9-11cultureandcooperantion

8/2/2019 9-11cultureandcooperantion

1/38

1

Dr. Dirk Nabers

Institute of Asian AffairsRothenbaumchaussee 32

D-20148 HamburgTEL 040-42887438

FAX 040-4107945mail to: [email protected]

CULTURE AND COOPERATION AFTER 9/11 JAPAN, GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Paper prepared for presentation at the 2004 ECPR, SGIR conference, The Hague, September9 to 11, 2004.

Draft. Comments welcome!

Introduction................................................................................................................................ 2

Wendt and his Critics................................................................................................................. 3

Systemic Culture and Discourse.............................................................................................. 11

Systemic Culture after 9/11 .....................................................................................................15

Ideas.....................................................................................................................................17

Norms ..................................................................................................................................21

Identities ..............................................................................................................................28

Culture and Collective Action ................................................................................................. 32

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................33
mailto:[email protected]


2/38

2

INTRODUCTION

Even before the guerrilla fighting in Iraq has died out, ever more academics and journalists

are rushing into print to tell us what has really happened in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars,

how international politics changed after 11 September 2001. But just how valid are their con-

clusions? What were and are the warring sides real objectives? Are the sources of informa-

tion they are citing reliable? Or do they present only a narrow approach that shuts out some

interpretations from the outset as illegitimate? This paper follows a simple purpose: to search

for the truth behind the truth, for thesis and antitheses in official explanations.

The basic theoretical question to be answered in the analysis is the following:How is colle c-

tive action in international relations possible? The question refers to constitutive theorizing

rather than a causal explanation for collaboration of two or more states (cf. Wendt 1999: 79-

88). The search for causal explanations has come to dominate the discipline of IR in the last

decades. This has lead to the neglect of research on the mind-sets and world views of non-

Americans and non-Europeans, e.g. Asians, Africans and Latin Americans (for a critique

Smith 2004). In the following analysis, it is the comparison of the foreign policies of the

United States, a European and an Asian country that will help us broaden our horizon with

regards to the nexus of culture and international cooperation. Empirically, I will try to solve

the problem by looking at international security cooperation after September 11th. The ques-

tion is then formulated as follows:How was collective action between the United States, J a-

pan and Germany poss ible in Afghanistan and Iraq, and what were the difficulties that in

some cases prevented co llective action?

Collective action shall be understood as the joint actions of a number of states. It is based on

in tersubjective understandings coordinated through the exchange of arguments. I assume that

it is the culture of the inte rnational system that is responsible for the prospect and the degree

of collective action. The principal quality of the structure of the international system consists

of the meaning ascribed to it by the agents (states) whose practice reproduces and changes it

(see especially Wendt 1999). It argues that social interaction ultimately does have transforma-


3/38

3

tive effects on the culture of the international system, because continuous co-operation is

likely to influence intersubjective meanings.1

The analysis proceeds in four steps: In the second section, I will refer to Alexander Wendts

Social Theory of International Politics as a promising tool to answer the main question of this

article. As far as the ontological structure of the international system is concerned, the argu-

ment builds on his theory. However, several authors have blamed Wendt for neglecting the

inextricable link between the role ofidentities, language and discourse in international politics

(Brglez, 2001; Smith, 2000; Suganami, 2001; Zehfu, 1998; Zehfuss, 2002), and thus of hav-

ing no concept of speech and communication (see also Herborth 2004). In the third section, I

will try to close this methodological gap. I will show how the process of systemic culture

transformation can be analyzed. At the center of the here introduced approach stands the

analysis of discourses, i.e. the exploration of speeches, writings, interviews, conversations and

so on. The study of identities through discourse analysis has become common in IR (e.g. Lar-

sen, 1997; Waever, 1998; Diez, 1999; Milliken, 1999). In the fourth section, I will analyze the

Social Construction of the Alliance against Terror along the lines of the developed methodo-

logical framework. As a result of the analysis, I expect to detect an irrefutable link between

the cultural structure of the international system and the degree of collective international ac-

tion.

WENDT AND HIS CRITICS

Even where common interests exist, cooperation often fails. On the contrary, states' interests

are sometimes not concurring, yet, cooperation does take place. Puzzled by the existing diffi-

culties in explaining international cooperation, IR scholars have offered numerous different

theories to explain the origin and development of international institutions, the most prom i-

nent among them being (neo -) realism , liberalism and (neoliberal) institutionalism . Suggest-

ing that the success of classic IR scholarship in helping us understand international coopera-

tion has been quite limited, I will introduce one of the most widely accepted and processed

constructivist approaches in IR, the one developed by Alexander Wendt, in particular his

1 The term intersubjectivity, frequently used by constructivists, is equivalent to that of 'common knowl-

edge', which is used in everyday language. Both refer to the beliefs held by individuals about each other.


4/38

4

monograph Social Theory of Int ernational Pol itics (1999). Wendts work has rapidly become

one of the main reference points of the theoretical debate in IR (Guzzini/Leander 2001: 316),

and even his critics believe that Wendts book is virtually certain to become a classic work

on international relations theory.2 Hayward Alker predicts that Wendts book is so impres-

sive an achievement that it has a good chance to become a standard text of the mainline,

American oriented, professional international relations literature (Alker 2000: 141); and

scholars such as Friedrich Kratochwil, one of Wendts strongest contenders, at least concedes

his respect:

While I think Wendts attempt is not as successful as claimed, there is no doubt in my mind that this is a

work of outstanding scholarship. [ ] Wendt has done a yeomans job in sensitising us to the complexi-

ties in building better theories.3

This kind of judgement seems reason enough to start with Wendts critique of rationalist ap-

proaches when trying to develop a theory of collective action in IR. Wendts theory offers

intriguing insights into the ontological structure of international pol itics. His basic level of

analysis is the international system as an ideational structure that gives meaning to the mate-

rial capabilities ofstates . The state itself remains an analytical concept in that it never really

becomes visible: it consists of an aggregation of (governmental) individuals. Since the nature

of international relations is determined by the ideas and beliefs that states have about eachother, and these are constituted principally by social rather than material structures, Wendts

unit of analysis has to be the state (Wendt 1999). According to Wendt, the nature of interna-

tional relations is determined by the ideas and beliefs that states have about each other. This

does not suggest that material power and interests are irrelevant, but rather that their implic a-

tions and effects are constituted by the social structure of the system.

Step by step, Wendt develops a theory of the international system, of cooperation and conflict.

Using institutionalist insights, Wendt assumes that states initially engage in pro-

communicative activities for egoistic reasons, e.g. because state goals cannot be pursued uni-

laterally. The argument depends on a mechanism of functional institutional efficiency in order

2 Keohane 2000: 125; see also Smith 2000: 151: In my view, Wendts book is likely to be as influential as

Waltzs. [] The book is likely to become the standard account for those working within the social con-structivist literature of International Politics.

3 Kratochwil 2000: 74/75; see also Krasner 2000: 131, for another judgement (His discussion of scientific

realism ought to be required reading for any student of international relations, or political science for thatmatter.) and Doty 2000: 137: Alex Wendts Social Theory of International Politics demonstrates perhaps

more long and hard thought about social theory and its implications for international relations theory than

most international relations scholars have dared to venture into.


5/38

5

to account for social change. Yet, institutionalist theories can only explain initial short-term,

behavioral cooperation, i.e. the impetus for engaging in communicative action, but fail to ac-

count for the development of long-term communal collaboration (for a critique cf. Sterling-

Folker 2000). On the other hand, his social constructivist model maintains that agents them-

selves are in process when they interact, which means that their very properties rather than

just behaviours are at issue. Interdependence, common fate and a homogenous culture can in

this sense be seen as independent variables, good for instigating states' engagement in com-

municative processes (Wendt 1999: Chapter 7).

