9 5
CHAPTER IV
Causes of the Revolution of 1978-79.
I ran has seen many changes in her h i s tory but the
changes brought about by the Revolution of 1978-79 are
momentous when the i n s t i t u t i o n of monarchy was abolished
and Islamic Republic was establ ished in i t s place. The
events of 1978 proved tha t the Pahlavi regime was incapable
of democratization and a l l the ' l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ' of the
Shah was super f ic ia l and window-dressing. What s tar ted
the ag i t a t ion of l a t e 70s was the publ icat ion of a l ibe l lous
a r t i c l e against -^yatollah Khomeini by a national newspaper.
But the storm had been gathering ever since the events of
1963. In fact . Opposition, however f r ag i l e , had existed
in I ran ian h is tory pa r t i cu l a r ly since the p ro tes t movement
agains t the tobacco concessions. The tobacco pro tes t of
1891-9 2 had heralded the outbreak of the Const i tu t ional
revolut ion of 1905-11, and remained a source of in sp i ra t ion
to a l l future revo l t s and revolut ionar ies in I ran .
I t was towards the end of the 19th C. tha t mini
organizations l ike the Secret Society, the Secret Centre,
the Social Democratic i?arty, the Society of Humanity, the
Revolutionary Committee founded by d i f fe ren t sect ions of
socie ty a t d i f fe ren t places had emerged with the common
objective of es tab l i sh ing a new Const i tu t ion . The
i n t e l l e c t u a l s , committed to secularism, were not very
recept ive to the idea of ulema's prominence. But these
differences were relegated to the background and a l l the
organizat ions became very act ive as a r e s u l t of the
d is rupt ion caused by econaTiic i n s t a b i l i t y .
96
The tobacco pro tes t and the demand for the cons t i tu
t iona l government served as the main guidel ines to the
modern revolu t ionar ies in t he i r f ight against au thor i ta
rianism of Shah. Mis-government, corruption, foreign
influense worsening socio-economic condit ions and general
f r u s t r a t i o n s pushed Iran and I ranians in to a struggle f ina l ly
leading to the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79. Many fac tors
played the i r par t but the main cause was the Shah himself.
The Shah was p o l i t i c a l l y , economically and soc ia l ly
out of tune with the masses. He hated the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s
and had contempt for the shia clergy whom he considered the
main obstacle to his plans for the modernization of the
country. His sympathy for Zoroastrians and the Bha i ' i s ,
who were very co-operative with him, only earned him the
i l l - w i l l and scorn of the ulema. The Shah's over-confidence
and arrogance kept him away from his people and made him to
have contempt for gradualism. He Klax "lacked - indeed
did not t ry to cu l t i va t e - the common touch . . . He sought
remoteness and majesty . . . " The highly cent ra l ized
autocracy of the Shah's regime, and the excessive securi ty
control through SAVAK had become counter productive and
roused resentment. Shah's programme and po l ic ies never
worked well because of his negligence, mistakes, i l l u s i o n ,
i r r e s o l u t e temper, coercive methods and his f a i lu re to
secure co-operation from the very eminent opposit ion.
He fa i led to carry his people with him.
1. Desmond Harney, "Some Explanations for the I ranian Revolution", Asian Affai rs , Vol.XI, Part I I , June 1980, P.140.
97
Shah's programme of modernization received b i t t e r
c r i t i c i s m pa r t i cu l a r ly from the orthodox sect ion of the
I r an ians . They saw an attempt to make I ranian society
m a t e r i a l i s t i c and increase the influence of the West in
the guise of modernization. Khomeini has been very
c r i t i c a l of the "ma te r i a l i s t i c mentality" found in America
and other European countr ies both communist and non-communist
which he finds responsible for c o n f l i c t s , bloodshed and war.
The Shah l a t e r admitted tha t "he had been too radical in
t rying to modernise Iran" and acknowledgej^that the pr ice
paid for rapid modernization was c l ea r ly too high and
unacceptable to the people. "I have been blamed for
over-throwing the s t ruc tures of ^n e s s e n t i a l l y t r a d i t i o n a l i s t
and conservative nation . . . our e f for t was too rad ica l and
too rapid perhaps . . . The mass of the people did not support
i t . . . they did not accept t h i s f an ta s t i c leap forward".
The modernization programme of the Pahlavis had
allowed western influence in I ran to grow, i^^estern j / 3 -dominance was a t i t s most imperial , t o t a l and complete^.
There was opposition to t h i s dominance. The ©pposition
was most c e r t a in ly d is t ressed over the presence of the
West and the East in one form or the other in I ran ,
leading to r i g h t i s t and l e f t i s t d iv is ions in the
socie ty . Both Reza Khan and Mohamed Reza Shah were
to be blamed for t h i s . About 50,000 foreign experts were
the highest paid people in I ran and I ranians themselves
1. See, The Messaqd of Peace 21 September 1979. 2 . See, MEED, 9 February 1979 P.24 and "The Shah's Final
Days"""Newsweek January 29, 1979, P. 18. 3.~Siddiqui, Op.ci t . P. 13
98
were treated as second c l a s s c i t i z e n s in the i r own
country. Reza Shah had alloMed fore ign domination 2
and outs ide e x p l o i t a t i o n of o i l resources of Iran.
The Shah sought American support for h i s own p o l i t i c a l
survival and Americans supplanted the Br i t i sh af ter the
Second World V̂ ar fos ter ing a new ro le as "protector and
guarantor" . ^he Americans not only consol idated the ir
p o s i t i o n i n Iran by replacing the B r i t i s h and Russian
inf luence but hoped that the mi l i tary a s s i s tance supply
programme for Iran "wil l increase the strength and
e f f i c i e n c y of Iranian army and the gendermerie so that
the country can guard i t s e l f against internal subversion
or external aggression" . Khomeini and h i s supporters
always denounced Shah as a t r a i t o r who had sold h i s country
i n the name of leading the nation towards a "Great C i v i l i z a
tion" . The Iranian c l ergy bel ieved that the West's aim
was to destroy the Islamic f a i t h , cul ture and i way of
l i f e and that the best way of countering outs ide inf luences
was to make Shah the target of t h e i r attack. They f u l l y
appreciated the f a c t that western i n t e r e s t in o i l and
American anxiety t o make Shah the policeman i n the re^itgion
aga ins t communism had resul ted in suf fer ing to the Iranians .
1. See, Ayatollah Gulza«e Ghafoori, 'A brief look at the Is lamic Revolution of Iran' Is lamic cu l ture , Iran V o l . 1 , No. 1, May 1980. P. 28.
2 . See, N.Mehdi, "The Development of Iranian Oil Industry" Is lamic Revolution (Virginia USA, 1980) V o l . 3 , No.3 P. 18
3 . See, K.R.Singh, 'Iran; Quest for Securi ty ' (New Delhi 1980) PP 36-37 and Graham, Op .c i t . P.68.
