, mobile equipment (locomotives, cars, etc.), and miscellaneous area inspections, but below the national average for signal, operating practices, and hazardous materials defects.

HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE HAZARDS

The project site is located directly adjacent to two steel transmission pipelines that run directly parallel to the Union Pacific railroad line. The pipelines are owned and operated by Kinder Morgan and consist of an 8-inch and a 10-inch steel transmission pipeline that primarily transport jet fuel. The 8-inch pipeline is located on the east side of the project site, and the 10-inch pipeline is located on the west side of the site. The pipelines are buried at a depth of 3 to 4 feet, and both operate at a pressure of 800 pounds per square inch. The valve stations (shut-off valves) for the pipelines are located to the north and south approximately one mile from the site.

Records of Past Pipeline Incidents

The Berkeley Fire Department was not aware of any past recorded leaks, accidents, or other incidents that resulted in injuries or property damage within one mile of the site.

Failures in Similar Pipeline Systems (Frequency, Magnitude, Consequences)

U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety figures show that in 2000 there were 288,586 miles of liquid transmission pipeline in operation. In the same year, 80 incidents were reported that had a fatality or injury or resulted in property damage. The incident rate per mile, therefore, is one incident per 3,607 miles. Over the 15-year period from 1986 to 2000, there was an average of 286,154 miles of liquid transmission pipeline in operation. During that same time period, there were 1,202 incidents reported that had a fatality or injury or resulted in property damage, for an average incident rate of 80.1 per year and one incident per 3,571 miles of transmission pipeline. The causes of the 80 reported incidents were corrosion (39 percent), unspecified cause (28 percent), damage by outside force (25 percent), and construction/material defect (9 percent). The U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety further classifies pipeline incident causes into four categories:



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Damage by Outside Force (Third-Party Dig-Ins)

Damage by outside force or third-party dig-ins is defined as pipeline damage caused by an entity (e.g., construction contractor) other than the pipeline owner. Incidents in this category generally occur during construction or maintenance projects that include subsurface excavation and result from inaccurate or incomplete knowledge about the subsurface alignment of the pipeline.

The likelihood of third-party dig-ins is largely based on the level of development in a given area along the pipeline alignment. Third-party dig-ins are most likely to occur in areas where new construction is expected or under way or in areas being redeveloped or where subsurface utility work is being conducted. Dig-ins are least likely to occur in undeveloped areas that are unlikely to be developed soon. This estimate is consistent with pipeline safety statistics reported by the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety, wherein damage by outside force ranged from 25 percent to 49 percent of the annual pipeline incident causes over the period of time from 1994 to 2000.

Corrosion (External and Internal)

Internal and external corrosion is also a leading cause of pipeline accidents. The primary causes of internal corrosion are the naturally high water content of liquid when it is pumped from a well and the presence of naturally occurring hydrogen sulfide often found in liquid sources. External corrosion causes also include soil moisture and microbes. The U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety reports a range of annual pipeline incident rates due to corrosion from 19 percent to 41 percent over the time period between 1994 and 2000. Pipeline incidents due to corrosion and deterioration can be avoided by operating the pipeline within its design capacity and by implementing a regular program of leak surveys, cathodic protection monitoring, and pipeline patrolling for evidence of conditions that might affect safe operation.

Ground Movement

Earthquakes may trigger ground movement that manifests as ground shaking, liquefaction, or landslides. Further information of the probability of earthquakes and the potential earthquake hazards associated with the project site is located in Section 4.6, Geology and Hazards. The Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities estimated that there is a 70 percent probability that one or more large earthquakes (magnitude 6.7 or greater) will occur along the San Andreas, Hayward, or Calaveras faults before the year 2020. Steel pipelines, like the 8-inch and 10-inch lines, are relatively resilient and generally accommodate ground movement well.

Construction or Material Defects

Nationwide, the U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety reports that the range of reportable incidents attributed to construction or material defects was 9 percent to 20 percent over the time period between 1994 and 2000. Design and construction of pipelines are regulated by state (California Public Utilities Commission General Order 112-E) and federal (Code of Federal Regulations 49 Part 192) law.