In the classical definition of Keohane's and Nye's Power and Interdependence, the concept of

interdependence refers to a state of mutual dependence, i.e. a situation in which one actor is

being determined or significantly affected by the forces of another actor. Interdependent rela-

tionships always involve costs, since autonomy of choice is restricted. Such a situation can

either imply mutual losses or gains. It is the asymmetries of interdependence that provide

sources of influence for states in their relations with other states (Keohane and Nye, 2001:

Chapter 1). Interdependence can occur in the economic field e.g. through growing interna-

tional tradebut also in the political, as Buzan and Waever put it in their definition of a re-

gional security complex. It refers to

a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that

their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another

(Buzan/Waever 2003: 44, emphasis in original).

Buzans and Waevers definition of a security complex shows how closely the concept of

interdependence is connected to a second possible reason for a country to engage in commu-

nicative action, i.e. common fate . States face a common fate when the existence or interests

depend on what happens to a group as a whole. The difference is that interdependence implies

an interactive moment while common fate has no such insinuation, it is constituted by a third

party which defines the first two as a group (Wendt 1999: 349).

Finally, another possible cause for engagement in communicative action is homogeneity . In

the case of states the variation could be in their domestic regime type democracy or authori-

tarianism, capitalism or socialism , but it also entails a subjective dimension in that states

categorize themselves as being alike with regard to the features that define a group (Wendt

1999: 353-354).


6/38

6

As has been said before these variables serve the purpose of setting off a state's engagement in

communicative processes. Yet they seem to be inadequate for explaining the erosion of egois-

tic identities over time and the creation of collective ones. Few institutions will be steady if

their members are occupied by an on-going reckoning over whether norm-conformity serves

their individual interests. Consequently, we assume that identities and interests are a continu-

ing outcome of interaction, not just an input into the communicative process, as for example

Schimmelfennig suggests in his treatment of rhetorical action in international relations.4

However, the question why identities and their corresponding interests are transformed in the

institutional communicative process cannot be answered satisfactorily by just pointing to the

endogenous character of identities and interests, either. One more question has to be asked in

this context: What makes states change their respective standpoints in the communicative

context? We have seen that interdependence, common fate and homogeneity can be efficient

causes of pro-communicative engagement, which will eventually lead to a transformation of

state identities. But this process can only ensue if states can surmount their apprehension of

being engulfed by those with whom they would identify. The principle of reflected apprais-

als in troduced into IR theory by Wendt helps solve this problem. If one state treats the other

as if it were a friend, then by this principle it is likely that the state internalizes that belief

(Wendt 1999: 327) Creating a basic confidence is therefore the fundamental problem of inter-

national identity-building. Wendt describes this process as complex learning (Wendt 1999:

330-331):

4 While rhetorical action refers to the strategic use of arguments, communicative action is best character-

ized as the non-strategic, appropriate use ofarguments (Schimmelfennig 2004: 203).


7/38

7

Figure 1: Learning processes in international politics

State A

Political action

based on an a priori

definition of a situation

Interpretation of State Bs political action

and new definition of the situation leads to

new political action

State B

Interpretation of State As political action

on the basis of its own

a priori definition of the situation

New definition of the situation leads to

political action (reaction)

and so on

The political acts of the states that communicate with each other constitute signals about the

role that one wants to play and about the corresponding role into which it wants to cast its

opponent. IfState B modifies its ideas because ofState A 's political action, then learning has

taken place. If this is the case, the actors will get to know each other, changing a distribution

of knowledge that was initially only privately held (a mere social structure) into one that is at

least partly shared (a culture) (Wendt 1999: 331). From a constructivist standpoint the mark

of a completely internalized culture is that actors identify with it, and include the wishes,

ideas, and intentions of others into their own ideas. If identity is nothing else than to have cer-

tain ideas about who one is in a given situation, then the sense of being part of a group is a

social or collective identity that gives actors an interest in the preservation of their culture


8/38

8

(Ibid.: 337). Certainly, State A can also take the role of an egoist or cast State B in a position

to be manipulated for the satisfaction of its own needs. Then this might threaten State B 's

needs, who will probably adopt an egoistic identity himself and act accordingly.

Anyhow, this shows that endless conflict and war, as predicted by realists, is not the only

logic of the international system as an anarchic structure. Even the tentative optimism of lib-

erals about international institutions and deepening interdependence facilitating international

cooperation within anarchy might not go enough. To illustrate this, Wendt introduces three

distinct cultures of the international system, Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian, which are

based on different role relationships, enemy, rival, and friend, and resulting in three different

cultures (Wendt 1999: ch. 6):

Figure 2: Anarchic Cultures5

Idea/Belief Norm Culture

Hobbes Force Self-help Enmity Realism

Locke Egoism Mutual Recognition Rivalry Institutio nalism

Kant Legitimity Self-restriction Friendship Idealism

We can derive three different hypotheses from this work, referring to different theoretical

approaches to the study of the international system, and leading to different grand strategies:

Self-help, mutual recognition and self-restriction. With Realism, one might expect the famil-

iar arms race, conflict and war to be the dominating features of anarchy; with institutionalism,

one might expect an independent role for international institutions and absolute gains seeking;

with constructivism, or idealism, actors might also have a well-developed sense of collective

identity, each state identifying with the fate of the other (Wendt 2003).

Wendt proclaims that the current condition of the international system is characterized by a

Lockean culture and the creation of a universal pluralistic security community (Wendt 2003:

521), with a strong tendency towards a Kantian culture or collective security system, at least

in the Western world. The question that is of interest for our research is whether this can be

proven empirically. A Kantian culture does not only postulate that disputes will be settled

without war or the threat of war (as has undoubtedly been the case in the North-Atlantic

5 In a later work, Wendt differentiates between five different stages in world history, each responding to the

immanent instabilities of the system before: a system of states, a society of states, world society (security

community), collective security, and a world state.


9/38

9

community), but that states will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a

third party (Wendt 1999: 298-299). Specifically, we will ask whether actors in the interna-

tional system (in our case the United States, Japan and Germany) really demonstrate a sense

of collective identity with respect to security and whether each identifies with the fate of the

whole, as Wendt seems to suggest in a recent article: The ease with which the US was able to

put together coalitions to fight the first Gulf War and the War on Terrorism, the persistence of

NATO after the Cold War, and even the Concert of Europe are all best explained by perceived

common fate. In all these cases mutual recognition had positive rather than just negative be-

havioral requirements. (Ibid: 521-522)

This is a good starting-point for a critique of Wendts work. To my mind, his predictions

about the development of the international system are misleading because he does not really

make an effort to analyze the existing culture of the international system empirically. As

Hayward Alker put it, not much is said [in Wendts book] on how to fill in the large, nearly

empty, more or less grey, boxes of his three cultural ideal types of anarchic socialization prac-

tices. (Alker, 2000, p. 146) It is by far not the case that his theory is not able to grasp the

dominant intersubjectivity of world politics. However, his arguments are missing a concept of

la nguage, as Maja Zehfuss has suggested (Zehfu, 1998; Zehfuss, 2002). Not surprisingly,

Wendt himself argues that social relationships are constituted by discursive structures (Wendt,

1999, p. 84); astonishingly, he does not elaborate on this problem any further.

The version ofscientific realism that he makes the basis of his theory neither precludes lin-

guistically informed epistemology, nor does it restrict the choice of methodology in any way.

His metatheoretical position basically says that there is a world out there that is independent

of our thinking (Wendt, 1999, p. 51). In this category one may include both empirical realism ,

which refers to those material facts that are directly observable, and linguistic realism , refer-

ring to what is present (and thus observable) within discourses (Brglez 2001; Wolf 2003).

