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1. Surprise! Ozone hole discovered over Antarctica in 1985

Given all the modern satellite technology in the possession of NASA and other U

agencies, it is ironic that the opening of a hole in the ozone over the South Pole in the

late 1970s went undetected for years. The satellite instrumentation did not fail us; rather

the computer programs written to diagnose the vast volumes of satellite data wer

Journal of R isk Research 1 (2), 165185 (1998)

Imaginable surprise in global change science

STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER

Departm ent of Biological Sciences and Institu te for International Studies, Stanford University, Stanford,

CA 943055020, USA

B . L . T U R N E R I I , H O L LY M O R E H O U S E G A R R I G A

George Perkins Marsh Institute and Gradu ate School of G eography, Clark University, Worcester,

M A 01610, USA

Abstract

Decisionmakers at all scales (individuals, rms, and local, national, and internationagovernmental organizations) are concerned about reducing their vulnerability to (or th

likelihood of) unexpected events, surprises. A fter briey and selectively reviewing th

literature on uncertainty and surprise, we adopt a denition of surprise that does no

include the strict requirement that it apply to a wholly unexpected outcome, but rathe

recognizes that many events are often anticipated by some, even if not most observers

Thus, we dene imaginable surprise as events or processes that depart from the expec

tations of some denable community. Therefore, what gets labelled as surprise depend

on the extent to which what happens departs from community expectations and on the

salience of the problem. We offer a typology of surprise that distinguishes imaginabl

surprises from risk and uncertainty, and develops several kinds of impediments to over

coming ignorances. These range from the need for more normal science to

phenomenological impediments (e.g., inherent unpredictability in some chaotic systems

to epistemological ignorance (e.g., ideological blocks to reducing ignorance). Based on

the input of some two dozen scholars at an Aspen Global Change Institute Summe

Workshop in 1994*, we construct two tables in which participants offer many possibl

imaginable surprises in the global change context, as well as their potential salienc

for creating unexpectedly high or low carbon dioxide emissions. Improving the antici

pation of surprises is an interdisciplinary enterprise that should offer a sceptica

welcoming of outlier ideas and methods.

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normal conditions. For example, every time a very high or low value came in, th

computer programs omitted it. The rejected values were called to no ones attentio

Incredibly, the phenomenon overhead went undetected by our high-technology fo

nearly a decade. Rather, incredulous British scientists, plotting by hand their ow

ground-based records of how much ultraviolet (UV) radiation was reaching the earth

surface at their station on the coast of Antarctica (Farman et al., 1985), detected steady decrease in the springtime ozone in the southern hemisphere from the mid-1970

to the mid-1980s. This unexpected phenomenon immediately triggered a reprogram

ming of the US data to allow all values, and there in beautiful living (false) colours fo

all to see (ideal for television) were maps showing a deep hole in the ozone over th

Antarctic continent growing in intensity over time and drifting over nearby oceans an

continents. This example shows that, sometimes, the knowable remains undetecte

because of the assumptions or views that frame the question or methods of analysis.

2. Not so surprising: climatic surprises are imaginable

In the wake of the heat waves, res, and droughts of 1988, media coverage of globa

warming exploded. Not surprisingly, so did congressional hearings on climate. Robe

Watson, then NA SA scientist and later head of the U S delegation to the plena ry sessio

of the 1995 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) testied to the Senat

Energy Committee1 that scientic uncertainty is a thing that scares me more tha

absolute knowledge. The fact that we have said that climate could possibly chang

dramatically and quickly has me concerned. The Antarctic ozone thing came as

surprise. To that remark, New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley pressed the panel of scientist witnesses to speculate out-loud on what kinds of surprises they had in mind. On

of us (SHS), after quipping that surprises are things you dont know about, nonethe

less followed with a list of highly uncertain, but plausible outcomes, like a ip-op i

North Atlantic ocean currents, a surge in polar ice masses, or unexpected region

patterns of climate response to build-ups of greenhouse gases. Other witnesses also ha

their hunches as to a nu mbe r of such possible su rprises. The willingness of the witnesse

to speculate on specic surprises illustrates that scientists, as well as members of th

public, deal often with the anticipation of the unexpected!

Strictly speaking, a surprise cannot be anticipated; by denition it is an unexpecteevent. Potential climate change, and more broadly global environmental change,

replete with this kind of surprise the truly unexpected because of the enormou

complexities of processes and interrelationships involved and our insufcient under

standing of them (such as coupling ocean, atmosphere, and terrestrial systems) (e.g

Darmstadter and Toman, 1993a; Broecker, 1994; Casti, 1994; Chapter 1 and Summar

for Policymakers, IPCC, 1996) as well as our improved understanding of the existenc

of chaos in such complexity (e.g., Cohen and Stewart , 1994; Robinson, 1982). The IPC

(1996) Summary for Policymakers concludes:

Future unexpected, large and rapid climate system changes (as have occurred in the past)

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Yet, by focusing on the perceptions of and responses to environmental events by the

public and expert communities alike, as indicated in the Senate Energy Committe

exchange noted, the existence of a different kind of surprise emerges, one that can

be anticipated (Kates and Clark, 1996). Risk-hazard and related research demonstrate

repeatedly that the event, process, or outcome registered as a surprise by the commu

nity in question was frequently known or forecast by others or the same event waknowable within the competing frameworks of understanding (Darmstadter and Toman

1993b). This message also emerged from the 1994 Aspen Global Change Institut

(A G CI) session on A nticipating Global Change Surprise, (A ppendix 1) the resu lts o

which we, the co-chairs (Schneider and Turner, 1995) of that session, report here. We

sketch the ra tionale used to reach the conclusion tha t the search for ant icipated su rprise

constitutes a fruitful avenue of research and then present the results of exercises to

identify what some of these surprises might be, how they could affect the impacts o

climate and other global changes, and how we might enlarge or focus ou r vision of thi

kind of surprise.

