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Ongoing Discussion of J. Allan Hobson (Vol. 1, No. 2):Commentary by Herbert Stein (New York)Herbert Stein M.D.aa 425 East 79th Street, New York, NY 10021, e-mail:Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Herbert Stein M.D. (2001) Ongoing Discussion of J. Allan Hobson (Vol. 1, No. 2): Commentary byHerbert Stein (New York), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences,3:2, 243-244, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2001.10773359

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Ongoing Discussion Vol. 1, No.2

When an object of the constructed outer worldbecomes of instinctual interest to an impulse wish ofthe constructed inner world, the quale of the formercombines with the affect of the latter to create an in-tense experience of almost consummatory quality.Think of the experience of falling in love, of re-sponding emotionally to a moving piece of music, tolaughing heartily at a good joke. The last is a particu-larly instructive example. The humor generally has twoparts. One is an intellectual exercise; the violation ofboundary creates a quale experience. The second com-ponent is the violation of a social norm, deriding athird person, making a prohibited sexual allusion, evenbelittling oneself. These experiences and the wishesthey betray generate affect. It is a combination of qualeand affect that creates the consummatory laughter. So

243

psychoanalysis consists not only of taking cognizanceof unreporting protomental activity and associatedprotoaffect, but also disentangling quale and affect,distinguishing between inner and outer, between af-fects precipitated by external events and mood gener-ated by inner mood regulatory processes.

It is this synthetic function of the ego and theneed for causality that are responsible for many of thewell-known defensive activities of the ego and that areresponsible for almost all of the illusions that have tobe undone in analysis.

Mortimer Ostow4421 Douglas AvenueRiverdale, NY 10471e-mail: MOstow1234@aol.com

Ongoing Discussion of J. Allan Hobson (Vol. 1, No.2)Commentary by Herbert Stein (New York)

As a sidebar to the ongoing discussion of dreams, Ishould like to propose an idea concerning the relation-ship of dreams to the very early development of mentalprocesses in the hopes that others will find it of inter-est. My hypothesis is that the infant develops its first"hallucinatory image," its first image that is not di-rectly related to current perception, as its first dreamduring REM sleep. Freud gave us a model in chapter7 of The Interpretation ofDreams in which the hungry,unsatisfied infant hallucinates an image, taken frommemory, of taking in milk from the breast.

A hungry baby screams or kicks helplessly. But thesituation remains unaltered, for the excitations arisingfrom an internal need is not due to a force producinga momentary impact but to one which is in continuousoperation. A change can only come about if in someway or other (in the case of the baby through outsidehelp) an "experience of satisfaction" can be achievedwhich puts an end to the internal stimulus. An essen-tial component of this experience of satisfaction isa particular perception (that of nourishment in ourexample) the mnemic image of which remains associ-ated thenceforward with the memory trace of the exci-

Herbert Stein is a member of the New York University Psychoana-lytic Institute.

tation produced by the need. As a result of the linkthat has thus been established, next time this needarises a psychical impulse will at once emerge whichwill seek to re-cathect the mnemic image of the per-ception and to re-evoke the perception itself, that isto say, to re-establish the situation of the originalsatisfaction. An impulse of this kind is what we calla wish; the reappearance of the perception is the ful-fillment of the wish; and the shortest path to the ful-filment of the wish is a path leading direct from theexcitation produced by the need to a complete ca-thexis of the perception. Nothing prevents us fromassuming that there was a primitive state of the psy-chical apparatus in which this path was actually tra-versed, that is, in which wishing ended inhallucinating.... [Freud, 1900, pp. 565-566].

This ability to "hallucinate" is particularly im-portant because we must be able to create images frommemory, independent of immediate current perceptionin order to engage in what we call thought. Withoutit we would be reactive animals unable to remove our-selves from a situation to consider it. Even those whodo not accept Freud's model must acknowledge thatat some point in its early development, the infant ac-quires the ability to create imagery from memory inde-pendent of its immediate perceptions. It could beargued that it is an inborn ability, but although infants

Ongoing Discussion Vol. 1, No.2

When an object of the constructed outer worldbecomes of instinctual interest to an impulse wish ofthe constructed inner world, the quale of the formercombines with the affect of the latter to create an in-tense experience of almost consummatory quality.Think of the experience of falling in love, of re-sponding emotionally to a moving piece of music, tolaughing heartily at a good joke. The last is a particu-larly instructive example. The humor generally has twoparts. One is an intellectual exercise; the violation ofboundary creates a quale experience. The second com-ponent is the violation of a social norm, deriding athird person, making a prohibited sexual allusion, evenbelittling oneself. These experiences and the wishesthey betray generate affect. It is a combination of qualeand affect that creates the consummatory laughter. So

243

psychoanalysis consists not only of taking cognizanceof unreporting protomental activity and associatedprotoaffect, but also disentangling quale and affect,distinguishing between inner and outer, between af-fects precipitated by external events and mood gener-ated by inner mood regulatory processes.

