6/11/2015
1
1
ERW management in Belgium
Hans Renders
June 2015
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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6/11/2015
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3
BELGIUM300 km Max distance..11 Mio peopleEuropean and international org.Mainly industry and services
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• Origin ERW pollution in Belgium
• History of bomb disposal
• Actual Situation– CMD Conventional Mun disposal
– OCW Old Chem weapons
– IEDD improvised explo device disposal
– UW EOD under water EOD
• Risk management
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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5
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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• In Flanders fields:
600 000 KIA
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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77
• In Flanders fields:
– 600 000 KIA
– 550 000 KIA in the trenches
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
88
• In Flanders fields:
– 600 000 KIA
– 550 000 KIA in the trenches
– 300 000 still buried
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
5
99
• In Flanders fields:
– 600 000 KIA
– 550 000 KIA in the trenches
– 300 000 still buried
– 200 000 missing
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
1010
• In Flanders fields:
– 600 000 KIA
– 550 000 KIA in the trenches
– 300 000 still buried
– 200 000 missing
– 1 500 000 wounded
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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1111
• In Flanders fields:
– 600 000 KIA
– 550 000 KIA in the trenches
– 300 000 still buried
– 200 000 missing
– 1 500 000 wounded
– 50 nationalities
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
1212
In Flanders fields:
– 600 000 KIA
– 550 000 KIA in the trenches
– 300 000 still buried
– 200 000 missing
– 1 500 000 wounded
– 50 nationalities
– Several hundreds of milliosn shells
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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1313
• In Flanders fields:
– 600 000 KIA
– 550 000 KIA in the trenches
– 300 000 still buried
– 200 000 missing
– 1 500 000 wounded
– 50 natinalities
– Several hundreds of millions shells
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
1414
• In Flanders fields:
– 600 000 KIA
– 550 000 KIA in the trenches
– 300 000 still buried
– 200 000 missing
– 1 500 000 wounded
– 50 nationalities
– Several hundreds of millions shells
– 30% duds / 4,5% toxic
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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15
WORLD WAR II
Less concentratedMore bombsVariety of GER,FRA, UK, US ……Different volumes per county
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Year KIA Wounded
1918 ?? ?? military, prisoners, own population ‐
1919 ?? ?? no skilled Pers needed.
1920 ?? ?? Government stops scrap trade due to many accidents
1921 ?? ?? contract with civil Coy 15 000 T/year
1922 ?? ?? contract with civil Coy 15 000 T/year dumping & drowning
1923 ?? ?? PROBLEM SOLVED: end of contracts
1924 ?? ?? end of active approach based on METAL value.
1925 ?? ?? reactive service due to many accidents
1926 ?? ?? still reporting scrap metal trade
1927 ?? ??
1928 ?? ??
1929 ?? ??
1930 ?? ??
1931 ?? ??
1932 ?? ??
1933 ?? ??
1934 ?? ??
1935 ?? ??
1936 ?? ??
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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Year KIA Wounded
1945 62 148 more complex munitions: chem delay, anti handling
1946 27 62 training from GER, UK ….
1947 4 19 Need for skilled Pers
1948 0 2
1949 2 7
1950 0 3 PROBLEM SOLVED AGAIN.
1951 2 8 reactive service 50‐200 pers
1952 2 3 open pit/ dumping , dwawning
1953 0 3
1954 0 4
1955 1 7
1956 1 1
1957 0 3
1963 1 0
1964 0 4
1967 0 1
1969 7 1
1970 1 9
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Year KIA Wounded
1972 0 0 end of dumping OCW
1978 0 9
1979 0 3
1980 0 3 IEDD threat homeland
1981 0 1
1982 0 4
1984 0 2
1985 0 2
1986 4 1
1987 0 1 approval to constuct dismanteling facilities
1998 0 1 construction finished
2006 0 2 new CDC / new technology
2007 0 2
2008 1 1 new CDC / new technology
2012 1 6 accident open burning + accident dismanteling
2016 New SDC
116 324 BEL EOD KIA and wounded since end of WW2
mainly on homeland Ops.