3. From uncertainty to surprise: a brief review

Surprise is an attribute of events or interpretations of them that is closely akin to th

related attributes of risk and uncertainty. Various meanings of these attributes may b

fused at times, owing to the different communities and cultures employing them. Th

interdisciplinary risk-hazard research community, however, has devoted considerabl

attention to this and related concepts, a brief review of which informs this work.

Much of the cu rrent work on surprise has grown out of an extensive body of researcon uncertainty.2 Yet, although widely acknowledged and studied, uncertainty remain

a difcult concept to dene or codify. Different conceptualizations and approaches t

uncertainty abound in the literature, crossing numerous elds of study and touching a

wide range of problem types. Two basic options are invariably followed in the face o

uncertainty, however. The rst is to reduce the uncertainties through data collection

research, modelling, simulation techniques, and so forth. Following this option, th

objective is to overcome uncertainty, to make the unknown known. But the dauntin

nature of uncertainties surrounding global environmental change, as well as the nee

to make decisions before the normal science option can provide resolution, force second option that of managing or integrating uncertainty directly into the decision

making or policy-making process. Before uncertainty can be so integrated, however

the nature and extent of the uncertainty must be claried. This understanding i

approached in several ways, which we briey review here.

The elds of mathematics, statistics, and more recently physics, provide the scienc

of uncertainty with many powerful means and techniques to conceptualize, quantify

and manage uncerta inty, ranging from the frequency distribu tions of probability theory

to the possibility and be lief statements of Bayesian statistics, and even to a method fo

quantifying ignorance (between belief and disbelief) found in Dempster-Shafer theor

(for examples see Tonn, 1991; Ayyub et al., 1992; Yager, 1992). A ddre ssing other aspect

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(e.g., Zadeh, 1965, 1990). More recently, researchers have proposed chaos theory an

complexication theory to focus on expecting the unexpected in models and theor

(e.g., Casti, 1994).

The practical application of many of these techniques was originally pioneered b

researchers in decision analysis (see Raiffa, 1968). In the elds of economics an

decision theory, researchers continue to study rational decision making under uncertainty and how to assess the value of collecting additional information (e.g., Cleme

1991). Methods for modelling risk attitudes, leading to the terms risk-prone and risk

adverse, attempt to capture how different people faced with making a decision reac

to the uncertainty surrounding the expected outcomes. Looking towards futur

outcomes in projecting climate change impacts and estimat ing marginal costs and bene

ts of mitigation efforts, economists such as Nordhaus (1991, 1993) and Yohe (1991

1993) explicitly address uncertainties, and discuss methods for better measuring nonlin

earities leading to surprises. In the context of energy, tables of possible, but uncertain

risks of alternative energy systems have been prepared (e.g., Schneider, 1979Uncertainty and, in its related context, surprise, are treated largely as the realizatio

that events, currently unknown, will occur affecting the nal outcome of a decision.

This acknowledgment of uncerta inty has found a prom inent place in many other eld

of study, each one speaking its own language of uncertainty. For example, researche

making risk assessments and setting safety standards nd it most useful to distinguis

between risk (the probability of a certain negat ive effect resu lting from a hazard occu

rence, given the specied level of exposure), variability (inter-individual differences i

vulnerability and susceptibility), and uncertainty (model parameter variability and an

unexplained residual) (e.g., Bogen and Spear, 1987). This three-pronged distinctioprovides information on uncertainty tailored to the needs and research questions of th

risk analyst. Researchers in other elds of study, for instance computer science, ma

be most interested in addressing other aspects of uncertainty, such as how it affects th

decision ow or logic of the computer system. Thu s, in writing for other computer scien

tists, Bonissone and Tong (1985) suggest a conceptualization that identies four source

of uncertainty in an expert system: (i) inaccuracy in the set of facts making up th

knowledge base; (ii) imprecision in the decision rule representation language; (ii

incomplete information; and (iv) aggregation of rules from different knowledge source

The above examples are not meant to imply that separate uncertainty analyses follostrict disciplinary bounds. While the last two examples offer approaches to un certaint

targeted specically to their respective disciplines, some of the concepts are clearl

transferable to other disciplines and to other types of decision making processe

including those concerning global environmental change. Consequently, research o

uncertainty cross-cu ts a num ber of different d isciplines. In work related to hazards an

risk, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and geographers have made importan

contributions to the discussions on risk perception, risk communication, and the socia

amplication of risk (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Fischhoff et al., 1982; Kahnema

et al., 1982; Kasperson et al., 1988). Similarly, work on visualizing or graphicall

conveying uncertainty also crosses a diverse set of disciplines including psychology

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efforts in the area of global environmental change, including the Intergovernmenta

Panel on Climate Change Assessment, IPCC, (1996) and the Resources for the Future

workshop (Darmstadter and Toman, 1993a,b), have made uncertainty an explicit an

central research concern, as has a recent Aspen Global Change Institute Workshop

(Moss and Schneider, 1997). Given the interdisciplinary nature of the study of globa

environmental change, it is not difcult to see how research in this eld has drawn ona wide range of techniques.

