IN THE SHADOW OF HISTORYRomanian-moldovan Relations

Kamil Całus

53

IN THE SHADOW OF HISTORYRomanian-moldovan Relations

Kamil Całus

nUmBeR 53WaRsaWsePtemBeR 2015

© Copyright by ośrodek studiów Wschodnichim. marka Karpia / Centre for eastern studies

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Contents

Theses /5

InTroduCTIon /8

I. romanIan-moldovan relaTIons In a hIsTorICal perspeCTIve /10

1. historical background /102. The Bessarabian question in Communist romania /143. romanian-moldovan relations after 1991 /16

II. FaCTors aFFeCTIng BIlaTeral relaTIons /24

1. The question of identity and language /242. The problem of granting romanian citizenship /273. The problem of the Bessarabian metropolitanate /304. The issue of the basic and border treaty /33

III. The oBjeCTIves and Tools oF romanIan polICy Towards moldova /35

IV. romanIa’s role In The polITICs oF ChIșInau /38

V. The sTaTe oF romanIan-moldovan seCTorIal CooperaTIon /41

1. economic and energy cooperation /412. security co-operation /463. Cultural and educational cooperation /47

VI. The Idea oF unIFyIng moldova wITh romanIa /50

1. The revival of the idea of unification /502. The current discourse on unification /523. political parties on the problem of unification /544. The public and unirea /575. prospects for unification /60

VII. prospeCTs For BIlaTeral relaTIons /63

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Theses

• Overthelastquarter-century,relationsbetweenChișinauandBucharesthaveoscillatedbetweenveryclosecooperationandopenhostility.Atanygiventime,theirnaturehasdependedbothontheshort-termpoliticalin-terestsofRomaniaandMoldova,aswellasonwhocurrentlyholdspowerinChișinauandBucharest.FromtheperspectiveofMoldova,whosepro-EuropeangovernmentstartedtoundertakerealactiononEuropeaninte-grationin2009,RomaniahasbecomeanimportantpartnerforfacilitatingcontactswiththeWest,aswellasbeingasourceofsupport.Forthisreason,theMoldovangovernment is interested inmaintaining thebestpossiblerelationswithitswesternneighbour,andinsuppressingandminimisinganytensionsbetweenthem.Ifpro-RussiangroupstakepowerinMoldova,thiswouldvery likely lead to theunthawing of the countries’ currentlysuppressedproblems,andaseriousdeteriorationintherelationship,be-causetheseforceswillemphasisetheindividualityoftheMoldovanpeopleandstokeanti-Romaniansentiments.

• RomaniaandMoldovahavedevelopedverystrong ties,mainlyresultingfromtheirmanyyearsofcommonhistory(includingjointstatehood),lan-guage,andculturalheritage.Ontheonehandthisclosenessfostersbilater-alrelations,butontheotherhanditalsoplacesthemunderaseriousbur-den.ThisisbecauseMoldovanstatehoodandidentityhassomehowbeenconstructedinoppositiontothestatehoodandidentityofRomania.Alargepartofthepopulation(particularlytheRussian-speakingminority)fearsclosercooperationwithBucharest,seeingthisasthreateningalossofinde-pendenceandpossibleunificationwithMoldova’swesternneighbour.Theresultingproblemsaffectallareasofbilateralrelations,political,military,and(toalesserextent)economic.ThismakesithardertofindsolutionstotheproblemswhicharemostimportantfromMoldova’sperspective,suchasthesigningofa‘basicandborder’treatywithRomania.

• For yearsRomaniahas declared thatMoldova is a priority of its foreignpolicy.Besides its traditional goals, consolidating its positionwithin theEUandNATOanditspartnershipwiththeUS,RomaniaistryingtomakeMoldovaoneofthemainfocusesofitsinternationalactivity.TheprimaryobjectiveofRomanianpolicytowardsMoldovaistoreinforcethe latter’spositionwithin the systemofWestern institutions and its internationallinks.Atthesametime,Romaniaistryingtopreventanyattemptatdeep-eningMoldovanintegrationinthestructuresbackedbyRussia,primarily

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theEurasianEconomicUnion.Bucharestisseekingtoachievethesegoalsnotonlyon thepolitical anddiplomatic levels,butalsoby increasing itseconomictieswithMoldova.InChișinau’sopinion,Bucharest’sactionsarealsofocusedonsupportingtheprocessesof ‘re-Romanianising’Moldova,whichshouldbeseenasanelementofbuildingRomanian‘softpower’.De-spiteBucharest’sconsistentpermanentpoliticalobjectives,however,Ro-maniahasnotdisplayedanycoherentstrategytowardsMoldova,anditspolicy towardsMoldovahasbeenverymucha functionofdomestic,notforeignpolicy.Bucharest’spoliticalobjectivesareoftensubordinatedtori-valryamongRomanianpoliticalparties.

• AlthoughRomaniahasplayedagenerallypositiveroleindrawingMoldovatowardsWestern structures andhas been effective in its actions, its ef-fectivenessinotherareasofbilateralcooperationremainsnegligible.Thetechnical supportBucharesthas given is less thannecessary, and infra-structureprojectshavebeenseriouslydelayed,asaresultofproblemsincoordinatingactionsamongtherelevantministries,amongother issues.Thishas led toaverywidegapbetween theverywide-rangingand fre-quentdeclarationsofsupportforMoldovaissuingfromBucharestandtheactualresults.

• FromChișinau’sperspective,RomaniaisavitalcounterweighttoRussianinfluence.TheMoldovangroupswhichcametopowerin2009,preachingtheideaofEuropeanintegrationandreducingRussianinfluence,naturallyturnedtoBucharest,seeingitasanagentandadvocateforChișinauintheEU.ForthesamereasontheCommunists,whoheldpowerin2001-2009,decidedtotakeamoderatelypro-Romanianturnafterasignificantdete-riorationinrelationswithRussiain2003.CooperationwithRomaniaoffersMoldovatheprospectofreducingnotonlyitspoliticalbutalsoitseconomicandenergydependenceonRussia.Bucharest’spossibilitiesarelimited:theRomanianmarketisnotabletoreplacetheRussianmarket,andthepro-jectsforenergycooperation,despitebeingpromotedformanyyears,havesofaronlyhadasymboliceffect.Bucharestisalsooftenseenontheinter-national stageas a representativeofMoldova’s interests in internationalorganisations,aswellasasourceoffinancialaidandtheknow-howneces-saryfortheimplementationofreforms.Atthesametime,theRomanianquestionisoneofthemajorkeystonesofinternalpolicyinMoldova,andindividualMoldovangroupsregularlyexploititfortheirownpoliticalin-terests,whichinturninfluencesthestateofthecountry’srelationswithBucharest.

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• TherhetoricofunificationusedbyseniorRomanianpoliticians(includingtheformerPresidentTraianBăsescu,andtoalesserextentPrimeMinisterVictorPonta)providepropagandafuelforthosepoliticalforcesinMoldovaandelsewhere(especiallyRussia)whichopposetheprocessofChișinau’smovestowardstheWest.Theproclamationofpro-unificationslogansplac-estherulingpro-EuropeancoalitioninMoldovainadifficultsituation,bystrengtheningtheargumentsoftheoppositionparties(includingtheSo-cialistPartyofIgorDodon,andtheCommunists),whosepoliticianshavelonginsistedtothepublicthattheprojectofEuropeanintegrationiscalcu-latedtobringaboutthe‘Romanianisation’ofMoldova,deprivingitofinde-pendenceandforcingitintoNATObythebackdoor.MoscowhasalsousedthedeclarationsflowingfromBucharestasanargumentagainstRomaniaandtheEUbecominginvolvedinMoldova.Moscowalsoarguesthatunifi-cationwouldimplytheenlargementofNATO,whichwouldconsequentlyposea threat toRussian interests.Thenarrativeofunificationalsorais-es tensionsamongMoldova’s ethnicminorities (primarily in theGagauzAutonomy,which is traditionally antipathetic towards Romanians), andmakestherelationshipwiththeauthoritiesofthebreakawayTransnistriamoredifficult.

• The idea ofMoldovan-Romanian unification in the foreseeable future isunrealistic,forpolitical,economic,andsocialreasons.ThemainpoliticalforcesinMoldova,regardlessoftheirpro-Westernorpro-Russiansympa-thies,arenotinterestedingivingupindependenceinthenameofcreatingacommonstate.Moldovanpoliticiansrealise that linking the twocoun-triesinaunitarymodelwoulddeprivethemoftheirpositionsandfuturecareerprospects,andwouldalsojeopardisetheirpoliticalandbusinessin-terests.ThevastmajorityofMoldovansocietyalsoopposestheidea,withparticularresistancecomingfromamongtheRussian-speakingminorityandtheseparatistareaofTransnistria.Contrarytotheirpoliticaldeclara-tions,therulingelitesinBucharestarealsonotinterestedintherealunifi-cationofRomaniaandMoldova.Theirunionistnarrativeispredominantlypropaganda,aimedfordomesticconsumption,andisintendedprimarilytomobilisevotersandemphasisetheirownpatriotism.Inaddition,thecostofsuchaprojectwouldexceedRomania’sfinancialcapacity.Anothercon-siderableobstacleisalsotheclearoppositionoftherelevantinternationalactors,primarilyRussiaand(informally)theEU.

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InTroducTIon

Romania’sinterestinMoldovaismainlybasedonhistoricalandculturalfactors.IntheeyesofmostRomanians,Moldovansarecompatriotswhowereforciblyseparatedfromthemotherland,firstlyin1812whenBessarabiawasincorporat-edintotheRussianEmpire,thenin1940,whenaftermorethantwentyyearsaspartofRomania,thoselandswereincorporatedintotheUSSRbytheMolotov-Ribbentroppact1.Moldova’sterritoriesareseeninRomaniaashistoricalRoma-nianland.ThissentimentisalsoreflectedinthepolicyofBucharest.Officially,relationswithChișinauareconsideredasspecial,andrepresentativesoftheRomanianpoliticalclassoutdoeachotherintheirdeclarationsofassistanceandsupportfortheireasternneighbour,referringtoasharednational,culturalandlinguisticcommunity.Inpractice,however,RomanianpolicytowardsMoldova(andbyextensionthetwocountries’politicalrelations)ismostoftenshaped,notbysentiment,butbyapoliticalpragmatismresultingfromthedesiretowinthesupportoftheRomanianelectorate,amongotherfactors.

Meanwhile,forMoldova,Romaniaisnotonlyaculturallyandhistoricallycloseneighbour,butalsothemostimportantpointofreferenceintheongoingdebateaboutMoldovanidentityoverthelastquarter-century.Moldova’sapproachtoRomaniaandtheRomanianculturalheritagedefinesthepoliticalandideologi-caldividinglineswithinitmuchmoreclearlythantheapproachtoeconomicorsocialquestions.

AllofthismeansthatinordertounderstandthecomplexityofMoldovan-Romanianrelations, it isnecessaryfirstofall tobefamiliarwiththehis-toricalcontextwhichlargelyshapesthecurrentrelationshipbetweenthetwocountries.Thisisessentialtounderstandingmostelementsofcontem-poraryRomanian-Moldovandiscourse,includingtheMoldovandisputeoveritsidentity,andtheseparatismproblemwithinMoldova.Thefirstchapterofthisworkisdedicatedtopresentingthehistoricalconditions,theturbulentpoliticalrelationsbetweenChișinauandBucharestinthemorethantwodec-adessincethecollapseoftheSovietUnion,andtheensuingdiscussionoftheproblemsofbilateralrelations.

1 OntheattitudeofRomanianstowardsMoldovansandMoldova,seeRepublicaMoldovaînconştiinţa publică românească at http://www.fundatia.ro/sites/default/files/Studiu%20Moldova.pdf and Studiu privind starea socială şi identitatea naţională în România, athttp://www.rgnpress.ro/rgn_12/images/stories/2012/08/11-sondaj_CRSS.pdf

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SubsequentchapterspresentthecontemporarysignificanceofMoldovaforBu-charestandRomania’sroleinChișinau’spolitics,includingtheobjectivesandinstrumentsofthepolicieseachpursuestowardstheother.ThissectionalsodiscussesthecurrentstateofRomanian-Moldovanrelationsinindividualfieldssuchaseconomy,cultureanddefence.

ThesixthchapterconcernstheconceptofthereunificationofMoldovaandRomaniawhichregularlyarisesinpublicdebateinbothcountries(andalsobeyondtheirborders).Inthissection,thisidea,the(im)probabilityofitsimple-mentation,anditsroleinMoldovan,RomanianandRussianpoliticsissubjectedtoextensiveevaluation.

ThistextcloseswithanattempttooutlinethefutureofRomanian-Moldovanrelationsintheforeseeablefuture.

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I. romanIan-moldovan relaTIons In a hIsTorIcal perspecTIve

1. historical background

Theareaoftoday’sMoldova(withtheexceptionoftheTransnistrianterri-tories,situatedontheleftbankoftheDniester)ispartofthehistoricalareaknownasBessarabia,whichfromthesecondhalfofthefourteenthcenturyuntil1812waspartofthePrincipalityofMoldavia(PrincipatulMoldovei),oneofthetwohistoricalRomanianstates(alongwithWallachia).In1812,theselands,alongwiththewholeofBessarabia(includingBugeac,Hotimandthesurroundingareas,aswellastoday’sright-bankMoldova)wereincorporatedintotheRussianEmpire.Asaresult,thepeoplelivinginthemwereisolatedfromthenation-andstate-buildingprocessestakingplaceintherestofthePrincipalityofMoldaviaandWallachia,whichwereunifiedin1881toformtheKingdomofRomania2.ThishadahugeimpactontheidentityoftheresidentsofBessarabia.Atthesametime,theRussianauthoritiesintroducedapro-grammeofintensiveRussificationtothenewlyannexedareas.In1826theyprohibitedtheuseoftheRomanianlanguageinlocaladministration,churchliturgyandeducation.Theydisplacedthe indigenouspopulationsanden-couragedrepresentativesofotherethnicgroupstosettleintheterritoriesofBessarabia3.Asaresult,therewasamassinfluxintothecitiesofSlavic,Jew-ish,GermanandArmenianpopulations,anditisthesegroupsthatcametomakeupthemajorityoftheregion’sintellectualandeconomicelite.Thepro-cessofRussificationfacilitatedastateofaffairswhereupto95%oftheethnicMoldovancommunityconsistedofilliteratepeasants.AsaresultofRussia’sactions,thepercentageofthepopulationdeclaringthemselvesasMoldovansinBessarabiafellfrom86%in1817to56%in18974.

2 TheprocessofunifyingtheRomanianstate,infact,lastedmorethantwentyyears.In1859therewastheso-called‘SmallUnification’(Rom.MicaUnire),theformalmergerintoasin-glestateofthePrincipalityofMoldavia(withoutBessarabia)andWallachia.From1862thenewlycreatedstatewasnamedRomania,whiletheKingdomofRomaniaonlycameintobeingin1881.

3 OnthehistoryofBessarabiaafterjoiningtheRussianEmpire,seeamongothersC.King,TheMoldovans:Romania,Russia,andthePoliticsofCulture,Stanford2000;Ş.Ciobanu,Ba-sarabia.Populaţia.Istoria.Cultura,Bucureşti-Chişinău,1992;A.Gil,Bessarabia.Wschod-niaMołdawiajakoguberniaCesarstwaRosyjskiego(1812–1918)[Bessarabia.EasternMol-dova as a gubernia of the Russian Empire (1812-1918)], in Spotkania polsko-mołdawskie[Polish-Moldovanencounters],ed.M.Kosienkowski,Lublin2013.

4 I.Nistor,IstoriaBasarabiei.Editieşistudiobio-bibliograficdeStelianNeagoe,Bucharest1991.

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In1918,theareasofBessarabia,Transylvania,theBanatandBukovinawerean-nexedtoRomania.Thiseventwascalled‘theGreatUnification’(MareaUnire),andinthehistoricalmemoryoftheRomaniansitinitiatedagoldenageinthehistoryofthecountry,calledtheperiodof‘GreatRomania’,whichlasteduntilWorldWarII.

BucharestquitequicklytookactiontopromoteRomanianidentityamongtheinhabitantsofthenewlyunifiedprovinces,butdidnothaveeitherthefinancialresourcesorsufficientnumbersoftrainededucationalandadministrativeper-sonneltosucceedindoingso5.Asaresult,attemptsto‘Romanianise’Moldovamoreoftenstokedtensionsamongtheminoritieslivingthere(especiallytheSlavic,andtoalesserextenttheGagauzpopulations)thanproducedanyrealresults6.Theresistancefromthepopulationwassolargethatfrom1918to1928Bucharestwasforcedtomaintaina‘stateofsiege’inMoldova,whichincludedrestrictionsoncivilrights,expandingthecompetenceofthepolice,andincreas-ingtheRomanianmilitarypresenceinthenewprovince7.

Meanwhile,in1924theSovietauthoritiescreatedtheMoldavianAutonomousOkrug(district)withintheUkrainianSSR,formedbycombiningtheterritoryoftoday’sTransnistriaandthelandseastofit,uptothecityofBălți.InafewmonthsthiswasrenamedtheMoldavianAutonomousSovietSocialistRepublic(MASSR).ThisareahadneverbeenpartoftheRomanianstate,andonlyabout30%ofthepopulationtherespokeRomanian8.Inthisarea,anewMoldovanna-tionalidentitywasdevelopedundertheauspicesofMoscow–‘Moldovenism’–asanalternativetotheRomanianidentity.ItstatedthattheMoldovanswereana-tionseparatefromtheRomanians,whousedadifferentlanguage(Moldovan)

5 AnotherproblemwasthequalityofpersonnelsenttoBessarabiabytheauthoritiesinBu-charest.Itoftenhappenedthatofficialsweresenttothenewlyannexedprovinceasakindofpunishment.

6 DuringRomanianruleoverBessarabiatherewerethreemajoruprisingsagainstthegov-ernmentinBucharest.ThefirsttookplacenearHotimin1919,andthesecond(inthesameyear)inTighina(Rus.Bender).Thethirdoccurred(mostlikelyattheinspirationofMos-cow)in1924inBugeac.AlltheseincidentsweresuppressedrelativelyquicklybytheRoma-nianarmy.

7 See formore detail S. Suveica, Basarabia în primul deceniu interbelic (1918–1928):Mod-ernizareprinreforme;G.Cojocaru,IntegrareaBasarabieiincadrulRomaniei(1918–1923),Bucharest1997;E.Enciu,Basarabiaînanii1918–1940:Evolutiedemograficăşieconomică,Chișinau1998,andalsopartlyinJ.Solak,Mołdawia.Republikanatrzypęknięta[Moldova.Arepublicbrokenintothree],Toruń2009.

8 C.Pantea,TheEthno-DemographicEvolutionofMoldavianAutonomousSoviet SocialistRepublic,Codrul Cosminului,2008,vol.14,p.170.

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writtenintheCyrillicandnottheRomanianLatinalphabet,andtheMoldovanstatewasclaimedtohavedescendedinastraightlinefromthefourteenth-centuryPrincipalityofMoldavia,andwasitsdirectsuccessorstate.AccordingtoadherentsofMoldovenism,theMoldovanslivinginthelandsontherightbankofthePrutsuccumbedtofullRomanianisationaftertheestablishmentoftheKingdomofRomania,andonlytheresidentsofBessarabiaretainedtheiridentity.TheyalsoemphasisedthattheMoldovannation,asopposedtotheRomanian,wasformedonamulti-ethnicterritory,inhabitedtoalargeextentbySlavicpeoples,thankstowhichitwasblessedwithaninnatetoleranceformulticulturalismandmultilingualism9.

