66th Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relaying ConferenceGerry Cauley, President and CEO, NERC

April 26, 2012

2 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

NERC Mission

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s (NERC) mission is to ensure the reliability of the North American bulk power system.

Florida Reliability Coordinating Council

Midwest Reliability Organization

Northeast Power Coordinating Council

ReliabilityFirst Corporation

SERC Reliability Corporation

Southwest Power Pool, Inc.

Texas Regional Entity

Western Electricity Coordinating Council

3 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Top Priority Reliability Issues

• Misoperations of relay protection and control systems • Human errors by field personnel • Ambiguous or incomplete voice communications • Right-of-way maintenance • Changing resource mix • Integration of new technologies • Preparedness for high impact, low frequency events • Non-traditional threats via cyber security

vulnerabilities NERC President’s Top Priority Issues for Bulk Power System Reliability, http://www.nerc.com/news_pr.php?npr=723 at http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/News/NERC%20President%20Top%20Priority%20BPS%20Reliability%20Issues%201-7-11.pdf

4 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Top Priority Reliability Issues

• Misoperations of relay protection and control systems • Human errors by field personnel • Ambiguous or incomplete voice communications • Right-of-way maintenance • Changing resource mix • Integration of new technologies • Preparedness for high impact, low frequency events • Non-traditional threats via cyber security

vulnerabilities NERC President’s Top Priority Issues for Bulk Power System Reliability, http://www.nerc.com/news_pr.php?npr=723 at http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/News/NERC%20President%20Top%20Priority%20BPS%20Reliability%20Issues%201-7-11.pdf

5 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Reliability

Equipment Reliability

Human Performance

Human Interaction with Equipment (coupled w/Automation)

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Unnecessary Trips during fault

Unnecessary Trips other than fault

Failure to trip Slow trip0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900835

432

4820

Misoperation Count by Category(total reported)

Misoperation Categories (2011 Q2-Q3)

Mis

oper

ation

Cou

nt

Misoperation Category

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Misoperation Causes (2011 Q2-Q3)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450 424

305

219

155

88 91

43

10

Total ReportedM

isop

erati

on C

ount

Misoperation Cause

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Electromechanical Microprocessor Solid state Unknown0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

138

96

63

8

Misoperation Relay Technology (2011 Q2-Q3)

Mis

oper

ation

cou

nt

Misoperations by Relay Technology(only Relay Failure/Malfunction Cause)

9 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Electromechanical Microprocessor Solid State Unknown0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

68

316

19 21

Mis

oper

ation

cou

nt

Misoperations by Relay Technology(only incorrect Settings/Logic/Design Error Cause)

Misoperation Relay Technology (2011 Q2-Q3)

10 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Mental Model of the System

• Apparent simplicity with hidden complexity Fitting your understanding

into the system constraints (hardware and software)

Different manufacturers, diverse applications and tools, requires different approaches

• Design for a person to use, set and operate

11 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Malcolm K. Sparrow John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Solving Problems: Untying the Knot

12 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITYRELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Solving Important Problems

• Increase of certain behaviors Discussion of Risk Control Maintain regulatory objectivity Examine the nature of problems Cross-functional problem solving Identify creative data-driven

solutions

Traditional Model Expert Model

Measured Results

Problem Solving

Risk Based Priorities

Enforcement

Compliance

Standards

13 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

NERC and the ERO Solve Problems

Category 1 - Grow-insZero during 2011

Category 2 – Fall-insZero during 2011

Category 3 – Fall-ins One outage caused by vegetation falling into lines from outside the right-of-way was reported during the 4th quarter 2011.

14 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Lessons Learned – Published 2011

Lessons Learned Brief Description

Generator Plant Gas Supply Event #1 (Minimum Gas Pressure Trip Settings)Generator Plant Gas Supply Event #2 (Communications Protocols)Area Control Error Event Relay Protection and Coordination for Close-in Faults

RTU to SCADA Path Vulnerabilities Power Line Carrier Relaying Zone 3 Relay Misoperation Wave Trap Mounting Issue AGC Application Freeze Sub-Synchronous Interaction between Series-compensated Transmission Lines Insulator Coating Protective Relay Field Revisions

15 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Lessons Learned Brief Description Backup Control Center Operation and TrainingSpecial Protection Systems Maintenance PrecautionsProtection Relaying – Out of date prints Transmission Relaying –Coupling Capacitor Voltage Transformer Failure Indications for Operations

Transmission Relaying – Removed Unused Components Transmission Line Splice Failure Generating Unit Temperature Design Parameters and Extreme Winter Conditions Adequate Maintenance and Inspection of Generator Freeze Protection Plant Instrument and Sensing Equipment Freezing Due to Heat Trace and Insulation Failures

Plant Fuel Switching and Cold Weather

Lessons Learned – Published 2011

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Lessons Learned – Published 2012

Lessons Learned Brief Description

Plant Onsite Material and Personnel Needed for a Winter Weather Event

Plant Operator Training to Prepare for a Winter Weather Event

Transmission Facilities and Winter Weather Operations

DC Supply and AC Transients

Saturated Bus Auxiliary Current Transformer causes Bus Differential Operations during Line Fault

Rotational Load Shed

17 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

Cause Code Assignment Process (CCAP)

• A1 Design/Engineering Problem• A2 Equipment/Material Problem• A3 Individual Human Performance LTA• A4 Management Problem• A5 Communication LTA• A6 Training Deficiency• A7 Other Problem

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A3 - Human Performance

Cause Code Assignment Process (CCAP)

• A1 Design/Engineering Problem• A2 Equipment/Material Problem• A3 Individual Human Performance

B1 SKILL BASED ERROR B2 RULE BASED ERROR B3 KNOWLEDGE BASED ERROR B4 WORK PRACTICES

• A4 Management Problem• A5 Communication LTA• A6 Training Deficiency• A7 Other Problem

•

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A3 - Human Performance

Cause Code Assignment Process (CCAP)

• A3 Individual Human Performance B1 SKILL BASED ERROR

o C01 Check of work LTAo C02 Step was omitted due to distractiono C03 Incorrect performance due to mental lapseo C04 Infrequently performed steps were performed incorrectlyo C05 Delay in time caused LTA actionso C06 Wrong action selected based on similarity with other actionso C07 Omission / repeating of steps due to assumptions for

completion B2 RULE BASED ERROR B3 KNOWLEDGE BASED ERROR B4 WORK PRACTICES

20 RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY

NERC Alert-Advisory

Configuration Control Practices- Advised Industry of events resulting from human performance errors during protection system maintenance.

Event examples of inadequate control procedures:• Relay technician follow proper procedure to return protection

system to normal state resulting in remote trip.• Construction team failed to use latest construction document

resulting in incorrect calibration of equipment.• Relay technician leaves work site. Returns to resume work but

did so at wrong cabinet and trips substation.• Technician trips a transformer due opening a wrong current

shorting switch.

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The Way Ahead

• Relays need to be designed understanding the human interface needs

• Relays require checks and supports for understanding, installing, operating and maintaining

• Risk based approach

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Questions and Answers

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NERC CCAP