These activities and accomplishments notwithstanding, the answer to the question o

how to dene or codify uncertainty remains unresolved. Communities of researcher

tend to develop denitions and taxonomies of uncertainty specically related to th

types and range of policy questions that they address in their research. Although no

all-encompassing typology of uncertainty exists, the struggle to dene the unknown

aspects of a eld of science serves a very real purpose. The typologies make explici

what is not known, and break it down into distinct components. Decomposing uncer

tainty into different dimensions provides insight into the natu re of the u ncertainty. Thdimensions also offer some structure on how to approach or reduce the uncertainties

make the most of available information, and utilize both what is known and what i

unknown in decision making.

One of the most extensive and comprehensive conceptualizations of uncertainty i

that developed by Smithson (1988). Smithsons taxonomy is based on the sociology o

knowledge, in which he moves the applicability of the social constructivists dictum tha

knowledge is socially constructed and negot iated to ignorance; it too is a social construc

tion. Thus, uncertainty is dened by Smithson as an incompleteness of knowledge o

information that is caused by vagueness, probability, and ambiguity. To provide somperspective on how this denition relates to others in his taxonomy, consider a few

more of his categorizations: ignorance is encountered when a person fails to agree o

show awareness of ideas that another person denes as actually or potentially valid

error refers to being in an erroneous cognitive state; taboo is socially enforced irrele

vance; and irrelevance is the act of ignoring something.

Other typologies of uncertainty exist, each making their own contributions to th

wider understanding of uncertainty (Brooks, 1986; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990; Fabe

et al., 1992; Wynne, 1992; Casti, 1994; Rowe, 1994; Moser, 1997). Here, we will limi

the discussion to three of these Functowicz and Ravetz (1990), Wynne (1992), anRowe (1994). Selected because they are widely cited and recognized in the global envi

ronmental change literature : they provide intere sting insights into the role of uncertaint

in science for policy making, and they provide the most appropriate context for th

concept of uncertainty in our usage below.

Functowicz and R avetz rank situat ions on an incremental scale from those possessin

low to high levels of uncertainty. They show how different management approache

correspond with the level of system uncertainty matched with varying degrees of deci

sion stakes. Where decision stakes and the level of systems uncertainty are low

constitutes, the realm of applied science and the type of uncertainty encountered i

technical. As the decision stakes and the level of uncertainty increase, the realm o

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and the level of systems uncertainty are high, epistemological uncertainty is encoun

tered in the realm of second orde r science. Functowicz and Ravetz use the term secon

order science to dene an area outside the traditional quantitative methods of applie

science. This term takes into account the postmodernist argument that all knowledg

is socially constructed and that science is only one way of producing knowledge. Whe

they extend u ncertainty into this realm, Functowicz and R avetz are acknowledging ththe uncertainties identied by science are in part dened by society as a whole. Ther

may be ignorance about ignorance. Functowicz and Ravetz call for post-norma

methods of evaluation to address these issues, although other terms have also bee

suggested (Weinberg (1972) uses the term trans-scientic and ORiordan and Camero

(1994) propose civic-scientic).

Wynne (1992) emphasizes that the modelling of environmental risk systems require

examination of not only the scientic evidence and competing interpretations, but als

investigation of the nature, assumptions, and inherent limitations of the scientic know

edge behind the data and the model. He identies four types of uncertainty riskuncertainty, ignorance, and indeterminacy each overlaying dimensions of uncerta int

Risk refers to a situation when the system behaviour is well known and the chances o

different outcomes can be quantied by probability distributions. If, however, the impo

tant system parameters are known but not the associated probabilities, uncertaint

exists. Ignorance is that which is not known (or even awareness that we do not kno

it) and, for Wynne, is endemic because scientic knowledge must set the bounds o

uncertainty in order to function. Indeterminacy captu res the unbou nded complexity o

causal chains and open networks. Uncertainty, in part, stems not only from an incom

plete understanding of determinate relationships, but from the interaction of thesrelationships with contingent and unpredictable actors and processes.

Rowe (1994) denes uncertainty as the absence of information, information tha

may or may not be obtainable (p. 743), and identies four dimensions of uncertaint

predicated on their source inherent in any decision making process: temporal (in bot

past and future states); structural (due to complexity); metrical (in measurement); an

translational (derived in explaining uncertain results). The fourth dimension, transla

tional uncerta inty, comes into play only after the rst three have been considered. Thes

dimensions can exist simultaneously in any situation, although one or more may ten

to dominate. Rowe pays special attention to the issue of variability and identies it aa contributor to uncertainty in all dimensions. Rowe (1994) does not offer a distinc

denition of variability. However, he does identify three primary sources of variability

(1) U nderlying Variants variants inherent in natural systems contributing to the sprea

of parameter values, including randomness, inconsistent human behaviour, and chaoti

or nonlinear dynamic systems behaviour; (2) Collective/Individual Membershi

Assignment the distinction between collective behaviour and a single instance o

behaviour for a parameter; and, (3) Value Diversity varying perspectives and valu

systems among people.

Although different in their characterizations of uncertainty, all three typologie

attempt to expand the conceptualization to recognize that uncertainty is not purely o

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and Handmer, 1995). In the areas of environmental policy and resource management

policy makers struggle with the need to make decisions utilizing vague and ambiguou

concepts (such as sustainability), with sparse and imprecise information, in decision

that have far-reaching, and often irreversible, impacts on both environment and society

Not surprisingly, efforts to incorporate uncertainty into the decision-making proces

quickly move to the forefront with the advent of decision-making paradigms, such athe precautionary principle, adaptive environmental management, the preventativ

paradigm or stewardship (e.g., Brown, 1997). As noted by Wynne, the shift toward

prevention in environmental policy implies an acceptance of the inherent limitation

of the ant icipatory knowledge on which decisions about environmental discharges [and

other environmental problems] are based (1992, p. 111).