Wendt maintains that phenomena normally seen as material, such as power, are actually con-

stituted by ideas: And these ideas exist and have effects because of the discursive forms

(norms, institutions, ideologies) in which they are embedded [] (Wendt, 2003, p. 495). At a

prominent place in his Social Theory , he even underlines the importance of discourse analy-

sis:


10/38

10

[] when confronted by ostensibly material explanations, always inquire into the discursive condi-tions which make them work. When Neorealists offer multipolarity as an explanation for war, inquire

into the discursive conditions that constitute the poles as enemies rather than friends. When Liberals of-

fer economic interdependence as an explanation for peace, inquire into the discursive conditions thatconstitute states with identities that care about free trade and economic growth. When Marxists offer

capitalism as an explanation for state forms, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute capi-talist relations of production. And so on (Wendt 1999: 135-136).

For Wendt, an inextricable link exists between peoples thoughts, culture, and discourse:

Thinking depends logically on social relations, not just causally. Human beings think through culture.

And since the structure of shared beliefs is ultimately a linguistic phenomenon, thi s means that language

does not merely mediate thinking, it makes thinking possible (Wendt 1999: 175).

However, though pointing out the relevance of discourses, what is strangely missing in his

book is a discussion of epistemological questions (for a critique Kratochwil 2000). He does

not seem to offer a clear idea about how to study the international system (that might explain

his failure to view the construction of the alliance against terror correctly as we will see

later6). For two reasons, the question is whether Wendts interactionist model (see Figure 1)

might not be too narrow to take hold of the transformation of the system-culture. First, the

adaptation process that he introduces is confined to the adjustment of behaviour (simple learn-

ing ) without offering a way to take hold of the possibility of identity and interest transforma-tion (complex learning ).7 Second, Wendt does not elaborate further on epistemological ques-

tions of discourse and language because he is committed to the empirical aspects of scientific

realism, which holds that the world is independent of the mind and the language of individual

observers. It is questionable whether one can recognise the world in a pure and direct fash-

ion, i.e. without any description, or whether what we recognise is always already organised

and formed by certain categorical and theoretical elements. (Ibid., p. 91). Thus, language is

more important than Wendt admits in his work. We need descriptions for the things in the

world, and those descriptions are not neutral and objective, but make the things what they are

in the first place.

Therefore, Wendts work offers no more than a splendid starting point for constructivist r e-

search focussing on the systemic level. However, when Wendt mentions ideas, culture and

discourse, he should also explore the potential of linguistic-sensitive literatures. This would

6 See also Krasner, 2000, who argues that Wendts argument is unsupported by empirical data.

7 For a very powerful critique see Herborth, 2004.


11/38

11

help with the operationalization of an empirical research programme.8 We will turn to the

relevance of speech and discourse in the next section, developing an analytical framework

that allows us the proper conceptualization of the international system from a constructivist

perspective.

SYSTEMIC CULTURE AND DISCOURSE

It is the social interaction within the international system that is of interest for the analysis. In

order to explain what is going on, to grasp the intersubjective quality of convergent expecta-

tions (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, p. 764), we have to look at discourses within the interna-

tional context. Before explaining the way how discourses can be studied, though, let us just

briefly clarify how they are defined in the following empirical investigation. The theory of

discourse considers communication as the production and exchange of meanings; discourses

constitute and construct the world in meaning (Schreiber/Moring, 2001). Van Dijk, one of the

leading modern discourse theorists, also points out that discourse should be understood as an

act of communication (van Dijk, p. 1977). Because of intertextuality, there can in principle be

no objective starting point and no conclusion of a discourse, since every speech act is con-

nected with many others and can only be understood on the basis of others. As an act of

communication,

[] discourse is socially constituted as well as socially conditioned it constitutes situations, objects of

knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is con-

stitutive both in the sense that it helps sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it

contributes to transforming it (Wodak 1996, p. 15).

In that sense, discourses also have transformative effects on culture. When people communi-

cate with each other, they negotiate about meanings. Through their communication, they pro-

duce and reproduce reality. This point has to be emphasized because we expect current dis-

courses in the international system to have ongoing effects on the culture of cooperation. Al-

tering values and norms are in a changing relationship with the social production of discourse

and must therefore be included in the analysis (Titscher et al. 2000, p. 27). To put it shortly,

the context of discourse is constantly being recreated through the discourse, and it in turn i n-

fluences the latter.

8 For this argument, see also Alker 2000.


12/38

12

The next important question then is how we study discourses as a means of explaining the

transformation of the culture of the international system. Since our units of analysis are states,

the first aspect that is of relevance here is the exploration of repetitive statements in major

speeches of government representatives because those speech acts convey the logic of the

government as they wish to express it. (Hoffmann and Knowles 1999, p. 17) The question

whether the speakers really mean what they say is of relative unimportance in this respect, for

it is not the speakers deeper in tentions or convictions that we are interested in:

An advantage of this approach (discourse analysis) compared with psychological approaches studyingperceptions and belief systems is that it stays totally clear of any relationship to what people really

think. It is not interested in inner motives, in interests or beliefs; it studies something public, that is how

meaning is generated and structured []. (Waever, 1995, p. 254)

Whether or not political actors really mean what they say is of minor weight because they will

always put forward their arguments strategically; both opportunistic and honest arguments

have real consequences for their advocates and the outcome of the debate. In reality, politi-

cians will always have to argue what the consequences of their policies are (see also Schim-

melfennig 2001, p. 66).

Neither can we expect with absolute certainty that a dominant discourse will evolve. The bat-

tle between discourses to become the leading interpretative structure actually tends to reveal

the configuration of power relations in a given histor ical moment, but they are so multifaceted

that we cannot foresee their exact outcomes (Smith 1998, p. 57). However, once a discourse

reaches the stage of establishing a dominant perception of reality for all those participating in

the communicative process, it reveals a lot about the course of action in collective identity

formation (Hoffmann and Knowles 1999, p. 15). If the same reality is reflected in the speech

acts of all interacting agents, we can speak of collective iden tity.

Particularly in so-called organic crises (Laclau 1977, p. 103, referring to Gramsci), existing

identities are apt to collapse and new dominant discourses can evolve. In such a crisis, more

and more actors open themselves up for innovative discourses, and hegemonic strategies can

be successful. The network of existing social structures is increasingly considered an obstacle

on the path to one's true self; the evolving hegemonic discourse, on the other hand, rein-

forces a specific actors identity crisis by offering alternative identity concepts.


13/38

13

As (in our case) it is multilateral in nature, this transition is a highly complex venture, encom-

passing a fundamental reconstruction of existing values and identities. As an ideal type, it can

be summed up as follows: (1) At the beginning there is the organic crisis, an external catas-

trophe like September 11th, that might weaken dominant discourses, i.e dominant perceptions

of reality, opening up cultural borders. (2) Alternative discourses start to compete in their in-

terpretation of the crisis. Sooner or later, one predominant interpretation will evolve, which

institutes the framework that determines what action is appropriate and what action is inap-

propriate to end the predicament (Laclau, 1990, p. 64). (3) Old identities tend to dissolve with

the construction of newly established dominant interpretative frameworks. (4) New identities

will then generate new kinds of political action along the lines of the dominant interpretative

framework (cf. also Laclau, 1977). In short, the process evolves as follows:

Figure 3: Culture and collective action in International Politics

crisis

alternativediscourses

hegemonic discourse

dominantinterpretative framework

new kinds ofpolitical action

Specific cultural forms like norms, rules, (political) institutions, conventions, ideologies, cus-

toms, and laws are all influenced by this process. It ends up in transforming actors beliefs

about each others rationality, strategies, preferences, and beliefs. Different actors are compet-

ing for hegemony in this process by offering their specific systems of narration as a com-

pensatory framework, and they will represent that framework as the only one that can resolve

an identity crisis (Laclau 1977: 103): if you are not with us, you are against us!


