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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Khrushchev speech at Baku.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 26 April 1960
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- DAILY BRIEF
c 1. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: In his 25 April. speech in Baku, Premier.Khru-
shchev combined a prediction that the "favorable" interna- \\\\\\ tional. trend would continue afterthe siunmit with an effort
\ :.-_~~\\ \ to increase pressure for Western concessions on the H1210!‘ . summit topics. As inprevious statements, he sought to create the impression that Soviet umlateral action on a sep-
.5; 2: ;\ :_>>_ arate German peace treaty could be dependent on the outcome .
‘ of the summit, while carefully avoiding committing the USSR )4 to such a position. E‘ore_ig1_i Minister Gromyko also restated
the standardSoviet position. on Berlin and Germany to Am- bassadors Thompson and Bohlen, while hinting that an.in-
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terim Berlin solution was still negotiable. Bo.t_lflKhrushchev @nd Gromykpjtook an optimistic line on the chances for ing the. main issues of a nuclear test agreement, [and Gromyko \\\\§
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stated that Khrushchev would be seeking a concrete e ision \\
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USSR-China: The Soviet Union has used_the major speech for the Lenin anniversary celebration to re-
_ fute the views onthe inevitability of war “developed by the Chi-
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~\>. nese Communists in theirtwo Red Flag "editorials on the occa sion- of Lenin's birthday. Attri-Exiting the views not to the Chinese but to '-‘bold publicists in the West," the speaker, Presidium mem-
ti _ber Otto Kuusinen, assertedthat such ideas are one-sided, obso- lete dogmatism and that today. the policy of peaceful coexistence, as developed by Lenin and followed b the USSR, is the "only
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..,- ’ USSR--Turke : Qt Soviet diplomat in Turkey is reported to
D \‘/\ be on political subjects which could be discusse Menderes» visit. to Moscow in July, presumably
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to determine how far the Turks are willing to go in their talk_s_] 0”’
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[_w_-ith Khrushchev. - Ankara has earlier indicated that it is ready . to conclude, cultural andhealth agreements and possibly an-eco- nomic agreement with the USSR, _but that Turkey will continue c
to base ' " tn ilit ct ‘tn it W st '
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allies.) (Page 4) A
II.- ASIAQAFRICA India =- Communist. China: The failure, of Nehru and Chou
En-lai to reach any substantive agreement as. a result of their sixd softlk ' N D1h' ak ital st rt‘ ay a s in ew e 1 m es mo ce am that re- lations between New Delhi and Peiping will remain strained for some time.. While neither side was willing .to budge from its \ basic position,. both apparently hoped to reduce tension along -thefrontier and agreed, in a communique on 25 April, to es==
_
tablish ajoint panel of officials to study evidence supporting respective borderclaims, These lower-level meetings from Juneto September are likely. to accomplish little be ond keeps ing the border problem. on-_the diplomatic level, (Page 5)
Tunisia: EStepped-up activities by the French and-Algerian \ rebel. elements along the Algerian=-Tunisian frontier, together -
with rebel efforts to "internationalize" the war by recruiting a "foreign legion," have aggravated-President Bourguiba's fear. that Tunisia will be caught in the middle. The President publicly warned-France on. 24 April against further border incursions,
___ \(Page *3)
_Somalia g_- British S_omali1an.d:@Iationalists of the Italian=» administered trust territory tofST>ma1ia and of the British Soma= liland Protectorate announced on 22 April, at the conclusionof Q
D \/_a week-long conference, their intention to unite the two terri-= 4 tories under a new -"Somali Republic"-on 1 July. The conferees apparently also reached agreement on the composition 0%] 26 Apr 60
, DAILY BRIEF -Iii " “
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Eliational assembly, the selection of a president, and-the. formation of a coalition government. Ethiopia, apprehensive over the at-= traction such a union would present to its large Somali minority is re orted to h ecurit forces in the Somali p .
