5052863-Offshore-Safety-Case-Trainingppt.pdf

7/28/2019 5052863-Offshore-Safety-Case-Trainingppt.pdf

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Sreejith Offshore Training pack

One Day Offshore Safety Training

Pillai Sreejith




Introduction

Offshore Safety Case Training

[email protected]




• Major accidents do happen around the world,some of them recent, have caused us to ask if they can happen to us – and they certainly can!

• We need to ensure they do not happen to us by:

• Re-emphasising our safety management system;

• Updating our existing Field safety Case; and

• Ensuring you all know about it!!

Why this training?




What will we learn today?

• The difference between occupational/personal andprocess safety;

• What is a major accident;• What is and what is in an offshore Safety Case;• What are the safety barriers / controls/ systems/

Safety Critical Systems (SCE) that prevent major accidents;

• The part we all must play in preventing major

accidents; and• Test our understanding of what we have learnedthrough Piper Alpha accident.






Recent Major Accidents in your offshore Field?

Please include details of major accidents (and near-misses) that occurred inyour installation/s to tell the participants the need for them to be cautious.Include photographs if you have.




Major Modifications

• List down the major modifications (process /marine) that occurred in your offshoreinstallation/s in the past 1 year to tell them thatthe risk profile has changed: – Examples:

• Flare system modifications• Addition of a hydrocarbon process equipment• Change in mooring system• Addition of gas compression facilities




What is a safety case?

• Operators of offshore installations want to besure that their operations are safe and do notexpose their people or their business tounacceptable levels of risk;

• Plant modifications , variations on operatingconditions and new ownership mean that the riskpicture is changing ; and

• Regulators and other stakeholders ask you to justify the continuing operation of the installationthrough safety cases.




Corporate HSE Management System

Show your HSEMS through a flow chart or a diagram toexplain how periodic risk assessment/s are done to updatesafety case, as part of global sustainability reporting / CSR.




Offshore Safety Case Update project

• Key steps involved:• Offshore site visit (to assess the safetycritical element / barrier performance);

• Risk Assessment (using realistic fieldinputs such as barrier performance to beused in QRA event gates in frequencyanalysis); and

• Safety Case update

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1 day Training Contents• Difference between Occupational /personal and Process & Marine Safety;• What is a major accident?;• Major Offshore accident case studies;

– Piper Alpha – Mumbai High Platform – BP Texas Refinery

• Potential Major accidents for offshore complex;• Offshore Safety Case;• Safety Barriers in the offshore complex / installation; and• Safety training assessment.

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Breaks for the day

• 10.30 am: Tea / Coffee Break

• 12.30 to 1.30 pm: Lunch break

• 3.30 pm: Tea / Coffee Break

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Once the safety systems /barriersfail, there can be major

accidents!!!Only you can operate and

maintain safety systems without flaws.

Key Message

[email protected]




Session Break




Occupational /Personal, Marineand Process Hazards

[email protected]




Learning objectives•To understand major accidents;

•To understand the difference between occupational/personal , marine and process hazards;

• To understand the ‘Swiss Cheese’ accident causation model and ‘BowTie’ barrier concept;

• To learn the importance of barriers in controlling major accidents

and

• To appreciate the need to maintain the safety systems in order tocontrol / mitigate major accidents.




Are these terms too obvious and

more of a commonsense issue?If so, why are we discussing this?

Discussion trigger : BP Texas findings by Mr. Baker panel.




Major Accident(UK HSE SC Regulations,2005 )

• A ‘Major Accident’ defined by UK HSE is: – A fire, explosion or the release of a dangerous substance

involving death or serious personal injury to persons on theinstallation or engaged in an activity or in connection with it;

– An event involving major damage to the structure of theinstallation or plant affixed thereto or any loss in the stability of the installation;

– The collision of a helicopter with the installation; – The failure of life support systems for diving operations in

connection with the installation; and

– Any other event arising from a work activity involving death or serious personal injury to five or more persons on the installationor engaged in an activity in connection with it.