Ravetz (1986) takes the concept of usable knowledge in the context of incomplet

science one step further by introducing the idea of usable ignorance. To Ravetz

acknowledging the ignorance factor means becoming aware of the limits of our knowl

edge an idea we pursue below. Ravetz argues that ignorance cannot be overcomwith any amount of sophisticated calculations. Rather, coping with ignorance demand

a better articulation of the policy process and a greater awareness of how that proces

operates. He recognizes that one can only replace ignorance by gaining more knowl

edge, bu t stresses that by being aware of our ignorance we do not encounter disastrou

pitfalls in our supposedly secure knowledge or supposedly effective technique (p. 429)

Following this lead, Dovers and Handmer (1995) offer a step-by-step framework fo

what they term ignorance auditing. In this framework, the policy maker is asked t

explicitly dene the types, causes, and sources of uncertainty and more specicall

ignorance affecting the decision at hand. The policy maker then identies methodto address these uncertainties where possible and consciously implements them within

the policy process or management task.

The emphasis on managing uncertainty rather than mastering it can be traced to

work on resilience in ecology (most notably by Holling, 1973, 1986). Whereas resis

tance implies an ability to withstand change or impact within some measure o

performance, resilience captures the ability to give with the forcing function, withou

disrupting the overall health of the system. In this framework, adaptation is an ecolog

ical mechanism whose aim is not to overcome or control environmental uncertainty

but to live with, and in some case, thrive upon, it. It is interesting to note that Holling

classical work did not focus on uncertainty per se but on surprise.

4. Dening surprise

The AGCI session on Anticipating Global Change Surprise drew upon many expert

(A ppendix 1) in global environmental change and from the na tura l hazards community

most of whom were largely unfamiliar with the extensive literature noted above

Nevertheless, drawing upon a po rtion of it, the resu lting denitions adop ted in the sessio

strongly corre spond to principal ideas embedded within tha t literature . The following i

a description of the workshops distinctions among the terms as they relate to surprise

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objective probabilities. Likewise, the fu ll range of potential ou tcomes is usually not known

Thus, risk a lmost a lways is accompanied by varying degrees of uncertainty.

(ii) uncertainty The condition in which the event, process, or outcome is know

(factually or hypothetically), but the probabilities that it will occur are no

known, or are highly subjective estimates.

Typically, when probabilities are assigned they are subjective (or depend upon subje

tive assumptions Schneider, 1994), and the ways to establish the reliability of differen

subjective probability estimates are debatable (e.g., Morgan et al., 1990; Morgan an

Keith, 1995; another AGCI workshop, this time on methods to deal explicitly an

formally with uncertainty in international assessments, contains further discussion an

references Hassol and Katzenberger, 1997).

(iii) surprise The condition in which the event, process or outcome is not know

or expected.

In this strict meaning, the attribution of surprise shifts toward the event, proces

or ou tcome itself is it a new or wholly unexpected experience or not? We may expe

surprises to occur, but we are surprised by the specic event, process, or outcom

involved. This meaning, as noted, begs the issue of anticipation because the very ac

of anticipation implies some level of knowledge or foresight. It is, therefore, not partic

u larly interesting or u sefu l for policy purposes. One except ion is those cases where th

conditions that might induce surprises for instance, rapid forcing of non-linear system

as quoted earlier from the IPCC 1996 Summary for Policymakers are known, eve

though the actual surprise events are not. This exception, which we could term imaginable conditions for surprise, could have policy meaning, since actions could b

proposed to mitigate the conditions in which surprise might be induced (e.g., slowin

down the rate of global change forcing, as in Chapter 6 of Schneider, 1997).

Because of the impracticality of the strict denition of surprise for policy making

various studies advocate the use of anothe r meaning for su rpr ise, one in which the a ttr

bution of surprise shifts more towards the expectations of the observer. Holling (1986

294) recognized this meaning of surprise as a condition in which perceived realit

departs qua litatively from expectations. It is this more interpre tive or relational meanin

of surprise one we label imaginable surprise that portends to be most useful foglobal change studies.

(iv) imaginable surprise The event, process, or outcome departs from the expec

tations of the observing community or those affected by the event or proces

Seen from this point of view, surprise about one or another aspect of climat

change is an after-the-fact reaction to an observation or new scientic ndin

that, in some sense, lies outside our range of expectations (Darmstadter an

Toman, 1993b: 3).

Almost every event may constitute an imaginable surprise to someone. But sinc

global change phenomena and their environmental and societal impacts are a commu

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reality departs from community expectations, and on the salience of the problem

imposed.

Imaginable su rpr ise applies to communities of expert s, policy makers, managers, an

educators who share common ranges of expectation that are generated by group

dynamics, leaders and signal processors, including the dominant educational and

research paradigms (Kasperson et al., 1988). For these communities, shared expectations follow from dominant interpretations among the expert community (e.g., globa

warming is likely, NR C, 1992 or IPCC, 1996) , from the ir t with broader policy agenda

(e.g., environmentally benign economic development is possible), and from vested

interest, conscious or unconscious, of an agency or group to maintain a particular view

(e.g., global population growth is environmentally damaging, or, alternatively, good fo

the economy e.g., Myers and Simon, 1995). Since policy making often reects a blend

of public and interest group perceptions of reality, the imaginable surprise formulatio

is much more relevant to global change policy issues than a strict denition of surpris

as an u nimaginable ou tcome.