14/38

14

While this kind of cultural transformation does not necessarily need a crisis to come about,

the concept of crisis is most welcome because it represents a situation in which our every-

day beliefs of how the world works are rigorously disrupted by an event that is out of our con-

trol. In that sense, it can be compared to trauma , i.e. a situation that is hard to describe and yet

demands to be communicated: [] it is outside the frameworks of normal social reality and

thus outside the linguistic and other symbolic tools we have at our disposal for making sense

of the world. (Edkins, 2002, p. 246)

We will consider 9/11 as a traumatic event and ask how the incidents of that day influenced

collective action between states in the international system. While an analysis of a domestic

discourse on a particular topic faces the problem of a boundless amount of available actors

and sources, the fund is much easier to survey if limited to the international system. The study

concentrates on speech-acts of decision makers that directly refer to the international institu-

tion, official statements issued by state governments concerning the institution, represen-

tative declarations and communiqus. In detail, it will bring together

official statements by heads of states and governments, their respective foreign, financeand trade ministers as well as state secretaries of foreign affairs on issues of regional co-

operation,

interviews, press releases and summaries of press conferences by members of the gov-ernments of the countries relevant for the analysis,

background information issued by the various governments concerning international se-curity cooperation,

joint statements by the heads of states or foreign ministers of the countries in questionand

official speeches held by delegates during international conferences.

There is no standard method to analyse a discourse. However, we have to take into

consideration that in communication flows between states more than one discourse may be

active at the same time. It is therefore necessary to introduce the concept of interdiscursivity

(Fairclough, 1995). Interdiscourse refers to the structure that underlies various discursive

events. The interdiscourse which Fairclough also called the order of discourse has primacy

over the particular types or fragments of discourses. The different fragments are also called

discursive practices. If we choose a specific organisation for investigation, we may find


15/38

15

various discursive practices. It is an important task to evaluate the practices for their effects

on collective action and conflict. The interdiscourse is therefore not necessary a harmonious

entity. In most cases it may be characterised by incoherence, inconsistency, conflict and

dilemma.

In the next section, I will arrange the particular types of discursive practices we find in the

chosen field, i.e. the fight against global terrorism after September 11th. We will investigate

how the reality of the international system is socially constructed by discourse. The discourse

will show us that some actions are adequate and others unthinkable; it will show us where

intersubjectivity exists and where it does not; finally, it will show us where collective action

between states is possible and where it is not. The analysis should start out with the definition

of the discursive event (discursive context) as a basis for the developing interdiscourse (Jger,

1999); we will restrict ouselves to a few words about the events of 9/11. In the first major

investigative step I will analyze various discursive practices , on the basis of which I will try

to evaluate the dominant culture of the international system after 9/11. According to Wendt,

global security arrangements comprise ideas and beliefs about the world (e.g. the nature of

world security), norms of proper behaviour (e.g. questions of international law and the

appropriateness of the use of force) and corporate and collective identities (resulting in the

three cultures introduced by Wendt: Hobbes, Locke and Kant).9 Discursive practices revolve

around these three concepts. They will be the focus of the analysis. In the last section, I will

briefly give an answer to the overall question of this paper, how collective action becomes

possible in international politics and why it fails so often.

SYSTEMIC CULTURE AFTER 9/11

Before starting our investigation, we have to pause to consider what actually instigated the

discourse in our specific case. Generally spoken, we have to situate the surveyed speech-acts

within the historical conditions that gave rise to them. In our instance, it is September 11,

2001, that is the starting point for a complex discourse raising questions about a) the current

and future state of world security, b) legal norms and the use of force in international security,

and c) national and collective identities in the international system.

9 For a comparable approach, though not using Wendts concepts, see Frederking, 2003.


16/38

16

What happened on September 11th? To give a short summary: In the morning of September

11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four U.S. airplanes bound from Washington and Boston to

California. At 8.45 a.m., American Airlines flight 11 crashed into the North tower of Manhat-

tans World Trade Center; only seventeen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175 hit the

south tower. Although at 9.40 a.m. the Federal Aviation Administration gave the order to

bring all flight operations to a standstill, at 9.43 a.m. American Airlines Flight 77 soared into

the Pentagon outside Washington D.C. Meanwhile, at 10.05 a.m., the first of the twin towers

co llapsed, and the second at 10.28 a.m. The fourth plane crashed into rural Pennsylvania, after

a group of passengers had tried to attack the h ijackers. Overall, some 3000 people lost their

lives.

My main argument is that it is not the terrorist attacks as such that shaped world politics in the

years that followed, as some observers would have it. If we watch the twin towers fall from

the perspective of a constructivist social scientist, we are not interested in the material process

of two skyscrapers being hit by airplanes, but in the interpretational process that is mobilized

by this event. What follows is a complex struggle between different interpretations of the

situation, in which different state actors do not only participate to achieve their individual or

collective goals, but more importantly try to determine who they are, where their position

is vis--vis the United States is, and what their place in the international system should be.

In the discourse about the American-led war against terror following 9/11, one has to differ-

entiate between two phases: the first phase starts with the invasion of Afghanistan, where 11

NATO countries plus Japan and other Asian nations participated in the International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) because they obviously saw the US effort there as legitimate and

appropriate. Germany, together with Britain, Turkey and the Netherlands, even took a leading

role in commanding that force; and in November and December 2001, the Japanese govern-

ment eventually sent six ships of the Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean to support the

American activities; in February 2002, three new warships and about 700 soldiers replaced

these vessels (AWSJ, 11 February 2002). Japans contribution also covered refugee assistance

as well as peace and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan after the fighting was over (MOFA

2002). The campaign in Afghanistan would have been unthinkable without the support of

American allies such as Japan and Germany.


17/38

17

The second phase starts in 2002, with American attention shifting from Afghanistan to Iraq

and the eventual invasion in March 2003. While this paper is being written, guerrilla fighting

in Iraq continues, and the struggle between America and its partners about the shape of a new

security world order is still going on. Certainly, particular signals that prove whether one is

willing to cooperate or not play an important role in this game. It would be wrong to stereo-

type the positions of the Americans, the Germans and the Japanese in the debate follow-

ing 9/11. It is however possible to discover predominant views that shape the thoughts of the

respective other. As has been said, these include certain ideas about the world, norms and

iden tities. I will analyze these three elements of the discourse in the following sections.

Ideas

As Laclau has pointed out, a discourse can only generate a dominant interpretative framework

if its system of narration operates as a surface of inscription for a wide variety of demands.

Its success is due to its abstract form, which in turn makes it possible for more identifications

to become possible (Laclau, 1990, p. 64). In the case of the discourse starting with 9/11, it is

the concepts of liberty and freedom that structure the field and signify the only possible alter-

native to absolute chaos in world politics. The terms occur in most of the speeches held by

American government officials in the days after the terrorist attacks, and they are mirrored in

speeches held by the German and Japanese heads of governments. By using the words as a

horizon, it becomes possible to create a dominant discourse in the early phase of the war

against terror. The term serves political purposes by making it possible to differentiate be-

tween countries that enjoy freedom and those that do not:

Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey show thatfreedom manifests itself differently around the globe and that new liberties can find an honoured

amidst ancient traditions. In countries such as Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco and Qatar, reform is underway,

taking shape according to different local circumstances (Rice, 2002).