Major AccidentsExamples

• Deadliest accident so far: 1988 Piper Alpha ( 167fatalities );

• 2 nd deadliest: 1980 Alexander L. Kielland

Accommodation rig capsized during a storm ( 123fatalities );• 3 rd deadliest: 1989 Seacrest drillship capsized

during a typhoon ( 91 fatalities ); and

• 9 th Deadliest: 2005 Mumbai High Platform fire ( 22fatalities ).




Potential Major Accidents in your Offshore Field

• Examples – please customize – Blowouts – Riser & Pipeline releases – Process Hydrocarbon Releases – Fire & Explosion – Ship Collision – Dropped Objects – Transportation Accidents – Helicopter crash

– Projectile/Missile impact – Structural damage – Turret Failure – Cargo Tank explosion




Occupational Hazards• Personal or Occupational Health and Safety Hazards

– Can give rise to incidents or accidents that primarily affect oneindividual worker for each occurrence

• Personnel injury from:

– Slips, trips and falls; – Electrical shocks; – Adverse effects from high noise/heat/dust/fumes; – Minor cuts / bruises; and – Struck-by objects.

• Generally OH are avoided by wearing PPEs & followingprocedures




Occupational Accidents

• Mainly those accidents that can becontrolled by the use of PPEs

Source courtesy: Internet

http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.wildlandfire.com/pics/other/wear_ppe.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.wildlandfire.com/arc/2003b_feb.htm&h=414&w=300&sz=23&hl=en&start=6&um=1&tbnid=IwD5vH3fyJpu-M:&tbnh=125&tbnw=91&prev=/images%3Fq%3DPPE%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den

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http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.occupationalhealthsafety.ca/images/Occupational-Health-and-Safety-Act-bg.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.occupationalhealthsafety.ca/&h=282&w=425&sz=166&hl=en&start=19&um=1&tbnid=WhIGvJn2cxW3TM:&tbnh=84&tbnw=126&prev=/images%3Fq%3DOCCUPATIONAL%2BACCIDENTS%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN




Process Safety & Marine Hazards• Process and Marine Safety Hazards

– Can give rise to major accidents that can have catastrophiceffects and can result in multiple injuries and fatalities, aswell as substantial economic, property and environmentaldamage

• Examples of these are: – Fires / Explosions – Helicopter crash – Dropped objects damaging structure or FPSO hull

– Un-ignited gas releases – Ship collisions – Riser / pipeline ruptures




Safety Performance OH & PSH

• Performance for occupational safety ismeasured through (eg.) lost time injuries(LTI); and

• Performance for process safety ismeasured process safety equipmentperformance, hydrocarbon releases, fires,etc.




Process Safety Accident

BP Texas City Refinery Fire and Explosion (15 killed, 180 injured)




Marine Accident

Ship collision in Japanese waters causing major damage(July 27, 2007)






Bow-tie Barrier ConceptEvents andEvents andCircumstancesCircumstances Harm to people andHarm to people anddamage to assetsdamage to assets

or environmentor environment

HHAAZZAA

RRDD

CCOONNSSEEQQUUEE

NNCCEESS

BARRIERS

Major accidentMajor accident

Construction /Engineering activitiesMaintenance activities

Operations activitiesSource courtesy: Internet




Barriers for Potential Major AccidentsTHREATS CONTROL &

PREVENTATIVE BARRIERS MITIGATIVE BARRIERS CONSEQUENCE

MAE

Instrumentation ,i.e. TAHH / LALL /

LAHH / PALL /PAHH

Relief System(PSV )

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System

Miscellaneous /TemporaryEquipment

F & GSystem

F & GDetectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

WellheadIsolation

BlowdownValves

ESD ManualPull Stations

HVAC

Manual Water Fire Fighting

Equipment

Deluge System

Manual FoamFire Fighting

Equipment

BlowdownValves

ESDManualPull Stations

Firewalls

Firewater Pumps

Firewater Ringmain

Gaseous

Systems

EmergencyLighting

EmergencyPower (UPS )

InternalCommunications

& Alarms

ExternalCommunications

Helideck CrashEquipment

MiscellaneousSafety

Equipment

Safe Refuge(Muster Area )

Escape Routes

TEMPSC & Liferafts

Helicopter Facilities

Direct to SeaEquipment

Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency response

CMMS

PTW

PreventativeBlowout (Surface blowouts )

Riser Pipeline Releases

Process Hydrocarbon Releases

Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash

Projectile /missile Impacts

Structural Environmental events

Transportation Accidents

Major Potential Accidents

Turret failure

Cargo tank explosionsIgnitioncontrol

Audits

Inspections

Maintenance




Do you know where these safetybarriers are in your installation/s?

