[Syllabus]

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 105938. September 20, 1996]

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 108113. September 20, 1996]

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

These cases touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based - the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal

defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."i[1]

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.ii[2]

On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant.iii[3] Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33.iv[4]

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:

14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed. conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.v[5]

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4. Defendants-ACCRA lawyers’ participation in the acts with which their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1. In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed under their respective names in Annex ‘A’ of the expanded Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.

4.5. Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and therefore denies that the ‘shares’ appearing in his name in Annex ‘A’ of the expanded Amended Complaint are his assets.vi[6]

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.vii[7]

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.viii

[8] The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.ix[9]

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.x[10]

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.xi[11]

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:

x x x.

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit.xii[12]

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the

ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:

I

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection clause.

3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.

III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the client(s).

2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.

IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status.xiii[13]

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco `without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal,'"xiv[14] and he has undertaken to identify his principal.xv[15]

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

I

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the “bigger fish” as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal with petitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein. (Underscoring ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled “Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government” respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their “so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco”; that “it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex “A” of the Third Amended Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of particular persons, some in blank.

We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo

Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the principal things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves.xvi

[16]

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.

II

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire,xvii[17] and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him.xviii[18] But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.xix[19] A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.xx[20] Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Courtxxi[21] and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,xxii[22] that is required by reason of necessity and public interestxxiii[23] based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.xxiv[24]

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and stable tradition.xxv[25] In Stockton v. Ford,xxvi[26] the U.S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it.xxvii[27]

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically “forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment.”xxviii[28] Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

x x x

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.xxix[29]

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client’s business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds

of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery.xxx[30] Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.xxxi[31]

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. “A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.”xxxii[32] He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.xxxiii[33]

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.

In Ex-Parte Enzor,xxxiv[34] a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the client’s identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client’s identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court’s contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.

U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig,xxxv[35] involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client

in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer’s legal advice was obtained.

The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the “Sandino Gang,” a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.

In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:

A client’s identity and the nature of that client’s fee arrangements may be privileged where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.

The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege. “In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client’s consent.” 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the client’s identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications.xxxvi[36]

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,xxxvii[37] prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer’s claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim against him.xxxviii[38]

x x x xxx xxx.

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; x x x And whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. xxx.

It appears... that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as service of the summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained.xxxix[39]

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,xl[40] the lawyer involved was required by a lower court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the court’s request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of properties

involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer’s refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.xli[41]

3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is privileged.

In Baird vs Korner,xlii[42] a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayers’ returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12,706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the

enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird’s repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into that client’s income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the exception that a client’s name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the client’s identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but one purpose - to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed - to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should be done.xliii[43]

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.xliv[44] Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.xlv[45]

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the client’s name

itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences.xlvi[46]

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners’ ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their clients’ shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners’ legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, “that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a... crime."xlvii[47]

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act for which the advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime.xlviii[48] The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.

In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.”xlix[49] "Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the subject thereof

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28655             August 6, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants. EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant.

C. V. Sanchez for appellant.Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, finding him guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him therefor to imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months, and one day, reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, indemnity, and costs.

Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.

The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the

querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.

Counsel de oficio in this court makes the following assignment of errors:

I. The lower court erred in not admitting in evidence Exhibit 1.

II. The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellant Eugenio Toledo did not take part in the fight between accused Sisenando Holgado and deceased Filomeno Morales, resulting in the death of the latter.

III. The lower court erred in not giving accused-appellant Eugenio Toledo the benefit of a reasonable doubt." Exhibit 1 above-mentioned in assignment of error No. 1, made originally in Tagalog, in translation reads as follows:

AFFIDAVIT

I. Sisenando Holgado, married, of legal age, and resident of this municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro, P. I., after being sworn in accordance with law, state the following:

My additional homestead situated in Calingag was cleaned by me and is at present planted with palay (rice), on which I also plant hemp, but the hemp planted by my workers is frequently uprooted by Filomeno Morales who claims that said land is his, whereas when I was cleaning said land nobody objected to it, but now that it is already cleaned, Filomeno Morales says that one-half of the land occupied by me is his; for

this reason I decided to see Filomeno Morales about this matter and when I talked to him this morning (Wednesday) at about nine o'clock, at the hemp plantation of Victorio Saudan situated in Calingag, he told me that if I should plant there anything he would cut my neck, and to this I answered that if he was going to cut my neck we would fight and thereupon he stabbed me with a penknife and then I slashed at him; after this we separated, and went to Dalmacio Manlisic's house. When we fought, there was nobody present.

Question by president: When you went to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic, did you not meet anybody before reaching said house?

Answer: I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic.

Question by president: How do you know that the hemp you planted on your land above-mentioned was frequently uprooted by Filomeno Morales?

Answer: Because he said as to my worker named Eulogio Supleo.

Question by president: Do you have anything more to say about the incident?

Answer: No more.

In testimony of all that I stated above, I signed this document in the presence of two witnesses and then swore to it in the presence of the municipal president here at Pinamalayan, Mindoro, this June fifteenth, nineteen hundred twenty-seven.

In the presence of:

(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLEHILARION NIEVA

Signed and sworn to before me, this June fifteenth, 1927.