4 . Report »S to Congress on mutual secur i ty programme from the s ix months ended December 31, 1953 US GPO, Washington, 1954 P. 27 a l so quoted Singh, Op .c i t . P. 38.
5 . See, Vahe Petross ian, "Khomeini's Return Marks Final Stage of Year Long Power Struggle", MEED, February 2, 1979 and "Construction Crusades in Iran" Islamic Republic Party
o q
C r i t i c s of Shah had seen lop-sided development
which had ignored the r e a l i t i e s of I ran ian socie ty .
They iound agr icu l ture being neglected and many indus t r i e s
s e t up by Shah were, according to them unproductive and
a drain on public revenues. Their main contentions^
was tha t there was no attempt to ameliorate the economic
hardship of the average I ran ian . Very l i t t l e of $90
b i l l i o n of o i l revenue during the period 1973-78 was
absorbed for development projects or used for improvement
of l iv ing condi t ions . Shah had maximised o i l production
when the country was unable to x absorb the revenue useful ly .
The r a t e of i n f l a t i on had mounted, agr icu l tu re slackened^
unemployment problem had assumed serious proport ions,
c a p i t a l outflow had increased and was estimated tha t 3
nearly $3 b i l l i o n were going out of I r an every year.
Despite a l l t h i s the Shah kept on purchasing mi l i t a ry
equipment from the west espec ia l ly from the USA, worth
b i l l i o n s of do l l a r s overlooking the basic needs of the
common I ran ians , Shah defended the purchase of arms
thus: "our policy of s t r i c t independence meant tha t we
needed the instruments of war , . . I wanted us to be armed
as be f i t t ed our secur i ty in tha t par t of the world' , H 4
Between 1975 and 1977 alone the US sold I ran about $700 5
mi l l ion of mi l i t a ry equipments. The heavy inflow of
1. See, Vahe Petrosslan, "Khomeini names Cabinet as Shah's men Give Away" - MEED, 16 February, 1979.
2 . "What happened to I r a n ' s o i l Revenue?" ALASTO (Tehran) June 4, 1980, P. 22 and a l so Raja Cooper, "Economic Prospects in the Islamic Republic" MEEB, 26 Jan.1979.
3 . See, Singh, Op.ci t . P.360. 4 . Pahlavi, Shah's Story, Op.ci t , P.128 5. See, Newsweek February 26, 1979 P,21
100
mi l i t a ry weapons was mostly Intended to pol ice the gulf.
The Shah himself had declared tha t "we are the only
country with the economic and mi l i t a ry sophis t ica t ion
necessary t o offer the area protect ion ' . I t I s estimated
t h a t between 1972-1973 and 1978-79 the defence expenditure
increased ten times which enabled the Shah to build one of 2
the l a rges t mi l i t a ry forces in the region.
In 1976 Iran had placed nearly $10 b i l l i o n worth of
orders with the US. The c r i t i c s saw hypocricy in Shah's 3
attempt to make I ran m i l i t a r i l y a super power . Mill ions
of poor and middle c l a s s I ranians were natura l ly angered
by the massive inflow of mi l i t a ry equipment a t a time
when I ran ian economy was col laps ing . The o i l fortune
could have saved I ran from economic des t ruc t ion but the
Shah's government mishandled the economy and Shah's own
personal ambitions destroyed i t , Fred Hal l iday ' s marxian
approach concludes tha t the demands and complaints of the
movement were "eminently ma t e r i a l i s t " and the I ranians
were f ight ing the c a p i t a l i s t system which had come to be
c lose ly linked with the American c a p i t a l i s t i n t e r e s t s " .
Dr. All Afrouz, however, does not accept economic reasons
alone as responsible for the Revolution, He says "Although
1. Quoted, Singh Op.cit . PP 156-157 2. See, ib id : P.238 and N.Mehdi, Op.ci t . P.18 3 . "A small country l ike I ran with an increase of
$18,871 b i l l i o n in revenue from o i l in 1971 spent over $10 b i l l i o n in tha t year alone to achieve mi l i t a ry super ior i ty in the gulf" See, N.Mehdi ib id .P .18
4 . Fred Halliday Op.ci t . PP.38-45, P.294.
101
the economic s i t ua t ion was one of the fac to rs , but by no
means i t was the cause of the Revolution" .
Corruption during the reigns of Shah Reza Shah and
Mohmed Reza Shah had assumed dangerous proport ions. Khomeini
had r i g h t l y pointed out the moral and s p i r i t u a l decadence
when he said " . , . , they destroyed our human resources and
c a p a b i l i t i e s and did not allow these to develop. The
cen t res of corruption and obsceni t ies mult ipl ied in the
c i t i e s to a ca tas t rophic extent and espec ia l ly in Tehran.
So many ways were created to corrupt our youth and the
massive propaganda was launched to a t t r a c t towards these
c e n t r e s . . . . they deprived us of our mental and s p i r i t u a l
independence . . . . " . The extravagant ce lebra t ions of
2 500 years of monarchy in October 1971 and the high
prevalence of corruption within the royal family had
become eyesores and i n t e l l e c t u a l s in pa r t i cu la r had come
to consider them as signs of moral decadence. Corruption
had se t in the educational system as wel l . One of the
a l l ega t i ons against Shah's regime was tha t i t destroyed
the individual honour and self respect of the c i t i z ens 3
of the country.
1. All Afrouz "Dealing with the counter-revolut ionary forces" in Kalim Siddiqui, e t . a l . Op.ci t . P.45
2. Imam Khomeini's speech a t Qom on 31 May 1979 - quoted Che Message of Peace July 10/ 1979 P.15.
3 . Khomeini once said "With a l l h is (Shah) power he pushed down the people, imprisoned them, tor tured theoi, executed them and did not allow them to breathe" - quoted Ministry of National Guidance (Tehran) n.d. P. 51
102
SAVAK had become the most symbolic expression of
the oppressive t a c t i c s of the regimd. Ever since i t was
es tabl ished in 1957,it had worked as "the Shah's eyes and
ears and where necessary h i s i ron f i s t neu t ra l i s ing a l l " 1 those d is loyal to the regime. The Red Cross Report on
pr ison to r tu re revealed tha t "between 90% and 95% of a l l
p o l i t i c a l secur i ty pr isoners in I ran were maltreated by
prison guards during the era of Pahlavi regime" . Shah,
however, defended SAVAK as an agency meant to combat 3
communist subversion. Khomeini considered i t as an
organization to protec t the Shah and t r e a t the people
"with extreme rudeness and contempt", to t e r r o r i s e the
people l e s t one day "some body dare to r i s e in opposit ion."