• Fire walls (are they A or H or J type? Whatdoes these alphabets mean?; if there is A

60 fire wall, is this acceptable? Why?)• Blast walls (are blast and fire walls same?

How are their locations decided?)

• Flame / flash back arrestors• ESD push buttons




Safety BarriersExplanation- Example 1

• Ignition Control – Hazardous Area Classification – Use of Ex type equipment (do you know how they are

designed? Why can’t they be designed as vapour / gas tight?) – Flash back arrestors, spark arrestors – Static charge discharge control (bonding, when do you install

bonding? Why is this done?) – Lightning control (how do you control these hazards?) – Inert gas system for cargo tanks – Use of inert gas system to dilute hydrocarbon vapours at vents




• What are the difference between Passive FireProtection (PFP) & Active Fire Protection (AFP)?

• Examples of PFP?

– Fire walls – In tumescent coatings (ESD valves?) – Heat shields on the escape routes?

• Examples of AFP?

– Deluge – FM 200 Gaseous Fire Fighting system – Fire & Gas Detection system

Safety BarriersExplanation- Example 2




Fire walls, Blast walls, Heat Shields

Source courtesy: Internet sources

A 60 Firewall

J 45/ H60, 0.3

bar Blast wall

Blast wall inplace

Heat Shield



Sreejith Offshore Training packSource courtesy: Internet




PROCESS

INSTRUMENTATION

IGNITIONCONTROL

BLOWDOW

N &RELIEFSYSTEM

FIRE&GASDETECTION

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN

ACTIVE

FIRE PROTECTION

PASSIVEFIREPROTECTION

Explosion / Fire Swiss Cheese Model

HydroCarbon

Releases

EXPLOSION

Maintenance Checks/test

Calibration

LoopChecks

Simulation

Audits

MOC/ECR

HAC

StaticElectric

Audits

LoopchecksforBD

Audits/Inspection

CFIsonReliefValves

LoopChecks

DetectorCalib

rations

Audits

MOC/ECR

CFTonESDV

LoopChecks

Audits/Inspection

FireDrills

Audits

CFTonFirePumps&Valves

Testingoffoam concentrate

MOC

IntegrityInspectionofPFP

firewalls

Audits

MOC

PerformanceIndicators

(Leading& lagging)

Prevention barriers Mitigation barriers




Discuss

• For major accident control, which side of the bow tie should be strong? Left(prevention) or the right side (mitigation) ?Why?

Major Accident

Discussion trigger: Can a gas explosion be effectively mitigated preventedwith water deluge?




Learning

• Major accidents;

• Potential major accidents at your offshore installation;

• Difference between personal / occupational, marine and process accidents;

• Swiss Cheese & Bow Tie safety concepts; and

•Importance of safety barriers in controlling major accidents.

[email protected]




Session Break




Major Accidents in

your Offshore Field

[email protected]




Learning Objectives

• To learn about the major accidents thatoccurred in your offshore complex tounderstand ‘What went wrong ?”; and

• To think about the potential barrier failuresthat might exist at offshore installationswhich could lead to potential major accidents.




Offshore Complex

• Show the field diagram

• Show the platforms / FPSOs and theinterconnecting pipelines

• Include the major additions / modificationsto highlight to the participants that theinstallation has changed over the years




Platform Accident Details

• Show the accident & near-miss trends (bar chart) and discuss cause breakdown (pie-chart)

• A graph that shows no particular trend (upwardor downward) could mean: – The HSE is not under control; – The HSE performance / accident data collection /

analysis is not proper; – No one knows what will be the future HSE

performance is!