Pipeline Risk Management and Emergency Response Plans

Kinder Morgan designs, installs, tests, operates, and maintains their pipelines to meet or exceed regulatory standards and maintains a comprehensive risk management program designed to reduce the probability of a pipeline accident and minimize the consequences of such an accident should one occur. Kinder Morgan’s risk management and emergency response plans



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are mandated by state and federal law and enforced by the California Public Utilities Commission and the Federal Department of Transportation. Kinder Morgan asserts that their transmission facilities, including the 8-inch and 10-inch steel pipelines, meet or exceed the state and federal requirements. Furthermore, the company maintains an emergency response plan for the two transmission lines aligned near the project site.

Kinder Morgan maintains a risk management plan to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of a pipeline incident caused by outside force, corrosion and deterioration, ground movement, or construction and material defects. The specific risk management measures Kinder Morgan employs are discussed below.

Pipeline Damage by Outside Force (Third-Party Dig-Ins)

Kinder Morgan maintains a policy that allows third parties to excavate near pipeline easements if the third party has notified the Underground Service Alert system. Kinder Morgan will locate and mark the underground lines.

Pipeline Corrosion and Deterioration

Maintenance of Kinder Morgan transmission lines, including the 8-inch and 10-inch transmission lines adjacent to the project site, is defined and mandated by state and federal laws. Kinder Morgan district personnel perform annual leak surveys, monitor cathodic protection, and regularly patrol the pipeline to monitor external conditions. Based on this information, Kleinfelder expects the likelihood of pipeline incidents due to corrosion and deterioration to be low.

Ground Movement

Kinder Morgan maintains emergency shut-off valve stations located approximately one mile on either side of the project site. As noted previously, steel pipelines like the 8-inch and 10-inch lines near the site are resilient and generally accommodate ground movement well. Based on this information, potential pipeline damage as a result of these phenomena is expected to be low to medium.

Pipeline Construction or Material Defects

Kinder Morgan meets or exceeds the state- and federally mandated design, construction, operation, and maintenance of their transmission pipelines. As part of their maintenance and operation plan, Kinder Morgan continuously monitors operating pressure, conducts annual leak surveys, monitors cathodic protection, and patrols pipelines for evidence of damage, leaks, or unsafe conditions. All of these measures serve to reduce the likelihood of defects or failures due to construction or pipeline materials. Based on the available information, Kleinfelder expects the likelihood of a reportable incident attributed to construction or material defects to be low.



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4.7.2 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

FEDERAL

Environmental Protection Agency

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides leadership in the nation's environmental science, research, education, and assessment efforts. The EPA works closely with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and Native American tribes to develop and enforce regulations under existing environmental laws. The EPA is responsible for researching and setting national standards for a variety of environmental programs and delegates to states and tribes responsibility for issuing permits and monitoring and enforcing compliance.

Federal Railroad Administration

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) was created by the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C. 103, Section 3(e)(1)). The purpose of FRA is to promulgate and enforce rail safety regulations, administer railroad assistance programs, conduct research and development in support of improved railroad safety and national rail transportation policy, and consolidate government support of rail transportation activities. The Office of Safety promotes and regulates safety throughout the nation's railroad industry. It employs more than 415 federal safety inspectors who operate out of eight regional offices nationally. FRA inspectors specialize in five safety disciplines and numerous grade crossing and trespass-prevention initiatives: Track, Signal and Train Control, Motive Power and Equipment, Operating Practices, Hazardous Materials, and Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety. The office trains and certifies state safety inspectors to enforce federal rail safety regulations. Central to the success of the rail safety effort is the ability to understand the nature of rail-related accidents and to analyze trends in railroad safety. To do this, the Office of Safety collects rail accident/incident data from the railroads and converts this information into meaningful statistical tables, charts, and reports.

Other Federal Agencies

Other federal agencies that regulate hazardous materials include the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the National Institute of Health (NIH). The following federal laws and guidelines govern hazardous materials.

• Federal Water Pollution Control Act

• Clean Air Act

• Occupational Safety and Health Act

• Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

• Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

• Guidelines for Carcinogens and Biohazards

• Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act Title III

• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

• Safe Drinking Water Act

• Toxic Substances Control Act



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Table 4.7-3 lists federal, state, and local regulatory agencies that oversee hazardous materials handling, and the statutes and regulations they administer.