It is this synthetic function of the ego and theneed for causality that are responsible for many of thewell-known defensive activities of the ego and that areresponsible for almost all of the illusions that have tobe undone in analysis.

Mortimer Ostow4421 Douglas AvenueRiverdale, NY 10471e-mail: MOstow1234@aol.com

Ongoing Discussion of J. Allan Hobson (Vol. 1, No.2)Commentary by Herbert Stein (New York)

As a sidebar to the ongoing discussion of dreams, Ishould like to propose an idea concerning the relation-ship of dreams to the very early development of mentalprocesses in the hopes that others will find it of inter-est. My hypothesis is that the infant develops its first"hallucinatory image," its first image that is not di-rectly related to current perception, as its first dreamduring REM sleep. Freud gave us a model in chapter7 of The Interpretation ofDreams in which the hungry,unsatisfied infant hallucinates an image, taken frommemory, of taking in milk from the breast.

A hungry baby screams or kicks helplessly. But thesituation remains unaltered, for the excitations arisingfrom an internal need is not due to a force producinga momentary impact but to one which is in continuousoperation. A change can only come about if in someway or other (in the case of the baby through outsidehelp) an "experience of satisfaction" can be achievedwhich puts an end to the internal stimulus. An essen-tial component of this experience of satisfaction isa particular perception (that of nourishment in ourexample) the mnemic image of which remains associ-ated thenceforward with the memory trace of the exci-

Herbert Stein is a member of the New York University Psychoana-lytic Institute.

tation produced by the need. As a result of the linkthat has thus been established, next time this needarises a psychical impulse will at once emerge whichwill seek to re-cathect the mnemic image of the per-ception and to re-evoke the perception itself, that isto say, to re-establish the situation of the originalsatisfaction. An impulse of this kind is what we calla wish; the reappearance of the perception is the ful-fillment of the wish; and the shortest path to the ful-filment of the wish is a path leading direct from theexcitation produced by the need to a complete ca-thexis of the perception. Nothing prevents us fromassuming that there was a primitive state of the psy-chical apparatus in which this path was actually tra-versed, that is, in which wishing ended inhallucinating.... [Freud, 1900, pp. 565-566].

This ability to "hallucinate" is particularly im-portant because we must be able to create images frommemory, independent of immediate current perceptionin order to engage in what we call thought. Withoutit we would be reactive animals unable to remove our-selves from a situation to consider it. Even those whodo not accept Freud's model must acknowledge thatat some point in its early development, the infant ac-quires the ability to create imagery from memory inde-pendent of its immediate perceptions. It could beargued that it is an inborn ability, but although infants

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have been shown to exhibit memory in recognitionwithin a few days of birth (Macfarlane, 1975), no onehas been able to demonstrate any evidence of "evoca-tive memory," awareness of an absent object, beforeat least 31/2 months (Baillargeon, 1987).

Freud does not specify whether this hallucinationof gratification first occurs in the sleep or waking state.My hypothesis is that it occurs first during REM sleep.If I am correct in that, then the first dream would alsobe the first "idea." My reason for proposing it is thatthe conditions of the REM state are ideal for the cre-ation of such an image. During REM sleep, the elec-troencephalographic state, as well as other physiologicsigns, such as breathing, heart rate, and erectile activ-ity are similar to those of an awake individual in astate of excitement. There is evidence that the limbicsystem is highly activated (Maquet, 1999). There isalso a generalized hypotonia and motor paralysis, anda relative insensitivity to stimuli. In other words, dur-ing REM sleep, the infant's condition is ideal for thedevelopment of an internal mental image: (1) Thereis a state of arousal and most likely a disinhibition ofdrive activity. The infant should be seeking gratifica-tion. (2) Motor activity is virtually shut off. Its usualaffectomotor means of getting attention and gratifica-tion (kicking and screaming) are shut off by the paraly-sis associated with the REM state. (3) Sensory stimuliare also shut off or at least very reduced. If the infantcan attempt to create a hallucination from memory,there is very little competing imagery to distract its at-tention.

To recapitulate: The REM state is like a protectedgarden of the mind in which this capacity to produceimagery can be developed. Since sensory input is vir-tually shut off, the gratificatory (dream) images canbe created without competition from sensory stimuli.It is the only state in which the infant is forced toseparate sensory impressions from motor behavior. Fi-nally, these conditions exist in the presence of excit-atory physiogical activity during which we couldeasily expect the presence of intense needs requiringgratification. As such a capacity develops during the

Herbert Stein

infant's extensive REM state, it can begin to be ap-plied during the waking state, providing the infant witha fundamental building block for intelligence.