(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLEMunicipal President

The discussion of the case in court has revealed three different points of view among the members participating, all leading to the same result of acquittal. Under such circumstances, it is, course, difficult for the writer of the opinion to do entire justice to those theories which do not conform to his own. However, an effort will be made to present the various opinions, leaving it for any individual member to enlarge upon the same, if he so desires.

I

The Chief and Mr. Justice Villamor would disregard entirely the first assignment of error and would, therefore, refrain from all discussion relative to the admissibility of Exhibit 1. Confining themselves exclusively to an analysis of the evidence other than Exhibit 1, they find that Eugenio Toledo has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The contradictions in the testimony for the prosecution pointed out by the trial judge do not impress these members of the court so seriously. In reality, there being but one witness for the prosecution who, on account of her relations with Filomeno Morales, and the land troubles, might be expected to exaggerate, and there being on the contrary exculpatory evidence for the defense, even without Exhibit 1, the Government has not made out its case. Consequently, on the testimonial facts, these members vote for acquittal.

II

The second view is that for which Messrs. Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real are responsible, and is that Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it effect, in relation

HisSISENANDO HOLGADO

Mark

with the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. What has heretofore been said with reference to the state of the record need not here be repeated. It only remains to be stated that Exhibit 1 was made by Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of sufficient time for reflection. The declaration of Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and not the party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation between the statement and the fact of which it forms part as strongly

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tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of afterthought. The nature and circumstances of the statement do not disclose intrinsic evidence of premeditation as revealed in a long, coherent, closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured. (22 C. J., pp. 461 et seq.; U. S. vs. David [1903], 3 Phil., 128.)

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III

The third opinion in court is that held by Messrs. Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand, who would resolve the first assignment of error by holding that the court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. Had Exhibit 1 been received, it is believed that its influence would have been felt by the trial court. Without Exhibit 1, the appellate court is bound by the appreciation of the evidence made in the trial court, and could, with little propriety, set aside the findings made by a learned trial judge. The case calls for an examination of the right of the courts to receive in evidence documents of the character of Exhibit 1.

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Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.

Professor Wigmore, one of the greatest living authorities on the law of evidence, has attempted to demonstrate the false premises on which the arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that the limitation is inconsistent with the language originally employed in stating the principle and is unjustified on grounds of policy. Professor Wigmore in turn has been answered by no less a body than the Supreme Court of Mississippi in the case of Brown vs. State of Mississippi ([1910], 37 L. R. A., New Series, 345). The editor of the Mississippi case in L. R. A., however, comes to the support of Professor Wigmore saying the unanimity of the decisions "is as complete as the shock which they give the general sense of justice." The question has likewise in recent years gained attention by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Donnelly vs. United States ([1913], 228 U. S., 243). There it was held that the court below properly excluded hearsay evidence relating to the confession of a third party, then deceased, of guilt of the crime with which defendant was charged. Mr. Justice Pitney, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "In this country there is a great and practically unanimous weight of authority in the estate courts against admitting evidence of confessions of third parties, made out of court, and tending to exonerate the accused." Mr. Justice Van Devanter concurred in the result while Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Lurton and Mr. Justice Hughes, dissented. Mr. Justice Holmes said:

. . . The rues of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to

convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man (Mattox vs. United States, 146 U. S., 140; 36 Law. ed., 917; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep., 50); and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of which seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the benefit of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the law and the arguments against the English doctrine are so well and fully stated by Mr. Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth at greater length. (2 Wigmore, Evidence, pars. 1476, 1477.)

In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have never felt bound to follow blindly the principles of the common law. A reexamination of some of those principles discloses anomalies.

A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of Mississippi states, "to reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person accused of a crime, under the same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by offering in evidence the admission of another under oath that this other committed the crime. Again admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest. We fail to see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will not be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second.

A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not here controlling. Most of them do not concern the confessions of declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as the principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he committed the crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but

as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven facts.

We cannot bring this decision to a conclusion without quoting the well considered language of Professor Wigmore on the subject, the pertinent part of a decision coming from a court which has gained respect particularly in criminal cases, and an editorial note. Professor Wigmore has said:

PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; Statement of Fact against Penal Interest, excluded; Confessions of Crime by a Third Person. — It is today commonly said, and has been expressly laid down by many judges, that the interest prejudiced by the facts stated must be either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, and not a penal interest. What ground in authority there is for this limitation may be found by examining the history of the execution at large.

The exception appears to have taken its rise chiefly in two separate rivulets of rulings, starting independently as a matter of practice, but afterwards united as parts of a general principle. . . .

These lines of precedent proceeded independently till about the beginning of the 1800s, when a unity of principle for some of them came gradually to be perceived and argued for. This unity lay in the circumstance that all such statements, in that they concerned matters prejudicial to the declarant's self-interest, were fairly trustworthy and might therefore (if he were deceased) be treated as forming an exception to the hearsay rule.

This broad principle made its way slowly. There was some uncertainty about its scope; but it was an uncertainty in the direction of breadth; for it was sometimes put in the broad form that any statement by a person "having no interest to deceive" would be admissible. This broad form never came to prevail (post, par. 1576). But acceptance was gained, after two decades, for the principle that all declarations of facts against interest (by deceased persons) were to be received. What is to be noted, then, is that from 1800 to about 1830 this was fully understood as the broad scope of the principle. It was thus stated without other qualifications; and frequent passages show the development of the principle to this point.