Prior to August 1992, the principal agency at the federal level regulating the generation, transport, and disposal of hazardous waste was the EPA under the authority of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). As of August 1, 1992, however, the California Department of Toxic Substance Control (DTSC) was authorized to implement the state’s hazardous waste management program for the EPA. The federal EPA continues to regulate hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).

TABLE 4.7-3 SUMMARY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REGULATORY AUTHORITY

Regulatory Agency Authority

Federal Agencies

Department of Transportation (DOT) Hazardous Materials Transport Act - Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 49

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Clean Air Act

Clean Water Act

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Occupational Safety and Health Act and CFR 29

State Agencies

Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) California Code of Regulations

Department of Industrial Relations (CAL-OSHA) California Occupational Safety and Health Act, CCR Title 8

State Water Resources Control Board and Regional Water Quality Control Board

Porter-Cologne Water Quality Act

Underground Storage Tank Law

Health and Welfare Agency Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act

Air Resources Board Air Resources Act

Office of Emergency Services Hazardous Materials Release Response Plans/Inventory Law

Department of Food and Agriculture Food and Agriculture Code

State Fire Marshal Uniform Fire Code, CR Title 19

Regional Agencies

Bay Area Air Quality Management District Air Resources Act



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STATE

Environmental Protection Agency

The California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal-EPA) and the State Water Resources Control Board establish rules governing the use of hazardous materials and the management of hazardous waste. Applicable state and local laws include the following:

• Public Safety/Fire Regulations/Building Codes;

• Hazardous Waste Control Law;

• Hazardous Substances Information and Training Act;

• Air Toxics Hot Spots and Emissions Inventory Law;

• Underground Storage of Hazardous Substances Act; and

• Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act.

Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC)

Within Cal-EPA, DTSC has primary regulatory responsibility, with delegation of enforcement to local jurisdictions that enter into agreements with the state agency, for the management of hazardous materials and the generation, transport, and disposal of hazardous waste under the authority of the Hazardous Waste Control Law (HWCL). In addition, DTSC is frequently involved with the clean-up of abandoned mine sites.

California Public Utilities Commission

Fifty railroad corporations operate in California. There are 11,000 public grade crossings located within 52 counties and 400 cities in California. The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) employs federally certified staff inspectors and coordinates with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and is the largest participating state agency in the nation to ensure that railroads comply with federal railroad safety regulations. The PUC investigates railroad accidents and responds to safety related inquiries made by community officials, the general public, and railroad labor organizations. The PUC is an active participant in Operation Lifesaver, a grade crossing awareness training program.

LOCAL

City of Berkeley General Plan

The City of Berkeley General Plan was adopted between 2001 and 2002 and includes the Disaster Preparedness and Safety Element. The purpose of the Disaster Preparedness and Safety Element is to reduce the risk of death, injuries, property damage, and economic and social dislocation from natural and man-made hazards and disasters. Table 4.7-4 below summarizes the project’s consistency with the applicable General Plan hazards policies.



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TABLE 4.7-4 PROJECT CONSISTENCY WITH BERKELEY GENERAL PLAN HAZARDS AND HUMAN HEALTH POLICIES

Berkeley General Plan Policies Consistency with General Plan Analysis

Policy S-1 Response Planning: Ensure that City’s emergency response plans are current and incorporate the latest information on hazards, vulnerability, and resources.

Yes

The proposed project would be required to comply with the City of Berkeley’s adopted Disaster Preparedness and Safety Element and would not obstruct emergency evacuation routes. Additionally, the proposed project would be required to be consistent with the objectives of the Disaster Mitigation Plan for the City of Berkeley. These measures would ensure that the proposed project would comply with the City’s most recent emergency operations plans.

Policy S-2 Neighborhood Preparation and Education: Continue to provide education, emergency preparedness training, and supplies to the community at the neighborhood level to support neighborhood-and community-based disaster response planning.

Yes See answer above under Policy S-1

Policy S-3 Public Information: Publicize disaster preparedness efforts (such as CERT) and expand public awareness of specific hazards and risks by making available all relevant information including mapping and reports on various hazards, information on vulnerability and risk education techniques, evacuation routes, and emergency services, and information on financial and technical assistance resources.