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Drilling
DISMANTLINGOrigin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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• Conventional Munition Disposal (CMD) ‐ Disposal of Ammunition WW I & WW II (*)
• Dismantling Toxic Ammunition WW I – Old Chemical Weapons (OCW) (*)
• Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) ‐Technical assistance to the Judicial Authorities / Fight against organized crime and terrorism (*)
• Underwater EOD
• Support to Mil Ops (incl Airborne Ops)
• Education and training
(*) Exclusivity of Defense ‐ Protocol between MOD, Justice, Interior (June 2014)+ Small Arms Ammunition – Protocol between MOD, Justice, Interior (Dec 2014)+ Fireworks – Protocol between MOD, Justice, Economy (Dec 2014)
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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Workforce (Jan 15)
18 ‐ 102 ‐ 70 (190)
PO ELKAPELLE MEERD AAL
EOD
Staff Battalion
IEDD Platoon
CMD PlatoonCMD Platoon
OCW Platoon
CMD Platoon
Diving School
BRUSSELS
POELKAPELLE
ZEEBRUGGE
MEERDAAL
EOD School
Territorial Waters
Company Meerdaal
Company Poelkapelle
Company Zeebrugge
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk managementCMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Reported by civilians to police ‐> REQUEST for intervention.
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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230
500
000
500
000
500
000
500
000
500
31253046
3229
3539
3125
2960
3289
3004 2977 3027
2797
3326
2897 2939
4084
304203
291 245342
267
724
353205 219 189 184 146 140
301
Years
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Only if locatedDetection and historical survey ‐> civilian Co
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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25
3 x 24/7 teams7 x routine (including heavy and UW EOD)
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Differentiated approach based on risk
– reactive
• Routine
• Urgent
• Immediate
– Active
• Restcapacity
• Based on evidence and risk
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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27
Final identificationtracebility
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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+‐10: 250‐2000 Lbs bombs/yearNeutralisation needs evacuationBuilt up area
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Dispose
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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BEST AVAILABLE TECH STUDYdifferent Mun flowsOpen detonation restrictedenviromental legislationeg stockpile disposalSDC
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Disposal
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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31
Report/Locate/Access/Identify/Render Safe/ Disposal
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Related tasks and issuesCollectors
Ex: law for collecting ERW , FFE, trade on internet.
source of accidents and illegal tradeFireworks illegal and unstabel. ADR.QC en QM of civil detection Co.Prevention on known polluted sitesLegal actions of civilians and Co.
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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PAARDENMARKT
35000 T of tox shellsEstimated 20 billionSediment on topLeaks will be filteredCWC, OCW, ACW
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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3535
Dismantling Contained Detonation
IDENTIFICATIONNon destructive
Identified OCW Platform
15239
OCW Non
OCW
Non OCW Platform
Scrap
“CLARK” HE‐R
HE‐R : High Explosive “RAUCH”, explosive projectile with smoke charge containing arsenic
Covered Earth
Detonation
Visual IDF X‐ray NAA
7
27
47
67
87
107
127
147
167
187
2150 2170 2190 2210 2230 2250 2270
data
backg roun d
2223 keV
2230 keV
E / keV
co un ts inelas tic sca tterin g
H
22
23
ke
V
S
22
30
ke
V
NAA: (Neutron Activation Analysis)
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Poelkapelle – Contained Detonating Chamber (CDC) DAVINCH
Total since 1998 : 18419 shells
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
19
37
267
3489
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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CONTAINED DETONATION CHAMBER
OFFGAS TREATMENT
Concept of dismantling OCWs with bottle solid filling
“CLARK”HE‐R
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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39
CD
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Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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41
116Requests
2014
0
50
100
150
200
250
1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
2004
MADRID
2005
LONDON
2001
NEW YORK
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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43
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
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Current projectspreparation phase in Antwerprecovery 06 EA bombs
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
CMD/ OCW/ IEDD/ UW EOD
6/11/2015
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45
MISSIONS ABROAD
CROATIA
BELBAT 1992‐97
UNTAES 1996‐98
Rft UNTAES 1996
BOSNIA‐HER
BOSNIAROAD 1992‐93
BELBOS 1994
BELUCA 1996‐97
BELUBG 1998‐2000
EXPLOSIVE WINTER 2003
ARMADILLO 2004