But in 1884, in a case in the House of Lords, not strongly argued and not considered by the judges in the light of the precedents, a backward step was taken and an arbitrary limit put upon the rule. It was held to exclude the statement of a fact subjecting the declarant to a criminal liability, and to confined to statements of facts against either pecuniary or proprietary interest. Thenceforward this rule was accepted in England; although it was plainly a novelty at the time of its inception; for in several rulings up to that time such statement had been received.

The same attitude has been taken by most American courts, excluding confessions of a crime, or other statements of facts against penal interest, made by third persons; although there is not wanting authority in favor of admitting such statements.

PAR. 1477. Same: Policy of this Limitation. — It is plain enough that this limitation, besides being a fairly modern novelty, is inconsistent with the broad language originally employed in stating the reason and principle of the present exception (ante, pars. 1457, 1476) as well as with the settled principle upon which confessions are received (ante, par. 1475).

But, furthermore, it cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only plausible reason of policy that has ever been advanced for such a limitation is the possibility of procuring fabricated testimony to such a admission if oral. This is the ancient rusty weapon that has always been drawn to oppose any reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of danger of abuse. This would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an innocent.

The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the sense of justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be true culprit. The absurdity and wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is patent.

The rulings already in our books cannot be thought to involve a settled and universal acceptance of this limitation. In the first place, in almost all of the rulings the declarant was not shown to be deceased or otherwise unavailable as a witness, and therefore the declaration would have been inadmissible in any view of the present exception (ante, par. 1456). Secondly, in some of the rulings (for example, in North Carolina) the independent doctrine (ante, pars. 139-141) was applicable that, in order to prove the accused's non-commission of the offense by showing commission by another person, not merely one casual piece of evidence suffices but a "prima facie" case resting on several concurring pieces of evidence must be made out. Finally, most of the early rulings had in view, not the present exception to the hearsay rule, but the doctrine of admissions (ante, pars. 1076, 1079) that the admissions of one who is not a co-conspirator cannot affect others jointly charged.

It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the rule culprit now beyond the reach of justice. Those who watched (in 1899) with self-righteous indignation the course of proceedings in Captain Dreyfus' trial should remember that, if that trial had occurred in our own courts, the spectacle would have been no less shameful if we, following our own supposed precedents, had refused to admit what the French court never for a moment hesitated to admit, — the authenticated confession of the escaped Major Esterhazy, avowing himself the guilty author of the treason there charged. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 1476, 1477.)

In the case of Pace vs. State ([1911], Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 135 Southwestern, 379), the appellant offered to prove in the trial court by the witness Byron Kyle that on Saturday morning following the killing of the deceased on the previous Sunday he had a conversation with Dick Cain, one of the parties to the homicide, in which Dick Cain admitted the he killed the deceased. The court ruled:

. . . Wherever the state seeks to fasten criminality upon the party on trial, the accused had a right to meet and rebut any testimony which may be offered against him in any legitimate way. If Cain

had been upon trial, his confession to the witness Kyle would have been admissible beyond any shadow of doubt, and would have been upon trial, his confession to the witness Kyle would have been admissible beyond any shadow of doubt, and would have been strong evidence to go before the jury. The estate would have been seeking to introduce this and with great earnestness, and correctly so. If appellant could prove that another party or others committed the homicide, it might prove his innocence, and would be strong evidence to go before the jury in his favor. Any legitimate fact or circumstance which would meet or tend to meet the state's case and break the force of criminative facts introduced against the accused is always admissible. Appellant's contention was that he did not kill the deceased, but that Cain did. The state's theory was the appellant shot the deceased, and Cain did not shoot him. Under the rules of evidence this testimony was clearly inadmissible.

We would like finally to turn attention to what was said by the editor of L. R. A. in his note in volume 37 hereinbefore referred to, viz:

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, — something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

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Again, if, seems indisputable, the desire to close the door to falsehood which cannot be detected dictates the exclusion of such testimony, the question as to the effect to be given to such a confession is solely one of weight and credibility. . . .

Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed. Shall Judges trained and experienced in the law display less discerning common sense that the layman and allow precedent to overcome truth?

JUDGMENT

For three somewhat divergent reasons, we are all of the opinion that the defendant-appellant Eugenio Toledo should be given the benefit of the reasonable doubt which prevails in our minds. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from will be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, and as it appears that he is now confined in Bilibid Prison, an order will immediately issue directing his release, with costs de oficio.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119359 December 10, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROBERT CLOUD, accused-appellant.

 

REGALADO, J.:p

The universal outcry and multinational campaign against child abuse can draw added impetus from this extreme case of a little boy, just barely two and a half years old, who was beaten to death by his own father. So it was alleged in an information for parricide filed against accused-appellant Robert Cloud in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City. 1

The case for the prosecution is presented by the Solicitor General 2 by adopting the factual findings of the trial court, with the pages of the stenographic notes being supplied by the People. Having painstakingly reviewed and analyzed the evidence of record, we find that such findings merit reproduction hereunder:

At around 11:00 o'clock in the morning on August 2, 1988 while a certain Mrs. Josephine Aguilar was at the emergency room of St. Luke's Hospital, Quezon City to have some stitches removed from her daughter's head her attention was called by a limpid boy being carried by a man followed by an old woman who was shouting hysterically. The boy is John Albert Cloud. She noticed that the face of the boy was swollen and bruised and his body covered with dry blood. A nurse commented that the little

boy — not more than three years old — must have been hit by a truck (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1993, pp. 7-10, 14-15, 33).