Policy S-5 The City’s Role in Leadership and Coordination: Ensure that the City provides leadership and coordination of the private sector, public institutions, and other public bodies in emergency preparedness.


Policy S-6 Damage Assessment: Establish and maintain a rapid damage assessment capability.


Policy S-7 Emergency Water Supply: Protect life and property in the event of an earthquake by evaluating alternate drinking water and fire-fighting water supply in the event of failure of the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) water supply.


Policy S-8 Continuity of Operations: Provide for the continuation of City government and services following a major disaster.


Policy S-9 Pre-Event Planning: Establish pre-event planning for post-disaster recovery as an integral element of the emergency




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Berkeley General Plan Policies Consistency with General Plan Analysis

preparedness programs of the City Council and each of the City departments.

Policy S-10 Sustaining Mitigation Initiatives: Improve the public awareness and establish new public/private partnerships to implement mitigation initiatives in the community and region through programs such as Project Impact.


Policy S-12 Utility and Transportation Systems: Improve the disaster resistance of utility and transportation systems to increase public safety and to minimize damage and service disruption following a disaster.


Policy S-13 Hazards Identification: Identify, avoid and minimize natural and human-caused hazards in the development of property and the regulation of land use.

Yes

A Phase I Site Assessment was prepared for the project site which concluded that there was no evidence of recognized environmental conditions (RECs) associated with the project site that warranted further investigation. Additionally, a Geotechnical Engineering Study analyzed the potential natural hazards from earthquakes, ground shaking, and liquefaction for the proposed project site. This report is discussed further in Section 4.6, Geology and Soils, of this EIR and provides mitigation measures for potential impacts from natural hazards.

Policy S-14 Land Use Regulation: Require appropriate mitigation in new development, in redevelopment/reuse, or in other applications.


Policy S-15 Construction Standards: Maintain construction standards that minimize risks to human lives and property from environmental and human- caused hazards for both new and existing building.

Yes

The project will be required to be constructed in accordance with the City’s Building Code, which includes construction standards to minimize risks to life and property resulting from seismic hazards.

4.7.3 IMPACTS AND MITIGATION MEASURES

STANDARDS OF SIGNIFICANCE

This analysis evaluates the project’s impacts on human health and risk of upset. These standards are based on 2007 State CEQA Guidelines Appendix G. A human health and risk of upset impact is considered significant if implementation of the project would result in any of the following:

1) Create a significant hazard to the public or the environment through the routine transport, use, or disposal of hazardous materials.

2) Create a significant hazard to the public or the environment through reasonably foreseeable upset and accident conditions involving the release of hazardous materials into the environment.



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3) Emit hazardous emissions or handle hazardous or acutely hazardous materials, substances, or waste within one-quarter mile of an existing or proposed school.

4) Be located on a site which is included on a list of hazardous materials sites compiled pursuant to Government Code Section 65962.5 and, as a result, create a significant hazard to the public or the environment.

5) For a project located within an airport land use plan area or, where such a plan has not been adopted, within two miles of a public airport or a public use airport, result in a safety hazard for people residing or working in the project area.

6) For a project located within the vicinity of a private airstrip, result in a safety hazard for people residing or working in the project area.

7) Impair implementation of, or physically interfere with, an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan.

8) Expose people or structures to a significant risk of loss, injury, or death involving wild land fires, including where wild lands are adjacent to urbanized areas or where residences are intermixed with wild lands.

Potential project conflicts with emergency access are addressed in Section 4.10, Public Services, potential hazards associated with flooding and tsunamis are addressed in Section 4.8, Hydrology and Water Quality, and potential hazards associated with earthquake are addressed in Section 4.6, Geology and Soils, of this EIR.

The Initial Study issued for this project identified that the 651 Addison Street Mixed-Use Project would have no impact regarding the criteria listed below to hazards and hazardous materials. Therefore, these impacts are not discussed further in this Draft EIR.

• Create a significant hazard to the public or the environment through the routine transport, use or disposal of hazardous materials.

• Emit hazardous emissions or handle hazardous or acutely hazardous materials, substances or waste within one-quarter mile of an existing or proposed school.