Major Accidents•

Identify major accidents, hi-potential incidents, near-misses;

•Discuss each of the major cases from the detail reports to explain:

–Causes

–Consequences

–Risk reduction recommendations

–Implementation status

– Any similar accidents occurred?

•If there are any photos of these accidents, show them.




CausesExamples

• Inadequate planning / organization;• Flaws in PTW procedures;• Written job procedure did not anticipate contributing

factors;• Failure to follow known job procedure (s);• Inadequate training;• Supervisor failure to identify unsafe condition; and• Failure to communicate.




Learning

• If no concrete action is taken to rectify the cause of the incident permanently, it might lead to an accidentnext time round – History has proven this;

• Accidents could happen even with safety barriers inplace;

• Personnel play an extremely important role inpromoting safety – competency, experience and

knowledge is important; and• We need to ensure that the safety barriers aremaintained so as to control / mitigate accidents.

[email protected]




Session Break




Potential Major Accident Events

at

Your Offshore Complex

[email protected]

In this presentation, the typical potential majoraccidents for FPSO / platform are included. This willrequire customisation in line with the field QRA results.




Learning Objectives

• To learn about the potential major accidents that can occur in offshore fieldand to understand the consequences;

• To be aware of the major risk contributorsat offshore installations; and

• To be aware of the risk levels for variouspersonnel at your offshore field.




Potential Major Accidents 1Examples

1. Surface Blowout

2. Riser / Pipeline Releases

3. Process HC Releases –Fires / Explosions

4. Ship collisions

5. Dropped Objects

6. Transportation Accidents


Potential Major Accidents 2




Potential Major Accidents 2Examples

7. Helicopter crash

8. Projectile / Missile impact

9. Structural damage

10. Turret Failure

11. Cargo Tank Explosion





Risk Terminology

• Individual Risk (IR)Individual Risk Per Annum is thefrequency with which an individual may beexpected to sustain fatal harm due toexposure to specific hazards in a year


ALARP Triangle




ALARP Triangle





What does risk mean?


Essential data used in




Essential data used inQuantitative Risk Assessment

(QRA)• Manning distribution• Transportation details•

Heat & Material Balance diagram• P&IDs• PFDs

• General Arrangement / Layouts• Design basis and safety philosophies




• Show the areas considered in the QRA• Explain the manning distribution of various

personnel categories in the areas• Tell them the risks calculated is rather

realistic since we have considered morefacts

Offshore InstallationAreas




Fires and Explosions

• Pool Fire

• Jet fire

• Vapour Cloud Explosio n

• Flash Fire

Explain the causes and consequences of each type of firesincluding their impairment potential

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http://images.google.com.my/imgres?imgurl=http://www.theage.com.au/ffximage/2007/08/31/GAS_narrowweb__300x374,0.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.theage.com.au/news/business/world-bank-calls-on-oil-producers-to-cut-50bn-gas-fire/2007/08/31/1188067369022.html&h=374&w=300&sz=18&hl=en&start=10&um=1&tbnid=QEBqKECag8DoMM:&tbnh=122&tbnw=98&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dgas%2Bfire%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den

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Impairment

• Discuss impingement and impairmentfrom pool and jet fires

• Pool fire impingement on steel structures: – 10 minutes

• Jet fire impingement on steel structures: – 5 minutes

Courtesy: CMPT QRAGuidelines

Risk assessment Flow Chart




Sectionalisation : Review PFDs, UFDs & P&IDs to separatethe process and utility system to various isolatable

sections.

HAZID: Identify potential hazards

Causal Analysis : Identify hazardous events associated with accidents

Risk reducing measures : Apply enhanced or additional control measures and mitigationmeasures.

Frequency Analysis and Event Tree Analysis:Frequency of each accidental event (top

event) and branch probabilities are assigned toevent tree and outcome event frequency are

estimated.

Consequence Modelling: Using the software. Thephysical effects and damages for each outcome

event are estimated

Impact Assessment : Analyse the fire andexplosion impact to structures and

equipment.