But the words of the old woman — the lola — of the little boy, showed the cause of the injury to be otherwise for she was repeatedly saying in a potpourri of cries and tears: "Pinatay siya ng sariling ama!" The old woman told the people inside the Emergency Room that the boy'sfather — Robert Cloud — wouldn't allow John Albert to come with her and when the boy started to cry and wouldn't stop crying his father began to beat the boy hard, tied his hands, and made "tusok, tusok" in his body. The father continued beating the boy even when excrements were already coming out from the boy's anus (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1993, pp. 12-13, 22).

The male companion of the boy said to the old woman: "Hoy, tigil ka na!" "Wag kang maingay." and told the people at E.R.: "Sira ang ulo ng matanda, eh!" (tsn, J. Aguilar, July 12, 1993, pp. 8-9) But the old woman wouldn't stop and continued to say: "Putang-ina ang ama niya . . . Hayop siya!"

When the doctor pronounced the boy dead the old woman knelt before him and cried like (Ix)ion (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1993, p. 10). His baptismal certificate says that John Albert was born on October 2, 1987 to Janet Villagracia and John Robert Cloud (Exh. "3").

The ear-piercing would probably have ended there but for the fact that Mrs. Aguilar's conscience was bothered by what she saw and heard as narrated above and decided to do something about it. She approached Atty. Remedios Balbin, Chairman in Quezon City of a civil liberties organization. Atty. Balbin, after a few weeks of research found out that Robert Cloud and family left his house at No. 69 San Isidro Street, Barangay Sto. Niño, Quezon

City[;] the boy's body was brought to Rey Funeral Homes[;] Dr. E. Cacas certified that the cause of death of John Albert Cloud is broncho pneumonia with heart complications (Exh. D-48) [;] and that the autopsy on the cadaver was waived by Natividad Calpito Cloud who claimed to be the boy's mother per her "Affidavit" dated August 3, 1988 (Exh. "D-47"). Atty. Balbin thereafter contacted the NBI and requested for the exhumation of the boy's cadaver (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1994, pp. 17-21, 32, 35-37, 42; R. Balbin, March 8, 1994, pp. 6, 17-21, 23, 25-27, 29-30, 36, 50, 54-55).

The exhumation was done on November 8, 1988 by the NBI at the Manila South Cemetery. The exhumation report stated the following findings:

Upper incisor, right, missing.Contusions; face, right side, 9.0 x 6.0 cm; buttocks, right and left sides, 20.0 x 12.0 cm;knees, anterior aspect, right, 6.0 x 4.5 cm;and left 8.0 x 5.0 cm.;

Contused-abrasion: face, left side, 14.0 x 6.0 cm;arm, left, postero-lateral aspect,6.0 x 4.0 cm;hand, right, dorsal aspect, 7.0 x 5.0 cm;thigh, right posterior aspect, extending to the lateral and anterior aspects 15.0 x 7.0 cm.

Hematoma — frontto-temporal region, left side 13.0 x 6.0 cm.

Hemorrhages, subdural and subarachnoidal, left cerebral hemisphere.

Heart chambers contain a small amount of embalmed blood.

Brain markedly congested and edematous.

Other visceral organs, congested.

Stomach, empty (Exhibits "E" and "E-l")

Although the crime was supposedly committed on August 2, 1988, for reasons hereinafter explained the information dated May 10, 1990 was filed on June 5, 1990. The decision of the trial court states that the accused was arrested only on April 15, 1993. That is why, with the proceedings that then had to be undertaken and the trial which had to be conducted, it was only in a decision dated November 11, 1994 that judgment was ultimately handed down, decreeing as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein accused ROBERT CLOUD GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of PARRICIDE for the violent death of his son JOHN ALBERT CLOUD and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as damages. Costs vs. the accused. 3

That it took more than six years to obtain a verdict for the child's death is a distressing indictment of the criminal justice system, particularly its investigative and prosecutory pillars. How the case managed to reach its logical denouement, however, is a tribute and does honor to the other component of the system — the community participation — which is the redeeming feature in this bizarre and repulsive case of barbarity to an innocent, helpless victim who was just a stage out of infancy.

As stated earlier, the events that later became the subject of testimonial evidence for the prosecution unfolded before the eyes of prosecution witness Josephine Aguilar who was then inside the emergency room of the hospital having stitches removed from her daughter's head. Although she was a perfect stranger to the family involved, but haunted by the sight and memory of the lifeless and battered child, she sought the help of Atty. Remedios Balbin, chairperson of a civil liberties organization in Quezon City. It was through their joint, unrelenting and selfless efforts that this case eventually wound up in the court a quo for judicial action.

Atty. Balbin conducted an investigative research which enabled her to coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Her efforts led to the discovery of the following facts:(1) Robert Cloud and his family left their house at No. 69 San Isidro Street, Barangay Sto. Niño, Quezon City immediately after the death of John Albert; 4 (2) John Albert's body was brought from the hospital to the Rey Funeral Homes; 5 (3) a certain Dr. E. Gacas certified that the cause of the death of John Albert was broncho pneumonia with heart complications; 6 and (4) the autopsy of the cadaver was waived by a certain Natividad Calpito Cloud who falsely claimed to be the mother of John Albert. 7 Incidentally, despite her active participation in various aspects of this case, she was never called upon by appellant to testify and corroborate his assertions therein.