• Be located on a site which is included on a list of hazardous materials sites compiled pursuant to Government Code Section 65962.5 and, as a result, create a significant hazard to the public or the environment.

• For a project located within an airport land use plan area or, where such a plan has not been adopted, within two miles of a public airport or a public use airport, result in a safety hazard for people residing or working in the project area.

• For a project located within the vicinity of a private airstrip, result in a safety hazard for people residing or working in the project area.

• Impair implementation of, or physically interfere with, an adopted emergency response plan or emergency evacuation plan.

• Expose people or structures to a significant risk of loss, injury, or death involving wild land fires, including where wild lands are adjacent to urbanized areas or where residences are intermixed with wild lands.



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METHODOLOGY

This analysis is based on information review of federal, state, and local regulatory databases, consultation with relevant agencies, field review, and a review of historical aerial photographs and topographical maps of the project site. The analysis also considers the results of AEI Consultants’ Phase I Environmental Site Assessment and the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis prepared by Kleinfelder for 700 University Avenue.

Railroad Hazard Assessment

A risk analysis methodology for railroad operations was prepared in the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis prepared by Kleinfelder for 700 University Avenue, which is located directly adjacent to the project site and equal distance to the Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR) rail lines. The methodology was used to assign subjective determinations of the probability of a hazardous situation (e.g., low, medium, high) based on the following factors:

• Normal or likely railroad operations (e.g., materials transported, use frequency)

• The presence of control measures (e.g., engineering controls)

• Preparation of emergency response plans by owner/operators

• Preparation of emergency response plans by local emergency response agencies (e.g., fire department)

• Local agency records of compliance or violations and permitting

• Information from industry-wide reporting agencies (e.g., Federal Railroad Administration and surveys of incident rates)

For example, a determination of low probability of a hazardous situation would be based on non-hazardous materials being transported, low frequency of track use, the presence of control measures within a system, the existence of emergency response plans, the existence of federal, state or local agencies that inspect and permit these businesses, and a low rate of emergency incidents in the industry as a whole.

Pipeline Hazard Assessment

A risk analysis methodology was prepared in the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis prepared by Kleinfelder for 700 University Avenue for the two jet fuel pipelines that run adjacent to the project site. The methodology is based on a protocol developed for the California Department of Education for evaluating hazardous material pipelines near school sites. The pipeline risk analysis is based on the following factors:

• Pipeline alignment

• Use characteristics (e.g., flow rate and operating pressure)

• Engineering design and safety features

• Records of past incidents



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• Failures in similar systems (frequency, magnitude, consequences)

• Risk management and emergency response plans of the pipeline owner and local emergency response agencies

Pipeline risk analyses proceed in two stages: first, the probability of a pipeline failure (e.g., leak or rupture) is estimated and compared to an acceptable failure rate; second, the magnitude of the consequences (e.g., pool fire or explosion resulting in fatalities) is estimated and compared to an acceptable level (e.g., one-in-one-million chance of fatality).

PROJECT IMPACTS AND MITIGATION MEASURES

Railroad Hazards

Impact 4.7.1 The proposed project would be located adjacent to the Union Pacific railroad line, which places the project site in an area with higher susceptibility to the risks associated with railroad hazards and including the possible upset from freight carrying hazardous materials. This would be a potentially significant impact.

The proposed project would be located adjacent to the Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR) rail lines. The trains that run on the line at times transport hazardous material; therefore, there is potential for the project to create a significant hazard to the public or the environment through the reasonably foreseeable upset and accident conditions involving the release of hazardous material into the environment associated with locating a residential land use adjacent to the railroad line.

The qualitative risk analysis of railroad hazards was prepared in the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis for the 700 University Avenue Project EIR (Certified on March 26, 2007; State Clearinghouse # 20050902079). The 700 University Avenue project EIR concluded that project exposure to railroad hazard risks would be considered a less than significant impact. The proposed project site is located across the street from the 700 University Avenue project and is also located an equal distance from the Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR) rail lines. Additionally, the proposed project has less frontage area exposed to the rail lines than the 700 University Avenue project. In comparison, the proposed project has 244 feet located parallel to the rail line and the 700 University Avenue project has approximately 390 feet located parallel to the railroad line. Therefore, because of the project site’s equal vicinity to the railroad tracks and because the proposed project has less frontage area to the railroad line due to the project’s size, it was determined that the proposed project would have equal impacts as the 700 University Avenue project in regard to railroad hazards. However, the 651 Addison Street project has the emergency egress exits on the corners of lot, which could lead people being fully exposed to the railway, such that in case of an emergency including fire or earthquake, residents risk exposure or entrapment by the railway.