Among the other fac tors , import of canned meat,
neglect of Islamic education in schools and un ive r s i t i e s
and general westernizat ion e t c . , ) g rea t ly fostered hatered
against Shah's regime. No wonder the Revolution began
i n the mosques and spread through clergymen. Islam became
the r a l ly ing point and the Islamic Republic with independence
and freedom became the watchword of the Revolution. Indeed
the beginning of the Revolution could be traced to the 15th
of Khorded (June 5, 1963) when i t was believed t h a t about
15,000 I ran ians were merci less ly massacred by Mohamed Reza
Shah's armed men. The Faiziyeh school on the day of Ashoora
c l e a r l y emphasised the Islamic or ig in of the r evo l t .
1, Graham Op.ci t . P. 145 2, See, NevB and Views (Tehran) December 22, 1979. 3 . Pahlavi, Op.cit^ PP 174-175. 4. Khomeini a t a meeting with a group of Ajrmy off icers in
Qom, quoted. The Message of Peace October 21, 1979.
103
Shah's government was t o t a l l y geared to serve the
i n t e r e s t of the Shah alone. Ever since 1953 when he
was challenged by Dr. Mossadegh, Shah had concentrated
a l l power in his own hands and used i t against i n s t i t u t i o n s
and individuals who posed a th rea t to him and h is author i ty .
Shah did not l ike sharing power with others and the absence
of other elements in the decision-making process in fac t
worked against Shah himself. He always used to avoid
debates on key issues l ike defence, secur i ty , economy e t c .
Khomeini once pointed out t ha t Shah was "always careful to 2
see t h a t no one spoke about the a f fa i r s of the country".
both No doubt , / in te rna l and external t h r ea t s made Shah
very r ig id in h i s approach to problems of the s t a t e . Ideas
of nationalism, implications of modernization, fears of
coup d ^ ' e t a t and armed r evo l t s , t h rea t s from re l ig ious
and t r i b a l groups e t c . , had l e f t Shah very nervous and
apprehensive. External th rea t s were no less alarming.
I r a n ' s massive o i l fortune had de f in i t e l y a t t r ac t ed outside
powers and competition was becoming a menace to I ran . These
considerat ions were responsible for Shah ge t t ing c lose ly
aligned with U.S. The system was tailor-made for Shah
and worked well un t i l i t was challenged in an organized way.
1. See, Singh, Op.ci t . P. 35. 2 . Interviews of Imam Khomeini t rans la ted by A.A.Ghassemy
(Tehran n.d) P. 11
104
Mohamed Reza Shah held on to power for 37 years
with the help of o i l money, SAVAK, a very « e l l equipped
defence system and ass is tance from h i s a l l i e s , U.S.A.
in p a r t i c u l a r . He however, fa i led "to make the I ranian 2 ^ ^
people happy". All the arms and pe t ro -do l l e r s could
not save the Pahlavi dynasty. Shah had to leave h is
country in the face of the revolutionary onslaught and
could never r e tu rn .
The mass upsurge was confined mostly to the big
c i t i e s and towns and in fac t i t was only af te r the
promulgation of Martial law under Gen.Azhari's govern
ment t h a t the rura l people a lso joined the fray. The
demonstrators were mostly the urban poor who were facing
the worst economic s i t ua t i on since the World War I I .
What r e a l l y aggravated the i r agony «as the r ea l i za t i on
t h a t t h e i r economic maladies were i ron ica l in the context
of the o i l boom and the huge spending xdi on arms purchase
by the Shah. This condit ion was very e f fec t ive ly exploited
by the Opposition.
^The Opposition made up of d i f fe ren t c lasses and
sec t ions of population re l i ed heavily on the Ideas of
"National F ron t ' s past a c t i v i t i e s " to avoid i so la ted
opposition and form concurrent act ion. I t was headed by
the r e l ig ious sect ion which had been waiting for an
opportunity to remove Shah and es tab l i sh Islamic ru l e .
1. "We were the par t of the Family" Pahlavi, Shah's Story Op.ci t . P. 153
2 . ib id ; P. 157 3 . Graham, Op.ci t . P.212
10 5
I t was t h i s g r o u p which had proved e f f e c t i v e i n t h e
r e v o l u t i o n of 1905-1906 a g a i n s t Shah M u z a f f a r u d d i n Shah .
But t h i s t ime t h e r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s h i p had b e t t e r means
and had a d o p t e d b e t t e r t a c t i c s t o be a b l e even t o
e l i m i n a t e m o n a r c h i c a l r e g i m e . The c o u n t r y ' s c l e r g y m e n
u n d e r t h e g u i d a n c e of e x i l e d A y a t o l l a h Khomeini d i d n o t
r e l e n t u n t i l t h e y had t o p p l e d t h e Shah . They c o n s i d e r e d
S h a h ' s i m p o r t of w e s t e r n l i f e s t y l e a s c o n t r a o l i c t o r y
t o t h e d i c t a t e s of Quran. They had come t o c o n s i d e r
Shah r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e n e g l e c t of r e l i g i o n i n I r a n .
They were aware of t h e p o p u l a r f e e l i n g a s t h e y t h e m s e l v e s
were v i c t i m s of S h a h ' s r e p r e s s i o n .
I r a n i a n s , i n g e n e r a l , s u p p o r t e d t h e m u l l a h s and
e n c o u r a g e d them t o be p o l i t i c a l a g a i n s t S h a h ' s r e g i m e .
The p e o p l e b e l i e v e d and were c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e ulema
and I s l a m were t h e o n l y means t o s e r v e t h ^ i r i n t e r e s t .
The ulema on t h e i r p a r t s t r e n g t h e n e d p e o p l e ' s b e l i e f by
c r i t i c i s i n g t h e p o l i c i e s and government of t h e Shah and
b l a m i n g t h e Shah f o r h i s e x t r a v a g a n c e and f o r t h e c o u n t r y ' s 2
bad economy. The re i s no d o u b t t h a t t h e ulema had a
c l e a r i d e a of t h e needs » and a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e I r a n i a n
p e o p l e and knew t h a t t h e i r own i n f l u e n c e among t h e m a s s e s
was b e c a u s e of t h e i r "mora l c h a r a c t e r , c a l i b r e s c h o l a r s h i p
and i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t e g r i t y and n o t b e c a u s e of any o f f i c e
t h a t t h e y happened t o h o l d " . The r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s
1 . See, Graham, O p . c i t . P.218 2 . Singh, O p . c i t . P.370. 3 . Itnpact I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 26 January t o 8 February 1979.