Atty. Balbin thereafter requested for the exhumation of the body of the little boy for purposes of autopsy. The exhumation was made on November 8, 1988, almost three months after the burial of John Albert. The exhumation report, which has been quoted by the People in its brief and is set out in full at the start of this opinion, revealed the grave and fatal injuries, internal and external, which caused the boy's death and could have resulted only from violence or strong physical force. On the strength of that report of the NBI, the sworn statement of Josephine Aguilar and the evidence gathered by Atty. Balbin, an information for parricide was eventually filed against herein appellant.

A warrant for the arrest of Robert Cloud was issued on June 11, 1990 which was returned unserved. Alias warrants were issued on June 29, 1992 and September 22, 1992 and finally on April 15, 1993. Appellant was arrested by the police at No. 22 Lourdes Castillo Street, Galas, Quezon City and was thereafter committed to jail. On April 26, 1993, duly assisted by counsel, he was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution built up its case on the basis of a sworn affidavit and testimony in open court of its principal witness, Josephine Aguilar. For a clearer appreciation of what she actually witnessed and overheard inside the emergency room of St. Luke's Hospital, we quote her testimony:

FISCAL PONFERRADA:

Q Madam witness, do you recall where were you on August 2, 1988 at around 11:00 in the morning, madam witness?

A I was in the emergency room of St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City, sir.

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Q While you were there after a couple of minutes, what happened? Do you recall any unusual incident, madam witness?

A An old woman came with a boy full of dried blood, sir.

Q You said old lady with a little boy, what happened after that, madam witness?

A Well she came in and she was crying, I heard the old woman, I heard the doctor as(k) the old lady what happened and the old lady told the doctor that it's the father who bit (sic) him up again and the old lady put the kid on the table and I saw the kid died, sir.

Q What happened next, what else did the old lady say, madam witness?

A The doctor told the old lady "wala na" then the old lady sitdown (sic) on the floor crying and crying h(y)sterically, sir.

Q Did you come to know the old woman, madam witness?

A No, sir.

Q How about the boy, did you come to know the name of the boy who died, madam witness?

A Albert Cloud, sir.

Q What happened after the boy died, madam witness?

A The lola started shouting telling everybody there how it happened, to the nurses and to the doctors.

Q You said the lola started telling the doctor what actually happened, did you hear these what the lola tell (sic) madam witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please narrate before this Honorable Court what you hear(d) as narrated by the lola, madam witness?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q What did you hear when she tells (sic) everybody?

A The father of the boy who died has burned in the skin, he was tie(d) and thrown against the wall, punch(ed) the boy, sir.

FISCAL PONFERRADA:

Q Did you have any occasion to see whether there are marks in the hands or the body of the boy, madam witness?

A At that time the boy was full of dried blood, sir.

Q After that?

A I see (interrupted)

Q What did you see, madam witness?

A He had dried blood here. The boy had dried blood in the forehead, sir.

COURT:

Q What else did you see?

A He has bruises, blood inside the skin, "mga pasa".

Q At that time?

A I only saw full of dried blood, sir.

Q Did you see the condition of the body of the boy?

A No, I only saw dried blood from head to foot, sir.

FISCAL PONFERRADA:

Q So at that time in the hospital you did not see the boy, madam witness?

A Only dried blood, sir. 8

The defense, on the other hand, argues that at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, appellant was not in his house and that the boy, John Albert, must have fallen from the stairs leading to the second floor of the house. The defense presented appellant and he testified that he left the house on the day in question and only learned upon his return that his son was already dead, thus:

Q Do you know how your son died, Mr. Witness?

A I don't know, sir.

Q By the way where were you on August 2, 1988 in the morning, Mr. Witness.

A I was at home, sir.

Q Did you leave that house on that day, August 2, 1988, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time did you leave the house, Mr. Witness?

A Around 10:30, sir.

Q In the morning?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, your son, where was he at the time you left the house, Mr. Witness?

A He was upstairs, sir.

Q Do you know what he was doing at the time you left, Mr. Witness?

A He was sleeping, sir.

Q Also, evidence already adduced in this case indicates that your son was brought to the St. Lukes Hospital, Quezon City by an old woman with a male companion on or about 12:00 o'clock noon on August 1, 1988 and by there (sic) your son died. Did you know that Mr. Witness?

A No, sir.

Q Why not, Mr. Witness?

A I was not at home that night, sir.

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Q Did you ever come to know on that very day that your son, John Albert Cloud, died, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q How did you come to know that your son died Mr. Witness?

A My "tiyahin" told me "nadisgrasya raw po ang anak ko".

Q Who is this auntie, what is her name, Mr. Witness?

A Teresita Alconyes.

Q Was that the old woman together with the male person (who) brought your son to the hospital, Mr. Witness?

A No, sir.

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Q Where did this aunt of yours Ms. Alconyes tell you that your son died, Mr. Witness?

A I was at Paco at that time, sir.

Q Is that the place where you were when you left your house at 10:00 o'clock in the morning?

A Yes, sir.

Q By the way, what is the address of your house on August 2, 1988?

