1 2 3 4 5 IN THE TULALIP TRIBAL COURT 6 TULALIP INDIAN RESERVATION 7 TULALIP, WASHINGTON g HAZEN GRAHAM SHOPBELL, enrolled Tulalip Tribal member, et ux., 9 No. TUL-CV-GC-2016-0278 Plaintiffs, 10 DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 11 V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 12 STATE OF WASHINGTON MOTION DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND 13 WILDLIFE; JIM UNSWORTH, 14 Director, State of Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife; 15 WENDY WILLETTE, Detective, State of Washington Department of Fish and 16 Wildlife; JOHN DOES 1-6, Law Enforcement Officers, State of 17 Washington Department of Fish and 18 Wildlife, 19 Defendants. 20 I. INTRODUC'T'ION AND STATEMENT OF GROUNDS 21 The only issue left in this case after this Court's Ruling on Defendants' Motion to 22 Dismiss is whether the Court should order the return of a Samsung tablet allegedly seized and 23 held by Defendants, but not returned to Plaintiffs. But, as conclusively demonstrated by the 24 declarations accompanying this Motion, Defendants are not in possession of the tablet in 25 question. For that reason, Plaintiffs cannot establish a crucial element of their replevin claim: 26 that WDFW is in possession of their property. WDFW is, therefore, entitled to summary DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR I ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125 Washington Street SE PO Box 40100 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100 (360)753-6200
Transcript
1
2
3
4
5 IN THE TULALIP TRIBAL COURT
6 TULALIP INDIAN RESERVATION 7 TULALIP, WASHINGTON
g HAZEN GRAHAM SHOPBELL, enrolled Tulalip Tribal member, et ux.,
9 No. TUL-CV-GC-2016-0278 Plaintiffs,
10 DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
11 V. SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
12 STATE OF WASHINGTON MOTION DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
13 WILDLIFE; JIM UNSWORTH,
14 Director, State of Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife;
15 WENDY WILLETTE, Detective, State of Washington Department of Fish and
16 Wildlife; JOHN DOES 1-6, Law Enforcement Officers, State of
17 Washington Department of Fish and 18 Wildlife,
19 Defendants.
20 I. INTRODUC'T'ION AND STATEMENT OF GROUNDS
21 The only issue left in this case after this Court's Ruling on Defendants' Motion to
22 Dismiss is whether the Court should order the return of a Samsung tablet allegedly seized and
23 held by Defendants, but not returned to Plaintiffs. But, as conclusively demonstrated by the
24 declarations accompanying this Motion, Defendants are not in possession of the tablet in
25 question. For that reason, Plaintiffs cannot establish a crucial element of their replevin claim:
26 that WDFW is in possession of their property. WDFW is, therefore, entitled to summary
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR I ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125 Washington Street SE PO Box 40100
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100 (360)753-6200
1 judgment. Furthermore, because the evidence shows that WDFW is not in possession of the
2 Samsung tablet, this Court cannot effectively order Defendants to return that tablet; any such
3 order would be ineffective and futile. Because this Court cannot provide any effective relief to
4 redress Plaintiffs' remaining claim, they lack standing to maintain this case. For these reasons,
5 this Court should enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants, dismissing this matter in its
6 entirety.
7 II. RELIEF REQUESTED
8 Defendants, the State of Washington Department of Fish And Wildlife; Jim Unsworth,
9 Director, State of Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife; Wendy Willette, Detective,
10 State of Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife; John Does 1-6, Law Enforcement
11 Officers, State of Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (collectively, WDFW), move
12 pursuant to Tulalip Tribal Code § 2.10.100(5)(b) for summary judgment in favor of WDFW
13 dismissing this matter in its entirety.
14 III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
15 The declarations from WDFW employees accompanying this motion establish that
16 WDFW is not currently in possession of any property seized from the Shopbell residence,
17 including a Samsung tablet. Does Plaintiffs' claim for return of property fail because they
18 cannot establish an indispensable element of such claim (that WDFW is currently is possession
19 of property seized from the Shopbell residence), warranting summary judgment dismissing
20 Plaintiffs' lawsuit? And do Plaintiffs lack standing because this Court cannot provide any
21 relief that will effectively redress Plaintiffs' claims, warranting summary judgment dismissing