•Risk AssessmentFatality Estimation : Determine the risk to personnel from eachoutcome event.•Risk Summation and Risk Ranking : Sum the risks to individualfrom each outcome events for hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbonhazards and identify the dominant risk contributors.Risk Assessment : Compare the risk levels against Individual Risk

Acceptability Criteria to determine whether additional measures arenecessary to reduce risks to ALARP.




Potential Major Accidents

Offshore Field










Subsea blow out





Fire Contours

• Show the jet, pool fire contourssuperimposed on the offshore installationlayout drawing to show them the potentialeffects.

MAE 5 D d Obj t




Causes:

Failure of lifting equipment (overload /damaged lifting equipment)

Failure of crane equipment (overload,etc.)

Lifting without following procedures /

controls

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment,platform, etc.)

Multiple fatalities / injuries

MAE 5 Dropped Objects






Helicopter, boat, personnel transfers

Risks from transportation




ANOA FIELD


Risks from transportation

MAE 6 T t ti A id t




MAE 6 Transportation AccidentsCauses:

Mechanical failure of boats /helicopter/ flights

Extraneous weather conditions

Material defects of personal transfer baskets or associated lifting tackles

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment,platform, etc.)






•Protection from side & vertical impacts?

•Personnel falling from height due togiddiness, loss of grip, high wind, loss of balance, etc.

Personnel Basket Transfers

Is there an option?

MAE 7 Helicopter Crash




MAE 7 Helicopter CrashCauses:

Failure of helicopter (engine failure/ extreme weather)

Failure of communicationequipment

Fire / explosion in FPSO / Platform

Pilot error

Consequences:

Fire

Major asset / helicopter damageMultiple fatalities / injuries

There are hardly any known occurrences of Helicopter crashing intoFPSO or platform









MAE 8 Projectiles / MissilesCauses:

Failure of equipment due tooverpressure

Inadequate design

Missiles / projectiles from gas turbinesand FPSO steam turbines

Consequences:

Asset damage (hull, equipment, etc.)







MAE 9 St t l E t




Causes:Structural failures due to extremeweather

Corrosion

Inadequate design

Crane boom collision

Consequences:

Asset damage


MAE 9 Structural Events













MAE 10 Turret Failure





MAE 11 Cargo Tank Explosion

FPSO

Overall Risk for Offshore




Overall Risk for OffshoreComplex

• Explain the Individual Risk (IR) for the various personnel categories;

• Explain the PLL (Potential Loss Of Life) values for the complex and variouspersonnel categories;

• Discuss if the IR value is within the ALARP tolerable region;

• Explain the major risk contributors for the offshore complex;

• Explain what is base case IR, and ALARP IR cases (sensitivity cases); and

• Explain what is traffic light system and how is it used to determine Realistic

Risk levels?

[email protected]




What is Traffic Light system?

Traffic Light system is used as an assessment tool by UK HSE, NOPSA, etc.

Traffic lights system and performance





Traffic lights system and performanceof safety systems

• Traffic light system was used to assessthe performance of safety systems;

• The performance of safety systems weredetermined based on: – Critical maintenance test results; – Accidents / incidents;

– Maintenance backlogs; and – Offshore audit findings.

How will the TL System used to calculate

impairment / event frequencies in QRA?

Traffic Light Interpretation





A c c e p t a b l e

Partially degraded

N o t a c c e p t a b l e

Safety Systems Performance

Tolerable




Earlier risk IR 1

Base case risk IR 2

Risk after Safety System

performanceAssessment IR 3

Potential residual risk after improvements IR4





Learning

• Individual Risk for all offshore personnel are within the acceptable limits;• Understanding potential major accidents for offshore installations

(causes and consequences);

• Understanding the major risk contributors at offshore field; and

• Understanding the personnel risk levels for various categories.




Session Break




Offshore Safety Cases

[email protected]




Learning objectives

•To understand the objective of Safety Cases;•To understand ‘The UK HSE OffshoreInstallations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005’;•To understand the typical SC update triggers;and•To know the Typical Safety Case contents.