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Afghanistan-USSR: Afghan Prime Minister Daud,. who is in the R for a three-weekvacation, is probably .trying to settle
, points of disagreement overfuture economic and cultural pro- Dtj rams which apparently arose during Khrushchev's visit to Kabul djj/jig n early March. If Daud is successful ineliminating objectionable
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I I I. THE WEST Cuba: Complex internal problems are impelling the Castro
regime more and more. to use the United States as a scapegoat. Ambassador Bonsal bel' s th int al te d C st ‘s
with possible danger . to American lives and property. The am» . bassador considers Castro's 22~April television attack on the» US to be the strongest, most direct, and most insulting to date.
(Pace W.)
, , , ieve ese ern nsions an a ro them may mount to dangerous extremes on May Day,
. LATE ITEMS »*Laos: Conservative. candidates appear to have achieved an
' -overwhelming victory in Sunday’s National, Assembly elections. In=- complete returns indicate that. Communist or pro-Communist can- didates won very few seats, if any. The defeated leader of the fel== 1ow~traveling Santiphab party has charged, probably with ,justifica=
V‘ tion, that the elections were "faked" and claims to have photographic {D evidence of 'élsritiun;fiitiiiggul-aii*iti‘es, The apparent manipulation of the vote may bring on-an intensification of guerrilla attacks by the Com= munist insurgents and would weaken the prestige of the new govern- ment to be formed after 10 May
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*South Korea: The National Assembly has requested that President Rhee immediately resign as he had earlier offered and has called f sid ntial el
taker government now being formed. Such a government will require military support. Martial law probably will be con-
‘ tinued.'
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Reviews Soviet Position on SummitWTopic§~
In his 25 April speech in Baku, Premier Khrushchev outlined in standard terms the Soviet position on the major EastK=West is-= sues which he intends to take up at the summit. Prefacing his statements with a prediction that the present "favorable" trend in international affairs will continue after the meeting in Paris, Khru- shchev singled out disarmament as the first item for discussion, to be followed by the German and Berlin questions.
The Soviet leader sought to build up pressure for Western con» cess-ions on Berlin by repeating his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Although he did not spell out the timing, by discussing the problem in the general context of the May meet- ing he again gave the impression that lack of progress at the sum- mit could be followed by such a treaty. In a further effort. to urge the West to seek aninterim solution on Berlin, _he repeated, as he recently did in Paris, his claim that a separate treaty would end all Western occupation rights, including access to Berlin. [in a private conversation with Ambassadors Thompson and Bohlen, Foreign Minister Gromyko also restated the standard Soviet posi tion on a peace treaty and a free city, while hinting that an interim agreement could be negotiategj
Khrushchev adhered closely to the Soviet position taken at the disarmament talks in char ing. that the West continues to substitute shchev would be seeking a "concrete"-decision on.disarmament, control for disarmament. éromyko statedthat. at the summit which could be translated into future actigng This approach provide further evidencethat Moscow will press or a joint statement ene dorsing the main principles of a treaty for "comp1ete and general disarmament" which the Soviet delegation at Geneva could represent as a directive to proceed with the Soviet plan.
\ - On the question of nuclear -tests, Khrushchev said he intended to
conduct serious negotiations at the summit, adding an optimistic
-S-EGR-E411
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assessment that a treaty could be concluded, in'v_iew of the Eisenhower-Macmillan .29 March statement proposing a volun- tary moratorium on small underground tests. The Soviet pre~ mier, however, im i -of the moratorium would be a.key question‘,
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-SE€RE-T-
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The USSR Rerates Chinese Views - ""'
The Soviet Union has used.the major speech given in Mos- cow in commemoration of Lenin's 90th birthday to refute the views recently expressed by the Chinese Communists in their two Red Flag editorials on the same occasion. Attributing the Chinese views to "bo1d publicists in the West," presidium mem- ber Otto Kuusinen, without mentioning Communist China, con- demned those who assert that Lenin was an opponent of peace- ful coexistence. '
Claiming that "these falsif;i;ers"" take from Lenin's works only those passages which support their own thesis, Kuusinen maintained that Lenin developed the idea of peaceful economic competition in. the world. Contradicting the Chinese, who in- sist that wars are inevitable so long as imperialism exists, Kuusinen stated that the conclusions reached at the 20th and 21st party congresses about ';'the'absence of inevitability of wars in our epoch" are "a new contribution.to Marxism;"
Kuusinen noted that to be loyal to Marxism—Leninism to- day itis not enough to repeat the old truth that imperialism is aggressive--as the Chinese do. To look on only this one side of- the question is "dogmatism," he said, and such dogmatism is obsolete. Kuusinen alleged that Lenin foresaw long ago that "the time will come when war will become so destructive as to be impossible."