22 Plaintiffs' suit?
23
24
25
26
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
2 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360)753-6200
1 IV. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING MOTION — FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2 A. Evidence Supporting Motion
3 This Motion is supported by the materials previously filed in this case and the
4 following declarations and attachments thereto, filed with this Motion: The Declaration of
5 Wendy Willette in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Willette Decl.); the
6 Declaration of Jennifer Maurstad in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
7 (Maurstad Decl.); the Declaration of Carly Peters in Support of Defendants' Motion for
8 Summary Judgment (Peters Decl.); the Declaration of Anthony Jaros in Support of
9 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (faros Decl.); the Declaration of Shawnn Vincent
10 in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Vincent Decl.); the Declaration of
11 Chris Clementson in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Clementson
12 Decl.); and the Declaration of Greg Dutton in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
13 Judgment (Dutton Decl.).
14 B. Factual Background
15 1. The Warrant and Warrant Execution
16 As part of an investigation into suspected crimes related to illegal trafficking in
17 shellfish, unlawful catch accounting, and violations of RCW 69.30.110, WDFW Detective
18 Wendy Willette obtained a search warrant from Tulalip Tribal Court for the search of the
19 residence of Plaintiff Hazen Shopbell; the Shopbell residence is on the Tulalip Reservation.
20 Willette Decl. at 3. The warrant (signed by Judge Colegrove) was signed on June 9, 2016. Id.
21 The warrant was executed at the Shopbell residence on June 13, 2016. Maurstad Decl. at 2;
22 Peters Decl. at 2; Vincent Decl. at 2. WDFW Sergeant Jennifer Maurstad, Officer Carly
23 Peters, Officer Anthony Jaros, and Officer Shawrn Vincent participated in the execution of the
24 warrant. Maurstad Decl. at 2; Peters Decl. at 2; Vincent Decl. at 2; Jaros Decl. at 2.
25
26
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
3 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360)753-6200
1 2. Seizure of Property From the Shopbell Residence and the Handling of That
2 Property
In the course of executing the warrant, WDFW seized various items, including 3
computer equipment, cell phones, and several electronic tablets. Maurstad Decl. at 2; Ex. A; 4
Peters Decl. at 2; Vincent Decl. at 2; Jaros Decl. at 2. In particular, WDFW's records, and the 5
declarations filed herewith, indicate that WDFW seized three electronic tablets from the 6
Shopbell residence: a white Samsung 16 gigabyte tablet with a cracked screen (assigned 7
evidence number WA-013809); a black Samsung tablet (assigned evidence number WA- 8
013810; and a gray Samsung 16 gigabyte notebook with a cracked screen with a leather case 9
(assigned evidence number WA-013811). Willette Decl. at 4; Dutton Decl., Ex. A; Maurstad 10
Decl., Exs. A-D. 11
Each of the WDFW officers involved in the execution of the search warrant at the 12
Shopbell residence and processing of evidence seized therefrom was familiar with WDFW's 13
evidence handling procedures and the evidence seized from the Shopbell residence was 14
handled consistently with those procedures. Willette Decl. at 4-5; Maurstad Decl. at 2; Peters 15
Decl. at 2-3; Vincent Decl. at 2-3; Jaros Decl. at 2; Clementson Decl. at 2-3; Dutton Decl. at 2- 16
4. At the Shopbell residence, each item of property seized was photographed, tagged, and 17
logged onto a Search Warrant Service Return — Notification of Items Seized form. Maurstad 18
Decl. at 2; Exs. A-D; Peters Decl. at 2-3; Vincent Decl. at 2-3; Jaros Decl. at 2. All property 19
seized was delivered by Sergeant Maurstad and Officer Peters to Detective Chris Clementson, 20
who then stored the seized property in his locked office at the WDFW offices in Mill Creek 21
until he delivered it to Detective Willette the following day. Maurstad Decl. at 2-3; Peters 22
Decl. at 2-3; Clementson Decl. at 3; Willette Decl. at 4. Detective Willette and Property and 23
Evidence Custodian Greg Dutton then processed all the seized property, including logging the 24
property through WDFW's evidence intake procedures. Willette Decl. at 4; Dutton Decl. at 3; 25
Ex. A. All property seized from the Shopbell residence was securely stored at the WDFW Mill 26
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 4 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125
PO Bohinx
40 street SE
PO Box 40100 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360)753-6200
1 Creek evidence storage facility, Willette Decl. at 4-5, Dutton Decl. at 2-4, except that certain
2 electronic equipment (including the three tablets seized from the Shopbell residence) was
3 provided to an agent of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
4 (ATF) for imaging. Willette Decl. at 4. Chain of custody forms were completed to document
5 the chain of custody of property provided to and returned from the ATF agent. Willette Decl.
6 at 4-5; Dutton Decl., Exs. B, C. On September 27, 2016, all property seized by WDFW from
7 the Shopbell residence, including the three tablets, was returned to the Shopbells. Willette
g Decl. at 4; Dutton Decl. at 4.
