5th Annual International Symposium
Biosecurity and Biosafety: Future Trends and Solutions
Palazzo Cusani‐Milan, ItalyApril 2‐4, 2014
NISREEN AL‐HMOUD (PhD in Microbiology)e‐mail: [email protected]
Round Table 3: Combining Development and Security
Effective Practices In Addressing Proliferation Risks In
Biotechnology: A Tool For Stability And Development
Knowledge without Knowledge without conscience is simply the conscience is simply the ruin of the soul.ruin of the soul.F. Rabelais, 1532
I. INTRODUCTION
• Biotechnology, and the knowledge that derives from it, has been increasing at a phenomenal rate for the past 20 years.
• Just as new biological knowledge builds on previous knowledge, so too, the biotech revolution was built on previous revolutions in transportation and communication.
• “Every major technology ‐ metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy ‐ has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones. Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the [twenty‐first] century?”(1)
Reminder
• Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) is Research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agriculture, plants, animals, the environment, or material.
• Reference: National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
• Between October 2011 and March 2012, a controversy regarding the publication of results of H5N1 influenza virus research by two scientists led to additional oversight of a relatively broad segment of the infectious disease research enterprise in the U.S. (2)
• The episode has been described as an example of the “dual use dilemma,” legitimate and open research that could be exploited for harm by others.
I. INTRODUCTION
• The recent concern regarding Dual Use Research (DUR) is focused on the traditional agents of biological warfare and the influenza viruses.
• Yet, these Select Agents are but a small part of the spectrum of biological threats and risks we humans, our animals, and plants face today. Therefore, DURC cannot be understood in isolation.
Franz, D (2014) The Dual Use Dilemma: Crying Out For Leadership
II. THE UNFOLDING PROBLEMS• DURC poses some immeasurable, but potentially high‐impact,
threats for state or non‐state terrorism. The more immediate risk is the unintended release of pathogens, with potential to harm humans, livestock, agriculture, or the environs.
• There is negligible oversight in any country over potential DURC executed in low‐security labs, such as those found in high schools, colleges, and most private sector facilities.
• No uniform international or regional standards or definitions exist of laboratory security, safety, or protocols for DURC*.
*: http://www.cfr.org/health/making‐new‐revolutions‐biology‐safe/p31453?cid=rss‐health‐making_the_new_revolutions_in_‐102313
III. HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY
• Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop.
• Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding‐ground for other threats, including civil conflict.
• Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease.
III. HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY
• Both health and security are of interest to government decision makers and decision influencers.
• However, the funding they provide to protect the population depends on their perception of the threat or risk.
• It also appears that in biology, government decision makers often prefer funding response measures rather than preventive measures, regardless of whether they are seeking health or security.
III. HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY• Strengthening health security required sustainedsustained and longlong‐‐
term investmentterm investment in human resources, infrastructure, and Standard Operating Procedures, adapted to local needs and circumstances.
• Early investment to build capacity and preparedness is much more cost‐effective than responding to events as they occurred.
IV. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
• There should be more emphasis on the role of healthy cultures within laboratories to counter the potential for accidental misapplications or intentional misuses of biological technologies by those possessing relevant knowledge.
• “Culture of Responsibility in the Life Sciences”
V. STATUS OF BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY IN MENA REGION
• Many Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries and for many laboratories, guidance or specific requirements for the appropriate handling and storage of Valuable Biological Materials (VBM) do not yet exist. This raises the following questions: – How are these agents generally kept in such countries? Who
has access to them?
– What kind of research is allowed and conducted with them?
– Who oversees this research?
– Who has the ultimate responsibility for these agents?
– Who should have access to information related to these agents, including research results and storage details?
V. STATUS OF BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY IN MENA REGION
• Many open questions still remain in the context of laboratory laboratory biosecuritybiosecurity, and much still needs to be done to reassure the public, scientists, laboratory managers, regulators, national authorities and the international community that the appropriate measures to prevent, manage, control and minimize the biorisks associated with possessing and handling infectious agents are in place.