KOSOVO
KFOR 1999‐2002
BELUKOS 2000‐2004
DVI KOSOVO 2000
BELUKROKO 2002‐2003
ALBANIA
AFOR 1999
BENIN
GENIMED 2001
JORDANDIVERS 2007
LEBANON
UNIFIL 2006‐2011
IRAQPROVIDE COMFORT 1991
AFGHANISTAN
ISAF VI 2004‐2005
KAIA LN 2007‐2008
PRT KUNDUZ 2005‐DEC 2012
ANA ENGR SCHOOL 2012‐2013
TF PALADIN 2012‐2013
LAOS
UXOLAO 1998‐2005
CAMBODIA
CMAC 1994‐2004
INDONESIA
AMM 2005
SOMALIA
RESTORE HOPE/UNOSOM
1992‐1993
RD CONGO
AMABEL KINSHASA 2003
AVENIR 2004
KANANGA 2008
RWANDAKIGALI 1986
UNAMIR 1993‐94
REP CONGO
GREEN STREAM 1997
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EOD course TM 9 mTL 5y + 6 m
DIVER courseDiver 6 mDive master 7 m
6/11/2015
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47
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
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• Introduction:
– (tripod beta investigation)
– BPR , EOD SOP validation process, documented Balance of risk mitigation and budget
– Local authority is risk owner based on bomb tech advice
–Reactive approach to reduce risk (activeonly if evidence and risk). Ex: quid bombsdetected with improved Tech
–PAM + input for emergency planning
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
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RISKRisk acceptance criteria change (also the Perception).=/= each intervention=/= during the intervention FRAFor procedures according to health and safety procedureScientificaly documented for legal liabilityEnviromental impactProb X Effect x expo
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
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PROBABILITYType of EOstate of the EO
security intact, springs, chem delayin general more difficult to handle.study of vibrations on EO
RSP appliedtechnological evolution allows safer RSP and disposal
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
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51
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
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EFFECTscientifically validated based on US Field guideeconomic impactenviromental impacteg. Protective constructionpayload is still as designed
ex: Ypres
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
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53
People Exposedmaximum delayed neutralisationsevacuation always needed, always difficultpublic transport was targeted during the war.quid essential personnel
Origin/ History/ Actual situation /risk management
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QUESTIONS • Pictures slide 22‐27, 43, 54With permission of ian Aldema
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• EOD Battalion works daily for the safety of the Belgianpopulation : Conventional and Improvised Explosive Devices.
• Exclusivity of Defense governed by a Protocol signed betweenMOD, Justice, Interior (June 2014)
• Belgian EOD Expertise is internationaly recognised (UN and NATO)
• Intensity of the Ops is depending on the international / homeland threat level
• High level of risk => High standards of proficiency and high technology equipments improve the safety
• Investments are needed : adapt to the threat – migration IED from abroad to homeland (Radio Command IED and Home Made Explosives)
• New installation for the disposal of OCW is ongoing
CONCLUSIONS
567,7cm
20cm LIVENS
OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OCW)
In the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) :• OCW are “… Chemical weapons which were produced before 1925 ...”• Dismantling/disposal processes compliant with CWC• Verification by OPCW
Specific MOU between OPCW and Belgian Defence mainly for the training of the OPCW inspectors
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OCW?
Visual IDF
N Y?
X‐ray
Non
OCW
OCW?
N ?
OCW?
NAA
N Y
15239
OCW
7
27
47
67
87
107
127
147
167
187
21 50 21 70 2 190 2210 2230 2250 2270
data
background
222 3 keV
223 0 keV
E / keV
counts ine las tic scatter ing
H
22
23
ke
V
S
22
30
ke
V
NAA: (Neutron Activation Analysis)
“CLARK”
5858
Dismantling Contained Detonation
IDENTIFICATIONNon destructive
Inflow
Daily found WWI ammunition
Identified OCW Platform
15239
OCW Non
OCW
Non OCW Platform
Scrap
“CLARK” HE‐R
HE‐R : High Explosive “RAUCH”, explosive projectile with smoke charge containing arsenic
Covered Earth
Detonation
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Shape Payload
Leichte Gasmine(DEU)7,6 cm750 g CG
Livens(GBR)19,5cm15,5 Kg CG
Condition
Armed ‐ unarmed
Fired – not fired
Corrosion
Leaking OCW
Damaged/deformedmunition
L F K Gr (7,7 cm)
More than 100 different toxic payloads !!Two main types of shell :
Liquid fillingBottle solid filling = CLARK projectile
OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OCW)
60
• Acquisition ongoing for a new installation to replace the damaged Dismantling Facility
• Installation will be of the type “Static Detonation Chamber” (SDC)• SDC‐technology is already in use in several countries (USA, GER, FRA, JAP,…)• To be delivered by end 2016
NEW INVESTMENTSTATIC DETONATION CHAMBER
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• SDC is a safer technology
• SDC is also able to treat:
– OCW with liquid content (All)
– OCW with solid content (NOT: Clarck 21 cm GER=>CDC)
– White Phosphorous
– Conventional ammunition (Up to 3 Kg NEQ)
– Small Arms Ammunition
– Pyrotechnics
NEW INVESTMENTSTATIC DETONATION CHAMBER
CDC : Contained Detonation ChamberOCW : Old Chemical WeaponsNEQ : Net Explosive Quantity