Safety Case-Definition

“A documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given

application in a given environment ”

Safety Case exists for Nuclear, Offshore, Aviation, and Rail industries

Safety Case Origin




Safety Case Origin(post 1988 Piper Alpha explosion)

“UK Offshore Operators, says Cullen, mustadopt this new philosophy on safety,producing a ‘Safety Case '. This includes

continuous hazard assessment over theplant's lifetime, fault tree analysis, whichlooks at all the ways an error could

develop, and takes account of ways that'human factors' contribute to disasters”

f l l




Safety Case Evolution Timeline

Forthwith: Immediate, at once

Lord Cullen recommended that the 4 (FEA, ESSA, EERA,SIGA) be carried outby the offshore operators immediately before the 1992 safety case regulationwas released.

h Off h S f C ?




Why Offshore Safety Case?

• Operators of offshore installations want to besure that their operations are safe and do notexpose their people or their business tounacceptable levels of risk;

• Plant modifications, variations on operatingconditions and new ownership mean that the riskpicture is changing ; and

• Regulators and other stakeholders ask you to justify the continuing operation of the installationthrough safety cases.

• Regulatory compliance is essential to your business

S f C




Safety Case

• First SC Regulations came into force in1992;

• Cullen Forthwith studies:

– A Fire Risk Analysis; – An assessment of the risk of ingress of smoke or gas into the accommodation;

– A review of the ability of emergency systems to

withstand severe accident conditions; and – An evacuation, escape and rescue analysis.

The UK HSE Offshore Installations




e U S O s o e sta at o s(Safety Case) Regulations 2005

• Key changes introduced by the 2005 Regulations include:-The requirement for duty holders to send an early design notification,instead of a design safety case, to HSE when establishing a new productioninstallation;-Duty holders are required to carry out a thorough and fundamental reviewof their safety cases at least every five years , or as directed by HSE;

-The present requirement to re-submit safety cases every three years hasbeen removed (inspectors will be checking to see that safety cases arebeing kept up to date through inspection);-New duties require licensees to ensure anyone they appoint as an operator is capable of fulfilling their legal responsibilities for safety;-Combined operations safety cases have been replaced by notifications,which do not need HSE acceptance; and-The Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees)Regulations have been amended to extend consultation with safetyrepresentatives to reviewing and revising a safety case, as well as preparingone.

T i l C f S f C




Typical Contents of Safety Case

• Facility description• HSE Management system• Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Summary

• Safety Critical elements and PerformanceStandards

• ALARP Demonstration• Fitness to Operate

Safety Case Update Triggers




Safety Case Update TriggersExamples

L i

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Learning

• Origin and objectives of Safety Case;• Piper Alpha Accident & Safety Case;• ‘The UK HSE Offshore Installations (Safety

Case) Regulations 2005;• Typical SC contents; and• Typical SC update triggers.




Session Break




Safety Barriers and their Rolein Controlling Major accidents

[email protected]




Learning objectives

•To understand the critical role of safety barriers /safety systems in controlling major accidents usingBow-Tie diagram;

•To understand safety barriers on offshoreinstallations;•To appreciate the need to maintain the barriersthrough maintenance system, inspections, etc.; and•To identify and monitor performance of safetybarriers through lead and lag indicators.

B Ti Di g




Bow Tie Diagram


Barriers for Potential Major Accidents




Barriers for Potential Major AccidentsTHREATS CONTROL &

PREVENTATIVE BARRIERS MITIGATIVE BARRIERS

MAE


LAHH / PALL /PAHH

Relief System(PSV )

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System


F & GSystem

F & GDetectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

WellheadIsolation

BlowdownValves


HVAC

Manual Water Fire FightingEquipment

Deluge System

Manual FoamFire FightingEquipment

Blowdown

Valves


Firewalls

Firewater Pumps

Firewater Ringmain

GaseousSystems

EmergeLighti

EmergePower (

Inter Communic

& Ala

Exter Communic

Helideck

Equip

MiscellaSafe

Equip

Safe Re(Muster

Escape

TEMPSCraft

HelicoFacilit

Direct tEquip

Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency r

CMMS

PTW




Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash




Turret failures

Cargo tank explosions

Ignitioncontrol

Audits

Inspections

UK HSE KP 3 Inspection Results




p




Sreejith Offshore Training packSource courtesy: Internet

What is wrong at present in oil &




g pgas industry?

