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THE JAPAN TIMES FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2016 7 Established 1897 — Incorporating e Japan Advertiser 1890-1940 e Japan Chronicle 1868-1940 e Japan Mail 1870-1918 e Japan Times 1865-1870 Owned and published daily by e Japan Times, Ltd. Chairman and Publisher TOSHIAKI OGASAWARA Vice Chairman YUKIKO OGASAWARA President TAKEHARU TSUTSUMI Managing Editors SAYURI DAIMON, EDAN CORKILL Chief Editorial Writer TAKASHI KITAZUME opinion EDITORIAL T he money scandal that led to the resignation of Akira Amari as economy minister makes yet another case for an overhaul of the system regulating political dona- tions, which has a history of being amended in response to recurring money problems involving senior law- makers and businesses but left with loopholes. Amari, a close political ally of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, quit his Cabinet position last week after admitting that he and his secretaries received millions of yen in cash and benefits in 2013 and 2014 from a construction firm that allegedly asked his office to intervene in talks it was having with a govern- ment-funded housing corporation for compensation related to a road construction project in Chiba Prefecture. While acknowledging receipt of the money, part of which was “pri- vately” used by one of his aides, Amari denied his office used its influence to turn the negotiations in the company’s favor, and the Urban Renaissance Agency (UR) — whose officials met with Amari’s aides a dozen times — says its decision to award the company more than ¥200 million in damages was not the result of meddling by the veteran lawmaker’s office. It has yet to be established whether any law has been bro- ken, including the anti-graft law, which prohibits lawmakers and their aides from receiving financial benefits for using their power to influence contracts and administrative decisions involving national and local governments. e UR released what it says are partial records of the conversation between its officials and Amari’s secretaries, which do not show that the aides made outright demands or put pressure on the officials to influence the talks with the construction firm. It’s not clear whether mere contact from the office of a powerful ruling party lawmaker asking for “explanations” on a dispute involv- ing government institutions in itself served as sufficient pres- sure. What seems clear is that business donations to individual politicians — which was supposed to have been banned in the amendments to the Political Funds Control Law in the 1990s — effectively remain business as usual today. Amari admitted he received a total of ¥1 million from the construction firm on two occasions, including once at his Cabinet office in an envelope containing cash that was stashed in a bag of confectionery. He said he interpreted the money as a gift celebrating his appointment to the Cabinet and recovery from an illness, and that he ordered his staff to adequately process the money as a political donation. e amended political funds law prohibits donations from businesses and organizations to individual politicians. e 1994 revision came on the heels of bribery and other money scandals involving senior Liberal Democratic Party lawmak- ers. e ban was intended to stop the collusion between poli- ticians and businesses. As a measure to cover the cost of political activities in more transparent ways, the system of providing subsidies from state coffers to political parties was introduced in 1995. More than ¥30 billion out of taxpayer money is distributed each year to political parties. But while political donations by businesses are supposed to have been restricted to political parties in the amended law, donations made to a local party chapter — typically headed by the lawmaker elected from that constituency — effectively end up in the hands of the lawmaker. e ¥1 million delivered to Amari in person — which, according his explanation, seems obviously directed to the lawmaker himself — was pro- cessed as a donation to the LDP’s No. 13 chapter in Kanagawa Prefecture represented by Amari. In the news conference announcing his resignation, Amari said lawmakers lose in elections if they deal only with “good people,” because in a single-seat electoral district “you cannot win the race unless you embrace anybody who comes your way.” His candid remark was apparently referring to the need to get support from a broad spectrum of people to win the tough winner-take-all competition in such constituencies — and perhaps alluding to the difficulty of rejecting donations from “bad” people who might be seeking favors in return for their money. It is ironic that the current single-seat district system in Lower House elections was introduced in 1995 as part of the political reforms in response to the repeated money scandals of lawmakers, along with the amendments to the political funds law. e previous multi-seat system, in which several lawmakers were elected from the same district, was billed as a key factor behind money politics because it forced LDP mem- bers to engage in fierce competition with each other within such districts. e single-seat constituency system concentrated the LDP’s power in the hands of the party leadership — which also con- trolled the money from government subsidies — and weak- ened the influence of the factional groups that used to sway the power games within the party and were also blamed for the problem of money in politics. But it seems only an illusion that political donations will be “clean” if they’re made to polit- ical parties, instead of individual politicians, since the sys- tem’s loopholes