9 However, Plaintiff Tia Anderson asserts that in addition to the three tablets noted
10 above, a fourth tablet, a black Samsung Galaxy tablet belonging to the Shopbell children, was
11 also seized by WDFW, but not returned. Affidavit of Tia Anderson in Support of Motion for
12 Entry of Order of Judgment of Default at 2. But, as reflected in the records documenting
13 WDFW's seizure of property from the Shopbell residence, and as far as the WDFW officers
14 involved in the search recall, three tablets, but not a fourth tablet, were seized from the
15 Shopbell residence, with all seized property being documented according to WDFW
16 procedures. Maurstad Decl. at 2; Ex. A-D; Peters Decl. at 2-3; Vincent Decl. at 2-3; Jaros
17 Decl. at 2. Each of the officers involved in execution of the search warrant at the Shopbell
18 residence, and those WDFW staff that were involved in handling, processing, storing, and
19 returning the evidence seized from the Shopbell residence, have declared that, to their
20 knowledge, WDFW neither seized nor possesses any additional tablet from the Shopbell
21 residence. Willette Decl. at 5; Maurstad Decl. at 3; Peters Decl. at 3; Vincent Decl. at 3; Jaros
22 Decl. at 2; Clementson Decl. at 3; Dutton Decl. at 5. Each officer has thoroughly searched for
23 the tablet and confirmed that WDFW does not possess it. Id. In particular, Evidence
24 Custodian Greg Dutton, who is responsible for inventorying and storing seized evidence,
25 declares that he has thoroughly searched the evidence storage locations and has not located an
26 additional tablet. Dutton Decl. at 4-5.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 5 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360)753-6200
1 3. Procedural History of This Case
2 In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs made three claims: a claim for declaratory judgment, a claim
3 for injunctive relief, and a claim, for replevin/return of property seized by WDFW from the
4 Shopbell residence. Complaint at 6-7. Following this Court's ruling on Defendants' Motion to
5 Dismiss, all that remains of this lawsuit is the claim for return of property (replevin), this Court
6 having dismissed all other remaining claims. See Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
7 for Lack of Jurisdiction at 7.
8 V. LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT
9 A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
10 Under the Tulalip Tribal Code, a Defendant may seek summary judgment as to all or
11 part of any claim. Tulalip Tribal Code § 2.10.100(5)(b). Under § 2.10.100(5)(c), "[t]he
12 judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
13 together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
14 and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Nearly identical
15 standards govern summary judgment under federal and state law, so federal and state cases
16 interpreting the summary judgment standard are instructive.
17 Under federal law, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers
18 to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
19 no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
20 matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). "[A]
21 parry seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
22 district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings,
23 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
24 any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323.
25
26
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
6 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON 1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360)753-6200
I If the moving party satisfies this initial burden, it is entitled to summary judgment
2 unless the non-moving party demonstrates the existence of "specific facts showing that there is
3 a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
4 rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial."'
5 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
6 In establishing that a genuine issue for trial exists, the non-moving party "must do more than
7 simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586. "The
8 mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is not
9 sufficient." Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F. 3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995).
10 And under Washington law, "summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue
11 of any material fact, if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and if
12 reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion from the evidence presented." Estate of
13 Becker v. Avco Corp., Wn.2d , 387 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2017). The moving party bears
14 the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jacobsen v. State, 89
15 Wn.2d 104,108, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977).. "[B]ut this does not relieve the nonmoving party of the
16 burden of producing evidence that would support a genuine issue for trial. The nonmoving
17 party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue and cannot rest on mere allegations.
18 Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Washington, Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 132, 769 P.2d 298
19 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
20 In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth
21 facts that are "evidentiary in nature." Overton v. Consol. Ins. Co., 145 Wn.2d 417, 430, 38
22 P.3d 322 (2002). Ultimate facts or conclusions of fact are not sufficient. Id. "A material fact
23 is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, in whole or in part." Anica v.