A In Quezon City, sir.

Q What specific address?

A No. 69 San Isidro St., Barangay Sto. Niño, Santol, Quezon City.

Q Did your aunt tell you how she came to know that your son died, Mr. Witness?

A No, sir.

Q When you learned that your son died from your aunt, what did you do?

A I went home immediately, sir.

Q Did you see any person in your house or did you reach your house?

A Yes, sir.

Q Whom did you meet in your house upon your return?

A None, sir.

Q So what did you do, Mr. Witness?

A I waited there, sir.

Q For whom did you wait, Mr. Witness?

A The one who brought my son to the hospital.

Q Were you able to wait for them, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who were those persons whom you waited for, Mr. Witness?

A My Lola and our houseboy, sir.

Q What did your Lola tell you upon their return, about your son, Mr. Witness?

A My Lola told me that my son is dead.

Q Did she tell you where your son was at that time?

A That he was at the hospital, sir.

Q Did you ask her whether she was the one who brought the child to the hospital?

A No, sir.

Q Was she the one or was she not the one who brought (him) to the hospital?

A "Sila ho."

Q Your Lola, is she your grandmother or your grandaunt?

A Grandmother, sir.

Q Mother of your mother?

A Yes, sir.

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Q Did you go to the hospital, Mr. Witness, to verify?

A No, sir.

Q Why not, Mr. Witness?

A "Masama ang loob ko" that is why I did not go anymore to the hospital, sir. 9

The defense also alleged that John Albert was a sickly child from birth and was often hospitalized due to difficulty in breathing, as shown by some medical records. 10 Further presented was the death certificate of John Albert Cloud issued by one Dr. Gacas and dated August 6, 1988, stating that the cause of death was broncho pneumonia with heart complications, 11 and the report made by Patrolman Ulep showing that he investigated the death of the child, John Albert Cloud. 12

On this aspect, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, the medical specialist at the NBI who examined the exhumed body of the little boy, was presented as a prosecution witness. His report 13 indicated "hemorrhage, intracranial, severe, traumatic" as the cause of death. He testified that "the upper incisor, right, was missing, contusions on the face, right side, buttocks, knees and on the head. And the said injuries could have been caused by a hard blunt object, hitting by a fist or a piece of wood." He did give a hypothetical concession "that it was also possible that it was the result of a fall from a building and as result of said injuries the boy suffered internal hemorrhage which was the immediate cause of his death." 14

However, as to what would be the more credible cause of death, this is what he had to say:

Q In your best judgment as a physician, (h)is injury, could have been caused by any force applied, what about the handle of a gun?

A We do not rule out that possibility.

Q Could this finding also with (sic) the result of the excessive of physical hitting (sic)?

A Yes, ma'am.

COURT:

Q Both buttocks sustained injuries according to your findings?

A Yes, right and left side.

Q If baby boy like this boy fall on the high building would sustain injury on the buttocks, the injury on the buttocks as well as the knees?

A The contusion on the buttocks are very extensive. They are 20 by 20 centimeters. So if the buttocks first (sic) is very different, if he falls it is very difficult for him and also on his knees. And the knees are anterior portion it is highly improbable.

FISCAL RAMOS:

Q So as far as the probabilit(ies) are concerned, are you looking for a possibility that he fell on (sic) a high place?

A All in all the fall of (sic) a high place is very remot(e). 15

To recall, the court a quo rendered its decision on November 11, 1994 or six years after the death of John Albert Cloud, and we find its observations therein to be very perceptive and significant, to wit:

The court also considers as inculpatory, corroborative circumstances, the following which the prosecutor elicited from the accused himself and which, in the court's opinion, do not constitute normal, reasonable or compatible with innocent behavior of a father with respect to the horrifying death of his son;

(a) the accused was told that his son died from a fall and he did not even bother to go to the hospital where his son lay dead;

(b) he did not bother to see the medical records or the medical certificate when he knew already that his son did not die of an ordinary, natural cause. And corollarily, said certificate is false and even the alleged doctor who made (it) is a false or non-existent doctor;

(c) the accused took his entire household to Paco, Manila away from Quezon City for years. There must have been some other reason than his alleged sorrow over John Albert's death. For, if it were just his sadness over it, then the Quezon City house could have been rented out or a caretaker left thereat. As it is, even Herminio Acosta left and did not return there anymore to date. Was there cause to shudder about in the death of a2-1/2 year old boy that the Quezon City house of accused had to be abandoned thus like a haunted castle? Under the circumstances, the court believes that it could only be the hounding darts and howls of the memory of what the accused did there rather than what he told the court supposedly happened there, that can furnish such a strong reason for the sudden abandonment of the house at 69 San Isidro St., Sto. Niño (quite an irony), Quezon City; and

(d) despite the alleged unusual cause of death of his son, he allowed his wife Natividad who is not the real mother of John Albert, to be the one to waive the autopsy on his son. We thus find a father very much afraid to face his own baby son freshly lying cold and dead. This is another eerie but nonetheless clear sign of circumstantial guilt. 16

The prosecution's primary evidence that it was appellant who beat up and killed the boy was the testimony of its principal witness Josephine Aguilar who declared that she heard appellant's grandmother herself shouting that it was appellant who killed his

own son by beating him to death. The said grandmother, Rufina Alconyes, was not presented in court, since at the time of the trial she was already dead.