It is the United States that is the archetype of freedom and justice. As Bush emphasizes, [we]

must stop the evil ones, so our children and grandchildren can know peace and security and

freedom in the greatest nation on the face of the Earth. (The White House, 2001c) In this

example, the meaning of the American identity is purposely shaped by its differential rela-

tionship to the rest of the world, especially those countries that are characterized by a lack of


18/38

18

freedom. The freedom metaphor is frequently employed by the German and Japanese gov-

ernments as well, segregating the civilized western world from the rest of the planet. As the

German government puts it: It is mainly religiously motivated extremism and fanaticism in

combination with the worldwide reach of international terrorism that threaten the achieve-

ments of modern civilization such as freedom and human rights, openness, tolerance and d i-

versity. (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2003). And the Japanese Prime Minister de-

clares on 27 September 2001: The entire global community stands undaunted and ready to

fight resolutely the unprecedented cowardly acts of terrorism. [] Now is the time for our

nation to confront the present difficulties with its full power in a spirit of international coop-

eration in order to defend peace and freedom for all humankind (Prime Ministers Office,

2001g).

Other concepts regularly used by Bush in particular peace and security serve the same

function. As Condoleezza Rice once explained, both refer to the prevention of violence by

terrorists, to the extension of the benefits of freedom and prosperity across the globe and

what should be noticed here to the creation of good relations among the worlds great pow-

ers (Rice, 2002). This was also expressed in various statements of top US government repre-

sentatives, most prominently in President Bushs defining speech at West Point: We have our

best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to build a world where the

great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war. (The White House, 2002b)

But it is not only the United States that sees a special responsibility [for itself] to help make

the world more secure (Ibid.); this view is also shared by Germany and Japan. The German

Defence Policy Guidelines of 2003 maintain that [t]he United States of America remain in-

dispensable to European security10; and the Japanese government at several occasions ex-

pressed its respect for the strong leadership that President Bush has exercised in the fight

against terrorism (cf. Prime Ministers Office, 2002a). Accordingly, the U.S. administration

left no doubt that future world security lies in the hands of Washington, and that it is America

that will take the lead both politically and militarily. As the Assistant to the President for N a-

tional Security Affairs put it: To support all these means of defending the peace, the United

States will build and maintain 21st century military forces that are beyond cha llenge (Rice,

2002).

10 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2003: paragraph 32.


19/38

19

It is at this point where the discourse is getting more specific. Washington is trying to con-

struct September 11th as a global tragedy11 that has no precedence. In so doing, 9/11

quickly took on an exceptional ahistoricity . (Der Derian, 2002: 102, emphasis in original)

The incidents of 9/11 are transformed from despicable acts of terror (The White House,

2001b) to acts of war.12 This bestowed the American government with extraordinary powers,

which had, as we will see when discussing relevant norms of international security, a far

reaching impact on both modern ius ad bellum and ius in bello . The ultimate warning was

formulated by the president on September 15th: Those who make war against the United

States have chosen their own destruction. (The White House, 2001e).

In this context, threat creation becomes functional to political purposes. Life as normal had

been interrupted by a new form of insecurity, and from now on, it was not only the United

States but the whole civilized world which was vulnerable and which might be attacked by

terrorists. Constructing fear served the function of maintaining quiescence and de-legitimizing

dissent both within the United States and the international community (Hariman, 2003; Jack-

son, 2004). In the constructivist literature, it has been argued that the very concept of the po-

litical is based on the identification of the enemy. This idea is related to the second dimension

of the war on terror: The new kind of terrorism that is now also threatening American allies

and draws a line between the Western, peace-loving world and some radical Islamic societies.

As Steve Smith has pointed out in his Presidential Address to the International Studies Asso-

ciation in 2003, IR as a discipline has more or less adopted the policy concerns of the western

hemisphere as if they were the policy concerns of the world (Smith, 2004, p. 510). It is a

mirror of existing international structures, thereby making itself complicit in the world that

led to September 11 (Ibid., p. 504). Being part of this international structure, unsurprisingly

Japan and the Germany are in line with the United States when it comes to interpreting 9/11

as an expression of a global threat. In this context, the words of the Japanese Prime Minister

can be seen as paradigmatic: I am outraged by these acts which pose a grave challenge not

only to the United States but to the entire free world (Prime M inisters Office 2001a).

11 Colin Powell on 26. October 2001: It was an attack against the world, not just against the United States.

(U.S. Department of State 2001a).12

As President Bush put it on the evening of September 11th

: America and our friends and allies join with allthose who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.

(The White House, 2001b).


20/38

20

The Japanese worldview seems to be harmonious with the American one when it comes to

threat perceptions. Koizumi constructs terrorism as a despicable act that threatens the lives

and lifestyles of the people all over the world and the peace and security of all the countries in

the world (Prime Ministers Office, 2001f). The new Japanese National Defense Program

Outline (NDPO) focuses on terrorism as the most imminent threat to the countrys security,

stipulating the establishment of a special force aimed at responding promptly to terrorism and

guerrilla warfare.13

Accordingly, President Bush declared terrorism as the mother of all threats, asserting that

modern terrorists are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century (The

White House, 2002b), omnipresent in the world and always prepared to attack our civiliza-

tion. This leads to the American government emphasizing its role as the sole world police-

man, which is summarized in the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United

States. The document commits the USA to

- pre-emptive, in some cases even preventive warfare against terrorism and rogue states

with weapons of mass destruction;

- unilateralism when our interests and unique responsibilities require (The White House,

2002a: 31);

- military supremacy to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in

hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States (ibid: 30).

Pre-emptive strikes, if necessary alone, and continued dominance are the ideas put forward by

the United States. They are continuously coupled with a liberal vision of world politics, again

and again emphasizing concepts such as freedom: [] the United States will use this mo-

ment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work

to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of

the world. (The White House, 2002a: V)

On the general level, there is wide acceptance for this vision both in Germany and in Japan.

Both countries do support military force if necessary as a means of last resort; it has however

be embedded in diplomatic efforts. The firm expectations for multilateralism on the German

13 New defense plan urges flexibility for new threats, The Japan Times , 6 September 2004.


21/38

21

side is one source of misunderstandings;14 another source is diverging threat perceptions,

which are more pronounced on the German-American than the Japanese-American axis. Dis-

agreement over the quality of threats lead to an ever growing incapacity of intersubjective

representations on the German-American link, which is particularly visible with regards to

Iraq. Long before the Iraq war started in March 2003, Saddam Hussein was not seen as the

principal threat to world security by the German government. Foreign Minister Fischer expl i-

cated in August 2002:

Our deep scepticism and thus our rejection stem from our belief that the wrong priority has been set

here. Our analysis shows that the threat comes primarily from Islamic terrorism. To date no-one can rule

out another major attack. Nor, however, has anyone proved so far that Saddam Hussein has any linkswith organizations such as al Qaida (Iraqwatch, 2002a).

The problem of deviating perceptions of realitycould be bridged by adhering to the same

standard norms of appropriate behaviour. In this regard, however, the gap between the transat-

la ntic and the transpacific relationships has also been widening since 2002. We will turn to

this question in the next section.

Norms

Norms are defined as collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity

(Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, p. 54). They constitute actors identities and inter-

ests, delineate collective goals and prescribe or proscribe behavior. In our context, especially

two areas of normative concern have to be discussed: the first area refers to the inter subjective

mismatch in interpreting modern ius ad bellum by the United States and some of its allies; the

second refers to the problems discussed in relation to tradi tional ius in bello .

The United States constructed the war against terror on the basis of the right to self-defense as

put forward by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State,

advocated in October 2001 on the height of the Afghanistan war:

I believe that Security Council resolution 1368 that was passed on the 12th of September, offers all ofthe legal basis and requirement that we need, in addition to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,

14 Certainly: Every right corresponds with a duty. On the other way round, every alliance duty corresponds

with a right, which means information and consultation (Bundesregierung, 2001b).


22/38

22

which is the right of self-defense. And we believe the United States was attacked on the 11th of Sep-

tember and that we have a right of self-defense in this regard (U.S. Department of State, 2001b).