5. A typology of surprise

The distinction between strict surprise and imaginable surprise is important but no

sufciently developed to be very useful for dealing with surprise phenomena. More

exhaustive treatments of the sub-categories of surprise or the sources of surprise revea

that there are signicant nuances with important implications for global change studie

or policies (Kates and Clark, 1996). Just as with uncertainty, different denitions an

typologies of surprise have been proposed. Brooks (1986), for example, offers a simpltripartite typology: (i) unexpected discrete events (such as the oil shocks of 1973 an

1979 or the Three Mile Island reactor incident); (ii) discontinuities in long-term trend

(such as the acceleration of USA oil imports between 1966 and 1973); and (iii) th

sudden emergence into political consciousness of new information (such as the relatio

between uorocarbon production and stratospheric ozone). This typology focuses o

the qualitative nature of the disjuncture between the event as it occurs and the even

as it was anticipated. Timmerman (1986), in contrast, focuses on the increasing inten

sity of the effects of surprises, distinguishing four types of surprises: anomalies, shocks

epiphanies, and catastrophes. In this typology, surprises are rated on a scale from anomalies whose effects are bare ly not iced to catastrophes that cause unrecoverable damage

A typology by Faber and colleagues (1992) is particularly useful for the imaginable

meaning because it highlights the relationships between the source of surprise and th

observer, in particular identifying different sources of ignorance that inuence what i

registered as a surprise by the observer. Since ignorance, or its opposite, und erstanding

in large part shapes expectations, the AGCI session, post-session review, and our own

subsequent work has led us to develop a variant of the Faber-Manstetten-Proops typo

logical map (Figure 1) that emphasizes the source of the expectations themselves an

the impediments to changing them.

The Faber-Manstetten-Proops version recognizes the distinctions made abov

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that we articulate below also have some applicability for assessing quasi-surprise i.e

risk and uncertainty.

Imaginable surprises occur among events, processes, and outcomes that are not aknown: the other path from sources of expectation on our typological map. This pat

divides further on the ability of the observer to change expectations, either closed o

open in kind. Closed expectations are simplest, as they involve denial of the poss

bility of unexpected outcomes and thus an unwillingness (entrenched ignorance) eve

to consider the possibility of a larger range of events or understanding. This source o

surprise cannot be changed unless cognitive alternatives are enterta ined by the o bserve

and, by denition, to entertain such alternatives engages avenues of open expectation

the more complex and interesting path in our typological map.

O pen expectat ions or the recognition or acknowledgment tha t all events, processe

and outcomes are not known is further subdivided into easy- and hard-to-enlarg

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SOURCES OF EXPECTATION

OUTCOMES NOT ALL KNOWNOUTCOMES ALL KNOWN

Risk

(probabilitiesknown)

Uncertanty

(probabilitiesnot known)

"EASY"-TO-ENLARGE EXPECTATIONS

PersonalImpedimentsPersonalImpediments

(due to level of

individual learning)

Education

Research

CommunalImpediments

(due to level of

"normal" science

directed towardthe issue)

EpistemologicalImpediments

(due to the wayscommunities organize

or view the world)

PhenomenologicalImpediments

(due to inadequacy orfundamental limits in

existing technology andthe full range of knownanalytical perspectives)

"HARD"-TO-ENLARGE EXPECTATIONS

OPEN EXPECTATIONS(willingness and ability to recognizethat some outcomes are not known)

(unwillingness to recognizethat some outcomes are not known)

CLOSED EXPECTATIONS

imaginable surprise

(Quasi-Surprise)

Fig. 1. Sou rces of differences in imaginable surprise: typological map.

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education can lead an observer (or research can educate a community) back to th

quasi-surprise category of risk and uncertainty, shown by the dashed line in the gure

A s we note below, however, numerous barriers impede this process of enlarging expec

tations by learning and research, and these barriers need to be understood explicitly

and taken into account in any attempt to reduce surprise.

The hard sub-categories include two major classes of impediments to improvedexpectations. Phenomenological impediments involve the suite of factors that act a

barriers to knowledge-building, at least in the short run, such as inadequate technology

or modes of analysis. This sub-category should not be confused with closed expecta

tions or open expectations of the communal kind. Closed expectations rest within th

rigid, unchanging belief system of the observing community, whereas communal imped

iments can be overcome in principle by providing more attention to the problem se

in question by applications of existing ways of knowing. Impediments of the phenom

enological kind, in contrast, rest in the somet imes momentary inadequ acies of the tool

and skills of the community. Non-momentary, fundamental limits may also existsuch as the inability to forecast accurately weather details beyond a few weeks

Unpredictability, owing to the chaotic nature of large-scale atmospheric dynamics, i

an example (e.g., Lorenz, 1969). Although so-called normal science may well lead to

breakthroughs that will one day permit credible forecasts past currently believed

predictability limits, it remains possible (even likely) that no amount of communa

research effort can lead to a breakthrough that would breach this apparent phenome

nological impediment.

Finally, epistemological impediments follow from the ways in which the variou

observing communities view the world and build their understanding within it (e.g., thcomputer programming that missed the ozone hole). If alternative epistemologies wil

not be explored in principle or because of social conventions, closed expectations wil

exist, even if unconsciously. For this set of open sub-categories, however, the episte

mological impediment follows largely from an uncritical belief in a favoured view

perspective, or paradigm: the kind of view inherent in the programming of data ana lysi

in our ozone story. Science now well knows that it operates by way of prevailin

paradigms (our epistemologies) that guide understanding, and hence expectations, fo

particular communities. A paradigm may dominate for a time, providing condition

temporarily not dissimilar to closed expectations. Science communities are usually sufciently diverse, however, to maintain competing paradigms that constantly challeng

the prevailing perspective. When these challenges are successful (i.e., provide bette

understanding), the community eventually adopts the alternatives. It is important t

recognize that contemporary behavioural and social sciences an important compo

nent of the study of imaginable surprise in climate change has been in a prolonged

state of competing paradigms that constantly challenge one another (Guba, 1990).