This model would help to explain the role ofREM sleep in the development of intelligence in mam-mals. If REM sleep provides the "laboratory" inwhich internal images can be more easily created, itwould provide any animal that has this capacity witha significant tool for the rapid and comprehensive de-velopment of intelligence. Those animals which do notexperience REM sleep would have to develop internalimagery through a much slower, more cumbersomeprocess during the waking state. Most mammals andbirds are capable of REM sleep. The exceptions, pri-marily a group of primitive mammals known asechidna, but also including dolphins, are far less intel-ligent than would be expected based upon the sizeof their cerebral cortices (Winson, 1990; Crick andMitchison, 1995). The implication is that REM sleepplays a crucial role in the development of intelligence.This is consonant with the idea that it is an essentialpart of the first step in the development of intelligence.

References

Baillargeon, R. (1987), Object permanence in 3 1/2 and 4 1/2-month-old infants. Develop. Psychology, 23:655-664.

Crick, F., & Mitchison, G. (1995), REM sleep and neuralnets. Behav. Brain Res., 69: 147-155.

Freud, S. (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. StandardEdition 4 & 5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.

Macfarlane, J. (1975), Olfaction in the development of so-cial preferences in the human neonate. In: Parent-InfantInteraction, ed. M. Hofer. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Maquet, P. (1999), Brain mechanisms of sleep: Contribu-tion of neuroimaging techniques. J. Psychopharmacol.,13:525-528.

Winson, J. (1990), The meaning of dreams. Sci. A/ner.,263:86-96.

Herbert H. Stein, M.D.425 East 79th StreetNew York, NY 10021e-mail: HStein@psychoanalysis.net

244

have been shown to exhibit memory in recognitionwithin a few days of birth (Macfarlane, 1975), no onehas been able to demonstrate any evidence of "evoca-tive memory," awareness of an absent object, beforeat least 31/2 months (Baillargeon, 1987).

Freud does not specify whether this hallucinationof gratification first occurs in the sleep or waking state.My hypothesis is that it occurs first during REM sleep.If I am correct in that, then the first dream would alsobe the first "idea." My reason for proposing it is thatthe conditions of the REM state are ideal for the cre-ation of such an image. During REM sleep, the elec-troencephalographic state, as well as other physiologicsigns, such as breathing, heart rate, and erectile activ-ity are similar to those of an awake individual in astate of excitement. There is evidence that the limbicsystem is highly activated (Maquet, 1999). There isalso a generalized hypotonia and motor paralysis, anda relative insensitivity to stimuli. In other words, dur-ing REM sleep, the infant's condition is ideal for thedevelopment of an internal mental image: (1) Thereis a state of arousal and most likely a disinhibition ofdrive activity. The infant should be seeking gratifica-tion. (2) Motor activity is virtually shut off. Its usualaffectomotor means of getting attention and gratifica-tion (kicking and screaming) are shut off by the paraly-sis associated with the REM state. (3) Sensory stimuliare also shut off or at least very reduced. If the infantcan attempt to create a hallucination from memory,there is very little competing imagery to distract its at-tention.

To recapitulate: The REM state is like a protectedgarden of the mind in which this capacity to produceimagery can be developed. Since sensory input is vir-tually shut off, the gratificatory (dream) images canbe created without competition from sensory stimuli.It is the only state in which the infant is forced toseparate sensory impressions from motor behavior. Fi-nally, these conditions exist in the presence of excit-atory physiogical activity during which we couldeasily expect the presence of intense needs requiringgratification. As such a capacity develops during the

Herbert Stein

infant's extensive REM state, it can begin to be ap-plied during the waking state, providing the infant witha fundamental building block for intelligence.

This model would help to explain the role ofREM sleep in the development of intelligence in mam-mals. If REM sleep provides the "laboratory" inwhich internal images can be more easily created, itwould provide any animal that has this capacity witha significant tool for the rapid and comprehensive de-velopment of intelligence. Those animals which do notexperience REM sleep would have to develop internalimagery through a much slower, more cumbersomeprocess during the waking state. Most mammals andbirds are capable of REM sleep. The exceptions, pri-marily a group of primitive mammals known asechidna, but also including dolphins, are far less intel-ligent than would be expected based upon the sizeof their cerebral cortices (Winson, 1990; Crick andMitchison, 1995). The implication is that REM sleepplays a crucial role in the development of intelligence.This is consonant with the idea that it is an essentialpart of the first step in the development of intelligence.

References

Baillargeon, R. (1987), Object permanence in 3 1/2 and 4 1/2-month-old infants. Develop. Psychology, 23:655-664.

Crick, F., & Mitchison, G. (1995), REM sleep and neuralnets. Behav. Brain Res., 69: 147-155.

Freud, S. (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. StandardEdition 4 & 5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.

Macfarlane, J. (1975), Olfaction in the development of so-cial preferences in the human neonate. In: Parent-InfantInteraction, ed. M. Hofer. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Maquet, P. (1999), Brain mechanisms of sleep: Contribu-tion of neuroimaging techniques. J. Psychopharmacol.,13:525-528.

Winson, J. (1990), The meaning of dreams. Sci. A/ner.,263:86-96.

Herbert H. Stein, M.D.425 East 79th StreetNew York, NY 10021e-mail: HStein@psychoanalysis.net

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