V. STATUS OF BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY IN MENA REGION
• Until very recently, the MENA region was a low priority for funding.
• The increased socio‐political turbulence in the region during the last several years has driven a heightened awareness globally of its implications for safety and security.
The Status of Bioscience Labs in MENA Region
• Some MENA countries have high excellence Biotech laboratories, but the capacity building in biosafety/biosecurity vary among the countries of the region. – Biosafety is more prevalent than biosecurity; one reason why
biosecurity is employed less often is because laboratory biosecurity is a relatively new concept!
– Simple practices and techniques predominate.
– Perceptions of risk vary among the region.
The Status of Bioscience Labs in MENA Region
• A lack of funding and other resources is considered as the primary factor that prevents laboratories from applying appropriate biosafety and biosecurity measures.– A lack of funds, in some countries of the region, prohibits laboratories
from purchasing the necessary equipment and hiring qualified staff.
• A lack of awareness or education is also a significant hurdle.– Many scientists are guided by their employers or employee training,
but biosafety training is minimally conducted in all MENA countries.
• Furthermore, every country in the region looks to its governmentto help shape its biosafety and biosecurity practices in the laboratory.– Yet, for many countries, no national regulations or guidance exists.
Consequent Risk!!!
• Insufficient safety and security measures at laboratories and other facilities pose clear and obvious risks.
•• What is requiredWhat is required?
• Full awareness by relevant communities of the risks that might be involved.
In order to achieve this, In order to achieve this,
• identify priorities (needs/difficulties/remedies);
• identify and assess the relevant beneficiaries, the implementing partners and the political willingness to build cooperation within the MENA countries;
• assess major risks area such as design, operation, and physical protection of high risk facilities and identify required preventive and corrective measures;
• design pilot projects in limited number of selected laboratories to ensure adequate levels of biosafety and biosecurity;
• assess effectiveness of regulatory framework and propose remedial measures in accordance with international best practices (including international awareness raising measures).
This can be achieved through
• establishing the MENA Network for Biosafety and Biosecurity.
• Topics of interest to the region: Risk of large outbreaks of diseases.– need of optimal sanitary situation,
– need of sound governmental response plans
Steps for Networking and Harmonization
• Establishment of a regional office for MENA Biosafety and Biosecurity.
• Identification of national focal laboratories in MENA countries.
• Establishment of laboratories network between MENA countries.– What methods should be used for developing the network?
– What information should be communicated?
• Coordination with the international organizations.–– Donors would work with regional and national biosafety Donors would work with regional and national biosafety
organizations to avoid duplicating training and other effortsorganizations to avoid duplicating training and other efforts.
Potential Areas of Cooperation with the International Organizations in Biosafety and Biosecurity
• Biosafety: – in operating procedures in BSL 3 lab,
– for the storage and the management of the strains collections,
– for the relevant legislations, regulations and procedures,
– for the knowledge of biorisk assessment and management.
• Biosecurity: – for the access, storage and the management of the strains
collections (traceability)
– for the relevant legislations, regulations and procedures
– export control/customs checking/borders monitoring
Biosafety Laboratories Network of MENA Region‐Roadmap
•• RegionalRegional approach.
• Sharing the culture of biological risks assessmentassessment.
• Sharing the culture of biological risks managementmanagement.
• Finalizing the fine assessment of the needs fine assessment of the needs of improvement in biosafety and biosecurity through a sound analysis of the laws sound analysis of the laws and regulationsand regulations in close cooperation with the international agencies.
• Upgrading and strengtheningstrengthening the legislationslegislations and regulationsregulationswith regard to export control for dual‐use goods.
• Upgrading and strengtheningstrengthening the quality managements quality managements systemssystems as needed, especially ISO 17025 for enhancing international cooperationinternational cooperation, thus economic developmenteconomic development.
Biosafety Laboratories Network of MENA Region‐Roadmap: Training Requirements
• The Training needs should be conducted at different levels: theoreticaltheoretical and pragmaticpragmatic, and for the four types of «customers»: governmental authorities, directors of laboratories, scientific staffand technical staff of the laboratories.