In1940,undertheMolotov-RibbentropPact,thewholeofBessarabia(andthusalsotheterritoryofmodernMoldova)andnorthernBukovinawereannexedtotheUSSR.TheMASSRwasabolished,andinitsplacetheMoldavianSovietSocialistRepublic(MSSR)wasestablished,joiningTransnistriatoasubstantialpartoftheRomanianterritoriesannexed10.In1941,thankstoitsalliancewiththeThirdReich,Romaniamanagedtoregainitslostterritory,aswellastakingmorelandeastofthesouthernBugriverfromtheUkrainianSSR.Overthenextthreeyears,undertheregimeofGeneralIonAntonescu,Romaniaexterminatedabout200,000RomanianandBessarabianJewsandRomaintheareabetweentheDniesterandtheSouthernBug(knownastheTransnistriaGovernorate[Ro.GuvernământulTransnistriei).

In1944,asaresultoftheRedArmy’scounteroffensive,theareawasreturnedtotheUSSR.TheSovietauthoritiesembarkedonpoliciesoflarge-scalede-Romani-anisationandMoldavianisationoftheMSSR.Therelativelyfewpro-RomanianactivistswhoremainedintherepublicaftertheannexationweresenttotheSovietUnionorshot.Thiswasalsothefateofthelandowners,clergyandanyoftheintelligentsiaassociatedwithRomania.Intheperiodfrom1940to1941alone,morethan30,000peopleweredeportedorarrested,andanother50,000-55,000weresenttoforcedlabourthroughouttheUSSR11.AftertheSovietarmyre-oc-cupiedBessarabia,therepressioncontinued.From1944until1951about40,000people(about1.5%ofallBessarabia’s inhabitants)weredeported(mainlyto

9 FormoreonthehistoryoftheMASSRandtheemergenceoftheideaof‘Moldovenism’,seeE.Negru,PoliticaetnoculturalăînRASSMoldovenească,Chișinau2003.

10 TheinclusionofpartoftheterritoriesoftheMASSRintothenewrepubliclegitimisedtheexistenceof theMoldavianSSR, andmeant that theexistingSovietpolitical eliteof theMASSRcouldbeusedtobuildthenewunionrepublic.

11 A.Moraru,IstoriaRomanilor.BasarabişiTransnistria,Chișinau1995,p.337.

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CentralAsia)aspartoftheprocessofde-kulakisation,forpoliticalorreligiousreasons.AnothertoolforbreakingsocialresistancewasthegreatfaminethatstrucktheMSSRin1946-7,whichclaimedbetween150,000and200,000vic-tims(about6-7%ofthepopulation)12.Inthisway,MoldovaunderwentdeepSovietisationwithinthespaceofjustafewyears13.Theprocessofimposinganewidentitywasaidedbythebilingualismoftheurbancentresconstitutingtheheartofthecountry’sintellectualandeconomiclife,whichhadcontinuedsincetheimperialperiod,togetherwiththeverylowculturalself-awarenessoftheruralpopulation.Thesmallundergroundoppositionwasmarginal,andwasunabletowithstandthedecisiveactionsoftheSovietauthorities.Itwasnotuntilthelate1980s,asaresultofthechangestakingplacewithintheUSSR,thatarevivaloftheRomaniannationalideabeganintheMSSR.

ThecomplexhistoricalpastofthecurrentterritoryofMoldovastillshapesthesimilarlycomplexrelationshipbetweentheinhabitantsofRomaniaandMol-dova.RomaniansperceivethevastmajorityofethnicMoldovansasmembersoftheRomanianpeople,andseeMoldovanidentityasmerelyakindofRomanianregionalidentity(liketheidentitiesofWallachiaorTransylvania).ThereisalsoacommonconvictionthatthepresentMoldovanRepublichasaRomanianchar-acterderivingfromthehistoricalpast.InasurveyconductedinJune2012bytheCentrulRomândeStudiişiStrategii,almost70%oftheRomanianssurveyedfeltthattheresidentsofBessarabiaareprimarily‘Romanians’,while85%feltthatthisareaisRomanianland14.

Ontheotherhand,theattitudeofMoldovanstowardsRomaniansisambivalent,rangingfromunconditionalsympathytoanantipathysometimesborderingonhatred.ManyethnicMoldovans(which,accordingtothe2004census,76%ofthepopulationbelievethemselvestobe,whileonly2-3%considerthemselvesRomanians)acknowledgethecultural,historicalandlinguistictiesbetweentheircountryandRomania,butonlysomeofthemdirectlyidentifywiththeRomanianelement15.Membersofthisgroupareusuallyfavourablyorneutrally

12 A.Ţăranu,Голод в Молдове (1946–1947).Cборник документов.Chișinau1993,p.10.13 Formoreabout theperiodofStalinist repressionand theSovietisationof theMSSR,see

V.Stavila,DelaBasarabiaromaneascalaBasarabiasovietica,1939–1945,Chișinau2000;andE.Şişcanu,Basarabiasubregimulbolșevic(1940–1952),Bucharest1998.

14 http://www.rgnpress.ro/rgn_12/images/stories/2012/08/11-sondaj_CRSS.pdf15 InastudyconductedinOctober2009amongresidentsofMoldova(omittingTransnistria),

respondentswereaskedtoindicatethedegreeofsimilaritybetweenMoldovanandRoma-nianidentityonascalefrom1to5,where1meantthatthetwowereidentical,and5that

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inclinedtowardsRomania16.AspecificgroupofMoldovanresidents(bothMol-dovanswhoseethemselvesasanationseparatefromtheRomanians,andtheethnicminorities),becauseoftheeducationtheyreceivedintheSovietperiod,seesRomaniaasahistoricaloccupyingpower,whichtwice(in1918,andtheninalliancewithHitlerin1941)annexedBessarabiaunlawfullyandattemptedto‘Romanianise’itsinhabitantsbyforce.ItismostlytherepresentativesofthisgroupwhoseeRomaniaasathreattothesovereigntyoftheMoldovanstate.

2. The Bessarabian question in communist romania

IntheearlyyearsofCommunistRomania,theBessarabianquestionwasnotraisedinpublicspace,andconstitutedakindoftaboo.BoththeannexationofBessarabiabytheRussianEmpirein1812,andinparticularthere-annexationbytheUSSRoftheseareasofRomaniain1940,remainedforbiddensubjectsforpoliticalreasons17,eventhoughthesubjectremainedaliveinthecollectivememoryoftheRomanianpeople.However,thetaboosbegantobebrokeninthelate1950sandearly1960s.ThiswaspartoftheprogrammeinitiatedbyGheo-rgheGheorghiu-Dej,thethenleaderofRomania,ofBucharest’slimitedeman-cipationfromtheSovietUnion.AfterNicolaeCeaușescucametopowerin1967,interestintheBessarabianquestioninRomaniaincreased.BucharestbegantoconsidertheKremlin’spolicytowardstheMoldavianSSRwithincreasinginterest.RomaniandiplomatsaccreditedinMoscowwereorderedtomonitorandanalyseSovietofficials’speechesforreferencestoBessarabiaandBuko-vina.TheRomanianSecuritatesecretservicealsoreceivedsimilarinstructions.Atthesametime,theoutdatedradioandtelevisiontransmitterlocatedinIașiwasmodernisedsothatitsbroadcastscouldcovertheentireterritoryoftheMoldovanSSR.Then,itbeganbroadcastingradioandtelevisionprogrammeswhichemphasisedthecommonhistoricalandculturaltiesbetweentheRoma-niansonbothbanksofthePrut.ThesetransmissionsweredirectedequallytothecitizensofSovietMoldovaandtheRomanians,whowerethusremindedofRomania’srightstohistoricalBessarabia.Inthe1960scensorshipofpublica-tionsjustifyingtheSovietclaimtotheseareasalsobegan.

MoldovanwascompletelydifferentfromRomanian.Almost26%chosearatingof‘1’or‘2’,while47%indicated‘5’or‘4’.http://www.interlic.md/download/988/

16 Nevertheless, identifyingoneself as aBessarabianRomaniandoesnotnecessarilymean(andoftendoesnotmean)onehasanysympathyfortheRomanianstate.

17 ItwasawkwardfortheRomanianCommunistPartytocriticisetheSovietUnionovertheannexationofBessarabia,notonlyforpoliticalreasons,butalsobecauseeveninthe1920s,thepartyhadofficiallysupportedtheideaofcedingtheselandstotheUSSR.

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AtthesametimetheBessarabianquestionwasraisedmoreandmoreboldlyinRomanianscience.ScientistsstartednotonlytotalkandwriteopenlyabouttheannexationofBessarabiabytheUSSR,buttheyevencalledthisevent‘anactofSovietimperialism’or‘Sovietoccupation’directly18.TheRomaniancharacterofthelandsbeyondthePrutbegantobeopenlyemphasised,andtheirhistorywasalsoincludedinstudiesofthehistoryofRomania.

ThesubjectoftheillegalityoftheannexationandRomania’srightstoBessara-biawasalsoraisedatthepolitical level.Duringthepartycongressin1965,CeaușescudiscussedaletterwrittenbyFriedrichEngelsin1888inwhichhecriticisedtheoccupationofBessarabiabytheRussianEmpirein1812.Ayearlater,alsoduringthepartycongress,CeaușescupubliclycondemnedtheRo-manianCommunistParty’ssupport(declaredinthe1920s)fortheannexationofBessarabia.

Thesuccessive leadersofCommunistRomaniaappealedtotheBessarabianquestionnotastheresultofgenuineresentment,orofanyrealdesiretodrawChișinauandBucharestclosertogether.Rather,thiswasaninstrumentofin-ternalpolicy,andtoalimitedextent,alsoofforeignpolicytowardstheSovietUnion.RaisingthesubjectofBessarabiawasawayofhighlightingthecountry’sindependencefromSovietinfluenceandbuildinguppoliticalandsocialsupportinsidethecountry.Inaddition,itintensifiednationalistsentimentswithinthecountry,consolidatedsociety,anddistractedthepublic’sattentionfromRoma-nia’sgraduallydeterioratingeconomicsituation.Toalimitedextent,itwasalsoaninstrumentforputtingpressureontheSovietUnion,whichBucharestusedwheneverrelationswithMoscowdeteriorated19.ActivepropagandaactivitiesorpoliticalgesturesbyRomaniainrelationtotheinhabitantsoftheMSSRcouldalsoprovokeunrestamongthepro-Romanianpartofthepopulationoftheseareas.Toavoidsuchsituations,theSovietauthoritiesweresometimeswillingtomakesmallconcessionstoBucharest.

18 M.MusatandI.Ardeleanu,whopublishedthebookViatapoliticaînRomania1918–1921inBucharestin1976,notonlyusedtheterm‘Sovietoccupation’inthecontextoftheannexa-tionofBessarabia,butalsoexplicitlystatedthatithadoccurred“asaresultoftheSoviet-Fascistpactof1939”.

19 ThetendencytoraisetheMoldovanissuetoconsolidateRomaniansociety,demonstratingRomania’sinternationalindependenceandbuildingpublicsupportfortherulingelite,didnotendwith theendofCommunism inRomania,and indeedstilloccurs (possiblyevenmorestronglythaninthepast)inmoderntimes,whichwillbediscussedlaterinthistext.

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3. romanian-moldovan relations after 1991

Inthelateeightiesandearlynineties,thewaveofperestroikaledtoincreasinglyfrequentandnumerousdemonstrationsintheMSSR,organisedbytheMoldo-vanPopularFront(FPM).Thismovement,establishedin1989,wasaconglom-erationofreformist,democraticandanti-Communistorganisationsfromacrosstherepublic(initiallyTransnistriaandGagauziawererepresentedaswell),whereinthedominantrolewasplayedbyrepresentativesofthepro-RomanianMoldovanintelligentsia:writers,professorsandjournalists.ItsactivistscalledfortheRomaniannationalandculturalrevivaloftheindigenouspeopleofMol-dova.On27August1989,inthecentralsquareofChișinau,theFPMorganisedarallyofabout300,000people,whichwaslaternamedtheGrandNationalAssembly(MareaAdunareNaţională)20.Asaresult,on31August1989theau-thoritiesadoptedalawrequiringtheuseoftheLatinscriptwhenwritingtheMoldovanlanguage.Hithertothelanguage,whichfromthelinguisticpointofviewisthesameasRomanian,hadbeenwrittenentirelyinCyrillic.Inthefirstpartiallyfreeelectionstothelocalparliamentin1990,theFPMmanagedtoformacoalitiontogetherwithsomeofthereform-mindedCommunistsandtakepower.

GrassrootscommunityinitiativeslinkingbothbanksofthePrutbordertookonmoreandmoremomentum.Historywasmadebytheso-calledBridgeofFlow-ers,whichwasorganisedon6May199021.Forafewhours,therequirementforRomanianstohaveapassportandvisatotraveltotheMSSRwassuspended.AroundamillioninhabitantsofRomaniacrossedovertheeightborderbridgeslinkingthetwocountries,bringingflowerswiththemandthrowingthemintotheriver22.On23June1990Moldovadeclareditssovereignty,andon27August1991,theparliamentinChișinauadoptedadeclarationofindependence,whichRomaniaacknowledgedonthesameday.

ThefestivaloftheRomaniannationalrevivalinMoldovawasmetbyfirmop-position fromrepresentativesof theRussian-speakingminorities living in

20 Thesquarewhere theevent tookplace isnowcalledPiațaMariiAdunăriNaționale (theSquareoftheGrandNationalAssembly).

21 OntherenaissanceofMoldovan-Romanianrelationsafter1990,seeJ.Pieńkowski,DlaczegoRumuniazawszebędziekochaćMołdawię?[WhywillRomaniaalwaysloveMoldova?],inSpotkaniaPolsko-Mołdawskie[Polish-Moldovanencounters],ed.M.Kosienkowski,Lublin2013,p.157.

22 Asecondsuchevent,thistimeforMoldovancitizens,tookplaceon16June1991.

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Moldova,whofearedmarginalisation(duetotheirignoranceoftheRomanianlanguage)aswellasapossiblemergerwithneighbouringRomania.Thisre-sistancetookonparticularintensityintheGagauziaandTransnistriaregions,whichhavepredominantlyRussian-speakingpopulations.On19August1990Gagauzia,inthesouthofthecountry,renounceditsallegiancetoChișinau,whileTransnistriadidthesameon2September1990.TheseregionsdeclaredthemselvestobeSovietrepublicsbelongingtotheUSSRandindependentofMoldova.Thesecessionofbothregions,particularlyTransnistriawhich ishighly-industrialisedandliesonstrategictradeandcommunicationroutes,provokedareactionfromChișinau.InMarch1992,full-blownarmedhostilities(precededbyminorskirmishes)beganbetweenMoldovanforcesandTrans-nistrianvolunteers,supportedbyRussiantroopsstationedintheregion.Thesubsequentfive-monthstruggle,whichclaimedthelivesofatleast650peopleonbothsides,representedadefeatforthegovernmentforces.On18July1992aceasefirewasdeclared,andon21JulyinMoscow,theMoldovanPresidentMir-ceaSnegursignedanagreementwithBorisYeltsinendingtheconflict23.Thus,ChișinaueffectivelylostallcontrolovertheterritoriessituatedontheleftbankoftheDniester,aswellastheright-banktownofBender(inRomanian,Tighina).

After1992theMoldovanpublic’spro-Romanianenthusiasmbegantowanequickly,asevidencedbytheearlyparliamentaryelectionsheldinFebruary1994.ThePopularFrontwononly7.5%ofthevote,andtheAgrarianDemo-craticParty,opposedtotheideaofunificationandfavouringMoldovanisation,tookcontrolofparliament,winning43%ofthevotes.Aftertheformationofthenewgovernment,relationswithRomaniabegantocool.Akeyeventwastheorganisation,attherequestofPresidentMirceaSnegur,ofareferendumon6March1994inwhichthecitizenscouldcommentontheirdesiretopreservetheindependenceofthenewlycreatedMoldovanRepublic(andthusdeclareindirectlywhethertheyfavouredpossibleunificationwithRomania)24.Atthat

23 Awide-rangingandobjectivedescriptionoftheoriginsofTransnistrianandGagauzsepa-ratism,andofthebattlesthemselves,canbefoundinJ.Solak,Mołdawia.Republikanatrzypęknięta.Historyczno-społeczny,militarnyigeopolitycznywymiar„zamrożonegokonflik-tu”oNaddniestrze[Moldova.Arepublicbrokenintothree.Thehistoricalandsocial,mili-taryandgeopoliticaldimensionsofthe‘frozenconflict’overTransnistria],Torun2010.

24 Thereferendumquestionwas:‘DoyouwanttheRepublicofMoldovatodevelopasanin-dependentandunitarycountry,withinthebordersestablishedonthedayoftheDeclara-tionofIndependence(23June1990);topromoteapolicyofneutrality;andmaintainmutu-allybeneficialeconomicrelationswithallcountriesoftheworldandguaranteeitscitizensequalrights,inaccordancewiththenormsofinternationallaw?’.

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time,independencewassupportedbyalmost98%ofthecitizensofMoldova25.Thenewgovernment’snextstepsweredictatedbythemandatetheyhadthusobtained,whichlaidthefoundationsforthebuildingofanindependentstate.InJuly1994,aconstitutionwasadoptedinwhichMoldovanandnotRomanianwasdesignatedasthestate’swrittenlanguage.Ayearlateranewnationalanthemwasadopted,abandoningtheRomaniannationalanthemwhichhadbeenusedsince199126.TheproblemofGagauziawasalsoresolved;itwasgiventhestatusofanautonomywithinMoldova,andwasatthesametimeguaranteedtherighttodeclareindependenceifChișinaueverdecidedtounitewithRomania.ThiswasaclearsignalthattheMoldovanauthoritieswerenotconsideringanysuchstep.BucharestdidnothideitsdisappointmentatChișinau’sactions,butdidnottakeanyvisibleactiontoinfluenceMoldova’spositionregardingRomania.

Thesituationchangedagainin1997-1998,whenPetruLucinschibecamepresi-dent,andtheAgrarianDemocraticPartywasreplacedbyacoalitionofthreepro-Westernparties,whichtookthenameoftheAllianceforaDemocraticandProsperousMoldova27.Romanian-Moldovanrelationswererevived.Thepro-WesterncoursedeclaredbythenewgovernmentinChișinaureceivedclearsup-portfromBucharest.Numerousbilateralmeetingsatallpoliticallevelsresultedin17bilateralagreementsbeingsigned.April2000sawtheinitiallingofatreatyonpartnershipandcooperation(knownasthebasicandbordertreaty),whichhadbeennegotiatedoverforalmostsevenyears28;bothpartiesunequivocallydeclaredaspecial,privilegedstatusfortheirbilateralrelations,resultingfromtheirhistoricalpastandtheirlinguisticandculturalcommunity.TheagreementstatedthatthepartnershipbetweenChișinauandBucharestmustbebuilton

25 Thisresultwasduetoseveralfactors.ThekeyreasonforthehighsupportforindependencewastheendjustafewmonthsearlieroftheconflictwithTransnistriaandthecontinuingtensioninrelationsbetweenChișinauandGagauzia.TheresidentsofMoldovarealisedthatmovingtowardsunificationwithRomaniacouldleadtotheoutbreakofanotherconflict.AnothernolessimportantreasonwasdisappointmentintheattitudeofBucharestwhich,despiteenormousinterestintheideaofunificationintheearlynineties,didnottakeanyfurtherstepstobringitabout.