106
were not united in the i r views. They often represented
conf l i c t ing ideas and yet they a l l found themselves drawn
in to the movdrnent under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Khomeini demanded an end to the Pahlavi regime and worked
for the establishment of an ' Is lamic s t a t e ' . The mullahs
held Shah responsible for foreign domination and western
influence in I ran . According to Khomeini the Shah "wasted
thd count ry ' s resources created mil l ions of refugees who
l e f t the agrarian sector and formed huge slums around the
c i t i e s . . . . " His compelling logic was tha t "an impious
ru l e r can only lead the country to ruin; a corrupt leader
can only appoint corrupt adminis t ra tors ; a head of s t a t e
operating on wrong pr inc ip les of government can only make 3
wrong decis ions" . I t i s c lear tha t through the co-operation
and strong support of the people the r e l ig ious c lass nurtured
a revolut ion to usher in changes in the I ran ian society based
on Islam. Along with the other groups^ the r e l ig ious c l a s s ,
no doubt, remained in the mainstream to d i r e c t the Revolution.
The main grouse of the re l ig ious c lasses against the
Shah's regime was tha t i t had led to corruption* moral
decadence and a r b i t r a r i n e s s . The l i f e s ty le encouraged
by the Shah was considered unlslamic and ruinous. I t was
1. Shariatmadari, for example, was only for cons t i tu t iona l rule and was agreeable to accept l i b e r a l reforms without much basic change. -
Of the re l ig ious leader, the following deserve special mention for the i r cont r ibut ion to the cause of the revolution - Ayatollah Taleghani, Ayatollah Mutahhari, Ayatollah Husain Ali Montazari, Ayatollah Najafi Marashi, Ayatollah Mohamed Reza Golpaygani e t c .
2 . Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad "Secularizat ion, I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and Khomeini's Islamic Republic" P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly (New York) No.2 Stammer 1979 P. 236.
3. i b i d . P.236
107
Indeed true tha t the Pahlavi monarchs had intended to
undermine the t r a d i t i o n a l hold of the mullahs on Iranian
socie ty through the i r modernization and secu la r iza t ion
and there was widespread resentprfment within the t r a d i t i o n a l
c l e r i c a l leadership. But i t would be d i f f i c u l t to ^XBKB
accept the claim of the Sh^h tha t the ulema were opposed
to h is land reforms and emancipation of women. There i s
no evidence to subs tant ia te th i s view. A leading mujtahid
Ayatollah Bourujerdi had c r i t i c i s e d the policy of " l imi t ing
the size of landed e s t a t e as against Islam". But Khomeini
has e x p l i c i t l y stated tha t they are not for the reversal of
the land reforms. Even with regard to the question of
emancipation of women, the ulema have t r i ed to explain
away the i r a t t i t ude by s ta t ing tha t Islam t rea ted men and
women equal ly. They were, however, t rying to be evasive.
But what r e a l l y came to the rescue of the ulema was the
ro le the Iranian women assumed for themselves in the move
ment. They not only voiced the i r opposition against Shah
but made the chador (veil) the i r symbol of pro tes t against
Shah's modernization programme thus strengthening the clergy.
The revo lu t ion i s t s and the ag i t a to r s found women pa r t i c ipa
t i on in the demonstration very helpful and encouraged i t
because they believed tha t the unexpected "female presence
tended to a unnervd<p r i o t police and the army, making
demonstrations more d i f f i c u l t to chal lenge".
1. Ehsan Yar Shater, Op.c i t . P.16. 2 . Graham, Op.c i t . P.227.
108
Many doubted if the mullahs would be capable of the
task they had undertaken unaided, 'the overal l leadership
of the mullahs in general and Khomeini in pa r t i cu la r over
the mi l l ions ag i ta t ing was complete. The d i sc ip l ine of
the mobs was something which took everybody by surpr i se .
I t was o f f i c i a l l y confided by the Americans tha t "Khomeini
can order half a mil l ion people into the s t r e e t s on a few
hours notice, h i s revolutionary guards wi l l throw themselves
joyously on any group defenseless or not".
The ulema and the mullahs were accused of being marxists
and reac t ionar ies by the Shah. The c r i t i c i sm of the mullahs
being marxists was unfair because the re l ig ious leadership
was not only against the a^thism of the marxists but Khomeini
even forbade his followers to havd iaa any truck with marxis ts .
Later developments more than confilmed the anti-communisti
stance of the re l ig ious leaders .
Among the i n t e l l e c t u a l s who played a major ro le in the
Revolution iJr.Ali S h a r i a t i ' s name should get the pride of
place. Through h i s wri t ings he spread the revolutionary
ideas in I ran pa r t i cu l a r l y among the youth and made Islam 2
the key to progress. Many consider Dr .Shar ia t i as primarily
responsible for bringing the western educated youth in I ran
i n t o the Islamic movement and as Instrumental for the success
of the Islamic Revolution. Prof.Abidi bel ieves tha t "In
the context of the recent revolut ion in I ran , Dr.AH Sha r i a t i ,
because of h i s soc io -po l i t i co - re l ig ious ideas, must be
considered as the Teacher of the Revolution".
1. Documents, No. 1-6, P. 576. 2 . See, Baquari, Op.ci t . P. 36 and CF.Loren Jenkins "Teetering
Shah" Newsweek January 1, 1979. 3 . See, Siddiqui, Op.ci t . P. 13. 4. A.H.H.Abidi, "Dr.All Sha r i a t i : The man and his Ideas"
T oi Pim ^nri i-.hp> M o d e r n /^ae (New D e l h i ) May 1982 P . 9 7 .
109
Closely aligned with the intellectuals were the
students who stood by the ideology of the revolution
and BBXHZ never gave in even under very great pressure.
They were right in the front of the movement against the
Shah. They had many reasons of their own to be opposed
to the Shah. Initially the Shah wanted extensive expansion
of university and higher education but when he realized
that increased student population was a menace to his
regime he slowed down the pace of higher education. Students
were closely watched and only those who fully adhered to
the Shah's programme were admitted. 'Wealthy Iranians could
always go abroad for higher education but poor Iranian
students were forced to tolerate the tyrannical rule of
the Shah. Under these strangulating conditions students
cried out for freedom and better living conditions. Iranian
students abroad had also reason to defy and oppose Shah.
This was very evident whenever Shah visited foreign countries,
The militancy of the students was very pronounced. Among
the students one section in particular caused the Shah
the greatest trouble since it believed in force and violence.
It consisted of guerrilla groups believing in the philosophy
of action of Mao and Fidel Castro and guerrilla tactics
of the PLO and trained in different parts of the world
since the second half of the 1960s. Perhaps their
methods resulted in "too many human losses" , but they
1. See, Tehran Journal, 22 January 1977
2. Rouleau, Op.cit. P. 5
ft/lVsORE UNIVERSITY LlBMRt iAYSor£-e70Coe
110
were very effect ive pa r t i cu la r ly in 1975-76 when they
went on a rampage bringing to the notice of the world
the i n t ens i t y of the i r ag i t a t ion .