• Unacceptable level of process safety relateddangerous occurrences especially in relation toloss of containment incidents;

• Major hazard industry measured safetyperformance using LTIs!!• Critical systems deteriorate over time without

warning until they fail catastrophically; and

• Audits tend to be too infrequent and workplaceinspections focus on personal safety.



Key Performance Indicators set to identify defects in safety systems




Permit-to-work

Inspection & Maintenance

Staff Competence

Operational Procedures

System defects

Lagging indicator

Leading indicator

Leading indicator

Lagging indicator

Lagging indicator

Lagging indicator

Leading indicator

Leading indicator

Accident Trajectory


PROCESS HYDROCARBON RELEASES/FIRES/EXPLOSIONS Example es te

P




PROCESSINSTRUMENTATION

IGNITIONCONTROL

BLOWDOWN &RELIEFSYSTEM

FIRE&GASDETECTION

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN

ACTIVEFIRE PROTECTION

PASSIVEFIREPROTECTION

p

HydroCarbon

Releases

E

XPLOSION

Maintenance

Checks/test

Calibration

LoopChecks

Simulation

Audits

MOC/ECR

HAC

StaticElectric

Audits

LoopchecksforBD

Audits/Inspection

CFIsonReliefValves

LoopChecks

DetectorCalibrations

Audits

MOC/ECR

CFTonESDV

LoopChecks

Audits/Inspection

FireDrills

Audits

CFTonFire

Pumps&Valve

Testingoffoam concentra

MOC

IntegrityInspectionofPFP

firewalls

Audits

MOC

PerformanceIndicators

(Leading& lagging)

Dual Performance Assurance




Dual Performance Assurance

ReactiveMonitoring

LaggingIndicator:

Outcome Indicator

Active MonitoringLeading

Indicators:Process or Input

Indicators

CriticalProcessSafety

Risk ControlSystem

Dual Assurance - leading and lagging indicators measuringperformance of each critical element of a Process Safety ManagementSystem


How effective are YOUR safety systems?




How effective are YOUR safety systems?

• Traffic light system was used to assessthe performance of safety systems;

• Each of the safety systems were assessedbased on: – Critical Maintenance Test (CMT) r esult s; – Accidents / incidents;

– Maintenance backlogs; and – Audit findings.

Traffic Light Interpretation






A c c e p t a b l e

Partially degraded

N o t a c c e p t a b l e

Safety Systems Performance

Tolerable

Offshore Audit Findings




gExamples

• H 60 fire walls penetrated to pass pipes andelectrical conduits

• Fire water deluge not provided for critical

hydrocarbon systems / valve clusters• Flame Detectors obstructed with pipework• Hazardous area Classification compromised

• Ex equipment maintenance flaws

Safety Barrier Performance





Safety Barrier PerformanceTHREATS CONTROL &

PREVENTATIVE BARRIERS MITIGATIVE BARRIERS

MAE


LAHH / PALL /PAHH

Relief System(PSV )

Navigational Aids

Pedestal Cranes

Inert Gas System


F & GSystem

F & GDetectors

ESD system

ESD Valves

WellheadIsolation

BlowdownValves


HVAC

Manual Water Fire FightingEquipment

Deluge System

Manual FoamFire FightingEquipment

Blowdown

Valves


Firewalls

Firewater Pumps

Firewater Ringmain

GaseousSystems

EmergeLighti

EmergePower (

Inter Communic

& Ala

Exter Communic

Helideck Equip

MiscellaSafe

Equip

Safe Re(Muster

Escape

TEMPSCraft

HelicoFacilit

Direct tEquip

Control

Detection

Mitigation

Emergency r

CMMS

PTW




Ship Collision

Dropped Objects

Helicopter Crash




Turret failures

Cargo tank explosions

Ignitioncontrol

Audits

Inspections




Learning




Learning

• Concept of Safety barriers in major accident control;and

• Role of offshore personnel in ensuring integrity of

safety barriers by monitoring performanceindicators; and• Performance of safety systems to control major

hazards cannot be monitored using LTIs which calls

for a shift in focus.



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