24 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 Wn. App. 481, 487, 84 P.3d 1231 (2004). If the non-moving party
25 "can only offer a `scintilla' of evidence, evidence that is `merely colorable,' or evidence that
26 is not significantly probative,"' the non-moving party cannot defeat a summary judgment
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 7 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WAsffiNGTON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125 Washington street SE
PO Box 40100 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100
2 (quoting Herron v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 170, 736 P.2d 249 (1987)). The non-
3 moving party "may not rely on speculation, on argumentative assertions that unresolved factual
4 issues remain, or on having its affidavits considered at face value." Id. Rather, the non-
5 moving party "must set forth specific facts that sufficiently rebut the moving party's
6 contentions and disclose that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Ultimate facts or
7 conclusions of fact are insufficient; conclusory statements of fact will not suffice." Seiber, 136
8 Wn. App. at 736-37 (citations omitted).
9 B. Because WDFW Does- Not Possess the Tablet, Plaintiffs Cannot Establish The
10 Elements of Their Return of Property Claim
11 As noted above, all that remains in this case is Plaintiffs' claim for return of property,
12 in which Plaintiffs claim that WDFW remains in wrongful possession of certain personal
13 property and seek an order compelling return of that property.' See Complaint at 7. Of course,
14 a sine qua non of Plaintiffs' return of property claim is establishing that WDFW "remains in
15 possession of," id., personal property seized from the Shopbell residence. If Plaintiffs cannot
16 establish that WDFW is currently in possession of the property at issue, their claim must
17 necessarily fail because they cannot establish an indispensable element of their claim.
18 As discussed in the accompanying declarations and above, WDFW is not currently in
19 possession of the only property at issue (a black Samsung tablet).2 Willette Decl. at 5;
Maurstad Decl. at 3; Peters Decl. at 3; Vincent Decl. at 3; Jaros Decl. at 2; Clementson Decl. 20
21 1 In this action, Plaintiffs do not seek damages from Defendants for deprivation or loss of the property at issue, See Complaint. Nor could they. This Court's Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss makes clear that
22 all that remains in this case is the issue of return of property and no other issue. Ruling at 5-7. So, damages for deprivation or loss of the seized property cannot be at issue in this case. Therefore, the claim for return of
23 property must fail if WDFW is not currently in possession of the property. Of course, Plaintiffs may seek damages from Defendants for deprivation or loss of seized property through Washington's tort claim process
24 under chapter 4.92 RCW. So, assuming WDFW did, in fact, seize the black Samsung tablet (which it strongly disputes), Plaintiffs have a clear remedy for loss of that property in the form of a tort claim against the agency.
25 2 It is WDFW's position that this fourth, black Samsung tablet was not seized by WDFW, contrary to
Ms. Anderson's assertion that it was. But even assuming it was seized, WDFW is not currently in possession of
26 that tablet, and thus Plaintiffs cannot maintain an action for return of property.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 8 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360)753-6200
1 at 3; Dutton Decl. at 4-5. Plaintiffs cannot plausibly refute WDFW's declarants' assertions
2 that WDFW does not possess the black Samsung tablet. The WDFW personnel in a position to
3 know whether the agency possesses the tablet (those involved in the search for and the
4 handling, processing, and storage of the seized evidence) have all stated that the agency does
5 not have the tablet. No evidence Plaintiffs can produce can plausibly refute these assertions.
6 Even assuming the assertions made in the Anderson Affidavit are true ()VDFW disputes this
7 assertion, believing that Ms. Anderson is mistaken in her recollection), the Anderson Affidavit
8 does not, and cannot, establish that WDFW is currently in possession of the black Samsung
9 tablet.
10 In short, Plaintiffs cannot possibly produce any evidence to establish that WDFW is
11 currently in possession of the tablet. Thus, no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect
12 to whether WDFW possesses the tablet. Therefore, WDFW is entitled to summary judgment
13 dismissing Plaintiffs claim for return of property because they cannot establish an
14 indispensable element of that claim.
15 C. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Maintain This Lawsuit Because This Court Cannot
16 Provide Effective Relief to Redress Their Remaining Claim Since WDFW Does Not Possess Any Property Seized From the Shopbell Residence
17 A fundamental prerequisite for maintaining a lawsuit in any court is that the court must
18 be able to redress the wrong the plaintiff complains of. If the court cannot provide redress, the
19 plaintiff lacks standing and the case must be dismissed.
20 In federal court, this "redressability" requirement is a component of justiciability and
21 Article III standing. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed: "It is a prerequisite
22 of justiciability that judicial relief will prevent or redress the claimed injury, or that there is a
23 significant likelihood of such redress. Redressability in this sense is an aspect of standing."
24 Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal citations omitted). And, as
25 the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "when a plaintiff's standing is brought into issue the relevant
26
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 9 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360)753-6200
inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the plaintiff has shown an injury to
himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Absent such a showing, exercise
of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent with the Art. III
limitation." Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). Put
another way: "[t]o satisfy [the redressability elements of standing], a plaintiff must show in the
first instance that the court is capable of granting the relief sought." Love v. Vilsack, 908 F.
Supp. 2d 139, 144-45 (D.D.C. 2012). "The redressability requirement ensures that a plaintiff
`personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention."' Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted).