The Bazaar, as in the past , played i t s role in
fanning the flames of revolut ion. The market had
de f in i t e ly become the representa t ive of the national
middle c l a s s with the inflow of cap i t a l and i t s expansion.
The Bazaar in I ran has always been the headquarters and
centre of p o l i t i c a l vehemence and d i s sen t . The merchant
c l a s s was act ive in developing the economy and was a lso
engaged in foster ing p o l i t i c a l ideology. They co-operated
and co-ordinated with the re l ig ious c l a s s to p ro tes t
agains t Shah's regime and were generous in financing
s t r i kes and demonstrations. Shah's modernization
programme had grea t ly extended the middle c l a s s in
I ran which found Shah's regime very harsh and unbearable.
The middle c l a s s remained "aloof and apart" and was
de f in i t e l y not well disposed towards monarchical system
p a r t i c u l a r l y because of Shah's land reforms programme.
I t was the middle c lass which proved i t s e l f to be the
death-knel l of the Pahalavi regime. Most po l i t i c i an s
and p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s , prominent in the movement had aA?iV^
played notable role under Cr.Mossadegh or in 1960-63. 2
They mostly represented the middle c l a s s .
1. See, W.B.Fisher, "The year in the Middle East" June 1978-79 Middle East and North Africa 79-80 (London, 1979) P.XV and a l so , Arband Abrahammlan "The causes of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Revolution in Iran" In te rna t iona l Journal of Middle Eastern Studies , Vol.10, August 1979 P. 393
2. Some of the prominent leaders were Daruish Farouher who headed the Nat ional is t Party, Dr.Karim Sanjabi who was the leader of the I ranian S o c i a l i s t Party, Dr.Bakhtlar who led the National Front I t s e l f un t i l he agreed to form a government; Mehdi Bazargan vvho had founded the I ran Liberat ion Movernent,Mohsin Peseshkpour,AhmedBani Ahmed e
I l l
The i n t e l l e c t u a l s , the p o l i t i c i a n s and the students
were demanding r e s to ra t ion of t h e i r c i v i l and cons t i tu t iona l
l i b e r t i e s . The National Front issued a twelve - point
programme in August 1978 which included a c a l l for the
^ s o l u t i o n of SAVrtK, re lease of p o l i t i c a l pr isoners ,
guarantee of r igh t s and freedoms, ending of mi l i t a ry
t r ibuna l s e t c .
These d i f fe ren t groups sought guidance and support
from the Ayatollahs in the i r s truggle against Shah.
Each group had i t s own dogma and pr inc ip les but a l l had
joined together to end the Shah's r u l e .
While discussing the role of d i f fe ren t groups in
mobilising support against Shah's regime , one cannot
ignore the ro le of the Tudeh par ty . I t was believed tha t
i n i t i a l l y i t did not formulate any programme of ending
Shah's rule but when i t became aware of the general
discontent and Shah's t o t t e r i n g image, i t joined the
movement of the Students and the ulema and worked for
the Islamic Revolution. Noureddin^ Kianouri leader of
the Tudeh Party, in an interview found no differences
between s c i e n t i f i c socialism on one hand and the socia l
content of Islam on the o ther . For him they have "much
in common". In fact , he did not sde any conf l i c t between
communism and 'Khomeini's v i s ion of Islamic Republic*.
Tudeh Party had i t s major support coming from the o i l
workers. I t was very obvious, immediately af ter the
f a l l of the Pahlavis, tha t Khomeini and h i s supporters
were not well disposed towards the Tudeh Party.
1. Newsweek, 29 January 1979.
112
Apart from the groups working towards revolut ion in
I ran from within, i t would be in t e re s t ing to find out if
any external forces a lso nurtured Mix the revolut ion.
Shah had a l l along been suspicious of Soviet Union's
i n t en t ions . He suspected Russian involvement and believed
t h a t the Russians were supporting the mullahs with a view
to help communism f lour ish in I ran. The Soviet Union,
according t o the Shah, was trying to make use of the
disenchantment and anger "to take over the revolution to
t h e i r ( i t s ) own advantage". Dr.Kissinger saw the
movement as "the r e s u l t of Soviet support of radical
movement on a global basis which has also now reached 3
I ran . One reason for many to believe tha t the Russians
were supporting and master-minding the opposition in I ran
was the Sov ie t ' s global s t ra tegy of undermining the US.
i n t e r e s t s . However these ideas lack c lear evidence and
a re based on circumstant ial conclusions. I t was widely
known tha t the Russians did not handle the movement d i r e c t l y
but "rode on the back of a movement with genuine r o o t s . . . "
But Khomeini denied any kind of contact with the communist
count r ies and in fac t went to the extent of declaring tha t
"the danger of communism to day i s no less than the western
capi tal ism and our dear people should be on guard against 5
t h e i r i n t r i gues" . Any attempt to d i r ec t l y implicate Soviet
Union would be to do in jus t i ce to the revolut ionary leadership.
1. See, Harney, Op.ci t . 2 . Pahlavi, Op.c i t . P. 168 3 . Quoted "Blossoming of the Perennial" Impact In t e rna t iona l ,
26 January to 8 February 1979. 4 . Harney^ Op.ci t . P. 140. 5. "Uuotations from Imam Khomeini", News letter (Iran's
Embassy, Dacca) No. 33, March 31, 1981
113
I t was a lso alleged tha t the West and espec ia l ly
the United States created an opportunity for a revolut ion
with a view to suppress communist influence in I ran .
Jimmy Carter af ter becoming the ^-resident in 1976
gave much importance to a l i be ra l Human Rights policy
throughout the world and indeed appealed to Shah to
ensure more l i b e r a l policy in h i s own country af ter he
was convinced of the excessiveness of the Shah's regime.
C a r t e r ' s r e l en t l e s s f ight for human r igh t s had a very
pos i t ive impact on the Opposition in I ran . They seized
upon i t "as a form of protect ive umbrella". Shah was
d e f i n i t e l y very unhappy with the US and had very reluctantly
i n i t i a t e d a policy of l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . Later, he held the
Americans responsible for the militancy of the Opposition
and he accused United Sta tes for the events tha t led to
h i s downfall. In his autobiography the Shah has expressed
surpr i se on the motives behind the American moves such as
the unannounced presence in Iran of General Huyser (the
Deputy Director of NATO) and his advice and tha t of the
American Ambassador Sullivan to the Shah to go into ex i le
and their attempt to hob-J^nob with the new government.
1. Graham, Op.cit . P.210
2. Pahlavi, Op.ci t . P.187. One of the generals and the Commander-in-Chief of the I ran ian Air Force by name Amir Husain Rabii said to the Judges before his execution tha t "General Huyser threw the Emperor out of the country l ike a dead mouse" - Time December 17, 1979.