26 Moldova’snewnationalanthemwasapoemcalled‘Limbanoastra’(Ourlanguage),writtenbyAlexanderMateevici,aBessarabianRomanian.ThepoemiswrittenintheRomanianlanguage,buttheactualnameofthelanguageisnevermentionedinitscontent.

27 ThedevelopmentofMoldovan-RomanianrelationsoverthelasttwodecadeshasalsobeenbroadlydescribedinO.Milevschi,Romania:FromBrotherlyAffectionwithMoldovatoDis-illusionmentandPragmatism,inMoldova:ArenaofInternationalInfluences,ed.M.Ko-sienkowski,W.Schreiber,Plymouth:LexingtonBooks,p.159.

28 Thenegotiationslastedsolongmainlybecauseofalackofagreementbetweenthepartiesonthefinal formsforrecordingthehistoricalandcultural foundationsofbilateralrela-tions(includingtherecognitionofaMoldovannation,asdistinctfromtheRomanian).

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mutualsupportfortheireffortsaimedatintegrationintoEuropeanstructures,andbasedontheinvolvementofRomaniaintheactivesupportofallactionstakenbyMoldovatopreserveitsunityandintegrityasastate.Oneresultofthedevel-opmentofthecountries’mutualrelationswasthecreationoftwoEuroregions,‘LowerDanube’and‘UpperPrut’(in1998and2000respectively).

However,thispositiveperiodinbilateralrelationsendedrelativelyquickly.TherisetopowerofthePartyofCommunistsoftheRepublicofMoldova(PCRM)inApril2001markedthebeginningofanotherradicalchangeinrelationsbetweenChișinauandBucharest.ThePCRMwenttothepollsproclaiminganideaof‘Moldovenism’derivedfromtheSovietera.Thepromotionofthisideaguar-anteedtheCommunistssupport,notonlyfromthemanypro-independenceorSovietisedMoldovans,whohadhadtheSovietversionofhistoryinstilledintothematschool,butalsotheRussian-speakingminoritieslivinginMoldova(Russians,Ukrainians,Gagauz,Bulgarians).Thishappenedfortworeasons.Firstly,MoldovenismlegitimisedtheMoldovanstate’srighttoindependenceanddeemedgroundlessanydiscussionsaboutthepossibilityofunifyingMol-dovaandRomania,whichtheRussian-speakingresidentsofthecountryandtheanti-RomanianethnicMoldovansfeared.ThisideaalsocreatedtheconceptofaMoldovannation,theexistenceofwhichRomaniahadtraditionallydenied,consideringallethnicMoldovansasjustmembersoftheRomanianpeople.Sec-ondly,MoldovenismpresentedMoldovaasacountrywhichhadlongbeenmulti-ethnic,multilingual,toleranttowardsotherreligionsandopentoallminorities.Inthisperspective,theCommunistscontrastedMoldovenismwithRomaniannationalism,whichfromtheirperspectivewaschauvinistandintolerant.AtthesametimetheCommunistsopenlypromotedrapprochementwithRussia(includingeventualaccessiontotheUnionStateofBelarusandRussia),andclosercooperationwiththecountriesoftheformerSovietUnion.

TheCommunists’ideologicalattitudewasperceivedverycoollyinRomaniafromthebeginning.MoldovenismstandsincontradictionwiththeRomaniannationalidea,andhastraditionallybeenprofoundlycriticisedasaproductofSovietnational-historicalengineering,designedtojustifyRussia’sclaimtotheterritoryofpresent-dayMoldova.RapprochementwithRussiaandthedeclaredlimitingofChișinau’scooperationwiththeEUalsoconflictedwithBucharest’sinterests.Aftertheparliamentaryelectionsof26November2000returnedtheSocialDemocraticParty(PSD)topower,Romaniaremainedstronglypro-West-erninitsorientation,puttingintegrationwithNATOandtheEUattheheartofitsforeignpolicy–instarkcontrasttoMoldova’sturneastwards.Thetwocountries’differencesinviewsonquestionsofidentityandtheirgeopolitical

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coursesposedaveryrealdangerofexacerbatingtensions.Forpragmaticrea-sons,theCommunistsmanagedtoavoidraisingsensitiveissuesinbilateralrela-tionsduringtheirfirstfewmonthsofrule29,butinJuly2001Chișinau’sadoptionofnewregulationselevatingthestatusoftheRussianlanguageprovokedthefirstconflicts.

Inthefollowingmonths,bilateralrelationswerealsoaffectedbythematteroftheoperationinMoldovaoftheBessarabianMetropolitanate30,whichissubjecttotheBucharestpatriarchy;aswellastheproblemoftheTreatyonPartnershipandCooperation,whosesigning(despitehavingbeeninitialledin2000)Romaniaconsistentlyrefused.Overthenextmonths,ChișinauandBucharestrepeatedlyblamedeachother,whichledtoafreezeinbilateralrelations.

ThesituationchangedinNovember2003,togetherwithChișinau’swithdrawalfromtheagreementwithTransnistriawhichMoscowhadforceduponit(theso-calledKozakmemorandum31),asaresultofwhichMoldovan-Russianrelationsdeteriorateddramatically.DeprivedofRussianpoliticalandfinancialsupport,thePCRMwasforcedtomakeapro-Westernturn,atleastatthelevelofitspublicrhetoric.ThegovernmentinChișinaualsobegantotryandimproverelationswithRomania.FromtheCommunists’perspective,theirpro-WesternturninthesituationoflosingMoscow’ssupportwasparticularlyimportantinthecontext

29 DuringPresidentVladimirVoronin’sfirst official visit toBucharest inMay2001,he an-nounced a “newpragmatic approach” toRomanian-Moldovan relations.ThedeclarationwasmetwithawarmwelcomefromthePresidentofRomaniaIonIliescu,whosaid:“Wewouldliketoleaveasidepoliticalandideologicaldifferencesandmaintainapragmaticap-proachtorelationsbetweenMoldovaandRomania,whichwillnotdeteriorate inthefu-ture.”(EvolutiapoliticiiexternearepubliciiMoldova(1998–2008),http://www.fes-moldo-va.org/media/publications/2010/Evolutia%20politicii%20externe%20a%20Republicii%20Moldova%20%281998-2008%29.pdf,p. 15.)Afterhis return toChișinau,Voroninpubliclystressed thepriority ofMoldova’s relationswithRomania, andboasted thathehad suc-ceededinestablishingfriendlyrelationswithPresidentIliescu.

30 FormoreseeChapterII.3,inthesectiondevotedtotheproblemoftheBessarabianMetro-politaninMoldova.

31 TheKozakMemorandum of 2003 provided for the solution of the Transnistria problemthroughthecreationofan ‘asymmetricfederation’ofMoldovaandTransnistria.There-alisationofthisscenariomaximisedtheinfluenceofTransnistriainfederalgovernmentpolicies,andminimisedtheimpactofthefederalauthoritiesonTransnistria,whilemain-tainingthepresenceofRussiantroopsintheregionasaguarantoroftheagreement.ThissolutionwouldhavechangedthepoliticalsysteminMoldovainfavourofthepro-Russianforces.PresidentVoronininitiallyexpressedinterestinimplementingthememorandum.Atthelastmoment,however,hewithdrewfromsigningtheagreement,whichwasinter-pretedasaseriousaffrontintheKremlin,andverynegativelyaffectedtheRussianauthori-ties’confidenceintheMoldovanCommunists.

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oftheparliamentaryelectionsplannedfor2005.Thepro-Russiansloganswithwhichthepartyhadwonpowerin2001werenolongereffective,andthechangeinitsgeopoliticalorientationopenedupanopportunitytogainWesternsupport.BoththeCommunists,whointhenewsituationwerecountingonimprovedrela-tionswithRomania,andBucharest,whichsawachanceinthedeteriorationofMoldovan-RussianrelationsforanewopeninginitstieswithChișinau,begancleareffortstotonedownthehostilerhetoric.

Moldova’snewpolicyborefruitin2004,when(inlargepartthankstosupportfromBucharest)ChișinauwasgrantedobserverstatusintheSouth-EasternEuropeCooperationProcess(SEECP)32.WithRomania’shelp,Chișinaualsoman-agedtosignaPactonStabilityandSecuritywithRussia,Ukraine,Romania,theOSCE,theUSandtheEU.Moldovancooperationintensifiedfurtherinconnec-tionwithits2005parliamentaryelections,wherethePCRM’smainsubjectwasEuropeanintegration.ThePresidentofRomania,TraianBăsescu,newlyelectedthatyear,openlysupportedboththepro-EuropeanaspirationsofChișinauaswellasPresidentVladimirVoroninhimself.

However,Romanian-Moldovanrelationsbegantodeteriorateonceagain in2006.OnekeytothereneweddisputewasRomania’sdesiretoincreasetheroleitwasplayingintheprocessofMoldova’sEuropeanintegration,aswellasthestillunresolvedproblemofthebasicandbordertreaty.TheturningpointandcatalystforthenegativechangeinbilateralrelationswastheofferPresi-dentBăsescumadetoMoldovain2006;heproposedtoChișinauthatMoldovashouldunitewithRomaniabeforeitsentryintotheEU,andbecomeamemberoftheCommunitywithitin2007.AlthoughfromthebeginningtheRomanianPresident’sideahadnochanceofbeingimplemented,andwasarhetoricaltrickratherthanacallforrealaction,itstillprovokedastrongreactionfromtheMoldovangovernment.InresponsetoBucharest’sproposal,VoroninpromptlyansweredthatMoldovawouldnever,evenafterjoiningtheEU,optforunifica-tionwithRomania33.

Thesetwostatementslaunchedasecondseriesofmutualaccusationsinfiveyears,whichinturnhasledtothesubsequentprolongedcrisisinrelationsbetween Bucharest and Chișinau. Tensions reached their peak after the

32 TheSouth-EastEuropeanCooperationProcess(SEECP)waslaunchedinSofiain1996.Itaimstostrengthensecurityintheregion,developeconomicrelationsandpromotedemocracy.

33 http://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/Politica/38114/Presedintele-Voronin-respinge-unirea-cu-Romania.html

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parliamentaryelectionsinApril2009,whenPresidentVoroninopenlyaccusedRomaniaofinspiringandco-organisingtheriotswhichtookplaceinChișinauaftertheannouncementofthevotingresults34.TheRomanianAmbassadorFilipTeodorescuwasdeclaredpersona non grataandforcedtoleaveMoldovawithin24hours.AtthesametimetheauthoritiesinChișinaudecidedtointroducevisarequirementsforRomanians,andtemporarilyclosedtheborder.Themove-mentoftrainsbetweenthetwocountrieswassignificantlyreduced(officiallyfortechnicalreasons).Thesetensionslastedarelativelyshorttime.DuetothelackofconsensusinMoldova’sparliamentonchoosingacandidateforpresident,earlyparliamentaryelectionswereheldinJuly2009.Asaresult,acoalitionoffourpro-Europeanpartiescametopower,andthisgovernmenthasopenedanewchapterinRomanian-Moldovanrelations.

Bilateralrelationsintensifiednotablyalmostimmediatelyaftertheformationofthepro-EuropeangovernmentinChișinau.Bucharestdecidedtotakeadvantageofthenewgovernment’sEUaspirations,andtakeoverasthemainadvocateofMoldova’sEuropeanintegrationprocess.Ontheonehand,itwouldprovideaplatformforcooperationandallowthebuildingoffriendlybilateralrelations,andontheotherRomaniawouldthusbolsteritsownpositionwithintheEU.InJanuary2010,attheinitiativeofBucharestandwiththeparticipationofFrance,aso-calledGroupofFriendsofMoldovawasfounded.RomanianpoliticiansalsobegantospeakoutinMoldova’sinterestsintheEuropeanParliament.Atthesametimetherehasbeenaclearrevivalofpoliticalcontacts.Representa-tivesoftheRomaniangovernmentarrivedinChișinaualmosteverymonth.TheclimatewasalsomademoreconducivebytherisetoMoldova’spresidencyofMihaiGhimpu,theleaderoftheLiberalPartyandaconfirmed‘Romanophile’,inAugust2009.Inaddition,inApril2010,PresidentsBăsescuandGhimpusignedadeclarationonstrategiccooperationinwhichBucharestundertooktohelpMoldovainitseffortsontheroadtoEuropeanintegration35.RomaniahasalsocommittedtoprovidingMoldovawithanEUacquis communautairetranslatedintoRomanian,whichmadetalksonsigninganAssociationAgreementwiththeEUmucheasieroverthefollowingyears.Attemptswerealsobegunatre-solvingtheproblemsinbilateralrelationswhichhaddatedbackmanyyears.In2010a‘borderregime’treatywassigned;thiswasacompromise,butinthe

34 Manyoftheprotesters,whonumberedtensofthousands,gatheredattheseatofgovern-mentandtheparliamentbuilding,carriedRomanianflagsandshoutedpro-Europeanandpro-Romanianslogans.Atonepoint,severaldemonstratorsalsomanagedtohoisttheRo-manianflagonthetopofthepresident’sofficialbuilding.

35 http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/0001739.pdf

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longrunitprovedunsatisfactorytoChișinau(asitlackedprecisedefinitionsofahistoricalandculturalnature),addressingthefailuretoagreeonabasicandbordertreaty36.Inthesameyear,thetwocountriesalsosignedanagreementonsmallbordertraffic,anddecidedtoopentwoRomanianconsulates(inBălțiandCahul),whichRomaniahadbeentryingunsuccessfullytoachieveforyears.AnotherimportantgesturewasthedecisiontostartremovingthebarbedwireandfortificationsontheMoldovansideoftheborderareathathadbeenleftoverfromtheSovietUnion.

FromtheperspectiveofChișinau,whichhasworkedforEuropeanintegrationsince2009,RomaniahasbecomeanimportantpartnerinfacilitatingcontactswiththeWest,aswellasbeingasourceoftechnicalassistance(inmattersofintegration)andthenecessaryknow-how.Forthisreason,theMoldovangov-ernmentisinterestedinsilencingandminimisinganytensionswithitswesternneighbour.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatthecausesforthesetensionshavebeeneliminated.

36 http://www.mae.ro/en/node/5879

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II. FacTors aFFecTIng BIlaTeral relaTIons

1. The question of identity and language

Thequestionofidentityisperhapsthemostsensitiveissueinthebilateralrela-tionsbetweenMoldovaandRomania,andcontinuallyinfluencestherelation-shipbetweenthetwocountries.

Accordingtothe2004census.76%ofthepopulationofMoldovadeclaredtheywereethnicMoldovans,whileonlyabout2-3%37considerthemselvestobeRo-manians38.Toagreaterorlesserextent,theyrecognisethehistorical,cultural,andgeneticrelationshipsoftheirnationwithRomania,butneverthelesstheyemphasisethattheyconstituteaseparatenationalgroupwhichhasitsownhis-toryandculturedistinctfromRomania’s.ThisviewisprimarilytheresultofthelongprocessofMoldavianisationconductedbytheSovietauthoritiesduringtheMSSRperiod,aswellastheexclusionofthepeoplelivingontheterritoryofmodernMoldovafromthenation-shapingprocessesofthemodernRomaniannationwhichhadbeentakingplacesincethemid-nineteenthcentury.NeitherthegovernmentinBucharestnortheRomanianscientificcommunitybelieveintheexistenceofaseparateMoldovannationality;theyareoftheopinionthatMoldovais‘thesecondRomanianstate’inhabitedprincipallybyRomanians,andtheyconsidertheveryconceptofa‘Moldovannation’tobenothingmorethantheresultoftheethnicengineeringconductedbytheUSSR.Romaniaalsoopposestheconceptofa‘Moldovanlanguage’,distinctfromtheRomanian,intheMoldovanlegalsystem(primarilytheconstitution).

ThisdifferenceofviewsbetweenBucharestandChișinauontheproblemofaseparatenationalidentityfortheMoldovanscausessystematicproblemsinbilateralrelations.OneexampleofthisisthefreezingofrelationsbetweenChișinauandBucharestin2001.On19Julythatyear,theParliamentofMol-dovaadoptedalaw‘Ontherightsofpersonsbelongingtonationalminoritiesandthelegalstatusoftheirorganisations’,whichgavespecialimportancetotheRussianlanguage.Underthenewlaw,Russianbecameade factoprivileged

37 Thesefiguresshouldbetreatedwithcaution.TherearemanyreasonstobelievethatthecensusresultsweremanipulatedaccordingtothedemandsoftherulingCommunistParty,whichwantedtoshowtheoverwhelmingpredominanceoftheMoldovanidentityovertheRomanian.Itmustthereforebeassumedthatthenumberofpeopledeclaringthemselvesas‘Romanians’isactuallyhigher,althoughunlikelytoexceed10%.

38 Anothercensuswasheldin2014,butitsresultshavestillnotbeenpublished.

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language,almostequalinstatustotheMoldovanlanguage.AllactsofnationalimportanceweretobepublishedinbothMoldovanandRussian,andcitizensweregiventherighttoapproachstateinstitutionsandreceiverepliesfromtheminRussian.Romaniarespondedaggressively,notonlytotheriseintheroleoftheRussianlanguageinMoldovaashighlightingtheeasternturnofChișinau’spolicy,butalsoontheofficialuseoftheterm‘Moldovanlanguage’intheact.Evenduringthediscussionontheformofthenewdocument,PresidentIliescupubliclyacknowledgedthattheclaimthatMoldovanwassupposedlydistinctfromRomanianwasaninstrumentfor‘denationalising’theRomani-anslivinginMoldova.AtthesametimeAdrianNăstase,theRomanianPrimeMinister,expressedhisconcernsattheMoldovanparliament’sdecisions.Bothspeechesendedtheperiodof‘pragmatism’inrelationsbetweenChișinauandBucharestwhichhadbeenobservedsincetheCommunistscametopowerinApril2001,andinitiatedanintensiveexchangeofmutualaccusations.Justtwodaysafterthepresidentandprimeminister’sdeclarations,thespeakeroftheMoldovanparliamentsaidthatRomaniansconstitutedanationalminorityinMoldova,justliketheRussiansorUkrainians.ThisstatementwasreceivedinBucharestasaseriousaffront.Thedeteriorationofrelationswasalsoinfluencedbyafreezeinthedialogueonthebasicandbordertreaty.AsearlyasSeptemberNăstasehadstatedthatalthoughrelationsbetweenMoldovaandRomaniastillretainedtheirspecialcharacter,hestressedatthesametimethattheyhadun-dergone“somechanges”sincethePCRMcametopowerinChișinau.OnceagainhestressedRomania’stoughstanceregardingthenamingofthelanguage.HealsomadehisplannedvisittotheMoldovancapitalthatOctoberconditionalonprogressbeingmadeinimplementingtheeconomicprojectswhichhadbeenagreedonearlier.

DuetoBucharest’srefusaltorecogniseMoldovansasaseparatenation,ithassystematicallydeniedtheirrighttoregisteraMoldovanminorityinRomania39.CensusesheldinRomaniaalsodonottaketheexistenceofaseparateMoldovannationalityintoaccount,andtreatallMoldovanslivinginthecountryasRo-manians,eveniftheyhaveMoldovancitizenship.MoldovanminoritieslivingbeyondthebordersofRomania,forexampleinUkraine,arealsounrecognisedbyBucharest(despitethefactthatUkrainerecognisestheexistenceofseparate

39 ThispositionsometimesmeetswithpeculiarreactionsfromtheMoldovanauthorities.OneexampleisVladimirVoronin’sstatementinFebruary2007inwhichhestatedthatbecauseBucharestdoesnotrecognisetheexistenceoftheMoldovannationality,about10millionMoldovanslivinginRomaniacannotobtainthestatusofanationalminority.Seehttp://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2007/02/070224_voronin_moldoveni.shtml

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RomanianandMoldovanminoritiesonitsterritory).Ontheotherhand,Mol-dovarecognisestheexistenceofaRomanianminorityonitsterritory,whichhasmetwithanegativereactionfromBucharest.