Under Washington State Law, too, redressability is a component of standing: "[F]or a
plaintiff to receive `standing' to bring a lawsuit, it must allege a personal injury fairly traceable
to the challenged conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." High Tide
Seafoods v. State, 106 Wn.2d 695, 702, 725 P.2d 411 (1986) (emphasis added). And
redressability is expressly a component of standing in most other states of the United States.3
No matter the court, the redressability requirement is in large part a prudential one: it
prevents the expenditure of judicial resources on cases where the court cannot provide an
3 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 466, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1990); Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 6-7, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996); Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc, v. Turner, 324 Ga. App. 762, 767, 751 S.E.2d 555 (2013); Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary Cty., 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141 (1996); Greer v. Ill. Hous. Dev. Auth., 122 Ill. 2d 462, 488, 524 N.E.2d 561 (1988); Schulz v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Kendall v. Howard Cty., 431 Md. 590, 603, 66 A.3d 684 (2013); Gazelka v. St. Peter's Hosp., 379 Mont. 142, 145, 347 P.3d 1287 (2015); Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 642-43, 102 A.3d 913 (2014); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 54 A.D.3d 180, 198, 861 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tenn. 2013); Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154-55 (Tex. 2012); Mattaponi Indian Tribe v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Water Control Bd., 261 Va. 366, 376, 541 S.E.2d 920 (2001). Cases from many other states are in accord; Defendants can provide citations to those cases at the Court's request.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 10 ATTORNEY GENERAL of WASfUNGTON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125 Washington Street SE PO Box 40100
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100 (360)753-6200
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
1 effective, concrete remedy, freeing courts to decide cases where it can provide such a remedy.
2 In other words, it prevents pointless cases from crowding courts' dockets. As the Illinois
3 Supreme Court observed: "Together with allied doctrines like mootness, ripeness, and
4 justiciability, the standing doctrine is one of the devices by which courts attempt to cull their
5 dockets so as to preserve for consideration only those disputes which are truly adversarial and
6 capable of resolution by judicial decision." Greer v. Ill. Hous. Dev. 4uth., 122 Ill. 2d 462, 488,
7 524 N.E.2d 561 (1988).
8 Furthermore, the redressability requirement allows courts to focus on their proper
9 role--deciding actual controversies and providing effective, concrete relief—rather than
10 weighing in on abstract or hypothetical questions. Without the ability to redress the plaintiff's
11 complaint, any decision by a court is "gratuitous" in nature and beyond the proper role of
12 courts. Simon, 426 U.S. at 38. As stated by the New Hampshire Supreme Court:
13 The requirement that parties have personal legal or equitable rights that are
14 capable of being redressed by the court tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a
15 debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.
16 Duncan v. State, 166 N.H. 630, 643, 102 A.3d 913 (2014) (internal quotations and
17 citations omitted).
18 In this case, the Court cannot redress the injury Plaintiffs complain of, WDFW's
19 alleged seizure of and failure to return the Samsung tablet, because WDFW does not possess
20 that tablet. Simply put, this Court cannot effectively order WDFW to return a tablet that it
21 does not possess. Again, as explained in the accompanying declarations, and as discussed
22 above, WDFW seized three, and only three, tablets from the Shopbell residence and all three
23 tablets were returned. Maurstad Decl. at 2; Peters Decl. at 2-3; Vincent Decl. at 2-3; Jaros
24 Decl. at 2; Willette Decl. at 4-5; Dutton Decl. at 4-5. Nevertheless, upon learning of the
25 allegation that a fourth Samsung tablet had been seized from the Shopbell residence, WDFW
26
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR I I ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 1125 Washington Street SE
PO Box 40100 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Olympia, WA 98504-0100
(360)753-6200
1 staff undertook a search for the tablet in order to verify that it was not in WDFW's possession.
2 Willette Decl. at 5; Maurstad Decl. at 3; Peters Decl. at 3; Vincent Decl. at 3; Jaros Decl. at 2;
3 Clementson Decl. at 3; Dutton Decl. at 4-5. No tablet was located. Id. WDFW does not
4 possess a fourth tablet, or any other property seized from the Shopbell residence. Id. As
![DoC Number: DECL EC LBB3222...DoC Number: DECL EC LBB3222_04; DoC Version: 1.0 Security Systems DÉCLARATION UE DE CONFORMITÉ (nº: DECL EC LBB3222_04) [FR] Modèle de produit/produit](https://static.documents.pub/doc/80x56/613cc9674c23507cb6359aba/doc-number-decl-ec-lbb3222-doc-number-decl-ec-lbb322204-doc-version-10.jpg)