Our rudimentary typology (Figure 1) is useful for at least two reasons. First, it place

su rprise in relation to observing communities, providing a logic for the imaginable kind

A nd second, the categories in the typology provide clues about how to deal with surprise

associated with the source of expectation, a subject to which we will return below.

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176 Schneideret a

Table 1. Candidate global-change surprises for the climate change example [Most of the entri

reect discussions at the 1994 AGCI Summer Session on Anticipating Global Change Surpris

(Schneider and Turner, 1995). The entries, edited by the authors, are examples and not intende

to be either comprehensive or independent.].

A . Surprises in anthropogenic causes of climate change

Development

l South remains proportionately behind the North in economic development.

l Transfer of wealth from South to North accelerates, widening the economic disparities

between the two.

l An underclass of nations is maintained owing to the diminished process of globalization.

Political organization / structure

l The nation state weakens, leading to conict and collapse of economic growth.

l Political economy of Russia leads to large-scale resource degradation / depletion, especiall

deforestation.

Health

l World mortality patterns are transformed by the emergence of a new, highly contagious

virus.

l Medical breakthrough increases life expectancy substantially.

l Chemical pollution causes signicant health effects in humans and other species, possibly

reducing fertility or creating demands for reduction in sulfate emissions in Asia and Russi

and in the use of agricultural biocides worldwide.

Population

l

Human population growth rate does not signicantly decrease; the demographic transitiondoes not stay on track globally.

l Smooth population trajectories foreseen in all standard projections of world population

become woefully inaccurate in the face of sharp departures from monotonic trends.

Technology / policy

l Funding stops for technology development that would facilitate a cost-effective low-carbon

future.

l Montreal Protocol to reduce emissions of ozone depleting substances weakened by refusa

of some developed countries to pay their agreed-upon shares to help developing countries

acquire substitutes.

Personal values

l Change takes place in the political consciousness of the value of nature.

Economy

l The global market does not control local allocation of natural resources, especially for

land and water use; rather non-market institutions (e.g., command-and-control economies,

quasi-market economies, local institutions) remain important.

l Insufcient economic growth and alternative migration patterns work to stabilize or

reverse the rates of deforestation in South America and south-east Asia.

Energy / resources

l India matches China in CO 2 and sulfate emissions.

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Table 1. Continued

l China shifts to low-carbon alternative energy source (e.g., nds ample supply of natural

gas or develops viable biomass industry).

l Energy use reverts to a parallel track with economic growth because (i) the cost of energy

conservation proves too expensive or politically intractable or (ii) a switch from an

industrial to a service economy proceeds slowly, or both.l CO 2 emissions from developing countries do not increase.

B. Surprises in non-anthropogenic causes of climate change

Oceanic

l A reduction in conveyor belt oceanic overturning leading to cooling at high latitudes

occurs, despite general (but slower) global warming.

l Heat stored in the ocean at intermediate depths is released to the atmosphere, leading to

rapid warming.

l Dimethyl sulde emissions decline with reduced sea ice, causing cloud brightness todecrease and warming to accelerate.

l Dimethyl sulde emissions change with sea-surface temperature change.

Geophysical

l Antarctic volcanoes lubricate ice-stream ow causing glacial surge and rapid sea level rise.

l Changes in volcanism is induced by change in climate (e.g., via sea level change).

Atmospheric

l Stratospheric cooling causes increased stratospheric clouds and greater loss of ozone at

high latitudes.

l Ozone depletion accelerates due to lax compliance with Montreal Protocol or refusal ofcertain states to live up to their commitments.

Other

l The Greenland ice sheet surges.

l High latitude forests are not a sustained CO 2 sink.

l Positive or negative biogeochemical feedbacks become signicant to climate forcing.

l Solar radiation increases (decreases) by 0.5% , dramatically enha ncing (reducing) anthro-

pogenic warming.

C. Surprises in environmental consequences

For nature

l Differential movement of species ranges in response to global environmental change

causes irreversible or very long-term ecological damage (extinction or cascading effects).

l Warmer climate becomes more stable.

l Warmer climate becomes less variable.

l Enhanced hydrological cycle leads to unanticipated extreme oods or droughts.

l Cloud liquid water content increases causing increased cloud reectivity which restrains

warming.

l Increased snow accumulation compensates faster outow in West Antarctica when theRoss Ice Shelf disintegrates

l Land cover stabilizes in South America

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natu ral, social, and policy sciences. These part icipants were less involved with theore tic

issues like typologies of surprises and more attuned to actual global change problem

There fore, they were asked to imagine what kinds of events, processes or ou tcomes withi

their domains of exper tise wou ld qualify, in their view, as (imaginable) surprise. Or, t

reverse the question, imagine what qualied as sufciently deviant from convention

views that many within each expert community would be surprised shou ld it occur (or no

occur). Not surprisingly, some of the responses suggested surprises that were opposite

reecting instances in which members of various expert communities held polarized o

unclear positions, both within and across such communities.

Table 1 lists the imaginable global change (but linked to climate change issues

178 Schneideret a

Table 1. Continued

l Spat ially varying (regional scale) compet ing forces create u nforeseen regional climate

anomalies (e.g., land-use changes, aerosols or tropospheric ozone).