make the distinction meaningless. Political funds control loophole Zhao Minghao Beijing ose who have criticized China’s cau- tious foreign policy need to reconsider their position, following President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia and Iran — two major Middle Eastern pow- ers that are currently at each other’s throats. e visits reflect the more active foreign policy approach that Xi has spearheaded, particularly in the Middle East. is new approach raises an important question: Can China’s impact on the region be more constructive than that of the United States? Now is certainly a tense time to become involved in the Middle East, a region where, as Richard N. Haass argues, a New irty Years’ War, in which “civil wars and proxy wars become impossible to distinguish,” is unfolding. A key factor in unleashing the current chaos — which represents the convergence of numerous deep-rooted challenges and conflicts — was Ameri- ca’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. By eliminating Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime, the U.S. paved the way for a Shiite-led gov- ernment, a development that tilted the regional balance of power toward Iran and left Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia feel- ing encircled by a Shiite coalition. at is why Iran and Saudi Arabia are so deeply involved in Syria’s civil war. ey know that the fate of President Bashar Assad’s Alawite regime will have significant implications for the regional order. For Saudi Arabia, reining in Iran is all the more important in the wake of the recent agreement on the country’s nuclear program, which has resulted in the lifting of international economic sanctions that have long constrained Iran’s regional leadership ambitions. Of course, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran — or Turkey, which has also joined the competition for regional influence — is seeking a direct confrontation. ese countries would rather empower other actors, even if it means fueling dangerous religious radicalization and the privatization of violence. e terror- ist movements that have emerged as a result of this approach — namely, the Islamic State group — cannot be defeated using traditional counter-ter- rorism operations. To be sure, these Middle East rivals are not the only ones involved in the region’s current quagmire. External powers like France, Russia, and, of course, the U.S. are also deeply involved, each with its own geopolitical objec- tives. Now China is entering the fray, bringing a uniquely constructive vision with it. e two characters that comprise the Chinese word for crisis mean, individu- ally, “danger” and “opportunity.” at is precisely what China sees in today’s Middle East. For most of the relevant actors, highly perilous geopolitical com- petition is overshadowing vast eco- nomic opportunities. Not for China. As Xi put it on his recent visit to Cairo: “Instead of looking for a proxy in the Middle East, we promote peace talks; instead of seeking any sphere of influ- ence, we call on all parties to join the circle of friends for the One Belt, One Road initiative.” is reflects the broader foreign pol- icy rebalancing that Xi has been pursu- ing since taking office in 2013. Unlike the U.S., which has been engineering a strategic “pivot” from one geographic region to another, China is rebalancing from “politics among nations” to “poli- tics among networks,” focusing on “con- nectivity” rather than “control.” e Middle East is crucial to this con- nectivity-oriented grand strategy, not least because of its key role in the One Belt, One Road project that Xi promoted in Cairo. China’s determination to re- establish the ancient Silk Roads — including the overland route that runs through the Middle East — has led it to enter into strategic partnerships with eight Arab countries in recent years, and to sign agreements with six Arab coun- tries to pursue the initiative jointly. Iran, Turkey and seven Arab countries are among the founding members of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a key institution for financing related infrastructure projects. But China is not waiting for the One Belt, One Road initiative to be com- pleted before pursuing increased trade with Mideast countries. During his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, he claimed that free trade negotiations between the Gulf Cooperation Council and China should be concluded this year. Moreover, Xi announced that China will issue $55 billion in loans to the Mid- dle East, including a $15 billion special loan for industrialization, $10 billion in commercial loans to boost production capacity, and $10 billion in concessional loans. e remaining $20 billion will go toward a joint investment fund with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar to invest in traditional energy, infrastruc- ture development and high-end manu- facturing industries in the region. All of this aligns with the “1+2+3” cooperation pattern that Xi proposed at the June 2014 Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in Beijing. According to this approach, energy cooperation should form the core of collaboration, while infrastructure construction and trade and investment form two wings. Nuclear power, satellites and new energy sources are three high-tech areas where cooper- ation can lead to important break- throughs. Here, the goal is to take advantage of the region’s energy resources, while helping it to industrial- ize and diversify its economy. Of course, China’s success in the Mid- dle East requires progress on mitigating the region’s tensions, cooling its hot spots and stabilizing weak countries — all of which will