114
Harney's conclusions and "explanations" on Ga r t e r ' s
role , vjere mainly in the context of the American domestic
scetae. President Carter , he points out, in order to
gain r e -e lec t ion , played the drama and "se t i t a l l in
motion". However, i t would be very unfair to the people
of I ran to give c r e d i t to outside elements for the revolution
in I ran . I t i s t rue tha t the US t r i ed *. i t s best to save
the fahlavi dynasty but i t was only when the posi t ion of
Shah had become hopeless for the Shah and h i s throne 2 t h a t the Americans abruptly looked for a l t e r n a t i v e s .
There i s no doubt tha t the US even t r i ed to get closer to
new government of Islamic I r an and t r i ed to take c r ed i t
for the ouster of Shah. Secretary of S ta te Cyrus Vance said
t h a t "the Carter Administration af ter having backed the 3
Shah wanted him out of I r an . "
Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi fa i led to assess the exact • »
s t rength of the opp^osition in i t ia l ly^ ' he almost ignored
demonstrations against his regime as the work of minority.
He believed tha t he had the support of "700,000 troops,
a l l the workers and most of the people". And whenphe
s i t u a t i o n became alarming he took harsh and inhuman
ac t ion to crush the Opposition and indeed unwitt ingly
made things worse. The mi l i t a ry of the Shah also proved
of no avai l and could not save him. In fac t , the B^ armed
forces were badly divided and the whole system was paralysed.
1. Harney, Op.c i t . P. 134. 2 . See, Singh, Op.ci t . P. 3 56 3 . See, Vahe Petrossian "The Shah Leaves and i s unl ikely
ever to Return" MEED 19 January 1979, P.11 4 . "US News and World Report" quoted in Singh, Op.ci t . P. 352
115
Shah fai led to recognise the leadership of
Ayatollah Khomeini and h is hold over the masses.
He invar iably dismissed the Opposition as the handiwork
of the Communists. He under-estimated the s trength
of popular movement and wrongly assessed the objectives
of the Revolution. He re l ied on group strength to
p ro tec t himself and the throne. There i s no doubt tha t
Shah rea l i sed his mistakes a t one point aad t r i ed to
soften the opposition by bringing an element of l iberal ism
in his administrat ion. He assured tha t the next govern
ment would be based on the p r inc ip les of Const i tut ion,
socia l j u s t i c e and public w i l l . He guaranteed freedom
of Press, pr iv i leges of the re l ig ious people and i n s t i
t u t ions , change of calendar e t c . , but i t was too l a t e .
3y then the revolutionary movement had not only picked
up but had also reached i t s peak. The aim of the
Revolution had become the ouster of Shah. As Karim
Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front put i t "the
only solut ion i s tha t the Shah maast go".
There may be d i f ferent causes tha t led to the
revolut ion xi in contemporary I ran but what astonished
many was the f a s t pace of events during 1978-79. There
i s no doubt many factors and members from more than one
c lass contributed to the success of the revolut ion but
had the people not par t ic ipa ted SZIOBBSS en-masse, t h i s
revolut ion would not have been poss ib le . Here l i e s the
1. "Iran a t the Sxtak Brink.'" Newsweek January 8, 1979.
116
g e n i u s of AyatoXlah Khomeini who providec3 t h e much-needed
l e a d e r s h i p and a r t i c u l a t e d t h e e f f o r t s of t h ^ masse s and
o t h e r g r o u p s .
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI:
R o h u l l a - a l - m u s a v i - a l Khomeini- was b o r n i n Khomeini
n e a r I s f a h a n i n 1900 (some say t h a t he was b o r n i n A p r i l
and o t h e r s say t h a t he was b o r n i n May) . H i s f a t h e r and
e l d e r b r o t h e r s were A y a t o l l a h s and t h e f a m i l y had a t r a d i t i o n
of d i s s e n t and m i l i t a n c y . His f a t h e r Sayy id Mus ta fa
Musavi was murdered by t h e a g e n t s of Ka ja r d y n a s t y when
A R o h u l l a - a l - m u s a v i was h a r d l y 5 months o l d . M u s t a f a - a l -
Musavi a v e r y n o b l e and c o u r a g e o u s man had t o pay f o r h i s
o p p o s i t i o n t o o p p r e s s i o n of t h e K a j a r s w i t h h i s l i f e .
R o h u l l a ' s b e r e a v e d mother demanded j u s t i c e from t h e Tehran
c o u r t and d i d n o t y i e l d u n t i l t h e m u r d e r e r of h e r husband
2
was b r o u g h t t o book and p u n i s h e d w i t h d e a t h s e n t e n c e -
R i g h t from t h e b e g i n n i n g R o h u l l a was t a u g h t t h e l e s s o n
of c o u r a g e and b r a v e r y by h i s mother who p a s s e d away when
h e r son was 15 y e a r s of a g e . R o h u l l a f i r s t s t u d i e d i n
s e m i n a r i e s a t I s f a h a n l a t e r c o m p l e t e d h i s s e c o n d a r y
e d u c a t i o n a t Arak and j o i n e d h i s t e a c h e r A y a t o l l a h H a e r i ,
one of t h e g r e a t e s t muslim t h e o l o g i a n s and f o u n d e r of
Haoze I l m i y a , a t Qom. Haoze I l m i y a had a l r e a d y shewed
s i g n s of becoming t h e nuc l eus of I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n a r y
1 . See , Time (New York) F e b r u a r y 5, 1979
2 . She i s r e p o r t e d t o have t a k e n t h e c h i l d r e n t o t h e s c e n e of t h e p l a c e of t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e o f f e n d e r and t o l d them "Now be a t p e a c e s i n c e t h e wolf h a s a t t a i n e d t h e f r u i t s of t h e e v i l d e e d s " - See, *A word a b o u t A y a t o i i a n Khomein i ' Noor (Poona, I n d i a ) V o l . 1 , J u l y 1980 P . l
117
a c t i v i t i e s and centre of Islamic renaissance. Rohulla
completed his education and secured a degree of I j tehad
and s ta r ted teaching usoole-fique and philosopny in 1927,
a t the Madrase Faiziah. Married in 1928, he became the
Chief Advisor to the leading Marja of the time - Ayatollah
Bourjerdi , 6n the death of Ayatollah Bourjerdi, Ayatollah
Khomeini became one of the chancellors of the Madrasa and
was considered an author i ty on Shiism.