In the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis for the 700 University Avenue project, it was determined that an impact would occur within a zone of 1,500 feet, which was selected based on the California Department of Education protocol for assessing risk associated with hazardous material pipelines near school sites. For the purposes of the railroad risk analysis, a train accident is defined as an event involving on-track rail equipment that results in monetary damage to the equipment or track and impact between rail equipment and a highway user, or any other event that results in injury or death. Railroad accidents that could result in adverse consequences for



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individuals residing or working on the project site are likely to involve the release of hazardous materials.

The likelihood of a railroad incident that could result in adverse consequences was estimated based on the following six criteria:

• Railroad alignment

• Use characteristics

• Engineering design and safety controls

• Regulatory agency records of past incidents

• Probability of a hazardous materials release

• The availability of appropriate risk management and emergency response plans

It was determined in the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis for the 700 University Avenue project that the probability of a hazardous materials release would occur within 1,500 feet of the project site is 0.0004, or approximately one release every 250 years (Kleinfelder 2005). The calculations to determine the probability of a hazardous materials release are presented in the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis prepared for 700 University Avenue and appears in Appendix D. Considering that the proposed project has less frontage to the rail line than the 700 University Avenue project, the probability of the project site being exposed to a hazardous materials release occurring once every 250 years would be slightly less than in the Kleinfelder study for 700 University Avenue.

Additionally, the probability of an accident resulting in a hazardous materials release is likely to be less than 0.004 or once every 250 years based on track and local conditions, such as:

• There are no switches at this location reducing the likelihood of a derailment.

• The tracks are straight and the view is unobstructed.

• The signage and warning systems at the Addison Street rail crossing include gates and lights.

• Freight train speeds are limited to 40 miles per hour or less.

• The train carries audible warning devices.

The risk analysis for this railroad line considers if there are appropriate risk management and emergency response plans that mitigate the consequences of a railroad incident. The railroad owner and the local emergency response agencies were contacted for the 700 University Avenue project to assess their risk management and emergency response plans. Union Pacific Railroad has emergency response plans for the stretch of track that passes by the project site and the 700 University Avenue project. According to a Union Pacific Railroad representative contacted for the Kleinfelder risk analysis, the emergency response plan conforms to all regulations. The Berkeley Fire Department has not prepared any specific emergency response plans for this stretch of track. However, the fire department maintains a general emergency response plan for large-scale disasters that may be caused by earthquakes, fires, floods, pipeline accidents, train accidents, and other catastrophic events.



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Therefore, based on the qualitative evaluation presented in the analysis above for the Kleinfelder risk analysis for the 700 University Avenue project, the likelihood of a railroad incident resulting in an unacceptable hazard to future residents at the project site is low. Additionally, the emergency response plans implemented by the Union Pacific Railroad and Berkeley Fire Department would help mitigate the consequences of a railroad incident for the proposed project. Considering that the proposed project site is equal distance to the rail line and is less exposed to the rail line than the 700 University Avenue project, it can be determined that the likelihood of a railroad incident resulting in an unacceptable hazard to future residents at the project site would be considered low. However, the project’s emergency egress exits could leave people being fully exposed to the railway, such that in case of an emergency including fire or earthquake, residents risk exposure or entrapment by the railway. Communication with the California Public Utilities Commission and UPRR indicated that any warning form of signage approved by the City of Berkeley would not require additional approval (CPUC, 2007). Therefore, the potential hazard associated with rail line accidents to future residents is considered a potentially significant impact.

Mitigation Measures

MM 4.7.1 The project building shall have four signs located near both the interior and exterior emergency egress exits that state “High Speed Train Crossing” with a symbol describing train crossing hazard. The signs shall function to warn people during an emergency to not exit toward the railroad tracks or approach the site mid-block. The proposed signs shall be submitted to the City Planning and Building and Safety Divisions for review prior to finalization and production.