The Solicitor General posits the view that the outbursts of that grandmother constituted exceptions to the hearsay rule since they were part of the res gestae. Those inculpatory and spontaneous statements were: (1) "Pinatay siya ng kanyang ama" (he was killed by his own father); (2) Putang ina ang ama niya . . . walang awa sa anak niya . . . hayop siya" (His father is a son of a bitch . . . without pity for his son . . . he is an animal); and (3) Appellant did not allow his son, John Albert, to accompany her and when the boy started to cry and would not stop, appellant beat his son very hard, tied his hands, and continued beating him until excreta came out of his anus. 17

The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard or saw does not merely constitute an independently relevant statement which it considered as an "exception to the hearsay rule, only as to the tenor rather than the intrinsic truth or falsity of its contents." 18 We will clarify this. Insofar as the statements of Rufina Alconyes are concerned, they are admissible as part of the res gestae, they having been caused by and did result from the startling, if not gruesome, occurrence that she witnessed; and these were shortly thereafter uttered by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. The report made thereof by Josephine Aguilar is not hearsay since she was actually there and personally heard the statements of Alconyes which she recounted in court. Her account of said statements of Alconyes are admissible under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, with respect to the tenor and not the truth thereof, since independent of the truth or falsity of the same they are relevant to the issue on the cause of the death of the victim.

Against the foregoing facts which came from the lips of these two women who had no ill motives whatsoever against appellant and the circumstantial evidence arising from his abnormal and inexplicable post-incident behavior, as well as the physical evidence which will hereafter be discussed, we have merely the bare denial of appellant and the testimony of his faithful houseboy cum driver, Herminio Acosta. Since the latter is the star witness of the defense, we will consider his testimony in extenso.

These are the pertinent parts of his representations in the trial court:

Q Mr. Acosta, where were you on August 2, 1988?

A I was at home, sir.

Q Where was your home then?

A At Santol but don't know specific address.

Q Do you know whose house was that?

A Mr. Robert Cloud the accused.

Q How long have you been staying there at that time?

A About three years.

Q What was your function in that house as a member of the family?

A I know a lot of things, cooking, taken child in the school, driving.

Q In other words you were utility man in that house?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Let us go back to August 2, 1988, who were member(s) of the household present, in the morning and afternoon?

xxx xxx xxx

A Myself, Natividad and Abet and Lola the old woman.

Q What is the full name of Naty?

A Natividad, the wife of Robert Cloud.

COURT:

Q Who is this Abet?

A The one who fell in the stairs.

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Q Who were inside that house, by the way what time of that day when the boy fell from the stairs?

A It was still early maybe 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning.

Q Now let us see, you said that there were six members of the household?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where was Naty, was Naty still there when the boy fell in the stairs?

A She was there at that time.

Q Why?

A I did not notice that she left.

Q What about Mr. Cloud the accused here Robert Cloud, was he there when the child fell from the stairs?

A He was not there also.

Q What about the Lola? Was she there when the boy fell?

A Yes, sir.

Q What do you mean there, when the boy fell the Lola was already there?

A No, sir.

Q Where was she?

A She left perhaps she buy (sic) something, sir.

Q Who were there in that house

A I was there, Jonald also.

Q What about the boy?

A He was upstairs in the room.

Q Now let us see at what time was that boy John Robert Cloud was upstairs?

A In the morning.

Q What was he doing there?

A I don't know because I was in the groundfloor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What time were you at the groundfloor?

A Morning when I heard something "kalabog" that I went there.

Q What were doing there?

A I was preparing food and water for Jonald, the old brother.

xxx xxx xxx

Q While you were doing this work, do you know what happened.

A As I said I heard "kalabog" as if something fell.

Q But before that you did not know that Mr. Cloud left?

A Yes, sir.

Q What about Mr. Cloud, what time did he leave?

A I don't remember.

Q What about the old woman what time did she leave?

A I could not remember the time.

Q Who left ahead Mr. Cloud or the old woman?

xxx xxx xxx

A The Lola first the one who left then Naty then Robert Cloud.

Q Now when you said that (they) left and you heard the "Kalabog" did you know what kalabog is that?

A Yes, sir, I went to the stairway.

Q And what did you find out?

A I saw Abet.

Q So what did you do?

A I held him, I don't know how he fell and I don't expect that he fall in the stairway.

Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the appearance of the boy if you can still remember?

A He had blood.

Q Where?

A On the arms in the face I cannot remember the other.

Q While you were holding that boy what transpired next?

A Lola arrived.

Q Did the lola see what happened to the boy while you were holding the boy, did the lola see the boy in your arm?

A Yes, sir.

Q Was there any remark made by an old woman while you were holding the boy?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please tell us as far as you can remember?

A She was angry with the father because according to her "pinabayaan daw ang bata."

Q Can you represent all as you can the statement of the lola?

A She was already angry and she was telling a lot of things that is all, I don't know what she said.

Q After that what happened?

A The baby was brought to the hospital.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q Who brought the boy to the hospital?

A The two of us, lola and I.

ATTY. MADAMBA:

Q What time?

A Pas(t) ten o'clock in the morning.

Q Do you know what happened in the hospital?

A I don't know I just left there.