• The TrainingTraining has to be conducted according to the types of activities: Research and Development (R & D)Research and Development (R & D), Biological Resources Biological Resources CentersCenters ‐ for the management of a collection of strains, especially when there are high pathogen biological strains ‐, exchanges of biological strains between laboratories, including packaging andtransportation, test or diagnostic laboratories, in compliance with the international best practices.
Biosafety Laboratories Network of MENA Region‐Roadmap: Recommendations
There is a need to develop a national/regional implementation plan that
•balances human and animal disease efforts,
•creates a national/regional regulatory framework,
•focuses on laboratory consolidation rather than expansion,•emphasizes international collaborative relationships, and
•identifies funding for creating a professional biosafety societyand national biosafety training centers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
• There is no consensus among science and security experts regarding which dual‐use research weighs on the side of social benefit, versus that which poses significant danger to mankind.
• Much work remains to be done internationally to safely and securely manage infectious agents and toxins and to reduce the risk of exposure and theft.
• Concerns in developing countries that the developed world will use DURC regulation to hold them back are not entirely groundless.– It is imperative that wealthy nations assist them in developing
their research, biosecurity, and bio‐surveillance capacities.
VI. CONCLUSIONS• Establishing a cultureculture of safety, security, and responsibility
will be immensely challenging, especially in those areas of the world that do not perceive the risks and/or lack adequate resources to mitigate those risks.
• The provision of safe and secure biological laboratories throughout the MENA countries, enhances the regional capacity to respond to the most challenging biological risks.
• The level of biosafety awareness and practices varies greatly among MENA countries. In some countries there is a long tradition of a biosafety culture, often built in the occupational occupational health legislationhealth legislation.– More information needs to be collected about laboratory
policies and practices in MENA region.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
• Regional Biosafety and Biosecurity Networks might be a more practical way to start.– The capacity in many MENA countries is still developing.
– A roadmap is needed for buildingbuilding and sustainingsustaining networks in the region that encourage cross‐border collaboration on technical policy issues in the biological field.
• The wealth of data obtained through these regional networks, when combined with insights obtained through complementary and collaborative relationships with partners in this field, canbe used to better raise regional and global awareness of the critical issues involved with developing, implementing, and overseeing biosafety and biosecurity measures in bioscience institutes around the world.
References
1) Matthew Meselson, Professor, Harvard Univ., Presentation on The Problem of Biological Weapons at the 1818th Stated Meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Jan. 13, 1999), available at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/cbw5.htm.
2) Ron A.M. Fouchier et al., Transmission Studies Resume for Avian Flu, 339 SCI. 520, 520 (2013). H5N1 is a subtype of the influenza A virus, known as “bird flu” or “highly pathogenic avian influenza”. It is sometimes designated “A/H5N1” or “A(H5N1).” It can cause illness in humans and many animal species.
3) Jennifer Gaudioso, Susan B. Rivera, Susan Caskey, and Reynolds M. Salerno (2006). Laboratory Biosecurity: A Survey of the U.S. Bioscience Community. Applied Biosafety, 11(3):138‐143.
References
4) Lisa M. Astuto‐Gribble, Jennifer M. Gaudioso, Susan A. Caskey, Tamara R. Zemlo (2009). A Survey of Bioscience Research and Biosafety and Biosecurity Practices in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Applied Biosafety, 14(4): 181‐196.
5) J. Craig Reed (2012). Global Biosafety and Biosecurity Challenges: Options for Nations with Limited Resources; Assessments of Needs, Challenges, and Resources (Plenary Session). Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High‐Containment Biological Laboratories.
6) David R. Franz (2014). Dual‐Use Dilemma: Crying Out For Leadership. Saint Louis University School of Law.
7) United Nations (2004). A more secure world: Our shared responsibility; Report of the High‐level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
Nisreen AL‐Hmoud
Project Director
Center for Excellence in Biosafety, Biosecurity and Biotechnology
Royal Scientific Society [email protected]