Timing/Implementation: Implemented on project plans prior to issuance of building permits. Installation must occur prior to occupancy.

Enforcement/Monitoring: City of Berkeley Building and Safety Division

Pipeline Hazards

Impact 4.7.2 The proposed project would be located adjacent to the Kinder Morgan Energy Partners hazardous liquid pipeline, which places the project site in an area with higher susceptibility to the risks associated with possible upset and exposure to hazardous materials associated with the pipeline. This would be a less than significant impact.

The project site is located adjacent to a hazardous liquid pipeline owned by Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, LP. Therefore, the proposed project would be located in an area that has the potential to create a significant hazard to the public or the environment through the reasonably foreseeable upset and accident conditions involving the release of hazardous material into the environment associated with locating a residential land use adjacent to hazardous liquid pipelines.

A qualitative risk analysis of pipeline hazards was prepared in the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis for the 700 University Avenue Project EIR. The 700 University Avenue Project EIR concluded that project exposure to pipeline hazard risks would be considered a less than significant impact. The proposed project site is located across the street from the 700 University Avenue project and is also located an equal distance from the hazardous liquid pipelines.



4.7-20

Additionally, the proposed project has a slightly smaller amount of area exposed to the pipelines than the 700 University Avenue project. By comparison, the proposed project has 244 feet located parallel to the pipeline and the 700 University Avenue project has approximately 390 feet parallel from the pipeline. Therefore, because of the project site’s equal vicinity to the pipelines and because the proposed project has less exposure to the hazardous liquid pipeline due to the project’s smaller size, it was determined that the proposed project would have equal or lesser impacts than the 700 University Avenue project in regard to liquid pipeline hazards.

The likelihood of a pipeline failure that would result in adverse consequences was estimated based on the following six criteria:

• Pipeline alignment, design, use characteristics, and safety features

• Regulatory agency records of past incidents

• Failures in similar pipeline systems

• The availability of appropriate risk management and emergency response plans

• Likelihood of failure due to third-party dig-ins, corrosion, ground movement, and construction or material defects

• Probability of a fatality resulting from a leak or rupture

To evaluate the hazards associated with the pipeline, the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis for the 700 University Avenue project analyzed the probability of two pipeline release scenarios (Kleinfelder 2005). The first scenario involved a one-inch hole in the pipeline, and the second scenario involved a full-bore rupture of the pipeline created by a third-party dig-in, ground movement, or other cause. The probability that these two release scenarios could result in a leak fire or rupture fire was evaluated using a protocol developed by the California Department of Education to assess hazardous material pipelines located within 1,500 feet of a proposed school site. Kleinfelder used the California Department of Education protocol to assess the probability of a fatality resulting from a fire following a pipeline leak or rupture within 1,500 feet of the project site. The objective of the California Department of Education protocol is to assess the probability of a fatality among school students, faculty, or staff in the event of a pipeline release that results in a fire. The California Department of Education has established a one-in-one-million fatality risk as the target risk level. Other potential consequences scenarios, pressure-jet fires, and explosions are not likely with jet fuel given its low explosivity. Therefore, these scenarios were not evaluated in the analysis. The calculations to determine the probability of these two release scenarios and to estimate the annual pipeline fatality per miles of hazardous liquid pipeline were presented in the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis prepared for 700 University Avenue and appears in Appendix D.

It was determined in the Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis for the 700 University Avenue project that the probability of a fatality risk from a leak fire or rupture fire for an individual was determined to be 6.97 x 10-7 (less than one-in-one million). This indicates that the risk of a leak fire or rupture fire at the project site is within the acceptable range defined by the California Department of Education protocol. Additionally, considering that the proposed project is less exposed to the rail line than the 700 University Avenue project, the probability of the project site and future residents being exposed to a potential fatality risk from a leak fire or rupture fire would be considered slightly less than in the Kleinfelder study for 700 University Avenue.