TheidentityproblemlargelylostitsimportanceinshapingRomanian-Moldo-vanrelationsafterthepro-EuropeanAllianceforEuropeanIntegrationcoali-tioncametopowerin2009.Theleadersoftwoofthethreepartiesformingthecoalitionatthattime(theLiberal-DemocraticPartyandtheLiberalParty40)declaredtheproximity,oreventheidentity,ofthepeoplesofRomaniaandMol-dova,aswellasofficiallyadmittingthattheyspeakRomanian41.Inaddition,in2013theConstitutionalCourt’sjudgementthattheDeclarationofIndependence,whichstatesthatRomanianisMoldova’sofficiallanguage,tookpriorityovertheConstitution,accordingtowhichthelanguageisMoldovan42.Atthesametime,60%ofMoldovansstillusetheterm‘Moldovanlanguage’todescribethestatelanguage,while37%believethatitscorrectnameis‘theRomanianlanguage’43.

Despitetheidentityissue’stemporarydisappearancefromtheagendaofMoldo-van-Romanianrelations,itmustbestatedthatthediscussionontheformoftheMoldovanidentityanditsrelationshipwiththeRomanianidentityisconstantlypresentinMoldovandomesticpolitics,evenunderthecurrentrulingcoalition.Despiteitspro-Europeanorientation,theDemocraticParty(PDM),thesecond-largestpartyinthecoalition,supportsthe‘Moldovanist’idea,emphasisingtheMoldovans’linguisticandculturaldistinctivenessandthespecialroleoftheRussianlanguageinthehistoryofMoldova,andalsodefendstherightsofthecountry’sRussian-speakinginhabitants.ThereisnodoubtthatRomaniawillremaintheessentialpointofreferenceintheconstantlyongoingprocessofMoldovaformingastableidentityforitself.

40 The ruling coalition inMoldova collapsed as a result of the political crisiswhich beganinJanuary2013.InMay2013anewgovernmentwasappointed,includingthetwopartieswhichhadformedthepreviouscoalition(theMoldovanLiberalDemocraticPartyandtheDemocraticParty),aswellastheLiberalPartyofReformers,madeupofsomeLiberalPartymembers.ThispartyhadthesameattitudetotheissueofidentityinMoldovaastheLiberalParty.

41 http://unimedia.info/stiri/premierul-leanca-si-presedintele-timofti--la-unison-denu-mirea-limbii-de-stat-trebuie-modificata-68185.html

42 SeeKamilCałus,MołdawskiSądKonstytucyjnyuznałjęzykrumuńskizapaństwowy[Mol-dova’sConstitutionalCourt designatesRomanian as the state language],OSW Analizy, 11December 2013: http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2013-12-11/moldawski-sad-konstytucyjny-uznal-jezyk-rumunski-za-panstwowy

43 http://unimedia.info/stiri/romana-sau-moldoveneasca-ce-spun-sondajele-75541.html

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2. The problem of granting romanian citizenship

TheRomanianpolicyfacilitatingRomaniancitizenshipforMoldovansisprob-ablyoneofthestrongesttoolsforbuildingRomania’s‘softpower’inMoldovasincethatcountrybecameindependent.

In1991,theparliamentinBucharestadoptednewregulationsontheacquisitionofRomaniancitizenship.Thesestatedthatformernationalsofthatcountrywhohadlosttheircitizenshipagainsttheirwillwouldhavetheopportunitytoregainit,withouthavingtosurrendertheircitizenshipormovingtoRomania.ThislawwasdirectedparticularlyattheinhabitantsofthoseterritorieswhichbelongedtoRomaniabefore1940,i.e.Moldova(withoutTransnistria),aswellasnorthernBukovinaandBugeac,whicharecurrentlylocatedwithinUkraine.TherighttoacquirecitizenshipundertheLawalsoappliestothedescendantsofthesepeople.FromtheperspectiveoftheRomaniangovernment,thisactwasintendedtofixthe‘historicinjustice’thatwastheforceddeprivationbytheUSSRofRomaniancitizenshipfromtheresidentsofBessarabia.However,inthe1990sRomaniancitizenshipdidnotenjoygreatpopularityamongMoldovans,asinpracticetheRomanianpassportdidnotbringanytangiblebenefitswithit.BesideshavingsomesentimentalvalueforthesmallpartofthepopulationofMoldovawhoseeitastheirhomeland,Romaniawasnotinvitingineconomicterms.Asaresult,onlyabout100,000peoplehadappliedforRomaniancitizen-shipbytheendofthedecade44.

InterestintheRomanianpassportincreaseddramaticallyaftertheEU’saboli-tionin2001ofvisarequirementsforRomaniancitizenstotravelintheSchen-genarea.Injustsixmonths,theRomanianauthoritiesreceivedalmost19,000applicationsfromresidentsofMoldovafortherestorationofcitizenship.Verysoon,theRomanianauthoritieswereforcedtotightenuptherules,bothduetoinsufficientadministrativeresourcestoprocesstheapplications,aswellasinthelightofcriticismofBucharestfromtheEU.Amongothermeasures,theRomanianauthoritiesbegantorequirethatdocumentsbesubmittedtotheMinistryofJusticeinBucharest,andnotatanyconsularbranchashadhith-ertobeenthecase.Inaddition,newcitizenswouldnotbeabletobenefitfromprivilegessuchastherighttotravelvisa-freetotheSchengenareaforaperiodoffouryears.Thenewregulationsalmostcompletelystoppedtheapplications

44 A.Cioroianu,ReacquiringtheRomanianCitizenship,Bucharest2012,p.360.

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torestorecitizenship45.Thesituationchangedagainafteramendmentstothelawoncitizenshipintroducedbytheparliamentin2007-2008.Bureaucraticprocedureswereimproved,andanewinstitutioninthestateadministrationwascreatedresponsibleforprocessingapplicationsforcitizenship,theNationalAdministrationforCitizenship,whichacceleratedtheprocessofnaturalisation.Atthesametime,Romania’saccessiontotheEUin2007significantlyincreaseditsownattractiveness46.Theproceduresforissuingcitizenshipwerefurtherrelaxedinreactiontotheanti-CommunistdemonstrationswhichtookplaceinChișinauaftertheparliamentaryelectionsinApril200947.Asaresult,by2013thenumberofMoldovanswithRomanianpassportshadrisentoabout400,000-500,00048.

TheissueofgrantingRomaniancitizenshipmustbeconsideredinthecontextoftheofficialrelationsbetweenBucharestandChișinau.Theprovisionsconcern-ingallowingMoldovancitizenstoacquireRomaniancitizenshipunderasimpli-fiedprocedureinthe1990sandthefirsthalfofthe2000sdidnotarousemuchreactionfromtheauthoritiesinChișinau,primarilyduetotherelativelysmallscaleofthisphenomenon,andthecountries’correctbilateralrelationsatthattime.However,thesituationchangedafterthemodificationsandamendmentsmadetothelawoncitizenshipin2007.TheofficeofPresidentVladimirVoronininChișinaucalledBucharest’spolicyathreattoMoldovanstatehood49,andinOctober2007theCommunist-dominatedparliamentpassedalawbanningpub-licofficeholdersfromholdinganyothercitizenshipthanMoldovan.Chișinau’scriticismofRomaniancitizenshippoliciesdrieduprelativelyquickly,however,asithadnosupportfromtheelectorate.ThepossibilityofobtainingaRomanianpassport,especiallyafterRomaniajoinedtheEU,metwithinterestfromasig-nificantpartofMoldovansociety(accordingtoTraianBăsescu,overamillionMoldovansappliedfortherestorationofcitizenship50).

45 ThenumberofMoldovanswhoweregrantedRomaniancitizenshipintheyears2001-2007amountedtobarely3000.

46 Undoubtedly,interestinRomaniancitizenshipwasraisedbytheintroductionon1Novem-ber2006ofvisarequirementsforcitizensofMoldova.

47 http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-5598907-guvernul-simplifica-procedurile-ob-tinere-cetateniei-romane-moldovenii-pot-obtine-cetatenia-daca-strabunic-roman.htm

48 ThisnumbercomesfromastudyconductedbytheSorosFoundationin2013.http://www.fundatia.ro/o-politic%C4%83-ce-cap%C4%83t%C4%83-viziune-redob%C3%A2ndirea-cet%C4%83%C8%9Beniei-rom%C3%A2ne-0

49 http://www.realitatea.net/voronin-acuza-romania-ca-pune-in-pericol-statalitatea-re-publicii-moldova_110217.html

50 http://www.realitatea.net/un-sfert-de-milion-de-moldoveni-au-primit-cetatenia-roma-na_935694.html

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AftertheAllianceforEuropeanIntegrationcoalitioncametopowerin2009,theissueofcitizenshipcompletelydisappearedfromthecatalogueofbilateralproblems.PrimeMinisterVladFilatofficiallydeclaredthatbothfromalegalperspective,aswellasinhispersonalopinion,Moldovanshavetherighttohavemultiplecitizenships51.ThepossibilityofMoldovansobtainingRomanianpassportsisamethodforthegovernmentinChișinautoalleviatesocialtensionsbyincreasingthemobilityofitscitizens,whichisparticularlyimportantformi-grantworkers.ItalsoallowsanincreaseincashflowtotheMoldovaneconomythroughanincreaseinremittancesfrompeopleworkingabroad.

ThequestionofgrantingcitizenshiptoMoldovancitizensshouldalsobeseenasaveryeffectiveinstrumentforensuringpoliticalpopularityinRomaniaitself.PromotingtheliberalisationofthelawoncitizenshipisonewayforRomanianpoliticianstopositionthemselvesaspatriotswhocareaboutthefateofcompa-triotsabroad,astancewhichtraditionallywinsthesympathyoftheelectorateandensuresariseinpoliticalpopularity.Atthesametime,thisapproachdoesnotgenerateanyvisiblecoststotheRomanianstate,asthenewcitizensdonotusuallysettleinRomania,nordotheyseekworkthere,whichcouldleadtogrowingresentmentamongtheRomanianpopulation.Inaddition,thenewciti-zensarealsowillingtovoteforpoliciespromotinganeasierprocessofgainingcitizenship.ItseemslikelythatoneofthereasonswhyTraianBăsescuinsistedonmodifyingthelegislationin2007wasthehopeofobtainingadditionalvotesfromnaturalisedMoldovans.Inthepresidentialelectionsin2009Băsescuwonthesecondroundbyaverysmallmargin(71,000);theoverwhelmingmajorityofvotersabroad–andthus,largelyMoldovanswithRomanianpassports–sup-portedhiscandidacy.

ConsideringthislargegroupofMoldovanswithRomanianpassports,Roma-nianpoliticianshavemadeahabitofincludingMoldovaintheirelectioncam-paignsoverthelastfewyears.In2012,beforethereferendumtodismissTra-ianBăsescufromthepostofPresidentofRomania,hepaidanofficialvisittoChișinau,therealpurposeofwhichwastomobilisethelocalelectorate.DuringtheelectionstotheParliamentofRomaniain2012,EugenTomac,acandidatefromthelistoftheDemocraticLiberalParty,alsoopenedhiselectoralcampaigninChișinau;afterwinningandtakinghisseatasadeputy,heopenedthefirstparliamentaryofficeofaRomaniandeputyintheMoldovancapitalin2013.

51 VladFilatmadethisdeclarationinaninterviewwithKamilCałusandPiotrOleksy,‘Wearenotafraidof thefuture’,published inthequarterlyNowa Europa Wschodnia [New Eastern Europe]No.5(XIII)2010.

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AlthoughtheEUliftedthevisarequirementforthoseMoldovancitizenswhoholdbiometricpassports(fortravelforuptothreemonths)inApril2014,thisdidnotnoticeablyreduceMoldovans’interestinthepossibilityofreceivingRomaniancitizenship.Visa-freetraveldoesnotofferthepossibilityofobtaininglegalemploymentintheEU,whichtheRomanianpassportdoesallow52.

3. The problem of the Bessarabian metropolitanate

SincethefirstyearsofMoldovanindependence,theissueofthestatusandpo-sitionoftheBessarabianMetropolitanate,whichoperatesinMoldovaandissubordinatetotheRomanianOrthodoxChurch,hasposedaproblemtotheauthoritiesinChișinauwhich,overtime,clearlybegantoaffectMoldovan-Romanianrelationsaswell.

Historically,theOrthodoxChurchinwhatisnowMoldovawassystematicallysubordinatedtotheMoscowPatriarchatewhentheseareaswerejoinedtotheRussianEmpirein1812.Bymid-centurytheMoldavianOrthodoxChurchhadinprincipleundergonetotalRussification.ThesituationwaschangedwhenthecurrentareasofMoldova(withoutTransnistria)joinedRomaniain1918,asaresultofwhichtheMoldavianArch-EparchwasincorporatedintotheRoma-nianOrthodoxChurch.ThisstatecontinueduntilthereturnoftheseareastoMoscow’scontrol.Aftertheannexationoftheterritoryoftoday’sMoldovain1940,theSovietauthoritiestookextensivemeasurestoeliminatetheinfluenceoftheRomanianOrthodoxChurch,andforcedthefaithfultocomeunderthejurisdictionofMoscow.TheBessarabianMetropolitanatewasrelegatedtothelevelofaneparchyandincorporatedintotheRussianOrthodoxChurch.ThenewunitwasledbyIeronimZaharov,aRussianpriestnominatedbyMoscow.TheassetsoftheformerBessarabianMetropolitanatewerenationalised,de-stroyedortransferredtotheRussianOrthodoxChurch.OrthodoxpriestsfromtheRomanianChurchwereexiledormurdered.Asaresult,injustafewyearstheSovietauthoritiesmanagedtotakefullcontroloftheremainingMoldovanchurchstructures.

InthewakeofGorbachev’s thaw,theRussianOrthodoxChurchrecoveringitsfreedomofactionproceededtorenewitsinfluenceinMoldova.AsearlyasSeptember1990,twomonthsafterMoldova’sdeclarationofitssovereignty,the

52 SeeMarta Jaroszewicz,KamilCałus,Moldova: ayear after the introductionof thevisa-free regime, OSW Analyses, 6 May 2015: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-ses/2015-05-06/moldova-a-year-after-introduction-visa-free-regime

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RussianPatriarchAlekseiIIcreatedthenewdioceseofBălțiduringhisvisittoChișinau,andappointedtheMoldovanPetruPăduraruitsbishop.InJanu-ary1991,theHolySynodinMoscowdecidedtoestablishaMetropolitanateofChișinauandAll-Moldova(hereinafterabbreviatedastheMoldovanMetropoli-tanate).Thepro-RomanianMoldovanPopularFrontthenrulinginChișinaudisapprovedoftheRussianOrthodoxChurch’sincreasinginfluence,butapartfromsuspendingtheofficialregistrationofthenewMetropolitanate, itdidlittletolimittheChurch’sactivity.ThesituationchangedinSeptember1992whenBishopPetruwasofficiallysuspendedforhispro-Romanianconvictions,andannouncedthecreationoftheAutonomousBessarabianMetropolitanatewithagroupofpriests.HealsoaskedthePatriarchoftheRomanianOrtho-doxChurch,TeoctistI,toincorporatetheself-proclaimedMetropolitanateintotheRomanianChurchwiththerankofdiocese.On19December1992,with-outconsultingMoscow,TeoctistdecidedtorestoretheOrthodoxBessarabianMetropolitanateintheRepublicofMoldova.TheinterimmanagementoftheMetropolitanate,untiltheelectionofametropolitanoftheRomanianEpiscopalChurch,wasentrustedtoBishopPetruofBălți.

ThecreationofanOrthodoxChurchinMoldovasubordinatetotheRomanianPatriarchatewasverywellreceivedinRomania,butthestrengtheningMoldo-vaneliteincreasinglyopenlysupportedtheChișinauMetropolitanate,subordi-natetoMoscow.Asaresult,althoughin1993theauthoritiesinChișinaufinallyregisteredtheMetropolitanateofChișinauandAll-Moldova(establishedin1991),eachsuccessiveattempttoregistertheBessarabianMetropolitanatewasturneddown.ThisconductbytheMoldovanauthoritieswasprimarilypoliti-callymotivated.ChișinauwishedtoavoidadeteriorationofitsrelationswithRussia,andmoreimportantly,toensurethesupportoftheMoldovanelector-ate,86%ofwhombelongtotheMoldovanMetropolitanate53.Inaddition,formalrecognitionoftheBessarabianMetropolitanatewouldhaveenabledthelattertorequesttherestitutionofpropertyseizedafterBessarabia’sannexationtotheSovietUnion,whichtheMoldovanMetropolitanatealsointendedtodo.TheauthoritiesinChișinaufearedthataclashbetweenbothOrthodoxChurchesforinfluenceandwealthcouldprovokesectariantensions,whichitwantedtoavoidatallcosts,especiallyinthecontextofthealreadysignificantethnictensionswithintherepublic.

53 Source:http://photos.state.gov/libraries/moldova/106281/PDF-RU/2011-IRF-RU.pdfTheMoldovanMetropolitanateismuchlargerthantheBessarabian.Itincludessome1300parishes,comparedtothefigureofjustover100parishessubordinatedtothelatter.DataonPatriarchKirill’sdeclarationin2013:http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/63936.htm

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DespitetheentanglementofthePatriarchatesofMoscowandBucharestincon-flictovertheofficialregistrationoftheBessarabianMetropolitanatethrough-outthe1990s,thisproblemeffectivelyremainedaninternalMoldovanmatter,anddidnotdirectlyaffecttherelationshipbetweenChișinauandBucharest.

ThesituationchangedradicallyafterthePCRMcametopower.AfterashortperiodofmaintaininggoodrelationswithRomania,itspoliticiansbegantoexploittheproblemoftheBessarabianMetropolitanateinordertoshapeitspolicytowardsBucharest.On2October2001IonMorei,theMoldovanMinisterofJustice,whileappearingbeforetheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightsinacaseconcerningtheofficialregistrationinMoldovaoftheBessarabianMetropoli-tanateOrthodoxChurch,describeditsactivitiesanditssupportbyBucharestasamanifestationofRomania’s“expansionistpolicy”and“anattempttoinflu-encetheinternalaffairsofthesovereignandindependentRepublicofMol-dovathroughtheuseofpro-Romanianforcesinsidethecountry”54.Inresponse,PrimeMinisterNăstasecalledonVoronintodismissMorei,butthisrequestwasrejected.AtthesametimeNăstaseannouncedthataslongasChișinaufailedtoreplyformallytoMorei’sspeech,bilateralrelationswould“havetoremainsubjecttoredefinition”55.Chișinausaidthattheminister’sstatementhadbeenpersonalinnature,andrefusedtomaketheofficialapologydemandedbyBucharest.NăstasefinallyannouncedthatdespitethesituationRomaniawantedtomaintainits‘technicalcooperation’withMoldova.