For society

l Regional climate anomalies lead to economic and political dislocations.

l Regional environmental degradation has global impacts on economic and political systems

which feed back on climate policy responses.

D. Surprises in human response to the advent or prospect of global change

Technology

l Geo-engineering is adopted, works as intended and mitigates most anthropogenic climatic

changes at low costs.

l Geo-engineering is practised intermittently by only a few nations causing international

political conicts and greater environmental instability.

Policy / International accords

l The climate convention increases funding for low-cost, low-carbon backstop technologies.

l The creation of expanded wildlife reserves and migration corridors lowers impact on

biodiversity.

l More credible climate-change scenarios and better understanding of regional climate

impacts identies specic winners and losers and thereby destroys consensus in the

international community for emissions reductions.

l CO 2 build-up in the atmosphere stalls for ve years, derailing the climate convention

process.

l Intense drought, forest res, devastating oods and powerful tropical storms create anemissions control stampede.

Value/Norms

l Society of the twenty-rst century chooses to be relatively carbon-free and resilient to

climate change.

l Society of the twenty-rst century chooses to maximize growth in GDP and ignores

potential long-term climatic consequences.

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they are linked (proximal relations), while others constitute underlying factors (dista

relations) that operate through various media before connecting to global change. Fo

example, under the subheading of health (anthropogenic causes) is this su rpr ise: wor l

mortality patte rns are transformed by the emergence of a new, highly contagious virus

The surprise here is that such patterns might be affected sufciently as to lower the

rate of global population growth substantially, thus reducing various demands on landand fossil fuel consumption that contribute to greenhouse gases. Each of the more

distal entries should be read analogously.

Tables 2A and 2B take some of these candidate global climate-change surprises and

rework them according to their t by surprise arenas, thus linking each directly to a

specic outcome. The rst arena (Table 2A) involves the scenario that by 2050 green

house gas concentrations are far higher than would be typically anticipated; carbon

sinks become saturated or emission rates escalate, or both, thereby causing concentra

tions to be much greater than a radiative equivalent of doubling CO2. The AG CI exper

community would be surprised but can imagine, for example: if research and development on low carbon sources of energy were effectively to cease; or if the general trend

to slower popu lation growth (the demographic transition) faded, thus driving u

demands for energy; or if deforestation of Siberia were a major source of greenhouse

gases. The second arena (Table 2B) explores surprises that provide the opposite scenari

for 2050; greenhouse gas concentrations are lower than expected and the rates of thei

deliveries continue to fall. For instance, most of our expert community would be

surprised but can imagine if this scenario followed from strongly implemented inter

nat ional accords, such as those to lower carbon d ioxide emissions; rapid deployment o

low carbon backstop technologies, such as hydrogen fu el-cell-powered cars; or becausdeforestation stabilizes in the tropical world.

7. Improving the anticipation of surprise in global change

Although we cannot explore the sources of every surprise that appears in our tables

as this would require an extensive research endeavour, most of them would t wel

within the categories of the open expectations path in our typological map. Those

surprises involving the environmental forcing functions and consequences of climatchange often tend to follow from inadequate attention given to the problem (communa

impediments) or our inability at th is time to measure or m odel adequate ly the processe

involved (phenomenological impediments). Examples of communal impediment

include:

l Dimethyl sulde emissions decline with reduced sea ice.

l Climate variability changes with global temperature rise.

l Hurricane intensity changes with global warming.

Expanded conventional research efforts could, in principle, reduce ignorance and thualter expectations in these categories. Examples where fundamental levels of knowl

d f b li d f i l l i hi i i h l i

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180 Schneideret a

Table 2. Candidate global climate change surprises arranged so that they (A) create a conditio

much exceeding a doubling of CO 2 by 2050, and (B) create a condition of much less than doublin

of CO 2 by 2050.

A . Greenhouse gas concentrations are far more than equ ivalent to a dou bling of CO2 by 2050

More than 50% of incremental CO2 remains in the atmosphere, sinks become saturated,

and world emission rates grow sharply (i) No signicant policies are adopted because

l improved understanding of climate impacts identies specic winners and losers,thereby compromising consensus in the international community for emissionreductions;

l people remain unaware of, or place low value on, environmental impacts likebiodiversity loss;

l of the weakening of the nation state leading to conict and collapse of treatyobligation enforcement

(ii) Decarbonization of the energy system stops because

l R&D on low-carbon sources halts;l nuclear accidents cause a shutdown of all nuclear plants;l China continues its commitment to coal use;l India increases coal-based energy signicantly.

(iii) Ene rgy/GNP ratio stops declining becausel the Demographic Transition (birth rates decline following increased afuence) does

not take place in the developing world;l fossil energy prices remain low;l cost of energy conservation proves too expensive to implement;l a transition to a service-dominated economy in the non-Western world proceeds

slowly.

(iv) Increased deforestation takes place becausel Siberia incurs major deforestation and degradation;l the developing world remains proportionately behind the economies of the devel-

oped world, leading to sustained land-cover changes.

B. G reenhouse gas concentrations are far less than equivalent to a dou bling of CO2 by 2050 World emission rates peak and decline in the near fu ture

(i) Strong international agreements to constrain emissions are implemented.l Dramatic weather extremes motivate political action.l Biodiversity preservation becomes of major societal value.

(ii) Ra pid decarbonization of energy systems takes place becausel low-cost biomass alternatives are developed;l articial photosynthesis is mastered;l inherently safe, inexpensive nuclear power is developed;l large natural gas discoveries are made in India and China;l China and Brazil develop a large biomass-energy industry;l fuel-cell-powered cars trigger an efcient, hydrogen-based economy.