It is indeed significant that the U.N. Security Council adopts the American version of the right

to self-defense in that it unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the ho rrifying terror-

ist attacks which took place on 11 September while recognizing the inherent right of ind i-

vidual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.15 Without accepting the

war terminology of the Bush administration, on September 28, the UNSC though again

unanimously condemned the terrorist attacks, explicitly reaffirming the right of individual or

collective self-defense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations.16

Washingtons change in language, from despicable acts of terror to acts of war opens the

door for a legitimate, good war, with sovereign nation-states as the primary targets. Neverthe-

less, this stance is criticized from a legal perspective. The attacks do not qualify as acts of war

under contem porary international law because they were not carried out by a sovereign state

(Lawler 2002, p. 154-155). Moreover, declaring war on terrorists dignifies the criminals with

the status of belligerents, thereby conferring on them a kind of legitimacy (Howard, 2002). By

doing this, they qualify as combatants under the Geneva convention and have to receive a

certain protection under contemporary ius in bello .

Therefore, Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network al Qaeda were naturally depicted as evil

precisely because they did not conform to Western ideas of how war should be conducted.17

The invisibility of its operational system make al Qaeda enormously dangerous, as John

Ashcroft pronounces in a very suggestive way: The highly coordinated attacks of September

11 make it clear that terrorism is the activity of expertly organized, highly coordinated and

well financed organizations and networks. Ashcroft hints at the ideological motivation of the

criminals (These organizations operate across borders to advance their ideological agendas)

15 S.C. Resolution 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Session, 4370th Meeting, at 1, U.N. Document S/RES/1368

(2001).16

S.C. Resolution 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Session, 4370th Meeting, at 1, U.N. Document S/RES/1373(2001).

17 See George W. Bushs speech to the Congress and the American People on 20 September 2001: This

group and its leader a person named Osama bin Laden -- are linked to many other organizations in differ-

ent countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are

thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations andneighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of ter-

ror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destru c-

tion. (The White House 2001d).


23/38

23

and at the operational basis of the group (They benefit from the shelter and protection of like-

minded regimes.)18

Given the traumatic impact of 9/11 and the evocative language of members of the Bush a d-

ministration, no sign of criticism was audible from Japan or Germany in the first weeks after

9/11, neither with regards to the norms of the ius ad bellum nor with regards to the ius in

bello. As Jenny Edkins has convincingly shown, trauma is directly related to political com-

munity and political power (Edkins, 2002). It triggers a sense of collective identity. On that

background, Prime Minister Koizumi declared on October 7th , the start of the Afghanistan

war: Japan strongly supports these actions to fight against terrorism (Prime Ministers Of-

fice, 2001b), and German Chancellor Schrder went even further in acknowledging the right

of self-defense on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter. On September 19th he said:

On the basis of the decisions of the Security Council, the United States can take measures against insti-

gators and brains behind them []. These are consistent with international law. On the basis of this r e-interpretation of international law, [the American government] can also take measures against states that

give shelter to those criminals (Bundesregierung 2001a).

Perceptive problems, misrepresentations and misunderstandings, especially on the transatlan-

tic axis, only occurred when the Bush administration shifted its attention towards Saddam

Hussein in 2002. In the discourse about Iraq, the American government, as most of the Euro-

pean countries, makes very clear that it sees Baghdad as a major threat to international secu-

rity that must be dealt with. However, the potential means favored by the Bush administration

differ from those preferred by the Germans. Whereas the Bush administration at no point left

any doubt it would also use military force to thwart the Iraq threat, many European countries

question whether that threat is so pressing that it would really require an invasion.

The alliance started to crumble when the U.S. appeared committed to widening the war to a

more general attack on terrorism and states supporting terrorists. In his 29 January 2002 State

of the Union Address, President Bush explicitly identified Iran, Iraq and North Korea as con-

stituting an axis of evil (The White House 2002d). Conflict arose with this rhetoric. The

phrase axis of evil leads nowhere, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer balked.19 Sub-

sequently, the differences went beyond bad word choice. They concerned different opinions

with regard to the right to preemptive military action in international affairs. Already at the

18 U.S. Department of Justice 2001a.

19 Cited in Hamilton, 2002, p. 8.


24/38

24

German-French summit meeting in the northern German city of Schwerin, both Chancellor

Schrder and French President Jacques Chirac announced that any military action in Iraq

would require previous UN Security Council legitimization.20 According to Foreign Minister

Fischer, the containment policy pursued by the United Nations had been on the whole su c-

cessful. Moreover, the German government accentuated that there was no direct link between

Baghdad and al Qaeda. Hence, no immediate action was needed (Iraqwatch, 2002a).

On the American side, although President Bush implied in his 12 September 2002 United Na-

tions speech that the United States might forgo an Invasion of Iraq if the regime noticeably

gave up its WMD programmes, Vice-President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

have always shown great doubt that weapons inspections could ever provide enough insur-

ance of Iraqi disarmament to make an invasion unnecessary. On 26 August 2002, Cheney for

example maintained that A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of

[Saddams] compliance with UN resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it

would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow back in the box.21 The case for ac-

tion against Iraq was put forward as follows:22

- nuclear weapons could lead Saddam to invade neighbouring countries and seek to dom i-

nate the Middle East,

- with Saddam as Iraqs leader, the risk of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists is high,

- the Iraqi government prevents effective inspections of facilities in the country,

- the status quo the humanitarian suffering, the deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia, the

periodic disorder of oil markets is costly to maintain,

- international law which Saddam time and again hurt in the last decade needs to be

upheld,

- the pressure on Iraq to disarm must be upheld even if one believes that using force is not

a solution to the problem.

The United States finally started the invasion of Iraq on March 19th , 2003, calling it a preemp-

tive strike against an enemy state. President Bush explains how his administration defines

preemptive action:

20 See UN must sanction Iraq strike, The Guardian , 31 July 2002.21

See In Cheneys words: The Administration Case for Removing Saddam Hussein,New York Times , 27August 2002.

22 For a summary see Gordon 2002.


25/38

25

We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year or five years thepower of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these cap a-

bilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when theyare strongest. We choose to meet that threat now where it arises before it can appear suddenly in ourskies and cities (The White House, 2003a).

This definition implies a reformulation of traditional ius ad bellum in two ways: First, it re-

serves the right for the United States to intervene in any country that is judged to be a threat at

any time in the future; second, it leads to a new concept of sovereignty. On the one hand, gov-

ernments are held responsible for what goes on within the borders of their states, on the other

hand, those who fail to act in accordance to the norms set by the United States will lose their

sovereignty (cf. Ikenberry, 2002, p. 53).

At the moment the invasion started, no higher worldwide legal authority existed than the

American government. The Bush administration is more dependent on the Congress than on

the UN Security Council, which the President puts in plain words in a global message on 17

March 2003:

Some permanent members of the Security Council announced they will veto any resolution that com-

pels disarmament. The Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities so we will rise to ours

(The White House 2003a).