Q I am calling your attention to the testimony of one Ms. Aguilar, according to her while she was attending to her child for treatment inside the hospital she saw John Albert Cloud and the old woman and according to her the old woman (was) hysterical and she was stating aloud the following words or expression "Pinatay siya ng sariling ama, pinatay siya ng sariling ama," did you hear that?

xxx xxx xxx

A I did not hear that because I left already.

Q There is also here a statement by, I think this is alluded to you, you said while the old woman (was) shouting you said "Hoy tumigil ka na at huwag kang maingay?"

A Yes, your Honor because she was saying a lot of thing that is why I left already.

Q When you said he was telling a lot of thing, what do you mean?

A "Parang ano ho iyung matanda, kasi may pagkaulyanin iyun."

Q Now after that you left, where did you go?

A I went home to Santol.

Q Whom did you see there?

A Mr. Robert Cloud.

Q Did you notice what he was doing at that time?

A He was already crying.

Q Did you ask him why he was crying?

A No, sir.

Q Did he talk to you?

A He just asked me what happened to the child.

Q What did you tell him?

A I told him that the child was dead. 19

Standing out in bold relief from this orchestrated story narrated by Acosta for the first time after six years of silence is his clearly deliberate effort to make it appear that appellant, his wife and grandmother were not in the house at the time of the incident, thus paving the way for him to claim that he alone saw and could testify to what happened to the victim. Yet, comparing his declarations thereon and those of appellant, they could not even agree or be specific as to when appellant supposedly left the house and stayed away in Paco, Manila. There was not even an attempt on their part to explain why it took more than two hours from the alleged accidental fall from the stairs to take the boy to the hospital which was not a considerable distance away.

The second floor could not be more than four meters from the ground floor, not so highly elevated even for a straight fall

therefrom. In fact, as the trial court elicited from appellant, the stairs from which the boy allegedly fell had only nine steps. It did not even go straight down but went four steps to the first landing then turned right where another five steps led to the ground floor. 20 Evidently, if one merely fell down such stairs, that fall would be broken at the landing where the stairs turned at a right angle, and even if he still continued rolling in that new direction, the momentum would have been greatly reduced. That would be true even if that person did not merely slip or fall, but was pushed or thrown, down the stairs.

And this brings us to the irrefutable physical evidence which, as medico-legal experts say, belies the adage that dead men tell no tales. Indeed, to the trained eye, the inanimate remains of the dead give testimony of their own and, in the present case, that is true even of the young victim who in life could not have been as articulate. We refer to the report of the NBI after the exhumation and autopsy which we have taken pains to completely set out here.

It would be the nadir of gullibility to believe that a small boy with his nominal weight could fall down the stairs above described with such velocity as to result in the injuries which even the experienced hospital staff initially believed were caused by his being run over by a truck. One needs to merely look at the description of the contusions on his face, buttocks and knees; the contused abrasions on his face, hand and thigh; the hematoma on the temporal region of his head; the severe hemorrhages on the cerebral hemisphere of his skull; and the congestion in his brain and visceral organs, to see that appellant and his star witness are gravely imposing upon the patience and credulity of this Court.

That is why when the victim was brought to the hospital, Acosta never even mentioned at all that the boy merely fell down the stairs. The normal action of any person bringing a patient to a hospital, especially a medico-legal case, is to give information even tentatively as to how the injuries were sustained. Yet, although the grandmother was announcing to everybody that the boy was killed through violent maltreatment by his own father, Acosta says he merely told her to keep quiet, and he forthwith left the hospital. He never dared to tell his present cock-and-bull story or mention the conjured accident on the stairs, especially to the

medical staff whom he knew he could not delude, and yet he has the effrontery to do so before this Court.

The circumstances which the court below considered as reactions betraying a sense and knowledge of guilt on the part of appellant and his cohorts have already been catalogued. One of them is the fact that immediately after the death of the victim in the hospital, appellant took his entire household to Paco, Manila, abandoned their house in Quezon City and never came back until several years later. This is admitted by appellant 21 and Acosta. 22 In fact, appellant admitted that, while investigations into the death of his son were going on, he left for Japan in 1990 and returned in 1993, 23 only to be arrested since the investigation had by then zeroed in on his culpability. This circumstance was even sought by the trial court to be clarified by Acosta, but this is what transpired:

Q Do you know or did you come to know why after the death of this boy in the house at Santol everybody left the house and did not return anymore for a long time?

A I don't know. 24

The Court is not unaware of the caution to be observed when circumstantial evidence is to be considered as inculpatory indicia in a criminal prosecution. That is why it has spent unusual time and effort to reflect upon all facets of the circumstances which the lower court accepted as an unbroken chain of events, reinforced by corroboration and yielding a conclusion of guilt, all consonant with the requisites therefor. 25 But, from whatever angle we take the view, the catena of facts cannot but produce an inference consistent with guilt and not with innocence. All these, even aside from the tenet that flight bespeaks guilt, a further strike against appellant in addition to the cover-up running the gamut from falsification to false testimony.

From such ruminations, we are fully convinced that the conscience of the Court can rest easy only by doing justice to an innocent child whose parents had heartlessly failed him. Somehow, a mystical cause may have called upon two good Samaritans — mother with a sense of humanity and a lady lawyer

with a passion for justice — to seek redress for his untimely death. On this consoling thought, we write finis to this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-12660 convicting accused-appellant Robert Cloud of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs in both instances.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

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