(iii) Ene rgy/GNP ratio declines sharply becausel

low-energy using technology is improved and adopted globally;l development increases per capita GNP sharply in developing world.

(i ) W ld i th t d li h l b

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Some of the surprises involving anthropogenic causes of and responses to climate chang

involve these kinds of impediments, but many more also follow from various com

munities preferred (conscious or not) pe rspectives and interpre tations and the ir inabilit

to reconcile the differences across community perspectives (epistemological impedi

ments). For example:

l An underclass of nations is maintained owing to the diminished process of glob

alization.

l Ideological preconceptions and nationalism lock out political consciousness o

global commons problems at scales larger than nation states.

In either of these cases, competing epistemologies have fundamentally different (an

often irreconcilable) interpretations of the intent, function, and outcomes of the preva

lent capitalist system as well as about the priority to be given to economic versus othe

social structures in these interpretations. Recognizing that communal, phenomeno

logical, and epistemological inuences on the range of expectations put restrictions onthe range of imaginable surprise, the global change community can tap various mean

of dealing with them. For example, global change studies are forced to deal with th

(i) connectivity and (ii) complexity of natural and human systems which, in turn, requir

that problem domains, disciplines, and perspectives be crossed (also Darmstadter and

Toman, 1993b, p. 3). Connectivity and complexity may run counter to the predominan

approach to problem solving in modern science to increase understanding by eve

narrowing and rening problems and analyses often within well-dened disciplines

Such approaches, of course, carry with them implications for our three impediments

We suggest that some of the problems inherent in complexity and connectivity can bameliorated: (a) by supporting work at and across the edges of the research cores tha

dominate the problem domains, disciplines, and perspectives (e.g., Schneider, 1988

Turner, 1991); (b) by complementing small- and large-scale approaches; and (c) b

encouraging the role of synthesis and synthesizers in both (a) and (b). None of thes

su ggestions denies the fundamental importance of research within cores and by the cor

specialist the dominant current d isciplinary science approach or the recognition tha

the root of globa l change studies involves systemic processes (e.g., embedded sub-cycle

within the global nitrogen cycle), each of which must be understood as completely a

possible at smaller scales. It does, however, argue for more integration and bettebalance among activities that could be labelled synthesis-edges versus specialization

cores. It is also important to recognize that systemic processes at large scales may no

be captured adequately by a focus on the patterns or trends of subsystems at smal

scales and that improved understanding can be gained only by cycling back and forth

between small- and large-scale levels of analysis, what Root and Schneider (1995) cal

strategic cyclical scaling.

Global climate change research, for example, is, as it should be, dominated by the

leading scientists and science centres (natural and social). These individuals and insti

tutions typically develop and share common views and opinions about various facet

of the problem such as the likelihood that climate warming is taking place and th

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change science, both natural and social, remains in a range of developmental stage

the unknowns are sufciently large to warrant attention to divergent themes abou

similar processes and outcomes. To facilitate this range of research, measures shoul

be taken to ensure a more open discourse and evaluation of alternatives, such as (a

by a more open airing and professional evaluation (as opposed to uncritical, equ

time and equal credibility often afforded to polarized viewpoints in the popular medi e.g. Schneider, 1990, Chapter 7) of less dominant or unconventional views, includin

those by advocacy science and scient ists; and (b) by reducing the redundancy of researc

focused on the dominant views and theses while still preserving a diversity of approache

within dominant paradigms, that is, create research overlap-without-cloning.

Finally, globa l change portends alterations to the basic processes that govern the stat

of the biosphere. Global-change research, therefore, might do well to anticipate thes

alterations, an effort that will require us to do more than study extant processes an

conditions alone. Various modes of analysis and approaches appropriate for such explo

rations, but typically underutilized in the research community, should be encouragedAmong these are: (a) backcasting scenarios from posited future states and/or recon

structing past scenarios in alternative ways to identify events or processes that migh

happen (recognizing, of course, that diffusion processes usually are not reversible an

diffusion-dominated systems cannot be meaningfully backcast); (b) increasing attentio

to and support for the study of outlier outcomes, searching for the r easons they appea

deviant and the lessons that might be drawn from them (e.g., H assol and Katzenberge

1997); and, (c) exploring the resilience paradigm (e.g., precautionary principle) along

side the optimization paradigm (e.g., cost-benet analyses) to inform policy makin

and diagnose alternative outcomes and risk management strategies. Other means oimproving the anticipation of surprise in global change science would emerge from

convening additional expert groups and asking them for more exhaustive assessmen

of the issues than we have attempted here. We suspect, however, that balanced assess

ments will consistently lead to recommendations that research as usual be tempere

with more less-than-usual or even unusual research alternatives. Improvements i

dealing with scientic surprise in climate change in particular and global change i

general, therefore, require the research and funding communities to seek a bette

balance among trad itional and experimental research alternat ives (also Kates and Clark

1996: 31). This aim, in turn, requires stra tegies that will facilitate th is balance, includinthe difcult problem of assessing qua lity in an interdisciplinary context (e.g., Schneide

1988).

O f course, stra tegies that shift resou rces to more problem-or iented, high risk, or int

grated studies are hard enough to fashion with expanding research support budgets, le

alone the current situation where traditionally federally funded global change researc

(and its standard measures of excellence) are increasingly under scrutiny by ideolog

ical anti-big-government politicians or budget-cutting-for-its-own-sake legislator

Nevertheless, we contend that the biggest societal and environmental returns o

research investments may, at least at the margins, lie in the support of unconvention

studies focused on ident ifying and u nderstanding ou tlier outcomes of the various inte

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