Not unexpectedly, the German government has from the beginning been suspicious that the

United States will seek to take the slightest sign of Iraqi non-compliance as a pretext for using

force. In spite of declaring his unconditional solidarity in the immediate aftermath of Sep-

tember 11th , the German Chancellor had already at that point made clear that there would be

no participation in any foreign adventures (Bundesregierung 2001b). Preemption is widely

seen as illegal under international law. While the Bush administrations justification for pre-

emptive war refers to the dangers and costs of inaction, current international law requires

showing that the threat to be preempted is (a) clear and imminent, such that immediate action

is required to meet it; (b) direct, that is, threatening the party initiating the conflict in specific

concrete ways, thus entitling that party to act preemptively; (c) critical, in the sense that the

vital interests of the initiating party face unacceptable harm and danger; and (d) unmanage-

able, that is, not capable of being deterred or dealt with by other peaceful means (Falk, 2002;

Schroeder, 2003). In view of that, German Foreign Minister Fischer reiterates that our fight

must always be legitimized under international law. It must respect national and international

law, human rights and the UN Charter. Human rights in particular should not be suspended


26/38

26

under the pretext of combating terrorism (Iraqwatch, 2003). Moreover, he emphasized that a

requirement for functioning alliances is prior consultation (Ibid.), and the German government

afterwards proposed a bill that included a clear restriction with regards to national sovereignty

granted by the Charter of the United Nations. In contrast to the far reaching reinterpretation of

international law that had taken place in the days after 9/11, the law stipulates that German

forces will participate in missions against international terrorism outside Afghanistan only

with the consent of the governments concerned (Bundesregierung 2001a).

Consequently, the German government was sceptical with regards to an American interven-

tion in Iraq. In sum, Berlin put forward the following arguments:

- since no one knows if Saddam really has WMD at his disposal, the potential military risks

are too high,

- after removing Saddam from power, the stability of the country remains uncertain and a

long-term engagement looks inevitable,

- a unilateral invasion even if it was backed by a coalition of the willing would set a

dangerous precedent and would violate international law if it was not legalized by the

UNSC (esp. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2003: 28).

Where the German government openly demonstrated its concern that the Bush administration

is seeking a pretext for war even if Saddam does give up his WMD programme, Japan can-

didly showed its support for the U.S. (see Nabers 2003). Whereas Tokyo clarified it favors the

alliance, Berlin made clear it would work to maintain international law. Moreover, the Koi-

zumi government showed trust in the Bush administration although multilateralism was dis-

missed by Washington, while Berlin repeatedly pointed to its standard option of diplomacy as

a tool to resolve the crisis.

During the course of the year 2002, Germany once again had to choose between long -held

foreign policy principles. Certain interest-shaping norms, such as the defiance of the use of

force and the protection of human rights, as well as the legality of the operation and the co m-

mitment to multilateralism, contradicted each other when Germany tried to take an active

stance on the Iraq issue. Germany opted for the rejection of force by all means. Peter Struck,

Schroeders defense minister, said in an interview with the newspaper Bild am Sonntag, As


27/38

27

long as I am defense minister, the Bundeswehr will not be deployed in Iraq (IHT, 9 Septem-

ber 2002).

In East Asia, Japan underlined its basic commitment to the alliance with the United States

several times. The Japanese government officially informed the United States in December

2002 that it will back the U.S. if it launches military operations against Iraq (JT, 23 December

2002). Tokyo also urged the U.S. to create an environment in which the international commu-

nity can jointly back the U.S. if it launches an attack against Iraq (ibid.), but eventually the

failure to achieve a multilateral solution under the heading of the United Nations was no ob-

stacle for Japan to back the U.S. On the day after the war had begun in Iraq, Prime Minister

Junichir Koizumi reiterated his support for the U.S.-led attack, saying it is natural for Ja-

pan to back Washington as an ally (JT, 24 March 2003), even if public sentiment tends into

another direction, as Koizumi put in plain words: The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty acts as a

major deterrent against actions by North Korea. My actions are based on careful consideration

of the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the international cooperative situation. (JT,

23 March 2003) While Japan seems to base its policy towards the USA on the logic that it

would be protected from North Korea, it is certain norms of a civilian power (Maull, 1990;

Maull, 2000; Harnisch, 2000) that guide Germanys stance.

When it came to the war in Iraq, Tokyo again made it clear that no military role could be ex-

pected of Japan. However, soon after the initial fighting in Iraq was over, the di spatch of the

troops which would come under the special measures bill for providing support to Iraq's

reconstruction implemented in the Summer of 2003 was taken into consideration by the

Koizumi government. In the political debate over the bill, the Japanese government indicated

that troops would not be sent to combat areas (AS online, 18 July 2003); and the US had to

wait until December for a final decision over the dispatch. In the German case, the basic

stance towards the use of military force remained unchanged for the time being. The tradi-

tional culture of restraint dominated the foreign policy agenda and shaped the German-

American relations in the months to come. Schrder wouldnt go further as to offer to help

train Iraqi police and security forces. There was no indication Germany would contribute

peacekeeping troops. To try to accommodate the German wish for multilateralism on the basis

of international law, Bush reassured Schrder when they met in Berlin in September 2003

that the United Nations would play a larger role in Iraqs reconstruction (IHT, 24 September2003).


28/38

28

All in all, the discourse about central norms in international security did not lead to the esta b-

lishment of a dominant interpretational framework, determining what action was appropriate

and what action was inappropriate in the war against terror. Old identities did obviously not

completely dissolve after 9/11, or competing identities evolved. In the next section, we thus

have to ask what factors prevented collective action in the second phase of the war.

Identities

The German, Japanese, and world wide support and the open demonstration of solidarity with

the United States in the days after 9/11 was overwhelming. On the day after the attacks, Japa-

nese Prime Minister Junichir Koizumi pledged his government would spare no effort in

providing the necessary assistance and cooperation [to the United States] (Prime Ministers

Office, 2001c). A week later, Koizumi promised that Japan [would] take its own initiative

towards the eradication of terrorism, in cooperation with the United States, and committed

his government to taking the necessary measures for the eventual dispatch of the SDF to su p-

port the United States (Prime Ministers Office, 2001d). This announcement came directly

after U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage had advised Japan to show the flag in

any future military action.23

Bound by its pacifist constitution,24 Japan can only provide rear-area support, non-offensive

information gathering, and minesweeping in the event of a conflict outside Japan (Nabers

2000, 2001), that is, support within a scope that [would] not constitute an integral part of the

use of force (Prime Ministers Office, 2001e). This effort culminated in Diet approval of the

Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, on October 29, 2001, which was lauded as a sign of

un precedented solidarity by the USA. American ambassador to Japan Howard Baker said that

the United States is grateful that Japan has acted so promptly and so well. (JT, 30 October

2001) The White House welcomed Japans support, declaring that Japan's actions demon-

23 Quoted in Southgate 2003: 1620.24

The famous Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution includes a renunciation of war. In the modern interpret-tation of the Japanese government, war potential is acceptable as long as it is maintained for the purpose

of self-defense. See Nabers 2001 and Berger 1998.


29/38

29

strate its commitment in the fight to eradicate international terrorism and its compassion and

sympathy for the victims of terrorism in the United States. (The White House 2001a).

Japan acted quickly and openly demonstrated its solidarity with the United States in the first

phase of the war. So did Germany, and all other European countries. Americas alliance part-

ners on the continent also showed immediate reaction invoking Article 5 of the NATO

treaty, thereby using its right of collective self-defense and promising to assist the United

States in its war against terrorism by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the

other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force [] (Arti-

cle 5 of the Washing ton Treaty).

The Bush administration had already insisted it would, as Condoleezza Rice wrote in 2000,

proceed from the firm ground of the national interest and not from the interest of an illusory

international community.25 There seem to be first and second class friends of the United

States, depending on the extent of support an ally is willing to provide. While the President

asserts that America has no truer friend than Great Britain (The White House, 2001f), he

moderates his view of Japan, pronouncing that Japan is one of Americas greatest and truest

friends (Prime Ministers Office 2002a). In contrast, theres no such word in President

Bushs speech to the German Bundestag in May 2002. Instead he challenges the growing

scepticism in Germany towards the American-led war on terror: Our histories have diverged,

yet we seek to live by the same ideals. We believe in free markets, tempered by compassion.

We believe in open societies that reflect unchanging truths. We believe in the value and dig-

nity of every life (Deutscher Bundestag, 2002).