DespiteChișinaurecognisingtheBessarabianMetropolitanateandofficiallyregisteringitin2002,thequestioncontinuestocauseproblemsinbilateralrela-tions.TheconflictbetweentheMetropolitanatesonceagaintookonapoliticalcharacterin2007,whentheSynodoftheRomanianOrthodoxChurchdecidedtocreatethreeneweparchiesinright-bankMoldovaandTransnistria.Thisre-ceivedanangryresponsefromboththeChișinauMetropolitanateandtheMos-cowPatriarchate,andwithinashorttimetheMoldovanauthoritiesalsojoinedintheconflict.PresidentVoroninstatedthattheRomanianOrthodoxChurch’sactionsarepartoftheconstantaggressionBucharestwascarryingoutagainstMoldova;hemadeanothersimilardeclarationinDecember200756.Asaresultoftheescalationofthedispute,ChișinauexpelledtwoRomaniandiplomats

54 L.Turcescu,L.Stan,Church–stateconflictinMoldova:theBessarabianMetropolitanate,inCommunist and Post-Communist Studies36(2003),p.460.

55 ConflictbetweenBucharestandChisinaushowsnosignof lettingoff…,http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2001/01-10-09.rferl.html

56 http://www.europalibera.org/archive/news/20071209/445/445.html?id=1450870

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anddemandedthatthefourpriestsoftheBessarabianMetropolitanateleavethecountry.ThedisputeendedwiththePatriarchateofBucharestwithdraw-ingfromitsdecisiontoopentheneweparchies,andaradicaldeteriorationofrelationsbetweenMoldovaandRomania.

Sincethecoalitionofpro-Europeanpartiescametopowerin2009,theconflictbetweentheMetropolitanatesnolongerhasapoliticaldimensionandhasnotaffectedbilateralrelations.Itshouldbeassumedthatifpro-Russianforcesandanti-Romanianforcestakepoweragain,thisissuewilloncemorebecomeaninstrumentinrelationsbetweenBucharestandChișinau.

4. The issue of the basic and border treaty

Althoughnegotiationshavebeenongoingsincetheearly1990s,RomaniahasconsistentlyrefusedtosignabasicdocumentwithMoldovagoverningthetwocountries’bilateralrelations(namelytheAgreementonPartnershipandCo-operation,orthebasicandbordertreaty)57.MoldovahascalledforRomaniatoadoptthisdocument,asdoingsowouldconstituteaformalrecognitionoftheMoldovan-Romanianborder.Meanwhile,thefailuretosignitintroducesanelementofuncertaintytobilateralrelations,hamperstheimplementationofreciprocalagreements,andgivesaverystrongpropagandaargumenttoanti-RomanianpoliticalforcesinMoldova.Bucharest’slackofpoliticalwilltosignsuchadocumentallowsthesegroupstoargue,withsomejustification,thattherealobjectiveofRomanianpolicyisinfacttoabsorbMoldova.Asaresult,thisalsoincreasessocialtensionsinsidethecountry,becausethelackofabordertreatyenhancesthefearsamongtheRussian-speakingminorityandthepro-independencesectionofMoldovansocietyofapossiblemergerwithRomania.

TheauthoritiesinBucharestarenotinterestedinsigningatreatywithChișinauprimarilyoutoffearofthereactionoftheirownelectorate.ForalargepartofRomaniansociety,suchastepwouldbeseenasasymbolicsealingofthelossoftheMoldovanlands,andtheformalabandonmentofanyhopeforthereunifica-tionofthetwocountries.Inaddition,thevastmajorityofRomanianpoliticianshavestressedthatsigningsuchadocumentwouldbeasymbolicacknowledg-mentoftheMolotov-RibbentropPact.Atthesametime,theyarguethatsuchatreatyisunnecessarybecauseRomaniarecognisedtheborderwiththeUSSR

57 BucharestandChișinauwereclosesttoreachinganagreementin2000,whentheAgree-mentonPartnershipandCooperationwas initialled.However, thisdocumenthasneverbeensignedbytheparties.

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in1947,undertheTreatyofParis,andsignedtheFinalActoftheConferenceonSecurityandCooperationinEuropein1975,whichiscommittedtotheterrito-rialintegrityoftheotherEuropeanstates.

Anadditionalproblemhamperingthesigningofthetwodocumentsisthepre-viouslydiscussedissueoflanguageandidentity.TheMoldovanauthorities,par-ticularlyduringCommunistrule,pushedforsuchatreatytoincludeprovisionsonthedistinctdifferenceoftheMoldovanlanguage,highlightingtheexistenceofanindependentMoldovannation.TheversionofthetreatyproposedbytheCommunistsalsopresentedadifferentnarrationofthehistoryoftheMoldovanlandsfromthatofRomania.TheMoldovanpositionmetstrongoppositionfromBucharest,makingitimpossibletoholdconstructivedialogueaimedatworkingoutacompromiseagreement.Thesituationhasnotchangedevensincetherisetopowerin2009ofpro-Europeanforces,whichweremuchmorefavourabletoRomaniaandmorewillingtomakeconcessionstoit.Chișinaudidagreetoseparatetheissueoflocalbordertrafficfromthebasicandbordertreaty,andasearlyas13November2009Bucharestsignedanagreementonthismatter.Ayearlater,on8November2010,thepartiessignedatreatyconcerningtheborderregime,whichdefinedtheissuesconcerningthemanagementandcontroloftheMoldovan-Romanianborder,andalsodefinedtheframeworkforcoopera-tionbetweenthetwocountries’borderservices.Bothdocumentsareofapurelytechnicalnature,however,andcannotbeseenastheequivalentofafullbordertreaty.Moreover,Bucharestonlyagreedtothesigningrelativelyreluctantly,primarilyinordertoaccelerateRomania’sjoiningtheSchengenarea.Despitesigningthedocument,ithasnotyetbeenratifiedbytheRomanianParliament58.

ItseemsthatthegovernmentinBucharestwillnotdecidetosignthebasicandbordertreatywithMoldovaintheforeseeablefuture,forfearofbeingcriti-cisedbythepoliticaloppositionanditsownelectorate.Chișinau’spressuretosolvethisproblemistooweak,justlikethepressurefromtheWesternpart-ners.Thereisnodoubtthattheabsenceofsuchanagreementwillstillremainapretextforanti-Europeanandanti-RomanianpropagandafromMoldova’spro-Russiancircles,andforRussiaitself.

58 http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1714504.html

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III. The oBjecTIves and Tools oF romanIan polIcy Towards moldova

Romania’spolicyobjectivestowardsMoldovaremainconstant,regardlessofthechangesintherulingelitesinBucharestandChișinau,orofthemutualrelationsbetweenthetwocountries.

TheprimaryobjectiveofRomanianpolicytowardsMoldovasincethelattergainedindependenceistoanchorChișinauinthesystemofWesterninstitu-tionsandinternationalassociations.Toachievethisgoal,regardlessofthestateofbilateralrelationsatanygiventime,BucharesthasrepeatedlyactedasMoldova’sadvocateinitseffortstojointheOSCE,theCouncilofEuropeandtheWTO.BucharesthasbeenastrongsupporterofMoldovajoiningtheEuropeanUnion,henceitsunequivocalsupportforallthepriorstagesofMol-dova’smovetowardstheEU,includingjoiningtheCETAandtheCentralEu-ropeanInitiative.RomaniaalsosupportedMoldovasigningtheAssociationAgreementassoonasitcould,aswellastheagreementontheDeepandCom-prehensiveFreeTradeArea(DCFTA)whichispartoftheAA;andhasoftenlobbiedforMoldova’sinclusioninEUregionalcooperationformatssuchastheDanubeStrategy.Romaniawasthemaininitiatorandfounderin2009oftheso-calledGroupofFriendsofMoldova(a.k.a.theGroupfortheEuropeanActionofMoldova)intheEU.

Atthesametime,RomaniaistryingtopreventanyattemptstodeepenMoldo-vanintegrationwiththestructurespromotedbyRussia.Moldova’sratificationin1994oftheBielavezhaAccordsandtheCISStatute(andthereforeitsformalagreementtojointhisorganisation)metwithanegativereactionfromBucha-rest.RomaniahasalsodenouncedtheideaofMoldovajoiningtheCustomsUn-ion.AlthoughBucharestofficiallysupportsMoldova’sterritorialintegrity,inpracticethepossiblereunificationofMoldovaandTransnistriadoesnotlieinRomania’sinterest.SuchamovecouldinfactleadtoanincreaseinRussianin-fluenceinthecountry,andwouldundoubtedlyalteritssocialstructureandin-creasetheroleoftheRussian-speakingpopulationinthepoliticsofChișinau59.ThiswouldundoubtedlyaffectrelationsbetweenMoldovaandRomania.Toachieveitsobjective,Bucharesthasbeenworkingnotonlyonthepoliticalanddiplomaticlevels,butisalsoseekingtoincreaseeconomictiesbetweenRomania

59 AsPresidentofRomania,TraianBăsescuspokeonthesecessionofTransnistriaforthesakeofMoldova’sEuropeanintegrationinApril2015:http://www.pan.md/news/Besesku-Mol-dova-doljna-otkazatisya-ot-Pridnestroviya/54851

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andMoldova.ThisisintendedbothtoincreaseRomania’simportanceasatrad-ingpartnerforMoldova,andtodevelopthetransportandenergyinfrastruc-turebetweenthetwocountries.

Bucharest’sactionstowardsChișinauarealsofocusedonsupportingthepro-cessesof‘re-Romanianising’Moldova,whichshouldbeseenaspartofamovetobuildupRomaniansoftpower.Romaniahasfunded6000scholarshipsforMoldovanstudentsandpupils;itprovidesliteratureinRomaniantoMoldova’slibraries,andsuppliesschoolwithhistorytextbooks(writtenbyRomanianhistorians,whichalsoallowsittopromotetheRomaniannationalidea).Inad-dition,thefinancingofscholarshipsallowsBucharesttoattractthemosttal-entedMoldovanstudents,whoeitherremaininRomaniaor(lessfrequently)returntoMoldova,wheretheyformapro-Romanianpolitical,administrativeandbusinesscaste.RomaniaalsoallocatesfundsfordevelopmentassistancetoMoldova,whichshouldalsobeincludedinRomania’sinstrumentsofsoftpower.Thelargestsuchinstrumentwasthenon-refundableaidprogrammelaunchedin2010attheinitiativeofthePresidentofRomaniaTraianBăsescu,whichamountedto€100million60.

ThesubjectofMoldovaisausefultooltobolsterthepositionofRomanianpoliticians.Theissueof(political,economicandsocial)aidforMoldovahasforyearsbeenoneofthearenasofdisputebetweenthelong-timePresidentofRomaniaTraianBăsescuandPrimeMinisterVictorPonta.Bothpoliticianshavestriventooutdoeachotherintheirachievementsinthisfieldoverthepastfewyears61.TheRomanianpresidentialelectionsinNovember2014wereanimportantfactorinmobilisingVictorPontatoincreasehisinvolvementinMoldovanmatters.

DespitetheexistenceofpermanentpolicyobjectivestowardsChișinau,thelackofaviablelong-termstrategyforRomania’sconducttowardsMoldovainthepolitical,economic,andsecurityspheresisnoteworthy.Thepreviouslydis-cussedactionsRomaniahasundertakenareoftenshort-terminnature(andsomeremainpurelydeclarative),anddonotconstituteastrategicallycoherent

60 Itshouldbenoted,however,thatdespitethesehigh-soundingdeclarations,asofnow(i.e.afterfouryearsofoperation)onlyabout€40millionofthepromised€100millionhasbeenpaid.Themainreasonforthedelaysisthefailuretodevelopthetechnicalsideofimple-mentingthenon-repayableloan,aswellasadministrativefailuresonthepartofRomania.

61 Forexample,seehttp://www.psd.ro/media/stiri/victor-ponta-pentru-republica-moldova-eu-am-facut-traian-basescu-doar-a-spus/

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whole.Moreover,eventhoughthecountryisofficiallyapriorityinBucharest’sforeignpolicy,itshouldbenotedthatthegroupofexpertswhocouldsupporttheGovernmentindevelopingsuchastrategyisstillrelativelysmall.

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Iv. romanIa’s role In The polITIcs oF chIșInau

Moldova’spolicytowardsRomaniahasbothanexternaldimension,focusedonthedevelopmentofbilateralrelationsper se,aswellasaninternaldimension,connectedwiththepoliticalstruggleinsidethecountry.Inthiscase,theroleofRomaniainMoldovanpoliticsis–incontrasttotheRomanianobjectivestowardsMoldova–muchmorevariable,anddependsonwhichforcescurrentlyholdpowerinChișinau.

InthecontextofforeignpolicyasseenbyChișinau,Romaniaisacrucialcoun-terweighttoRussianinfluence.Examplesofthisincludethepro-RomanianturnwhichtheMoldovancommuniststookafterthedramaticdeteriorationinrelationsbetweenMoldovaandRussiain2003.NaturallythegroupspursuingEuropeanintegration,whichtookpowerin2009andthushadtoworktoreduceRussianinfluence,alsoturnedtowardsBucharest,seeingitasanagentandad-vocateforChișinauintheEU.Moreover,RomaniaoffersMoldovatheprospectofreducingnotonlyitspolitical,butalsoitseconomicandenergydependenceonRussia.BucharestisalsooftenseenasarepresentativeofMoldovaninterestsininternationalorganisations,andassourceofthefinancialaidandknow-hownecessarytoconductreforms.

TheRomanianquestionisthekeystoneofdomesticpolicyinMoldova,andisregularlyusedbyindividualMoldovangroupsinplayingofftheirpoliticalin-terests.Duringtheirtimeinofficein2001-2009,theCommunistswillinglyac-cusedtheirpoliticalopponentsofwantingtomergeMoldovawithRomania,cooperatingwiththeRomanianauthorities,orhavingtheiractivitiesfinancedbyRomania.Thisnotonlyreducedsupportfortheirpoliticalopponents,butalsostirredupanti-Romanianphobiainsociety.Additionally,thisanti-Roma-nianismfuelledbythefearofunificationwasanelementinconsolidatingthecountry’sinhabitantsandcalmingdomesticpoliticalandethnicdifferences.ItwasusefulfromthepointofviewoftheCommunists,whocouldeasilypresentthemselvesastheonlyrealpoliticalforcewhichwasdefendingthecountry’sindependenceandresistingthoseright-winggroupingswhosevictory(fromtheperspectiveoftheelectoratewhichopposedreunificationwithRomania)wouldhaveruntheriskofMoldovabeingabsorbedbyitswesternneighbour.

Thepro-EuropeanpartiesalsodrawupontheRomanianfactorfortheirinter-nalpoliticalpurposes62.Fromtheperspectiveofthelargestcoalitionparty,the

62 In2010-14powerwasheld inChișinaubyapro-Europeancoalitionof threeparties, thePLDM,PDMandPL.Aftertheelectionsof30November2014apro-Europeanminoritycoa-

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PLDM,andtheLiberalParty,,RomaniaisafactorwhichweakenstheidentitymodelofferedbytheCommunistPartyandstrengthenstheRomanianelementsofMoldovanidentity,whichinturnlimitsRussianinfluence(insocio-culturalterms).TheMoldovanDemocraticParty,thoughitisofficially‘Moldovenist’andopposestheincreasinginfluenceofRomaniancultureinMoldova,hasbeenwillingtoundertakepoliticalcooperationwiththeRomanianSocialDemocraticParty(PSD)ledbyPrimeMinisterVictorPonta.InSeptember2014,thelead-ersofbothpartiessignedanagreementoncooperationinBucharest,whichprovidedformutualsupportduringtheelectioncampaignsforthepresidencyinRomaniaandtheparliamentinMoldovarespectively63.Atthesametime,PontawasopenlysupportedinhisrunforpresidentbythethenPrimeMinis-terofMoldovaIurieLeanca,aswasKlausIohannisbyVladFilat,theleaderofthePLDM,incooperationwiththeNationalLiberals(PNL)groupinwhichthecurrentRomanianpresidenthashispoliticalroots.

TheactionsofleadingRomanianpoliticianssupplypropagandafuelforthosepolitical forces inMoldovaandelsewhere(especiallyRussia)whichopposethepro-EuropeanfactionsandtheprocessofChișinau’smovewestward.ThismainlyconcernsthestatementscomingfromBucharest(andespeciallyformerPresidentBăsescu)concerningthepossibleunificationofMoldovaandRoma-nia64.ThiskindofrhetoricfromtheRomaniangovernmentputstherulingpro-EuropeancoalitioninMoldovainadifficultsituation,asitreinforcestheargu-mentsoftheoppositionparties(includingIgorDodon’sSocialistPartyandthePCRM),whosepoliticianshavelonginsistedtopublicopinionthattheEuropeanintegrationprojectisaimedatthe‘Romanianisation’ofMoldova,deprivingitofitsindependence,andbringingitintoNATObythebackdoor.

MoscowalsousesthisasanargumentagainstRomanianandEUinvolvementinMoldova,andinportrayingaunificationscenariowhichwouldentailtheenlargementofNATOandathreattoRussianinterests.Declarationsconcern-ingunificationhavealsoraisedtensionsamongMoldova’sminorities,primarilytheGagauzAutonomy,andexacerbatedrelationswiththeseparatistauthorities

litionwascreated,includingonlythePLDMandPDM.SeeKamilCałus,Moldovahasami-nority coalition, OSW Analyses, 28 January 2015: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-01-28/moldova-has-a-minority-coalition

63 ThePDMhelpedthePSDrunacampaigninMoldovatargetedatMoldovanswithRomaniancitizenship.

64 ThesetypesofstatementsweremaderegularlybyBucharestduringBăsescu’stimeinof-fice.MoredetailsinChapterV.

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inTransnistria,whoseresidentshavetraditionallybeenafraidof‘Romanianexpansionism’65.Also,theformularepeatedbyRomanianpoliticians(Băsescu,Pontaandothers),accordingtowhichunionisconditionalonthewilloftheMol-dovanpeople,hasnotbeenpositivelyreceivedbysomeoftheelitesinChișinau,becausefromtheirperspectiveMoldovawouldbedeprivedofitssubjectivityandturnedintoa‘seasonalstate’.

However,itseemsthatwiththecomingtopowerofKlausIohannisasthenewpresidentofRomania,Bucharest’srhetoricinrelationtoMoldovawillbecomemorecautious,whichshouldweakentheanti-Europeanopposition’sarguments,andreducetheriskofsocialtensionscausedbytheanti-RomanianmoodofpartoftheMoldovanpublic.

65 MoredetailsinChapterV.

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v. The sTaTe oF romanIan-moldovan secTorIal cooperaTIon

1. economic and energy cooperation

Sincethelate1990sRomaniahasbeenanimportanttradepartnerforandin-vestorinMoldova,anditsroleintheMoldovaneconomyisgrowingsteadily.Theonlyexceptiontothisrulecameintheyearsof2009and2010,butthedeteriorationoftraderelationsatthattime(seeFigure1)wasduetoexternalfactors,primarilytheglobalfinancialcrisis.Whereasin2005MoldovaexportedgoodstoRomaniawithatotalvalueofUS$111.6million,thisfigurehadalmostquadrupledtoUS$434millionin2014,accountingforover18.5%oftotalMol-dovanexports.Inthesameperiod,importsfromRomaniarosealmostthreetimesfromUS$257.3millionin2005toUS$803millionin2014,representing15%oftotalMoldovanimports66.BothoftheseindicatorsrankedRomaniafirstamongMoldova’skeytradingpartnersin2014.Previously,Russiahadoccupiedthisplaceformanyyears,butasaresultoftheembargoimposedbyMoscowonalcoholicproductsandthemajorityofMoldovanfruitproduction(inSeptember2013andJuly2014respectively),RussiahaslostitsformerpositioninitstradewithMoldova.