4.7-21

The likelihood of a pipeline upset incident occurring is considered low to medium and the probability of a fatality resulting from a pipeline release is below one-in-one million, which is the generally accepted target level for acceptable risk by the California Department of Education protocol. Additionally, the implementation of Kinder Morgan’s risk management and emergency response plans, which are mandated by state and federal law and enforced by the California Public Utilities Commission and the Federal Department of Transportation and are discussed above, would ensure that the pipeline is maintained to avoid possible risks associated with the release of hazardous materials from the pipeline. Therefore, the project impacts related to creating a significant hazard to the public or the environment through reasonably foreseeable upset and accident conditions involving the release of hazardous materials into the environment associated with the hazardous liquid pipelines would be less than significant.

Mitigation Measures

None required.

Exposure to Hazardous Materials

Impact 4.7.3 The proposed project could expose humans to hazardous materials from previous historic uses of the project site. This is considered a less than significant impact.

The Phase I Site Assessment conducted by AEI Consultants recognized several historical environmental conditions associated with the project site, including a 550-gallon UST and 8,000-gallon diesel tank which were removed from the site in 1987 and the previous use of the building as a chemical storage warehouse as late as the mid-1970s. Additionally, the Phase I Site Assessment determined that there were several potential environmental issues associated with the project site, including PCBs and herbicides, potential asbestos-containing materials, and the high pressure petroleum pipeline located parallel with the existing railroad tracks.

The warehouse building located on the project site was demolished in June 2007, which eliminated any potential hazards associated with the removal of asbestos. The high pressure petroleum pipeline is discussed above under Impact 4.7.2. Additionally, the Phase I Site Assessment concluded that there was no evidence of recognized environmental conditions associated with the project site or nearby properties and concluded that no further investigations for the subject property were recommended. Therefore, the impacts associated with the exposure of humans to hazardous materials are considered less than significant.

Mitigation Measures

None required.

4.7.4 CUMULATIVE SETTING, IMPACTS, AND MITIGATION MEASURES

CUMULATIVE SETTING

The cumulative setting for hazards associated with the project generally consists of existing, approved, proposed, and reasonably foreseeable development in the City of Berkeley, including the projects discussed in Table 4.0-1. Hazardous material and human health impacts are site-specific. Cumulative impacts associated with hazardous materials and human health risks from increased development include, but are not limited to, impacts on transportation, air quality, hydrology and water quality, and biological resources. The cumulative impacts



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associated with these potentially affected resources are analyzed in the applicable sections of this Draft EIR.

CUMULATIVE IMPACTS AND MITIGATION MEASURES

Cumulative Hazards and Hazardous Material Impacts

Impact 4.7.4 Implementation of the project in addition to existing, approved, proposed, and reasonably foreseeable development may result in cumulative hazardous material and human health risk impacts. This is a less than cumulatively considerable impact.

The cumulative effects from ongoing development in the area could create a hazard risk. However, each individual project is responsible for mitigating their specific risks associated with hazardous materials. Impacts associated with hazardous materials and risk of upset are generally site-specific. However, the project must comply with all federal, state, and local regulations regarding the handling of such materials. Additionally, the potential railroad and pipeline hazards are existing unrelated hazards that would not be cumulatively affected by the proposed project and other development. The proposed project is not anticipated to contribute to cumulative human heath and safety impacts. Cumulative hazards and hazardous material impacts are considered to be less than cumulatively considerable.

Mitigation Measures

None required.



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REFERENCES

AEI Consultants. 2005. Phase I Environmental Site Assessment 651 Addison Street, Berkeley, CA. March 17, 2005.

California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC). 2007. State of California Hazardous Waste and Substances Sites List. September 2007.

California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). 2007. Personal communication with PMC staff. December 2007.

City of Berkeley. 2002. City of Berkeley General Plan (Adopted 2001-2002).

City of Berkeley. 2004. “Disaster Mitigation Plan for the City of Berkeley” (Draft 04/28/2004) <http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/Manager/disastermitigation.html>. [Website accessed September 2007].

Federal Railroad Administration. 2207. http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/Query/Default.asp?page=tenyr2a.asp. [Website accessed September 2007].

Hess, Brad. 2007. Federal Railroad Administration. Personal Communication with PMC staff. December 3, 2007.

Kleinfielder. 2005. Railroad Safety Study and Pipeline Risk Analysis 700 University Avenue, Berkeley, California. November 8, 2005.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2007. http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/pcb/#EPA%20PCB%20Regulations>. [Website accessed September 2007].

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