Great many events had l e f t a l a s t ing impression on
the young mind of Khomeini. S tor ies of revol t against
tobacco monopoly and the cons t i tu t iona l revolut ion of 1906
were fresh in his memory. As a young man, Ayatollah
Khomeini was a witness to the d i s in t eg ra t ion of h is country
in the F i r s t VJorld War and to the r i s e of Reza Khan as a
d i c t a t o r . In 1941 he wrote a book severely c r i t i c i s i n g
the ru le of Reza Shah and the overthrew of Dr.Mossadegh
in 19 53 had only hardened his feel ings towards the Pahlavi
dynasty. By 1962 af ter the death of Ayatollah Bourjerdi 2
Khomeini had become the leading Ayatollah, and had indeed
launched a several at tack on the Shah's modernization
programme and his close r e l a t i ons with the West in general
and USA in pa r t i cu la r despi te the fac t tha t Mohamed Reza
Shah had returned to throne with greater power and greater
au thor i ty . Shah's White Revolution, h is secu la r i sa t ion
of I ran and increasiajin western influence had become
1. See, Martin Woolacott, "Does Khomeini Really Understand?" The Guardian January 28, 1979, P. 7 and Graham Op.ci t . P.220.
2. "In 1962 the Ayatollah became head of I r a n ' s Sh i i t e sect to which most of the count ry ' s 34 mil l ion people belong", Angus Bemining and others "The Khomeini Enigma" Newsweek January 29, 1979.
118
focal point of c r i t i c i sm from the Orthodox c i r c l e s of
which Ayatolla Khomeini was the Chief Qlergy.
I n i t i a l l y , h i s g rea tes t support came from the
student community but a f te r the at tack of Madrass-e-
Faiziah many more sect ions of the I ranian society joined
him in his campaign against tyranny and oppression of
the Pahlavi regime^Khomeini ' s provocative and strong
speeches led to h i s a r r e s t and subsequent ex i l e .
There i s no doubt tha t by the time of h i s expulsion in
1964 Khomeini had already become very popular and
famous "by publicly condemning both the Shah's v io la t ions
of the Const i tu t ion and the granting of extra t e r r i t o r i a l i t y
to American c i v i l i a n and mi l i t a ry advisors and the i r
dependents". Even in exi le Khomeini continued to
have his remarkable influence over I r an ians . As Richard
W.Cottam puts i t : "His author i ty r e s t s on h is remarkable
a b i l i t y to appeal to I r a n ' s lower and lower middle c l a s s e s .
He speaks the i r language, understands the i r profound sense
of in jus t i ce and deprivat ion and can a r t i c u l a t e i t " .
Khomeini's br ief stay in Turkey, h is movements in I raq
and close associat ions with the Pales t in ians caused a
grea t deal of concern to the I ranian regime which, in fac t ,
1. Many consider 1962 as the year when Ayatollah Khomeini s ta r ted the revolut ion against the Shah: See, "Ayatollah Khomeini's l i f e sketch in brief" I ran under the Shade! of Islamic. Republic (Tehran) 2 October 1979'"(a book in Urdu)
2 . Rouleau, Op.ci t . P.6 3 . Richard Cottam, "Revolutionary I ran and the War with
Iraq" Current History (Philadelphia, US) Vol.80, June 1981 P.6
119
asked the Iraqi^i government to keep a watch and r e s t r i c t
Khomeini's movement. However, nothing could prevent
Khomeini's contacts with his people in I ran . Khomeini's
message tha t Islam did not j u s t mean prayer and fas t ing
but stood for the pr inciple of social j u s t i c e , had a
profound impact on the I ranians and the movement against
the regime progressively accelerated. And Khomeini's
exhor ta t ion to his countrymen to f ight for the sake of
^ l l a h while describing the v i r t ue s of martyrdom from
ex i l e increased the confrontation between the people and
the secur i ty guards in I ran . A frightened Shah even
asked the I raq i government to force Khomeini out but
tha t only helped the Ayatollah to find refuge in France
and for the " f i r s t time publicised his views through
western Press" . The Ayatollah could keep himself in
touch with h is followers be t t e r from France through
phone c a l l s , wr i t ten messages and v i s i t o r s . He could
divulge the condit ions in Iran and expose the misdeeds
of Shah with the help of l i b e r a l ed i to rs through the
western press . His messages, tape recorded, were f i r s t
sent to Uom from where they were c i rcu la ted c landes t ine ly 2 throughout I ran . All his messages had a very great
impact leaving Shah almost he lp less . With pressure
mounting Mohamed Reza Shah l e f t the country. Khomeini
saw in the e x i t of the Shah only a preface to the f inal
1. See, Time: January 7, 1980 P. 12 2 . See, Rager Homan, "The or igin of the I ranian Revolution",
In te rna t iona l Affairs , (London) Autumn 1980, P.637 and "The Ayatol lah 's Hit Parade" Time February 12, 1979
120
victory which would come about with the ending of all
foreign domination.
Ayatollah Rohulla Khomeini symbol and architect of
the Iranian Revolution, returned from exile after the
Shah had left Iran. The people of Iran demonstrated
their support and faith in Khomeini in very clear terms.
Khomeini called upon his people to demonstrate peacefully
in support of Bazargan government and appealed to the
military to join the people. The Iranian Air Force
refused to obey the commanols of their superior officers
following the Imam's appeal. Indeed later the military
also announced its neutrality when police stations, radio
and Television stations etc., fell into the hands of the
people and there was no resistance left. However, for
Khomeini the final victory would come about only with the
establishment of Islam and not just with the disappearance
of monarchy. For him Islam is the answer for all problems
of man since he believes that Islam neglects nothing.
Khomeini'pcii political philosophy is based on the
idea that "Islam is a religion where even its ds divine
1. See, "The Shah Takes His Leave" Time January 29,1979.
2. "It is unimportant if you fail in our Revolution but if you damage the honour of Islam then we have created a catastrophy,... our victory does not mean only overthrow of former regime. Our victory will come when we have succeeded in changing ourselves into proper muslims and acting in strict accordance with Islamic teachings " "Imam Khomeini speaks to the nation" The Message of Peace, July 10, 1979.
3. See, "Lectures on Islamic government" (Viiayat ul Faqih) Islamic Revolution August 1980, P.6
121
i n s t ruc t ions » are p o l i t i c a l . The sermons of the
Friday Prayers, and the f e s t i v a l sermons, the gatherings
a t Mecca, Arfat and Mina are a lso p o l i t i c a l . I t s prayers
a r e p o l i t i c a l and i t s p o l i t i c s are prayers" . He had
ca l l ed upon the ulema not to keep a low prof i le of
themselves in society since Prophet Mohamed himself
was in the midst of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y throughout his
l i f e . He strongly believds tha t nothing but Islam
could unite a nation of 35 mi l l ion people for a common
goal and he i s very c r i t i c a l of the "so cal led nationalism".