Figure 1.MoldovanexportstoRomania(asapercentageoftotalexports)intheyears2005-2014

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10.23

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sources:TheNationalBureauofStatisticsoftheRepublicofMoldova,theNationalInstituteofStatisticsofRomania,UNComtradeandtheWTO

66 DatafromtheNationalBureauofStatisticsofMoldova(NBS).

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Figure 2.MoldovanimportsfromRomania(asapercentageoftotalexports)intheyears2005-2014

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*8

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Figure 3.TradebetweenMoldovaandRomania(asapercentageofMoldova’stotaltrade)intheyears2005to2014

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*9

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10.90

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sources:TheNationalBureauofStatisticsoftheRepublicofMoldova,theNationalInstituteofStatisticsofRomania,UNComtradeandtheWTO

Moldova’simportanceforRomaniantradeisnegligible,whichismainlyduetothesmallsizeoftheMoldovanmarketanditslimitedabsorptioncapacity.Asaresult,thetradeturnoverbetweenthetwocountriesdoesnotexceed1%ofRomania’stotalforeigntradevolume(seeFigure2).RomaniaprimarilysellsfueltoMoldova(especiallygasolineanddiesel),whichrepresentsmorethanhalf

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ofitsexportstothatcountry67.TherestofRomania’sexportsincludechemicalandmetalproducts.MeanwhileMoldovaprimarilysellsRomaniacablesandinsulatedelectricconductors(about35%oftotalexports)aswellasvegetableproductsandsugar.

Figure 4.Moldova’sshareinRomaniantrade(asapercentageofRomania’stotaltrade)

0,4

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0.68

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sources:TheNationalInstituteofStatisticsofRomania,UNComtradeandtheWTO

RomaniaiscurrentlythesixthlargestmajorinvestorinMoldova,accountingfor7%ofthetotalfundsinvestedinthiscountry68.ThemostimportantRoma-niancompaniesoperatingontheMoldovanmarketincludethefuelgiantsRom-petrolandPetrom,theBancaComercialăRomână(BCR),themediacompaniesJurnalTrustMediaandMediaPro,thebuildingcompanyConstruct-Arabesque,EuropeanDrinks(foodindustry),andRomstal(sanitaryfittings,heatingsys-tems).InMay2014thecompanyDedeman,themainsellerofbuildingmateri-alsinRomania,alsoannounceditsentryontotheMoldovanmarket,aswellasinvestmentsof€30million69.RomanianinvestorsareprimarilyattractedtoMoldovabyitsworkforce,whichischeaperthaninRomania,itsknowledgeofRomanianandRussian,anditsusuallyhighqualifications.DespitetheRussiantraderestrictionsintroducedin2014,MoldovaisstillamemberoftheCIS’sfreetradezone,whichensuresRomanianinvestorsaccesstothewiderpost-Soviet

67 In2013,RomaniaexportedfuelworthUS$393milliontoMoldova.DatafromtheNationalBankofMoldova.

68 Itshouldbenotedthatin2013thetotalvolumeofRomanianinvestmentsinMoldovafellby22%,althoughthisisconsideredtobeatemporaryphenomenonresultingfromthedeterio-rationoftheeconomicsituationinRomania.Formore,seehttp://www.ukrinform.ua/rus/news/ruminskie_investitsii_v_moldovu_sokratilis_na_22_1593553

69 http://vesti.md/?mod=news&id=29214

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market.AnothermotivationforRomaniancompaniesisthetaxincentivesMol-dovaofferstoforeigninvestors,andthetaxrates,whicharegenerallylowerthanRomania’s.OnespecificwayofinvestingRomaniancapitalinMoldovahasbeenthecreationofMoldovan-Romaniancompanies,atrendwhichisgrowingdynamically.In2009about650suchcompanieshadbeenregistered,andasmanyas1200bythebeginningof2013.

Sincethe1990sRomaniahasbeentryingtoboostitsroleasaproviderofenergyresourcestoMoldova.ThecountryisamajorsupplierofgasolineanddieseloiltoMoldova(in2013Moldovacovered72.4%and60.5%respectivelyofitsdemandforthesefuelswithimportsfromRomania)70.AttemptsarealsobeingmadetoenablethedeliveryofRomaniannaturalgastoMoldova.On27August2014,theoperationofaninterconnectorbetweentheRomaniancityofIașiandUngheniinMoldovawasinaugurated.Thisconnectionwillultimatelyallowthetransmis-sionofabout1.5bcmofgasannually,whichwouldmeetright-bankMoldova’scurrentneeds(about1bcmannually)withroomtospare.Currently,however,theinterconnectorcanonlyuseabout5%ofthebandwidth,duetothelackofaconnectionwithChișinau(whichisthemaingascustomerinright-bankMol-dova),aswellastheinefficientcompressionandtransportationinfrastructureontheRomanianside.Moldova’sEconomicsMinisterAndrianCandudeclaredinSeptember2014thatthepipelinewouldreachfulltransmissioncapacityby2016,butthisseemsunlikely71.Despitethesetechnicallimitations,MoldovasignedacontractforgassuppliesfromRomaniainDecember2014.Accordingtotheagreement,thegasfromthissourcewillbeaboutUS$65cheaperthanRussiangas(whose2014priceamountstoaboutUS$330).Workiscontinuingonupgrad-ingthepowertransmissionbusesbetweenMoldovaandRomania(viaIași–Un-gheni–StrăşeniandVulcănești–Isaccea),whosecompletionwillallowelectricityimportsfromRomania,andallowMoldovatodiversifyitssuppliesmorewidelythanatpresent.Accordingtoannouncementsbyseniorrepresentativesofthetwocountries,energytransmissioncouldstartin201572.CurrentlyMoldova‘imports’

70 DatafromtheNationalBureauofStatisticsofMoldova.71 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/v-2016-godu-kishinev-poluchit-gaz-iz-rumynii

FormoreontheinterconnectorissuesandMoldova’senergyproblems,seeseeKamilCałus,TheIasi-Unghenipipeline:ameansofachievingenergyindependencefromRussia?Mol-dova’sattemptsatgassupplydiversification,OSW Analyses, 11October2015:http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-10-11/iasi-ungheni-pipeline-a-means-achieving-energy-independence

72 http://ava.md/economics/023204-s-2015-goda-moldova-smozhet-importirovat-elektroener-giq-iz-ruminii.html

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electricityfromtheMoldovanGRESpowerplantlocatedinTransnistria,andtheUkrainiancompanyDTEKPowerTrade73.

RomaniancompaniesarealsoinvolvedininfrastructureprojectsinMoldova.ThecompanyElectroputereVFUhassignedacontracttomodernisetheMoldo-vanrailcompany’spassengertrains(dieselmultipleunits).In2010,CertSIGNwonthetendertointroducetachographsfortheinternationalroadtransporta-tionsystemtoMoldova,andin2011PA&COInternationalsignedacontractwiththegovernmenttorenovatetheBălți–Sărăteniroadsection(ayearlater,thesamecompanyalsowonatendertoconstructanothersection).Thepossibilityofeithermodernisingthecurrentorconstructinganewrailwayline(toEuro-peanstandards)betweenIașiandUngheni,aswellasbuildingbridgesoverthePrutandahighwayconnectingthetwocountries,hasalsobeendiscussedformanyyears,althoughwithouttangibleresults.However,apartfrompoliticaldeclarationsandmemoranda,norealworkontheseprojectshasstartedsofar.

Itshouldbenotedthatalthougheconomiccooperationatthelevelofprivateoperatorsisrisingrapidlyandrelativelyeasily,largestrategiceconomicpro-jectsinvolvingthegovernmentsinBucharestandChișinauregularlyrunintodifficulties.Thisistrueofbothenergyprojects,whoseimplementationbytheoriginallyplanneddateshasbeengreatlydelayed,and infrastructurepro-jects.Theabove-mentionedcontracttomodernisetherailwaytrainsendedinscandal.Oftheplanned15trainsonlyfourwererenovated,whilenoneofthemremainedoperationalformorethanafewweeks.Thecompaniesrenovatingtheroadswereaccusedofcorruptionduringthetenderphase,andnumerousprojectsdiscussedattheintergovernmentallevelneveremergedfromtheplan-ningstage.ThemainreasonsfortheseomissionsweretheinefficiencyoftheadministrativebodiesinMoldovaandRomania,alackoffunding,andtheoftenunfavourablepoliticalclimatesduetochangesofgovernmentinChișinau.

OneparticularformofeconomiccooperationisthedevelopmentaiddonatedbyRomaniain2007inconnectionwithitsentryintotheEuropeanUnion.SincethebeginningMoldovahasbeenthemainrecipientofthataidfromBucharest,andreceivesapproximatelyathirdofallRomanianaid.Theamountofthisaidisrelativelysmall;thepredictionfor2015isfortheimplementationofprojectswithatotalvalueofabout€800,00074.

73 Ibid.74 http://independent.md/mae-al-romaniei-aloca-circa-35-din-bugetul-de-asistenta-pentru-

dezvoltare-pe-2015-republicii-moldova/#.VNjLP7M5Dcu

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2. security co-operation

Despitethefactthatsince1991thetwocountrieshaveadoptedseveralreciprocalagreementsonsecurity(includinganagreementoncooperationinthemilitarysphere[1992],anagreementoncooperationincivildefenceduringpeacetime[1994]andanagreementoncooperationinmilitarytransport[1997]),therealco-operationinthisfieldde factobeganaftertheAllianceforEuropeanIntegrationcametopowerin2009.Duringtheruleofthepro-Europeancoalition,ChișinauandBucharestsignedacomprehensiveagreementonmilitarycooperationandanagreementonpolicecooperationandborderprotection,amongothers.Theimplementationoftheseagreementsfacesseriousproblems,however,mainlyduetothesluggishnessoftheRomanianlegislativeauthorities.Nevertheless,therehasbeenanoticeableriseincooperationinthefieldofsecurity.

Thefirstunofficialdraftcomprehensiveagreementonmilitarycooperation(re-placingthedocumentsignedin1992)appearedin201075,althoughanewagree-mentoncooperationinthemilitaryfieldwaseventuallysignedon20April2012.Thisdocumentcoversaverywiderangeofbilateralcooperationinareassuchasdefencepolicy(includingjointdefenceplanning),intelligence,logistics,training,militaryresearch,airspacecontrol,sharingmilitarytestinggrounds,andjointparticipationinpeacekeepingmissionscarriedoutundertheaegisoftheUN,theOSCEandtheEU76.Amongtheformsofcooperation,thebilllistsmutualconsultationsandvisits(includingconferences), jointexercisesandmilitarytraining,exchangesofhumanresourcesanddocumentation,aswellasconstantcontactbetweenbothcountries’militarystructuresresponsibleforcrisisresponse.TheagreementalsoenvisagesthecreationofaJointMilitaryCommission(Comisiamilitarămixtă)whichwouldmeetannually;thisbody’smaintaskistoanalysethestateofthetwocountries’cooperationanddeterminetheagendaforthenextyear,whichshouldmakeoptimumuseoftheopportu-nitiesarisingfromtheagreement’sexistence77.Thisdocumentalsospecifies

75 http://moldnews.md/rus/news/3183876 http://www.lege-online.ro/lr-LEGE-75%20-2013-%28146795%29.html The list of areas for

cooperationbetweenMoldovaandRomanialistedinthedocumentisverylong,andhas27items,includingsuchspecificexamplesasmilitaryhistory.Moreover,thedealdoesnotfi-nalisethelistofthoseareas,statingthat“thepartiesmaycooperateinotherareasnotlistedinthisdocument”.

77 Both anti-Romanian forceswithinMoldova, especially thePCRMandTransnistria, andRussiahavearguedthattheagreementviolatesMoldova’sneutralstatus.Theyhaveregu-larlytriedtopresenttheJointMilitaryCommissionasakindofcentraljointforcecommandheadquarters,ratherthanaconsultativebody.

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anumberoftechnicalissuesrelatingtoprinciplesoforganisation,particularlythefinancingofjointexercises,training,etc.Additionallyinthemilitaryfield,on2December2013thetwocountriessignedanagreementonthemutualpro-tectionofconfidentialmilitaryinformationandoncooperationinthefieldofmilitaryeducation.Theseagreementswereintendedinpracticetodeveloptheprovisionsoftheagreement‘Oncooperationinthemilitaryfield’.Underthese,about100MoldovansoldiersgotoRomaniaeveryyearfortraining78.

DespitedeclarationsfrombothChișinauandBucharest,Romanian-Moldovancooperationinthesecurityfieldhassofarbeenverylimited.Apartfromlimitedactivitiesofaneducationalnature,instancesofjointmilitaryexercisesortechni-calsupport,forexample,havebeenrelativelyrare.Importantly,RomaniadoesnothavearealisticstrategyforguaranteeingthesafetyofMoldova,andmoreoverithasnoteventakenanyconcretestepstocreateorimplementsuchastrategy79.BucharestistryingtointerestNATOintheproblemofMoldova’ssecurity,andalsoseestheAllianceaguarantorofitssecurity.Atthesametime,despitethesmallscaleoftheircooperationinreality,itisRomania(nexttotheUS)whichre-mainsChișinau’smainpartnerinthemilitarydimension.Inadditiontosecuritycooperationinthemilitaryfield,RomaniaalsoprovidesChișinauwithongoingsupportforfindingapoliticalsolutiontotheTransnistrianconflict.

3. cultural and educational cooperation

Cooperationinthebroadlyunderstoodareaofcultureismostsensitivetochang-esinthepoliticalmoodbetweenthetwocountries.Despitethis,Romaniahasbeenabletotakesomeactionsinthatarea,regardlessofpoliticalissues.AkeyelementofthiscooperationisthescholarshipprogrammewhichBucharesthasrunandfundedsincetheearlynineties,throughwhichabout2500MoldovancitizensstudyatRomanianuniversitieseveryyear.Since2009thisnumberhasmorethandoubled80.Romaniaalsoregularlysponsorsthepurchaseofbooks

78 http://www.army.md/?lng=2&action=show&cat=124&obj=235979 ThetwomaindocumentsadoptedbytheparliamentinBucharestonsecurityissues,the

NationalDefenceStrategyandtheNationalSecurityStrategyofRomania,relatetoMol-dovainverygeneralterms.Thelegislaturedeclaresthereinitsdesiretoextendtheareaof‘stabilityandsecurity’eastwards,andexpressesinterestintheproblemofTransnistrianseparatismandconcernattheillegalpresenceofforeign(Russian)troopsontheterritoryofMoldova.Comparehttp://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SSNR/SSNR.pdfandhttp://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf

80 Fortheyear2014/2015,theRomaniansidecommitteditselftofund6000scholarships,in-cluding2800forundergraduatestudents,1500forhighschoolstudents,and125scholarshipsfordoctoralstudents.http://ava.md/society/025812-ruminiya-predostavit-moldove-5-tisy-

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forlibraries,andinOctober2014itprovidedMoldovawith100minibusesforschoolscost-free.Bucharestalsoactivelysupportsinter-universitycooperation.

In2010,aRomanianCulturalInstitutewaslaunchedinChișinau,whosemissionincludesorganisingexhibitions,conferences,concerts,financingscholarshipprograms,languagecourses,etc.ItalsohelpspromoteMoldovanartistsandcreatorsinRomania,whichfromtheInstitute’sperspectiveisseenasanele-mentofsupportingRomanianculture(MoldovanartistsareconsideredpartoftheRomanianculturalspace).

Romania’sparticularimportanceforcultureinMoldovawashighlightedinareportfundedfromtheEUbudgetentitledPreparatory activities. Culture in the EU’s external relations,inwhichRomaniawasdesignatedasacountryofkeyimportanceforMoldova’sculturalrelations81.

RomaniaisalsopresentinMoldova’smediaspace.Since1999,thebasiccablenetworksinmajorcitieshaveofferedtheprivateRomanianPROTVchannel.Afterabreakofsomeyears(causedbythepoliticalconflictbetweenBucharestandMoldova’srulingCommunists),rebroadcastingofthefirstchannelofRo-manianpublictelevisionTVRresumedin2010.Inaddition,in2014thepartiesagreedtobroadcastbothTVRandMoldova1respectivelyontheMoldovanandRomaniancableoperators.TheRomanianchannelAntena1isalsolocallyre-broadcast.AMoldovanversionoftheRomaniandailynewspaperAdevarul(thesecondlargestnewspaperinMoldova)isavailableonthepressmarket,asarevariousweekliesandmonthliescommonlypublishedinRomania82.

Romania’sactionsinMoldovainthefieldofcultureandeducationshouldbeseenasrelativelyeffective.Theymeetthepublicinterest,andarereceivedposi-tivelyinmostcases.RomanianactivitiesintheculturaldimensionarebasicallydirectedonlytotheRomanian-speakingpopulation,ormorebroadlyspeak-ing,toethnicMoldovans83.Asaresult,theyimproveRomania’simageamongthispartofthepopulation,althoughtheyoftendeepenthedistrustfeltbythe

ach-stipendii.html and http://aif.md/rumyniya-uvelichila-kolichestvo-stipendij-dlya-moldavskix-studentov/

81 http://cultureinexternalrelations.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Moldova-country-re-port.pdf

82 ItisworthnotingthattheavailabilityofRomanianmediainMoldovaissignificantlylessthanthatofRussianmedia.

83 Theexceptiontothisrule,whichcouldbeaharbingerofchangesinRomanianpolicyinthisarea,wasthelaunchinJune2015oftheRomanianInformationCentreattheUniversity

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Russian-speakingpopulation.ThisproblemalsoappliestoRomanianmediainMoldova,which(withafewexceptionsinthecaseofthepress)onlyoperateintheRomanianlanguage,withoutreachingtheRussian-speakingminorities.TheresultisthattheRussianmediaarethemaincarriersofpopularcultureinMoldova,reachingawideraudienceandexertinggreaterinfluenceonthatsec-tionofthepopulation’sattitudesandopinionsthanRomanianmedia.Romania’slackofinterestinMoldova’sminoritiesintheculturalandeducationaldimen-sionisprimarilyduetothefearofbeingaccusedoftryingto‘Romanianise’theRussian-speakinginhabitantsofthecountry,aswellasforideologicalreasons.ThisiswhyRomaniansmainlybelievecooperationwithethnicMoldovans,whoareclosertothem,tobemorereasonable.

ofComrat,atRomania’sinitiativeandfundedbyBucharest.Seehttp://gagauzia.md/news-view.php?l=ru&idc=390&id=5849

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vI. The Idea oF unIFyIng moldova wITh romanIa

1. The revival of the idea of unification

ThetrendtowardstheunificationofMoldovaandRomaniatookonamasscharacterattheendoftheeighties.Proponentsofunification,calledUnionists(fromtheRomanianUnirea,union)preachedtheneedtorevisetheMolotov-RibbentropPact,onthebasisofwhichtheSovietUnionannexedBessarabiain1940,aswellasthereturnofthehistoricallyRomanianlandsofMoldovatothemotherland.Thecatalystfortheseprocesseswas,ontheonehand,theweaknessandsubsequentdisintegrationoftheSovietUnion,whichopenedupthetheo-reticalpossibilityofarevisionofborders.Ontheotherhand,therewasariseinpro-RomaniansentimentswithinMoldovaitself,whichwasmanifestedintheincreasingpoliticalsignificanceoftheMoldovanPopularFrontinMoldova(amongotherthings).Amajorroleinthedevelopmentofthesetrendswasalsoplayedbytheemergenceofgenuineparty-politicalcompetitioninRomaniaitself,astheresultoftheoverthrowofNicolaeCeaușescu.Pro-unificationslo-ganswereproclaimedbymanynewRomaniangroups,becausetheseenjoyedconsiderablepopularityamongtheelectorate.