require smart diplo- macy by many actors. But peace and development are inextricably linked. To turn the tide against extremism, Middle Eastern countries must be able to pro- vide economic opportunities to their people, and these can only be secured through trade, investment, and jobs. In this fundamental respect, China has a lot to offer the Mideast — and Xi has shown his determination to offer it. Minghao Zhao is a research fellow at the Charhar Institute in Beijing, an adjunct fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, and a member of the China National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). © Project Syndicate, 2016 China’s new role as a Middle East peacemaker Stephan Richter Washington THE GLOBALIST Angela Merkel finds herself in a pickle. e German chancellor has just per- formed a major course correction on the refugee issue. She now talks about “hun- dreds of thousands” of the people who arrived in 2015 having to reckon with returning to their home country. e problem for Merkel? Her latest pronouncements are not just a course correction, but also an outright aban- donment of her previous stance. After all, she had been adamant about offering all comers a long-term perspec- tive of staying in Germany. How to explain it all? To save face and plead for forgiveness, Merkel’s best option is to argue that it was all a big “misunderstanding.” e lyrics of the 1965 blues rock hit by e Animals, “Don’t Let Me Be Misun- derstood,” come to mind for Merkel’s salvation: But I’m just a soul whose intentions are good Oh Lord, please don’t let me be misun- derstood If I seem edgy I want you to know at I never mean to take it out on you Sometimes I find myself long regretting Some foolish thing some little simple thing I’ve done Cause I’m just a soul whose intentions are good Even though the usually cautious Merkel took her fellow citizens on quite a ride, at long last she now articulates the legal boundaries of the 1951 Con- vention Relating to the Status of Refu- gees, which provides up to three years of temporary refuge. She also states that only relatively few of those who arrived this past year meet the standards required to be granted asylum in Germany. Merkel’s government has also finally resolved a practical rule of immigration that should have been articulated months earlier. For future refugee arriv- als from Syrian refugee camps, Germany will give preference to accepting fami- lies with young children. ere are other reasons to explain Merkel’s turn. e right-wing AfD party has been rising in the polls to alarming levels, eating into the voter potential of both the CDU and the SPD. To stop that trend, Merkel eventually came to the conclusion that she had to reverse course — and the SPD, her part- ner in the so-called grand coalition, grudgingly arrived at the same conclu- sion. Making Merkel’s newfound “religion” reality will be anything but easy. Germany’s administrative practice in the past has been to “tolerate” the con- tinued presence of many people in the country even though their applications for asylum were rejected. Changing that practice will prove hard. What Merkel is urgently trying to do is to manage expectations. First and fore- most, that means to diminish the out- landish expectations, systematically and extremely cynically fed by the traffick- ers, that Germany will take in all new arrivals. A course correction was also inevita- ble because her constant, mantra-like referral to a “European solution” on the refugee issue — while admirable in principle — never stood a chance to become reality. Middle-of-the-road vot- ers arrived at the conclusion that the chancellor, widely known for her sober- ness and sense of realism, should have known better. A sizable segment of her core voters felt increasingly alienated. Voters also came to the silent conclu- sion that Merkel, in taking the stances she took on the refugee issue (for exam- ple, talking about tackling the economic inequities that are the root cause of the refugee crisis), was confused about what her daytime job was — and is. She acted splendidly — assuming she were secre- tary-general of the United Nations. e major challenge — and true course reversal Merkel must accomplish — still remains on the agenda. Bizarrely, the same people in the CDU who often as a form of practical Chris- tian belief are extremely welcoming to refugees also remain adamantly opposed to an immigration law that would establish criteria for which eco- nomic refugees would be welcomed in the country. e German debate thus shows policy preferences diametrically opposed to those in the United States and Canada. ose countries accept certain quanti- ties of refugees, but only on a very lim- ited basis. In contrast, they are very keen to attract as many skilled economic migrants as the labor market and the future requirements of a productive U.S. or Canadian economy might warrant. Merkel, who likes to talk about Ger- many’s future economic needs, but has done astonishingly little to improve the country’s productivity during her entire decade in office, still has to get her head around that issue. Stephan Richter is the publisher and editor-in-chief of The Globalist. He also is the president of The Globalist Research Center. © The Globalist 2016 Merkel flip-flop: don’t let me be misunderstood Alex Goldfarb London In 2006, Alexander Litvinenko, a former officer of Russia’s Federal Security Ser- vice (FSB), the KGB’s successor, was poi- soned in London with radioactive polonium-210. For the last decade, his widow, Marina Litvinenko, has waged an uphill battle to get a measure of jus- tice for her husband. Now, finally, she has prevailed. Litvinenko had to stand up not