For him "the nation arose j u s t for Islam" and Islam i s
"a p o l i t i c a l r e l i g ion . I t i s a r e l i g ion in which p o l i t i c s 4
can c l ea r l y be seen in the ins t ruc t ions and r i t u a l s . . . . "
I t i s Khomeini's bel ief tha t Iran would be an Islamic
Republic only when each and every aspect of the government
" r e f l e c t s the rule of Allah, when our statesmen are a l l
godly people, when the statesmen in author i ty , the higher
government administrators are godly people and free from
the g r i p of concupiscence". This i s where Khomeini
emphasises the role of education and wants education
to be based on Islam without depending on values borrowed
e i t h e r from the ^as t or from the Vfest.
1. "i^ltheologian Cannot be a Dic ta tor" , News and Views March 3, 1980 P. 5
2. See, "laam Khomeini's speech in meeting with a group of Tehran Ulema" Islamic Republic Party >^eekly Bul le t in , July 27, 1981.
3 . See, H.Mashhadi, "Imam Khomeini a t rue defender of Islam" News and Views, July 30, 1980 P.19.
4 . "Islam is a P o l i t i c a l Religion", Selected Messages and Speeches of Imam Khomeini (Tehran) Ministry of National Guidance n.d) PP 22-23. '
"Imam s t r e s ses on Moral i-'ducation Pur i f ica t ion" Islamic Republic Party Weekly Bul le t in . 19 January 1981 See, Tehran Times, June 14, 1981, a lso Islamic Republic Party 'JeeKly Bul le t in 19 uanuary 1981 PP 9-10.
122
Khomeini always identified the Revolution itself
with Islam and associated the nation with both. rie once
declared that the Revolution has been "by the nation
itself; they have the same moral attachment to this
Revolution as they have to Islam". At every stage
Khomeini has not only tried to interpret Islam for the
day to day affairs of the Iranians but has always
attempted to keep the philosophy of the Revolution
2 and the movement alive. His endeavour has always been
to emphasise the need for "Islamic government fully
devoted to Islamic principles and devoid of western
ideas and totally inclined to Islam..." Khomeini
maintains that super powers wished to separate the
clergymen from the people and intended to separate
politics from religion. Time and again he has cautioned
his people that "the defeat of the Islamic clergy si is 4
the defeat of Islam itself"
1. "Islamic Revolution Not Framed by the «Jest or East or by any Group" Islamic Republic Party »''eekly Bulletin, May 8, 1981.
2. "Shedding tears and expressions of grief for those mortyred is a means of keeping alive these great movements... It was the movement of Imam Husain which he has given rise to present revolution ... that this movement is only a ray of that brilliant sun which is the movement of Karbala.... This movement must be preserved at all times at all places... the mourning processions which marched in streets symbolised opposition to oppression and tyranny" "Dialogue with the Nation ... Speeches of ^yatollah Khomeini" The Message of Peace November 30, 1979
3. "Imam's historical Message on Uuds' Day" Basheer (New Delhi) 15 'August 1980.
4. "Dialogue with the Nation:... Op.cit. January 17, 1980 and also "Pakistan ^rmy Officers visit ^yatollah Khomeini" I he Message of Peace November 30, 1979.
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Khooieini's stand a l l through has been tha t "every-
thing must be Islamic in the Islamic Republic". He
had always emphasised tha t the revolut ion was not intended
j u s t for the overthrow of the monarchical rule but "For
the establishment of Islamic government which would be
conducive to the promulgation of divine laws". He
once declared tha t his conception of Islamic government
was l ike the government of ^ l i ibn Abi Talib with a l l
people following Islam and based on a j ud i c i a l system
founded on Islamic divine laws and not the laws borrowed
from the i '̂est'*'. Throughout the Revolution Khomeini
had the unenviable task of defending the t r ad i t i ons of
Islam, c r i t i c i s i n g and attacking the materialism of the
West, and upholding s p i r i t u a l i t y in p o l i t i c s .
Khomeini i s well aware of the need for a fresh
s t a r t with an exuberant Islamic cu l tu re . The Islamic
society should be one in which, one i s afraid of oneself
and not of the government. Crusade against the self
(Jehade-Nafs) i s the g r ea t e s t of a l l crusades in Islam.
Khomeini's conception of Islamic Republic i s one where
oppression and in jus t ice are not possible and where a l l
have equal r igh t s without any sect ion exploi t ing the
other . He gives all importance to the p o l i t i c a l ro le
of the ulema in such a soc ie ty . Khomeini c a l l s for a
1. Islamic Republic Party Weekly Bul le t in 27 July 1981 2 • Imam Khomeini, The Revolutionary Line of Action,
(Srinagar, India) n.d. P. 10. 3 . See, Khomeini I n s i s t s on a Islamic Republic, MEED,
9 March 1979 and 'She Message of Peace rtug.29, 1979.
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thorough transformation of the I ranian society wiping
out a l l t races of the old regime and materialism and
ushering in Islam a t every level whether i t i s the
m i l i t a r y , police or the judic iary or the fezaar.
His c a l l has always been for a fundamental change
through revolut ion whether i t be with the un ive r s i t i e s
or the communication system. The new Republican
Const i tu t ion is an attempt to Islamize society and
government a t every level and to carry forward the
object ives of the Islamic Revolution.
^ya to l l ah Khomeini has been c r i t i c i s e d by many.
His opponents thought of him as a crazy man who had 2
become a puppet in the hands of the ou t s ide r s . Some
consider Khomeini as having done "more harm to the
Islamic image in one month than a l l the propaganda
of the 15 years" by his word and ac t . His inc i t ing
the people to violence, i n f l ^ a t o r y a t tacks on foreigners
and pa r t i cu l a r ly America, his s i lence on the v io la t ions
of the sanc t i ty of the foreign emissaries e t c . , are 3
mentioned as unlslamic. However, the fac t remains t ha t Ayatollah Khomeini not only comprehended the condit ions
1. See, The Message of Peace, July lo, 1979 and May 14, 1980.
2 . See, Time December 17, 1979; and also February 5, 1979 and Reza Shah Pahlavi Op.c i t . P. 163
3 . See, Lancd, Marrcw "Islam Against the West" Time, December 17, 1979.
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i n Iran from thousands of kilometers away but
successful ly guided the Revolution and f i n a l l y
emerged v ic to r ious . One could be c r i t i c a l of
h is methods and approach but h is undisputed leadership
over the Iranians can not be denied. He was the
most important actor in the Revolution and continues
t o be the single most powerful au thor i ty in I ran today.
l .See, M.Masjid Jameii, The Revolution which Islam Created (Tehran, n.d) P.63. CF Ayatollah Shariatmadari was however c r i t i c a l when he said t h a t "Khomeini i s a man who has been s i t t i n g in Pa r i s , the Land of freedom under an apple t r e e , we are s i t t i n g here under ba r re l s of guns and tanks". ••'Waiting for the Ayatollah", Time February 5, 1979.