TheunionistideawasparticularlystronginMoldovaduringtheperiodofwin-ningindependencefromtheUSSR.AfterthecoalitionoftheMoldovanPopularFrontandthepro-reformistCommunistscametopowerin1990,activemeas-ureswerelaunchedinChișinauwhichfavouredtheeffectiveunificationofthetwocountries.Moldova’sdeclarationofindependence,adoptedon27August1991,openlycondemnedtheseparationofBessarabiafromRomaniaandrec-ognisedRomanian,andnotMoldovan,astheofficiallanguage84.Thisdocu-mentthuscreatedalegalbasisforthepossiblereunificationofMoldovawithRomania,whichboththethengovernmentinChișinau85andthepublicmoodfavoured.TheRomanianflagandnationalanthemweredeclaredasofficialstatesymbolsofMoldova.TheideaofunificationalsorapidlygainedsupportinRo-maniaitself.BucharestdidrecognisetheindependenceofMoldova,butitsdec-larationimplicitlyassumedthatindependencewasmerelyatransitionalstepontheroadtoreunificationwithRomania.VisarestrictionsforMoldovanswere

84 TheDeclarationofIndependenceoftheRepublicofMoldova,http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=313228

85 DuringhisfirstofficialvisittoRomaniainFebruary1991,theMoldovanPresidentMirceaSnegurstressedtheethnicunityoftheresidentsofbothcountries,speakingof“RomaniansonbothsidesofthePrut”.

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liftedrelativelyquickly,andasimplifiedbordertrafficregimewasintroduced.BucharestalsoorganisedassistanceintheformofbooksandtextbooksintheRomanianlanguageforschoolsandlibrariesinMoldova.

Apartfromthesede factosymbolicactions,however,theRomanianauthoritiesfailedtoundertakeanyrealeffortstosupporttheunificationbeingpromotedbygroupsinbothcountries.Thiswasrelatedprimarilytotheradicallydeteriorat-ingeconomicsituationinRomania,aswellasthepoliticalinstabilityafterthefallofCeaușescu.ThesefactorsforcedBucharesttofocusprimarilyonitsdo-mesticsituation.ThesituationwascomplicatedbytherisingtensionsbetweenChișinauandtheself-proclaimedauthoritiesinGagauziaandTransnistria,whichon19Augustand2September1990respectivelydeclaredtheirindepend-encefromtherestoftherepublic.Inaddition,thearmedconflictbetweenMol-dovaandthebreakawayTransnistriawhichtookplacein1992clearlyweakenedthepositionandimageofRomaniainMoldova.AlthoughBucharestwastryingtohelptheMoldovansintheirfightagainsttheseparatists,itshelpwasfarfromsufficient,anddisappointedMoldova’spro-Romaniancircles.Transnistria’svic-tory,supportedbytheauthoritiesinMoscow,wasakindofdemonstrationofforcebyRussia,whichafterashortperiodofweaknessresultingfromthecol-lapseoftheUSSRbegantoregainitsinfluenceinMoldova.Atthesametime,UnionistsentimentinRomaniaandMoldovabegantodropoffvisibly.

DespitethesupportoflargepartsofRomanianpoliticalcircles,then-presidentIliescuneverspokeoutclearlyinfavouroftheunificationofthetwocountries,ashewasawareoftheproblems,botheconomicandpolitical,whichwouldhaveresultedfromit(thefactofthestationingofRussiantroopsinTransnis-triaplayednosmallpartintheseconsiderations).TheRomanianauthoritiesde factoacknowledgedtheexistenceoftwoseparateRomanianstatesand,basicallyabandoningtheideaofaunificationalongGermanlines,adoptedastrategyofgradualre-integrationbycreatingacommoneconomicandculturalspace,aswellasaprocessofslowpoliticalintegration86.

InChișinauin1994,thepro-unificationforcesleftpower.ThenewparliamenttookanumberofactionsaimedatconsolidatingMoldovanstatehoodanddrop-pingUnionistrhetoric.AConstitutionwasadoptedaccordingtowhichtheof-ficiallanguageintherepublicwasMoldovan,theflagwasmodifiedtodistin-guishitfromRomania’s,andthenationalanthemwaschanged.Theso-called

86 ManagingConflictintheFormerSovietUnion:RussianandAmericanPerspectives,p.203.

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independencereferendum87alsoconfirmedthemoodofmostpeople in thecountry.Atfirst,Bucharestdenouncedthereferendum’sorganisation,recog-nisingitsresultsonlyasa‘survey’,butattheendoftheyear,PresidentIliescusaidinaspeechthat“todayRomaniarecognisesMoldovaasanindependentcountry,butmaybeoneday,somejoyousday,wewillbecomewitnessestothefullcultural,historicalandterritorialreunificationofthislandwithus.Ontheotherhand,iftherecanbetwoGermanstates,whycannottwoRomaniasexist?”88.Thisdeclarationsignificantlyweakenedtheroleofpro-unificationdiscourseinRomanianpoliticsoverthenextfewyears.

2. The current discourse on unification

Overthefollowingtenyears,Bucharest’sforeignpolicywasprimarilyfocusedonstrengtheningRomaniaasmuchaspossiblewithinWesternstructures.Thepriorityinthisprocess,knownasthe‘returntoEurope’,becameintegrationwithNATOandtheEU,whereasrelationswithMoldova,andinparticulartheissueofthepossiblemergerofthetwocountriesbecameasecondaryorevenatertiaryproblem.Romanianpoliticiansaremostlyawarethatraisingrevi-sionistideasoftheUnireawouldinfactbeperceivedintheWestasanun-ambiguouslynegativestep,andwouldformanobstacletotheaforementionedplansforbringingRomaniaclosertotheWest.

ThegradualresumptionofunificationissuesinthepublicdebateinRomaniastartedin2004whenTraianBăsescuassumedtheofficeofPresident.Inhisfirstmonthsinoffice,hiseffortstointensifyrelationswithChișinaucausedthetacticalpro-WesternturnwhichPresidentVoroninmadeatthestartof2004,inconnectionwiththefailureoftheKozakMemorandumandthelossofMoscow’ssupport.Thesubjectofunificationbeganincreasinglytooccupythepublicspace.MoldovanandRomaniannewspaperspublishedarticlesandanalysesdevotedtothetechnicalissues,thescenariosandthecostslinkedtopossibleunification;theyalsoconductednumerouspollsonthematter.Thisdiscoursewaselevatedtoawholenewlevelon1July2006,whenBăsescuofferedChișinauthechanceforMoldovatojoinRomaniabeforethelatter’sentrytotheEU.AlthoughtherulingMoldovanCommunistsfirmlyrejectedtheRomanianpresident’sproposal,itstillledtoincreasedinterestinthesubjectofunification

87 Thevotedidnotmeettheformalrequirementsforareferendum(amongothermatters,itwasheldjustaweekaftertheparliamentaryelections,andnotafterthelegallyrequiredintervalof90days),andsoitwasofficiallycalledasociologicalsurvey.

88 ManagingConflict...,op. cit.,p.204.

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inbothcountries.Anotherimpetuswhichintensifiedthediscourseonunifica-tioninMoldovawasPresidentBăsescu’sdeclarationon27November2013(ontheeveofMoldova’sinitiallingtheAssociationAgreementwiththeEU)onRo-maniantelevision;heannouncedthatunificationwithMoldovawasRomania’sthirdstrategicobjective89(afterjoiningNATOandtheEU).

Băsescu’srhetoricledtoamarkedincreaseintheimportanceoftheunificationdiscourseinRomanianpolitics,andincreasedpublicinterestinthesubject.Romanianvotershavecometoexpectclearstatementsfromtheirleadersre-gardingBucharest’spolicytowardsMoldova.Asaresult,inrecentyears,everymajorRomanianpoliticianhasbeende factoforcedtoinvoketheideaofUnireaintheirrhetoric,whichisparticularlynoticeableinpre-electionperiods.Inasense,VictorPonta,Romania’sprimeministerandthefavouritetowinthepresidentialelectionsinRomaniain2014,madetheissueofunificationthecor-nerstoneofhiselectioncampaign.Pontaenteredtheelectionas‘thepresidentwhowilluniteus’,andinhiselectionprogramstatedthat“RomanianeedsanewGrandUnification”.AlthoughhestressedatthesametimethathewasreferringtotheunityofallRomanians,whohadbeendividedasaresultoftenyearsofPresidentBăsescu,itwasclearthathisrhetoricreferredtoapossiblefutureunificationofRomaniaandMoldova.ThepressurefromtheelectorateduringtheseelectionswassohighthatevenKlausIohannis,whohadnotpreviouslyreferredtoMoldovanissuesinanyway90,declaredinapre-electioninterviewthat“withoutthevotesoftheinhabitantsofBessarabia,noRomanianpresidentcaneverfullybepresident”.Healsostressedthat“ifMoldovanswantunifica-tion,thenno-onewillstopthem”91.However,afterIohanniswontheelectionsinDecember2014,therewasaclearmutingofthepro-unionistaccents.

Moldova’sunificationdiscourseclearlylostitsimportanceafterthereferendumof1994,andremainedsountil2001,playingamarginalroleinpublicdebatewithinthecountryuntiltherisetopowerofthePCRMandPresidentVladimirVoronin.ItsimportanceincreasedwhentheCommuniststookpower,asthey

89 http://stiri.tvr.ro/traian-basescu-la-tvr--urmatorul-proiect-pentru-romania-trebuie-sa-fie-vrem-sa-ne-intregim-tara-_37653.html

90 In November 2014 Iohannis admitted publicly that he had never visited Chișinau orChernivtsi. This statementwasmetwith public criticism, and intensified awave of al-legations that Iohannis was uninterested in the question of Bessarabia. http://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2014/11/11/iohannis-a-declarat-ca-nu-a-fost-niciodata-la-cernauti-si-la-Chișinau-21-12-21

91 http://ziarulnational.md/exclusiv-klaus-iohannis-fara-votul-basarabenilor-niciun-pre-sedinte-al-romaniei-nu-ar-fi-un-presedinte-implinit/

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hadbuilttheirpoliticalsupportonfirmresistancetoRomania’sallegedeffortstoabsorbMoldova.Theparty’spoliticalinterestlayinmakingtheirelectoratefearfuloftheRomanians.Asaresult,theissueofunificationwaspresentforthenexteightyearsinthepublicspace,albeitatdifferentlevelsofintensity92,andwasconsistentlypresentedinanegativelight.TheCommunistsfounditeasytoexploitallegationsofpro-unionismindiscreditingthepro-Europeanoppositionpartiesandthepro-Romaniangroupingsintheeyesoftheelector-ate.Thesituationchangedaftertheparliamentaryelectionsin2009,whenthepro-EuropeangroupsthatestablishedtheAllianceforEuropeanIntegration(AIE)coalitionremovedthePCRMfrompower.ThesegroupsseeRomaniaastheircountry’smainadvocateintheprocessofEuropeanintegrationandthus,forpurelypragmaticreasons,theysoughtfromthebeginningtorebuildbilat-eralrelationswithRomaniatothebestpossibleextent.Thehistorical-identityconflictswhichcharacterisedtheruleofthePCRMweresilenced.Chișinauhasalsogivenuppushingforasolutiontotheseissues,astheycouldadverselyaffectthetwocountries’mutualrelations,includingontheissueofthebordertreaty.Atthesametime,thedeclaredRomanophileMihailGhimpu,theheadofthepro-RomanianLiberalParty,tookoverasactingPresidentaftertheCommunistVladimirVoronin.Asthecoalitionhadhoped,thisresultedinanincreaseinBucharest’sgoodwillinrelationtoChișinau.Thisalsorevivedthehopesofthose(thenmarginal)politicalandsocialmovements(seebelow)whichfavouredtheunificationofRomaniaandMoldova.Thenewgovernmentdidnotsupporttheminanyway,and(incontrasttotheCommunists)maintainedaneutralattitudetowardstheiractivitiesandslogans.Talkofunificationwasfuelledfromtwosources:thepro-unificationgroups,andtheoppositionsoundingthealarmagainstit.However,despiteopeningupandextendingthediscussionaboutunificationintandemwiththenewcoalition’srisetopower,thisproblemneverbecameamajorfocusfortheMoldovanpublic.

3. political parties on the problem of unification

InMoldovaatpresent,noneofthemajorpoliticalformationsofficiallysupportstheideaofunifyingthetwocountries.Theleftistandcentre-leftgroupings,i.e.thePCRMunderVladimirVoronin,thePartyofSocialistsledbyIgorDodon,andtheDemocraticPartyofMarianLupu,pro-Europeanbut‘Moldovenist’initsrhetoric,allunequivocallyopposethepotentialmergerofthetwostates

92 Asdiscussed,Romanian-Moldovanrelationsbetween2004and2006proceededrelativelywell.ControversialtopicssuchastheissueofunificationwerenotraisedinMoldovaduringthattime.

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andobjectverystronglywhenBucharestraisesthematter.Thesepartiesalsoview theactivitiesofunificationmovements inMoldovaverynegatively93.Thisisunderstandable,asallthesepartiesappealtoanelectoratewhichde-claresitsattachmenttoaMoldovanidentityseparatefromtheRomanian(i.e.‘Moldovenism’),aswellastheRussian-speakingminorities.BoththesegroupsofvotersarenaturallyopposedtothepossiblejoiningofMoldovatoRomania.Thelargestpro-Europeangrouping,theLiberalDemocrats(PLDM)ledbyfor-merPrimeMinisterVladFilat,striveeverydaytoavoidunequivocaldeclara-tionsconcerningtheirattitudetowardsUnirea,inordernottodiscouragetheirpro-Romanianvoters.Howevertheydoreact(althoughinamoremoderatewaythantheaforementionedgroups)insituationswhereBucharest’spro-unifi-cationrhetoricbecomestooinsistentandstartstothreatenariseintensionswithinthecountry.ThePrimeMinisterofMoldova,thePLDM’sIurieLeanca,reactedtoPresidentBăsescu’sdeclarationinNovember2013thatunificationwithMoldovawasRomania’sthirdstrategicobjective(afterjoiningNATOandtheEU)bycallingit“counterproductive”,andsaidthatit“onlycreatesartificialproblems”andwasa“divisive”move94.Healsostressedthat“apro-Europeancoursedoesnotmeanalossofsovereignty”.Reactionslikethisareaimedatfendingoffarguments,fromtheoppositionandRussia,accusingthepro-Euro-peanfactionsinMoldovaofattemptingreunificationwithRomaniaunderthepretextofEuropeanintegration.Eventhemostpro-RomaniangroupcurrentlyinvolvedinmainstreamMoldovanpolitics,theLiberalParty(PL)ledbyMihaiGhimpu,hasrefrainedfromcallingforunification95,eventhoughitunambigu-ouslydeniestheexistenceofaMoldovannationseparatefromtheRomanians,andhighlightstheculturalunityof‘theRomaniansonbothsidesofthePrut’.

PoliticalgroupswhichclearlyfavourMoldovajoiningRomaniaareextremelymarginal,andtheirtotalsupportdoesnotexceed1%ofthevotes.Themainpro-unificationgroupingcurrentlyoperatinginMoldovaistheNational-LiberalParty,ledbyVitaliePavlicenco.Thispartywonlessthan0.5%ofthevoteinthelastelections.

93 ThePartyofSocialistsisoneofseveralgroupswhichhavedemandedtheformalbanningofunionistmovementsinMoldova.http://ria.ru/world/20150518/1065201919.html

94 http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/leanca-declaratiile-de-unire-ale-lui-basescu-ne-scind-eaza-societatea-si-ne-au-creat-deja-probleme-11814527

95 Whenaskedabouthisattitude tounion inan interview inMarch2010,MihailGhimpu,asactingpresidentofMoldova,repliedevasively:“Thereareproblemsthatcanbesolvedby timeandby thepublic. Ifpeoplewantunification,neitherGhimpunorVoronin,nei-therPutinnorClintonwillstopthem.”Source:http://www.europalibera.org/content/arti-cle/1970942.html

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InRomania,themainstreampoliticalpartiesapproachtheissueofunificationwithacertaindistance,althoughduetothefactorsmentionedabovetheycan-notanddonotwanttodistancethemselvesunequivocallyfromtheidea.ThemainforceontheRomanianpoliticalscene,theSocial-DemocraticParty(PSD)ofVictorPonta,adoptsthetraditionalrhetoric,accordingtowhichtheprac-ticalunificationofthetwocountrieswilltakeplacewhenMoldovabecomesamemberoftheEuropeanUnion,becausethiswillleadtotheabolitionofbor-ders,fullfreedomtotravel,liveandwork,anddeepeconomicintegration.Asdemonstratedbytheexampleofthelastpresidentialelection,suchrhetorichasundergoneacertainrevisionunderpressurefrompoliticaldemands.Asalreadymentioned,duringtheelectioncampaignPontaambiguouslyalludedtotheideaoftheGreatUnificationof1918.ThesecondmajorpoliticalgroupinRomania,theNationalLiberalParty(PNL),hasinacertainsenserejectedtheideaofunifyingMoldovaandRomania(althoughithasnotsaidsoexplicitly).Accordingtotheparty’sofficialposition,it“supportsthesovereignty,trueindependenceandterritorialintegrityofMoldova,andlooksforwardtobilateralrelationsbasedontheprinciplesofpartnershipandcommonidentity”.Inaddition,RomaniashouldsupportMoldovainits“aspirationstostrengthenitsstatehood”,intheparty’sopinion96.Ontheotherhand,somestatementsbyhigh-rankingpoliti-ciansintheparty(includingitsleaderCrinAntonescu)arenotsoclear,andrefertothepossibleunionofthetwocountries97.

ThemainpoliticalpartyinRomaniawhichopenlysupportstheideaofunifi-cationwithMoldovaremainsthenationalistGreaterRomaniaParty(PRM),ledbyCorneliuVadimTudor.Overtheyears,however,thisgroupinghasbeenconsistentlylosingthepoliticalsupportoftheelectorate.In2000and2004ithaditsshareofsuccess(earning19.48%and12.92%ofthevoterespectively),butnowcanonlyrelyonthevotesofabout2%oftheelectorate,andsince2008ithashadnorepresentativesinparliament.Pro-unionistslogansarealsousedbythePopularMovementParty(PMP)createdin2013,whichisprimarilymadeupofsupportersoftheformerPresidentTraianBăsescu;however,supportforthispartydoesnotexceed5%.Atthesametime,noneofthepoliticalpartiesopenlyadvocatingunionwithMoldovahasproposedevenageneralplanforachievingthisgoal.