In a clear indication of Americas intentions to build coalitions of the willing, Defense Sec-

retary Donald Rumsfeld dispatched his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, to politely decline the NATO

offer, stating that the mission would define the coalition.26 Washington announced its inter-

est in military cooperation only for the time after the removal of the Tal iban from power.

German Chancellor Schrder had already pledged unconditional political and military support

for the United States right after September 11th. Two months later, when Americas call for

assistance finally came, Schrder took the issue to the parliament in Berlin and won approval

25 Quoted in Hirsh 2002:32.

26 Qoted in Hirsh 2002: 21


30/38

30

for the deployment of 1.200 troops. The Chancellor tied the matter to a vote of confidence

and thereby also conveyed to the Americans a strong sign of solidarity.27

This corresponded with what America had expected from its alliance partners. President Bush

had first delivered his message to the world in his speech on September 20, 2001: Either you

are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to

harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. (The

White House, 2001d) The meaning of identity is as is often the case in discursive formations

constructed through differential relations to other groups, other cultures respectively: Any

country has the choice to stand with civilization and good (us), or with barbarism and evil

(them).

Henceforth, the construction of collective identities in the western world was not an easy

enterprise. As a result of the American claim for primacy, attempts by Bush moderates such

as Powell to push a more all-embracing global agenda and construct a wider collective iden-

tity have faltered. Problems evolving from different representations of Self and Other

arose when Iraq was put on the agenda by the United States. By going to the United Nations

on 12 September 2002 to demand fulfilment of UN Security Council resolutions, President

Bush deliberately tried to show the importance the United States attaches to winning allied

support. However, this strategy was only partly successful, as can again be seen from compar-

ing the German and Japanese cases. In Europe, the new U.S. understanding of NATOs str a-

tegic doctrine defense of common interests, reaching beyond collective defense of mem-

bers territories, was not backed by all allies. This became more apparent after the first phase

of the fight against terrorism the removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan was

over (for implications see Hamilton, 2002, p. 8). French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said

that Europe is threatened by a new simplistic approach that reduces all the problems in the

world to the struggle against terrorism, and when President Bush came up with his notion of

an axis of evil, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said he favoured a political

strategy for dealing with Iraq rather than a military one. American Secretary of State Colin

Powell reiterated that Europe still plays an important role in the United States strategic con-

siderations, but on the other hand indicated that Washington would not sacrifice its interests in

27 See Jansson, Eric: Germanys Wartime Debate: Post-War takes on new meaning in Germany, World-

Press online, http://www.worldpress.org/article_model.cfm?article_id=323&dont=yes [3 March 2004].


31/38

31

the pursuit of multilateralism (IHT, 7 February 2002). In other words: The USA is willing to

act unilaterally in case the alliance partners do not agree (NYT, 23 February 2002).

Bush himself explicated before the German Bundestag that collective identity does not imply

sameness as a precondition: Different as we are, we are building and defending the same

house of freedom its doors open to all of Europes people, its windows looking out to global

challenges beyond. (The White House, 2002c) In this context , thefreedom metaphor again

served the purpose of uniting different countries behind the same objective. As one can see

from the discourse over the intervention in Iraq, the metaphor was not able of serving this task

appropriately; it did not lead to bridge identity gaps between Europe and the United States,

while identification with Washington obviously occurred in Tokyo. Collective identity in-

volves shared characteristics, it even induces actors to be altruistic in some cases. Altruism,

though, does not play a noticeable role in the German-American relationship after the second

phase of the war against terror had begun.

As we have heard from Wendt, a culture is internalized and we can speak of a collective iden-

tity when actors include the wishes, ideas, and intentions of others into their own ideas. Bush

himself expressed best what is meant by this during his election campaign in 2000: Our n a-

tion stands alone right now in the world in terms of power. And thats why weve got to be

humble and yet project strength in a way that promoted freedom. [] If we are an arrogant

nation, theyll view us that way, but if were a humble nation, theyll respect us.28 This

method undoubtedly worked better on the Japanese-American axis. What is remarkable, is the

incremental reversal of long-held principles by Japan, again visible on the height of the Iraq

debate. To quote just one very significant example, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), in

late January 2003 announced that preemptive strikes against DPRK missile bases by the Japa-

nese military would be legal and that the refueling of American warplanes, as they prepared to

attack Iraqi targets, would not correspond to our countrys use of force or exercising of the

right to collective defense, as Osamu Akiyama, cabinet Legislation Bureau director general,

put it (JT, 31 January 2003). Keeping in mind the governments interpretation of Article 9 of

the constitution, that all sovereign nations have a right to collective self-defense, but, in Japan

the exercise of that right is prohibited by the constitution, this policy turn represents a remark-

able development that can be interpreted as a new identity of Japan in international security.

In this context, altruism definitely plays a role. Altruism does not exclude rationality, but the

28 Quoted in Hirsh 2002: 41.


32/38

32

basis on which interests are calculated is the alliance with the USA a factor that seems to be

weaker on the German-American link.

CULTURE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

The analysis of discourses between states are able to reveal why cooperation in international

politics happens and why it is sometimes so difficult to achieve. The method exposes how

some ideas are privileged over others, how norms are maintained, reformulated and aban-

doned, how identity is constructed and how power is legitimized. Ideas, norms, identity, and

culture do play an important role in the construction and reconstruction of the international

system. Although it is difficult to actually measure the strength of identity, the salience of

the distinction between self and other and the price governments are actually willing to

pay for the group that they identify with make it possible to grasp the meaning of collective

identities in world politics (Risse 2003). Boundary constructions the main element of dis-

course analyses directly refer to the structure of the international system.

Our discourse starts with the catastrophe of September 11th . Alternative visions soon started to

compete in their interpretation of the events of that day. Especially the American government

tried to institute a cognitive framework that would determine what reaction was appropriate

and what reaction was inappropriate to react to the terrorist attacks. However, in the second

phase of the war against terror, the speech acts emanating from the United States seem to vio-

late constitutive norms on which especially the transatlantic community and the German-

American relationship had been based for decades, such as multilateralism and close consulta-

tion. Over time, the more Washington acted unila terally, the more it encouraged opposition

from Europe (especially Germany and France), that saw itself as the warden of the rule of

international law. What is even more dangerous from a European/German perspective is the

prospect that Washington pursues a course of building coalitions of the willing to deal with

international crises, at the same time perceptibly abandoning its former alliances like NATO.

American imperial ambition (Ikenberry 2002) embraces temporary alliances, but their fun-

damental beliefs reject stable partnerships, such as the transatlantic community. (Risse 2003:

10)


33/38

33

In the second phase of the war against terror, the United States failed to create what Laclau

and Mouffe (1985) call a hegemonic discourse. Key signifiers in the discourse, such as

freedom, liberty, democracy and peace embodied different meanings in particular in

German and American speech acts. It might be necessary for a hegemonic discourse to be

able to include a wide variety of demands, even if these are antagonistic at the beginning.

Then the discourse must strive to neutralize these demands by representing them as a bloc that

stands opposed to a common enemy.

That was obviously hard to achieve from 2002 onwards. States do not always define their

interests in terms of the norms set by international law, but follow neatly defined national

interests, which are constituted by threat perceptions and certain role-specific identities. In the

Japanese case, it is the North Korean threat, coupled with the awareness that American lead-

ership best serves the countrys aims, that eventually shaped Japans position in international

security relations. The range of collective action may depend on the membership of a country

to what Buzan called a security complex, a constellation of security concerns. The transfer

of the structural and normative principles that guide conflict management inside democracies

to the international level as predicted by liberals is not convincing in this context, since

Pakistan and some other non-democratic countries have also joined the anti-terror alliance. In

the future, much will depend on how sta

Date post:	06-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	david-miranda
View:	215 times
Download:	0 times

9-11cultureandcooperantion

Documents