In developing the theme that the strength of the socialist world will soon be such that it cannot fail to win out in peace- ful competition, Kuusinen made the interesting observation that the significance of violenceis soon exhausted, but that "influ- ence and example will tell." He asserted, therefore, that the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence, now being followed by the Soviet Union, is the only correct and vital policy.
Kuusinen's observation echoes Khrushchev's admonition in Peiping last September that Communists should not "test the stability of the capitalist system by force." The speech as a whole is an expression of Khrushchev's view that bloc coun- tries should do nothing to jeopardize forthcoming negotiations in which the West will have no choice but to make accommoda- tions to C ' ecause of the shift in the balance of pews
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Moscow Sounding Out Turks on Iflirushchev-Menderes Talks
fiihe Soviet Govefihment is apparently seeking to determine ,
how far the Turks are willing to go in discussing political sub- jects during Premier Menderes’ visit to Moscow in July. A Soviet diplomat in Ankara is reported to have recently consulted a prominent Turkish lawyer with excellent contacts among high- er Turkish officials to get his reaction to the Khrushchev-Men- deres exchange of visits and to specific subjects which might be brought up for discussion_.j
‘.
[in particular, the diplomat was anxious to elicit a reaction to a possible Soviet suggestion. that Turkey reduce its armed forces. While it is highly unlikely that Menderes would enter into serious discussions with Khrushchev on this subject, So- viet policy-makers may be planning to use the announcement on 14 January by Khrushchev of a 1,200,000-man cut in the Soviet military establishment to urge that Turkey should "match" the reduction as a contribution to ending the cold war. Following Khrushchev's statement, the Supreme Soviet appealed to other governments for military cutbacks, and Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly criticized the Western powers for failing to respongj
Elhile Turkey agreed to the exchange of visits largely in order to put itself in better position to take advantage of any improvement in East-West relations following the summit meet- ing in May, Turkish officials have emphasized they envisa e no change in their- firmly anti-Communist foreign
rkey plans to conclude only cultural, health, and veterinary agreements with the USSR] and possibly an economic agreemegt]
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the Soviet ambassador has complainecfthaffhe atmosphere in Turkey is "not very warm" for Khrushchev's receptionj \this evalua- tion is correct and he has informed US officials that An no intention of taking measures to improve the
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Nehru-ChougTalks Fail to Produce Border Agreement
The inability of Prime Minister Nehru and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to make any real headway toward a border agree- ment during their six days of. talks in New Delhi makes it almost certain that Sino-Indian relations will continue strained for some time. The two leaders admitted in a joint communique on 25 April that while their "long, frank, and friendly talks" -
had led to a better understanding of their opposing views, they "did not resolve the differences that had arisen."