96 http://www.pnl.ro/subpagina/capitolul-12-rela-iile-externe-i-afacerile-europene97 TheleaderofthePNL,CrinAntonescu,statedon30November2013thattheunionis“ana-

tionalaspirationsoughtbybothbanksofthePrut”andthatpersonallyhe“wasobviouslyinfavourofit”.http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/antonescu-despre-unirea-republica-moldo-va-aspiratie-nationala-ambele-parti-prutului-1_52998806c7b855ff56576fb0/index.html

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4. The public and unirea

ThelevelsofsupportforreunifyingthetwocountriesamongRomaniansareveryhigh,atabout70%.However,thisfigurefallsoffdramaticallywhenre-spondentsareinformedaboutthehighfinancialcostsofMoldova’spossibleannexation.Unificationatanypriceisdemandedbyonlyabout17%ofRomani-ans98.DespitesuchhighsupportforUnirea,RomanianspayverylittleattentiontothecurrentsituationinMoldovaandtoMoldovansthemselves.ReportsontheireasternneighbourappearrelativelyrarelyintheRomanianmedia,andknowledgeofthesocialandpoliticalsituationinthiscountryismostlyrudi-mentaryandfullofstereotypes99.AccordingtoastudyconductedbytheSorosFoundationin2011,upto90%ofRomanianshadnevervisitedMoldova,68.4%didnothaveanycontactswithMoldovancitizens,andonly4.5%ofrespondentssaidthattheyhadfriendlycontacts100.Upto70%ofrespondentsstatedthattheyhadnotseenasingleitemofinformation(TVreports,posters,etc.)aboutMol-dovaoverthelastyear,andupto82%believethattheyknowlittleorverylittleaboutMoldova101.Itcanbeassumedthatthesituationhasimprovedslightlysincethatpoll,thankstotheactivitiesofmovementssuchasAcţiunea2012,orthegeneralriseininterestintheregioncausedontheonehandbytheongo-ingprocessofMoldova’sEuropeanintegration,andontheotherhandduetotheUkrainiancrisis.However,itdoesnotseemthatanysuchchangewillbesignificant.

98 SeeKamilCałus,TomaszDąborowski,ThepresidentofRomaniasupportsunificationwithMoldova, OSW Analyses, 4 December 2013: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-ses/2013-12-04/president-romania-supports-unification-moldova, and http://www.hot-news.ro/stiri-esential-16104519-sondaj-ires-trei-sferturi-dintre-romani-declara-acord-unirea-romaniei-republica-moldova.htm

99 GenerallyRomaniansseeMoldovansastheir‘poorerbrethren’,whichoftenleadstochau-vinisticbehaviour. In January2014aRomanian journalist,RaduBanciu, saidona radioprogrammehewashostingthat“MoldovaisexactlylikeaRomaniangypsystandingwithhishandoutontheChampsElysees.That’swhataMoldovanis:agypsyorapeasant,whohasbeenbeggingfromRomaniaeversinceI’veknownthem.”BanciualsosaidduringthebroadcastthatfemaleMoldovanstudentscomingtoRomaniafundedbyscholarshipsfromBucharestare“whoreswhogetpregnantstraightawayduringthefirstyear.”Source:http://www.gandul.info/magazin/radu-banciu-pus-la-punct-de-o-studenta-dupa-ce-i-a-jignit-pe-toti-moldovenii-sunt-o-curva-dar-nu-am-ramas-gravida-in-primul-semestru-11910998

100 RepublicaMoldovaînconştiinţapublicăromânească,http://www.fundatia.ro/republica-moldova-%C3%AEn-con%C8%99tiin%C8%9B-public%C4%83-rom%C3%A2neasc%C4%83

101 ThelevelofRomanians’ignoranceaboutthemajorpoliticalissuesinMoldovaisevidencedbythefactthatupto74%ofrespondentscouldnotgiveacorrectanswertothequestion‘WhatisTransnistria?’.

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TherearecurrentlynofullyreliablepollsonMoldovansupportfortheideaofunificationwithRomania102.Accordingtotheavailablestudies,in2010unionwas‘fully’supportedbyabout10-11%ofallthecountry’sinhabitants;another18-20%oftherespondentssupportedtheidea‘tosomeextent’,althoughitshouldbestipulatedthatmanyMoldovansunderstood‘significantstrengthening’tomeanmutualcooperationwhilemaintainingMoldovanstatehood.ItshouldbeestimatedthattherealnumberofsupportersofUnireastandsatabout15%(mostvoterswhosupportunificationfavourtheLiberalParty,whosebackingdoesnotexceed10%).

UnionissupportedinparticularbythatpartofMoldovansocietywhichde-claresitselfas‘Romanians’,asignificantportionoftheRomanian-speakingintelligentsia,aswellasthesmallportionofthosewhoidentifythemselvesasMoldovansandseeunionasanopportunitytoimprovelivingstandards.TheunambiguousopponentsofunificationincludetheRussian-speakingminori-tieslivinginMoldova,includinginparticulartheUkrainians,Russians,Bul-gariansandGagauz.TheSlavs’resistanceisprimarilyduetotheirlinguisticandculturalalienationfromRomania.Theseminoritiesfearthattheywouldbecomesecond-classcitizensinaRomanianstate,andthattheirrighttocul-tivatetheirowntraditionsandlanguageswouldbegreatlyreduced.Theyarealsoawareofthepossiblepoliticalconsequences:thedeteriorationofrelationswithRussiaandthelikelydifficultiesintravellingtotheeast.Therathernega-tiveimageofRomaniaderivedfromtheSoviethistoricalschool,whichstressedthatcountry’sfascistpastaboveall,includingitsparticipationintheSecondWorldWaragainsttheSovietUnion,andtheorganisationoftheHolocaustandtheexterminationoftheRomapopulationonTransnistrianterritory,isalsoofsomesignificance.

TheGagauz,aTurkish-speakingpeoplenumberingabout150,000whomostlyliveinareasoftheGagauzAutonomyinsouthofthecountry,areaspecialcasehere.Thispeopleischaracterisedbyitswidespreadandunusuallystrongpro-Russianandanti-Romanianattitude.Inthecollectiveconsciousnessofthisnationality,theRussiansareseenastheGagauz’defendersagainstexternalthreats,especiallyRomania.BadmemoriesoftheAutonomy’speriodunderrule

102 DoubtshavebeenraisedabouttheconductofsurveysonunificationinMoldova.Amongtherespondentstherehasalmostalwaysbeenanover-representationofpeopledeclaringthemselvesasMoldovansorRomanians.Sometimestheopinionsofimportantminorities,includingtheGagauz,havesimplynotbeentakenintoaccount.Thewayinwhichtheques-tionswereformulatedalsoleavesmuchtobedesired.

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fromBucharestintheinterwarperiod,aswellastheruleofthefascistregimeofIonAntonescuduringWorldWarII,arestillveryvividinthememoryoftheGagauz.Moreover,RomaniaisseenastheinstigatoroftheMoldovan-Romaniannationalismofthelateeighties,andoftheethnictensionswhichresultedfromit103.FearofunificationwithRomania(fuelledfurtherbyBăsescu’sdeclara-tioninNovember2013)wasoneofthemainreasonsfortheorganisationinGagauziaofareferenduminFebruary2014(unrecognisedbyChișinau)onhowintegrationwithMoldovashouldproceed,inwhich98.5%ofvotersfavouredtheRussian-sponsoredCustomsUnion104.

TheinhabitantsofTransnistriadisplayanextremelynegativeattitudetowardsreunification.TheregionseparatedfromMoldova,amongothers,forfearofRo-manianisationandbeingabsorbedbyRomania.TransnistriaalsoaccusedBu-charestofbeinginvolvedintheTransnistrianwarontheMoldovanside.Sincetheendofthemilitaryphaseoftheconflict,theinhabitantsofTransnistriahaveremainedafraidofapossibleMoldovan-RomanianmilitaryinterventionagainstTransnistria,calculatedbyChișinautoregaincontroloftheterritory.Theseparatistrepublic’spopulationcommonlyseesRomaniaasconductingaconsistentpolicyofaimingtoannexMoldova,andhavingavestedinterestinabsorbingthehighlyindustrialisedregionofTransnistria.

SocialmovementspromotingUnirea operatemoreorlessformallyinbothcoun-tries.Thelargestandbest-recognisedistheAcţiunea2012UnionistPlatform,di-rectedbyGeorgeSimon,whichincludesabout40non-governmentalorganisa-tions,bothRomanianandMoldovan,andhasasignificantnumberofindividualmembers.Thisorganisationwasestablishedin2011,anditsnamecommemo-ratesthe200thanniversaryofthedetachmentin1812ofBessarabiafromthePrincipalityofMoldaviaanditsabsorptionbytheRussianEmpire.Thismove-mentorganisesregularmarchesinthestreetsofChișinauandBucharest,called‘Unionistmarches’.Traditionallytheseattractseveralthousandparticipantsfrombothcountries.Italsoconductseducationalandinformationalactivitiesinthefieldofhistoricalandidentityquestions,bothbyorganisingsummerschoolsandcourses,aswellasbypublishingnewsletters,printingposters,etc.Thisorganisationisfundedbymembershipfees,taxallowancesanddirectsubsidies.

103 FormoreabouttheGagauzquestion,andtheGagauz’relationswithRomania,seeKamilCałus, Gagauzia: growing separatism inMoldova?,OSW Analyses, 10March 2014: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-10/gagauzia-growing-separa-tism-moldova

104 Ibid.

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Officially,theplatformisnotsupported(certainlynotfinancially)byanypoliti-calforcesineitherRomaniaorMoldova.Moldova’spro-Europeaneliteperceivemostofthisorganisation’sactivitiesasathreattostabilityinthecountry.Inthelightofsuchallegations,on13May2015Acţiunea2012’sleaderGeorgeSimonreceivedafive-yearbanonenteringtheterritoryofMoldova105.Themovement’sactivitiesaresupportedbyTineriiMoldovei(YouthofMoldova),anorganisa-tionadvocatingtheunificationofRomaniaandMoldova,whichismadeupof‘MoldovansbornafterthefallofCommunism’106.

5. prospects for unification

TheunificationofRomaniaandMoldovaisunlikelyintheforeseeablefuture.Ob-staclestothisprocessincludeeconomic,social,political,andinternationalissues.

Accordingtoavailableestimates,inthefirstfiveyearsafterRomania’sputativeabsorptionofMoldova,Bucharestwouldhavetospendaminimumof30to35billioneurosonadaptingMoldova’sinfrastructure,administrativesystemandlegalsysteminorderforittooperatewithinasinglecountry107.WithRomania’sGDPrunningatUS$189billionandanannualbudgetamountingtoaboutUS$70billion,thesecostswouldhaveamajorimpactonthecountry’seconomy108.Fur-thermore,unionwouldadmittedlyslightlyrisetheGDPofthecommonstate(byabout€7billion),buttheGDPper capitawouldfallfromthecurrentlevelofUS$9499toUS$8312.

Theeconomicquestionisparticularlyimportantinthecontextofpublicsupportforintegration.ThevastmajorityofRomaniansfavourunitywithMoldova–butnotatanyprice.Ontheotherhand,supportforreunificationinMoldovahasnotexceeded15%sincethemid-nineties.

InadditiontooppositionfromethnicMoldovans,furtherresistanceshouldalsobeexpectedfromtheRussian-speakingminorities,especiallythetraditionallyanti-RomanianGagauz.AttemptstounitewouldprobablyrevivetheGagauz

105 http://infoprut.ro/39424-breaking-george-simion-expulzat-de-sis-din-republica-moldo-va.html

106 http://tinerii.md/cine-suntem-noi107 http://www.newschannel.ro/stiri/cat-ne-ar-costa-unirea-cu-basarabia/108 IllustrationofhowbigafinancialeffortitwouldbefortheRomanianstatetospendthis

sumistheproblemdiscussedearlierofBucharestassigningasumof€100millionaspartoftheaiditpromisedtoMoldovain2009.

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separatistmovementrootedinthebeginningofthenineties,whichwouldprob-ablyadditionallybesupportedbyRussia.Anothersocio-politicalproblemisTransnistria.TheunificationofMoldovawithRomaniawouldmeetwithverystrongpublicresistanceintheseparatistregion,aswellasastrongreactionfromRussia(asinthecaseofGagauzia).SoitseemsthatMoldovacouldonlyjoinRomaniawithoutTransnistria,andprobablywithoutGagauzia.SuchascenariowouldrequireChișinauandBucharesttorecognisetheindependenceofthoseregions,orresolvetheirissuesinotherways(forexamplebyjoiningthemtoUkraine).Bothofthesescenariosnowseemveryunlikely.

OneofthekeyobstaclesontheroadtoeventualunificationistheoppositionofMoldova’srulingelite.Moldovanpoliticiansrealisethatthetwocountriesmergingonaunitarymodelwoulddeprivethemoftheirpositionsandfuturecareerprospects,aswellasjeopardisingtheirpoliticalandbusinessinterests.ItseemsveryunlikelythatMoldovanpoliticianscouldwinsufficientpopular-ityinaunitedRomanianstatetoplayasimportantrolesastheydoinMoldova.Evenassumingthatpoliticalunitywouldbeachievedthroughfederalisation,thusmaintainingtheexistenceofMoldovanlegislativeandexecutivebodies,thepositionoftheMoldovanrulingelitewouldclearlysufferanyway.Inad-dition,duetotherelativelylowsupportfortheideaofunificationamongtheMoldovanpublic,itdoesnotseemlikelythatthosegroupsseekingtoachieveitcouldwinanyrealinfluenceonpowerinthecountry,orshapethegovern-ment’spolicies.

TherulingelitesinBucharest,contrarytotheirpoliticaldeclarations,arealsoun-interestedinarealunificationofRomaniaandMoldova.Theirunionistnarrativeismerelypropaganda:itisintendedfordomesticconsumptionandisprimarilyusedtomobilisevotersandemphasisetheirownpatriotism.Proofofthisincludesthefactthatnoneofthemaingroupsactivelysupportthe(officialandunofficial)movementstopromoteunion,suchasAcţiunea2012(exceptintheshortterm,forpoliticalexpediency).RomanianpoliticiansrealisethattheeventualsuccessoftheunificationprojectcouldbedisastrousforthefutureoftheRomanianstate,notonlybecauseoftheeconomicorpoliticalcosts,butalsotheexpectedriseintensionsamongethnicminoritiesbothinthenewly-attachedMoldovaandinRomaniaitself.MergingthetwocountrieswouldderailtheideaoftheRoma-nianunitarystateadvocatedbyBucharest,andwouldraisejustifieddemandsforautonomyfromtheHungarianminoritylivinginthecountry,amongothers109.

109 WecouldexpectthatafterjoiningMoldova,liketheGagauzAutonomy,Romania’sHungar-ianswoulddemandthatBucharestcreateasimilarautonomousadministrativeunitforthem.

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Thelastcategoryofobstaclesisthatoftheinternationalcontext.TheEU’sre-sponsetoanypossibleactionsaimedatunifyingthetwocountriesiscurrentlyhardtopredict,butitcanbeassumedthatthesewouldberathernegative,es-peciallyiftheunificationoccurredafterRomaniaenteredtheSchengenzone.TheprocesswouldnotonlybecostlyfromtheEU’sperspective,butwouldalsojeopardisesecuritywithintheCommunity.TheEUmemberstates’reactiontoaunificationscenariocanbepredictedonthebasisoftheirnegativereactionstotheRomanianpolicyofgivingpassportstoMoldovans,andtoTraianBăsescu’sappealtounitewithMoldovabeforeRomaniajoinedtheEU.Atthesametime,weshouldalsoexpectobjectionsfromRussia(regardlessofwhetherTrans-nistriawouldalsobejoinedtoRomania),forwhomunionwouldalterthestra-tegicsituationintheregion,inconnectionwiththeliquidationoftheneutralMoldovaandade factoshiftofNATO’sborderstotheeast.ItseemsverylikelythatUkrainewouldalsoreactnegatively,asittraditionallyperceivesRomaniaasathreat.KievmayalsofearthatRomania’srecoveryofMoldovawouldsetaprecedentforfurtherterritorialclaims,includingnorthernBukovinaandBugeac,whichnowbelongtoUkrainebutweregovernedbyBucharestintheinterwarperiod.

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vII. prospecTs For BIlaTeral relaTIons

EverythingindicatesthattherelationshipbetweenBucharestandChișinauwillretainitsspecialcharacter.ThedeepsentimentalattachmentoftheRomanianstothelandsofmodernMoldovawillshapetheactionsofRomanianpoliticianswho,inthefutureasnow,willraisetheMoldovanquestiontowinovermorevoters.Ononehand,then,weshouldexpectRomaniatocontinuefirmlysup-portingMoldovainitsEuropeanintegrationprocess,andtotryandretainitsroleasChișinau’smainadvocateintheinternationalarena.Ontheotherhand,thehistoricalconditionswillstillposeaseriousobstacletothesigningofthebasictreatyandsomeotherelementsoftheborderandbilateralagreements.NordoesitseempossiblethatBucharestcanopenlydistanceitselffromtheideaofUnireaintheforeseeablefuture,whichwillprobablyarouseregularten-sionsamongtheRussian-speakingminoritieslivinginMoldovaaswellasthepro-Russianandanti-Romaniangroups,andwillalsobeexploitedbyRussianpropaganda.Howeveratthesametime,italsoseemsquiteunlikelythatpoliti-calpartiesorsocialmovementssupportingtheunionofthetwocountriesineitherRomaniaorMoldovawillmanagetogainmainstreamsupportandtakepowerintheforeseeablefuture.Meanwhile,bothKlausIohannis’presidentialcampaignandhisactivitiessincebecomingPresidentofRomaniainDecember2014indicatethathewillfocusprimarilyonfightingcorruptioninthecountryandprovidingdiplomaticsupporttoMoldova(alsointhecontextofChișinau’seffortstoobtaincandidatestatusforEUmembership),whichwillactasareas-suringfactorandcontributetothedevelopmentofbilateralrelations110.

Relationsbetweenthetwocountries,burdenedastheyarewithenormoushis-toricalandculturalbaggage,willthereforedependlargelyontheactionsofRomania,ashasbecometraditional;butthemainfactorinfluencingthemwillprimarilyremainwhatkindofpoliticalforcescometopowerinChișinau.Ifpro-Russiangroupsgainpower,thiswilllikelyunfreezethecurrently‘frozen’prob-lems,andbringaboutaseriousdeteriorationinbilateralrelations.Indeed,theseforceswillaggressivelyemphasisetheseparatenessofMoldovansandinflameanti-Romaniansentiments.However,aslongasMoldovanpolicyisshapedby

110 AnexampleofIohannis’rhetoricontheissueofunificationishiscommentaryonthedem-onstrationbyunionistson16May2015inChișinau’scentralsquare.TheRomanianPresi-dentsaidthenthatsupportersofUnireamustrealisethatthemostimportantissueiscur-rently bringingMoldova into theEuropeanUnion,whichRomaniawill support. http://independent.md/iohannis-comenteaza-protestele-din-republica-moldova-pentru-promo-va-ideea-de-unire-cu-romania/#.VVsBlvmqhHw

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thecurrentpro-Europeangroups,theywillprobablymanagetoavoidseriousmisunderstandingswithBucharest,asthatwouldnotbeintheirinterest.

Thedevelopmentofcooperationwillalsobefosteredinsubsequentyearsbythedevelopment(whichhasbeennoticeableforsometime)oftheformationandconsolidationofaMoldovanidentitywhichaffirmsitsRomanianrootsanddoesnotdenythefactofthe‘Romanian-ness’ofthelanguageindailyuseorthecommonhistorybetweenthetwostates.Inconnectionwiththis,culturalcooperationwillcontinuetodevelop.Romania’simportancefortheMoldovaneconomywillcontinuetoincrease,becauseofrisingtrade,newinvestmentsandthedevelopmentofdistributionsystemswhichcansupplyMoldovawithRomaniangasandelectricity.TheprocessofMoldova’sEuropeanintegrationwillplayaveryimportantcontextinthedevelopmentofbilateralrelations.Un-doubtedly,thecountry’seventualaccessiontotheEUwouldleadtoasignificantstrengtheningoftherelationship.Intheforeseeablefuture,however,MoldovanmembershipoftheEUisunlikely.

KamIl caŁusWork on this text was completed in June 2015

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Map 2.BordersofRomaniainthe1930s,theso-called‘GreatRomania’

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Map 3.ContemporaryRomaniaandMoldova

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