only to the Kremlin, which was accused of sending two agents to London to carry out the assassination, but also to the United Kingdom’s government, which was wary of spoiling its relationship with Russia. At one point three years ago, she stood in tears on the steps of the Royal Courts of Justice, where judges had refused to protect her from the poten- tially high legal costs if she failed to compel the government to hold an inquiry. But in the end, Litvinenko got her day — actually, 34 days — in court. And on Jan. 21, Sir Robert Owen, chairman of the public inquiry, announced his ver- dict: It is “beyond doubt” that the FSB agents Andrei Lugovoi and Dmitry Kov- tun carried out the assassination, which was “probably approved” by Russian President Vladimir Putin. e evidence against Lugovoi and Kovtun came mostly from the police file, which established a “polonium trail” left by the pair around London. Very high levels of contamination were noted, par- ticularly in the lavatory next to the bar where Litvinenko drank the poisoned tea and in the two bathrooms in the hotel rooms where the assassins stayed. Litvinenko never visited any of these three places, where the assassins appar- ently disposed of the unused toxin. A witness testified that Kovtun had declared, before the hit, that he was on a mission to “kill a traitor” with “a very expensive poison.” e inquiry found that the assassins failed twice before fulfilling their mis- sion. On Oct. 16, with most of the radio- active material spilling onto the tablecloth, Litvinenko ingested only a small dose, and on Oct. 26, all of the Po-210 spilled on the floor of Lugovoi’s hotel bathroom. Finally, on Nov. 1, they managed to give Litvinenko the lethal dose, causing his death 22 days later. ough Po-210 obviously leaves a trail, it is difficult to detect unless one is looking for it, as it emanates rare alpha radiation, which is not readily detect- able by conventional hospital and police equipment like Geiger counters. It was not until three weeks after the poison- ing, just hours before his death, that Lit- vinenko was tested for alpha-emitters. As for the role of the Russian state, that evidence came from MI6, the Brit- ish secret service, and was presented in a closed session of the inquiry. Although the evidence has not been made public, the Daily Telegraph reports that the U.S. National Security Agency provided the British authorities with intercepts of electronic communications between the assassins and their handlers in Moscow. e argument implicating Putin comes from expert testimony that such an order could not have been issued with- out his approval. e obvious question is why. Here, Owen was less precise, listing several factors that could have put Litvinenko in Putin’s crosshairs, including his defec- tion to the U.K. in 2000, his close rela- tionship with Putin’s arch-enemy, Boris Berezovsky, and his allegations of FSB complicity in the terror bombings that propelled Putin to power in 1999. Lit- vinenko’s blog post calling Putin the “Kremlin pedophile” in response to the president’s bizarre decision to kiss an unknown boy’s stomach in full view of the world’s media could also have fueled the Kremlin’s ire. But the most plausible motive for the assassination relates to Litvinenko’s plan to testify about Putin’s ties to Spain-based Russian organized crime — ties that dated back to the 1990s, when Putin was deputy mayor of St. Peters- burg. With Litvinenko scheduled to pro- vide official evidence to a prosecutor in Madrid just one week after his poison- ing, the apparent haste and persistence of Lugovoi and Kovtun is easy to under- stand. Had he made it to Madrid, Litvinen- ko’s deposition would have focused on the business connections between the bosses of the so-called Tambov crime syndicate and members of Putin’s inner circle. It is these Putin cronies who now face targeted sanctions by the United States and the European Union over Russia’s recent adventures in Ukraine. eir illicit enrichment is reflected in a recent statement by the White House that they consider Putin “corrupt.” Not surprisingly, the Kremlin has lashed out at the White House for the accusations, just as it has at the U.K. government for the Litvinenko inquiry, whose findings, though “a joke,” will “poison” Britain’s relationship with Rus- sia. As usual, the Kremlin is attempting to avoid accountability by spewing dis- information and claiming that the West is persecuting Russia. State-controlled media even offered an alternate (and utterly baseless) theory: Litvinenko was “accidentally poisoned” while handling polonium for MI6. In Litvinenko’s case, the accused are unlikely to face many real-world conse- quences. Putin is immune from any kind of prosecution, and he refuses to extra- dite Lugovoi and Kovtun to face murder charges. e U.K.’s response has included granting Marina Litvinenko a closed-door meeting with Home Secre- tary eresa May and freezing the sus- pects’ assets. But, while Prime Minister David Cameron condemned the killing, he also spoke of keeping lines of com- munication open because the U.K. “needs Russia” for a settlement in Syria. As a result, the punishment will not fit the crime. Nonetheless, the importance of revealing the truth cannot be overes- timated — not just for the sake of the victim, but also to make clear what Putin’s regime is capable of doing. is case — the first-ever terrorist attack in a Western capital using a radioactive weapon — will be remembered as a hallmark of Putin’s ruthless and corrupt reign. Alex Goldfarb is president of the Litvinenko Justice Foundation in London. © Project Syndicate, 2016. www.project-syndicate.org At last, justice for Litvinenko PAGE: 7