Ejeither Nehru nor Chou retreated from his basic position on the border issue‘,
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lNehru, during the first three days oftalks, insistently argue that In- dia was the injured party and that the next conciliatory move was up to the Chinese. He apparently refused to accept any agreement based on the status quo, demanding Chinese mili- tary withdrawal from Ladakh as a condition for any substantive negotiations. Other top Indian. Government officials reportedly were even_more outspoken in expressing New~Delhi's indigna- tion over Chinese actions in the border areaj -
Ehou reportedly met this uncompromising attitude with equal obstinacy, insisting that "rightful" Chinese occupation of disputed-territory constitutes a prime criterion of owner- ship and holding that the entire border is imdelimited, there- fore subject to negotiating During his stay in India, Chou hinted broadly in public that acceptance .of the Chinese posi- tion could lead to an eventual exchange of disputed areas in Assam for those in Ladakho Attempting at the ‘same time to salvage some good will, Chou restated his old assurances that Peiping would not send troops across .the McMahon line, even though the line "is completely unacceptable to China."
Nehru and Chou agreed to turn the border discussions over to subordinate officials of both countries, who will meet
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from June to September to "examine, check, and study" the historical evidence each. side has advanced in support of its territorial claims. These officials are not empowered to recommend a solution but only to draft a report on points of "agreement and disagreement." "Every effort" will be made during this period to avoid further border clashes. These meetings, to be held in Peiping and New Delhi, are likely to accomplish little beyond keeping a- channel openfor eventual negotiations.
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-S-E-GREFP
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Tunisian. President Warns France afldfi Rebels liresident Bourguiba, striving to maintain Tunisia's offi-
cial noninvolvement in the conflict in Algeria, recently warned both France and the Algerian rebels to refrain from actions which would compromise his government's position. In a bel- ligerent speech on 24 April he warned France: "Tunisia is capable of successfully conducting a war if" she. is obliged to do so by aggressions." He was referring to a series of recent border incidents which have arisen from the stepped—up activi- ties of both French and Algerian rebel troops in the Algerian- Tunisian frontier area_._']
Kljleanwhile, the President is believed to have admonished the Algerian rebels in Tunisia not to engage in any activities near the border which might stimulate. such French» retaliation, as ground fire against concentrations of Algerian military units on the Ttmisian side of the border. Bourguiba also apparently told Algerian officials that any new materiel must cross with- out delay from Libya to Algeria, without assembly or stockpil- ing in Tunisiafl
Ellhe Ttmisian foreign minister has indicated that the efforts of the Algerians to "internationalize" the conflict, particularly the acceptance of "volunteers" from other states, would pose a problem for his country. He said that any Tunisians volunteer- ing would lose their citizenship. In the case of foreigners, Tunis would hold their own governments responsible for their actions in Tunisigl
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oina1ia;a:n_<i_!,ritish *Pr9teotorate filntend to Unipn [fiationalist 1€3.dLTSL©*ITT18 itanan-anminisfered trust terrie
tory of Somalia and of the British Somaliland Protectorate an- nounced on 22 April, at the conclusion of a week-long conference, their intention to unite the two territories under a "Somaliland Republic" on 1 J ulyfl
@3ritain has invited protectorate leaders to London in May and apparently hopes to dampen enthusiasm for early independ-~ ence and union. Various British officials have expressed doubts, however, about their ability to influence developments, and Lon- don might considerably shorten .the present tentative schedule calling for independence in two or three years]
4..- Qhe confereesmwho met in Mogadiscio, capital of Somaliaand the designated capital of the new state--released a joint communie qué at the end of the conference outlining their plans for the uniono The legislative bodies of the two territories are to merge to form the new national assembly which will elect a president to head a coalition govermnent formed by the political parties now in power in the respective countr@
. ®1€ agreement appears to be a major. victory for Somalia's Prime Minister Issa. He was believed to favor a loose associa- tion with the protectorate in order to prevent upsetting the deli~» cate tribal balance which would permit him to remain in power, but he now appears to have executed a clever.po1itical maneuver which- probably will strengthen the position of his party and greatly enhance his own popularity, In return for agreeing to accept the protectorate's plan for total integration, Issa apparently received -a pledge of support from the protectorate leaders as eitherprime minister or president of the new statelj
Qgddis Ababa is apprehensive overthe attraction such a union would present to the nomadic Somalis who inhabit Ethiopia's Ogaden region, and has substantially increased its security forces in.the Somali border areas du.ring the past year, Three battalions of Im- perial Body Guard troops-=-“Ethiopia's elite fighting force--=-renort=~ edly were moved into this area recently?‘
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Afghan Prime Minister Daud Talks With-Khrushchev
Afghan Prime Minister Daud, who began a three-week vaca=- tion in the USSR on 14 April, is probably trying to settle points of disagreement with Moscow over future economic and cultural programs. Daud's sudden visit to the USSR suggests he believes that high-level policy problems require further discussion.be- tween himself and Soviet officials. These problems were appare ently first recognized as serious during Khrushchev's visit to Kabul in early March and accounted for the tense atmosphere at Khrushchev's departure.
The Afghans are probably, concerned that Soviet proposals for closer economic and cultural cooperation may undercut Afghan- istan's neutrality and independence. Soviet officials apparently tried unsuccessfully to secure an outlet for "cultural" propaganda by establishing a binational cultural center in Kabul under the terms of the cultural agreement signed by Khrushchev and Daud.
his government "continually reminds“ the USSR that an ideological campaign "or any other kind of propaganda activ- ity" in Afghanistan would shake close-Afghan-Soviet relations "to their foundations."
\ \
Elnother source of friction could be a reported Soviet proposal to place-Soviet personnel in the Afghanbureaucracy to expedite im= plementation of future economic assistance programs. The USS will probably insist that future large-scale economic assistance for Afghanistan's Second Five-+-Year Plan (1961=1966) consist of loans rather than grants, while Afghanistan's policy is to accept only grant aid until it can service additional debts. I
Daud reportedly -met Khrushchev at Sochi on 24 April.
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II I. THE WEST
Castro's Growing Problems Impelling I-lim Toward More and Stronger. Attacks on US A
Cuba's increasingly complex domestic problems are impel-~ lingthe Castro regime more and more to use the United States as a scapegoat. Ambassador Bonsal believes these internal tensions and Castro's reaction to them may mount to dangerous levels on May Day, when the regime plans to stage mass demonstrations of loyalty highlighted by parades of workers.’ and students’ militias and addresses by Castro and other top officials. Workers in five of Cuba's six provinces are being offered free transportation to Havana for the May Day events. In view of the bitterness against the United States which Castro, other top officials, and the proe government press are attempting to promote, the atmosphere on 1 May -could produce serious incidents against the lives and prop- erty of US citizens.
Castro, in a television appearance on 22 April, described United States policy toward Cuba as "fascist, Goebbels-like, and a betrayal of the principles for which thousands died in the past war against fascism." Ambassador Bonsal described this attack on the United Stat ' est, most direct, and most
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e political situation has become serious, "creating great expectations with the approach of 1 May, the date on which it is hoped that Castro will define the ideological orientation of this government (with respect to Communism) before a crowd of a mil-=1 lion people. . . . It is felt that the moment for a definition has ar- rived. . . . Confusion is widespread, discouragement. . .and even despondency."
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In Oriente Province, once. Castro's stronghold, \
‘support for Castro 1S ec ning
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among all classes. intervention in business and agriculture has cut off many sources of private in- come and has led -to an economic
attention is focused on the economic situation and that the.Communist. issue is not an‘ important factor in the discontent.
—”F9P—SE6R-E11
26 AP1’60 CEK§';§?$v'ed“?$F|5Ei駧§? 5650/6i/'1'§EB'§1'11893 Page 11
-BIO-AJ.l1LDE.A£ELA_f_ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
THE PRESIDENT The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President
. Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State_
The Secretary of State -
The Under Secretary of State ' The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research,
The Department of Defense ' The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Ch.ief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director
Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman
National Security Agency The Director
National Indications Center The Director
fYf\I\YI'I'II'\l1'I\Y"FIJ_Ii Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03177893
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